THIRD DIVISION 6. ID.; ID.; ID.
; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS; ONE WHO CLAIMS
[G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992.]
NELLY LIM, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D. VICTORIO, as
Presiding Judge of RTC-Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, and JUAN SIM, Respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for Petitioner.
Bince, Oficiana & Dancel for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; EVIDENCE; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS;
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE; RATIONAL BEHIND THE RULE. — This rule on the physician-
patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the
physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and
enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct
opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is for the
general interest of the community.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBJECT TO WAIVER. — Since the object of the privilege is to protect
the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is made to the physician’s testimony.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed,
the following requisites must concur: "1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case; 2. the person against whom
the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; 3. such person
acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; 4. the
information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and 5. the information was confidential, and,
if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS. — These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental
conditions necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to
wit: "1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. 2. This element
of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties. 3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than
the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation."cralaw virtua1aw library
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE; SCOPE. — The physician may be
considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or
palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him
"safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is
the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as
the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so
long as the subject communicated is not stated."cralaw virtua1aw library
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS MUST PROVE REQUISITES THEREOF. — One who claims this
privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE;
INFORMATION GATHERED IN PRESENCE OF THIRD PARTIES, NOT PRIVILEGED. — There is
authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation with a physician in the presence of third
parties removes such information from the mantle of the privilege: "Some courts have held that the casual
presence of a third person destroys the confidential nature of the communication between doctor and patient
and thus destroys the privilege, and that under such circumstances the doctor may testify. Other courts have
reached a contrary result."cralaw virtua1aw library
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGED, WAIVED IN CASE AT BAR. — while it may be true that
counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr.
Acampado and filed a formal motion for the quashal of the said subpoena a day before the witness was to
testify, the petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question
asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite the trial
court’s advise that said counsel may interpose his objection to the testimony "once it becomes apparent that
the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule." The particular
portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioner’s Petition and
Memorandum, and in the private respondent’s Memorandum, do not at all show that any objections were
interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege,
the failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This petition brings into focus the rule on the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship. Petitioner
urges this Court to strike down as being violative thereof the resolution of public respondent Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991 denying due course to a petition to annul the order of the trial court
allowing a Psychiatrist of the National Mental Hospital to testify as an expert witness and not as an attending
physician of petitioner.
The parties are in agreement as to the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully married to each other.
On 25 November 1987, private respondent filed with Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that petitioner has been allegedly
suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and until the
present." After the issues were joined and the pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued. Private
respondent presented three (3) witnesses before taking the witness stand himself to testify on his own behalf.
On 11 January 1989, private respondent’s counsel announced that he would present as his next witness the
Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine
who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify on 25 January 1989. Petitioner’s counsel opposed the
1
motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter
had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from
schizophrenia. Over such opposition, the subpoena was issued on 12 January 1989.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On 24 January 1989, petitioner’s counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash the subpoena and suspend
the proceedings pending resolution of the motion.
Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand on 25 January 1989, the court heard this urgent motion.
Movant argued that having seen and examined the petitioner in a professional capacity, Dr. Acampado is
barred from testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship. Counsel for
private respondent contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and
would not testify on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity.
The trial court, per respondent Judge, denied the motion and allowed the witness to testify. Dr. Acampado
thus took the witness stand, was qualified by counsel for private respondent as an expert witness and was
asked hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness she examined
and treated the petitioner for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the medicines she had
prescribed.
Since petitioner’s counsel insisted that the ruling of the court on the motion be reduced to writing,
respondent Judge issued the following Order on the same date:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In his omnibus motion filed with the Court only yesterday, January 24, 1989, petitioner seeks to prevent Dr.
Lydia Acampado from testifying because she saw and examined respondent Nelly Lim in her professional
capacity perforce her testimony is covered by the privileged (sic) communication rule.
Petitioner contends that Dr. Acampado is being presented as an expert witness and that she will not testify
on any information she acquired in (sic) attending to Nelly Lim in her professional capacity.
Based on the foregoing manifestation of counsel for petitioner, the Court denied the respondent’s motion and
forthwith allowed Dr. Acampado to testify. However, the Court advised counsel for respondent to interpose
his objection once it becomes apparent that the testimony sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged
communication rule.
On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered routinary (sic) questions to qualify her as an expert in
psychiatry; she was asked to render an opinion as to what kind of illness (sic) are stelazine tablets applied to;
she was asked to render an opinion on a (sic) hypothetical facts respecting certain behaviours of a person;
and finally she admitted she saw and treated Nelly Lim but she never revealed what illness she examined
and treated her (sic); nor (sic) the result of her examination of Nelly Lim, nor (sic) the medicines she
prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the omnibus motion dated January 19, 1989 is hereby DENIED." 1
On 3 March 1989, petitioner filed with the public respondent Court of Appeals a petition 2 for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991, to annul the aforesaid order of respondent Judge
on the ground that the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and
to prohibit him from proceeding with the reception of Dr. Acampado’s testimony.chanrobles.com : virtual
law library
On 18 September 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution 3 denying due course to the petition
on the ground that "the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of the testimony given by or
obtained from Dr. Acampado when she testified on January 25, 1989." Hence, the respondent Judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion. In support thereof, the respondent Court discussed the conditions
which would render as inadmissible testimonial evidence between a physician and his patient under
paragraph (c), Section 24, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court and made the following
findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The present suit is a civil case for annulment of marriage and the person whose testimony is sought to be
stopped as a privileged communication is a physician, who was summoned by the patient in her professional
capacity for curative remedy or treatment. The divergence in views is whether the information given by the
physician in her testimony in open court on January 25, 1989 was a privileged communication. We are of the
opinion that they do not fall within the realm of a privileged communication because the information were
(sic) not obtained from the patient while attending her in her professional capacity and neither were (sic) the
information necessary to enable the physician to prescribe or give treatment to the patient Nelly Lim. And
neither does the information obtained from the physician tend to blacken the character of the patient or bring
disgrace to her or invite reproach. Dr. Acampado is a Medical Specialist II and in-charge (sic) of the Female
Service of the National Center for Mental Health a fellow of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association and a
Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatrists. She was summoned to testify as an expert witness and
not as an attending physician of petitioner.
After a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr. Acampado’s testimony, We find no declaration that touched
(sic) or disclosed any information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during the period she
attended her patient in a professional capacity. Although she testified that she examined and interviewed the
patient, she did not disclose anything she obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment
of her patient. Given a set of facts and asked a hypothetical question, Dr. Acampado rendered an opinion
regarding the history and behaviour of the fictitious character in the hypothetical problem. The facts and
conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer and (sic) had no bearing to (sic) whatever
information or findings the doctor obtained from attending the (sic) patient. A physician is not disqualified
to testify as an expert concerning a patient’s ailment, when he can disregard knowledge acquired in
attending such patient and make answer solely on facts related in (sic) the hypothetical question. (Butler v.
Role, 242 Pac. 436; Supreme Court of Arizona Jan. 7, 1926). Expert testimony of a physician based on
hypothetical question (sic) as to cause of illness of a person whom he has attended is not privileged,
provided the physician does not give testimony tending to disclose confidential information related to him in
his professional capacity while attending to the patient. (Crago v. City of Cedar Rapids, 98 NW 354, see
Jones on Evidence, Vol. 3, p. 843, 3rd Ed.).
The rule on privilege (sic) communication in the relation of physician and patient proceeds from the
fundamental assumption that the communication to deserve protection must be confidential in their origin.
Confidentiality is not to be blindly implied from the mere relation of physician and patient. It might be
implied according to circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the nature of the ailment and the
occasion of the consultation. The claimant of the privilege has the burden of establishing in each instance all
the facts necessary to create the privilege, including the confidential nature of the information given." 4
Her motion to reconsider the resolution having been denied, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. In her view, the respondent Court of Appeals "seriously erred" :chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
"I.
2

. . . in not finding that all the essential elements of the rule on physician-patient privileged communication
under Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 24, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence)
exist in the case at bar.
II.
. . . in believing that Dr. Acampado ‘was summoned as an expert witness and not as an attending physician
of petitioner.’
III.
. . . in concluding that Dr. Acampado made ‘no declaration that touched (sic) or disclosed any information
which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during the period she attended her patient in a
professional capacity.’
IV.
. . . in declaring that ‘the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of the testimony given by or
obtained from Dr. Acampado.’" 5
We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda 6 after the
private respondent filed his Comment 7 and the petitioner submitted her reply 8 thereto. The parties
subsequently filed their separate Memoranda.
The petition is devoid of any merit. Respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in its
challenged resolution.
The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he
may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to
enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient." chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
This is a reproduction of paragraph (c), Section 21, Rule 130 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court with two
(2) modifications, namely: (a) the inclusion of the phrase "advice or treatment given by him," and (b)
substitution of the word reputation for the word character. Said Section 21 in turn is a reproduction of
paragraph (f), Section 26, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court with a modification consisting in the change
of the phrase "which would tend to blacken" in the latter to "would blacken." 9 Verily, these changes
affected the meaning of the provision. Under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was sufficient if the information
would tend to blacken the character of the patient. In the 1964 Rules of Court, a stricter requirement was
imposed; it was imperative that the information would blacken such character. With the advent of the
Revised Rules on Evidence on 1 July 1989, the rule was relaxed once more by the substitution of the word
character with the word reputation. There is a distinction between these two concepts." ‘Character’ is what a
man is, and ‘reputation’ is what he is supposed to be in what people say he is.’Character’ depends on
attributes possessed, and ‘reputation’ on attributes which others believe one to possess. The former signifies
reality and the latter merely what is accepted to be reality at present." 10
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and confidential
disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by
apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end
that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. 11
It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the community. 12
Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is made to
the physician’s testimony. 13
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must
concur:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional
capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly
character) of the patient." 14
These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment of a
privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 15
The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for
curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the
3
physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. 16 It is to
be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a
communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not
privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated." 17
One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites. 18
Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Us to no other course of action but to agree with the
respondent Court’s observation that the petitioner failed to discharge that burden. In the first place, Dr.
Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, she
did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the
petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no
bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the patient. There is, as
well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the
hypothetical problem were influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her
expert opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was
acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert witness, her
testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded. The rule on this point is summarized as
follows:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"The predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the statutory physician-patient
privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in
response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical mental condition of a patient
whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated,
excluding and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may have concerning such patient. But
in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient privilege where it is asserted in such a case, the physician
must base his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in the question, excluding from consideration his
personal knowledge of the patient acquired through the physician and patient relationship. If he cannot or
does not exclude from consideration his personal professional knowledge of the patient’s condition he
should not be permitted to testify as to his expert opinion." 19
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado’s testimony that the petitioner was never interviewed alone.
Said interviews were always conducted in the presence of a third party, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q I am asking you, doctor, whom did you interview?
A I interviewed the husband first, then the father and after having the history, I interviewed the
patient, Nelly.
Q How many times did Juan Sim and Nelly Lim go to your office?
A Now, the two (2) of them came three (3) times. As I have stated before, once in the month of April
of 1987 and two (2) times for the month of June 1987, and after that, since July of 1987, it was the father of
Nelly, Dr. Lim, who was bringing Nelly to me until November of 1987.
Q Now, Dr. Lim is a fellow physician?
A Yes, I understand.
Q Was there anything that he told you when he visited with you in a clinic?
A I would say that there was none. Even if I asked information about Nelly, I could not get anything
from Dr. Lim.
Q Now, when Dr. Lim and his daughter went to your clinic, was there any doctor who was also
present during that interview?
A No, sir, I don’t remember any." 20
There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation with a physician in the presence
of third parties removes such information from the mantle of the privilege:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third person destroys the confidential nature of the
communication between doctor and patient and thus destroys the privilege, and that under such
circumstances the doctor may testify. Other courts have reached a contrary result." 21
Thirdly, except for the petitioner’s sweeping claim — that" (T)he information given by Dr. Acampado
brings disgrace and invite (sic) reproach to petitioner by falsely making it appear in the eyes of the trial court
and the public that the latter was suffering from a mental disturbance called schizophrenia — which caused,
and continues to cause, irreparable injury to the name and reputation of petitioner and her family," 22 —
which is based on a wrong premise, nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that indeed, the
information obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken the former’s "character" (or "reputation"). Dr.
Acampado never disclosed any information obtained from the petitioner regarding the latter’s ailment and
the treatment recommended therefor.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the quashal of the said subpoena a
day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel
had objected to any question asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate
the privilege, despite the trial court’s advise that said counsel may interpose his objection to the testimony
"once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged
communication rule." The particular portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado
quoted in the petitioner’s Petition 23 and Memorandum, 24 and in the private respondent’s Memorandum,
25 do not at all show that any objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr.
Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver
thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
4

G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994
MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN, JR., respondents.
Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday and Tuason for petitioner.
Oscar F. Martinez for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the trial court in a petition
for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. The witness testifying on the report is the
husband who initiated the annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the report.
The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on privileged
communication between physician and patient, seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents of
the report. After failing to convince the trial court and the appellate court, she is now before us on a petition
for review on certiorari.
On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at the Saint Vincent de Paul
Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union produced three children, Edgar Johannes, Karl Wilhelm and
Alexandra. Their blessings notwithstanding, the relationship between the couple developed into a stormy
one. In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain.
The effort however proved futile. In 1973, they finally separated in fact.
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and
signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. On 2 November 1978, presenting the report among
others, he obtained a decree ("Conclusion") from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila
nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due
to lack of due discretion existent at the time of the wedding and thereafter." 1 On 10 July 1979, the decree
was confirmed and pronounced "Final and Definite." 2
Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pasig, Br. II,
issued an order granting the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial
court. 3 In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied
in her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant." 4
At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on
privileged communication between physician and patient. Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation
expressing her "continuing objection" to any evidence, oral or documentary, "that would thwart the
physician-patient privileged communication rule," 5 and thereafter submitted a Statement for the Record
asserting among others that "there is no factual or legal basis whatsoever for petitioner (Edgar) to claim
'psychological incapacity' to annul their marriage, such ground being completely false, fabricated and merely
an afterthought." 6 Before leaving for Spain where she has since resided after their separation, Ma. Paz also
authorized and instructed her counsel to oppose the suit and pursue her counterclaim even during her
absence.
On 29 May 1991, Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the introduction of the confidential psychiatric
report as evidence, 7 and afterwards moved to strike out Ma. Paz' Statement for the Record. 8
On 4 June 1991, the trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report in
evidence and ruling that —
. . . the Court resolves to overrule the objection and to sustain the Opposition to the respondent's Motion;
first, because the very issue in this case is whether or not the respondent had been suffering from
psychological incapacity; and secondly, when the said psychiatric report was referred to in the complaint,
the respondent did not object thereto on the ground of the supposed privileged communication between
patient and physician. What was raised by the respondent was that the said psychiatric report was irrelevant.
So, the Court feels that in the interest of justice and for the purpose of determining whether the respondent as
alleged in the petition was suffering from psychological incapacity, the said psychiatric report is very
material and may be testified to by petitioner (Edgar Krohn, Jr.) without prejudice on the part of the
respondent to dispute the said report or to cross-examination first the petitioner and later the psychiatrist who
prepared the same if the latter will be presented. 9
On 27 November 1991, the trial court denied the Motion to Reconsider Order dated June 4, 1991, and
directed that the Statement for the Record filed by Ma. Paz be stricken off the record. A subsequent motion
for reconsideration filed by her counsel was likewise denied.
Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision promulgated 30
October 1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition for certiorari. 10 On 5 February 1993, the motion to
reconsider the dismissal was likewise denied. Hence, the instant petition for review.
Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the contents of the psychiatric report and
prays for the admission of her Statement for the Record to form part of the records of the case. She argues
that since
Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court 11 prohibits a physician from testifying on matters which
he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity, "WITH MORE REASON should
be third person (like respondent-husband in this particular instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on
privileged matters between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical report, findings or
evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged
relation with a patient." 12 She says that the reason behind the prohibition is —
. . . to facilitate and make safe, full and confidential disclosure by a patient to his physician of all facts,
circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and
publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled
safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. 13
She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the contents of the psychiatric evaluation report
"will set a very bad and dangerous precedent because it abets circumvention of the rule's intent in preserving
the sanctity, security and confidence to the relation of physician and his patient." 14 Her thesis is that what
cannot be done directly should not be allowed to be done indirectly.
5
Petitioner submits that her Statement for the Record simply reiterates under oath what she asserted in her
Answer, which she failed to verify as she had already left for Spain when her Answer was filed. She
maintains that her "Statement for the Record is a plain and simple pleading and is not as it has never been
intended to take the place of her testimony;" 15 hence, there is no factual and legal basis whatsoever to
expunge it from the records.
Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the rules are very explicit: the prohibition
applies only to a physician. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case at bar where
the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged communication is the husband and not the
physician of the petitioner." 16 In fact, according to him, the Rules sanction his testimony considering that a
husband may testify against his wife in a civil case filed by one against the other.
Besides, private respondent submits that privileged communication may be waived by the person entitled
thereto, and this petitioner expressly did when she gave her unconditional consent to the use of the
psychiatric evaluation report when it was presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which
took it into account among others in deciding the case and declaring their marriage null and void. Private
respondent further argues that petitioner also gave her implied consent when she failed to specifically object
to the admissibility of the report in her Answer where she merely described the evaluation report as "either
unfounded or irrelevant." At any rate, failure to interpose a timely objection at the earliest opportunity to the
evidence presented on privileged matters may be construed as an implied waiver.
With regard to the Statement for the Record filed by petitioner, private respondent posits that this in reality
is an amendment of her Answer and thus should comply with pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court,
hence, its exclusion from the records for failure to comply with the Rules is proper.
The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of the communication between physician and
patient, as well as the reasons therefor, is not doubted. Indeed, statutes making communications between
physician and patient privileged are intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to make
a full disclosure to his physician of his symptoms and condition. 17 Consequently, this prevents the
physician from making public information that will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the
patient. 18 For, the patient should rest assured with the knowledge that the law recognizes the
communication as confidential, and guards against the possibility of his feelings being shocked or his
reputation tarnished by their subsequent disclosure. 19 The physician-patient privilege creates a zone of
privacy, intended to preclude the humiliation of the patient that may follow the disclosure of his ailments.
Indeed, certain types of information communicated in the context of the physician-patient relationship fall
within the constitutionally protected zone of privacy, 20 including a patient's interest in keeping his mental
health records confidential. 21 Thus, it has been observed that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
founded upon the notion that certain forms of antisocial behavior may be prevented by encouraging those in
need of treatment for emotional problems to secure the services of a psychotherapist.
Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals 22 clearly lays down
the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil
case; (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the
information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the
patient.
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document
executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition.
Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot
have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the
report.
Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private respondent on the ground
that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on
privileged communications but never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in
failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such
objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
The other issue raised by petitioner is too trivial to merit the full attention of this Court. The allegations
contained in the Statement for the Records are but refutations of private respondent's declarations which may
be denied or disproved during the trial.
The instant appeal has taken its toll on the petition for annulment. Three years have already lapsed and
private respondent herein, as petitioner before the trial court, has yet to conclude his testimony thereat. We
thus enjoin the trial judge and the parties' respective counsel to act with deliberate speed in resolving the
main action, and avoid any and all stratagems that may further delay this case. If all lawyers are allowed to
appeal every perceived indiscretion of a judge in the course of trial and include in their appeals depthless
issues, there will be no end to litigations, and the docket of appellate courts will forever be clogged with
inconsequential cases. Hence, counsel should exercise prudence in appealing lower court rulings and raise
only legitimate issues so as not to retard the resolution of cases. Indeed, there is no point in unreasonably
delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who after coming out
from a storm still have the right to a renewed blissful life either alone or in the company of each other. 23
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on 30 October 1992 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117740. October 30, 1998]
CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA EMPAYNADO,
CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD and ROSEMARIE S. ABAD, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 19, 1994,
finding private respondents as the heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad as well as annulling petitioners extra-
judicial partition of the decedents estate.
The facts are as follows:
On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco
sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, before the then Court of
First Instance of Manila. In their petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 86792, petitioners claimed
that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no
6
descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972, petitioners amended their
petition by alleging that the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021, listed therein as
belonging to the decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the true owner being their late
mother, Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator
of the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.
Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late
mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 13530,
53671, and 64021. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the above-mentioned TCTs in the
name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad,
TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina Abad
Gonzales. The three promptly executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs.
Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel, Escolastico Viola.
On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad
Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition in Special Proceedings
No. 86792. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been the common-law wife of
Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from 1943 to 1971, and that during these period,
their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado. Private
respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad
with another woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the
exclusion of collateral relatives, private respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the
existence of said three children in order to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad.
On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to withdraw their first motion and, in lieu thereof, filed
a motion for reconsideration praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed administrator instead of Cesar Tioseco.
The trial court denied private respondents motion to remove Cesar Tioseco as administrator, but allowed
them to appear in the proceedings to establish their right as alleged heirs of Ricardo Abad.
Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had managed to cancel TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and
64021 through the stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mothers estate. Accordingly, on October 4,
1973, private respondents filed a motion to annul the extra-judicial partition executed by petitioners, as well
as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484, the Torrens titles issued in substitution of TCT Nos. 13530,
53671, and 64021 and the real estate mortgages constituted by the latter on said properties.
After due trial, the lower court, on November 2, 1973, rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad and Rosemarie S. Abad acknowledged natural children of
the deceased Ricardo M. Abad;
(2) Declaring said acknowledged natural children, namely: Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad, and Rosemarie
S. Abad the only surviving legal heirs of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad and as such entitled to succeed to
the entire estate of said deceased, subject to the rights of Honoria Empaynado, if any, as co-owner of any of
the property of said estate that may have been acquired thru her joint efforts with the deceased during the
period they lived together as husband and wife;
(3) Denying the petition of decedents collateral relatives, namely: Dolores M. Abad, Cesar M. Tioseco and
Carolina M. Abad to be declared as heirs and excluding them from participating in the administration and
settlement of the estate of Ricardo Abad;
(4) Appointing Honoria Empaynado as the administratrix in this intestacy with a bond of THIRTY
THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS; and
(5) Ordering Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new administratrix all property or properties, monies and
such papers that came into his possession by virtue of his appointment as administrator, which appointment
is hereby revoked.[1]
The trial court, likewise, found in favor of private respondents with respect to the latters motion for
annulment of certain documents. On November 19, 1974, it rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds oppositors Motion for Annulment, dated October 4, 1973 to be meritorious
and accordingly
1. Declares that the six (6) parcels of land described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021, all registered in
the name of Ricardo Abad, as replaced by TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No.
108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina de Mesa Abad-
Gonzales, and the residential house situated at 2432 Opalo Street, San Andres Subdivision, Manila, to be the
properties of the late Ricardo Abad;
2. Declares the deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Lucila de Mesa, executed on
May 2, 1972 (Doc. No. 445, Page No. 86, Book No. VII, Series of 1972 of the notarial book of Faustino S.
Cruz) by petitioners and Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, to be inexistent and void from the beginning;
3. Declares as null and void the cancellation of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 and issuance in lieu
thereof, of TCT Nos. 108482, 108483 and 108484;
4. Orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 108482 of Dolores de Mesa Abad; TCT No.
108483 of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco; and TCT No. 108484 of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales and in lieu
thereof, restore and/or issue the corresponding certificate of title in the name of Ricardo Abad;
5. Declares as inexistent and void from the beginning the three (3) real estate mortgages executed on July 7,
1972 executed by (a) petitioner Dolores de Mesa Abad, identified as Doc. No. 145, Page No. 30, Book No.
XX, Series of 1972; (b) petitioner Cesar de Mesa Tioseco, identified as Doc. No. 146, Page 31, Book No.
XX, Series of 1972; and (c) Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, identified as Doc. No. 144, Page No. 30,
Book No. XX, Series of 1972, all of the notarial book of Ricardo P. Yap of Manila, in favor of Mrs. Josefina
C. Viola, and orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration or annotation thereof from the
back of the torrens title of Ricardo Abad; and
6. Orders Atty. Escolastico R. Viola and his law associate and wife, Josefina C. Viola, to surrender to the
new administratrix, Honoria Empaynado, TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484 within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 1973 decision was denied by the trial court. Their
notice of appeal was likewise denied on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Because of this
7
ruling, petitioners instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with the Court of Appeals, docketed there
as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-03268-R. On November 2, 1974, the appellate court granted petitioners petition and
ordered the lower court to give due course to the latters appeal. The trial court, however, again dismissed
petitioners appeal on the ground that their record on appeal was filed out of time.
Likewise, on January 4, 1975, petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the November 19, 1974 ruling of the
trial court. On March 21, 1975, this appeal was similarly denied on the ground that it had been filed out of
time.
Due to the dismissal of their two appeals, petitioners again instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings
with the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-04352. The appellate court affirmed the
dismissal of the two appeals, prompting petitioners to appeal to the Supreme Court. On July 9, 1985, this
Court directed the trial court to give due course to petitioners appeal from the order of November 2, 1973
declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad, and the order dated November 19, 1974,
annulling certain documents pertaining to the intestate estate of deceased.
The two appeals were accordingly elevated by the trial court to the appellate court. On October 19, 1994, the
Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The orders of
the court a quo in SP No. 86792, to wit:
1. Order dated November 2, 1973, declaring in substance that Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie, all surnamed
Abad as the acknowledged natural children and the only surviving heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad;
2. Order dated November 19, 1974, declaring in substance that the six (6) parcels of land described in TCT
Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 are the properties of Ricardo Abad; that the extra-judicial partition of the
estate of the deceased Lucila de Mesa executed on May 2, 1972 is inexistent and void from the beginning;
the cancellation of the aforementioned TCTs is null and void; the Register of Deeds be ordered to restore
and/or issue the corresponding Certificates of Title in the name of Ricardo Abad; and
3. Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco
from the latter Order, for being filed out of time, are all AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against petitioner-
appellants.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioners now seek to annul the foregoing judgment on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENTS CECILIA E. ABAD, MARIAN E. ABAD AND ROSEMARIE S. ABAD ARE THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN OF THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
II. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE SUBJECT ESTATE WHETHER THE SAME IS OWNED
BY THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD OR BY LUCILA DE MESA, THE MOTHER OF
PETITIONERS AND RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abads filiation, submits the startling theory that the
husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian Abad were born in
1948 and 1954, respectively.
It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to Jose
Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria Nina, prior to the birth of
Cecilia and Marian. But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners claim
that the latter died sometime in 1971.
The date of Jose Libunaos death is important, for if he was still alive in 1971, and given that he was legally
married to Honoria Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian are not Ricardo Abads
children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado. Article 256, the applicable provision
of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[4]
To bolster their theory, petitioners presented in evidence the application for enrolment at Mapua Institute of
Technology of Angelita Libunao, accomplished in 1956, which states:
Fathers Name: Jose Libunao
Occupation: engineer (mining)
Mothers Name: Honoria Empaynado[5]
as well as Cesar Libunaos 1958 application for enrolment at the Mapua Institute of Technology, which
states:
Fathers Name: Jose Libunao
Occupation: none
Mothers Name: Honoria Empaynado[6]
Petitioners claim that had Jose Libunao been dead during the time when said applications were
accomplished, the enrolment forms of his children would have stated so. These not being the case, they
conclude that Jose Libunao must have still been alive in 1956 and 1958.
Additionally, petitioners presented the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos[7] stating that
to their knowledge Jose Libunao had died in 1971, leaving as his widow, Honoria Empaynado, and that the
former had been interred at the Loyola Memorial Park.
Lastly, petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas,[8] Ricardo Abads physician, declaring that in
1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the latter had
become sterile as a consequence thereof.
With these pieces of evidence, petitioners claim that Cecilia and Marian Abad are not the illegitimate
children of Ricardo Abad, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses Jose Libunao and Honoria
Empaynado.
8

At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are disputing the veracity of the trial courts finding of facts. It
is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court
of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.[9] Petitioners, however, argue that
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court when there appears in the record of the
case some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked, or the significance of
which has been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of the case.[10]
This Court finds no justifiable reason to apply this exception to the case at bar.
First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say the least, far
from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that ones parent is deceased is not necessarily
proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was being accomplished. Furthermore, the
joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as to the supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is
not competent evidence to prove the latters death at that time, being merely secondary evidence thereof. Jose
Libunaos death certificate would have been the best evidence as to when the latter died. Petitioners have,
however, inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is no showing that said death certificate has
been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose Libunaos death. More telling, while the records
of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed buried there in 1971, this
person appears to be different from Honoria Empaynados first husband, the latters name being Jose Santos
Libunao. Even the name of the wife is different. Jose Bautista Libunaos wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while
the wife of Jose Santos Libunao was Honoria Empaynado.
As to Dr. Arenas affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged
communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[11] The rule on confidential
communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or treatment
given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient existed between
the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the advice or treatment
given by him or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally attending the patient; d)
the information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the
information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient.[12]
Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however, that the
finding as to Ricardo Abads sterility does not blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners conveniently
forget that Ricardo Abads sterility arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly
blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the
attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to blacken the
reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And the same remains
inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As stated by the trial court:
In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that: The
privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in established precedents. It is
an established rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy intended to be promoted
thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and disclosures
which a patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living are not permitted to
impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light communications and disclosures made under
the seal of the statute.
Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish their claim by the
quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence presented by private respondents
overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad. We quote with
approval the trial courts decision, thus:
In his individual statements of income and assets for the calendar years 1958 and 1970, and in all his
individual income tax returns for the years 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970, he has declared therein
as his legitimate wife, Honoria Empaynado; and as his legitimate dependent children, Cecilia, Marian
(except in Exh. 12) and Rosemarie Abad (Exhs. 12 to 19; TSN, February 26, 1973, pp. 33-44).
xxxxxxxxx
In December 1959, Ricardo Abad insured his daughters Cecilia, then eleven (11) years old, and Marian, then
(5) years old, on [a] twenty (20) year-endowment plan with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and paid for
their premiums (Exh. 34 and 34-A; 34-B to C; 35, 35-A to D; TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 7-20).
In 1966, he and his daughter Cecilia Abad opened a trust fund acount of P100,000.00 with the Peoples Bank
and Trust Company which was renewed until (sic) 1971, payable to either of them in the event of death
(Exhs. 36-A; 36-E). On January 5, 1971, Ricardo Abad opened a trust fund of P100,000.00 with the same
bank, payable to his daughter Marian (Exh. 37-A). On January 4, 1971, Ricardo Abad and his sister Dolores
Abad had (sic) agreed to stipulate in their PBTC Trust Agreement that the 9% income of their P100,000.00
trust fund shall (sic) be paid monthly to the account reserved for Cecilia, under PBTC Savings Account No.
49053 in the name of Ricardo Abad and/or Cecilia Abad (Exh. 38) where the income of the trust fund
intended for Cecilia was also deposited monthly (TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 21-36). Ricardo Abad had
also deposited (money) with the Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank in the name of his daughter Marian,
represented by him, as father, under Savings Account 17348 which has (sic) a balance of P34,812.28 as of
June 30, 1972. (Exh. 60-B)
With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are
precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable provisions are:
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 1003. If there are noillegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Italics supplied)
As to petitioners claim that the properties in the name of Ricardo Abad actually belong to their mother
Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that the evidence presented by private
respondents proved that said properties in truth belong to Ricardo Abad. As stated earlier, the findings of
fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, it being in a better
position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in
the case.[13] In fact, petitioners seem to accept this conclusion, their contention being that they are entitled
to the subject estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de Mesa.
Digressing from the main issue, in its decision dated October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial courts order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco on the ground that the same was filed out of time. This affirmance is erroneous, for on July 9, 1985,
this Court had already ruled that the same was not filed out of time. Well-settled is the dictum that the
rulings of the Supreme Court are binding upon and may not be reversed by a lower court.
9
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30184 dated October 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the affirmance of the Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar
de Mesa Tioseco for being filed out of time is SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 70054 July 8, 1986
BANCO FILIPINO, petitioner,
vs.
MONETARY BOARD, ET AL., respondents.
Ramon Quisumbing and Norberto Quisumbing and Emmanuel Pelaez for petitioner.
Inigo B. Regalado, Jr. counsel for Central Bank.
Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano & Hernandez for respondents.
RESOLUTION
On November 4, 1985, Petitioner Bank filed in the instant case a "Motion to Pay Back Salaries to All BF
Officers and Employees from February to August 29, 1985" in connection with its "Opposition to
Respondents" Motion for Reconsideration or for Clarification of the Resolution of the Court En Banc of
October 8, 1985." On November 7, 1985, this Court referred said motion to pay back salaries to Branch 136
(Judge Ricardo Francisco, presiding) of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which this Court had earlier
directed under our Resolution of October 8, 1985 issued in G.R. No. 77054, to conduct hearings on the
matter of the closure of petitioner Bank and its alleged pre-planned liquidation.
On January 22, 1986, said Regional Trial Court, after considering the petitioner's motion of November 4,
1985, the respondents' opposition thereto dated January 15, 1986; the petitioner's Reply dated January 16,
1986, and the respondents' Rejoinder dated January 20, 1986, issued an order directing the respondents
herein "to pay all officers and employees of petitioner their back salaries and wages corresponding to the
period from February to August 29, 1985."
On February 4, 1986, respondents herein filed with this Court an "Appeal from, or Petition to Set Aside,
order to Pay Back Salaries dated 22 January 1986" praying for the reversal and setting aside of the
aforestated trial court's Order dated January 22, 1986. This was formally opposed by Petitioner when it filed
its "Answer to Appeal (re: back salaries)" on February 26, 1986. A month later, on March 26, 1986,
respondents filed their "Reply to the Answer" which petitioner traversed in a "Rejoinder to the Reply" dated
April 2, 1986.
In a normal situation, no controversy would be expected in the matter of the payment of said back salaries
because in the instant case, the party praying for the same is the employer Bank. The attendant
circumstances here present have, however, created a peculiar situation. There is resistance to the claim
because the management of the assets of the Bank has been transferred to the Respondents' Receiver who
perceived that the directive to pay back salaries after closure of the Bank would be dissipation of the banks'
assets to the prejudice of its various creditors.
There is, however, in this case a significant matter that deserves consideration of this Court and which must
be viewed from the stand-point of equity. What stands out is that, regardless of whether the employees of
Banco Filipino worked or not after January 25, 1985, there is the uncontested manifestation found in BF's
Answer to the Appeal, dated February 26, 1986 (Vol. IV of Case Records) that:
2. In the fact the receiver/liquidator Carlota Valenzuela had paid Union employees of petitioner BF
back salaries for no work from January 25, 1985 up to June, 1985. .. (Emphasis supplied)
All employees, thereto, of petitioner Banco Filipino who have not yet received their back salaries
corresponding to the period from January 25, 1985 up to June, 1985 manifestly deserve and ought to be
similarly paid by the respondent Monetary Board. It is but fair that the issue whether or not the employees of
petitioner Bank had actually worked during said period should now be discounted considering this voluntary
act of respondent Monetary Board which would remove by estoppel any impediment to the receipt by all
bank employees of their back salaries from January 25, 1985 up to June, 1985, assuming that some of them
have not yet received the same.
As the remaining period from June, 1985 to August, 1985, involves but a minimal period only of two (2)
months, and considering the unfortunate plight of the numerous employees who now invoke the
symphathetic concern of this Court, and inasmuch as the appealed Order for the payment of back salaries is
only for a limited period or up to August, 1985, the appealed order of November 7, 1985 may be sustained.
Petitioner BF and its stockholders have long put on record their consent to this patment of back salaries of its
separated officers and employees. It is also averred that BF intends to reopen its bank and branches, and the
payment of back salaries to its employees, no less would help in the preservation of its personnel which is
the bank's most important assest, apart from doing justice to those aggrieved employees. It is mentioned that
the Central Bank Liquidator has now more than a billion pesos in cash of Banco Filipino since it continued
to receive payments from BF borrowers some P1.5 million a day. It is also said that with the deposits of
petitioner BF with the Bank of PI, there is money sufficient to allow the withdrawal of the sums needed to
pay the salaries of the employees who have been now out of work for over a year. Apparently, no substantial
prejudice for the payment of the distressed employees of the bank for only a specified limited period until
the other issues in the consolidated consideration.
WHEREFORE, ruling that the Order of November 7, 1985 of Judge Ricardo Francisco, granting salary to
the officers and employees of Banco Filipino for the period from February, 1985 to August 29, 1985, may
now be deemed moot and academic insofar as it relates to the period from January 25, 1985 to June, 1985 up
to August, 1985, covers but a minimal span of two (2) months, the Court RESOLVES, for the reasons of
equity, to allow the aforestated Order to remain undisturbed and to DISMISS the appeal therefrom. This
Order is immediately held executory.
Gutierrez Jr., J., took no part.
G.R. No. 70054 July 8, 1986
BANCO FILIPINO vs. MONETARY BOARD
10

