TAÑADA V.

TUVERA
No. L-63915136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
Escolin J

Facts:

In procuring the enforcement of public duty, a petition was sought by Tañada, Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys
for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc (MABINI) seeking a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
There is a need for Publication of Laws to strengthen its binding force and effect: giving access to legislative records,
giving awareness to the public of the law promulgated. The Official Gazette, however, does not contain publications of
administrative and executive orders that affect only a particular class of persons. The Official Gazette, as mandated by
law, presents all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability.” Also, Article 2 of the Civil Code
expressly recognized that the rule as to laws takes effect after 15 days unless it is otherwise (for some do specify the
date of effectivity) following the completion of the publication in the Official Gazette. However, the decree has been
misread by many; for it has no juridical force, but a mere legislative enactment of RA 386.

Issue:

Whether or not to provide publications of the law elsewhere, aside from the Official Gazette, as it would
be essential to the effectivity of the said legislative or executive act that regulates the acts and conduct of people as
citizens.

Held: YES

Ratio: Respondents were granted petition to publish all unpublished issuances in the Official Gazette, serving as a
response to the maxim “ignorance as an excuse for noncompliance.” The effectivity of laws shall follow the notice to
parties concerned, for such is a public right. There will be no retroactive effect for laws with dates which applied the 15-
day rule of publication in the Official Gazette. Without the publication there can be no effectivity, article 2 of the civil
code promotes the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even the law itself provides for its effectivity date
Kasilag versus Rodriguez
G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939
IMPERIAL, J

FACTS: The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an accompanying accessory contract of
mortgage. The executed accessory contract involved the improvements on a piece land, the land having
been acquired by means of homestead. P for his part accepted the contract of mortgage. Believing that
there are no violations to the prohibitions in the alienation of lands P, acting in good faith took
possession of the land. To wit, the P has no knowledge that the enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an
element of the credit transaction of Antichresis.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is deemed to be a possessor in good faith of the land, based upon
Article 3 of the New Civil Code as states “Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith,” the Petitioner’s lack of knowledge of the contract of antichresis.

HELD: YES

Ratio: Sec 433 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides “Every person who is unaware of any flaw in
his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated shall be deemed a possessor of good
faith.” And in this case, the petitioner acted in good faith. Good faith maybe a basis of excusable
ignorance of the law, the petitioner acted in good faith in his enjoyment of the fruits of the land to
which was done through his apparent acquisition thereof.
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
KAPUNAN, J

Facts:
On Nov. 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego´s widow, filed in the RTC of Pasig
a compalint for damages against the deceased´s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised,
among other defenses, the widow´s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The
RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff. On
appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death
benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.

HELD: YES

Ratio:
The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code. Maria Juergo was
unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance
Fund. She filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation
report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s
personnel.
ATIENZA, vs. BRILLANTES,
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
QUIASON, J

FACTS: Complainant alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro with whom respondent
Judge was cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko
with whom he has 5 children. Respondent alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage
ceremony (1965) before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a
marriage license. Upon request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage
ceremony with her in Manila. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Respondent claims
that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good
faith and for all legal intents and purposes that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized
without a license. Respondent also argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not
apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of
the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar.

HELD: Yes.

Ratio: Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a
rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of
Article 40 to his case.
Espiritu vs. Cipriano
G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974
ESGUERRA, J.

FACTS:
RA No. 6126 “Section 1 – no lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which another’s dwelling is
located shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed
between the lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed
300php a month. It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at
bar is covered by the aforecited law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6126 will have retroactive effect at the case at bar

Held: NO.

Ratio:

A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial, the statute affects
substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction therefore is in order. Article 4 of the
civil code ordains that law shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that
where the law is clear. Established and undisputed is the fact that the increase in the rental of the lot
involved was effected in January, 1969, while the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a
period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals had been effected. The said law did not, by
express terms, purport to give retroactive effect.
Aruego vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.

FACTS: On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional
rights was filed before RTC Manila by the minors Antonia Aruego and alleged the sister Evelyn
Aruego represented by their mother Luz Fabian. The complaint was opposed by the
legitimate children of Jose Aruego Jr.The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego. A petition
for certiorari was then filed alleging that the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August
3, 1988 shall have a retroactive effect thereby the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint on the
ground of prescription.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Family Code shall have a retroactive effect in the case.

