* Assignment (Sept 2):

IV. Warehouse Receipts Law (Act No. 2137, as amended)

1. Bank of the Philippine Islands, et. al., v. J.R. Herridge, G.R. Nos. L-21000, 21002-21004, and 21006,
December 20, 1924
2. PNB vs. Producers Warehouse Association, G.R. No. L-16510, January 9, 1922
3. Consolidated Terminals, Inc. vs. Artex Dev. Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-25748, March 10, 1975
4. Lu Kian vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Manila Port Service, G.R. No. L-23033, January 5, 1967
5. PNB vs. Hon. Marcelino Sayo, G.R. No. 129918. July 9, 1998

In the matter of the involuntary insolvency of Umberto de Poli. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, ET AL
vs.
J.R. HERRIDGE, assignee of the insolvent estate of U. de Poli, BOWRING and CO., C.T. BOWRING and
CO., LTD., and T.R. YANGCO

(G.R. Nos. L-21000, 21002-21004, and 21006. December 20, 1924)

FACTS:

The insolvent Umberto de Poli was for several years engaged on an extensive scale in the exportation of
hemp, maguey and other products of the country. He was also a licensed public warehouseman, though
most of the goods stored in his warehouses appear to have been merchandise purchased by him for
exportation and deposited there by he himself.

In order to finance his commercial operations De Poli established credits with some of the leading
banking institutions doing business in Manila at that time, among them the Hongkong& Shanghai Banking
Corporation, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the Asia Banking Corporation, the Chartered Bank of
India, Australia and China, and the American Foreign Banking Corporation. De Poli opened a current
account credit with the bank against which he drew his checks in payment of the products bought by him
for exportation. Upon the purchase, the products were stored in one of his warehouses and warehouse
receipts issued therefor which were endorsed by him to the bank as security for the payment of his credit
in the account current.

When the goods stored by the warehouse receipts were sold and shipped, the warehouse receipt was
exchanged for shipping papers, a draft was drawn in favor of the bank and against the foreign purchaser,
with bill of landing attached, and the entire proceeds of the export sale were received by the bank and
credited to the current account of De Poli.

De Poli was declared insolvent by the Court of First Instance of Manila with liabilities to the amount of
several millionpesos over and above his assets. An assignee was elected by the creditors and the election
was confirmed by the court. Among the property taken over the assignee was the merchandise stored in
the various warehouses of the insolvent.This merchandise consisted principally of hemp, maguey
and tobacco.

The various banks holding warehouse receipts issued by De Poli claim ownership of this merchandise
under their respective receipts, whereas the other creditors of the insolvent maintain that the warehouse
receipts are not negotiable, that their endorsement to the present holders conveyed no title to
the property, that they cannot be regarded as pledges of the merchandise inasmuch as they are not public
documents and the possession of the merchandise was not delivered to the claimants and that the claims
of the holders of the receipts have no preference over those of the ordinary unsecured creditors.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warehouse receipts issued are negotiable?

HELD:

Yes, a warehouseman who deposited merchandise in his own warehouse, issued a warehouse receipts
therefore and thereafter negotiated the receipts by endorsement.

The receipt recites that the goods were deposited “pororden”of the depositor, the warehouseman, but
contained no statement that the goods were to be delivered to the bearer of the receipts or to a specified
person. It is in the form of a warehouse receipts and was not mark “nonnegotiable”.

Therefore the receipts was negotiable warehouse receipts and the words “pororden” must be construed
to mean “to the order”.
Case No. 2
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PRODUCERS' WAREHOUSE ASSOCIATION,
defendant-appellee (1922)

JOHNS, J: Briefed by: Liwag, Angelene L.

Corporation appointed as manager of warehouse business of another corporation pledged quedans of latter
issued in name of former as collateral with a bank which brought action to recover value of goods.

Characters:
PNB is a bank in the PH
Producer’s Warehouse Association (PWA) is a domestic corporation doing general warehouse business
Phil. Fiber and Produce Company (PFPC) is another domestic corporation

FACTS:
PWA and PFPC entered into a written contract, wherein PFPC would act as the general manager of
the business of PWA, and that PFPC would exercise a general and complete supervision over the
management of the business of PWA (subject only to the control of PWA’s board of directors).