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 70054 July 8, 1986
BANCO FILIPINO, petitioner,
vs.
MONETARY BOARD, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
Subject of this "Petition to Set Aside Order to Produce Documents dated 17 February 1986" is the Order of
Branch 136, Regional Trial Court, Makati, granting the motion of the petitioner herein, based on Section 1,
Rule 27, of the Rules of Court, for the production, inspection, and copying of certain papers and records
which are claimed as needed by the Petitioner Bank for the preparation of its comments, objections, and
exceptions to the Conservator's report dated January 8, 1985, and Receiver's Report dated March 19, 1985.
The documents now asked to be produced, inspected, and copied are the following:
(1) Copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board (MB) deliberations on the closure of Banco
Filipino (BF) and its meeting on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985;
(2) Copies of the letter and reports of first conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the MB and to
Central Bank Governor Jose Fernandez;
(3) Papers showing computations of all the interests and penalties charged by the CB against BF;
(4) Schedule of recommended valuation of reserves per Mr. Tiaoqui's report dated March 19, 1985;
(5) Adjustment per Annex "C" of Mr. Tiaoqui's report;
(6) Annexes"A","B",and"C"of the joint report of Mr. Tiaoqui, Mr. Aurellano, and Mrs. Valenzuela;
(7) Schedule of devaluation of CB premises of Paseo de Roxas of same report;
(8) Schedule of BF's realizable assets from P5,159.44 B to P3,909.23 B as of January 25, 1985;
(9) Documents listed in BF's letter to Mrs. Carlota Valenzuela dated October 25, 1985.
In issuing the challenged order, the court below took the view that the Supreme Court's resolution referring
to it the matters relative to the bank's closure does not preclude the petitioner from availing of this mode of
discovery as an additional means of preparing for the hearing. It considered the documents sought to be
produced as not privileged because these constitute or contain evidence material to the issues into by the
Court. These materials are said to comprise of records of the administrative proceedings conducted by
respondent's officials and representatives from the inception of and preparation of the challenged reports and
the resolution placing petitioner under receivership and thereafter under liquidation as it is the regularity and
impartiality of these administrative proceedings which are being assailed by the petitioner, the trial court saw
no reason why said documents should be thus concealed from it.
Respondents Monetary Board and Central Bank take exception to the said order and pray in their petition
before this Court for the reversal and setting aside of the same. The grounds recited in support of their
petition are the following:
(1) The ratiocination of the trial court is wholly in error because the proceedings before it do not at all
deal with either the administrative proceedings conducted by the respondents or the regularity and
impartiality of the CB actions on BF; it does so simply upon the charge that no "hearing" was given BF prior
to those actions of closure and liquidation. However, no such prior hearing had been called as none is
required by the law and by the Supreme Court decisions in force to this date (Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. vs.
Arca, 15 SCRA 66, and Rural Bank of Bato vs. IAC, G.R. 65642, Oct. 15, 1984).
(2) The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are confidential pursuant to Sections
13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act.
Sec. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal interest. Whenever any member attending a meeting of the
Monetary Board has a material personal interest, directly or indirectly, in the discussion or resolution of any
given matter, said member shall not participate in the discussion or resolution of the matter and must retire
from the meeting during the deliberation thereon. The subject matter, when resolved, and the fact that a
member had a personal interest in it, shall be made available to the public. The minutes of the meeting shall
note the withdrawal of the member concerned. (As amended by PD No. 1827).
Sec. 15. Responsibility. — Any member of the Monetary Board or officer or employee of the Central Bank
who wilfully violates this Act or who is guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties shall be
held liable for any loss or injury suffered by the Bank as a result of such violation or negligence. Similar
responsibility shall apply to the disclosure of any information of a confidential nature about the discussion or
resolutions of the Monetary Board, except as required in Section 13 of this Act, or about the operations of
the Bank, and to the use of such information for personal gain or to the detriment of the Government, the
Bank or third parties. (As amended by Presidential Decree No. 72). (Italics supplied).
(3) The Monetary Board deliberations were necessarily held subsequent t• the submission of the CB
reports. They did not enter into the making of those reports and can have no materiality to any question of
fact that may be raised in relation to their contents.
On April 16, 1986, Petitioner Banco Filipino filed its Comment on Respondent's petition to set aside the
order for the production of the documents. In said pleading, the petitioner bank assails the respondent's
petition on the following grounds:
(1) There is no reason why Banco Filipino should not be furnished the documents, particularly Nos. 3
to 9 of its motion, when these are merely attachments to the Supervision and Examination Sector, Dept. It
(SES) Reports, copies of which were given to it pursuant to a Supreme Court order.
(2) The Supreme Court in its referral of October 8, 1985 to the RTC Makati intended full evidence
taking of the proceeding for judicial review of administrative action filed with the Supreme Court, the trial
court being better equipped for evidence taking.
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(3) The respondents cannot claim privilege in refusing to produce the Central Bank records because it
is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality. Petitioner cites as a precedent the doctrine
established in the case of U.S. vs. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713, which states that "when the ground for
asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal case is based only on the
generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of
law."
(4) The requested documents and records of the Central Bank are material and relevant because BF is
entitled to prove from the CB records (a) that Governor Fernandez closed BF without a MB resolution and
without examiner's reports on the financial position of BF; (b) that a MB resolution was later made to
legalize the BF closure but it had no supporting examiner's report; (c) that the earlier reports did not satisfy
respondent Governor Fernandez and he ordered the examiners and the conservator, Gilberto Teodoro, to
"improve" them; and (d) that the reports were then fabricated.
Petitioner adds that what respondents fear is disclosure of their proceedings because petitioner has accused
the CB governor of (a) covering 51% of its stockholding, (b) encashing BF securities in trickles as fuel a
run, (c) appointing a conservator when the President ordered the MB to grant petitioner a P 3 Billion credit
line, (d) replacing Estanislao with Gilberto Teodoro when the former wanted to resume normal operations of
BF, and (e) changing the conservatorship to receivership when it appointed Carlota Valenzuela as receiver
again without hearing.
On May 13, 1986, Respondent Monetary Board filed their Reply to Petitioner Bank's Comment dated April
15, 1986. Respondents argue that:
(1) The case of U.S. vs. Nixon and the other decisions cited by petitioner are inapplicable because-
a) The authorities cited refer only to a claim of privilege based only on the generalized interest of
confidentiality or on an executive privilege that is merely presumptive. On the other hand, the so-called MB
deliberations are privileged communications pursuant to Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court because
statements and opinions expressed in the deliberation of the members of the MB are specifically vested with
confidentiality under Secs. 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act. The "public interest" requirement for non-
disclosure is evident from the fact that the statute punishes any disclosure of such deliberations.
b) Petitioner has not in the least shown any relevance or need to produce the alleged MB
deliberations. What petitioner intends to prove are not "issues" raised in the pleadings of the main petition.
(2) Petitioner is interested, not in discovering evidence, but in practicing oppression by the forced
publication of the MB members' confidential statements at board meetings.
(3) The so-called deliberations of the Monetary Board are in truth merely the individual statements and
expressions of opinion of its members. They are not statements or opinions that can be imputed to the board
itself or to the Central Bank. The transcripts of stenographic notes on the deliberations of the MB are not
official records of the CB; they are taken merely to assist the Secretary of the MB in the preparation of the
minutes of the meetings. And as advertedly also, the tape recordings are not available as these are used over
and over again.
The motion for the production of the subject documents was filed by petitioner pursuant to Section 1, Rule
27, of the Rules of Court. It has been held that "a party is ordinarily entitled to the production of books,
documents and papers which are material and relevant to the establishment of his cause of action or defense"
(General Electric Co. vs. Superior Court in and for Alameda County, 45 C. 2d 879, cited in Martin, Rules of
Court, 3rd edition, Vol. 2, p. 104). "The test to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of
documents and the sufficiency of their description is one of reasonableness and practicability" (Line Corp. of
the Philippines vs. Moran, 59 Phil. 176, 180). "On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for
production and inspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged
matter, that is, books, papers which because of their confidential and privileged character could not be
received in evidence" (27) CJS 224). "In passing on a motion for discovery of documents, the courts should
be liberal in determining whether or not documents are relevant to the subject matter of action" (Hercules
Powder Co. vs. Haas Co., U.S. Dist. Ct. Oct. 26, 1944, 9 Fed. Rules Service, 659, cited in Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1979 Ed. Vol. 2, p. 102). Likewise, "any statute declaring in general terms that
official records are confidential should be liberally construed, to have an implied exception for disclosure
when needed in a court of justice" (Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII, p. 801, citing the case of Marbury vs.
Madison, 1 Cr. 137,143).
In the light of the jurisprudence above-cited, this Court holds that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the court below in granting petitioner's motion for the production of the documents
enumerated herein. We accept the view taken by the court below that the documents are not privileged and
that these constitute or contain evidence material to the issues being inquired into by the Court.
With respect to Items Nos. 3 to 9, these are the annexes to the Supervision and Examination Sector, Dept. II
(SES) Reports submitted to the Central Bank and Monetary Board which were taken into consideration by
said respondents in closing petitioner bank. A copy of the SES Reports was furnished to the petitioner. We,
therefore, fail to see any proper reason why the annexes thereto should be withheld. Petitioner cannot
adequately study and properly analyze the report without the corresponding annexes. Pertinent and relevant,
these could be useful and even necessary to the preparation by petitioner of its comment, objections and
exceptions to the Conservator's reports and receiver's reports.
Regarding copies of the letter and reports of first Conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the Monetary Board
and to Central Bank Governor Fernandez (Item No. 2) these appear relevant as petitioner has asserted that
the above-named Conservator had in fact wanted to resume normal operations of Banco Filipino but then he
was thereafter replaced by Mr. Gilberto Teodoro. The letter and reports could be favorable or adverse to the
case of petitioner but whatever the result may be, petitioner should be allowed to photocopy the same.
As to the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino and its
meetings on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985, (Item No. 1), respondents contend that "it is obvious from
the requirement (Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act) that the subject matter (of the deliberations),
when resolved. . . shall be made available to the public but the deliberations themselves are not open to
disclosure but are to be kept in confidence." This Court, however, sees it in a different light. The
deliberations may be confidential but not necessarily absolute and privileged. There is no specific provision
in the Central Bank Act, even in Sections 13 and 15 thereof, which prohibits absolutely the courts from
conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these are relevant or material to a matter subject of a suit
pending before it. The disclosure is here not intended to obtain information for personal gain. There is no
indication that such disclosure would cause detriment to the government, to the bank or to third parties.
Significantly, it is the bank itself here that is interested in obtaining what it considers as information useful
and indispensably needed by it to support its position in the matter being inquired to by the court below.
On the other hand, respondents cite Section 21, Rule 130, Rules of Court which states:
Section 21. Privileged Communications. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:
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xxx xxx xxx
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications
made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by disclosure.
But this privilege, as this Court notes, is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the
protection of public interest (Vogel vs. Gruaz 110 U.S. 311 cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1980 Ed. Vol. 5, p. 211). Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule
will not be applicable.
The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence
does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure question.
... ,( Agnew vs. Agnew,'52 SD 472, cited in Martin Rules of Court of the Philippines, Third Edition, Vol. 5,
p. 199).
In the case at bar, the respondents have not established that public interest would suffer by the disclosure of
the papers and documents sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank was already closed as of
January 25, 1985, any disclosure of the aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this time pose no
danger or peril to our economy. Neither will it trigger any bank run nor compromise state secrets.
Respondent's reason for their resistance to the order of production are tenuous and specious. If the
respondents public officials acted rightfully and prudently in the performance of their duties, there should be
nothing at all that would provoke fear of disclosure
On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the documents. Not only the banks
and its employees but also its numerous depositors and creditors are entitled to be informed as to whether or
not there was a valid and legal justification for the petitioner's bank closure. It will be well to consider that—
Public interest means more than a mere curiosity; it means something in which the public, the community at
large, has some pecuniary interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected (State vs. Crocket,
206, p. 816 cited in Words and Phrases, Vol. 35, p. 229).
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order to produce documents dated February 17, 1986 issued by
the court below in S.C.- G.R. No. 70054, is hereby affirmed, except as to the copies of the tapes relative to
the Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino on January 25, 1985 and its meetings on
July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985 and only if such tapes are actually no longer available taking into account
respondent Monetary Board's manifestations that the tape recording of the deliberations of that Board are,
for purposes of economy, used over and over again inasmuch as these tapes are not required to be kept or
stored. (See Respondent's Reply, dated May 12, 1986; Rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 1288-1289).
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 95367. May 23, 1995.]
COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ, NERIO ROGADO, and ELISA
RIVERA, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED CITIZENS,
Respondents.
Valmonte Law Offices for Petitioner.
The Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; GOVERNMENT; PRIVILEGE AGAINST DISCLOSURE OF STATE
SECRETS; BASIS. — At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with
respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon
public interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a
private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENT; CONFIDENTIALITY OF HIS CONVERSATION
AND CORRESPONDENCE. — In the litigation over the Watergate tape subpoena in 1973, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized the right of the President to the confidentiality of his conversations and
correspondence, which it Jikened to "the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations." Said the "Court
in United States v. Nixon: The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and
correspondence, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to
which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for
protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
decision making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of
shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except
privately, These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of the government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution. . . Thus, the Court for the first time gave executive privilege a constitutional
status and a new name, although not necessarily a new birth.
3. ID.; JUDICIARY; CONFIDENTIALITY OF JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS. — "The
confidentiality of judicial deliberations" mentioned in the opinion of the Court referred to the fact that
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court and judges of lower federal courts have traditionally treated their
working papers and judicial notes as private property. A 1977 proposal in the U.S. Congress that Justices
and judges of lower federal courts "should be encouraged to make such arrangements as will assure the
preservation and eventual availability of their personal papers, especially the deposit of their papers in the
same depository they select for [their] Public Papers" was rebuffed by the Justices who, in a letter to the
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Regulation and Government Information of the U.S. Senate, referred to
"difficult concerns respecting the appropriate separation that must be maintained between the legislative
branch and this Court.
4. POLITICAL LAW; GOVERNMENT; PRIVILEGE AGAINST DISCLOSURE OF STATE
SECRETS; RULE. — With respect to the privilege based on state secret, the rule was stated by the U.S.
Supreme Court as follows: Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of
executive officers. Yet we will not go so far as to say that the court may automatically require a complete
disclosure to the judge before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case. It may be possible to
satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of
the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.
When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the
security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by
the judge alone, in chambers. . . In each case, the showing of necessity which is made will determine how far
the court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate. Where
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there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even the
most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that
military secrets are at stake. A fortiori, where necessity is dubious, a formal claim of privilege, made under
the circumstances of this case, will have to prevail. On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality
does not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general
public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined to find in the Constitution an
absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena considered essential to the enforcement of criminal
laws.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRODUCTION OF PERSONNEL RECORDS OF EIIB DOES NOT INVOLVE
REVELATION OF MILITARY SECRETS. — In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or
diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB.
Indeed, EIIB’s function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding
"illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling,
tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to
determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence
will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege
resting on similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONNEL RECORDS OF EIIB, NOT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. — Nor
has our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers personnel records of the EIIB as
classified information. To the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke to support their
contention that there is adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds, provides that the "only item of
expenditure which should be treated strictly confidential" is that which refers to the "purchase of information
and payment of rewards." It should be noted that the regulation requires that "reasonable records" be kept
justifying the confidential or privileged character of the information relating to informers. There are no such
reasonable records in this case to substitute for the records claimed to be confidential.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; DENIAL BY OFFICIALS OF THE EIIB THAT THERE WERE SAVINGS FROM
CERTAIN ITEMS AND THAT DBM HAD RELEASED ALLOCATION NEEDED FOR 947
PERSONNEL, IN EFFECT INVITED INQUIRY INTO VERACITY OF CLAIM. — The other statutes and
regulations invoked by petitioners in support of their contention that the documents sought in the subpoena
duces tecum of the Ombudsman are classified merely indicate the confidential nature of the EIIB’s
functions, but they do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to account for its funds to the proper authorities.
Indeed by denying that there were savings made from certain items in the agency and alleging that the DBM
had released to the EIIB only the allocations needed for the 947 personnel retained after its reorganization,
petitioners in effect invited inquiry into the veracity of their claim. If, as petitioners claim, the subpoenaed
records have been examined by the COA and found by it to be regular in all respects, there is no reason why
they cannot be shown to another agency of the government which by constitutional mandate is required to
look into any complaint concerning public office.
8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; REQUIRED TO ACT
PROMPTLY ON COMPLAINTS IN ANY FORM OR MANNER. — On the other hand, the Ombudsman is
investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious persons and that the
allotments for these items in 1988 wire used for illegal purposes. The plantilla and other personnel records
are relevant to his investigation. He and his Deputies are designated by the Constitution "protectors of the
people" and as such they are required by it "to act promptly on complaints in any form or manner against
public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporation."cralaw virtua1aw library
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; SAFEGUARD IN THE PRODUCTION OF PRESUMPTIVELY PRIVILEGED
SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS. — Even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively
privileged, this decision would only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their non-production.
However, as concession to the nature of the functions of the EIIB and just to be sure no information of a
confidential character is disclosed, the examination of records in this case should be made in strict
confidence by the Ombudsman himself. Reference may be made to the documents in any decision or order
which the Ombudsman may render or issue but only to the extent that it will not reveal covert activities of
the agency. Above all, there must be a scrupulous protection of the documents delivered. With these
safeguards outlined, it is believed that a satisfactory resolution of the conflicting claims of the parties is
achieved. It is not amiss to state that even matters of national security have been inquired into in appropriate
in camera proceedings by the courts. We see no reason why similar safeguards cannot be made to enable an
agency of the Government, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to carry out its constitutional duty to protect
public interests while insuring the confidentiality of classified documents.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT NEED NOT BE SIGNED AND VERIFIED. — Petitioners contend
that under Art. XI, §13(4) the Ombudsman can act only "in any appropriate case, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law" and that because the complaint in this case is unsigned and
unverified, the case is not an appropriate one. This contention lacks merit. As already stated, the Constitution
expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed "in any form or manner" concerning official
acts or omissions. Thus, Art. XI, 12 provides: The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people,
shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and shall in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the
result thereof. Similarly, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Rep. Act No. 6770) provides in 26(2): The Office of
the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form concerning an official act or
omission . . .
11. ID.; ID.; LIMITATION ON POWER TO INVESTIGATE. — Rather than referring to the form of
complaints, therefore, the phrase "in an appropriate case" in Art. XI, §12 means any case concerning official
act or omission which is alleged to be "illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. "The phrase "subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law" refers to such limitations as may be provided by Congress or, in the
absence thereof, to such limitation as may be imposed by the courts. Such limitations may well include a
requirement that the investigation be conducted in camera, with the public excluded, as exception to the
general nature of the proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman. A reconciliation is thereby made
between the demands of national security and the requirement of accountability enshrined in the
Constitution.
12. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS; NOT DENIED TO
RESPONDENTS WHERE OMBUDSMAN COMMENCED INVESTIGATION ON THE BASIS OF
UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT; CASE AT BAR. — Nor is there violation of petitioners’ right to the equal
protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can
only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed,"
while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an
investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the
Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form
or manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which
keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the
Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and
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influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand complainants are
more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.
13. ID.; ID.; RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; NOT AVAILABLE WHERE
DOCUMENTS REQUIRED TO BE PRODUCED ARE PUBLIC. — It is contended that the issuance of the
subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners’ right against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that
the documents required to be produced in this case are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces
tecum is directed are government officials in whose possession or custody the documents are. Moreover, if,
as petitioners claim the disbursement by the EIIB of funds for personal service has already been cleared by
the COA, there is no reason why they should object to the examination of the documents by respondent
Ombudsman.
KATIPUNAN, J., dissenting opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. POLITICAL LAW; GOVERNMENT; PRIVILEGE AGAINST DISCLOSURE OF STATE
SECRETS; EIIB CAN NOT BE REQUIRED TO DISCLOSE DOCUMENTS BY THE OMBUDSMAN IN
ASCERTAINING PROPER DISBURSEMENT OF ITS FUNDS. — Disclosure of the documents as
required by the Ombudsman would necessarily defeat the legal mandate of the EIIB as the intelligence arm
of the executive branch of government relating to matters affecting the economy of the nation. As such,
EIIB’s functions are related to matters affecting national security. In the performance of its function in
relation with the gathering of intelligence information executive privilege could as well be invoked by the
EIIB, especially in relation to its covert operations. The confidentiality privilege invoked by petitioners
attaches in the exercise of the functions of the Chief Executive, as a separate and co-equal branch of
government. By the same parity of reasoning, the disclosure of the EIIB documents required to be examined
by the Ombudsman even in camera proceedings, will under the pretext of ascertaining the proper
disbursements of the EIIB funds will unnecessarily impair the performance by the EIIB of its functions
especially those affecting national security. Besides, the determination of the legality of EIIB’s
disbursements of funds allocated to it are properly within the competence of the Commission on Audit,
which as the ponencia of Justice Mendoza finds, has been cleared in audit. The Commission on Audit had
adopted, as in the past, measures to protect "classified information" pertaining to examination of
expenditures of intelligence agencies. In the present case, disclosure of information to any other agency
would unnecessarily expose the covert operations of EIIB, as a government agency charged with national
security functions.
2. ID.; DETERMINATION OF A QUESTION AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY, A
POLITICAL QUESTION. — The determination, by the executive branch, through its appropriate agencies,
of a question as affecting the national security is a policy decision for which this Court has neither the
competence nor the mandate to infringe upon. In the absence of a clear showing a grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Executive, acting through its (national security) agencies, I am of the opinion that we
cannot interfere with a determination, properly made, on a question affecting economic security lest we are
prepared to ride roughshod over certain prerogatives of our political branches. In an area obviously affecting
the national security, disclosure of confidential information on the promptings of some dissatisfied
employees would Potentially disturb a number of carefully laid-out operations dependent on secrecy and I
am not prepared to do this. The characterization of the documents as classified information is not a shield for
wrongdoing but a barrier against the burdensome requests for information which necessarily interfere with
the proper performance of their duties. To give in, at every turn, to such requests would be greatly disruptive
of governmental functions. More so in this case, since expenditures of the EIIB for personal funds had
already been previously examined and passed upon in audit by the’ Commission on Audit. There has been
no allegation of any irregularity in the COA’s earlier examination, and in the absence of substantiated
allegations, the previous determination ought to be accorded our respect unless we want to encourage
unnecessary and tiresome forays and investigations into government activities which would not only end up
nowhere but which would also disrupt or derail such activities.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS
OF PUBLIC CONCERN; NOT ABSOLUTE; ACCESS TO OFFICIAL RECORDS MAY BE
REGULATED. — The constitutional right allowing disclosure of governmental documents, i.e., the right to
information on matters of public concern is not absolute. While access to official records may be prohibited,
it may be regulated. Regulation includes appropriate authority to determine what documents are of public
concern, the manner of access to information contained in such documents and to withhold information
under certain circumstances, particularly, as in this case, those circumstances affecting the national security.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum and orders
issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant
and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce
"all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all evidence such as vouchers
from enforcing his orders.
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the
EIIB’s Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman
in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an
employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies
furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The letter reads in pertinent parts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. These are the things that I have been observing. During the implementation of E.O 127 on May 1,
1988, one hundred ninety (190) personnel were dismissed. Before that implementation, we had a monthly
savings of P500,000.00 from unfilled plantilla position plus the implementation of RA 6683 wherein seventy
(70) regular employees availed a total amount of P1,400,000.00 was saved from the government monthly.
The question is, how do they used or disbursed this savings? The EIIB has a syndicate headed by the Chief
of Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the
"Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA). The Commissioner of EIIB has a biggest share on this. Among his
activities are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) Supporting RAM wherein he is involved. He gives big amount especially during Dec. Failed coup.
b) Payment for thirty five (35) mini UZI’s.
c) Payment for the purchased of Maxima ‘87 for personal used of the Commissioner.
d) Another observation was the agents under the Director of NCR EIIB is he sole operating unit
within Metro Manila which was approved by no less than the Commissioner due to anomalous activities of
15
almost all agents assigned at the central office directly under the Commissioner. Retired Brig. Gen. Almonte
as one of the Anti-Graft board member of the Department of finance should not tolerate this. However, the
Commissioner did not investigate his own men instead, he placed them under the 15-30 payroll.
e) Many more which are personal.
2. Sir, my question is this. Can your good office investigate EII intelligence funds particularly
Personal Services (01) Funds? I wonder why the Dep’t. of Budget & Mgmt. cannot compel EIIB to submit
an actual filled up position because almost half of it are vacant and still they are releasing it. Are EIIB
plantilla position classified? It is included in the Personal Services Itemnization (PSI) and I believe it is not
classified and a ruling from Civil Service. Another info, when we had salary differential last Oct ‘88 all
money for the whole plantilla were released and from that alone, Millions were saved and converted to ghost
agents of EIA.
3. Another thing that I have observed was the Chief Budget Division possesses high caliber firearms
such as a mini UZI, Armalite rifle and two (2) 45 cal. pistol issued to him by the Assistant Commissioner
wherein he is not an agent of EIIB and authorized as such according to memorandum order number 283
signed by the President of the Republic of the Philippines effective 9 Jan. 1990.
Another observation was when EIIB agents apprehended a certain civilian who possesses numerous assorted
high powered firearms. Agents plus one personnel from the legal proclaimed only five (5) firearms and the
remaining was pilfered by them.
Another observation is almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler syndicate monthly
and brokers every week for them not to be apprehended.
Another observation is the commissioner allocates funds coming from the intelligence funds to the media to
sustain their goods image of the bureau.
In his comment 1 on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied that as a result of the separation of
personnel, the EIIB had made some savings. he averred that the only funds released to his agency by the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) were those corresponding to 947 plantilla positions which
were filled. he also denied that there were "ghost agents" in the EIIB and claimed that disbursements for
"open" (i.e., "covert" personnel) plantillas of the agency had been cleared by the Commission on Audit
(COA); that the case of the 30 Uzis had already been investigated by Congress, where it was shown that it
was not the EIIB but an agent who had spent for the firearms and they were only loaned to the EIIB pending
appropriation by Congress; that, contrary to the charge that a Maxima car had been purchased for his use, he
was using a government issued car from the NICA; that it was his prerogative as Commissioner to "ground"
agents in the EIIB main office so that they could be given reorientation and retraining; that the allegation
that the EIIB operatives pilfered smuggled firearms was without factual basis because the firearms were the
subject of seizure proceedings before the Collector of Customs, Port of Manila; that the EIIB had been
uncompromising toward employees found involved in anomalous activities; and that intelligence funds had
not been used for media propaganda and if media people went to the EIIB it was because of newsworthy
stories. Petitioner asked that the complaint be dismissed and the case considered closed.chanrobles.com.ph :
virtual law library
Similarly petitioner Perez, budget chief of the EIIB, denied in his comment 2 dated April 3, 1990 that
savings had been realized from the implementation of E.O. No. 127, since the DBM provided allocations for
only the remaining 947 personnel. He said that the disbursement of funds for the plantilla positions for
"overt" and "covert" personnel had been cleared by the COA and that the high-powered firearms had been
issued for the protection of EIIB personnel attending court hearings and the Finance Officer in withdrawing
funds from the banks.
The Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman’s office, Jose F. Saño, found the comments
unsatisfactory, being "unverified and plying only on generalizations without meeting specifically the points
raised by complainant as constitutive of the alleged anomalies." 3 He, therefore, asked for authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation. Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a subpoena 4 to
petitioners Almonte and Perez, requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their
witnesses, as well as a subpoena duces tecum 5 to the Chief of the EIIB’s Accounting Division ordering him
to bring "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as
vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum. In his Order
dated June 15, 1990, 6 respondent Ombudsman granted the motion to quash the subpoena in view of the fact
that there were no affidavits filed against petitioners. But he denied their motion to quash the subpoena
duces tecum. He ruled that petitioners were not being forced to produce evidence against themselves, since
the subpoena duces tecum was directed to the Chief Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. In addition the
Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the Records Section of the EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before
the investigator "all documents relating to Personnel Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents,
salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved for a reconsideration, arguing that Rogado and Rivera were EIIB
employees under their supervision and that the Ombudsman was doing indirectly what he could not do
directly, i.e., compelling them (petitioners Almonte and Perez) to produce evidence against themselves.
Petitioners’ motion was denied in respondent Ombudsman’s order dated, August 6, 1990. hence, this petition
which questions the orders of June 15, 1990 and August 6, 1990 of respondent Ombudsman.
To put this case in perspective it should be stated at the outset that it does not concern a demand by a citizen
for information under the freedom of information guarantee of the Constitution. 7 Rather it concerns the
power of the Office of the Ombudsman to obtain evidence in connection with an investigation conducted by
it vis-a-vis the claim of privilege of an agency of the Government. Thus petitioners raise the following
issues: 8
I. WHETHER OR NOT A CASE BROUGHT ABOUT BY AN UNSIGNED AND UNVERIFIED
LETTER COMPLAINT IS AN "APPROPRIATE CASE" WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF THE
CONSTITUTION IN WHICH PUBLIC RESPONDENT CAN OBLIGE PETITIONERS BY VIRTUE OF
HIS SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO PROCEDURE TO HIM "ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO
PERSONAL SERVICES FUNDS FOR THE YEAR 1988 AND ALL EVIDENCES, SUCH AS
VOUCHERS (SALARY) FOR THE WHOLE PLANTILLA OF EIIB FOR 1988."cralaw virtua1aw library
II. WHETHER OR NOT "ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PERSONAL SERVICES FUNDS
FOR THE YEAR 1988 AND ALL EVIDENCES, SUCH AS VOUCHERS (SALARY) FOR THE WHOLE
PLANTILLA OF EIIB FOR 1988" ARE CLASSIFIED AND, THEREFORE, BEYOND THE REACH OF
PUBLIC RESPONDENT’S SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM.
I.
16
There are several subsidiary issues raised by petitioners, but the principal ones revolve on the question
whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary vouchers of
EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified. Disclosure of the documents in question is
resisted on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB’s documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its
plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics
and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB." 9
Petitioners do not question the power of the Ombudsman to issue a subpoena duces tecum nor the relevancy
or materially of the documents required to be produced, to the pending investigation in the Ombudsman’s
office. Accordingly, the focus of discussion should be on the Government’s claim of privilege.chanrobles
law library
A.
At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such
paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even
though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights. 10
In addition, in the litigation over the Watergate tape subpoena in 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
the right of the President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence, which it likened to
"the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations.” Said the Court in United States v. Nixon. 11
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence, like the claim
of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for
the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in
candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those
who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions
and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations
justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of the government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution . . .
Thus, the Court for the first time gave executive privilege a constitutional status and a new name, although
not necessarily a new birth. 12
"The confidentiality of judicial deliberations" mentioned in the opinion of the Court referred to the fact that
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court and judges of lower federal courts have traditionally treated their
working papers and judicial notes as private property. A 1977 proposal in the U.S. Congress that Justices
and judges of lower federal courts "should be encouraged to make such arrangements as will assure the
preservation and eventual availability of their personal papers, especially the deposit of their papers in the
same depository they select for [their] Public Papers" 13 was rebuffed by the Justices who, in a letter to the
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Regulation and Government Information of the U.S. Senate, referred to
"difficult concerns respecting the appropriate separation that must be maintained between the legislative
branch and this Court." 14
There are, in addition to such privileges, statutorily-created ones such as the Government’s privilege to
withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of laws. 15
With respect to the privilege based on state secret, the rule was stated by the U.S. Supreme Court as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers. Yet we
will not go so far as to say that the court may automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge before
the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case. It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. When this is the case, the
occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege
is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers. .
. . In each case, the showing of necessity which is made will determine how far the court should probe in
satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate. Where there is a strong showing
of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even most compelling necessity
cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake. A
fortiori, where necessity is dubious, a formal claim of privilege, made under the circumstances of this case,
will haw to prevail. 16
On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic
or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations,
courts have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena
considered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws. 17
B.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of
records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB’s function is the gathering and evaluation of
intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but
not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." 18 Consequently, while in cases
which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling
production, 19 no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other
considerations.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers personnel records of the EIIB as
classified information. To the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke to support their
contention that there is adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds, provides that the "only item of
expenditure which should be treated strictly confidential" is that which refers to the "purchase of information
and payment of rewards." Thus, part, V, No. 7 of the Circular reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The only item of expenditure which should be treated as strictly confidential because it falls under the
category of classified information is that relating to purchase of information and payment of rewards.
However, reasonable records should be maintained and kept for inspection of the Chairman, Commission on
Audit or his duly authorized representative. All other expenditures are to be considered unclassified
supported by invoices, receipts and other documents, and, therefore, subject to reasonable inquiry by the
Chairman or his duly authorized representative. 20
It should be noted that the regulation requires that "reasonable records" be kept justifying the confidential or
privileged character of the information relating to informers. There are no such reasonable records in this
case to substitute for the records claimed to be confidential.
The other statutes and regulations 21 invoked by petitioners in support of their contention that the documents
sought in the subpoena duces tecum of the Ombudsman are classified merely indicate the confidential nature
17
of the EIIB’s functions, but they do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to account for its funds to the proper
authorities. Indeed by denying that there were savings made from certain items in the agency and alleging
that the DBM had released to the EIIB only the allocations needed for the 947 personnel retained after its
reorganization, petitioners in effect invited inquiry into the veracity of their claim. If, as petitioners claim,
the subpoenaed records have been examined by the COA and found by it to be regular in all respects, there
is no reason why they cannot be shown to another agency of the government which by constitutional
mandate is required to look into any complaint concerning public office.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by
fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The plantilla
and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation. He and his Deputies are designated by the
Constitution "protectors of the people" and s such they are required by it "to act promptly on complaints in
any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation." 22
His need for the documents thus outweighs the claim of confidentiality of petitioners. What is more, while
there might have been compelling reasons for the claim of privilege in 1988 when it was asserted by
petitioners, now, seven years later, these reasons may have been attenuated, if they have not in fact ceased.
The agents whose identities could not then be revealed may have ceased from the service of the EIIB, while
the covert missions to which they might have been deployed might either have been accomplished or
abandoned. On the other hand, the Ombudsman’s duty to investigate the complaint that there were in 1988
unfilled positions in the EIIB for which continued funding was received by its officials and put to illegal use,
remains.chanrobles law library
Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, this decision would
only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction. However, as concession to the
nature of the functions of the EIIB and just to be sure no information of a confidential character is disclosed,
the examination of records in this case should be made in strict confidence by the Ombudsman himself.
Reference may be made to the documents in any decision or order which Ombudsman may render or issue
but only to the extent that it will not reveal covert activities of the agency. Above all, there must be a
scrupulous protection of the documents delivered.
With these safeguards outlined, it is believed that a satisfactory resolution of the conflicting claims of the
parties is achieved, It is not amiss to state that even matters of national security have been inquired into in
appropriate in camera proceedings by the courts. In Lansang v. Garcia 23 this Court held closed door
sessions, with only the immediate parties and their counsel present, to determine claims that because of
subversion there was imminent danger to public safety warranting the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus in 1971. Again in Marcos v. Manglapus 24 the Court met behind closed doors to receive military
briefings on the threat posed to national security by the return to the country of the former President and his
family. In the United States, a similar inquiry into the danger to national security as a result of the
publication of classified documents on the Vietnam war as a result of the publication of classified documents
on the Vietnam was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. 25 We see no reason why similar safeguards cannot
be made to enable an agency of the Government, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to carry out its
constitutional duty to protect public interests 26 while insuring the confidentiality of classified documents.
C.
Petitioners contend that under Art. XI, § 13 (4) the Ombudsman can act only "in any appropriate case, and
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" and that because the complaint in this case is
unsigned and unverified, the case is not an appropriate one. This contention lacks merit. As already stated,
the Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed "in any form or manner"
concerning official acts or omissions. Thus, Art. XI, § 12 provides:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations and shall in appropriate
cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. (Emphasis added)
Similarly, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Rep. Act No. 6770) provides in § 26(2):chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form concerning an
official act or omission. It shall act on the complaint immediately and it finds the same entirely baseless, it
shall dismiss the same and inform the complainant of such dismissal citing the reasons therefor. If it finds a
reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall first furnish the respondent public officer or employee with
a summary of the complaint and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two hours from
receipt thereof. If the answer is found satisfactory, it shall dismiss the case. (Emphasis added)
Accordingly, in Diaz v. Sandiganbayan 27 the Court held that testimony given at a fact-finding investigation
and charges made in a pleading in a case in court constituted a sufficient basis for the Ombudsman to
commence investigation, because a formal complaint was really not necessary.
Rather than referring to the form of complaints, therefore, the phrase "in an appropriate case" in Art. XI, §
12 means any case concerning official act or omission which is alleged to be "illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient." 28 The phrase "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" refers to such limitations
as may be provided by Congress or, in the absence thereof, to such limitations as may be imposed by the
courts. Such limitations may well include a requirement that the investigation be conducted in camera, with
the public excluded, as exception to the general nature of the proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman.
29 A reconciliation is thereby made between the demands of national security and the requirement of
accountability enshrined in the Constitution. 30
What has been said above disposes of petitioners’ contention that the anonymous letter-complaint against
them is nothing but a vexatious prosecution. It only remains to say that the general investigation in the
Ombudsman’s office is precisely for the purpose of protecting those against whom a complaint is filed
against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution as much as securing the State from useless and
expensive trials. There may also be benefit resulting from such limited in camera inspection in terms of
increased public confidence that the privilege is not being abused and increased likelihood that no abuse is in
fact occurring.chanrobles law library : red
II.
Nor is there violation of petitioners’ right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all
forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or
sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection
to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in
permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into
account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official
wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the
18
other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are x-------------------------x
public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held
against them. 31 On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot G.R. No. 169660 April 20, 2006
afford to hire lawyers. 32
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
III. vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., in his
capacity as Secretary of Defense, and GENEROSO S. SENGA, in his capacity as AFP Chief of Staff,
Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners’ right against Respondents.
self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case are public
records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials in whose x-------------------------x
possession or custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by the EII of
funds for personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they should object to G.R. No. 169667 April 20, 2006
the examination of the documents by respondent Ombudsman.chanrobles law library : red
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner,
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed documents vs.
be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined in this decision. HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Respondent.