HELD: NO

RATIO: The Supreme Court upheld that the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect in so far as
the instant case is concerned as its application will prejudice the vested rights of respondents to have
her case be decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. It is a well settled reception that laws shall have
a retroactive effect unless it would impair vested rights. Therefore, the Family Code in this case cannot
be given a retroactive effect
Brehm vs. Republic

G.R. No. L-18566,September 30, 1963

PAREDES, J.

FACTS:
Brehm was a non-resident alien of the Philippines. He filed a petition however, to adopt his
step-child. He argued that Article 335 of the New Civil Code which prohibits a non-resident alien to
adopt was inapplicable because it covers adoption only for the purpose of establishing a relationship of
paternity
and filiations where none existed, but not where the adopting parents are not total strangers to the
child. Petitioners further contended that they could adopt pursuant to Article 332 of the New Civil Code
which expressly authorizes the adoption of a step-child by a stepfather.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Brehm as a non resident may adopt a child

Held: NO

RATIO:
Article 338 should be construed in connection with Article 335. Article 33G clearly states that
"The following cannot adopt ... (4) non-resident aliens." It is therefore mandatory because it contains
words of positive prohibition and is couched in negative terms, importing that the act required shall not
be done otherwise than designated (50 Am. JUl'. 51). On the other hand, Article 338 provides that "the
following may be adopted: (3) step-child by the step-father or step-mother." This provision is merely
directory and can only be given operation if the same does not conflict with the mandatory provisions of
Article 335, Moreover, it is Article 335 that confers jurisdiction to the court over the case and before
Article 338 may or can be availed of, such jurisdiction must first be established. There is no question that
petitioner Brehm is a non-resident. By his own testimony, he supplied the conclusive proof of his status,
and no amount of reasoning will overcome the same. For this reason he cannot adopt.
People vs. Jabinal
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
ANTONIO, J.

Facts:

On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a revolver without the
requisite license or permit. He claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, altho ugh he had
no license o r permit, he had appo intm ents
as Secret Agent from the P r o v i n c i a l G o v e r n o r o f B a t a n g a s a n d a s C o n f i d e n t i a l A
g e n t f r o m t h e P C P r o v i n c i a l Co mm ander, and the said appo intments expressly carri
ed with them the autho rity to po ssess and carry the said firearm . The accused further
co ntended that in v iew o f his appointments, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the
Supreme Court’s decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People vs. Lucero. The trial court found the
accused criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings
in Macarandang* and in Lucero* were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa**. The case was
elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Court’s rulings in the
cases of Macarandang and of Lucero.

HELD: YES.

RATIO: The appellant was acquitted. Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws,
are nevertheless evidence of what the law means; this is the reason why Article 8 of the New
Civil Code provides that, “Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the constitution shall
fo rm part o f the legal system .” The interpretatio n upo n a law by the Supreme Co urt
constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date the law was originally passed, since the court’s
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed
intends to effectuate.
Martinez vs. Van Buskirk

G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910

MORELAND, J.

Facts:
On September 11, 1908, plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromota on Calle Real,
district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as she was going, when a
delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the
defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite direction
to that in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of said plaintiff’s
carromota, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed,
crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped, in order to give
defendant’s delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant’s
wagon and horses ran into the carramota occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned
it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the
carromota itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it. While unloading the forage and
in the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and
made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away
and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was
unable to stop the horses. Carmen Ong de Martinez with his husband filed a case against the cuchero
and its employer Court of first instance saw the case in favor of the appellee/plaintiff and found that the
defendant was guilty of negligence and a judgemenet of Php 442.50 with interest of 6% per annum

Issue:
Whether or not there was negligence on the part of the cuchero thus the accident. Whether or not the
employer has liability on the case.