PWA issued seven (7) negotiable quedans to PFPC for 15k++ piculs of Copra, which the terms states
that. . .

o PWA agreed to deliver that amount of copra to PFPC or its order

o PWA will deliver the packages noted therein upon the surrender of the warrant to PWA

o No transfer of interest/ownership will be recognized unless registered in the books of PWA
o The words “negotiable warrant” were printed in red ink in the quedan

"This warrant is of no value unless signed by an officer of the association," and were signed “PWA by Mr.
Wicks, Treasurer, and by R. Torres, Warehouseman."
Each receipt was also numbered, and stated the number of the warehouse and where situated and recited
that storage charges were at the rate of P0.04 per picul per month, and that the insurance rate was 1/3%
per month of the declared value.

PFPC then arranged for overdraft with PNB (bank) for P1M and to secure it, the subject quedans
were endorsed in blank and delivered by PFPC to PNB [COLLATERAL SECURITY], which became
the owner and holder thereof (received the quedans in good faith).
Without making a tender of any charges, PNB REQUESTED THE DELIVERY OF THE COPRA DESCRIBED
IN THE QUEDANS, and, for its failure to do so, commenced an action to recover its valuealleged to
be P240k+, with interest at the rate of 6 % per annum + in good faith, PNB purchased these quedans,
and that it is the owner, and recites all of the conditions printed on the back, and made a part of the
quedans+ PNB requested the defendant to register the quedans in the name of PNB, and to deliver
to it the 14K piculs of copra, and, upon that date, that it had offered to satisfy any lien that defendant
might have, to surrender the receipts with such endorsement that it might require, and to receipt
therefor, when the goods were delivered, if such signature is requested by the defendant.

However, PWA refused to complydespite repeated requests of PNB, stating that it could not be
delivered since the goods mentioned are not in the warehouse + PWF stated that the quedans
were invalid and wrongfully issued.


LC ruled in favor of PWF.

Note: *The testimony is conclusive that the quedans in question were duly executed by Wicks, as
treasurer, and Torres, as warehouseman, for and on behalf of the defendant, and as its act and deed.
That it appears from its own books that in 1918, PFPC was indebted to the PNB in the sum of P887k+, and
Mr. Kauffman, president of PWA, testified that PFPC had an indebtedness. The testimony is also
conclusive that after the quedans described in the complaint were issued to the PFPC, they were
ENDORSED IN BLANK, and PHYSICAL POSSESSION DELIVERED to the PNB as COLLATERAL
SECURITY for the overdraft of the Produce Company, and that each of them is in FORM
NEGOTIABLE.

ISSUE: WoN the quedans were validly negotiated to PNB?

HELD:
Yes.


The quedans have legal force and effect.

o They were duly EXECUTED by Wicks, as TREASURER and Torres as WAREHOUSEMAN, for and in
behalf of the defendant.

o The said quedans were ENDORSED IN BLANK and PHYSICAL POSSESSION WAS DELIVERED to
PNBas COLLATERAL SECURITY for the overdraft of PFPC and
o That the quedans were in NEGOTIABLE FORM. 


PWA was ESTOPPED TO claim or ASSERT that PNB did not comply with any condition precedent.
In this kind of action, a person has NO LEGAL RIGHT TO DENY THE EXISTENCE OF QUEDANS on
which it is based, and then claim that the plaintiff has not complied with the provisions of the
instrument.


=>The decision of the lower court is reversed, and judgment will be entered here in favor of PNB and
against the PWA for P240k+ (value of Copra), with interest thereon from March 21, 1919, at the rate of
6% per annum, and costs in this and the lower court. So ordered. 