SO ORDERED. x-------------------------x

EN BANC G.R. No. 169834 April 20, 2006

G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006 PDP- LABAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.
President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N.
PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity x-------------------------x
as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO,
JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, G.R. No. 171246 April 20, 2006
RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO
OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners, JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR
vs. AMORANDO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FILEMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA, and the INTEGRATED
Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, BAR FOR THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
Respondents. vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
DECISION
G.R. No. 169659 April 20, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
BAYAN MUNA represented by DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep.
CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep. RAFAEL MARIANO, Rep. LIZA MAZA, Rep. TEODORO CASINO, A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early history of
Rep. JOEL VIRADOR, COURAGE represented by FERDINAND GAITE, and COUNSELS FOR republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep certain
THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented by ATTY. REMEDIOS BALBIN, information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power
Petitioners, in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: "Decision,
vs. activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased,
Macapagal-Arroyo, Respondent. these qualities will be diminished."1

19
History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse,
hence, the necessity to guard it zealously.
The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such
power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its
declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance under review has
come from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles it to a strong presumption of
constitutionality. Once the challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the Constitution, it is duty-
bound to declare it so. For the Constitution, being the highest expression of the sovereign will of the Filipino
people, must prevail over any issuance of the government that contravenes its mandates.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials
and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government
Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine
National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials
of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery
and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech
of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful
provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations2 dated September 22,
2005 to the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen.
Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of
Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP
Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig.
Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F.
Balutan, for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the
following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled
"Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in
the Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on July
26, 2005 entitled "The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping Capital of the World"; (3) Privilege Speech of
Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1, 2005 entitled "Clear and Present Danger"; (4) Senate
Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal – Resolution Directing the Committee
on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest,
on the Role of the Military in the So-called "Gloriagate Scandal"; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by
Senator Biazon – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an
Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines.
Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff, General
Generoso S. Senga who, by letter3 dated September 27, 2005, requested for its postponement "due to a
pressing operational situation that demands [his utmost personal attention" while "some of the invited AFP
officers are currently attending to other urgent operational matters."
On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita a letter4 dated September 27, 2005 "respectfully request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing
[regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials of the Executive Department have been invited"
in order to "afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so
that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation."
Senate President Drilon, however, wrote5 Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are unable to
accede to [his request]" as it "was sent belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as notices
to all resource persons were completed [the previous] week."
Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter6 from the President of the North
Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail project be
postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative
to the project had been secured.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation
of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,"7
which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as
follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers
between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the
government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –
(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs.
Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not
use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and
not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public
officers covered by this executive order, including:
Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive
order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No.
133250, 9 July 2002);
Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not
be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).
20
Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements
(Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R.
No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9
July 2002).
(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:
Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the
executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers
who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the
executive privilege; and
Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in
Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of
E.O. 464, and another letter8 informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at
the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the
President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required consent from the
President." On even date which was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen.
Senga sent a letter9 to Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security,
informing him "that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer
of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written
approval from the President" and "that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to
appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on]
28 September 2005."
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation
scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and
Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.
For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries
without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings.
As to the NorthRail project hearing scheduled on September 29, 2005, Executive Secretary Ermita, citing
E.O. 464, sent letter of regrets, in response to the invitations sent to the following government officials:
Light Railway Transit Authority Administrator Melquiades Robles, Metro Rail Transit Authority
Administrator Roberto Lastimoso, Department of Justice (DOJ) Chief State Counsel Ricardo V. Perez, then
Presidential Legal Counsel Merceditas Gutierrez, Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) Undersecretary Guiling Mamonding, DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza, Philippine National
Railways General Manager Jose Serase II, Monetary Board Member Juanita Amatong, Bases Conversion
Development Authority Chairperson Gen. Narciso Abaya and Secretary Romulo L. Neri.10 NorthRail
President Cortes sent personal regrets likewise citing E.O. 464.11
On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for certiorari and
prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, House of Representatives Members Satur Ocampo,
Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino, Courage, an organization of
government employees, and Counsels for the Defense of Liberties (CODAL), a group of lawyers dedicated
to the promotion of justice, democracy and peace, all claiming to have standing to file the suit because of the
transcendental importance of the issues they posed, pray, in their petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and
void for being unconstitutional; that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary and alter-ego of President Arroyo, be prohibited from imposing, and threatening to impose
sanctions on officials who appear before Congress due to congressional summons. Additionally, petitioners
claim that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them from fulfilling their respective obligations.
Thus, Bayan Muna alleges that E.O. 464 infringes on its right as a political party entitled to participate in
governance; Satur Ocampo, et al. allege that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and duties as members of
Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation
of laws; Courage alleges that the tenure of its members in public office is predicated on, and threatened by,
their submission to the requirements of E.O. 464 should they be summoned by Congress; and CODAL
alleges that its members have a sworn duty to uphold the rule of law, and their rights to information and to
transparent governance are threatened by the imposition of E.O. 464.
In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his constitutional rights as a citizen,
taxpayer and law practitioner, are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his petition that E.O.
464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc.12 (ALG), alleging that as a coalition of 17
legal resource non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering and work with the poor
and marginalized sectors in different parts of the country, and as an organization of citizens of the
Philippines and a part of the general public, it has legal standing to institute the petition to enforce its
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, a right which was denied to the public by
E.O. 464,13 prays, that said order be declared null and void for being unconstitutional and that respondent
Executive Secretary Ermita be ordered to cease from implementing it.
On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution
of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it has already
sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and impedes the valid
exercise of the Senate’s powers and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern,
filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be
declared unconstitutional.
21
On October 14, 2005, PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected into the Philippine
Senate and House of Representatives, filed a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R.
No. 169834, alleging that it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464 because it hampers its legislative agenda
to be implemented through its members in Congress, particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation and transcendental issues need to be resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the
executive and legislative branches of the government.
Meanwhile, by letter14 dated February 6, 2006, Senator Biazon reiterated his invitation to Gen. Senga for
him and other military officers to attend the hearing on the alleged wiretapping scheduled on February 10,
2005. Gen. Senga replied, however, by letter15 dated February 8, 2006, that "[p]ursuant to Executive Order
No. 464, th[e] Headquarters requested for a clearance from the President to allow [them] to appear before
the public hearing" and that "they will attend once [their] request is approved by the President." As none of
those invited appeared, the hearing on February 10, 2006 was cancelled.16
In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Blue
Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under the Ginintuang
Masaganang Ani program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several Cabinet officials were invited to
the hearings scheduled on October 5 and 26, November 24 and December 12, 2005 but most of them failed
to attend, DA Undersecretary Belinda Gonzales, DA Assistant Secretary Felix Jose Montes, Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority Executive Director Norlito R. Gicana,17 and those from the Department of Budget and
Management18 having invoked E.O. 464.
In the budget hearings set by the Senate on February 8 and 13, 2006, Press Secretary and Presidential
Spokesperson Ignacio R. Bunye,19 DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez20 and Department of Interior and
Local Government Undersecretary Marius P. Corpus21 communicated their inability to attend due to lack of
appropriate clearance from the President pursuant to E.O. 464. During the February 13, 2005 budget hearing,
however, Secretary Bunye was allowed to attend by Executive Secretary Ermita.
On February 13, 2006, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and the incumbent members of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as taxpayers, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as the official
organization of all Philippine lawyers, all invoking their constitutional right to be informed on matters of
public interest, filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 171246, and pray that
E.O. 464 be declared null and void.
All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from
implementing, enforcing, and observing E.O. 464.
In the oral arguments on the petitions conducted on February 21, 2006, the following substantive issues were
ventilated: (1) whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing E.O. 464 prior to
its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation; and (2) whether E.O. 464
violates the following provisions of the Constitution: Art. II, Sec. 28, Art. III, Sec. 4, Art. III, Sec. 7, Art. IV.
Sec. 1, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Art. VI, Sec. 22, Art. XI, Sec. 1, and Art. XIII, Sec. 16. The procedural issue of
whether there is an actual case or controversy that calls for judicial review was not taken up; instead, the
parties were instructed to discuss it in their respective memoranda.
After the conclusion of the oral arguments, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda,
paying particular attention to the following propositions: (1) that E.O. 464 is, on its face, unconstitutional;
and (2) assuming that it is not, it is unconstitutional as applied in four instances, namely: (a) the so called
Fertilizer scam; (b) the NorthRail investigation (c) the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP; and (d) the
investigation on the Venable contract.22
Petitioners in G.R. No. 16966023 and G.R. No. 16977724 filed their memoranda on March 7, 2006, while
those in G.R. No. 16966725 and G.R. No. 16983426 filed theirs the next day or on March 8, 2006.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 171246 did not file any memorandum.
Petitioners Bayan Muna et al. in G.R. No. 169659, after their motion for extension to file memorandum27
was granted, subsequently filed a manifestation28 dated March 14, 2006 that it would no longer file its
memorandum in the interest of having the issues resolved soonest, prompting this Court to issue a
Resolution reprimanding them.29
Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates the following constitutional provisions:
Art. VI, Sec. 2130
Art. VI, Sec. 2231
Art. VI, Sec. 132
Art. XI, Sec. 133
Art. III, Sec. 734
Art. III, Sec. 435
Art. XIII, Sec. 16 36
Art. II, Sec. 2837
Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita et al., on the other hand, pray in their consolidated memorandum38
on March 13, 2006 for the dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit.
The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as follows:
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and
3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to
its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of whether the
requisites for a valid exercise of the Court’s power of judicial review are present is in order.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations,
to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
22
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.39
Except with respect to the requisites of standing and existence of an actual case or controversy where the
disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the rest of the requisites shall be omitted.
Standing
Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that the allegations in G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660 and
169667 make it clear that they, adverting to the non-appearance of several officials of the executive
department in the investigations called by the different committees of the Senate, were brought to vindicate
the constitutional duty of the Senate or its different committees to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation or in
the exercise of its oversight functions. They maintain that Representatives Ocampo et al. have not shown any
specific prerogative, power, and privilege of the House of Representatives which had been effectively
impaired by E.O. 464, there being no mention of any investigation called by the House of Representatives or
any of its committees which was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464.
As for Bayan Muna’s alleged interest as a party-list representing the marginalized and underrepresented, and
that of the other petitioner groups and individuals who profess to have standing as advocates and defenders
of the Constitution, respondents contend that such interest falls short of that required to confer standing on
them as parties "injured-in-fact."40
Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend that Chavez may not claim an interest as a taxpayer for
the implementation of E.O. 464 does not involve the exercise of taxing or spending power.41
With regard to the petition filed by the Senate, respondents argue that in the absence of a personal or direct
injury by reason of the issuance of E.O. 464, the Senate and its individual members are not the proper parties
to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Invoking this Court’s ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin42 and Valmonte v.
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,43 respondents assert that to be considered a proper party, one must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury
due to the enforcement of E.O. 464.44
That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-
making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation45 is not disputed. E.O. 464,
however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-
making.46 Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the
outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed,
legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they
claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.47
In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino (Bayan Muna),
Joel Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and Liza Maza
(Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of any claim that an
investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees was aborted due to the
implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes
on their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation
and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it obtained three seats
in the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the
legislative process consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list system of affording citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties who lack well-defined
political constituencies to contribute to the formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the
nation.48
As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their petitions, passing on the
standing of their co-petitioners Courage and Codal is rendered unnecessary.49
In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an organization of citizens, and the
incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer members,50 invoke
their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, asserting that the right to information,
curtailed and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the effective exercise of other constitutional rights51 and
to the maintenance of the balance of power among the three branches of the government through the
principle of checks and balances.52
It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of
laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of
Representatives,53 this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere
fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the transcendental
issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a constitutional crisis. For it to
be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance, however, it must establish (1) the
character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case
of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of
the government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions
being raised.54 The first and last determinants not being present as no public funds or assets are involved
and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in the resolution of the
controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its allegation that E.O. 464
hampers its legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only a "generalized interest" which it
shares with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that
indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial
resolution.55 In fine, PDP-Laban’s alleged interest as a political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal
standing.
Actual Case or Controversy
Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing the absence of the executive officials invited by the
Senate to its hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464, particularly those on the NorthRail project and the
wiretapping controversy.
Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy, there being no showing that President Arroyo has
actually withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited officials.56 These officials, they
claim, merely communicated to the Senate that they have not yet secured the consent of the President, not
that the President prohibited their attendance.57 Specifically with regard to the AFP officers who did not
attend the hearing on September 28, 2005, respondents claim that the instruction not to attend without the
President’s consent was based on its role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, not on E.O. 464.
23

Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest on an unfounded apprehension that the President
will abuse its power of preventing the appearance of officials before Congress, and that such apprehension is
not sufficient for challenging the validity of E.O. 464.
The Court finds respondents’ assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the
appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or
controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require either a deliberate withholding
of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing
before Congress.
As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the
hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further event before
considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this
Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Constitutionality of E.O. 464
E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress, deprives Congress
of the information in the possession of these officials. To resolve the question of whether such withholding
of information violates the Constitution, consideration of the general power of Congress to obtain
information, otherwise known as the power of inquiry, is in order.
The power of inquiry
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which
reads:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied)
This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the
latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein – the Batasang Pambansa
– and its committees.
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno,58 a case
decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in
the power to legislate.
Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leading witness in
the controversy, was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the
questions of the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the Senate, detained for contempt.
Upholding the Senate’s power to punish Arnault for contempt, this Court held:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power
to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly
and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words,
the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also
that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is
essential to obtain what is needed.59 . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from
the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate.60
The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of
investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation,
is a proper subject for investigation.
Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in Arnault was a
proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure of public funds of which
Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the Court held, "also involved government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous
to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and
informed on executive operations.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of
information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of
their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to
that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.
As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however, the right of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or
judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,61 the inquiry itself might not properly be
in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp
judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in
Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the
possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations,
along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is
in aid of legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry.
The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published
rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly
published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of
Rights.
These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected,
even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none
24
appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be
established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department
under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the
Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures prominently in the
challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses,62 and in its very title, a
discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Executive privilege
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the
promulgation of the 1986 Constitution.63 Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it
has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.
Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the
public, the courts, and the Congress."64 Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-
level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the
public."65
Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. 66 It has encompassed claims of varying
kinds.67 Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it
may be more accurate to speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information
may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing
degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations."
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents,
beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would
subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informer’s privilege, or the privilege
of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to
officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has
been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. 68
Tribe’s comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus:
Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist
disclosure of information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique role
and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. Courts ruled early that the executive had a
right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets. The courts have also granted the
executive a right to withhold the identity of government informers in some circumstances and a qualified
right to withhold information related to pending investigations. x x x"69 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The entry in Black’s Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope of
the doctrine.
This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from
disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary
to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental
operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an
appropriate exercise of the executive’ domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those
documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative
communications.70 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be
considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question
that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional
privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.71
The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon, 72 decided in 1974. In issue in
that case was the validity of President Nixon’s claim of executive privilege against a subpoena issued by a
district court requiring the production of certain tapes and documents relating to the Watergate
investigations. The claim of privilege was based on the President’s general interest in the confidentiality of
his conversations and correspondence. The U.S. Court held that while there is no explicit reference to a
privilege of confidentiality in the U.S. Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to
the effective discharge of a President’s powers. The Court, nonetheless, rejected the President’s claim of
privilege, ruling that the privilege must be balanced against the public interest in the fair administration of
criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it was not there addressing the issue of claims
of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional demands for information.
Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are rare.73 Despite frequent
assertion of the privilege to deny information to Congress, beginning with President Washington’s refusal to
turn over treaty negotiation records to the House of Representatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has never
adjudicated the issue.74 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a case
decided earlier in the same year as Nixon, recognized the President’s privilege over his conversations against
a congressional subpoena.75 Anticipating the balancing approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Nixon, the Court of Appeals weighed the public interest protected by the claim of privilege against the
interest that would be served by disclosure to the Committee. Ruling that the balance favored the President,
the Court declined to enforce the subpoena. 76
In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v.
Vasquez.77 Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the
following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege:
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the
claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord
deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the
public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A
President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the
considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is
fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. It did
not involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the people to information.78 Nonetheless, the
Court recognized that there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the
25
public, thus acknowledging, in substance if not in name, that executive privilege may be claimed against
citizens’ demands for information.
In Chavez v. PCGG,79 the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is
a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military,
diplomatic and other national security matters."80 The same case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are
also a recognized limitation on the right to information.
Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,81 the Court ruled that the right to information does not
extend to matters recognized as "privileged information under the separation of powers,"82 by which the
Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.
It also held that information on military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and
information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused
were exempted from the right to information.
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in
this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the
courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character.
While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the
ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that
executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive
officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Validity of Section 1
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences between the two
provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these provisions separately.
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior
determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the
challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of
department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads’ possession of any
information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis
Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section
1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or
upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by
such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related
thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing,
the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article
VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides
for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." As the following
excerpt of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows, the framers were aware that these two
provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the Question Hour] yesterday,
I noticed that members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to appear before the House of
Representatives or before the Senate. I have a particular problem in this regard, Madam President, because
in our experience in the Regular Batasang Pambansa – as the Gentleman himself has experienced in the
interim Batasang Pambansa – one of the most competent inputs that we can put in our committee
deliberations, either in aid of legislation or in congressional investigations, is the testimonies of Cabinet
ministers. We usually invite them, but if they do not come and it is a congressional investigation, we usually
issue subpoenas.
I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner Suarez when he said that the fact that the
Cabinet ministers may refuse to come to the House of Representatives or the Senate [when requested under
Section 22] does not mean that they need not come when they are invited or subpoenaed by the committee of
either House when it comes to inquiries in aid of legislation or congressional investigation. According to
Commissioner Suarez, that is allowed and their presence can be had under Section 21. Does the gentleman
confirm this, Madam President?
MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20 refers only to what was originally
the Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under
which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the
House.83 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance
was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The
reference to Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one of the proponents of the amendment to make
the appearance of department heads discretionary in the question hour.
So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the Committee on Style,
precisely in recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision on question hour from its original
position as Section 20 in the original draft down to Section 31, far from the provision on inquiries in aid of
legislation. This gave rise to the following exchange during the deliberations:
MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Style] We now go, Mr.
Presiding Officer, to the Article on Legislative and may I request the chairperson of the Legislative
Department, Commissioner Davide, to give his reaction.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide is recognized.|avvphi|.net
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one reaction to the Question Hour. I propose
that instead of putting it as Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say?
MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that previously when we sequenced this but we reasoned that
in Section 21, which is Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power of Congress in terms of its own lawmaking;
whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a power in terms of its own lawmaking power because in
26
Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of legislation. And so we put Question Hour as Section 31. I hope
Commissioner Davide will consider this.
MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a
complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would
be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of
legislation.
MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the committee, we find merit in the suggestion of Commissioner
Davide. In other words, we are accepting that and so this Section 31 would now become Section 22. Would
it be, Commissioner Davide?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide and Maambong
proceeded from the same assumption that these provisions pertained to two different functions of the
legislature. Both Commissioners understood that the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
different from the power to conduct inquiries during the question hour. Commissioner Davide’s only
concern was that the two provisions on these distinct powers be placed closely together, they being
complementary to each other. Neither Commissioner considered them as identical functions of Congress.
The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners’ alone. From the above-quoted exchange,
Commissioner Maambong’s committee – the Committee on Style – shared the view that the two provisions
reflected distinct functions of Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the other hand, was speaking in his
capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative Department. His views may thus be presumed as
representing that of his Committee.
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite meaning. It is a
period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers
accountable for their acts and the operation of the government,85 corresponding to what is known in Britain
as the question period. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution86 which
made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system
established by that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly
accountable to it.
An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National Assembly for
the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential
system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired, the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National
Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.87
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question
hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers.88 To that
extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of
the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not,
however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all
circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress’
right to executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative. As
Schwartz observes:
Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is that the
Congress has the right to obtain information from any source – even from officials of departments and
agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the situation which prevails in a
parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a clear separation between the legislative and executive
branches. It is this very separation that makes the congressional right to obtain information from the
executive so essential, if the functions of the Congress as the elected representatives of the people are
adequately to be carried out. The absence of close rapport between the legislative and executive branches in
this country, comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system, and the nonexistence in the
Congress of an institution such as the British question period have perforce made reliance by the Congress
upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to perform its legislative
tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive information, its power of oversight of
administration in a system such as ours becomes a power devoid of most of its practical content, since it
depends for its effectiveness solely upon information parceled out ex gratia by the executive.89 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be
considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while
the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which
it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of
legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.90
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it
is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the
lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive
branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by
refusing to comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based
on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch
of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the
Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis
not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the
judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during
the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice.
27