Held: NO

RATIO: There was no negligence on the part of the cuchero and there is also no liability on the
employer as well.That the cochero was experienced and capable, the horses on the other hand are
gentleand tractable and that the cochero has driven one of the horses for a year and the other one for 6
months but no accident occurred.It has become a custom for all cocheros to leave the horses as
they were during the incident to help carry the loads off the wagon. This was allowed because it was
beneficial to the businessmen. “Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public
policy shall not be countenanced. Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules
of evidence” of the Civil Code
Armigos vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-50654 November 6, 1989

PADILLA, J.:

FACTS:
Private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against Rudy Gleo Armigos with the Municipal Court
of Digos, Davao del Sur for the collection of damages and attorney's fees. After trial, judgment was
rendered in favor of Cristito Mata. A copy of the decision was received by Armigos on June 8, 1977, and
the following day, June 9, 1977, he filed a notice of appeal with the said municipal court,
and on June 24, 1977, he completed the other requirements for the perfection of an appeal, including
the filing of an appeal bond and the payment of the appellate court docket fee. But the presiding judge
of Court of First Instance, Judge L.D. Carpio dismissed the appeal for it was filed beyond the
reglementary period. Armigos filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus with preliminary injunction with
the Court of Appeals, claiming that from June 8, 1977, when he received a copy of the decision of the
municipal court, to June 24, 1977, when he perfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days had elapsed so
that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, dismissing his appeal for having been
filed beyond the reglementary period, is erroneous and contrary to law. The petitioner contended that
the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he received copy of the
decision, so that the first of the 1 5-day period comprising24 hours is: from 4pm of June 9, 1977 to 4pm
of June 10, 1977 and the last day, from 4pm of June 23, 1977 to 4pm of June 24, 1977.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the “hour” of the receipt
of the decision.

HELD: NO.

RATIO: The Court of Appeals rejected Armigos’ interpretation for it would result in many confusing
situations and many unreliable testimonies as to the time a copy of a decision, order or pleading. In the
case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Encarnacion, the Court held that when a law was to be effective
upon approval by the President and the President signed the same on June 16, 1950, the law should be
considered to have taken effect not on the exact hour when the President signed the same on June 16,
1950 but from the very first minute or hour of said day of June 16, 1950.Because it was filed beyond the
reglementary period, He should have filed it on June 23, 1977 for his appeal to be valid. Art. 13 of the
NCC, provides that in computing period, the 1st day is excluded, the last day is included. The Petition is
DENIED.
Namarco vs. Tecson
GR. No. 29131, August 27, 1969
CONCEPCION, C.J

Facts: On November 14, 1955, the CFI-Mla. rendered judgment in a civil case, Price Stabilization Corp.
vs. Tecson, et al. Copy of this decision was, on 10/21/55 served upon defendants in said case. On
12/21/65, NAMARCO, as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and choses in action of Price, as
pltff in that case and judgment creditor therein, filed w/ the same court, a complaint against defendants
for the revival of the judgment rendered therein. Def. Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the
ground of prescription of action, among others. The motion was granted by the court. Hence, the appeal
to the CA w/c was certified to the SC, upon the ground that the only question raised therein is one of
law, namely,

ISSUE: Whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of
limitations.

HELD: YES.

The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit provision
of Art. 13 limiting the connotation of each "year"-- as the term is used in our laws-- to 365 days.
[The action to enforce a judgment which became final on December 21, 1955 prescribes in 10 years.
Since the Civil Code computes "years" in terms of 365 days each, the action has prescribed on December
19, 1955, since the two intervening leap years added two more days to the computation. It is not the
calendar year that is considered.]
US vs Tiqui

G.R. No. 915, August 1, 1902

ARELLANO, C.J.

FACTS: The final judgment in this case having been pronounced on the 31st day of March last, the
complaining witness, on the 5th day of April, gave notice of appeal. The appeal was allowed. Counsel for
the accused now moves the court to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was taken on the sixteenth
day after the promulgation of the sentence, fifteen days being the term assigned by article 47 of the law.

ISSUE: whether the fifteen days are to be counted from the very day of the publication of the judgment.

HELD:

RATIO:

Article 1130 of the Civil Code establishes as a principle that "when the term of an obligation is fixed by
days to be counted from a specified one, such day shall be excluded from the computation, which
shall begin in the following day." The reason why the first day is excluded is undoubtedly because the
appellant is given fifteen days in which to appeal, and as Paragraph 1, article 7 of the Civil Code provides
that a day shall always be understood to consist of twenty-four hours, it follows that the period allowed
would not be fifteen complete days were the day in question — that is, the day of the publication of the
judgment — to be included in the computation.
Ibanez de Aldecoa vs. HSB

G.R. No. L-6889, August 26, 1915

TRENT, J.