Note:
 (JUST IN CASE…)

3. IN AN ACTION TO RECOVER PERSONAL PROPERTY OR ITS VALUE, TENDER OF CHARGES AND LIENS
IS NOT NECESSARY WHERE DEFENDANT CLAIMS THAT THE PROPERTY IS NOT IN EXISTENCE OR IN
ITS POSSESSION. — Where by the provisions of the quedans the property was to be delivered upon
the payment of certain charges, it is not necessary to tender such charges where the other party
denies liability, is not willing to perform its part, or to deliver the property.
4. WHERE ONE CORPORATION APPOINTS ANOTHER AS ITS GENERAL MANAGER, THE FORMER IS
BOUND BY THE AUTHORIZED ACTS OF THE LATTER WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS AUTHORITY. —
Where the defendant entered into a written contract appointing PFPC, another corporation, as general
manager of its business for a term of years, with full power to manage its business, subject only to the
control of the defendant's board of directors, and under such power PFPC issued the quedans of the
defendant in its own name and pledged them as collateral with a bank, which received them in good faith,
the defendant is bound by the acts of its general manager, and estopped to deny its authority to
issue such quedans.
5. CORPORATION BOUND BY ACTS OF ITS GENERAL MANAGER. — Where one corporation appoints
another corporation its general manager with authority to issue quedans in the name of the former, and
the latter issued quedans of the former in its own name and pledged them for value to a bank as
collateral, in the absence of fraud or collusion to which the bank was a party, the quedans are
valid and binding, and the former is liable to the bank for the property therein described or its
value.

LUA KIAN
v.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY and

MANILA PORT
SERVICE
G.R. No. L-23033 January 5, 1967

FACTS: The present suit was filed by Lua Kian against the Manila Railroad
Co. and Manila Port Service for the recovery of the invoice value ofimported evaporated "Carnation" milk
alleged to have beenundelivered. Defendant Manila Port Service as a subsidiary of defendant Manila
Railroad Company operated the arrastre service at the Port of Manila under and pursuant to the
Management Contract entered into by anbetween the Bureau of Customs and defendant Manila Port
Service.Plaintiff Lua Kian imported 2,000 cases of Carnation Milk from the Carnation Company of San
Francisco, California, and shipped on Board SS "GOLDEN BEAR" per Bill of Lading No.
17.Out of the aforesaid shipment of 2,000 cases of Carnation Milk per Bill of Lading No. 17,only 1,829
cases marked `LUA KIAN 1458' were discharged from the vessel S`GOLDEN BEAR' and received by
defendantManila Port Service per pertinent tally sheets issued by the said carrying vessel.
Discharged from the same vessel on the same date unto the custody ofdefendant Manila Port Service
were 3,171 cases of Carnation Milk marked "CEBU UNITED 4860-PH-MANILA" consigned to Cebu United
Enterprises, per Bill of Lading No. 18.Defendant Manila Port Service delivered to the plaintiff thru its
broker, Ildefonso Tionloc, Inc. 1,913 cases of Carnation Milk market"LUA KIAN 1458" per pertinent gate
passes and broker's deliverreceipts. A provisional claim was filed by the consignee's broker for and in
behalf of theplaintiff with defendant Manila Port Service.

The invoice value of the 87 cases of Carnation Milk claimed by the plaintiff to have been short-delivered
by defendant Manila Port Service is P1,183.11 while the invoice value of the 87 cases of Carnation Milk
claimed by the defendant Manila Port Service to have been over-delivered by it to plaintiff is P1,130.65.
The 1,913 cases of Carnation mentioned in paragraph 5 hereof were taken by the broker at Pier 13, Shed
3, sometime in February, 1960where at the time, there were stored therein, aside from the shipmen
involved herein, 1000 cases of Carnation Milk bearing the same marks and also consigned to plaintiff Lua
Kian but had been discharged from SS `STEEL ADVOCATE' and covered by Bill o
Lading No. 11.Lua Kian as consignee thereof filed a claim for short-delivery againdefendant Manila
Port Service, and said defendant Manila Port Service paid Lua Kian plaintiff herein, P750.00 in settlement
of its claim.