Having established the proper interpretation of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the Court now
proceeds to pass on the constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of
any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances
of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The
reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible,
in a way that will render it constitutional.
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in
the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such
inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the
Executive Secretary.
Validity of Sections 2 and 3
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior
officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security
officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e. department heads,
Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are "covered by the
executive privilege."
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. Given the title of
Section 2 — "Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege" —, it is evident that under the rule of
ejusdem generis, the determination by the President under this provision is intended to be based on a similar
finding of coverage under executive privilege.
En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually
covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly
invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.
In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of executive
privilege, the reference to persons being "covered by the executive privilege" may be read as an abbreviated
way of saying that the person is in possession of information which is, in the judgment of the head of office
concerned, privileged as defined in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus proceed on the assumption that this is
the intention of the challenged order.
Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is "covered by the
executive privilege," such official is subjected to the requirement that he first secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before Congress. This requirement effectively bars the appearance of the official
concerned unless the same is permitted by the President. The proviso allowing the President to give its
consent means nothing more than that the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue
of E.O. 464.
Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office, authorized by the
President under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official is in possession of information that is
covered by executive privilege. This determination then becomes the basis for the official’s not showing up
in the legislative investigation.
In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation
must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the
President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the President has not
reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even without mentioning the term "executive
privilege," amounts to an implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by
authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.
The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate President Drilon
illustrates the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464. It reads:
In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the Committee of the Whole regarding the Northrail
Project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 September 2005 at 10:00 a.m., please be informed
that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be able to attend the same
without the consent of the President, pursuant to Executive Order No. 464 (s. 2005), entitled "Ensuring
Observance Of The Principle Of Separation Of Powers, Adherence To The Rule On Executive Privilege
And Respect For The Rights Of Public Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of Legislation
Under The Constitution, And For Other Purposes". Said officials have not secured the required consent from
the President. (Underscoring supplied)
The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being
requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence.
Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot
attend the hearing.
Significant premises in this letter, however, are left unstated, deliberately or not. The letter assumes that the
invited officials are covered by E.O. 464. As explained earlier, however, to be covered by the order means
that a determination has been made, by the designated head of office or the President, that the invited official
possesses information that is covered by executive privilege. Thus, although it is not stated in the letter that
such determination has been made, the same must be deemed implied. Respecting the statement that the
invited officials have not secured the consent of the President, it only means that the President has not
reversed the standing prohibition against their appearance before Congress.
Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermita’s letter leads to the conclusion that the executive branch, either
through the President or the heads of offices authorized under E.O. 464, has made a determination that the
information required by the Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of writing, there has been no contrary
pronouncement from the President. In fine, an implied claim of privilege has been made by the executive.
While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege may be
invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the possession of
the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress. Thus, the case holds:
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in
the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or
discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court
and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential.
28
This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of
exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is
essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative
and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.91 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions
claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by
the Order to determine whether it is valid.
While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the ground
invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of privilege, a
defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated by the letter of respondent
Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not
accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded
involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates
the types of information that are covered by the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to
speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not even
intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase "confidential or
classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order."
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged.
It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it
is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the
dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in
terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It
threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with
the information that it has requested.
A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore,
be clearly asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds teaches:
The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by
a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head
of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. The
court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do
so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.92 (Underscoring
supplied)
Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of
determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in
which it is made, it should be respected.93 These, in substance, were the same criteria in assessing the claim
of privilege asserted against the Ombudsman in Almonte v. Vasquez94 and, more in point, against a
committee of the Senate in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.95
A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening:
[T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from disclosure impossible,
thereby preventing the Court from balancing such harm against plaintiffs’ needs to determine whether to
override any claims of privilege.96 (Underscoring supplied)
And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:97
On the present state of the record, this Court is not called upon to perform this balancing operation. In
stating its objection to claimant’s interrogatories, government asserts, and nothing more, that the disclosures
sought by claimant would inhibit the free expression of opinion that non-disclosure is designed to protect.
The government has not shown – nor even alleged – that those who evaluated claimant’s product were
involved in internal policymaking, generally, or in this particular instance. Privilege cannot be set up by an
unsupported claim. The facts upon which the privilege is based must be established. To find these
interrogatories objectionable, this Court would have to assume that the evaluation and classification of
claimant’s products was a matter of internal policy formulation, an assumption in which this Court is
unwilling to indulge sua sponte.98 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy99 similarly emphasizes that "an agency must provide ‘precise and
certain’ reasons for preserving the confidentiality of requested information."
Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America100 amplifies, thus:
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and description of the
documents within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality.
Without this specificity, it is impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of disclosure of the very thing
sought to be protected. As the affidavit now stands, the Court has little more than its sua sponte speculation
with which to weigh the applicability of the claim. An improperly asserted claim of privilege is no claim of
privilege. Therefore, despite the fact that a claim was made by the proper executive as Reynolds requires, the
Court can not recognize the claim in the instant case because it is legally insufficient to allow the Court to
make a just and reasonable determination as to its applicability. To recognize such a broad claim in which
the Defendant has given no precise or compelling reasons to shield these documents from outside scrutiny,
would make a farce of the whole procedure.101 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Due respect for a co-equal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege
clearly stating the grounds therefor. Apropos is the following ruling in McPhaul v. U.S:102
We think the Court’s decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly relevant to
these questions. For it is as true here as it was there, that ‘if (petitioner) had legitimate reasons for failing to
produce the records of the association, a decent respect for the House of Representatives, by whose authority
the subpoenas issued, would have required that (he) state (his) reasons for noncompliance upon the return of
the writ. Such a statement would have given the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its
inquiry by taking other appropriate steps to obtain the records. ‘To deny the Committee the opportunity to
consider the objection or remedy is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes.
His failure to make any such statement was "a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to produce
papers before a congressional committee[, and] cannot be condoned." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.103 A useful
analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination.
Thus, Hoffman v. U.S.104 declares:
The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would
incriminate himself – his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to
say whether his silence is justified, and to require him to answer if ‘it clearly appears to the court that he is
29
mistaken.’ However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the
sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the
very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident
from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the
question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure
could result." x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely
invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully
insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the
circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.
No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the
heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to
be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere expression of
opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.
Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged order the alleged unlawful
delegation of authority to the heads of offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, in
particular, cites the case of the United States where, so it claims, only the President can assert executive
privilege to withhold information from Congress.
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain
information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect
of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the
President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to
authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive
privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is
crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch,105 or in those
instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities.106 The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain informations
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by
definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity
must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President
the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the
privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of
the President," which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary
power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the
President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold
such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3,
in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.
It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own
judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the
President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in
order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the
matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the
President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the
failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to
compel his appearance.
The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent of the
President under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure "respect for the rights of public officials appearing in
inquiries in aid of legislation." That such rights must indeed be respected by Congress is an echo from
Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that "[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected."
In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied
claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such authorization is partly
motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the
authorization itself.
Right to Information
E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in the
hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their right to
information on matters of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in claiming, however, that what is
involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry, but the right of the people
to information.
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the
power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the
demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the
same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information
grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to
Congress and not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a
highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to
information.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any
executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily
deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a
matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in
formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress — opinions which they can then communicate
to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their
freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective
only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when
30
the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can
such bear fruit.107 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the
sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.
Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication
While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt
from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to
people in general, Tañada v. Tuvera states:
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a
law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed
instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest
which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in
courts of justice.108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged order must
be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which
members of the body politic may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people
should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.
Conclusion
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the
mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
is frustrated. That is impermissible. For
[w]hat republican theory did accomplish…was to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy, based on
the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the
doctrine of popular sovereignty. (Underscoring supplied)109
Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information
cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to
inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater value – our
right as a people to take part in government.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464
(series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are,
however, VALID.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131636. March 5, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARTEMIO INVENCION y SORIANO, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Before us for automatic review[1] is the Decision[2] dated 22 September 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 9375, finding accused-appellant Artemio Invencion y
Soriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his 16-year-old daughter
Cynthia P. Invencion, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay Cynthia the sum of
P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.
Artemio was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac with thirteen counts of rape in separate
complaints docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9363 to 9375, all dated 17 October 1996. The cases were
consolidated and jointly tried. At his arraignment Artemio entered a plea of not guilty in each case.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution in its evidence in chief were Elven Invencion, Eddie Sicat,
Gloria Pagala, Dr. Rosario Fider, and Atty. Florencio Canlas. Presented as rebuttal witnesses were Gloria
Pagala and Celestino Navarro.
Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil of Sapang Tagalog Elementary School in Tarlac, Tarlac,
testified that he is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law wife.
Sometime before the end of the school year in 1996, while he was sleeping in one room with his father
Artemio, Cynthia, and two other younger brothers, he was awakened by Cynthias loud cries. Looking
towards her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion. After about two minutes, his
father put on his short pants.[3]
Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a drunkard. He angrily prohibited
Cynthia from entertaining any of her suitors. Whenever he was drunk, he would maul Elven and quarrel with
his stepfather, Celestino Navarro.[4]
Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer and neighbor of Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac,
testified that on the second week of March 1996, between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m., while he was passing by the
house of Artemio on his way to the field to catch fish, he heard somebody crying. He then peeped through a
small opening in the destroyed portion of the sawali wall of Artemios house. He saw Cynthia lying on her
back and crying, while her father was on top of her, doing a pumping motion. Eddie observed them for about
fifteen seconds, and then he left and proceeded to the field to catch fish.[5] He reported what he had
witnessed to Artemios stepfather, Celestino, later that morning.[6]
Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of Artemio, testified that she and
Artemio started living together in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, in February 1969. Out of their common-law
relationship, they had six children, one of whom was Cynthia. In March 1982, she and Artemio parted ways
permanently. Later, Gloria and her children lived in Pura, Tarlac. When Artemios mother died sometime in
31
1996, Cynthia lived with Artemio in a small one-room dwelling owned by Celestino and located in
Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac.[7] On 30 August 1996, her son Novelito told her that Cynthia was
pregnant. Gloria then went to the house of Artemio and asked Cynthia about her condition. The latter
confessed that she had been sexually abused by her father. Gloria then went to the office of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac and reported what Artemio had done to their daughter Cynthia.[8]
Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial Hospital testified that she examined Cynthia on 16 September 1996.
She found Cynthia to be five to six months pregnant and to have incomplete, healed hymenal lacerations at
3, 5, 8 oclock positions, which could have been caused by sexual intercourse or any foreign body inserted in
her private part.[9]
Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI agent, testified that on 18 September 1996, Cynthia, accompanied by her
mother, complained before him and NBI Supervising Agent Rolando Vergara that she was raped by her
father Artemio. She then executed a written statement,[10] which she subscribed and sworn to before Atty.
Canlas.[11]
The defense did not present Artemio as a witness. Instead, his counsel de parte, Atty. Isabelo Salamida, took
the witness stand and testified for the defense. He declared that on 24 June 1997 (the same day when he
testified before the court), between 10:45 and 11:00 a.m., he and his secretary went to the house of Artemio
in Barangay Sapang Tagalog. The hut was made of sawali. Its door was padlocked, and its windows were
shut. When he went around the house and tried to peep through the old sawali walls on the front and left and
right sides of the hut, he could not see anything inside the room where Artemio and his children used to
sleep. Although it was then about noontime, it was dark inside.[12] Atty. Salamida then concluded that
prosecution witness Eddie Sicat was not telling the truth when he declared having seen what Artemio did to
Cynthia when he peeped through a small opening in the sawali wall of the house in the early morning
sometime on the second week of March 1996.
On rebuttal, Gloria Pagala testified that the house where Artemio used to live was a small hut with some
destroyed portions in its sawali walls. When she went there to visit her children sometime in December
1995, there was a hole in front and at the sidewall of the hut facing a vacant lot where people passed by to
fish in a nearby brook.[13] When she went to the place again sometime in September 1996 after she was
informed of Cynthias pregnancy, she noticed that the destroyed portions of the huts sawali walls were not
yet repaired.[14]
The second rebuttal witness Celestino Navarro, stepfather of Artemio, testified that he is the owner of the
small house where Artemio and his children used to reside. At the time that Artemio and his children,
including Cynthia, were living in that house, the huts old sawali walls had some small holes in them, thus
confirming the testimony of Eddie Sicat. After Artemio was arrested on the basis of Cynthias complaint
before the NBI, Celestino made some repairs in the hut by, among other things, placing galvanized iron
sheets to cover the holes at the destroyed portions of the sawali walls. Thereafter, a person named Alvin
occupied the house.[15]
In its Decision of 22 September 1997, the trial court convicted Artemio in Criminal Case No. 9375. It,
however, acquitted him in all the other twelve cases for lack of evidence.
In his Appellants Brief, Artemio contends that the trial court erred in
I disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant.[20]
... BELIEVING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
II
NOT DISMISSING THIS CASE FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE [HIS] GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven, as his son,
should have been disqualified as a witness against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.[16] Besides, Elvens testimony appears not to be his but what the prosecution wanted him to say, as
the questions asked were mostly leading questions. Moreover, Elven had ill-motive in testifying against him,
as he (Artemio) was cruel to him.
In another attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, Artemio points to the
following inconsistencies in their testimonies: (1) as to the time of the commission of the crime, Elven
testified having seen Artemio on top of his sister one night in March 1996, while Eddie Sicat testified having
seen them in the same position between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. in the second week of March 1996; (2) as to the
residence of Cynthia in 1996, Gloria testified that the former was living with her in Guimba from November
1995 to September 1996, while Elven and Eddie declared that she was in Sapang Tagalog in March 1996;
and (3) as to the residence of Artemio, Jr., Gloria stated that he was living with the appellant, but later she
declared that he was living with her in Pura.
Artemio also argues that since his house had no electricity and was dark even at daytime, it was impossible
for Elven and Eddie to see him allegedly doing pumping motion on top of Cynthia. In his Reply Brief, he
likewise urges us to disregard the testimonies of rebuttal witnesses Celestino and Gloria. According to him,
Celestino had an ax to grind against him (Artemio) because he had been badgering Celestino for his share of
the lot where the hut stands, which was owned by Artemios deceased mother. On the other hand, Gloria
wanted to get rid of Artemio because she was already cohabiting with another man.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of Artemios
conviction and sentence, but recommends that a civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000 be awarded in
addition to the awards of moral and exemplary damages.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the trial court on the culpability of Artemio.
It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. This is so because the
trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or
falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion, the sudden pallor of a discovered lie, the
tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer, the forthright tone of a ready reply, the furtive glance, the blush of
conscious shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of
the solemnity of an oath, or the carriage and mien.[17] This rule, however, admits of exceptions, as where
there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that has been ignored or misconstrued by the
court, or where the trial court has acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of the facts.[18] We do not find any of
these exceptions in the case at bar.
As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court,[19] otherwise known as the rule on filial privilege. This rule is not strictly a rule on
The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As
correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to
32
waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was
testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only to tell the truth.[21]
Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecutions act of propounding leading questions on Elven. Section
10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court[22] expressly allows leading questions when the witness is a child of
tender years like Elven.
The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves scant consideration. Such
insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and flimsy. As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender age,
could not have subjected himself to the ordeal of a public trial had he not been compelled by a motive other
than to bring to justice the despoiler of his sisters virtue. There is no indication that Elven testified because
of anger or any ill-motive against his father, nor is there any showing that he was unduly pressured or
influenced by his mother or by anyone to testify against his father. The rule is that where there is no
evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is
that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence.[23]
We find as inconsequential the alleged variance or difference in the time that the rape was committed, i.e.,
during the night as testified to by Elven, or between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. per the testimony of Eddie. The
exact time or date of the commission of rape is not an element of the crime. What is decisive in a rape
charge is that the commission of the rape by the accused has been sufficiently proved. Inconsistencies and
discrepancies as to minor matters irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for
acquittal.[24] In this case, we believe that the crime of rape was, indeed, committed as testified to by Elven
and Eddie.
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of both Elven and Gloria do not impair the credibility of these
witnesses. We agree with the trial court that they are minor inconsistencies, which do not affect the
credibility of the witnesses. We have held in a number of cases that inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses that refer to minor and insignificant details do not destroy the witnesses credibility.[25] On the
contrary, they may even be considered badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness on the material
points in the testimonies. What is important is that the testimonies agree on essential facts and substantially
corroborate a consistent and coherent whole.[26]
Artemios allegation that it was impossible for both Elven and Eddie to have seen and witnessed the crime
because the room was dark even at daytime was convincingly disputed by rebuttal witnesses Gloria Pagala
and Celestino Navarro. Furthermore, as observed by the OSG, even if the hut was without electricity, Elven
could not have been mistaken in his identification of Artemio because he had known the latter for a long
time. Moreover, Elven was at the time only two meters away from Cynthia and Artemio. Even without
sufficient illumination, Elven, who was jostled out of his sleep by Cynthias loud cry, could observe the
pumping motion made by his father.[27]
The alleged ill-motives on the part of Gloria and Celestino were not sufficiently proved. Nothing in the
records suggests any reason that would motivate Gloria to testify falsely against Artemio, who is the father
of her other children. Moreover, we have repeatedly held that no mother would subject her child to the
humiliation, disgrace, and trauma attendant to the prosecution for rape if she were not motivated solely by
the desire to have the person responsible for her childs defilement incarcerated.[28] As for Celestino, he
testified that the lot where the hut stands is owned by his daughter Erlinda, and not by Artemios mother.[29]
At any rate, even without Celestinos testimony, Artemios conviction would stand.
The remaining issue for our resolution is the correctness of the penalty of death imposed by the trial court.
The death penalty was imposed because of the trial courts appreciation of the special qualifying
circumstances that Artemio is the father of the victim and the latter was less than 18 years old at the time the
crime was committed.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which is the governing law in this
case, pertinently reads:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
...
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
To justify the imposition of the death penalty in a rape committed by a father on a daughter, the minority of
the victim and her relationship with the offender, which are special qualifying circumstances, must be
alleged in the complaint or information and proved by the prosecution during the trial by the quantum of
proof required for conviction. The accusatory portion of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 9375 reads as
follows:
That on or about the month of March 1996 at Sapang Tagalog, Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Artemio S. Invencion did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by using force and intimidation have carnal knowledge
of his daughter Cynthia P. Invencion who was sixteen (16) years old, in their house.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[30]
Although the relationship of Cynthia with her father Artemio was alleged in the complaint and duly
established by evidence during trial, the allegation in the complaint regarding her age was not clearly
proved.
In the very recent case of People v. Pruna,[31] we set the guidelines in appreciating age either as an element
of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
33

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7
years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims mother or
relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented and offered in
evidence to prove Cynthias age. The statement in the medical certificate showing Cynthias age is not proof
thereof, since a medical certificate does not authenticate the date of birth of the victim. Moreover, pursuant
to Pruna, Glorias testimony regarding Cynthias age was insufficient, since Cynthia was alleged to be 16
years old already at the time of the rape and what is sought to be proved is that she was then 18 years old.
Moreover, the trial court did not even make a categorical finding on Cynthias minority. Finally, the silence
of Artemio or his failure to object to the testimonial evidence regarding Cynthias age could not be taken
against him.
It must be stressed that the severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried
out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of
procedure and evidence.[32] Accordingly, in the absence of sufficient proof of Cynthias minority, Artemio
cannot be convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. He should only be convicted
of simple rape and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As regards the civil liability of Artemio, the awards of moral damages in the amount of P50,000 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 are insufficient. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory upon the
finding of the fact of rape,[33] should also be awarded. In simple rape, the civil indemnity for the victim
shall not be less than P50,000.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac, in Criminal Case No.
9375 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that that accused Artemio Invencion y Soriano is held
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim Cynthia Invencion the sums of P50,000 as indemnity;
P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 169895 March 23, 2011
ISAGANI M. YAMBOT, LETTY JIMENEZ-MAGSANOC, JOSE MA. D. NOLASCO, ARTEMIO T.
ENGRACIA, JR. and VOLT CONTRERAS, Petitioners,
vs.
Hon. ARTEMIO TUQUERO in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, and ESCOLASTICO U. CRUZ,
JR., Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court), assailing the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62479 dated July 8, 2005 and its Resolution2 dated September 29,
2005 in the same case.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
On May 26, 1996, the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI) printed an article3 headlined Judge mauled me, says
court employee, carrying the by-line of petitioner Volt Contreras (Contreras). The article reported an alleged
mauling incident that took place between respondent Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Escolastico
U. Cruz, Jr. (Judge Cruz) and Robert Mendoza (Mendoza), an administrative officer assigned at the Office
of the Clerk of Court of the Makati RTC.
Reckoning the article to be false and malicious, Judge Cruz initiated a Complaint4 for libel with the City
Prosecutor of Makati. In particular, Judge Cruz protested the following sentence in said article:
According to Mendoza, Cruz still has a pending case of sexual harassment filed with the Supreme Court by
Fiscal Maria Lourdes Garcia, also of the Makati RTC.5
Rebutting the statement, Judge Cruz alleged that there was no suit for sexual harassment pending against
him before this Court, and attached a certification dated July 16, 19966 of the Deputy Court Administrator
attesting to the pendency of only two administrative cases against him, namely RTJ-96-1352 (Re: Mauling
incident) and OCA IPI No. 96-185-RTJ (For gross ignorance of the law, Partiality and Rendering an unjust
judgment).
For his part, Contreras filed a counter-affidavit7 with the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, explaining the
supposed factual basis for his article. It appeared that Atty. Maria Lourdes Paredes-Garcia (Paredes-Garcia)
had filed with this Court a Petition for Review to question a contempt order issued against her by Judge
Cruz. In connection with said Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 120654, Paredes-Garcia
filed a Reply dated February 5, 1996 asking this Court to look deeply into allegations of one Enrina Talag-
Pascual (Talag-Pascual) that Judge Cruz made sexual advances to her while she was a member of his staff at
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Paredes-Garcia claimed that she suffered similar indignities
from Judge Cruz, and prayed that her Petition be treated as an administrative case against said judge.
Paredes-Garcia appended a January 29, 1996 affidavit executed by Talag-Pascual to purportedly show the
34
proclivity of Judge Cruz for seducing women who became objects of his fancy. Contreras claimed that the
statement in his news article constituted a fair and true report of a matter of grave public interest as it
involved the conduct of a regional trial court judge.
In the meantime, on September 11, 1996, this Court rendered its Decision8 on the Petition of Paredes-
Garcia, granting her prayer to set aside Judge Cruz’s contempt order. The prayer in Paredes-Garcia’s Reply
that the Petition be treated as an administrative case against Judge Cruz was not passed upon by the Court.
Subsequently, the City Prosecutor of Makati approved a Resolution9 finding probable cause against
Mendoza and six PDI officers and employees, namely: Contreras, Isagani Yambot, Letty Jimenez-
Magsanoc, Jose Ma. Nolasco, Artemio Engracia, Jr. and Carlos Hidalgo (the PDI Staff). On February 21,
1997, the City Prosecutor filed an Information10 for libel against Mendoza and the PDI Staff. Thereafter, the
PDI Staff filed a Motion with the trial court for the deferment of the arraignment to allow them to appeal to
the Secretary of the Department of Justice.
On March 3, 2000, then Secretary of Justice Artemio Tuquero (Secretary Tuquero) dismissed the PDI Staff’s
Petition for Review of the Resolution of the City Prosecutor.11 Secretary Tuquero rejected the argument of
therein petitioners that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of lack of supporting affidavits from
third persons. According to Secretary Tuquero, affidavits of third persons are not essential for a libel
complaint to prosper, as it is enough that the person defamed can be identified.12 As regards the factual
basis presented by Contreras, Secretary Tuquero noted it cannot be said that Judge Cruz was indeed facing a
sexual harassment suit in this Court.13 The Motion for Reconsideration14 was denied in a Resolution15
dated October 12, 2000.
The PDI Staff with the exception of Hidalgo (herein petitioners) filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court
of Appeals to challenge the aforementioned Resolutions of Secretary Tuquero. The Petition was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 62479.
On July 8, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.
Applying our ruling in Advincula v. Court of Appeals,16 the appellate court held that since the Information
had already been filed with the trial court, the primary determination of probable cause is now with the
latter.17 The Court of Appeals denied the ensuing Motion for Reconsideration in the assailed Resolution
dated September 29, 2005.
Hence, petitioners filed this Petition for Review with this Court, raising the following issues:
(A) WHETHER OR NOT A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE OR
DEFICIENT IF IT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY AFFIDAVITS OF THIRD PERSONS.
(B) WHETHER OR NOT A NEWS REPORT ON THE ACTUATIONS OF A PUBLIC OFFICIAL IS
PRIVILEGED IN NATURE AND HENCE, THE PRESUMPTION OF MALICE IS DESTROYED.
(C) WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVILEGED NATURE OF A PUBLICATION IS A GROUND FOR
DISMISSAL AND THAT THE RESPONDENT NEED NOT WAIT UNTIL TRIAL TO RAISE THE
ISSUE OF PRIVILEGE.
(D) WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLISHER AND EDITORS ARE JOINTLY LIABLE WITH THE
AUTHOR OF THE ALLEGEDLY OFFENDING NEWS REPORT EVEN IF THEY DID NOT
PARTICIPATE IN THE WRITING AND EDITING OF SAID NEWS REPORT.18
In raising the above issues, petitioners essentially questioned the Makati City Prosecutors Office’s finding of
probable cause to charge them with libel, as affirmed by the Secretary of Justice. As stated above, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari by applying the procedural doctrine laid down in Advincula.
Similar to the present case, in Advincula, respondents Amando and Isagani Ocampo filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals questioning the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
which had earlier led to the filing of Informations against them in court. The Court of Appeals granted the
Petition and set aside the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. In reversing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, we applied the rule that certiorari, being an extraordinary writ, cannot be resorted to when other
remedies are available. The Court observed that respondents had other remedies available to them, such as
the filing of a Motion to Quash the Information under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, or allowing the trial to
proceed where they could either file a demurrer to evidence or present their evidence to disprove the charges
against them.19
At the outset, it should be made clear that the Court is not abandoning the foregoing ruling in Advincula.
However, Advincula cannot be read to completely disallow the institution of certiorari proceedings against
the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause when the criminal information has already been
filed in court. Under exceptional circumstances, a petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice (involving an appeal of the prosecutor’s ruling on probable cause) may be allowed,
notwithstanding the filing of an information with the trial court.
In Ching v. Secretary of Justice,20 petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
assailing the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 115, otherwise known as the Trust Receipts Law. Conformably with said Resolution, the City
Prosecutor filed 13 Informations against petitioner. Upon denial of the Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals assailing the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. While this Court ultimately affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling
denying the Petition for Certiorari, the discussion affirming the resort to said extraordinary writ is
enlightening:
In Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), this Court held that the acts of a quasi-judicial
officer may be assailed by the aggrieved party via a petition for certiorari and enjoined (a) when necessary to
afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) when necessary for the orderly
administration of justice; (c) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (d) where the
charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (e) when there is clearly no prima
facie case against the accused. The Court also declared that, if the officer conducting a preliminary
investigation (in that case, the Office of the Ombudsman) acts without or in excess of his authority and
resolves to file an Information despite the absence of probable cause, such act may be nullified by a writ of
certiorari.
Indeed, under Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Information shall be
prepared by the Investigating Prosecutor against the respondent only if he or she finds probable cause to
hold such respondent for trial. The Investigating Prosecutor acts without or in excess of his authority under
the Rule if the Information is filed against the respondent despite absence of evidence showing probable
cause therefor. If the Secretary of Justice reverses the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor who found
no probable cause to hold the respondent for trial, and orders such prosecutor to file the Information despite
the absence of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice acts contrary to law, without authority and/or in
excess of authority. Such resolution may likewise be nullified in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.21
35
In light of the particular factual context of the present controversy, we find that the need to uphold the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press and crystal clear absence of a prima facie case against the
PDI staff justify the resort to the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause the dishonor or contempt of
a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.22 Consequently, the following
elements constitute libel: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the
imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.23 The glaring absence of
maliciousness in the assailed portion of the news article subject of this case negates the existence of probable
cause that libel has been committed by the PDI staff.
As previously stated, Judge Cruz initiated the complaint for libel, asserting the falsity and maliciousness of
the statement in a news report that "(a)ccording to Mendoza, Cruz still has a pending case of sexual
harassment filed with the Supreme Court by Fiscal Maria Lourdes Garcia, also of the Makati RTC."24 It can
be easily discerned that the article merely reported the statement of Mendoza that there was allegedly a
pending case of sexual harassment against Judge Cruz and that said article did not report the existence of the
alleged sexual harassment suit as a confirmed fact. Judge Cruz never alleged, much less proved, that
Mendoza did not utter such statement. Nevertheless, Judge Cruz concludes that there was malice on the part
of the PDI Staff by asserting that they did not check the facts. He claimed that the report got its facts wrong,
pointing to a certification from the Deputy Court Administrator attesting to the pendency of only two
administrative cases against him, both of which bear captions not mentioning sexual harassment.
A newspaper should not be held to account to a point of suppression for honest mistakes, or imperfection in
the choice of words.25 While, indeed, the allegation of inappropriate sexual advances in an appeal of a
contempt ruling does not turn such case into one for sexual harassment, we agree with petitioners’
proposition that the subject news article’s author, not having any legal training, cannot be expected to make
the fine distinction between a sexual harassment suit and a suit where there was an allegation of sexual
harassment. In fact, three other newspapers reporting the same incident committed the same mistake: the
Manila Times article was headlined "Judge in sex case now in physical injury rap";26 the Philippine Star
article described Judge Cruz as "(a) Makati judge who was previously charged with sexual harassment by a
lady prosecutor";27 and the Manila Standard Article referred to him as "(a) Makati judge who was
reportedly charged with sexual harassment by a lady fiscal."28
The questioned portion of the news article, while unfortunately not quite accurate, on its own, is insufficient
to establish the element of malice in libel cases. We have held that malice connotes ill will or spite and
speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.29 Malice is present when it is shown that the author of the
libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the
truth or falsity thereof.30
The lack of malice on the part of the PDI Staff in the quoting of Mendoza’s allegation of a sexual
harassment suit is furthermore patent in the tenor of the article: it was a straightforward narration, without
any comment from the reporter, of the alleged mauling incident involving Judge Cruz. The subject article
was, in fact, replete with other allegations by Mendoza of purported misconduct on the part of Judge Cruz.
Except for the above-quoted statement, Judge Cruz did not find the other assertions by Mendoza as reported
by the PDI article to be libelous:
At around 2 p.m., Mendoza said, an employee at Cruz’s court fetched him to the judge’s chamber.1âwphi1
He was walking along the corridor when Cruz looked out, saw him, and yelled, "Mendoza, halika nga rito
(come here)."
"He dragged me to his chamber and locked the door. Tatlo kami doon, kasama ang sheriff niya na si Nory
Santos," Mendoza said.
Inside, Mendoza said Cruz began taunting him, asking him, "Matigas ba ang dibdib mo, ha? (Do you have a
strong chest?)" Mendoza said, (h)e was made to sit in a guest’s chair in front of Cruz’s desk. He recalled
seeing placed on top of a side table a .99mm and a .45 caliber pistol which he presumed to belong to the
judge.
While standing, Mendoza said the judge began punching him, at the same time subjecting him to verbal
abuse. The first punch was at the left side of his chest, the second at the right. The third was at his left knee,
then last was at the right knee, Mendoza said.
His right knee was still swollen as of yesterday.
"Hinamon pa niya ako, square daw kami," he said. "At hindi daw niya ako titigilan at ipapatanggal pa daw
niya ako (He even dared me to a fight. He threatened me that he would not stop until I am fired from my
job)," Mendoza said.
"Kung anak pa daw niya ang nakalaban ko, babarilin na lang daw niya ako sa sentido at babayaran na lang
ako (He said if it was his son with whom I quarreled, he would have simply put a bullet to my head and paid
for my life)."31
In Borjal v. Court of Appeals,32 we held that "[a] newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage,
should be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with
minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long
as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the
general community."33 Like fair commentaries on matters of public interest,34 fair reports on the same
should thus be included under the protective mantle of privileged communications, and should not be
subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.35 The concept of privileged
communication is implicit in the constitutionally protected freedom of the press,36 which would be
threatened when criminal suits are unscrupulously leveled by persons wishing to silence the media on
account of unfounded claims of inaccuracies in news reports.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62479 dated July 8, 2005 and its Resolution dated September 29, 2005 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus -
36
 PENNSWELL, INC. Amount
Respondent. P.O.
Date
G.R. No. 172835 1. a. Anti-Friction Fluid

Present: b. Excellent Rust Corrosion (fake)

MPL-800
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. MPL-008
Chairperson, 153,941.40
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, 155,496.00
CHICO-NAZARIO, 5714
NACHURA, and 5888
REYES, JJ. 05/20/99
06/20/99
Promulgated:
2. a. Contact Grease
December 13, 2007 b. Connector Grease (fake)
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x COG #2
CG
DECISION 115,236.00
230,519.52
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 5540
6327
04/26/99
Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation seeks, via the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules 08/05/99
of Court, the nullification of the 16 February 2006 Decision[1] and the 25 May 2006 Resolution[2] of the 3. a. Trixohtropic Grease
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86329, which affirmed the Order[3] dated 30 June 2004 of the b. Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating (fake)
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 64, in Civil Case No. 00-561. EPC
EPC#2
Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air transportation 81,876.96
services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the business of 81,876.96
manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants. 4582
5446
On various dates, respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade, covered by Sales 01/29/99
Invoices No. 8846,[4] 9105,[5] 8962,[6] and 8963,[7] which correspond to Purchase Orders No. 6433, 6684, 04/21/99
6634 and 6633, respectively. Under the contracts, petitioners total outstanding obligation amounted to 4. a. Dry Lubricant
P449,864.98 with interest at 14% per annum until the amount would be fully paid. For failure of the b. Anti-Seize Compound (fake)
petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts, respondent filed a Complaint[8] for a Sum of ASC-EP
Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC. ASC-EP 2000
87,346.52
In its Answer,[9] petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was not without valid and justifiable reasons. In 124,108.10
particular, petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of P592,000.00 by respondent for its 5712
previous sale of four items, covered by Purchase Order No. 6626. Said items were misrepresented by 4763 & 5890
respondent as belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical with products petitioner had 05/20/99
previously purchased from respondent. Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by respondent which merely 02/16/99 & 06/24/99
altered the names and labels of such goods. Petitioner specifically identified the items in question, as
follows: According to petitioner, respondents products, namely Excellent Rust Corrosion, Connector Grease, Electric
Strength Protective Coating, and Anti-Seize Compound, are identical with its Anti-Friction Fluid, Contact
Label/Description Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, and Dry Lubricant, respectively. Petitioner asseverated that had respondent
Item No. been forthright about the identical character of the products, it would not have purchased the items
37
complained of. Moreover, petitioner alleged that when the purported fraud was discovered, a conference was
held between petitioner and respondent on 13 January 2000, whereby the parties agreed that respondent
would return to petitioner the amount it previously paid. However, petitioner was surprised when it received
a letter from the respondent, demanding payment of the amount of P449,864.94, which later became the
subject of respondents Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money against petitioner.
During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel[10] respondent to give a detailed list of
the ingredients and chemical components of the following products, to wit: (a) Contact Grease and
Connector Grease; (b) Thixohtropic Grease and Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating; and (c) Dry
Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound.[11] It appears that petitioner had earlier requested the Philippine
Institute of Pure and Applied Chemistry (PIPAC) for the latter to conduct a comparison of respondents
goods.
On 15 March 2004, the RTC rendered an Order granting the petitioners motion. It disposed, thus:
The Court directs [herein respondent] Pennswell, Inc. to give [herein petitioner] Air Philippines
Corporation[,] a detailed list of the ingredients or chemical components of the following chemical products:
a. Contact Grease to be compared with Connector Grease;
b. Thixohtropic Grease to be compared with Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating; and
c. Dry Lubricant to be compared with Anti-Seize Compound[.]
[Respondent] Pennswell, Inc. is given fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order to submit to [petitioner]
Air Philippines Corporation the chemical components of all the above-mentioned products for chemical
comparison/analysis.[12]
Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that it cannot be compelled to
disclose the chemical components sought because the matter is confidential. It argued that what petitioner
endeavored to inquire upon constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to divulge.
Respondent maintained that its products are specialized lubricants, and if their components were revealed, its
business competitors may easily imitate and market the same types of products, in violation of its proprietary
rights and to its serious damage and prejudice.
The RTC gave credence to respondents reasoning, and reversed itself. It issued an Order dated 30 June 2004,
finding that the chemical components are respondents trade secrets and are privileged in character. A priori,
it rationalized:
The Supreme Court held in the case of Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 299
SCRA 744, p. 764, that the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that aside from national
security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property
Code and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act)
are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.
Trade secrets may not be the subject of compulsory disclosure. By reason of [their] confidential and
privileged character, ingredients or chemical components of the products ordered by this Court to be
disclosed constitute trade secrets lest [herein respondent] would eventually be exposed to unwarranted
business competition with others who may imitate and market the same kinds of products in violation of
[respondents] proprietary rights. Being privileged, the detailed list of ingredients or chemical components
may not be the subject of mode of discovery under Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which expressly
makes privileged information an exception from its coverage.[13]
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition and affirmed the Order
dated 30 June 2004 of the RTC.
The Court of Appeals ruled that to compel respondent to reveal in detail the list of ingredients of its
lubricants is to disregard respondents rights over its trade secrets. It was categorical in declaring that the
chemical formulation of respondents products and their ingredients are embraced within the meaning of
trade secrets. In disallowing the disclosure, the Court of Appeals expounded, thus:
The Supreme Court in Garcia v. Board of Investments (177 SCRA 374 [1989]) held that trade secrets and
confidential, commercial and financial information are exempt from public scrutiny. This is reiterated in
Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (299 SCRA 744 [1998]) where the Supreme
Court enumerated the kinds of information and transactions that are recognized as restrictions on or
privileges against compulsory disclosure. There, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that:
The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters and
intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other
related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) re also exempt
from compulsory disclosure.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that a party cannot be compelled to produce, release or disclose
documents, papers, or any object which are considered trade secrets.
In the instant case, petitioner [Air Philippines Corporation] would have [respondent] Pennswell produce a
detailed list of ingredients or composition of the latters lubricant products so that a chemical comparison and
analysis thereof can be obtained. On this note, We believe and so hold that the ingredients or composition of
[respondent] Pennswells lubricants are trade secrets which it cannot be compelled to disclose.
[Respondent] Pennswell has a proprietary or economic right over the ingredients or components of its
lubricant products. The formulation thereof is not known to the general public and is peculiar only to
[respondent] Pennswell. The legitimate and economic interests of business enterprises in protecting their
manufacturing and business secrets are well-recognized in our system.
[Respondent] Pennswell has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies
and other confidential programs and information against the public. Otherwise, such information can be
illegally and unfairly utilized by business competitors who, through their access to [respondent] Pennswells
business secrets, may use the same for their own private gain and to the irreparable prejudice of the latter.
xxxx
In the case before Us, the alleged trade secrets have a factual basis, i.e., it comprises of the ingredients and
formulation of [respondent] Pennswells lubricant products which are unknown to the public and peculiar
only to Pennswell.
38
All told, We find no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
public respondent Judge in finding that the detailed list of ingredients or composition of the subject lubricant
products which petitioner [Air Philippines Corporation] seeks to be disclosed are trade secrets of
[respondent] Pennswell; hence, privileged against compulsory disclosure.[14]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Unyielding, petitioner brought the instant Petition before us, on the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVAILING LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT UPHELD THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
CHEMICAL COMPONENTS OR INGREDIENTS OF RESPONDENTS PRODUCTS ARE TRADE
SECRETS OR INDUSTRIAL SECRETS THAT ARE NOT SUBJECT TO COMPULSORY
DISCLOSURE.[15]
Petitioner seeks to convince this Court that it has a right to obtain the chemical composition and ingredients
of respondents products to conduct a comparative analysis of its products. Petitioner assails the conclusion
reached by the Court of Appeals that the matters are trade secrets which are protected by law and beyond
public scrutiny. Relying on Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, petitioner argues that the use of modes
of discovery operates with desirable flexibility under the discretionary control of the trial court. Furthermore,
petitioner posits that its request is not done in bad faith or in any manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress
respondent.
A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and
those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it.[16] The definition also extends to a secret
formula or process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some article
of trade having a commercial value.[17] A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or
compilation of information that: (1) is used in one's business; and (2) gives the employer an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not possess the information.[18] Generally, a trade secret is a
process or device intended for continuous use in the operation of the business, for example, a machine or
formula, but can be a price list or catalogue or specialized customer list.[19] It is indubitable that trade
secrets constitute proprietary rights. The inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar
innovation has rights therein which may be treated as property, and ordinarily an injunction will be granted
to prevent the disclosure of the trade secret by one who obtained the information "in confidence" or through
a "confidential relationship."[20] American jurisprudence has utilized the following factors[21] to determine
if an information is a trade secret, to wit:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer's business;
(2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in
developing the information; and
(6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an independent
source.[22]
In Cocoland Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[23] the issue was the
legality of an employees termination on the ground of unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets. The Court
laid down the rule that any determination by management as to the confidential nature of technologies,
processes, formulae or other so-called trade secrets must have a substantial factual basis which can pass
judicial scrutiny. The Court rejected the employers naked contention that its own determination as to what
constitutes a trade secret should be binding and conclusive upon the NLRC. As a caveat, the Court said that
to rule otherwise would be to permit an employer to label almost anything a trade secret, and thereby create
a weapon with which he/it may arbitrarily dismiss an employee on the pretext that the latter somehow
disclosed a trade secret, even if in fact there be none at all to speak of.[24] Hence, in Cocoland, the
parameters in the determination of trade secrets were set to be such substantial factual basis that can
withstand judicial scrutiny.
The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondents special lubricants are trade secrets
within the contemplation of the law. Respondent was established to engage in the business of general
manufacturing and selling of, and to deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise dispose of goods, wares,
merchandise, products, including but not limited to industrial chemicals, solvents, lubricants, acids, alkalies,
salts, paints, oils, varnishes, colors, pigments and similar preparations, among others. It is unmistakable to
our minds that the manufacture and production of respondents products proceed from a formulation of a
secret list of ingredients. In the creation of its lubricants, respondent expended efforts, skills, research, and
resources. What it had achieved by virtue of its investments may not be wrested from respondent on the
mere pretext that it is necessary for petitioners defense against a collection for a sum of money. By and
large, the value of the information to respondent is crystal clear. The ingredients constitute the very fabric of
respondents production and business. No doubt, the information is also valuable to respondents competitors.
To compel its disclosure is to cripple respondents business, and to place it at an undue disadvantage. If the
chemical composition of respondents lubricants are opened to public scrutiny, it will stand to lose the
backbone on which its business is founded. This would result in nothing less than the probable demise of
respondents business. Respondents proprietary interest over the ingredients which it had developed and
expended money and effort on is incontrovertible. Our conclusion is that the detailed ingredients sought to
be revealed have a commercial value to respondent. Not only do we acknowledge the fact that the
information grants it a competitive advantage; we also find that there is clearly a glaring intent on the part of
respondent to keep the information confidential and not available to the prying public.
We now take a look at Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, which permits parties to inspect documents
or things upon a showing of good cause before the court in which an action is pending. Its entire provision
reads:
SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection order. Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefore, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or
control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or
control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated
relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the
inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
39