Facts:

Under the Old Civil Code, the principle of Patria Potestad, granted the parent of a child the
administration and usufruct of the property of their minor child until the formal emancipation of said child
upon reaching the age of majority. In 1901, the New Civil Code impliedly repealed this law
by introducing the concept of guardianship and removing the parent’s administration over the child’s
property. Petitioners were formally emancipated by their parents on 1903, thereupon obtaining full
administration over their property. Following subsequent events, Aldecoa and Co., wherein petitioners
were partners thereof, became heavily indebted and entered into mortgage agreement with the
HSB. Upon the liquidation of said firm, petitioners filed a proceeding and procured a judgment
annulling the articles of co-partnership with Aldecoa and Co., and decreeing that they were
creditors and not partners of the firm. It is contended by the petitioners that under the New Civil
Code, their emancipation was null and void since they were no longer under the principle of
Patria Potestad, and thus had no capacity to enter into a mortgage agreement.

Issues:

WON Isabel Palet, mother of the petitioners, could legally emancipate the plaintiffs
under the law in force in the Phils in 1903, and thus confer upon them capacity to execute a
valid mortgage on their real property.

HELD: YES.

RATIO: That the patria potestad (parental authority) of the mother did not terminate
upon the enactment of the new Code of Civil Procedure, but was saved from the operation of
the new law by section 581 thereof. Hence, her rights and duties as to her children as well as
theirs, should be regulated by the provisions of the old Civil Code. Under the old Civil Code the
mother could validly emancipate the children, and, subsequent to such emancipation, the
children could execute a binding mortgage upon their real property with the consent of their mother. It is
urged, lastly, that the mortgage contract is void as to the plaintiffs by reason of a lack of
consideration. It is asserted that they executed the mortgage under the impression that they
were partners in the firm of Aldecoa & Co., when, as decided by a final judgment of the Court of
First Instance, they were not such partners.
Insular Government vs. Frank

G. R. No. 2935. March 23, 1909

JOHNSON, J.

Facts of the Case: The Insular Government of the Philippine Islands entered into a contract for
a period of 2 years with the defendant, by which the latter was to receive a salary of 1,200
dollars per year as a stenographer. In addition the government paid the travel expenses of the
defendant, one-half salary and provided a clause for damages if the defendant violates the
agreement. The defendant only performed his contract for 6 months and was sued by the
plaintiff. The defendant argued that he can not be liable for the said contract he entered
because he is a minor under Philippine laws.

Issue: Whether or not he can plead infancy as a defense.

Held: NO

His argument is untenable because of the time and place he entered he entered the contact, he
was of age and fully capacitated, he can be held liable for damages. (Article 15 should apply in
this case wherein the Nationality Principle must be adopted. The reason is under the country
where he is a citizen of which is the United States, he was already legally capacitated to enter
into a contact for reaching the age of majority.)
Bellis vs Bellis

G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967

BENGZON, J.P., J.

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five
legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his
second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.

6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his
estate and properties to his seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions
to the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which
they were entitled according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased
wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two
separate wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the
illegitimate children’s successional rights

HELD: NO

Ratio: Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law
of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a)
the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. Intestate and
testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property maybe found
Edward Christensen vs. Helen Christensen

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

LABRADOR, J.

Facts of the case: Edward E. Christensen, a citizen California, USA but domiciled here in the
Philippines died testate in Manila, survived by two acknowledged natural daughters, Maria Lucy
Christensen and Helen Christensen Garcia. The Court of First Instance of Davao rendered a
decision directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600.00
paid by her to Helen Christensen as her legacy, and declaring the former entitled to the residue
of the property in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator.

Helen Christensen Garcia opposed on the ground that under Article 16 paragraph 2 of the New
Civil Code, California rule should be applied and that under the California law, the matter should
be referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile. In which under the Philippine Laws Helen
is entitled to one-half of the estate in full ownership. Lucy Christensen on the other hand, argued
that as her father was a citizen of California his will are to be governed by the internal law of
California in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way
he desires.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine law is applicable.

Held: YES.

The domicile of the deceased, Edward Christensen, a citizen of California, is in Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, Helen, should be
governed by the Philippine law, the domicile, pursuant to Article 946 of the Civil Code of the
California, not by the internal law of California. Judgment reversed.
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

CONCEPCION, J.

Facts of the Case: Soledad Cagigas a high school teacher of Sibunga Provincial High School
had a relationship with Francisco Hermosisima who was 10 years younger. One evening in
1953 they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board of MV Escano to which Mr. Hermosisima
was assigned as apprentice pilot. Soledad advised the petitioner that she was in the family way,
where upon he promised to marry her. Their child Chris Hermosisima was born on June
17,1954 and subsequently on June 24,1954 the defendant married one Romanita Perez.
Soledad filed petition for support and for moral damages for alleged breach of promise. The
courts ruled in favor of the Soledad hence the appeal is brought to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach to promise to marry.