CFI: ruled that 1,829 cases marked Lua Kian (171 caseslessthan the 2,000 cases indicated in the bill of
lading and 3,171 casemarked "Cebu United" (171 casesoverthe 3,000 cases in the bill of lading were
discharged to the Manila Port Service.Considering that Lua Kian and Cebu United Enterprisewere the
only consignees of the shipment of 5,000 cases o"Carnation" milk,it found that of the 3,171 cases
marked"Cebu United", 171 should have been delivered to LuaKian.Inasmuch as the defendant Manila
Port Service actuallydelivered 1,913 cases to plaintiff,which is only 87 casesshort of 2,000 cases as per
bill of lading the former was
ordered to pay Lua Kian the sum of P1,183.11 representingsuch shortage of 87 cases, with legal interest
from the dateof the suit, plus P500 as attorney's fees.

Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court and contend that theyshould not be made to answer for the
undelivered cases of milk,insisting that Manila Port Service was bound to deliver only
1,829 cases to Lua Kian and that it had there before in fact over-delivered to the latter.

ISSUE: Whether defendant Manila Port Service is liable for the undeliveredcases of “Carnation” milk to
petitioner due to improper marking.

RULING: Yes The bill of lading in favor of Cebu United Enterprises indicated that
only 3,000 cases were due to said consignee, although 3,171 caseswere marked in its favor. Lua Kian
whose bill of lading on the otherhand indicated that it should receive 171 cases more.
The legal relationship between an arrastre operator and theconsignee is akin to that of a depositor and
warehouseman. Ascustodian of the goods discharged from the vessel, it was defendantarrastre operator's
duty, like that of any ordinary depositary, to takegood care of the goods and to turn them over to the
party entitled totheir possession. The said defendant should have withheld delivery becauseof the
discrepancy between the bill of lading and the
markings and conducted its own investigation, not unlike thatunder Section 18 of the Warehouse
Receipts Law, or calledupon the parties, to interplead, such as in a case underSection 17 of the same law,
in order to determine the rightfulowner of the goods.It is true that Section 12 of the Management
Contractexempts the arrastre operator from responsibility formisdelivery or non-delivery due to
improper or insufficientmarking. It cannot however excuse the defendant from liability in this
casebecause the bill of lading showed that only 3,000 cases were
consigned to Cebu United Enterprises. The fact that the excess of171 cases were marked for Cebu United
Enterprises and that theconsignment to Lua Kian was 171 cases less than the 2,000 in the bill of lading,
should have been sufficient reason for the defendant Manila Port Service to withhold the goods pending
determination otheir rightful ownership.With respect to the
attorney's fees awarded below, this Court noticethat the same is about 50% of the litigated amount of
P1,183.11Attorney’s fees was decreased to P300.00.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. HON. MARCELINO L. SAYO, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 45), NOAH'S ARK SUGAR
REFINERY, ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO, JIMMY T. GO and WILSON T. GO, respondents.

FACTS
Noah's Ark Sugar Refinery (Noah's Ark) issued several Warehouse Receipts (Quedans) on various dates,
some of which were endorsed, to Luis T. Ramos and Cresencia K. Zoleta. Ramos and Zoleta then used the
quedans as security for two loan agreements with the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Ramos and Zoleta
failed to pay their loans upon maturity. Consequently, PNB demanded the delivery of the sugar stocks
covered by the quedans endorsed to it by Zoleta and Ramos. Noah's Ark, however, refused, claiming
ownership of the quedans. PNB sued herein private respondents for specific performance. The case
reached the Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of PNB. Motions for reconsideration by Noah's Ark was
denied by the Court. Thereupon, private respondents filed before the trial court an Omnibus Motion
seeking, among others the deferment of the proceedings until their claim for warehouseman’s lien would
be heard. On the other hand, PNB filed a Motion for the issuance of the Writ of Execution and opposition
to the Omnibus Motion filed by the private respondents. Private respondents won their case up to the
Supreme Court, which declared that while the PNB is entitled to the stocks of sugar as the endorsee of the
quedans, delivery to it shall be effected only upon payment of the storage fees. PNB's motion for
reconsideration was denied. Private respondents filed a Motion for Execution of Defendant's Lien, which
was opposed by the petitioner. However, the trial court granted private respondents Motion for
Execution. PNB was immediately served with a Writ of Execution. PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with urgent prayer for Quashal of the Writ of Execution and an Urgent Motion to Lift Garnishment of their
funds with BangkoSentral ng Pilipinas. The trial court denied all the motions of PNB. Hence, PNB filed this
special civil action for certiorari asking for the annulment of the orders of the trial court: one, granting
private respondents' motion for execution to satisfy their warehouseman's lien, and two, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the first order and urgent motion to lift the garnishment.
Noah’s Ark claimed for warehouseman’s lien for the storage of thegoods.
RTC: granted lien. PNB appealed
ISSUE
WoN PNB is entitled to the stocks of sugar as the endorsee of thequedans, without paying the lien