A more than cursory glance at the above text would show that the production or inspection of documents or
things as a mode of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court may be availed of by any party upon a
showing of good cause therefor before the court in which an action is pending. The court may order any
party: a) to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, which are not privileged;[25] which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action; and which are in his possession,
custody or control; or b) to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control
for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated
relevant object or operation thereon.
Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged.[26] The documents
must not be privileged against disclosure.[27] On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for
production and inspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged
matter; that is, books and papers which, because of their confidential and privileged character, could not be
received in evidence.[28] Such a condition is in addition to the requisite that the items be specifically
described, and must constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which
are in the partys possession, custody or control.
Section 24[29] of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to
wit: (a) communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c)
communication between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and penitent; and (e)
public officers and public interest. There are, however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned by
Rule 130. Among them are the following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of
published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d)
information contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank deposits. [30]
We, thus, rule against the petitioner. We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the finding
of the RTC that there is substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary
rights over the detailed chemical composition of its products.
That trade secrets are of a privileged nature is beyond quibble. The protection that this jurisdiction affords to
trade secrets is evident in our laws. The Interim Rules of Procedure on Government Rehabilitation, effective
15 December 2000, which applies to: (1) petitions for rehabilitation filed by corporations, partnerships, and
associations pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A,[31] as amended; and (2) cases for rehabilitation
transferred from the Securities and Exchange Commission to the RTCs pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799,
otherwise known as The Securities Regulation Code, expressly provides that the court may issue an order to
protect trade secrets or other confidential research, development, or commercial information belonging to
the debtor.[32] Moreover, the Securities Regulation Code is explicit that the Securities and Exchange
Commission is not required or authorized to require the revelation of trade secrets or processes in any
application, report or document filed with the Commission.[33] This confidentiality is made paramount as a
limitation to the right of any member of the general public, upon request, to have access to all information
filed with the Commission.[34]
Furthermore, the Revised Penal Code endows a cloak of protection to trade secrets under the following
articles:
Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500
pesos shall be imposed upon any manager, employee or servant who, in such capacity, shall learn the secrets
of his principal or master and shall reveal such secrets.
Art. 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon the person in charge, employee or
workman of any manufacturing or industrial establishment who, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall
reveal the secrets of the industry of
the latter.
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, has a
restrictive provision on trade secrets, penalizing the revelation thereof by internal revenue officers or
employees, to wit:
SECTION 278. Procuring Unlawful Divulgence of Trade Secrets. - Any person who causes or procures an
officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to divulge any confidential information regarding the
business, income or inheritance of any taxpayer, knowledge of which was acquired by him in the discharge
of his official duties, and which it is unlawful for him to reveal, and any person who publishes or prints in
any manner whatever, not provided by law, any income, profit, loss or expenditure appearing in any income
tax return, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos (P2,000), or suffer imprisonment
of not less than six (6) months nor more than five (5) years, or both.
Republic Act No. 6969, or the Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990,
enacted to implement the policy of the state to regulate, restrict or prohibit the importation, manufacture,
processing, sale, distribution, use and disposal of chemical substances and mixtures that present
unreasonable risk and/or injury to health or the environment, also contains a provision that limits the right of
the public to have access to records, reports or information concerning chemical substances and mixtures
including safety data submitted and data on emission or discharge into the environment, if the matter is
confidential such that it would divulge trade secrets, production or sales figures; or methods, production or
processes unique to such manufacturer, processor or distributor; or would otherwise tend to affect adversely
the competitive position of such manufacturer, processor or distributor.[35]
Clearly, in accordance with our statutory laws, this Court has declared that intellectual and industrial
property rights cases are not simple property cases.[36] Without limiting such industrial property rights to
trademarks and trade names, this Court has ruled that all agreements concerning intellectual property are
intimately connected with economic development.[37] The protection of industrial property encourages
investments in new ideas and inventions and stimulates creative efforts for the satisfaction of human needs.
It speeds up transfer of technology and industrialization, and thereby bring about social and economic
progress.[38] Verily, the protection of industrial secrets is inextricably linked to the advancement of our
economy and fosters healthy competition in trade.
Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged the private character of trade secrets. There is a privilege not
to disclose ones trade secrets.[39] Foremost, this Court has declared that trade secrets and banking
transactions are among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as embodied in
the Constitution.[40] We said that the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside
from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the
Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.[41]
40

Significantly, our cases on labor are replete with examples of a protectionist stance towards the trade secrets
of employers. For instance, this Court upheld the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company
prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company, on the rationalization that
the company has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors.[42] Notably, it was in a labor-related case that this
Court made a stark ruling on the proper determination of trade secrets.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 77[43] of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the
Philippines, in order to compel respondent to reveal the chemical components of its products. While it is true
that all consumer products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or imported, shall indicate their
general make or active ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not apply to
respondent. Respondents specialized lubricants -- namely, Contact Grease, Connector Grease, Thixohtropic
Grease, Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating, Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound -- are not
consumer products. Consumer products, as it is defined in Article 4(q),[44] refers to goods, services and
credits, debts or obligations which are primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes,
which shall include, but not be limited to, food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. This is not the nature of
respondents products. Its products are not intended for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes.
Rather, they are for industrial use, specifically for the use of aircraft propellers and engines.
Petitioners argument that Republic Act No. 8203, or the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs, requires the
disclosure of the active ingredients of a drug is also on faulty ground.[45] Respondents products are outside
the scope of the cited law. They do not come within the purview of a drug[46] which, as defined therein,
refers to any chemical compound or biological substance, other than food, that is intended for use in the
treatment, prevention or diagnosis of disease in man or animals. Again, such are not the characteristics of
respondents products.
What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is that the chemical formulation
of respondents products is not known to the general public and is unique only to it. Both courts uniformly
ruled that these ingredients are not within the knowledge of the public. Since such factual findings are
generally not reviewable by this Court, it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence
already considered in the proceedings below.[47] We need not delve into the factual bases of such findings
as questions of fact are beyond the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Factual findings of the trial court
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.[48]
We do not find merit or applicability in petitioners invocation of Section 12[49] of the Toxic Substances and
Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990, which grants the public access to records, reports or
information concerning chemical substances and mixtures, including safety data submitted, and data on
emission or discharge into the environment. To reiterate, Section 12[50] of said Act deems as confidential
matters, which may not be made public, those that would divulge trade secrets, including production or sales
figures or methods; production or processes unique to such manufacturer, processor or distributor, or would
otherwise tend to affect adversely the competitive position of such manufacturer, processor or distributor. It
is true that under the same Act, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources may release
information; however, the clear import of the law is that said authority is limited by the right to
confidentiality of the manufacturer, processor or distributor, which information may be released only to a
medical research or scientific institution where the information is needed for the purpose of medical
diagnosis or treatment of a person exposed to the chemical substance or mixture. The right to confidentiality
is recognized by said Act as primordial. Petitioner has not made the slightest attempt to show that these
circumstances are availing in the case at bar.
Indeed, the privilege is not absolute; the trial court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for
doing justice.[51] We do not, however, find reason to except respondents trade secrets from the application
of the rule on privilege. The revelation of respondents trade secrets serves no better purpose to the
disposition of the main case pending with the RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money. As can be
gleaned from the facts, petitioner received respondents goods in trade in the normal course of business. To
be sure, there are defenses under the laws of contracts and sales available to petitioner. On the other hand,
the greater interest of justice ought to favor respondent as the holder of trade secrets. If we were to weigh the
conflicting interests between the parties, we rule in favor of the greater interest of respondent. Trade secrets
should receive greater protection from discovery, because they derive economic value from being generally
unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.[52] To the mind of this Court, petitioner was not able
to show a compelling reason for us to lift the veil of confidentiality which shields respondents trade secrets.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 16 February 2006, and the Resolution dated 25
May 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86329 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68097 January 16, 1986
EDWARD A. KELLER & CO., LTD., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COB GROUP MARKETING, INC., JOSE E. BAX, FRANCISCO C. DE CASTRO, JOHNNY DE LA
FUENTE, SERGIO C. ORDOÑEZ, TRINIDAD C. ORDOÑEZ, MAGNO C. ORDOÑEZ,
ADORACION C. ORDOÑEZ, TOMAS C. LORENZO, JR., LUIZ M. AGUILA-ADAO, MOISES P.
ADAO, ASUNCION MANAHAN and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents-
appellees.
Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano & Hernandez Law Office for petitioner.
Vicente G. Gregorio for private respondents.
Roberto P. Vega for respondent Asuncion Manahan.
AQUINO, C.J.:
This case is about the liability of a marketing distributor under its sales agreements with the owner of the
products. The petitioner presented its evidence before Judges Castro Bartolome and Benipayo. Respondents
presented their evidence before Judge Tamayo who decided the case.
A review of the record shows that Judge Tamayo acted under a misapprehension of facts and his findings are
contradicted by the evidence. The Appellate Court adopted the findings of Judge Tamayo. This is a case
where this Court is not bound by the factual findings of the Appellate Court. (See Director of Lands vs.
Zartiga, L-46068-69, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 346, 355).
41
Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. appointed COB Group Marketing, Inc. as exclusive distributor of its
household products, Brite and Nuvan in Panay and Negros, as shown in the sales agreement dated March 14,
1970 (32-33 RA). Under that agreement Keller sold on credit its products to COB Group Marketing.
As security for COB Group Marketing's credit purchases up to the amount of P35,000, one Asuncion
Manahan mortgaged her land to Keller. Manahan assumed solidarily with COB Group Marketing the
faithful performance of all the terms and conditions of the sales agreement (Exh. D).
In July, 1970 the parties executed a second sales agreement whereby COB Group Marketing's territory was
extended to Northern and Southern Luzon. As security for the credit purchases up to P25,000 of COB Group
Marketing for that area, Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr. and his father Tomas, Sr. (now deceased) executed a
mortgage on their land in Nueva Ecija. Like Manahan, the Lorenzos were solidarily liable with COB Group
Marketing for its obligations under the sales agreement (Exh. E).
The credit purchases of COB Group Marketing, which started on October 15, 1969, limited up to January
22, 1971. On May 8, the board of directors of COB Group Marketing were apprised by Jose E. Bax the
firm's president and general manager, that the firm owed Keller about P179,000. Bax was authorized to
negotiate with Keller for the settlement of his firm's liability (Exh. 1, minutes of the meeting).
On the same day, May 8, Bax and R. Oefeli of Keller signed the conditions for the settlement of COB Group
Marketing's liability, Exhibit J, reproduced as follows:
This formalizes our conditions for the settlement of C.O.B.'s account with Edward Keller Ltd.
1. Increase of mortgaged collaterals to the full market value (estimated by Edak at P90,000.00).
2. Turn-over of receivables (estimated outstandings P70,000.00 to P80,000.00).
3. Turn-over of 4 (four) trucks for outright sale to Edak, to be credited against C.0.B.'s account.
4. Remaining 8 (eight) trucks to be assigned to Edak, C.O.B will continue operation with these 8
trucks. They win be returned to COB after settlement of full account.
5. C.O.B has to put up securities totalling P200,000.00. P100,000.00 has to be liquidated within one
year. The remaining P100,000.00 has to be settled within the second year.
6. Edak wig agree to allow C.O.B. to buy goods to the value of the difference between P200,000.00
and their outstandings, provided C.O.B. is in a position to put up securities amounting to P200,000.00.
Discussion held on May 8, 1971.
Twelve days later, or on May 20, COB Group Marketing, through Bax executed two second chattel
mortgages over its 12 trucks (already mortgaged to Northern Motors, Inc.) as security for its obligation to
Keller amounting to P179,185.16 as of April 30, 1971 (Exh. PP and QQ). However, the second mortgages
did not become effective because the first mortgagee, Northern Motors, did not give its consent. But the
second mortgages served the purpose of being admissions of the liability COB Group Marketing to Keller.
The stockholders of COB Group Marketing, Moises P. Adao and Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr., in a letter dated
July 24, 1971 to Keller's counsel, proposed to pay Keller P5,000 on November 30, 1971 and thereafter every
thirtieth day of the month for three years until COB Group Marketing's mortgage obligation had been fully
satisfied. They also proposed to substitute the Manahan mortgage with a mortgage on Adao's lot at 72 7th
Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City (Exh. L).
These pieces of documentary evidence are sufficient to prove the liability of COB Group Marketing and to
justify the foreclosure of the two mortgages executed by Manahan and Lorenzo (Exh. D and E).
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him "as admissions of a party".
The admissions of Bax are supported by the documentary evidence. It is noteworthy that all the invoices,
with delivery receipts, were presented in evidence by Keller, Exhibits KK-1 to KK-277-a and N to N-149-a,
together with a tabulation thereof, Exhibit KK, covering the period from October 15, 1969 to January 22,
1971. Victor A. Mayo, Keller's finance manager, submitted a statement of account showing that COB Group
Marketing owed Keller P184,509.60 as of July 31, 1971 (Exh. JJ). That amount is reflected in the customer's
ledger, Exhibit M.
On the other hand, Bax although not an accountant, presented his own reconciliation statements wherein he
showed that COB Group Marketing overpaid Keller P100,596.72 (Exh. 7 and 8). He claimed overpayment
although in his answer he did not allege at all that there was an overpayment to Keller.
The statement of the Appellate Court that COB Group Marketing alleged in its answer that it overpaid Keller
P100,596.72 is manifestly erroneous first, because COB Group Marketing did not file any answer, having
been declared in default, and second, because Bax and the other stockholders, who filed an answer, did not
allege any overpayment. As already stated, even before they filed their answer, Bax admitted that COB
Group Marketing owed Keller around P179,000 (Exh. 1).
Keller sued on September 16, 1971 COB Group Marketing, its stockholders and the mortgagors, Manahan
and Lorenzo.
COB Group Marketing, Trinidad C. Ordonez and Johnny de la Fuente were declared in default (290 Record
on Appeal).
After trial, the lower court (1) dismissed the complaint; (2) ordered Keller to pay COB Group Marketing the
sum of P100,596.72 with 6% interest a year from August 1, 1971 until the amount is fully paid: (3) ordered
Keller to pay P100,000 as moral damages to be allocated among the stockholders of COB Group Marketing
in proportion to their unpaid capital subscriptions; (4) ordered the petitioner to pay Manahan P20,000 as
moral damages; (5) ordered the petitioner to pay P20,000 as attomey's fees to be divided among the lawyers
of all the answering defendants and to pay the costs of the suit; (6) declared void the mortgages executed by
Manahan and Lorenzo and the cancellation of the annotation of said mortgages on the Torrens titles thereof,
and (7) dismissed Manahan's cross-claim for lack of merit.
The petitioner appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed said judgment except the award of P20,000 as moral
damages which it eliminated. The petitioner appealed to this Court.
Bax and the other respondents quoted the six assignments of error made by the petitioner in the Appellate
Court, not the four assignments of error in its brief herein. Manahan did not file any appellee's brief.
We find that the lower courts erred in nullifying the admissions of liability made in 1971 by Bax as president
and general manager of COB Group Marketing and in giving credence to the alleged overpayment computed
by Bax .
42

The lower courts not only allowed Bax to nullify his admissions as to the liability of COB Group Marketing
but they also erroneously rendered judgment in its favor in the amount of its supposed overpayment in the
sum of P100,596.72 (Exh. 8-A), in spite of the fact that COB Group Marketing was declared in default and
did not file any counterclaim for the supposed overpayment.
The lower courts harped on Keller's alleged failure to thresh out with representatives of COB Group
Marketing their "diverse statements of credits and payments". This contention has no factual basis. In
Exhibit J, quoted above, it is stated by Bax and Keller's Oefeli that "discussion (was) held on May 8, 1971."
That means that there was a conference on the COB Group Marketing's liability. Bax in that discussion did
not present his reconciliation statements to show overpayment. His Exhibits 7 and 8 were an afterthought.
He presented them long after the case was filed. The petitioner regards them as "fabricated" (p. 28,
Appellant's Brief).
Bax admitted that Keller sent his company monthly statements of accounts (20-21 tsn, September 2, 1976)
but he could not produce any formal protest against the supposed inaccuracy of the said statements (22). He
lamely explained that he would have to dig up his company's records for the formal protest (23-24). He did
not make any written demand for reconciliation of accounts (27-28).
As to the liability of the stockholders, it is settled that a stockholder is personally liable for the financial
obligations of a corporation to the extent of his unpaid subscription (Vda. de Salvatierra vs. Garlitos 103
Phil. 757, 763; 18 CJs 1311-2).
While the evidence shows that the amount due from COB Group Marketing is P184,509.60 as of July 31,
1971 or P186,354.70 as of August 31, 1971 (Exh. JJ), the amount prayed for in Keller's complaint is
P182,994.60 as of July 31, 1971 (18-19 Record on Appeal). This latter amount should be the one awarded to
Keller because a judgment entered against a party in default cannot exceed the amount prayed for (Sec. 5,
Rule 18, Rules of Court).
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the trial court and the Appellate Court are reversed and set aside.
COB Group marketing, Inc. is ordered to pay Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. the sum of P182,994.60 with
12% interest per annum from August 1, 1971 up to the date of payment plus P20,000 as attorney's fees.
Asuncion Manahan and Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr. are ordered to pay solidarity with COB Group Marketing the
sums of P35,000 and P25,000, respectively.
The following respondents are solidarity liable with COB Group Marketing up to the amounts of their
unpaid subscription to be applied to the company's liability herein: Jose E. Bax P36,000; Francisco C. de
Castro, P36,000; Johnny de la Fuente, P12,000; Sergio C. Ordonez, P12,000; Trinidad C. Ordonez, P3,000;
Magno C. Ordonez, P3,000; Adoracion C. Ordonez P3,000; Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr., P3,000 and Luz M.
Aguilar-Adao, P6,000.
If after ninety (90) days from notice of the finality of the judgment in this case the judgment against COB
Group Marketing has not been satisfied fully, then the mortgages executed by Manahan and Lorenzo should
be foreclosed and the proceeds of the sales applied to the obligation of COB Group Marketing. Said
mortgage obligations should bear six percent legal interest per annum after the expiration of the said 90-day
period. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44060 July 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, alias "BENBEN", defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Bienvenido Paragsa, alias "Benben", appealed to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (Judge Agapito Hontanosas, presiding), the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused Bienvenido Paragsa of the crime of
Rape as charged in the Information beyond reasonable doubt and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum
to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the maximum and to
indemnify the complaining witness in the amount of P8,000.00 (People vs. Rogato Rivera, 58, O.G. and
People vs. Chan et al., CA No. 03545-GR, August 11, 1967) with all legal accessories and to pay the costs.
Being a detention prisoner, he is entitled to the full credit of his preventive imprisonment from the time of
his confinement up to the date of the promulgation of this judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 10-19, rollo).
Because the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed by the Court of Appeals on the accused, this case is
now before US for review pursuant to Section 34, Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as
the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimony of Mirasol Magallanes, the alleged rape victim,
her aunt-in-law, Mrs. Lita Parochel, and Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco of the Bantayan Emergency Hospital,
Bantayan, Cebu, who examined the offended party and submitted Exhibit A embodying his findings thereon,
Substantially, the records show that in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, Mirasol, who was then a little over
twelve and a half (12½) years old (Exhibit B, p. 7, rec.), was alone in her parents' house in Sitio Tabagac of
Barrio Bunacan, Municipality of Madridejos, Cebu, cooking hog feed. Her parents were away at the time —
her father was in Cadiz, while her mother was in Sagay, both in Negros Occidental (p. 16, t.s.n., Jan. 5,
1972) while the rest of the family were with Mirasol's grandmother in Barrio Codia; also in Madridejos,
Cebu. Mirasol was a 6th grade student of the Bunacan Elementary School (p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971). Upon
instruction of her mother, she did not go to school that afternoon so that she could look after the pigs and
cook their feed. Thus, she was alone in the ground floor of their house cooking hog feed when the accused,
Bienvenido Paragsa, armed with a hunting knife, entered the house and closed the door after him.
Approaching from behind, he placed his left arm around Mirasol's neck, encircled her abdomen with his
43
right arm, at the same time pointing the hunting knife with s right hand at her breast, and threatened her not
to shout otherwise she would be killed. Thereafter, the accused pushed her to a bamboo bed nearby, rolled
up her dress and, with his two hands, removed her panties. The accused then placed his hunting knife on the
bed by Mirasol's side, opened the zipper of his pants while kneeling on the bed, opened Mirasol's thighs,
picked up the hunting knife again, placed himself on top of Mirasol, inserted his erect penis into her sexual
organ and then made four push and pull movement until he ejaculated (pp. 7, 10-11, 12, 13, 14, t.s.n., Ibid).
In the process, Mirasol's dress and panties were not torn, since, because of fear, she allowed the accused to
roll up her dress and pull her panties without any resistance whatsoever. During the intercourse, the accused
was not holding the hunting knife. After the accused had discharged, he ran to the storeroom of the house
upstairs because he heard Mrs. Lita Parochel, wife of the younger brother of Mirasol's father, calling from
outside the gate of the house, asking Mirasol to open the gate. Mirasol did not answer because she was then
in the act of putting on her panties (p. 14, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 10, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972). After she had put on her
panties, she opened the gate and saw her aunt Lita, who asked her what the accused did to her, but she did
not answer because she was afraid as the accused was still inside the house. She also did not tell her aunt
Lita that the accused had sexual intercourse with her under threats and against her will. Her aunt Lita then
walked away.
Thereafter, the accused reappeared in the room and told Mirasol that if she would tell her aunt Lita what he
did, he would kill her (pp. 13-14, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971). After the incident, Mirasol went to Barrio Codia later
in the afternoon of the same day and joined her brother and sister and grandmother. She did not reveal to any
of them what transpired between her and the accused in Tabagac.
Mirasol's father returned from Cadiz, Negros Occidental that same day; but Mirasol did not also reveal the
incident to him because she was afraid her father might punish her. Her mother returned home on July 16,
1971 from Sagay, Negros Occidental; but Mirasol did not also tell her mother about what happened to her on
July 13 in Tabagac It was her aunt Lita who revealed the matter to Mirasol's mother, who thereupon
confronted her daughter. Mirasol had to reveal the incident of July 13 to her mother only when her mother
asked her about it; because, according to her, she wanted to take revenge on the accused (p. 15, Dec. 3,
1971). Three days after her return from Sagay, Negros Occidental — on July 19, 1971 — Mirasol's mother
brought her to the Bantayan Emergency Hospital in Bantayan, Cebu, where she was examined by Dr. Luis
L. Gandiongco, who submitted his findings as follows:
Abrasion of inguinal region
Abrasion, left thigh, medial side
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Discharges sticky, milky in color, found at the anterior fornix but negative for spermatozoa (Exh.
A, p. 8, rec.; p. 2, t.s.n., Nov. 16, 1971).
Mrs. Lita Parochel, the aunt-in-law of Mirasol, testified that she is the wife of the younger brother of
Mirasol's father. Her house is fifty (50) meters away from the house of her brother-in-law, Ruperto
Magallanes. In the afternoon of July 13, 1971, she went to the house of her brother-in-law in Tabagac
Arriving there, she saw, through the gate which was made of split bamboos, the accused running away when
she shouted to Mirasol, who was then in the act of putting on her panties, to open the gate (p. 10, t.s.n., Jan.
15, 1972). Mirasol opened the gate after she had put on her panties. Entering the house, Mrs. Parochel asked
Mirasol what the accused did to her, but Mirasol did not answer. So, she hid and from her hiding place she
saw the accused emerge from his hiding place and run away, passing through the gate of the fence.
Thereupon, she told Mirasol to go home to barrio Codia because she was also going there (p. 15, t.s.n., Ibid).
Mrs. Parochel met Mirasol's father at about 4:00 o'clock the same afternoon but she did not talk to him about
what she saw earlier in Tabagak However, she revealed the incident to her husband (p. 17, t.s.n., Ibid).
When Mirasol's mother returned from Sagay, Negros Occidental, Mrs. Parochel had a conversation with her
regarding the person of the accused and thereafter Mirasol's mother filed the corresponding complaint
against the accused (p. 18, t.s.n., Ibid).
Incidentally, in support of the complaint of Bernandina Magallanes, mother of Mirasol, Mrs. Parochel
executed an affidavit which she subscribed and swore to before the municipal judge of Madridejos, Cebu, on
July 30, 1971, wherein she stated, among other things:
1. That at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, I went to the house of Ruperto
Magallanes, my neighbor;
2. That when I entered their fence, I found out that one Benben Paragsa ran from the bed where
Mirasol Magallanes was sitting on while putting on her panties;
3. That she, Mirasol Magallanes, upon my arrival, did not say anything to me about the happening;
and that I was only thinking that something had happened (Exh. 1, p. 5, rec.).
In his typewritten brief, the appellant enumerated and discussed five errors as having been committed by the
trial court. These errors may, however, be boiled down to the issue of credibility.
Appellant admits having sexual intercourse with Mirasol, the complaining witness, but he stoutly denied that
he did so by employing force or intimidation against Mirasol. He claims he and Mirasol were sweethearts;
that on the day of the incident, it was Mirasol who invited him to the latter's house where they had sexual
intercourse after kissing each other; and that the intercourse they had that afternoon was, as a matter of fact,
their third sexual intercourse (pp. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8-9, t.s.n., March 21, 1972).
The foregoing testimony of the accused was substantially corroborated by two witnesses for the defense,
Mercado Batosbatosan and Eduardo Ducay (pp. 5, 6-7, 12, 15-16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 25, t.s.n., Feb. 1, 1972).
A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and
inconclusive to justify a conviction.
Certain circumstances negate the commission by the appellant of the crime charged and point to the
conclusion that the sexual intercourse between the appellant and the complaining witness was voluntary.
Force and intimidation were not proven. Mirasol did not offer any resistance or vocal protestation against the
alleged sexual assault. She could have easily made an outcry or resisted the appellant's advances without
endangering her life. But she did not. She was allegedly raped in her own home, not far from her neighbors
and during the daytime. If, indeed, she was raped under the circumstances narrated by her, she could have
revealed the same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her what the accused did
to her upon entering the house immediately after the intercourse took place and when the accused ran from
the bed to a storeroom of the house to hide upon seeing and/or hearing the voice of her aunt Lita. or, she
could have grabbed the hunting knife by her side when the copulation was going on, and with it she could
have possibly prevented the accused from consummating the sexual act. But she did not.
Another circumstance is that Mirasol did not reveal immediately to her parents that she was raped. It was
only after her mother arrived from Sagay, Negros Occidental, three (3) days after the incident, and
44
confronted her about the rape incident that her mother learned through her aunt Lita that she eventually
revealed to her mother what the accused did to her in the afternoon of July 13, 1971.
Still another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of the appellant
and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had had
two previous sexual communications before July 13, 1971, one of which happened on June 29, 1971 in the
house of the accused, where Mirasol and the accused slept together in the evening of the same day after the
mother of the accused and Mirasol had returned from the town fiesta of Bantayan, Cebu (p. 10, t.s.n., March
21, 1972).
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements
uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can be taken as an
admission of what is said, it must appear: (1) that he heard and understood the statement; (2) that he was at
liberty to interpose a denial; (3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in
which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts were within his
knowledge; and (5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to
the issue (IV Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1973 ed., p. 316). These requisites of
admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the
accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.
One more circumstance which engenders serious doubt on the truthfulness of Mirasol is the testimony of Dr.
Gandiongco that he did not notice any laceration in the walls of Mirasol's vagina, thus —
Q Doctor, you testified that according to your findings a foreign body might have inserted the
internal organ of the offended party?
A Yes, sir.
Q And as a matter of fact, in your examination there was no laceration?
A There was no laceration (p 5, t.s.n., November 16, 1971; Emphasis supplied).
Considering Mirasol's tender age, if she had no previous sexual experience, she must have been a virgin
when she was allegedly raped by the accused. Yet she did not state that she felt some pain as the accused
tried to insert his organ into her private part. Neither did she state that she was bleeding during and after the
alleged forced coition. Instead, she matter-of-factly narrated that the accused made four push and pull
movements after which the latter ejaculated — indicating that he had an easy time doing it.
If WE are to believe her story, certainly the doctor who examined her could have noticed the lacerations
even after the lapse of three (3) days from the coition, if the intercourse on July 13, 1971 was in fact her first
experience. WE believe the absence of lacerations in the walls of Mirasol's vagina, as testified to by Dr.
Gandiongco, supra, eloquently confirms the truth of the accused's assertion that before the incident in
question, he and Mirasol had two prior copulations.
And still another circumstance which casts serious doubt on the credibility of the complaining witness and
her aunt Lita is the matter of the hunting knife. While it is true that on the witness stand these two witnesses
practically corroborated each other on this particular point, the matter of the accused having a hunting knife
with him on the day of the incident was not, however, mentioned by Mrs. Parochel in her affidavit, Exhibit
1, which she executed on July 30, 1971 — five months before she testified in court. Besides, at the trial, the
prosecution did not bother to present such "hunting knife".
A last circumstance which also engenders serious doubt on the veracity of Mrs. Parochel, whose testimony
the trial court summarized, runs thus:
... The victim did not answer the call of her aunt nor did she open the barred door.
... She returned to the opened door and asked Mirasol what had happened. Mirasol was very pale, trembling
and in a state of shock, did not answer her inquiries ...(p. 3, Decision; p. 64, rec.; emphasis added).
The Solicitor General adopted the above factual summary made by the trial court by stating that —
Mirasol's aunt, Lita Parochel ... found her niece in a state of shock (p. 4, Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee; p.
49, rec.; Emphasis supplied).
A painstaking scrutiny of the record, particularly the transcript of stenographic notes, shows that contrary to
the finding of the trial court, Mirasol answered the call of her aunt and opened the gate of the house after she
had put on her panties (p. 14, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971); and that Mirasol only seemed to be afraid, besides
trembling (p. 23, t.s.n., 1972); nowhere in the record is any evidence of Mirasol having been in a state of
shock.
If Mirasol was in fact in a state of shock —
1. How come she was able to put on her panties and thereafter open the gate of the house when she
heard her aunt Lita calling from the outside?
2. Her aunt Lita would feel so alarmed and so concerned that she would not lose any time to bring
her to a doctor or to a hospital for medical treatment or assistance;
3. Her aunt Lita would have confronted the accused who was still hiding in the closet in a corner of
the ground floor, or she would have gone to the nearest police authority or barrio captain, who could have
easily apprehended the accused:
4. Her aunt could have sought the assistance of their barriomates or neighbors; or
5. She could have brought Mirasol to her own house which was on about 50 meters away (pp. 7, 20,
t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972). But what did she do? She abandoned Mirasol "because" she Mirasol had to feed her
hogs (p. 24, Idem).
That Mirasol was pale, afraid and trembling can only be attributed to the fact that her aunt discovered her
having sexual intercourse at so young an age and that she feared that her aunt would report the same to her
parents.
And if Mrs. Parochel really believed that her niece Mirasol was raped by appellant about 3 o'clock that
afternoon of July 13, 1971, why did she not report the outrage to Mirasol's father — her husband's brother —
whom she met about 4 o'clock that same afternoon, just one hour after the alleged rape?
Mrs. Parochel's close relationship to her niece-daughter of her brother-in-law — vitiates her credibility.
Appellant cannot be legally convicted of simple seduction under Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code, for
the same is not warranted by the wording of the information, which does not alleged deceit, although
45
appellant testified that he promised to marry Mirasol if "something happens to her body." Much less can
simple seduction include rape.
WHEREFORE, APPELLANT BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, ALIAS "BENBEN", IS HEREBY
ACQUITTED, WITH COSTS de oficio AND HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED
UNLESS HE IS BEING DETAINED ON OTHER CHARGES.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30423 November 7, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y CUDILLAN, MELECIO
CUDILLAN y ARCILLAS, and JESUS MEDALLA y CUDILLAN, defendants-appellants.
ANTONIO, J.:
This is an automatic review of a decision of the court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District,
Branch VII, Pasay City finding all the accused, namely, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y
Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, guilty of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing them as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Melecio Cudillan, ,Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre, and Mario
Comayas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, committed with four (4)
aggravating circumstances, not offset by any mitigating circumstance, and hereby sentences all of them to
suffer the penalty of death, to be carried out pursuant to the applicable provisions of law, to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of Adlina Sajo in the amount of P350,000.00, representing the value of the
pieces of jewelry unrecovered, to pay jointly and severally also the heirs of Adelina Sajo the amount of
P12,000.00. and to pay the costs.
With or without appeal, let this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to law.
During the pendency of this appeal, Melecio Cudillan died on arrival at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on
August 16, 1970, and the case as against the said accused, insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, was
dismissed on August 29, 1974. This decision, therefore, is limited to appellants Ramiro Alegre, Mario
Comayas and Jesus Medalla.
This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found in
her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla compound, Ignacio Street, Pasay City, in the early morning
of July 26, 1966. According to the Necropsy Report, she died of asphyxia by manual strangulation, and the
time of her death was placed between eighteen to twenty-two hours before 12:30 p.m. of July 26, 1966.
Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and several
cabinets were open, and some personal garments, hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No
witness saw the commission of the crime. Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in
one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police
headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, but was later released that same day for lack of
any evidence implicating him in the crime.
During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of
pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into
possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Adlina
Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29,
1966 (Exhibits "F", "F-1" and "F-2"). In this statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio
Cudillan implicated a certain "Esok" of Villalon, Calubian, Leyte; Jesus Medalla, of Villahermosa, Calubian,
Leyte; Mario Cudillan, also of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; one "Danny" Fernandez, of Balaquid,
Cabucgayan, Biliran Sub-province; and one "Rammy, " another Leyteno. When brought to Metro Manila
and while he was inside the Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again executed an
extrajudicial confession (Exhibits "A ", "A-1 " to "A-6" on July 31, 1966. This was sworn to before the
Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966. In this second statement, he narrated in detail the
participation in the commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario."
According to said statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section,
Secret Service Division, and Identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas as the persons he
referred to as Jesus Medalla, "Rami" and "Mario" in his declaration. On the basis of the aforementioned
extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan, an Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed by the
Special Counsel of Pasay City against Celso Fernandez, alias "Esok," Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, Ramiro
Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas, and one John Doe."
When arraigned on August 10, 1966, Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla and Ramiro Alegre
entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however, testified
on the actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts contained in the decision under review was based
principally and mainly on the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan. Thus, the details of the planning
and the execution of the crime were taken from the "Pasay Sworn Statement" (Exhibits "A", "A-1" to "A-
6"). The only evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellants are the
testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo.
The testimony of Sgt. Mariano Isla of the Pasay City police is to the effect that when he was investigating
Melecio Cudillan, the latter pointed to Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla as his companions
in the commission of the crime. According to him, said appellants "just stared at him (Melecio Cudilla) and
said nothing."
Q. In what particular place in the Police Department did you have to confront the accused Melecio
Cudillan with the other suspects'?
A. In the office of the Secret Service Division.
Q. When you said there was a confrontation between the accused Melecio Cudillan and other suspects
whom do you refer to as other suspects?
A. Jesus Medalla, Celso Fernandez, Rosario Dejere and Mario. There was another person Eduardo
Comayas. He was also one of those suspects but Melecio Cudillan failed to point to him as his companion.
46
 A. That he was also inside the room when they killed Adelina Sajo.
Q. Who were those persons or suspects pointed to by Melecio Cudillan in the Police Department of
Pasay City as his companions? Q. Now, regarding that conversation you had with the accused Jesus Medalla, when did that take
place, more or less?
A. To Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre and Mario Comayas.
A. About that month also of June, about the middle of June.
Q. When Melecio Cudilla pointed to these persons what did these three persons do?
Q. What year?
A. They just stared at him and said nothing. (t.s.n., pp. 15-16, Hearing of October 28, 1966).
A. 1967.
According to the trial court, had the appellants "really been innocent (they) should have protested vigorously
and not merely kept their silence." Q. Do you know the other accused Mario Comayas?

Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner in the Pasay City jail, declared that the three (3) appellants admitted A. Yes, sir.
to him that they took part in the robbery and homicide committed in the residence of the deceased, viz.:
Q. Why do you know him?
ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
A. He is also one of the prisoners and our cells are near each other. Q. If he is inside the courtroom,
Q. Do you know the other accused Ramiro Alegre? will you please point him out?

A. Yes, sir. INTERPRETER:

Q. If he is inside the court room, will you please point him out? Witness indicating to the fellow who gave his name as Mario Comayas.

INTERPRETER: ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Witness points to the fellow in the second row, fourth from the left who, upon being asked, gave his name as Q. Did you have any occasion to talk with the accused Mario Comayas?
Ramiro Alegre.
A. Yes, sir.
ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
Q. When was that, more or less?
Q. Did you have any occasion to talk to Ramiro Alegre?
A. In the month of June, about the middle part also of June.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what did you talk about?
Q. Where?
A. Regarding this case of Adelina Sajo and he admitted to me that he was one of those who planned
A. In the city jail because our cells are also near each other. and killed Adelina Sajo.

Q. And what did you and Ramiro Alegre talk about? Q. I see! And what, else did he tell you, if any?

A. Concerning his case and he told me that he has also anticipated in the commission of the killing of A. That while the killing was being perpetrated upstairs he was told to by the door.
Adelina Sajo.
Q. How about the other accused Melencio Cudillan, do you know him?
Q. By the way, when did you talk with Ramiro Alegre, more or less?
A. Yes, sir.
A. About the middle of June.
Q. If he is in court, will you please point him out?
Q. And what else did Ramiro Alegre tell you, if any?
INTERPRETER:
47

Witness pointing to the accused who gave his name as Melecio Cudillan.
ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
Q. Why do you know Melecio Cudillan?
A. Because he is with me in one cell.
Q. Were you able also to talk with Melecio Cudillan?
A. Most of the time because we used to talk about our case.
Q. When have you talked with Melecio Cudillan, more or less?
A. Three days after my confinement and subsequently thereafter up to about the first week of June,
1967.
Q. And what did the accused Melecio Cudillan tell you about this case?
ATTY. RAMIREZ:
Objection, Your Honor, leading.
COURT:
Witness may answer, there is already a basis.
A. That they were the ones who planned and killed Adelina Sajo. (t.s.n., pp. 286-289, Hearing of July
21, 1967).
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn
statements as the product of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by counsel when he
was investigated by the police. Appellants Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas denied any involvement in the
crime. They testified that at the time of the incident in question. they were attending the internment of the
deceased child of Ciriaco Abobote. According to Jesus Medalla, he and his companions left the Maravilla
compound at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of July 25, 1966 to attend the internment. 'They left the cemetery
at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and proceeded directly to his house at Leveriza Street where he stayed
the whole night. Mario Comayas confirmed that he and Jesus Medalla were at the house of Ciriaco Abobote
in the morning of July 25, 1966, until after 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon when he returned to the bakery
where he was employed to resume his work.
Appellant Ramiro Alegre did not testify but presented three (3) witnesses to support his defense. Thus,
Urbano Villanueva testified that he was a sub-contractor of Jose Inton for the welding project of David M.
Consunji at the Sheraton Hotel construction; that Ramiro Alegre began working at the construction as a
welder on July 13, 1966, and that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Alegre
worked in the project and that he knew this because he is the foreman and timekeeper in the project. He
Identified the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1"). Rodolfo Villanueva and Romeo Origenes
testified that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning up to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 25, 1966, appellant
Ramiro Alegre was at the Sheraton Hotel construction at Roxas Boulevard. Their testimony is confirmed by
the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1") which contained the number of hours he actually worked at
the Sheraton Hotel construction project.
Appellants now contend that the lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio
Cudillan (now deceased) as evidence against herein appellants; in concluding from the alleged "Silence" of
appellants when allegedly pointed to by Melecio Cudillan as "his companions" in the commission of the
crime, an admission of guilt; and in giving undue weight and credence to the testimony of an inmate of the
Pasay City Jail that appellants admitted to him their participation in the crime.
I
The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (Exhibits "A", "A- I " to "A-6" and "F", "F-1" and "F-2"),
on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in
question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and
Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet" 1 there being no
independent evidence of conspiracy. 2 As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused,
although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is
merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. 3 While there are recognized exceptions
to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such
exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit
admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their
purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
II
The next question to be resolved is whether or not the silence of appellants while under police custody, in
the face of statements of Melecio Cudillan implicating them as his companions in the commission of the
crime, could be considered as tacit admission on their part of their participation therein.
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify,
may not be taken as evidence against him, 4 and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. 5 It
has also been held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against
him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him,
otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory. 6 The leading case of Miranda v. Arizona7 held that the
prosecution may not use at trial the fact that an individual stood mute, or claimed his privilege against self-
incrimination, in the face of an accusation made at a police custodial interrogation. Prior to Miranda, it was
the view of many authorities that a man to whom a statement implicating him in a crime is directed may fail
to reply if he is in custody under a charge of the commission of that crime, not because he acquiesces in the
truth of the statement, but because he stands on his constitutional right to remain silent, as being the safest
course for him to pursue and the best way out of his predicament. 8 Other courts have held that the
circumstance that one is under arrest by itself does not render the evidence inadmissible, and that an
accusation of a crime calls for a reply even from a person under arrest or in the custody of an officer, where
the circumstances surrounding him indicate that he is free to answer if he chooses. 9
We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements
by another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to
such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the
commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to deny the
statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self-incrimination.
48
The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against self- incrimination is a fundamental right. It is a
personal right of great importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably. The privilege against self-
incrimination is an important development in man's struggle for liberty. It reflects man's fundamental values
and his most noble of aspirations, the unwillingness of civilized men to subject those' suspected of crime to
the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; the fear that self-incriminating statements may be
obtained by inhumane treatment and abuses, and the respect for the inviolability of the human personality
and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life." 10
In the words of Chavez v. Court of Appeals: 11
... this right is 'not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the
court;' it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is fundamental to our
scheme of justice ...
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his
guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable
against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime.
Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand —
with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will. EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34686 February 24, 1932
PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. ANTIGUA BOTICA RAMIREZ, DANIEL
BOQUER, and J. J. DUNBAR, Defendants-Appellees.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. 34687 February 24, 1932.
PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. ANTIGUA BOTICA RAMIREZ, DANIEL
BOQUER, and J. J. DUNBAR, and EDUARDO GUTIERREZ REPIDE, Defendants-Appellees.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. 34688 February 24, 1932.
PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. J. J. DUNBAR, DANIEL BOQUER, EDUARDO
GUTIERREZ REPIDE, and MANUELA REYES Y ALMEIDA, Defendants-Appellees.
Ross, Lawrence & Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr. for appellant.
Jose Ma. Cavanna, J. W. Ferrier & Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellees.
OSTRAND, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in the above-entitled three cases
which have been tried together and decided by the court below as one case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
In case G.R. No. 34686, plaintiff-appellant seeks to collect from defendants-appellees, Antigua Botica
Ramirez, Daniel Boquer, and J. J. Dunbar, the amount of P7,531.28 which represents the balance of an
overdraft account of the Antigua Botica Ramirez with the plaintiff as of December 17, 1928. J. J. Dunbar
and Daniel Boquer were guarantors for the overdraft.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In case G.R. No. 34687, plaintiff-appellant sees to collect from defendants, Daniel Boque, Antigua Botica
Ramirez, J. J. Dunabar, and Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, the amount of P5,837.07, balance as of March 24,
1930, of a promissory note for P6,000 executed by the defendants on June 7, 1927, in favor of the plaintiff,
whereby the defendant promised, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff 90 days after its
execution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In case G.R. No. 34688, plaintiff-appellant seeks to collect from defendants J. J. Dunbar, Daniel Boquer,
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, and Manuela Reyes y Almeida, the sum of P17,702.52, balance of December 10,
1927, of a promissory note for P30,000 executed by Dunbar Boquer, and Gutierrez Rupide, P10,000 of
which was guaranteed by Manuela Reyes y Almeida with a mortgage of a parcel of land situated in the City
of Manila in favor of the plaintiff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
For some time before the complaints were filed the Antigua Botica Ramirez was under the control and
management of the plaintiff, and a few months after plaintiff's complaints were filed, and upon plaintiff's
petition a receiver of the properties of the defendant Antigua Botica Ramirez was
appointed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After trial, the court below rendered judgment, dismissing the three complaints, ordering the cancellation of
the mortgage of Manuela Reyes' land, discharging the receiver and ordering him to turn over the properties
of the defendant Antigua Botica Ramirez to plaintiff. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed to this court
and made the following assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred in permitting the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide testify, over the objection and
exception of counsel for the plaintiff, that he signed the promissory notes marked Exhibits J and M in cases
Nos. 34687-88, as a mere surety, and for no consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
2. The trial court erred in not striking from the record defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide's testimony that
his codefendant Daniel Boquer told him that the plaintiff gave him several extentions for the payment of the
promissory notes marked Exhibits J and M in cases Nos. 34687-88, and in finding that such extensions were
in fact given by plaintiff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
3. The trial court erred in permitting the defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, Daniel Boquer and J. J.
Dunbar and the witness Rosario Boquer testify, over the objection and exception of counsel for the plaintiff,
that the shares which they owned of the stock of the defendant corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez were
assigned by them to plaintiff in payment of their obligations and in finding that such assignment, as claimed
by the defendant, was in fact made.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
4. The trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff administered the business of the defendant corporation
Antigua Botica Ramirez, without any intervention on the latter's part, and in not permitting plaintiff's witness
J. M. Araullo testify as to the condition of the corporation in the month of April,
1929.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
5. The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff sold certain furniture and other properties of the defendant
Antigua Botica Ramirez at very reduced prices.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
49
6. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the documents marked defendant's Exhibit CC, DD and EE,
and in not permitting plaintiff's witnesses E.B. Ford and E.B. Velasquez testify on
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
7. The trial court erred in finding that the preponderance of evidence was in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
8. The trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the defendants, and not in favor of the plaintiff, as
prayed for in its complaints.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
9. The trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motions for a new trial.
Under the first assignment of error, counsel for the plaintiff contend that the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez
Repide should not have been permitted by the lower court to testify that he signed the promissory notes
marked plaintiff's Exhibits J and M as a mere surety, and for no consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
We think that this point is well taken. It is admitted by the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide that he
signed the promissory notes as a surety, and it was immaterial, so far as the plaintiff was concerned, whether
or not the said Gutierrez Repide received anything in payment for the use of his signature. (Clark vs. Sellner,
42 Phil., 384.) chanrobles virtual law library
The second assignment of error has reference to the action of the lower court in not striking from the record
the testimony of the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide that he was told by the defendant Daniel Boquer
that the plaintiff bank gave him (Boquer) several extensions for the payment of the promissory notes
Exhibits J and M, and in finding that plaintiff gave such extensions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
We have not found anything in the record to justify defendant's contention. The only witness for the
defendants who testified on the alleged extensions given by plaintiff was the defendant Gutierrez Repide
himself, and his testimony consisted only of hearsay evidence and general statements against the direct and
positive evidence introduced by plaintiff that no extension was ever given for the payment of the promissory
notes. But what convinces the court that plaintiff did not extend the time for the payment of the promissory
notes in question, is the fact that the testimony of the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, was not
corroborated by either the defendant Daniel Boquer, who imparted the information to Gutierrez, Repide, or
by the defendant J. J. Dunbar. The latter, in fact, admitted that no extension was given him for the payment
of the promissory notes. Dunbar testified as follows:
Q. Mr. Dunbar, have you ever obtained an extension for the payment of the indebtedness or obligations of
the Antigua Botica Ramirez to the Philippine Trust Company and Fidelity & Surety Company covered by
some of the documents here presented in evidence? - A. No, sir.
Plaintiff might not have been prompt in proceeding against the principal debtor, but mere delay is no defense
at all for the surety.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We rule that the lower court erred in not striking from the record the testimony of the defendant Eduardo
Gutierrez Repide on the alleged extensions given by plaintiff to the defendant Daniel Boquer for the
payment of the promissory notes marked plaintiff's Exhibits J and M, and in finding that such extensions
were given by plaintiff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The third assignment of error is directed toward the action of the lower court in permitting the defendants
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, Daniel Boquer, and J. J. Dunbar, and the witness Rosario Boquer to testify that
the shares which they owned of the stock of the corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez were assigned by them
to plaintiff that such assignment was, in fact, made.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendants claim that they assigned to plaintiff the shares which they owned of the stock of the
corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez in payment of their obligations. Plaintiff denies that such assignment
was ever made, and claims that the shares in question were assigned for the purpose of enabling plaintiff to
reorganize the corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez and sell its business at a fair and reasonable
price.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We have carefully examined the evidence, and are of the opinion that plaintiff's contention should be
sustained. The defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Daniel Boquer testified, in direct examination, that
a deed of assignment to plaintiff of the shares in question in payment of the obligations of the defendants
was to be executed, and the record shows that no such document was ever
executed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is claimed by the defendants that the assignment of their shares of the stock of the corporation Antigua
Botica Ramirez to the plaintiff bank was made in payment of their obligations. Examining, however, the
notice for the special stockholders' meeting on April 26, 1929, which notice was prepared by the defendant
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide himself, no mention is made therein of any assignment of the shares in question in
payment of the obligations of the defendants to plaintiff. The notice simply says that the meeting was being
called "for the purpose of electing the new members of the Board of Directors and determining the manner
of liquidating with the Philippine Trust Company and Fidelity & Surety Company of the Philippine Islands
the obligations of the corporation (Antiga Botica Ramirez) pending payment, and at the same time resolve
the indorsement of all the shares of the corporations to the creditor corporations in order that the latter might
reorganize the Antigua Botica Ramirez (antes Zobel), Inc. in the manner most convenient to their interest."
Had such an assignment as claimed by the defendants been made, it is but natural to except that the
defendant Gutierrez Repide would have made some mention thereof in the notice for the meeting prepared
by him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The fourth and fifth assignments of error relate to the action of the lower court in holding that plaintiff
administered the business of the defendant corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez without any intervention on
the latter's part; in not permitting the witness J. M. Araullo to testify as to the condition of the corporation in
the month of April, 1929; and in finding that plaintiff sold certain properties of the defendant Antigua Botica
Ramirez at very reduced prices.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We think these points are well taken.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendants contend that plaintiff should not have sold for P5,000 a credit of P18,539.25 which the
defendant corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez had against the Palma Rosa Manufacturing Company. The
record, however, shows that the debtor, the said Palma Rosa Manufacturing Company, was insolvent and
that before the new board of directors of the corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez made the sale, the
defendants Daniel Boquer and Jose V. Ramirez were asked by plaintiff to make their comments and
recommendations and that no attention was paid to plaintiff's request. The defendants should not be heard
now to complain.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant Daniel Boquer testified, in direct examination, that he delivered to plaintiff's witness J. M.
Araullo all the assets of the defendant coporation Antigua Botica Ramirez. On rebuttal, Araullo was not
permitted to controvert Boquer's testimony.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
50
The defendant Daniel Boquer was the manager of the business of the Antigua Botica Ramirez before the
plaintiff took possession thereof, and the defendants claimed that the business was properly managed by
Boquer. On rebuttal, Araullo was not permitted to testify as to the condition of the business at the time
plaintiff took it over for the purpose of reorganization.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The rulings of the lower court were erroneous. The witness Araullo should have been permitted to testify, on
rebuttal, on the points covered by the defendant Boquer in direct examination.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
With reference to the sale of a motorcycle and certain shelves of the corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez,
we have examined the record and found nothing therein to show that they were not sold for a reasonable
price. It appears that the party who once offered P500 for the motorcycle and later on P150, had no money
and claimed that the motorcycle was in bad condition, and there is total lack of evidence as to the condition
in which the shelves were at the time of the sale.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The sixth and seventh assignments of error are concerned with certain evidence offered by the defendant and
admitted by the lower court over the objection of counsel for the plaintiff, and with certain evidence offered
by the plaintiff and rejected by the lower court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the decision to be rendered by the court, we shall only discuss the assignment of error in
connection with the document marked Exhibit EE offered by plaintiff in evidence and rejected by the lower
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Plaintiff's Exhibit EE is a copy of the minutes of a special meeting of the stockholders of the corporation
Antigua Botica Ramirez held on April 26, 1929, wherein a transcript of the stenographic notes taken at the
stockholders' meeting of the same corporation held on April 19, 1929, was incorporated. At the said meeting
of April 19, 1929, the defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar and Daniel Boquer admitted their
obligations to the plaintiff bank and such admissions were inserted, without any objection on the part of the
said defendants, in the minutes of the special stockholders' meeting of April 26,
1929.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Counsel for the defendants objected to the introduction of said Exhibit EE on the ground that it contained
certain statements made by the said defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar, and Daniel Boquer;
that the latter were not given an opportunity to explain their statements before plaintiff offered the document
in evidence; and that this contention is without merit. Had plaintiff intended to impeach statements made by
the defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar, and Daniel Boquer on another occasion, plaintiff, as
claimed by counsel for the defendant, should have laid a foundation for the introduction in evidence of said
Exhibit EE by calling the attention of the said defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar, and
Daniel Boquer to their former statements, but apparently plaintiff had no such purpose. Plaintiff's purpose in
introducing the said Exhibit EE was probably to show certain admissions against interest made by the
defendants, and said EE might then be admissible without the necessity of plaintiff's first making the
defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar, and Daniel Boquer explain their statements.
. . . In offering in evidence the testimony given by Mr. Hemady and the Hashims in the earlier case, the
defendant-appellant did not claim that said testimony contained admissions against interest by the parties to
the action of their agents; if such had been the case, the testimony would have been admissible without the
laying of a foundation and without the witness having testified in the case at bar. . . . (Juan Ysmael & Co. vs.
Hashim and Gorayeb, 50 Phil., 132, 138.)
For all the foregoing considerations, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and judgment is
hereby rendered -chanrobles virtual law library
In case No. 34686, in favor of the plaintiff Philippine Trust Company and against the defendants Antigua
Botica Ramirez, Daniel Boquer, and J. J. Dunbar, jointly, for the sum of seven thousand five hundred thirty-
one pesos and twenty-eight centavos(P7,531.28), with interest at the rate of nine per cent (9%) per annum
from December 17, 1928, until paid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In case No. 34687, in favor of the plaintiff Philippine Trust Company and against the defendants Antigua
Botica Ramirez, Daniel Boquer, J. J. Dunbar, and Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, jointly and severally, for the
sum of five thousand eight hundred thirty-seven pesos and seven centavos (P5,837.07), with interest at the
rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum, from March 24, 1930, until paid; and additional sum of five hundred
eighty-three pesos and seventy centavos (P583.70) for and as attorney's fee and costs of
collection.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In case No. 34688 in favor of the plaintiff Philippine Trust Company and against the defendant J. J. Dunbar,
Daniel Boquer, Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Manuela Reyes y Almeida, jointly and severally, for the sum
of seventeen thousand seven hundred and two pesos and fifty-two centavos (P17,702.52), with interest at the
rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum from December 10, 1927, until paid, the liability of the defendant
Manuela Reyes y Almeida being limited, however, to the sum of ten thousand pesos (10,000), which is the
amount of the obligation secured by her mortgage of February 13, 1926.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The defendants J. J. Dunbar, Daniel Boquer, and Eduardo Gutierrez Repide are further sentenced to pay
plaintiff, jointly and severally, the additional sum of one centavos (P1,702.25) for and as attorneys' fees and
costs of collection.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant Manuela Reyes y Almeida is further sentenced to pay plaintiff the additional sum of one
thousand pesos (P1,000) for and as attorney's fees and costs of collection.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The costs will be limited to the attorney's fees and costs of collection as hereinbefore stated. So ordered.
It must be stressed here that even under a regime of martial law, the operations of our laws governing the
rights of an accused person are not open to doubt. Under the code for the administration of detainees, all
officers, civilian and military personnel are sworn to uphold the rights of detainees. Among such
fundamental rights are the right against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination, the right, when under
investigation for the commission of an offense, to remain silent, to have counsel, and to be informed of his
rights; the right not to be subjected to force, violence, threats, intimidation and degrading punishment or
torture in the course of one's detention, and the safeguard that any confession obtained in violation of the
foregoing rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. 12 The 1973 Constitution gives explicit constitutional
sanction to the right to silence. Thus, in Section 20 of Article IV of the Constitution, there is this categorical
mandate: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
51
This privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Constitution protects, therefore, the right of a
person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no
penalty for such silence. 13
This aspect of the right has been comprehensively explained by then Associate Justice Enrique M. Fernando,
now Chief justice, in Pascual Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 14 thus:
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to
declare: 'The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of
his guilt.' Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed
the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant 'to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses
to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.'
Identifying the right of an accused to remain silent with right to privacy, this Court, in Pascual explained that
the privilege against self-incrimination "enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government
may not force to surrender to its detriment."
We hold, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to draw from appellants' silence while under police
custody, in the face of the incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid
appellants had tacitly admitted their guilt. We hold, further, that in view of the inadmissibility of the
extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan implicating herein appellants, the remaining evidence against
them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo, is insufficient to sustain the
judgment of conviction. Indeed, it is inherently improbable that herein appellants would have readily
confessed their participation in the commission of a heinous crime to a casual acquaintance in a prison
detention cell, considering that on the same occasion they strongly denied any involvement in such crime
before the police authorities.
WHEREFORE, the judgement appealed from is reversed, and appellants Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo,
Mario Comayas y Cudillan and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime with which
they are charged. Their immediate release from detention is ordered, unless they or any one of them is
otherwise held for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman,
RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE
PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO
CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
[G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he
is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The
warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded
on the parties dispute. While the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship
between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner
believing he would rescue them from lifes adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-
year term commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but
surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governos,
Luis Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family
and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.[1]
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona
Jr, then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled I Accuse.
He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from
November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70
million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate
President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and
the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.[2]
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed
by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the expos of Governor Singson. On the other hand,
Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach
the petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued
a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to
step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern.[3] Two days later or on October
13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of the petitioner.[4]
Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner
take the supreme self-sacrifice of resignation.[5] Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early
on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
Services[6] and later asked for petitioners resignation.[7] However, petitioner strenuously held on to his
office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior
Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar
Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.[8] On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II
also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry.[9] On November 3, Senate President Franklin
Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling
coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.[10]
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker
Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment[11] signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the
members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of
Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was
52
unseated by Representative Fuentabella.[12] On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment
trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.[13]
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial
started.[14] the battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as
prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo,
Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar
Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led
by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense
counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice
Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flamiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House Raul
Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by
live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points were the constant
conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the December hearings was the
testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one
foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature Jose Velarde on documents involving a
P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.[15]
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it
resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty.
Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioners Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the
petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider
trading.[16] Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10[17] the senator-judges ruled
against the opening of the second envelop which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held
P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The public and private prosecutors
walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President.[18] The ruling
made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By
midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against
the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective
resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment
tribunal.[19] Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment
proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public
prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.[20]
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioners resignation. A 10-kilometer line of
people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue
in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the peoples solidarity in demanding petitioners resignation.
Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in
the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more
people.[21]
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner
informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for
President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of
National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services
went to the EDSA Shrine.[22] In the presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of
thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that on behalf of your Armed Forces, the
130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to
this government.[23] A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service
commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.[24] Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries,
assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.[25] Rallies for the resignation of
the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was
ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second envelop.[26] There was no
turning back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful
and orderly transfer of power started at Malacaangs Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary.
Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito
Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the presidential Management
Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato
de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.[27]
Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which
resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning until the news
broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the
EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines.[28] At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.[29] He issued the
following press statement:[30]
20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and
serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a
factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake
of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:[31]
53

Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m., on January 20.[32] Another copy
was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.[33]
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and
duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative
Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office
as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice-
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed
to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated
as an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve
(12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of
office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20,
2001.
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that maybe filed by a proper
party.
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys.[34]
Recognition of respondent Arroyos government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in
a reception or vin d honneur at Malacaang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio
Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent Arroyo.[35] US
President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US
recognition of her government.[36]
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of
Representatives.[37] The House then passed Resolution No. 175 expressing the full support of the House of
Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Philippines.[38] It also approved Resolution No. 176 expressing the support of the House of Representatives
to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the
attainment of the nations goals under the Constitution.[39]
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.[40] A few days later, she
also signed into law the Political Advertising Ban and Fair Election Practices Act.[41]
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.[42] the
next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator
Guingona, Jr.[43] Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmea voted yes with
reservations, citing as reason therefore the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyos
presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.[44]
The House of Representatives also approved Senator Guingonas nomination in Resolution No. 178.[45]
Senator Guingona took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later.[46]
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio
and has been terminated.[47] Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated for the record that she voted against
the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment
case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another
elective post.[48]
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyos public acceptance rating jacked up from
16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.[49] In another survey conducted by the ABS-
CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted President
Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by
60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao.
Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes:
58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass, and 54% among the Es or very poor
class.[50]
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of
Conduct for government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines
Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious
misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-
00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery,
violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B.
Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the
charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the
following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and
Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the
aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-
15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754,
1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the
term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Thru another counsel, petitioner, on
February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. Acting on GR Nos.
146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents to comment thereon within a
54
non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001. On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of
GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents comments on or before 8:00 a.m.
of February 15.
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief
Justice Davide, Jr.,[51] and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban[52] recused themselves on motion of
petitioners counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that
they have compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side but
nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file
their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement
for Gag Order on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court
resolved:
(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of
the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged
resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited
for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while
they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from
resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E.
Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may
immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on
February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic.[53]
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for
decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of
petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is
immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question
Private respondents[54] raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar
assail the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration. They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the
presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic;
that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign
governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket which the Court
cannot enter.
We reject private respondents submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on
political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th
century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential
considerations, continue to be refined in the mills constitutional law.[55] In the United States, the most
authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan
in the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr,[56] viz:
x x x Prominent on the surface on any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretions; or the impossibility of a courts
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
justiciability on the ground of a political questions presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of
political questions, not of political cases.
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer
delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question.[57] Our leading case is Tanada v.
Cuenco,[58] where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political
questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of
a particular measure. To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political
question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government.[59] Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the thou shalt
nots of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.[60] With the new provision,
however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and
55
symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political
thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid
language to x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or
the extension thereof x x x.
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v.
President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.[61] and related cases[62] to support their thesis that since the cases at
bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A
more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that
the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign
people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution[63] declared that the Aquino
government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended. It is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government
sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government
automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent
Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the
1987 Constitution.[64] In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution.
Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987
Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I
involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is
an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II
is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice
President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves
legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not
inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the
reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the
recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among the reforms sine quibus
non.[65] The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its
Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions,
orally or in writing, through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for
purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to
the authorities, individually or collectively. These fundamental rights were preserved when the United States
acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7,
1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided that no law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances. The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.[66]
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,[67] and the 1973[68] Constitution. These
rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
The indispensability of the peoples freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident.
The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring
individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth;
third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth, it
is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the
precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus.[69] In this sense, freedom of speech
and of assembly provides a framework in which the conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take
place without destroying the society.[70] In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,[71] this
function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights
Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized that the basis of the right of assembly is the
substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this means talk for all and
by all.[72] In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,[73] this Court similarly stressed that
"... it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to
petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who
are deaf to their grievances are ciphers.
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution
require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article
II,[74] and section 8[75]of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 11[76] of
Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also
involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803
case of Marbury v. Madison,[77] the doctrine has been laid down that it is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . . Thus, respondents invocation of the doctrine of
political is but a foray in the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question.
Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and
by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent
disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took
her oath as president.
The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which
provides:
Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice
President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or,
in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then acts as President until
President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
x x x.
56
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January
20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Republic. Resignation is not a high
level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to
resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.[78] The validity of a resignation is not
governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be
implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he
evacuated Malacaang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions
before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the
succession of events after the expos of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated.
The more detailed revelations of petitioners alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked
the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which initially was
given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115
representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioners powerful political allies
began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and
Former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers
resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the peoples call for his resignation intensified. The call
reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the
second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the
EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew
exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the
petitioner. The window is provided in the Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the diary of Executive
Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.[79] The Angara Diary reveals that in morning
of January 19, petitioners loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they
decided to crate an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled
Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: Ed, seryoso na ito.
Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)[80] An hour later or at 2:30, p.m.,
the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The
proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that
petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the
sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and dramatically announced the
AFPs withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The
seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator
Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation.[81] Petitioner did nor
disagree but listened intently.[82] The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel
repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a
sweetener by saying that petitioner would allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his
family.[83] Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified
exit but said he would never leave the country.[84] At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara,
Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace.[85] This is proof that
petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with
the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and
requested, Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (lets cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly
transfer of power.[86] There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we
note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The
resignation of the petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of
January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of
five days after the petitioners resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and
(3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner.[87] Again, we note
that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact.
According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following
entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
xxx
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he
just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape,
bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape,
the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go.[88]
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said
x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following
happened:
Oppositions deal
7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagals spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this round,
I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled Negotiating Points. It reads:
1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on
Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic
of the Philippines.
57
2. Beginning today, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration
shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice president to various positions and offices of the
government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the
president and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings
account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to
the request to the Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:
1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and
property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed
freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector throughout their natural
lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of
Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities Vice President (Macapagal).
3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate siting as an impeachment court will authorize the
opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not
belong to President Estrada.
4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the Transition
Period), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet
officials as part of the orientation program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under Vice
President (Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary
signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in
Annex A heretofore attached to this agreement.[89]
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that
during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact.
The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the
transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement which was premised on the resignation of the petitioner
was further refined. It was then signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator
Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the
respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara Diary narrates the fateful events, viz:[90]
xxx
11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a
peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in
the background.
Agreement
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be
effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic of
the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January 2001,
wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation
activities with incumbent officials.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of
the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and
police authority Vice President.
4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national
military and police authorities.
5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the
contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex B heretofore
attached to this agreement.
xxx
11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and
awaiting the signature of the United Opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
58
Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (Why couldnt you wait? What about the
agreement)? I asked.
Reyes answered: Wala na, sir (Its over, sir).
I asked him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?
And General Reyes answer: Oo nga, i-delete na natin, sir (Yes, were deleting that part).
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already moot
and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which have been
signed by myself, Dondon and Macel to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side,
as it is important that the provision on security, at least, should be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the
oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The president is too stunned for words.
Final meal
12 noon Gloria takes her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The President is having his final meal at the Presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet
members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is
there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the
President.
1 p.m. The Presidents personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada familys personal possessions
as they can.
During lunch, Ronie Puno mentions that the President needs to release a final statement before leaving
Malacaang.
The statement reads: At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I
have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president, I do
not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake
of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shrik from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he
was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was
going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the
people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him
to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may
come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying
the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave of absence due to his
inability to govern. In support of this thesis, the letter dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate
President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
Sir
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.[91] The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases
at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the
counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the
Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the
week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press
release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily
unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time being.
Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it
was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the presidency,
then the resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it
commands scant legal significance. Petitioners resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a
changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the
59
people. There is another reason why this Court cannot give any legal significance to petitioners letter and
this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as
a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA
No. 3019 originated from Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the
Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his
sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, reserved to propose during the period of
amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for any
act of graft or corruption, or is under administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or
retire.[92] During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:
Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation,
criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this
Act for an offense committed during his incumbency.[93]
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second paragraph
of the provision and insisted that the Presidents immunity should extend even after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar to Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section
15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly
focused on the immunity of the President which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill.
There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official with
pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be
obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a
protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to
prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code.
To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional
right.[94] A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at
the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or
prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative
proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioners contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show
that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were
OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been
filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner
for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases
cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA
No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or
prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting
President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12
of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is
debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered
pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the
senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked
out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were
postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he
resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the
powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is
contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President Pimentel and
Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the
petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that Congress has
the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing
his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII.[95] This contention is the centerpiece
of petitioners stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and
until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged
by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his
office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For
that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with
its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session within twelve
days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that
60
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."
That is the law. Now the operative facts:
(1) Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and
Speaker of the House;
(2) Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at
about 12:30 p.m.;
(3) Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution
No. 175;[96]
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176[97]which states:
RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE
ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS
AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE
ATTAINMENT OF THE NATIONS GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the peoples loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police
and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their
recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing
and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by
reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the individual
members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must ensure to the
people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation,
to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national
reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrendering its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the
House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the national interest
demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its
congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the Nations
goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 178[98] which states:
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF
SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such
vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both
Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines
- qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives
confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
61
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioners letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate
signed the following:
RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change and
challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of purpose
and resolute cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite
diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and resolve to discharge our duties to attain desired changes and overcome the nations
challenges.[99]
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82[100] which states:
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF
SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is it vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President due to the assumption to the Presidency
of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting
separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Phillippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence, and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having served
the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman
of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice. Senator of the land - which qualities
merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83[101] which states:
RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus officio
and has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court of Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January 16
and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the second envelope be transferred
to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the Rules of the
Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the Senate President.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the
Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously
with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th)
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President.
62

(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any
sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner
Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco,[102] we hold that this Court cannot exercise its
judicial power for this is an issue in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislative x x x branch of the government. Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,[103] there is a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it. Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon
petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political
in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be
decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to
rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch
of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the
immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings
against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioners contentions, a revisit of our legal history on executive immunity will be most
enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case
of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco tiaco and Crossfield,[104] the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner
W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief
of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly
conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Johnson, held:
The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch
the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and
unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law,
could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of
courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the executive authority by an act
unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that
the Governor-General, like the judges of the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be
personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his
official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter is properly presented to it and the
occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as
possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy
is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property rights
have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is
mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty,
any more that it can a member of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly. Public policy
forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in
relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the
discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy
between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so
plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercise discretion in determining
whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability
for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he
actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority
to act or not. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority. If he
decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men,
reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of authority to
act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, he acts, not as
Governor-General but as a private individual, and, as such, must answer for the consequences of his act.
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from
suit, viz: x x x. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive
spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the State
and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder; resulting in a way, in a distrust as to the
integrity of government itself.[105]
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity. Then
came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973
Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the amendments involved executive immunity.
Section 17, Article VII stated:
The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for
official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this
Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco Professional Chair Lecture entitled, Presidential Immunity And All The
Kings Men: The Law Of Privilege As A Defense To Actions For Damages,[106] petitioners learned counsel,
former Dean of the UP college of Law, Atty. Pacifico Agabin, brightlined the modifications effected by this
constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:
In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the absolute
immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only from civil claims but also from
criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the
President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not only
the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon
63
orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute
immunity defense syndrome).
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive
immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by then Member of Parliament, now Secretary of
Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos
violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the
anachronism the king can do no wrong.[107] The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People Power
revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive
immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas,
viz:[108]
Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the committees omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision
for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this
second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973
Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that
the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that
kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii
is now facing litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during
his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution
was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he
cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The
impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that
led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.[109] Since the Impeachment Court is now
functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted
before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a
submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting
President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal
prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment
proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases
may already be filed against him, viz:[110]
xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for
example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment
court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation
would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of
it may continue in the ordinary courts.
This is in accord with our ruling in In re: Saturnino Bermudez[111]that incumbent Presidents are immune
from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.
Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted
and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his
criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His
reliance in the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan[112] and related cases[113]are inapropos for they have a
different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The
cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for
unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.[114]
Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to
expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In
the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,[115] US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to
produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven
advisers of President Nixons associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other
offenses which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washingtons
Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted
co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the
President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office
before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme
Court. It concluded that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in
a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. In the 1982 case of
Nixon v. Fitzgerald,[116] the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the President from civil
damages covers only official acts. Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine
in the case of Clinton v. Jones[117] where it held that the US Presidents immunity from suits for money
damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our
jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.[118] It
declared as a state policy that (t)he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."[119] It ordained that (p)ublic officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[120] It set the rule that (t)he
right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or
64
from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.[121] It maintained
the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.[122] It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with
enormous powers, among which is to "(i)nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.[123] The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.[124]
These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioners claim that a non-sitting president
enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
V even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He
submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in
violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of
unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.[125] The British approach the
problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop
criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.[126] The American approach is
different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right
of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e.,
substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul
convictions in high profile criminal cases.[127] In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,[128] later reiterated in the case
of Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[129] we laid down the doctrine that:
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity.
It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile
and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for,
as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish information about
trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial
of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the
minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases.
The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables
and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For
another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We
have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their
impartiality. x x x x x x x x x. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence
and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity
stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of
publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we
rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records
do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive
media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove
that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change
discharged the burden.
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.[130] and
its companion cases. viz.:
Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing
preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the
substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its
excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure,
few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even
today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime.
Indeed, even the principal actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers
have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial
notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. Inn the seminal case of
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was wisely held:
xxx
(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates
conclusively that the time this Nations organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England
had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all
concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or
partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized: when a
shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the
open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community
concern, hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that societys criminal process satisfy the
appearance of justice, Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be
provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported
by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in
the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nations system of justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v. United States, 362
US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a
common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read
as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First
65
Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of
speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had
long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly
is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the
free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen. A
trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and representatives of the media have a right to
be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of
what takes place.
(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to the public the right
to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as
indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the
guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised
for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we
held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation
of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on
the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to
consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-
page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-
record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was
conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery
motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the
disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity. (emphasis supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more
than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.[131] He needs to show more weighty social science
evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note,
the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of
prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the
petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of
the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its
findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the
petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote
petitioners submission, the respondent Ombudsman has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news
reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs.[132] News reports have
also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the
petitioner[133]and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this
bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news
reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of
the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and
regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of
derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his
subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigating prosecutors the
independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their
superiors.[134] They can be reversed but they can not be compelled to change their recommendations nor
can they be compelled to prosecute cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating
prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman
resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the finding of probable cause
against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
VI.
Epilogue
A word of caution to the hooting throng. The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different
dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the
majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more
threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute
the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized as the most
fundamental of all freedoms.[135] To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to
prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a
circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls the impatient
vehemence of the majority. Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated
by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy,
the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy has
proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to convince
the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the
key to mans progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some
peoples prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G. R. No. 146202. July 14, 2004]
RUFINA PATIS FACTORY, and JESUS LUCAS, SR. petitioners, vs. JUAN ALUSITAIN,
respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From the June 23, 2000 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54722 affirming that of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) awarding retirement benefits in the amount of P88,595.00 to
respondent Juan Alusitain (Alusitain), petitioners Rufina Patis Factory and Jesus Lucas, Sr. (Lucas) come to
this Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
66
 3. That I cannot secure a certification of separation from my last employer because I have not reached the
The antecedent facts are as follows: company applicable age of retirement.

In March 1948, Alusitain was hired as a laborer at the Rufina Patis Factory owned and operated by petitioner 4. That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts and to support my retirement
Lucas. After close to forty three years or on February 19, 1991, Alusitain admittedly tendered his letter of paper.
resignation which is quoted verbatim:
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
February 19, 1991
(Signed)
TO: MR. JESUS LUCAS, JR.
ASSISTANT MANAGER Affiant[3]
RUFINA PATIS FACTORY
On January 7, 1993, Republic Act No. 7641 (R.A. 7641),[4] AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLE 287 OF
Gentlemen: PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, BY PROVIDING FOR RETIREMENT PAY TO QUALIFIED PRIVATE
I would like to tender my separation letter as a laborer, from your good company effective this 20th of SECTOR EMPLOYEES IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY RETIRMENT PLAN IN THE ESTABLISHMENT,
February 1991. May I take this opportunity to extent my heartfelt thanks to you for having given me the took effect[5] providing, among other things, thusly:
chance to commit myself to work in your factory from which I owe varied experiences that has made a part
of me and be what I am today. Anticipating your outmost consideration on this matter. I remain. Art. 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the
collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.
VERY TRULY YOURS,
xxx
(Signed)
JUAN A. ALUSITAIN In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the
establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty five (65)
RECEIVED THE ABOVE SEPARATION LETTER ON THIS DAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1991. years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the
said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one half (1/2)
(Signed) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole
BY: JESUS R. LUCAS, JR. year.
Assistant Manager[2]
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen
On May 22, 1991, Alusitain executed a duly notarized affidavit of separation from employment and (15) days plus one twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5)
submitted the same on even date to the Pensions Department of the Social Security System (SSS). The days of service incentive leaves.
affidavit reads:
xxx
Republic of the Philippines )SSS
Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the penal provisions under Article 288
Quezon City ) of this Code.[6]

AFFIDAVIT OF SEPARATION FROM EMPLOYMENT Sometime in 1995, Alusitain, claiming that he retired from the company on January 31, 1995, having
reached the age of 65[7] and due to poor health, verbally demanded from petitioner Lucas for the payment of
I, JUAN ASERAS ALUSITAIN of legal age, 63, Filipino and residing at Int. 18 Flores St., Mal. Mla, after his retirement benefits. By his computation, he claimed that he was entitled to P86,710.00[8] broken down
having [been] sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and state; as follows:

1. That I am [a] bonafide member of the Social Security System with SSS Number 03-0107252-0 Retirement Benefits = month salary for every year of service

2. That I was separated from my last employer RUFINA PATIS FACTORY with address at 290 C. Arellano One-half month salary = P1,885.00
St., Malabon, Metro Manila on 2-20-91 and thereafter, I was never again re-employed.
Years of Service = 47 years

67
Retirement Benefits = P86,710.00[9]
Petitioner Lucas, however, refused to pay the retirement benefits of Alusitain, prompting the latter to make a
written demand on September 20, 1995. Lucas, however, remained adamant in his refusal to give in to
Alusitains demands.
Having failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, Alusitain filed on November 17, 1995 a complaint before
the NLRC against petitioners Rufina Patis Factory and Lucas for non-payment of retirement benefits. The
complaint was docketed as NLRC Case No. 00-11-07474-95.
Petitioners maintained that Alusitain had resigned from the company on February 19, 1991 per his letter of
resignation and the Affidavit of Separation dated May 22, 1991.[10]
On the other hand, while respondent admitted having tendered his letter of resignation on February 19, 1991
and executed the Affidavit of Separation on May 22, 1991,[11] he nevertheless maintained that he continued
working for petitioners until January 1995, the date of actual retirement, due to illness and old age, and that
he merely accomplished the foregoing documents in compliance with the requirements of the SSS in order to
avail of his retirement benefits.[12]
By Decision[13] of February 6, 1997, Executive Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Guanio upheld Alusitains
position in this wise:
After carefully considering the respective submissions of the parties and the evidence they adduced in
support of their opposing claims, this Office rules in favor of the complainant.
To substantiate his allegation that he had continued working for the respondents even after his supposed
resignation on February 19, 1991, the complainant submitted in evidence his sworn statement and that of his
eldest daughter, Gloria Alusitain. In his affidavit, the complainant swore that: Bagamat ako ay pensionado
ng SSS, ako ay patuloy na naglilingkod/nagtratrabaho sa kompanya ng Rufina Patis Factory hanggang
noong buwan ng Enero 1995. By way of corroboration, his daughter on the other hand, stated under oath that
since elementary school (sic), she was the one who brought food to her father at work in the Rufina Patis
Factory; and that the last time she brought him food at the said factory was in the month of January 1995.
While the foregoing statements may appear to be self-serving, still they have the ring of truth. From
experience, it is quite common that the eldest daughter would be tasked with the duty of taking lunch to her
father at work. Besides, the respondents failed to controvert these sworn declarations by submitting their
counter-affidavits. If it is true that the complainant had in fact stopped working on February 1991, the
respondents could have produced a number of witnesses who could have attested to this. Hence, their failure
to submit even a single affidavit does not speak well of their credibility in this regard.
Thus, this Office finds that the complainant had executed the letter of resignation and affidavit of separation
from employment in 1991 only for the purpose of securing a pension from the SSS, but that despite this he
remained in the employ of the respondents until his actual retirement on January 31, 1995, two years after
the effectivity of Republic Act 7641 on January 7, 1993. At the time of his retirement, the complainant was
already sixty-five (65) years of age and had served the respondent company for forty-seven (47) years and
therefore, he is legally entitled to the retirement benefits granted by R.A. 7641 which is one-half (1/2) month
salary for every year of service which as computed will amount to a total of P88,595.00 (P1,885.00 x 47
years).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents Rufina Patis
Factory and Jesus Lucas, Sr., jointly and severally to pay complainant Juan Alusitain his retirement benefits
in the amount of P88,595.00.
SO ORDERED.[14]
On appeal, the NLRC, by Resolution[15] of May 17, 1999, affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision.
Aggrieved by the NLRC resolution, petitioners brought the case on certiorari[16] to the Court of Appeals
which, by the assailed decision, dismissed it, holding that the NLRC committed no error much less any
grave abuse of discretion[17] as Alusitain was able to sufficiently establish that his letter of resignation and
Affidavit of Separation were executed only for the purpose of securing a pension from the SSS and that he
remained in the employ of petitioners.[18]
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals by Resolution[19] of
December 6, 2000, petitioners lodged the present petition.[20]
Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred when it did not give weight and probative value to Alusitains
letter of resignation and Affidavit of Separation, choosing instead to give credence to his self-serving sworn
statement and that of his daughter that he remained in the employ of petitioners until January 31, 1995.
Petitioners assert that the Affidavit of Separation, being a public document, is entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face, and proof is required to assail and controvert the same, citing Cacho v. Court of Appeals[21]
and Arrieta v. Llosa.[22]
Petitioners further assert that the appellate court erred in applying retroactively R.A. 7641 as said law does
not expressly provide for such retroactive application and to do so would defeat the clear intent of Congress.
Furthermore, petitioners insist that the case of Oro Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC[23] is inapplicable and submit
that what is controlling is the case of J.V. Angeles Construction Corp. v. NLRC[24] where this Court held
that before R.A. 7641 could be given retroactive effect, the claimant should still be an employee of the
employer at the time the said law took effect,.
The petition is impressed with merit.
This Court held in Oro[25] that R.A. 7641 should be given retroactive effect, viz:
R.A. 7641 is undoubtedly a social legislation. The law has been enacted as a labor protection measure and as
a curative statute that absent a retirement plan devised by, an agreement with, or a voluntary grant from, an
employer can respond, in part at least, to the financial well-being of workers during their twilight years soon
following their life of labor. There should be little doubt about the fact that the law can apply to labor
contracts still existing at the time the statute has taken effect, and that its benefits can be reckoned not only
from the date of the laws enactment but retroactively to the time said employment contracts have started. .
.[26] (Underscoring supplied)
The doctrine enunciated in Oro has been clarified in several cases. In CJC Trading, Inc. v. NLRC,[27] this
Court, speaking through Justice Florentino Feliciano, held that R.A. 7641 may be given retroactive effect
where (1) the claimant for retirement benefits was still the employee of the employer at the time the statute
took effect; and (2) the claimant had complied with the requirements for eligibility under the statute for such
retirement benefits.[28] These twin requirements for the retroactive application of R.A. 7641 have been
reiterated in Philippine Scout Veterans Security and Investigation Agency v. NLRC,[29] Cabcaban v.
68
NLRC,[30] J.V. Angeles Construction Corporation v. NLRC,[31] and Manuel L. Quezon University v.
NLRC.[32]
It is thus clear that in order for respondent to claim retirement benefits from petitioner Rufina Patis Factory,
he has to prove that he was its employee at the time R.A. 7641 took effect.
As a general rule, the factual findings and conclusions of quasi-judicial agencies such as the NLRC are, on
appeal, accorded great weight and even finality, unless petitioners are able to show that the NLRC arbitrarily
disregarded the evidence before it or misapprehended evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary
conclusion if properly appreciated.[33]
In affirming the decision of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, the Court of Appeals disregarded Alusitains
letter of resignation and Affidavit of Separation and gave weight to his and his daughters sworn statements
that he remained in the employ of petitioners until January 31, 1995.
It is a basic rule in evidence, however, that the burden of proof is on the part of the party who makes the
allegations[34] ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat.[35] If he claims a right granted by law, he must
prove his claim by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of that of his opponent.
In the case at bar, it was incumbent on Alusitain to prove that he retired on January 31, 1995 and not on
February 20, 1991 as indicated on his letter of resignation. As the following discussion will show, he utterly
failed to discharge the onus.
Respondents letter of resignation and May 22, 1991 Affidavit of Separation which he admittedly voluntarily
executed constitute admissions against his own interest.[36] The said documents belie his claim that he
retired on January 31, 1995. Being an admission against interest, the documents are the best evidence which
affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.[37] The rationale for the rule is based on the
presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration was true.[38] Thus,
it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not.[39]
While these two documents may have facilitated the release of Alusitains retirement benefits from the SSS,
hence, beneficial to him at that time, they may still be considered admissions against interest since the
disserving quality of the admission is judged as of the time it is used or offered in evidence and not when
such admission is made.[40] Thus, it matters not that the admission is self-serving when it was made, so
long as it is against respondents present claim.[41]
No doubt, admissions against interest may be refuted by the declarant.[42] It bears stressing, however, that
Alusitains Affidavit of Separation filed with the SSS is a notarial document,[43] hence, prima facie
evidence[44] of the facts expressed therein.[45]
Since notarial documents have in their favor the presumption of regularity, to contradict the facts stated
therein, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.[46]
Alusitain explains through his subsequent sworn statement that he only executed these two documents in
order to obtain his retirement benefits from the SSS. His daughter, also by sworn statement, corroborates his
explanation. His position does not persuade.
In order for a declarant to impugn a notarial document which he himself executed, it is not enough for him to
merely execute a subsequent notarial document. What the law requires in order to contradict the facts stated
in a notarial document is clear and convincing evidence. The subsequent notarial documents executed by
respondent and his daughter fall short of this standard.
The case of Reyes v. Zaballero[47] is instructive. In said case, the creditor executed on December 1, 1944 a
notarial document stating that he was releasing a real estate mortgage as the debtor had already paid his debt.
On even date, the creditor subsequently executed an affidavit without the debtors knowledge stating that he
had accepted the payment under protest and obligado por las circunstancias actuales. This Court held that the
creditors statement in his affidavit that he received the money obligado por las circunstancias actuales is
self-serving evidence.[48]
A contrary rule would undermine the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarial documents. In
Dequito v. Llamas,[49] this Court held:
After executing the affidavit voluntarily wherein he made admissions and declarations against his own
interest under the solemnity of an oath, he cannot be allowed to spurn them and undo what he has done. He
cannot, even with great repentance, retrieve the body he forsook and now wishes to live.[50]
Neither is the sworn statement of Alusitains daughter sufficient to prove that he indeed retired on January
31, 1995. The February 6, 1997 Decision of Labor Arbiter Guanio relates the material portion of the sworn
statement of Alusitains daughter as follows:
. . . By way of corroboration, his daughter on the other hand, stated under oath that since elementary school
(sic), she was the one who brought food to her father at work in the Rufina Patis Factory; and that the last
time she brought him food at the said factory was in the month of January 1995.[51] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Alusitains daughter did not state, however, that her father worked for petitioner Rufina Patis Factory until
his alleged retirement on January 31, 1995. All she said was that the last time she brought him food at the
factory was in January 1995. To conclude that Alusitain was still employed on January 1995 from the mere
fact that his daughter brought him food at the Rufina Patis Factory is non sequitur.
Lastly, while it is evident that Alusitains subsequent sworn statement is in the nature of a retraction of his
May 22, 1991 Affidavit of Separation, such retraction does not necessarily negate the affidavit. For
retractions are generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts as they can
easily be fabricated. Thus, before accepting a retraction, it is necessary to examine the circumstances
surrounding it and possible motives for reversing the previous declaration, as these motives may not
necessarily be in consonance with the truth. To automatically adopt them hook, line and sinker would allow
unscrupulous individuals to throw wide open the doors to fraud.
In the case at bar, Alusitains retraction is highly suspect. Other than his bare and self-serving allegations and
the sworn statement of his daughter which, as reflected above, cannot be relied upon, he has not shown any
scintilla of evidence that he was employed with petitioner Rufina Patis Factory at the time R.A. 7641 took
effect. He did not produce any documentary evidence such as pay slips, income tax return, his identification
card, or any other independent evidence to substantiate his claim.
While the NLRC and its Labor Arbiters are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence in the
adjudication of cases,[52] this should not be construed as a license to disregard fundamental rules on
evidence in proving ones allegations.[53]
69
In fine, Alusitain having failed to prove that he was an employee of petitioner at the time R.A. 7641 took
effect, his claim for retirement benefits thereunder must be disallowed. Once this decision becomes final and executory, let the corresponding order for the issuance of the decree be
issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals June 23, 2000 Decision and December 6,
2000 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 54722 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.[1]
The Director of Lands and Mercedes Dizon did not appeal from the adverse decision of the Pasig-Rizal CFI.
SO ORDERED. Thus, the order for the issuance of a decree of registration became final, and Decree No. N-150912 was
issued by the Land Registration Commission (LRC).[2] Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 10215 was
Republic of the Philippines issued in the name of Fermina Castro by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal on May 29,
SUPREME COURT 1974.[3]
Manila
The land was then sold to Jesus S. Yujuico, and OCT No. 10215 was cancelled. On May 31, 1974,[4]
SECOND DIVISION Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 445863 was issued in Yujuicos name, who subdivided the land into
two lots. TCT No. 446386[5] over Lot 1 was issued in his name, while TCT No. S-29361[6] over Lot 2 was
ESTATE OF THE LATE G.R. No. 168661 issued in the name of petitioner Augusto Y. Carpio.
JESUS S. YUJUICO, represented Annotations at the back of TCT No. 446386 show that Yujuico had, at one time or another, mortgaged the
by ADMINISTRATORS lot to the Philippine Investments System Organization (PISO) and Citibank, N.A. Annotations in the title of
BENEDICTO V. YUJUICO and Present: petitioner Carpio reveal the lot was mortgaged in favor of Private Development Corporation (PDC), Rizal
EDILBERTO V. YUJUICO; and Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and then Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) and
AUGUSTO Y. CARPIO, QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to secure various loans.
Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES, Sometime in 1977, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1085 entitled Conveying the Land Reclaimed in the
TINGA, Foreshore and Offshore of the Manila Bay (The Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project) as Property of the
VELASCO, JR., and Public Estates Authority as well as Rights and Interests with Assumptions of Obligations in the Reclamation
- versus - NACHURA,* JJ. Contract Covering Areas of the Manila Bay between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction
and Development Corporation of the Philippines (1977) was issued. Land reclaimed in the foreshore and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Promulgated: offshore areas of Manila Bay became the properties of the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government
and the COURT OF APPEALS, corporation that undertook the reclamation of lands or the acquisition of reclaimed lands. On January 13,
Respondents. October 26, 2007 1989, OCT No. SP 02 was issued in favor of PEA. The PEA also acquired ownership of other parcels of
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x land along the Manila Bay coast, some of which were subsequently sold to the Manila Bay Development
Corporation (MBDC), which in turn leased portions to Uniwide Holdings, Inc.[7]
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.: The PEA undertook the construction of the Manila Coastal Road. As this was being planned, Yujuico and
Carpio discovered that a verification survey they commissioned showed that the road directly overlapped
In 1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration and confirmation of her title over a parcel of their property, and that they owned a portion of the land sold by the PEA to the MBDC.
land with an area of 17,343 square meters covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964 located in the Municipality of
Paraaque, Province of Rizal (now Paraaque City), in the Pasig-Rizal Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch On July 24, 1996, Yujuico and Carpio filed before the Paraaque City Regional Trial Court (RTC), a
22. The application was docketed LRC Case No. N-8239. The application was opposed by the Office of the complaint for the Removal of Cloud and Annulment of Title with Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 96-
Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the Director of Lands, and by Mercedes Dizon, a private party. Both 0317 against the PEA. On May 15, 1998 the parties entered into a compromise agreement approved by the
oppositions were stricken from the records since the opposition of Dizon was filed after the expiration of the trial court in a Resolution dated May 18, 1998. On June 17, 1998, the parties executed a Deed of Exchange
period given by the court, and the opposition of the Director of Lands was filed after the entry of the order of of Real Property, pursuant to the compromise agreement, where the PEA property with an area of 1.4007
general default. After considering the evidence, the trial court rendered its April 26, 1974 Decision. The hectares would be conveyed to Jesus Yujuico and petitioner Carpio in exchange for their property with a
dispositive portion reads: combined area of 1.7343 hectares.