Held: No.

Ratio: Where a woman who was an insurance agent and former high school teacher around 36
years of age and approximately 10 years older than the man, “overwhelmed by her love” for a
man approximately 10 years younger than her, had intimate relations with him, because she
wanted to bind him, by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of
clergy” it cant be said that he is morally guilty of seduction. The court therefore eliminated the
award for moral damages and affirmed the other aspects of the decision of the Court of Appeals
without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan

[G.R. No. 122166. March 11, 1998]

PANGANIBAN, J.

Facts of the case: During 1981, hundreds of Philippine Coconut Authority employees resigned,
they were required to apply for PCA clearance in order to claim their gratuity benefits. PCA will
only sign their clearances if there is no item appearing under pending accountability or after
every item previously entered there under is fully settled. However, those with pending
accountabilities had their clearances signed as these will be just deducted from their benefits.
This was an accepted practice in PCA. A PCA officer, Atty. Llorente refused to sign Mr. Curios
clearance on the reason that he had pending accountability Mr. Curio filed before the
Sandiganbayan alleging that the lawyer abuse his position when he in acted in bad faith by not
signing his clearance. He claims that Llorente violated article 17 and 19 of the civil code.

Issue: Whether or not Mr. Llorente is liable for his actions.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: He is liable for civil damages. A legal act can be a source of civil liability if he acted on
bad faith. The petitioner was unfair when he applied the rule inconsistently with Mr. Curio. His
acts is contrary to justice and good faith.
Pe vs. Pe
G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Facts of the case: The plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe. When she
disappeared she was 24 and unmarried. The defendant on the other hand is a married man. He
used to stay in the same town as Lolita because of his work. He was adopted by a collateral
relative of Lolita’s father who treated him as a member of the family. Sometime in 1952, he
frequented the girl’s house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the
rosary. They eventually fell in love and carried on a clandestine love affair. The rumor of their
illicit love affair reach the girl’s parents and they forbid him to go to their house and filed
deportation proceedings. In April 1957, Lolita disappeared together with her clothes and in the
cabinet they saw a note of the defendants inviting her for a date on the day of her
disappearance.

Issue: Whether or not a claim for moral damages can be recovered on account of Article 21.

Held: YES

Ratio: The circumstances under which Lolita fell in love was through as ingenious scheme,
seduced her as shown when he frequented their house on the pretext that he wants to learn
how to pray the rosary as a result of this frequent visits she fell in love with the respondent. The
injury he has caused her family is indeed immeasurable considering that he is a married man.
This injury is no doubt committed in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the Civil Code. Therefore he was ordered to pay
P5,000 as damages and P2,000 as attorney’s fees and expenses of the litigation.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

DAVIDE, JR., J.

Facts of the Case: Gashem Shookat Baksh’ petitioner promised Marilou Gonzales that he will
marry her during the October school break. The petitioner even went to visit Marilou’s parents in
her hometown to secure their approval to the marriage.

On August 20, 1987, the petitioner and Marilou lived in together. However, in the course of their
union, the petitioner’s attitude towards Marilou had changed. He began to maltreat her and even
threatened to kill her. Furthermore, the petitioner to repudiate their marriage agreement said
that he is already married in Bacolod City.

These circumstances drove the respondent to file a complaint against him. The Court of
Appeals in favor of the respondent, ordered him to pay moral damages and attorney’s fees
including the litigation expenses. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not damages may be recovered for breach of promise to marry.

Held: YES

Ratio: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the private respondent. The acts pf the petitioner,
being a foreigner, has abused Filipino hospitability and has offended the Filipinos’ sense of
morality, good customs, culture and tradition. The private respondent’s honor and reputation
was stained by the petitioner’s breech of promise to marry. Therefore, moral damages may be
recovered.
Wassmer vs Velez

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

BENGZON, J.P., J.