HELD
YES. The petition was meritorious.
While PNB is entitled to the stocks of sugar as the endorsee of thequedans, delivery to it shall be effected
only upon payment of the storagefees.The warehouseman is entitled to the warehouseman’s lien
thatattaches to the goods invokable against anyone who claims a right ofpossession thereon.However, in
this case, the lien was lost when R refused to deliver thegoods, which were not anchored to a valid excuse
(i.e. nonsatisfaction of W/Hman Lien) but on an adverse claim of ownership.The loss of W/H Man’s lien
does not necessarily mean theextinguishment of the obligation to pay the W/H fees and chargeswhich
continues to be a personal liability of the owners, PNB in thiscase. However, such fees and charges have
ceased to accrue from thedate of the rejection by Noah’s Ark to heed the lawful demand for therelease of
the goods.

Case #3: CONSOLIDATED TERMINALS, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. ARTEX

DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., defendant-appellee.
[G.R. No. L-25748. March 10, 1975.]

FACTS:Petitioner Consolidated Terminals, Inc. (CTI) was the operator of a customs bonded
warehouse located at Port Area, Manila. It received on deposit one hundred ninety-three (193) bales
of high density compressed raw cotton valued at P99,609.76. It was understood that CTI would keep
the cotton in behalf of Luzon Brokerage Corporation until the consignee thereof, Paramount Textile Mills,
Inc., had opened the corresponding letter of credit in favor of shipper, Adolph Hanslik Cotton of Corpus
Christi; Texas.

Allegedly by virtue of a forged permit to deliver imported goods, purportedly issued by the Bureau of
Customs, respondent Artex Development Co., Inc. was able to obtain delivery of the bales of cotton
on November 5 and 6, 1964 after paying CTI P15,000 as storage and handling charges. At the time
the merchandise was released to Artex, the letter of credit had not yet been opened and the
customs duties and taxes due on the shipment had not been paid. (That delivery permit, Annex A of
the complaint, was not included by CTI in its record on appeal).

CTI, in its original complaint, sought to recover possession of the cotton by means of a writ of
replevin. The writ could not be executed. CTI then filed an amended complaint by transforming its
original complaint into an action for the recovery from Artex of P99,609.76 as compensatory
damages, P10,000 as nominal and exemplary damages and P20,000 as attorney's fees.

It should be clarified that CTI in its affidavit for manual delivery of personal property (Annex B of its
complaint not included in its record on appeal) and in paragraph 7 of its original complaint alleged that
Artex acquired the cotton from Paramount Textile Mills, Inc., the consignee.

To which, Artex filed a motion to dismiss.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS: It was not shown in the delivery permit that Artex was the entity
that presented that document to the CTI. Artex further averred that it returned the cotton to
Paramount Textile Mills, Inc. when the contract of sale between them was rescinded because the cotton
did not conform to the stipulated specificationsas to quality (14-15, Record on Appeal). No copy of the
rescissory agreement was attached to Artex's motion to dismiss.

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA RULING:In sustaining Artex's motion to dismiss, which CTI did
not oppose in writing, Judge Perez said: "Since the plaintiff (CTI) is only a warehouseman and
according to theamended complaint, plaintiff was already paid the warehousing andhandling
charges of the 193 bales of high density compressed rawcotton mentioned in the complaint, the
plaintiff can no longer recover forits services as warehouseman.

"The fact that the delivery of the goods was obtained by the defendant without opening the
corresponding letter of credit cannot be the basis of a cause of action of the plaintiff because such
failure of the defendant to open the letter of credit gives rise to a cause of action in favor of the
shipper of the goods and not in favor of the plaintiff.