Facts of the case: On August 23,1954, plaintiff Beatriz Wassmer and defendant Francisco
Velez applied for licensed to contract to marriage which was subsequently issued. Their
wedding was set on September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed. Party dresses
and wedding dresses were prepared. A matrimonial bed with accessories was bought. Bridal
showers were given and gifts were received. Then, 2 days before the wedding, defendant
simply left a note for plaintiff stating, “we’ll have to postpone wedding because my mother
opposes it.” He enplaned to his home city of Cagayan de Oro, and the next day, the day before
the wedding, he wired plaintiff: “nothing had changed. Rest assured returning soon.” But he
never returned and was never heard again.

Issue: Whether or not the Wassmer ,plaintiff, may recover damages.

Held: Yes.

Ratio: This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. Mere breach of promise to marry
is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparations
and publicity only to walk out of it when the matrimony was about to be solemnized is different.
This is contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 NCC. Defendant is liable for actual damages as well as moral and
exemplary damages. Judgment affirmed.
People vs. Ritter

G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Facts of the Case: On October 10,1986, Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought a boy and a girl namely
Jesse “Egan” Ramirez and Rosario Baluyut inside his hotel room at MGM Hotel along
Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These 2 children were picked up by the respondent to satisfy
his carnal desires and he paid them after for the services rendered. After the incident, Rosario
told Egan that the American inserted something in her vagina but they did not do anything more.
Rosario tried to endure the pain and there was point Egan saw her agony.

Then on May 14,1987, Gaspar Alcantara while scavenging for garbage, saw Rosario bloodied
and unconscious near Happy Bakeshop, brought her to Olongapo City General Hospital for
treatment. He was the one who gave the personal circumstances of Rosario. Rosario was later
operated to remove the foreign object in her body and the operation was successful. The next
day May 20,1987 she died.

A case was brought against Ritter after a thorough investigation and he was charged with the
crime of rape with homicide.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent for the death of Rosario.

Held: No.

The respondent, Mr. Ritter, was declared not guilty due to reasonable doubt because of lack of
evidence pointing to the respondent causing the victim’s death. However the court believed that
the committed act was injurious not only to the victim but also to the public and ordered the
respondent be expelled from the country. The appellant was also ordered to pay the amount of
P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyut.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN vs. REYES,
[G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005]
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

FACTS:

There are two versions of the story:

Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel
was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart
invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr.
Tsuruoka. Reyes agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s
gift. He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be
heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied
him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the
plaintiff. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be
intimate consisting only of those part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his
food then leave the party.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

HELD: NO.

RATIO: Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary
precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the
party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to
know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under
Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
Obana vs. Court of Appeals

G.R.NO. L-36249 March 29, 1985

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Facts:

On November 21, 1964, Anacleto Sandoval was approached by Chan Lin who offered to purchase from
him 170 cavans of rice at the price of P37.25 per cavan. The driver attempted to collect the payment from
Chan Lin and Petitioner Sandoval but the latter refused, stating that he had already made the payment to
Chan Lin. With refusal, Sandoval filed suit against Chan Lin, before the Municipal Court of San Fernando,
La Union which ordered defendant Chan Lin to pay to Sandoval ½ of the cost of the rice or P2,805. On
appeal by Chan Lin to the court of First Instance, judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint. On her
appeal to Appellate Court, Sandoval obtained a reversal in his favor. Hence, the present petition seeks for
the review of the decision of Court of Appeals ordering Obaña inaction to return to Sandoval, Private
Respondent herein, 170 cavans of rice or to pay its value in the amount P37.25 per cavan, with legal interest
from the filing of the complaint until fully paid.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner-dependent had unjustly enriched himself at the expense of another by holding
on to property no longer belonging to him.

Held: YES.

RATIO: No person should be benefited without a valid basis or justification, shall enrich himself at
the expense of another and hold on to a property no longer belonging to him. The petition- defendant
in his own testimony said that he was repaid the sum of P5,600 by Chan Lin and claimed that he delivered
the rice back to them. However, the driver denied that the rice had ever been returned. The driver’s version
is more credible since Sandoval’s lawyer had manifested in open court that they would have withdrawn the
complaint if they returned the rice. In law and equity, therefore, Sandoval is entitled to recover the rice,
or the value thereof since he was not paid the price therefore.
Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals

[G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005]

CORONA, J.:

Facts of the case: Nestor Nicolas together with his wife lease and apartment owned by Florence
Concepcion. Nestor was engaged in business and Florence contributed capital. In July 1985 Florence’s
brother in law Rodrigo accused him of having a relationship with Florence. Nestor then went to Rodrigo
upon Rodrigo’s dare to meet the Concepcion family who allegedly knew about the relationship. However,
they denied any knowledge thereof. Because of all of these, Nestor felt extreme embarrassment that he
can no longer face his neighbors. Florence also seized to do business with him that made their business
suffer. Nestor demanded public apology and payment of damages from Rodrigo. Rodrigo ignored this
demand.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable to pay damages.