"With respect to the allegation of the amended complaint that the goods were taken by the
defendant without paying the customs duties and other revenues (sic) assessed thereon, this does
not give rise to a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff for the party aggrieved is the government.

"Likewise, the alleged presentation of a forged permit to deliver imported goods by the defendant
did not give rise to a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff but in favor of the Bureau of Customs
and of the consignee." (18-19, Record on Appeal)

Judge Perez was guided more by logic and common sense than by any specific rule of law or
jurisprudence.Therefore, the lower court dismissedCTI’s amended complaint for damages against
Artex, predicated on lack of cause of action.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS: As warehouseman, it was entitled to the possession (should be

repossession) of the bales of cotton; that Artex acted wrongfully in depriving CTI of the possession of
the merchandise because Artex presented a falsified delivery permit, and that Artex should pay
damages to CTI.

The only statutory rule cited by CTI is section 10 of the Warehouse Receipts Law which provides
that "where a warehouseman delivers the goods to one who is not in fact lawfully entitled to the
possession of them, the warehouseman shall be liable as for conversion to all having a right of
property or possession in the goods . . ."

CTI appealed the case directly to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not as a warehouseman, CTI has a cause of action for damages against Artex?

SC RULING: NO.We hold that CTI's appeal has not merit. Its amended complaint does not clearly show
that, as warehouseman, it has a cause of action for damages against Artex.

The real parties interested in the bales of cottonwere Luzon Brokerage Corporation as depositor,
Paramount Textile Mills, Inc. as consignee, Adolph Hanslik Cotton as shipper and the Commissioners of
Customs and Internal Revenue with respect to the duties and taxes. These parties have not sued CTI for
damages or for recovery of the bales of cotton or the corresponding taxes and duties.
The case might have been different if it was alleged in the amended complaint that the depositor,
consignee and shipper had required CTI to pay damages, or that the Commissioners of Customs and
Internal Revenue had held CTI liable for the duties and taxes. In such a case, CTI might logically and
sensibly go after Artex for having wrongfully obtained custody of the merchandise.

But that eventuality has not arisen in this case. So, CTI's basic action to recover the value of the
merchandise seems to be untenable. It was not the owner of thecotton. How could it be entitled to claim
the value of the shipment?

In other words, on the basis of the allegations of the amended complaint, the lower court could not
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer thereof. It could not render such valid judgment
because the amended complaint did not unequivocally allege what right of CTI was violated by
Artex, or, to use the familiar language of adjective law, what delict or wrong was committed by
Artex against CTI which would justify the latter in recovering the value of bales of cotton even if it
was not the owner thereof. (See Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666; 1 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed.,
pp. 259, 495).

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: SC dismissed the case.

DOCTRINES:
1. WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS LAW; WAREHOUSEMAN; LIABILITY FOR DELIVERY OF GOODS TO WRONG
PARTY. — Section 10 of the Warehouse Receipts Law provides that where a warehouseman delivers the
goods to one who is not in fact lawfully entitled to the possession of them, it shall be liable as for
conversion to all having a right of property or possession of the goods.

2. ACTIONS; CAUSE OF ACTION; PERSON NOT REAL PARTY IN INTEREST HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION;
CASE AT BAR. — Since the real parties interested in the recovery of the bales of cotton in the case at bar
are the depositor, consignee and shipper, the warehouseman has no cause of action in seeking recovery
of damages for the non-delivery of said bales.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. — It would be different if the depositor, consignee and shipper had
required the warehouseman to pay damages, or that the Commissioners of Customs and Internal
Revenue had held it liable for the duties and taxes. In such a case, the warehouseman might logically and
sensibly go after the party wrongfully obtaining custody of the merchandiser.

4. ID.; ID.; DELICT OR WRONG REQUIRED FOR VALID JUDGMENT TO BE RENDERED. — Where a
complaint does not unequivocally allege what right was violated, or what delict or wrong was committed,
no valid judgment can be rendered thereon (See Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666; 1
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., pp. 259, 495).