HELD: Yes

RATIO: there is no question that Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings social humiliation as a result of Rodrigo’s accusations. Hence, he is entitled to the
payment of moral damages.
Casupanan vs. Laroya

[G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002]\

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

A vehicular accident, two cases were filed before the MCTC of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed
a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. However, upon motion
of Laroya on the ground of forum-shopping, the MCTC dismissed the civil case. On Motion for
Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action
which can proceed independently of the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo then filed a
petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capas, Tarlac. But the RTC ruled
that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and
therefore, the proper remedy should have been an appeal. Hence, Casupanan and Capitulo filed
this petition.

ISSUE: WON an accused in a pending criminal case can validly file a separate civil action for
quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.

HELD: YES.

Ratio: There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an
independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule
111 expressly states that the "offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended
party" may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not
to the accused. - See more at:
http://studentsofsocrates.blogspot.com/2011/01/casupanan-vs-laroya-case-digest-gr-
no.html#sthash.TkYzrVVU.dpuf
Donato vs. Luna

G.R No.L-53642, April 15, 1988

GANCAYCO, J.:

Facts of the case: On January 23, 1979, private respondent Paz Abayan filed a case of bigamy against
herein petitioner, Leonila C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 28, 1979,
before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed a civil action for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that
private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one,
since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R.
Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense
that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force,
violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's
consent to the marriage.Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of the criminal case , petitioner
filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case contending that civil case No. E-02627 seeking
the annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must
first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed which was turned down by the judge.

Issue: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the court should be suspended in view
of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before another court on the ground that the latter
constitutes a prejudicial question.

Held: No.

The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue
before civil court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner’s guilt
or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Also parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts. Only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void. So long as there is no declaration the
presumption is that marriage exists. Therefore, one who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Quiambao vs. Osorio

G.R. No. L-48157 March 16, 1988

FERNAN, J.:

FACTS:

Private Respondent claims to own the land and Petitioner through force, intimidation, strategy and
stealth entered their property. Petitioner raised to dismiss the case since an administrative case is
pending before the Office of Land Authority between the same parties and involving the same piece of
land arguing respondent’s right to eject petitioner from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial question
which bars a judicial action until after its termination.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BETWEEN THE PRIVATE PARTIES CONSTITUTES A PREJUDICIAL
QUESTION WHICH WOULD OPERATE AS A BAR TO SAID EJECTMENT CASE

Held: YES

Ratio: There is no prejudicial question. A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises
in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI BOBIS

GR No. 138509, July 31, 2000

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts:

Respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with Ma. Dulce Javier. With said marriage not yet
annulled, he contracted a second marriage with herein petitioner Imelda Marbella (on Jan. 25, 1996),
and a third marriage with certain Julia Hernandez, thereafter. Petitioner then filed a case of bigamy
against respondent on Feb. 25, 1998, at the RTC of Quezon City. Thereafter, respondent initiated a civil
action for the declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage license. He then filed a motion to
suspend the criminal proceeding for bigamy invoking the civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a
prejudicial question to the criminal case. The RTC granted the motion, while petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy

Held: No.

Ratio: Any decision in the civil case the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of
the criminal charge. It is therefore not a prejudicial question. Respondent cannot be permitted to use
his malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.
Ching vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-59731 January 11, 1990

PARAS, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner was charged before the Makati RTC with Estafa, in relation to the
“Trust Receipts Law.” Thereafter, Petitioner filed before the Manila RTC for declaration
of nullity of documents and for damages. Petitioner then filed a petition before the
Makati RTC for the suspension of the criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial
question in a civil action.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a prejudicial question to suspend the criminal proceedings against the
petitioner

Held:

No.

Ratio: The two essential requisites of a prejudicial question are: (1) The civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (2) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.

In the case at bar, the alleged prejudicial question in the civil case for the declaration of nullity of
document and for damages, does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal action for estafa. Nonetheless the guilt of the accused
could still be established and his culpability under penal laws determined by other evidence