____________________________
* As per September 3, 2007 raffle.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicant, Fermina Castro, of legal age, single, Filipino and a
resident of 1515 F. Agoncillo St., Corner J. Escoda St., Ermita, Manila, the true and absolute owner of the
land applied for situated in the Municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal, with an area of 17,343 square
meters and covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964 and orders the registration of said parcel of land in her name
with her aforementioned personal circumstances.
On July 31, 1998, the incumbent PEA General Manager, Carlos P. Doble, informed the OSG that the new
PEA board and management had reviewed the compromise agreement and had decided to defer its
implementation and hold it in abeyance following the view of the former PEA General Manager, Atty.
Arsenio Yulo, Jr., that the compromise agreement did not reflect a condition of the previous PEA Board,
requiring the approval of the Office of the President. The new PEA management then filed a petition for
relief from the resolution approving the compromise agreement on the ground of mistake and excusable
negligence.
70

The petition was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it was filed out of time and that the
allegation of mistake and excusable negligence lacked basis.
The PEA fared no better in the Court of Appeals (CA), as the petition was dismissed for failure to pay the
required docket fees and for lack of merit.
The matter was raised to the Supreme Court in Public Estates Authority v. Yujuico[8] but PEAs petition was
denied, upholding the trial courts dismissal of the petition for relief for having been filed out of time. The
allegation of fraud in the titling of the subject property in the name of Fermina Castro was not taken up by
the Court.
On June 8, 2001, in a Complaint for Annulment and Cancellation of Decree No. N-150912 and its
Derivative Titles, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Fermina Castro, Jesus S. Yujuico, August Y. Carpio
and the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0222, filed with the Paraaque
City RTC, respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, alleged that when the land registered to
Castro was surveyed by Engr. H. Obreto on August 3, 1972 and subsequently approved by the LRC on April
23, 1973, the land was still a portion of Manila Bay as evidenced by Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243,
Surveys to 1980; 1st Ed/. January 9/61: Revised 80-11-2; that Roman Mataverde, the then OIC of the
Surveys Division, Bureau of Lands, informed the OIC of the Legal Division that [w]hen projected on
Cadastral Maps CM 14 deg. 13 N-120 deg, 59E, Sec.2-A of Paraaque Cadastre (Cad. 299), (LRC) Psu-964
falls inside Manila Bay, outside Cad. 299; that then Acting Regional Lands Director Narciso V. Villapando
issued a Report dated November 15, 1973 stating that plan (LRC) Psu-964 is a portion of Manila Bay; that
then Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Director of Lands, Ernesto C. Mendiola, submitted his Comment and
Recommendation re: Application for Registration of Title of FERMINA CASTRO, LRC Case No. N-8239,
dated Dec. 1, 1977, praying that the instant registration case be dismissed; and that Fermina Castro had no
registrable rights over the property.
More significantly, respondent Republic argued that, first, since the subject land was still underwater, it
could not be registered in the name of Fermina Castro. Second, the land registration court did not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate inalienable lands, thus the decision adjudicating the subject parcel of land to
Fermina Castro was void. And third, the titles of Yujuico and Carpio, being derived from a void title, were
likewise void.[9]
On September 13, 2001, Yujuico and Carpio filed a Motion to Dismiss (With Cancellation of Notice of Lis
Pendens),[10] on the grounds that: (1) the cause of action was barred by prior judgment; (2) the claim had
been waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; (3) a condition precedent for the filing of the complaint
was not complied with; and (4) the complaint was not verified and the certification against forum shopping
was not duly executed by the plaintiff or principal party.
On November 27, 2001, respondent Republic filed an Opposition[11] to the motion to dismiss to which
defendants filed a Reply[12] on January 14, 2002, reiterating the grounds for the motion to dismiss.
In the August 7, 2002 Order of the RTC,[13] Civil Case No. 01-0222 was dismissed. The trial court stated
that the matter had already been decided in LRC Case No. N-8239, and that after 28 years without being
contested, the case had already become final and executory. The trial court also found that the OSG had
participated in the LRC case, and could have questioned the validity of the decision but did not. Civil Case
No. 01-0222 was thus found barred by prior judgment.
On appeal to the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 76212, respondent Republic alleged that the trial court erred in
disregarding that appellant had evidence to prove that the subject parcel of land used to be foreshore land of
the Manila Bay and that the trial court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 01-0222 on the ground of res
judicata.[14]
The CA observed that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use and, therefore, not
registrable and their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private
ownership or confer title upon the registrant.
Further, according to the appellate court res judicata does not apply to lands of public domain, nor does
possession of the land automatically divest the land of its public character.
The appellate court explained that rulings of the Supreme Court have made exceptions in cases where the
findings of the Director of Lands and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) were
conflicting as to the true nature of the land in as much as reversion efforts pertaining foreshore lands are
embued with public interest.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Order dated
August 7, 2002 of the trial court in Civil Case No. 01-0222 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is hereby REMANDED to said court for further proceedings and a full-blown trial on the merits with
utmost dispatch.[15]
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners now raise the following issues before this Court:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THE HONORABLE COURT AND HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS NECESSITATING THE HONORABLE COURTS EXERCISE
OF ITS POWER OF SUPERVISION CONSIDERING THAT:
I. THE REVERSAL BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE TRIAL COURTS
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE INSTANT CASE IS BASED ON ITS
ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN, ALLEGEDLY
PART OF MANILA BAY.
A. IN THE FIRESTONE CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT APPLIED THE PRINCIPLE OF RES
JUDICATA NOTWITHSTANDING ALLEGATIONS OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OF A LAND
REGISTRATION COURT, FORECLOSING ANY FURTHER ATTEMPT BY RESPONDENT THEREIN,
AS IN THE INSTANT CASE, TO RESURRECT A LONG-SETTLED JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF
REGISTRABILITY OF A PARCEL OF LAND BASED ON THE SHEER ALLEGATION THAT THE
SAME IS PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
71
B. THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE
SUBJECT LAND WAS PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
C. RESPONDENTS REVERSION CASE SEEKS TO RETRY THE VERY SAME FACTUAL ISSUES
THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN JUDICIALLY DETERMINED OVER THIRTY (30) YEARS AGO.
D. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL BASES APPLIED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS
QUESTIONED DECISION ARE MISPLACED, CONSIDERING THAT THEY ARE ALL PREDICATED
ON THE ERRONEOUS PREMISE THAT IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS PART
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
II. RESPONDENT IS BARRED BY JURISDICTIONAL ESTOPPEL AND LACHES FROM
QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT.
III. RELIANCE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS ON THE ISOLATED PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE
HONORABLE COURT IN THE PEA CASE IS UNWARRANTED AND MISLEADING CONSIDERING
THAT THE MATTER OF WHETHER RES JUDICATA APPLIES WITH RESPECT TO THE LAND
REGISTRATION COURTS DECISION IN 1974 WAS NOT IN ISSUE IN SAID CASE.
A. THE INSTANT REVERSION CASE IS NOT THE PROPER RECOURSE.
B. THE VALIDITY OF THE COURT-APPROVED COMPROMISE AGREEMENT 15 MAY 1998
HAS ALREADY BEEN AFFIRMED BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE PEA CASE.
IV. EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS MANDATE THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE ON
ORDINARY ESTOPPEL AND LACHES IN THE INSTANT CASE AGAINST RESPONDENT.
V. RESPONDENT CANNOT BE GIVEN SPECIAL CONSIDERATION AND EXCUSED FOR
TRANSGRESSING RULES OF PROCEDURE.[16]
Essentially, the issues boil down to three: (1) Is a reversion suit proper in this case? (2) Is the present petition
estopped by laches? (3) Did the CA erroneously apply the principle of res judicata?
An action for reversion seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private
individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain.[17] This remedy is provided under
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141 (Public Land Act) which became effective on December 1, 1936. Said
law recognized the power of the state to recover lands of public domain. Section 124 of CA No. 141 reads:
SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation
of any of the provisions of Sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one hundred and
twenty one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and
null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title,
patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the
reversion of the property and its improvements to the State. (Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to Section 124 of the Public Land Act, reversion suits are proper in the following instances, to wit:
1. Alienations of land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions in violation of Section 118, CA
No. 141;
2. Conveyances made by non-Christians in violation of Section 120, CA No. 141; and
3. Alienations of lands acquired under CA No. 141 in favor of persons not qualified under Sections 121, 122,
and 123 of CA No. 141.
From the foregoing, an action for reversion to cancel titles derived from homestead patents or free patents
based on transfers and conveyances in violation of CA No. 141 is filed by the OSG pursuant to its authority
under the Administrative Code with the RTC. It is clear therefore that reversion suits were originally utilized
to annul titles or patents administratively issued by the Director of the Land Management Bureau or the
Secretary of the DENR.
While CA No. 141 did not specify whether judicial confirmation of titles by a land registration court can be
subject of a reversion suit, the government availed of such remedy by filing actions with the RTC to cancel
titles and decrees granted in land registration applications.
The situation changed on August 14, 1981 upon effectivity of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 which gave the
Intermediate Appellate Court the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of
RTCs.
When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on July 1, 1997, it incorporated Rule 47 on
annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions of the RTCs. The two grounds for annulment under
Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be
filed within four (4) years from its discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by
laches or estoppel as provided by Section 3, Rule 47. Thus, effective July 1, 1997, any action for reversion
of public land instituted by the Government was already covered by Rule 47.
The instant Civil Case No. 01-0222 for annulment and cancellation of Decree No. N-150912 and its
derivative titles was filed on June 8, 2001 with the Paraaque City RTC. It is clear therefore that the reversion
suit was erroneously instituted in the Paraaque RTC and should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The proper court is the CA which is the body mandated by BP Blg. 129 and prescribed by Rule 47 to handle
annulment of judgments of RTCs.
In Collado v. Court of Appeals,[18] the government, represented by the Solicitor General pursuant to
Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129, filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. Similarly in the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals,[19] the Solicitor General correctly filed the annulment of judgment with the
said appellate court.
This was not done in this case. The Republic misfiled the reversion suit with the Paraaque RTC. It should
have been filed with the CA as required by Rule 47. Evidently, the Paraaque RTC had no jurisdiction over
the instant reversion case.
Assuming that the Paraaque RTC has jurisdiction over the reversion case, still the lapse of almost three
decades in filing the instant case, the inexplicable lack of action of the Republic and the injury this would
cause constrain us to rule for petitioners. While it may be true that estoppel does not operate against the state
or its agents,[20] deviations have been allowed. In Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, we said:
72
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual
circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a
policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only
in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not
be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a
shabby thing; and subject to limitations x x x, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against
public authorities as well as against private individuals.[21] (Emphasis supplied.)
Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as in this case, the lot was already
alienated to innocent buyers for value and the government did not undertake any act to contest the title for an
unreasonable length of time.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where the title of an innocent purchaser for value who relied on the clean
certificates of the title was sought to be cancelled and the excess land to be reverted to the Government, we
ruled that [i]t is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the
government to avoid an injustice to innocent purchasers for value (emphasis supplied).[22] We explained:
Likewise time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the
certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts cannot disregard such rights and order the
cancellation of the certificate. Such cancellation would impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for
everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance
whether the title has been regularly issued or not. This would be contrary to the very purpose of the law,
which is to stabilize land titles. Verily, all persons dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore, and the law or the courts do not oblige them to go
behind the certificate in order to investigate again the true condition of the property. They are only charged
with notice of the liens and encumbrances on the property that are noted on the certificate.[23]
xxxx
But in the interest of justice and equity, neither may the titleholder be made to bear the unfavorable effect of
the mistake or negligence of the States agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of
manifest damage to third persons. First, the real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land to put
a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at
the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. Second, as we discussed earlier, estoppel by
laches now bars petitioner from questioning private respondents titles to the subdivision lots. Third, it was
never proven that Private Respondent St. Jude was a party to the fraud that led to the increase in the area of
the property after its subdivision. Finally, because petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any error
that might have been committed by its agents who had surveyed the property, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of their functions must be respected. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system,
which petitioner purportedly aims to protect by filing this case, shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and
inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their
duties.[24]
Republic v. Court of Appeals is reinforced by our ruling in Republic v. Umali,[25] where, in a reversion
case, we held that even if the original grantee of a patent and title has obtained the same through fraud,
reversion will no longer prosper as the land had become private land and the fraudulent acquisition cannot
affect the titles of innocent purchasers for value.
Considering that innocent purchaser for value Yujuico bought the lot in 1974, and more than 27 years had
elapsed before the action for reversion was filed, then said action is now barred by laches.
While the general rule is that an action to recover lands of public domain is imprescriptible, said right can be
barred by laches or estoppel. Section 32 of PD 1592 recognized the rights of an innocent purchaser for value
over and above the interests of the government. Section 32 provides:
SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value.The decree of registration shall not
be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any
person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of
First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from
and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained
by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights
may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this
Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrances for value.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In this petition, the LRC (now LRA), on May 30, 1974, issued Decree No. N-150912 in favor of Fermina
Castro and OCT No. 10215 was issued by the Rizal Registrar of Deeds on May 29, 1974. OCT No. 10215
does not show any annotation, lien, or encumbrance on its face. Relying on the clean title, Yujuico bought
the same in good faith and for value from her. He was issued TCT No. 445863 on May 31, 1974. There is no
allegation that Yujuico was a buyer in bad faith, nor did he acquire the land fraudulently. He thus had the
protection of the Torrens System that every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of
title for value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the
certificate and any of the x x x encumbrances which may be subsisting.[26] The same legal shield redounds
to his successors-in-interest, the Yujuicos and Carpio, more particularly the latter since Carpio bought the lot
from Jesus Y. Yujuico for value and in good faith.
Likewise protected are the rights of innocent mortgagees for value, the PISO, Citibank, N.A., PDC, RCBC,
PCIB, and DBP. Even if the mortgagors title was proved fraudulent and the title declared null and void, such
declaration cannot nullify the mortgage rights of a mortgagee in good faith.[27]
All told, a reversion suit will no longer be allowed at this stage.
More on the issue of laches. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto
has either abandoned or declined to assert it.[28]
When respondent government filed the reversion case in 2001, 27 years had already elapsed from the time
the late Jesus Yujuico purchased the land from the original owner Castro. After the issuance of OCT No.
10215 to Castro, no further action was taken by the government to question the issuance of the title to Castro
until the case of Public Estates Authority, brought up in the oral argument before this Court on September 6,
2000.[29] We then held that allegation of fraud in the issuance of the title was not proper for consideration
and determination at that stage of the case.
73
From the undisputed facts of the case, it is easily revealed that respondent Republic took its sweet time to
nullify Castros title, notwithstanding the easy access to ample remedies which were readily available after
OCT No. 10215 was registered in the name of Castro. First, it could have appealed to the CA when the
Pasig-Rizal CFI rendered a decision ordering the registration of title in the name of applicant Castro on April
26, 1974. Had it done so, it could have elevated the matter to this Court if the appellate court affirms the
decision of the land registration court. Second, when the entry of Decree No. N-150912 was made on May
29, 1974 by the Rizal Register of Deeds, the Republic had one (1) year from said date or up to May 28, 1975
to file a petition for the reopening and review of Decree No. N-150912 with the Rizal CFI (now RTC) on the
ground of actual fraud under section 32 of PD 1592. Again, respondent Republic did not avail of such
remedy. Third, when Jesus Yujuico filed a complaint for Removal of Cloud and Annulment of Title with
Damages against PEA before the Paraaque RTC in Civil Case No. 96-0317, respondent could have
persevered to question and nullify Castros title. Instead, PEA undertook a compromise agreement on which
the May 18, 1998 Resolution[30] was issued. PEA in effect admitted that the disputed land was owned by
the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners and their title legal and valid; and impliedly waived its right to
contest the validity of said title; respondent Republic even filed the petition for relief from judgment beyond
the time frames allowed by the rules, a fact even acknowledged by this Court in Public Estates Authority.
Lastly, respondent only filed the reversion suit on June 8, 2001 after the passage of 27 years from the date
the decree of registration was issued to Fermina Castro.
Such a Rip Van Winkle, coupled with the signing of the settlement with PEA, understandably misled
petitioners to believe that the government no longer had any right or interest in the disputed lot to the extent
that the two lots were even mortgaged to several banks including a government financing institution. Any
nullification of title at this stage would unsettle and prejudice the rights and obligations of innocent parties.
All told, we are constrained to conclude that laches had set in.
Even granting arguendo that respondent Republic is not precluded by laches from challenging the title of
petitioners in the case at bar, still we find that the instant action for reversion is already barred by res
judicata.
Petitioners relying on Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[31] as a precedent to the case at bar
contend that the instant reversion suit is now barred by res judicata.
We agree with petitioners.
The doctrine on precedents is expressed in the latin maximStare decisis et non quieta movere. Follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.[32] In order however that a case can be considered as a
precedent to another case which is pending consideration, the facts of the first case should be similar or
analogous to the second case.
A perusal of the facts of the Firestone case and those of the case at bar reveals that the facts in the two (2)
cases are parallel. First, in Firestone and in this case, the claimants filed land registration applications with
the CFI; both claimants obtained decrees for registration of lots applied for and were issued OCTs. Second,
in Firestone, the Republic filed a reversion case alleging that the land covered by the OCT was still
inalienable forest land at the time of the application and hence the Land Registration Court did not acquire
jurisdiction to adjudicate the property to the claimant. In the instant case, respondent Republic contend that
the land applied for by Yujuico was within Manila Bay at the time of application and therefore the CFI had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. Third, in Firestone, the validity of the title of the
claimant was favorably ruled upon by this Court in G.R. No. 109490 entitled Patrocinio E. Margolles v. CA.
In the case at bar, the validity of the compromise agreement involving the disputed lot was in effect upheld
when this Court in Public Estates Authority v. Yujuico dismissed the petition of PEA seeking to reinstate the
petition for relief from the May 18, 1998 Resolution approving said compromise agreement. With the
dismissal of the petition, the May 18, 1998 Resolution became final and executory and herein respondent
Republic through PEA was deemed to have recognized Castros title over the disputed land as legal and
valid. In Romero v. Tan,[33] we ruled that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. We also
made clear that a judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits, wherein the
parties have validly entered into stipulations and the evidence was duly considered by the trial court that
approved the agreement. In the instant case, the May 18, 1998 Resolution approving the compromise
agreement confirmed the favorable decision directing the registration of the lot to Castros name in LRC Case
No. N-8239. Similarly, in Firestone, the Margolles case confirmed the decision rendered in favor of Gana in
Land Registration Case No. 672 ordering the issuance of the decree to said applicant. Fourth, in Firestone,
the Supreme Court relied on the letter of then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez that the evidence of the
Bureau of Lands and the LRC was not sufficient to support an action for cancellation of OCT No. 4216. In
the instant case, both the Solicitor General and the Government Corporate Counsel opined that the Yujuico
land was not under water and that there appears to be no sufficient basis for the Government to institute the
action for annulment. Fifth, in Firestone, we ruled that the Margolles case had long become final, thus the
validity of OCT No. 4216 should no longer be disturbed and should be applied in the instant case (reversion
suit) based on the principle of res judicata or, otherwise, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.[34]
Clearly from the above, Firestone is a precedent case. The Public Estates Authority had become final and
thus the validity of OCT No. 10215 issued to Castro could no longer be questioned.
While we said in Public Estates Authority that the court does not foreclose the right of the Republic from
pursuing the proper recourse in a separate proceedings as it may deem warranted, the statement was obiter
dictum since the inquiry on whether or not the disputed land was still under water at the time of its
registration was a non-issue in the said case.
Even granting for the sake of argument that Firestone is not squarely applicable, still we find the reversion
suit already barred by res judicata.
For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1)
there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be between the
two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.[35]
There is no question as to the first, third and last requisites. The threshold question pertains to the second
requisite, whether or not the then Pasig-Rizal CFI, Branch 22 had jurisdiction over the subject matter in LRC
Case No. N-8239. In Civil Case No. 01-0222, the Paraaque City RTC, Branch 257 held that the CFI had
jurisdiction. The CA reversed the decision of the Paraaque City RTC based on the assertion of respondent
Republic that the Pasig-Rizal CFI had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, and that there was a need to
determine the character of the land in question.
The Paraaque City RTC Order dismissing the case for res judicata must be upheld.
The CA, in rejecting the dismissal of the reversion case by the Paraaque RTC, relied on two cases, namely:
Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapanta[36] and Republic v. Vda. De Castillo.[37]
In Municipality of Antipolo, we held that the land registration court had no jurisdiction to entertain any land
registration application if the land was public property, thus:
Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for registration of public
property of ANTIPOLO, its Decision adjudicating the DISPUTED PROPERTY as of private ownership is
74
null and void. It never attained finality, and can be attacked at any time. It was not a bar to the action
brought by ANTIPOLO for its annulment by reason of res judicata.
[x x x] the want of jurisdiction by a court over the subject matter renders the judgment void and a mere
nullity, and considering that a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested,
from which no rights can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts
performed and all claims flowing out of are void, and considering, further, that the decision, for want of
jurisdiction of the court, is not a decision in contemplation of law, and hence, can never become executory, it
follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata.
xxxx
It follows that if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which
cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over
the same because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title alone,
become the owner of the land illegally included (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503; Ledesma vs.
Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769).
[x x x x]
Under these circumstances, the certificate of title may be ordered cancelled (Republic vs. Animas, et al.,
supra), and the cancellation maybe pursued through an ordinary action therefore. This action cannot be
barred by the prior judgment of the land registration court, since the said court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter. And if there was no such jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not apply. [x x x]
Certainly, one of the essential requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the subject matter, is absent in this case.
(Italics supplied).[38]
The plain import of Municipality of Antipolo is that a land registration court, the RTC at present, has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the application which respondent Republic claims is public land. This
ruling needs elucidation.
Firmly entrenched is the principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.[39]
Consequently, the proper CFI (now the RTC) under Section 14 of PD 1529[40] (Property Registration
Decree) has jurisdiction over applications for registration of title to land.
Section 14 of PD 1592 provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (Emphasis supplied.)
Conformably, the Pasig-Rizal CFI, Branch XXII has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the land
registration case filed by Fermina Castro, petitioners predecessor-in-interest, since jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations of the initiatory pleadingthe application.[41] Settled is the
rule that the authority to decide a case and not the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction.
When there is jurisdiction, the decision of all questions arising in the case is but an exercise of
jurisdiction.[42]
In our view, it was imprecise to state in Municipality of Antipolo that the Land Registration Court [has] no
jurisdiction to entertain the application for registration of public property x x x for such court precisely has
the jurisdiction to entertain land registration applications since that is conferred by PD 1529. The applicant
in a land registration case usually claims the land subject matter of the application as his/her private
property, as in the case of the application of Castro. Thus, the conclusion of the CA that the Pasig-Rizal CFI
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the application of Castro has no legal mooring. The land
registration court initially has jurisdiction over the land applied for at the time of the filing of the application.
After trial, the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, can determine whether the title to the land applied for
is registrable and can be confirmed. In the event that the subject matter of the application turns out to be
inalienable public land, then it has no jurisdiction to order the registration of the land and perforce must
dismiss the application.
Based on our ruling in Antipolo, the threshold question is whether the land covered by the titles of
petitioners is under water and forms part of Manila Bay at the time of the land registration application in
1974. If the land was within Manila Bay, then res judicata does not apply. Otherwise, the decision of the
land registration court is a bar to the instant reversion suit.
After a scrutiny of the case records and pleadings of the parties in LRC Case No. N-8239 and in the instant
petition, we rule that the land of Fermina Castro is registrable and not part of Manila Bay at the time of the
filing of the land registration application.
The trial courts Decision in 1974 easily reveals the basis for its conclusion that the subject matter was a dry
land, thus:
On February 1, 1974, the applicant presented her evidence before the Deputy Clerk of this Court and among
the evidence presented by her were certain documents which were marked as Exhibits D to J, inclusive. The
applicant testified in her behalf and substantially declared that: she was 62 years old, single, housekeeper
and residing at 1550 J. Escoda, Ermita, Manila; that she was born on June 3, 1911; that she first came to
know of the land applied for which is situated in the Municipality of Paraaque, province of Rizal, with an
area of 17,343 square meters and covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964 while she was still ten (10) years old or
sometime in 1921; that when she first came to know of the land applied for, the person who was in
possession and owner of said land was her father, Catalino Castro; that during that time her father used to
plant on said land various crops like pechay, mustard, eggplant, etc.; that during that time, her father built a
house on said land which was used by her father and the other members of the family, including the
applicant, as their residential house; that the land applied for was inherited by her father from her
grandfather Sergio Castro; that Catalino Castro continuously possessed and owned the land in question from
1921 up to the time of his death in 1952; and that during that period of time nobody ever disturbed the
possession and ownership of her father over the said parcel of land; that after the death of her father in 1952
she left the place and transferred her place of residence but she had also occasions to visit said land twice or
thrice a week and sometimes once a week; that after she left the land in question in 1952, she still continued
possessing said land, through her caretaker Eliseo Salonga; that her possession over the land in question
from the time she inherited it up to the time of the filing of the application has been continuous, public,
adverse against the whole world and in the concept of an owner; that it was never encumbered, mortgaged,
or disposed of by her father during his lifetime and neither did she ever encumber or sell the same; that it
was declared for taxation purposes by her father when he was still alive and her father also paid the real
estate taxes due to the government although the receipt evidencing the payment of said real estate taxes for
75
the property applied for have been lost and could no longer be found inspite of diligent effort exerted to
locate the same.
The other witness presented by the applicant was Emiliano de Leon, who declared that he was 70 years old,
married, farmer and residing at San Jose, Baliwag, Bulacan; that he knew Catalino Castro, the father of the
applicant because said Catalino Castro was his neighbor in Tambo, Paraaque, Rizal, he had a house erected
on the land of Catalino Castro; that he was born in 1903 and he first came to know of the land in question
when in 1918 when he was about 18 years old; that the area of the land owned and possessed by Catalino
Castro where he constructed a residential house has an area of more than one and one-half (1 ) hectares; that
the possession of Catalino Castro over the land in question was peaceful, continuous, notorious, adverse
against the whole world and in the concept of an owner; that during the time that Catalino Castro was in
possession of the land applied for he planted on said parcel of land mango, coconut and banana, etc.; that
Catalino Castro continuously possessed and owned said parcel of land up to the year 1952 when he died; that
during the time that Catalino Castro was in possession of said land, nobody ever laid claim over the said
property; that said land is not within any military or naval reservation; that upon the death of Catalino
Castro, the applicant took possession of the land applied for and that up to the present the applicant is in
possession of said land; that he resided in the land in question from 1918 up to the time he transferred his
place of residence in Baliwag, Bulacan in the year 1958.
On February 11, 1974, the Court, pursuant to the provision of Presidential Decree No. 230 issued by his
Excellency, Ferdinand E. Marcos dated July 9, 1973 held in abeyance the rendition of a decision in this case
and directed the applicant to submit a white print copy of plan (LRC) Psu-964 to the Director of lands who
was directed by the Court to submit his comment and recommendation thereon.
The property in question is declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 51842 (Exhibit G) and
real estate taxes due thereon have been paid up to the year 1973 (Exhibit H).
In compliance with the Order of this Court February 11, 1974, the Director of Lands, thru Special Attorney
Saturnino A. Pacubas, submitted a report to this Court dated April 25, 1974, stating among other things, that
upon ocular inspection conducted by Land Inspector Adelino G. Gorospe and the subsequent joint ocular
inspection conducted by Geodetic Engineer Manuel A. Cervantes and Administrative Assistant Lazaro G.
Berania, it was established that the parcel of land covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964 no longer forms part of the
Manila Bay but is definitely solid and dry land.
In this connection, it should be noted that Administrative Assistant Lazaro G. Berania and Geodetic
Engineer Manuel A. Cervantes, in their report dated March 22, 1974 have also stated that the land applied
for cannot be reached by water even in the highest tide and that the said land is occupied by squatter families
who have erected makeshift shanties and a basketball court which only prove that the same is dry and solid
land away from the shores of Manila Bay.
Furthermore, Land Inspector Adelino G. Gorospe in his letter-report dated November 28, 1973 has also
stated that there is a house of pre-war vintage owned by the applicant on the land in question which in effect
corroborates the testimony of the applicant and her witness that they have lived on the land in question even
prior to the outbreak of the second world war and that the applicant has been in possession of the land in
question long time ago.[43]
To counter the evidence of applicant Castro, and bolster its claim that she has no valid title, respondent
Republic relies on the July 18, 1973 Office Memorandum[44] of Roman Mataverde, OIC, Surveys Division,
to the OIC, Legal Division, of the Bureau of Lands, stating that when projected on cadastral maps CM 14
13N - 120 59 E., Sec. 3-D and CM 14 30N - 120 59E., Sec. 2-A of Paranaque [sic] Cadastre (Cad-299),
(LRC) Psu-964 falls inside Manila Bay, outside Cad-299.[45]
The same conclusion was adopted in a November 15, 1973 letter of Narciso Villapando, Acting Regional
Lands Director to the Chief, Legal Division, Bureau of Lands and in the Comment and Recommendation of
Ernesto C. Mendiola, Assistant Director, also of the Bureau of Lands.
Respondent likewise cites Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243 Revised 80-11-2 to support its position that
Castros lot is a portion of Manila Bay.
The burden of proving these averments falls to the shoulders of respondent Republic. The difficulty is
locating the witnesses of the government. Roman Mataverde, then OIC of the Surveys Division retired from
the government service in 1982. He should by this time be in his 90s. Moreover, Asst. Regional Director
Narciso Villapando and Asst. Director Ernesto C. Mendiola are no longer connected with the Bureau of
Lands since 1986.
Assuming that OIC Roman Mataverde, Asst. Regional Director Narciso Villapando and Assistant Director
Ernesto C. Mendiola are still available as witnesses, the projections made on the cadastral maps of the then
Bureau of Lands cannot prevail over the results of the two ocular inspections by several Bureau of Lands
officials that the disputed lot is definitely dry and solid land and not part of Manila Bay. Special Attorney
Saturnino A. Pacubas, Land Inspector Adelino G. Gorospe, Geodetic Engineer Manuel A. Cervantes and
Administrative Asst. Lazaro A. Berana, all officials of the Bureau of Lands, were positive that the disputed
land is solid and dry land and no longer forms part of Manila Bay. Evidence gathered from the ocular
inspection is considered direct and firsthand information entitled to great weight and credit while the
Mataverde and Villapando reports are evidence weak in probative value, being merely based on theoretical
projections in the cadastral map or table surveys.[46] Said projections must be confirmed by the actual
inspection and verification survey by the land inspectors and geodetic engineers of the Bureau of Lands.
Unfortunately for respondent Republic, the bureau land inspectors attested and affirmed that the disputed
land is already dry land and not within Manila Bay.
On the other hand, the Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243 does not reveal what portion of Manila Bay was
Castros lot located in 1974. Moreover, a hydrographic map is not the best evidence to show the nature and
location of the lot subject of a land registration application. It is derived from a hydrographic survey which
is mainly used for navigation purposes, thus:
Surveys whose principal purpose is the determination of data relating to bodies of water. A hydrographic
survey may consist of the determination of one or several of the following classes of data: depth water;
configuration and nature of the bottom; directions and force of currents; heights and times of tides and water
stages; and location of fixed objects for survey and navigation purposes.[47]
Juxtaposed with finding of the ocular inspection by Bureau of Lands Special Attorney Pacubas and others
that Castros lot is dry land in 1974, Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243 is therefore inferior evidence and
lacking in probative force.
76
Moreover, the reliability and veracity of the July 18, 1973 report of Roman Mataverde based on the alleged
projection on cadastral maps and the Villapando report dated November 15, 1973 are put to serious doubt in
the face of the opinion dated October 13, 1997 of the Government Corporate Counsel, the lawyer of the
PEA, which upheld the validity of the titles of petitioners, thus:
We maintain to agree with the findings of the court that the property of Fermina Castro was registrable land,
as based on the two (2) ocular inspections conducted on March 22, 1974 by Lands Administrative Assistant
Lazaro G. Berania and Lands Geodetic Engr. Manuel Cervantes, finding the same no longer forms part of
Manila Bay but is definitely solid land which cannot be reached by water even in the highest of tides. This
Berania-Cervantes report based on ocular inspections literally overturned the findings and recommendations
of Land Director Narciso V. Villapando dated November 15, 1973, and that of Director Ernesto C. Mendiola
dated December 1, 1977, and the fact that the Villapando-Mendiola reports were merely based on
projections in the cadastral map or table surveys.
xxxx
A. The Legal prognosis of the case is not promising in favor of PEA.
4.1 LRC Case No. N-8239 has already become final and executory and OCT No. 10215 was already issued
in favor of Fermina Castro. Any and all attempts to question its validity can only be entertained in a quo
warranto proceedings (sic), assuming that there are legal grounds (not factual grounds) to support its
nullification. Subjecting it to a collateral attack is not allowed under the Torrens Title System. In Calalang
vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 208 SCRA 215, the Supreme Court held that the present petition is
not the proper remedy in challenging the validity of certificates of titles since the judicial action required is a
direct and not a collateral attack (refer also to: Toyota Motor Philippine Corporation vs. CA, 216 SCRA
236).
4.2 OCT No. 10215 in favor of Fermina Castro was issued pursuant to a cadastral proceeding, hence is a rem
proceedings which is translated as a constructive notice to the whole world, as held in Adez Realty
Incorporated vs. CA, 212 SCRA 623.
4.3 From the cursory and intent reading of the decision of Judge Sison in LRC Case No. N-8239, we cannot
find any iota of fraud having been committed by the court and the parties. In fact, due process was observed
when the Office of the Solicitor General represented ably the Bureau of Lands. In Balangcad vs. Justices of
the Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 169, the Supreme Court held that title to registered property becomes
indefeasible after one-year from date of registration except where there is actual fraud in which case it may
be challenged in a direct proceeding within that period. This is also the ruling in Bishop vs. CA, 208 SCRA
636, that to sustain an action for annulment of a torrens certificate for being void ab initio, it must be shown
that the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction over the case and there was actual fraud in securing
the title.
4.4 As to priority of torrens title, PEA has no defense, assuming that both PEA and Yujuico titles are valid,
as held in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. CA, 215 SCRA 783, where two (2)
certificates purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails.
4.5 The documents so far submitted by the parties to the court indicate that the mother title of the Yujuico
land when registered in 1974 was not underwater. This was shown in the two (2) ocular inspections
conducted by the officials of the Land Bureau.
4.6 The provision of P.D. 239 that no decree of registration may be issued by the court unless upon approval
and recommendation of the Bureau of Lands was substantially complied with in the Report of Lands Special
Attorney Saturnino Pacubas, submitted to the court.[48]
Even the counsel of respondent Republic, the OSG, arrived at the conclusion that there is no sufficient legal
basis for said respondent to institute action to annul the titles of petitioners, thus:
It may be stated at the outset that a petition for annulment of certificate of title or reconveyance of land may
be based on fraud which attended the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate
of title.
Based on the decision in the LRC Case No. N-8239 involving the petition for registration and confirmation
of title filed by Fermina Castro, there is no showing that fraud attended the issuance of OCT No. 10215. it
appears that the evidence presented by Fermina Castro was sufficient for the trial court to grant her petition.
The testimony of Fermina Castro, which was corroborated by Emiliano de Leon, that she and her
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years sufficiently
established her vested right over the property initially covered by OCT No. 10215. The report dated April
25, 1974 which was submitted to the trial court by the Director of Lands through Special Attorney Saturnino
Pacubas showed that the parcel of land was solid and dry land when Fermina Castros application for
registration of title was filed. It was based on the ocular inspection conducted by Land Inspector Adelino
Gorospe and the joint circular inspection conducted by Geodetic Engineer Manuel A. Cervantes and
Administrative Assistant Lazaro Berania on November 28, 1973 and March 22, 1974 respectively.
The aforesaid report must be requested unless there is a concrete proof that there was an irregularity in the
issuance thereof. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the ocular inspection of the parcel of land,
which was made the basis of said report, is presumed to be in order.
Based on the available records, there appears to be no sufficient basis for the Government to institute an
action for the annulment of OCT No. 10215 and its derivative titles. It is opined that a petition for
cancellation/annulment of Decree No. N-150912 and OCT No. 10215 and all its derivative titles will not
prosper unless there is convincing evidence to negate the report of the then Land Management Bureau
through Special Attorney Pacubas. Should the Government pursue the filing of such an action, the
possibility of winning the case is remote.[49]
More so, respondent Government, through its counsel, admits that the land applied by Fermina Castro in
1973 was solid and dry land, negating the nebulous allegation that said land is underwater. The only
conclusion that can be derived from the admissions of the Solicitor General and Government Corporate
Counsel is that the land subject of the titles of petitioners is alienable land beyond the reach of the reversion
suit of the state.
77
Notably, the land in question has been the subject of a compromise agreement upheld by this Court in Public
Estates Authority.[50] In that compromise agreement, among other provisions, it was held that the property
covered by TCT Nos. 446386 and S-29361, the land subject of the instant case, would be exchanged for
PEA property. The fact that PEA signed the May 15, 1998 Compromise Agreement is already a clear
admission that it recognized petitioners as true and legal owners of the land subject of this controversy.
Moreover, PEA has waived its right to contest the legality and validity of Castros title. Such waiver is
clearly within the powers of PEA since it was created by PD 1084 as a body corporate which shall have the
attribute of perpetual succession and possessed of the powers of the corporations, to be exercised in
conformity with the provisions of this Charter [PD 1084].[51] It has the power to enter into, make, perform
and carry out contracts of every class and description, including loan agreements, mortgages and other types
of security arrangements, necessary or incidental to the realization of its purposes with any person, firm or
corporation, private or public, and with any foreign government or entity.[52] It also has the power to sue
and be sued in its corporate name.[53] Thus, the Compromise Agreement and the Deed of Exchange of Real
Property signed by PEA with the petitioners are legal, valid and binding on PEA. In the Compromise
Agreement, it is provided that it settles in full all the claims/counterclaims of the parties against each
other.[54] The waiver by PEA of its right to question petitioners title is fortified by the manifestation by
PEA in the Joint Motion for Judgment based on Compromise Agreement that
4. The parties herein hereto waive and abandon any and all other claims and counterclaims which they may
have against each other arising from this case or related thereto.[55]
Thus, there was a valid waiver of the right of respondent Republic through PEA to challenge petitioners
titles.
The recognition of petitioners legal ownership of the land is further bolstered by the categorical and
unequivocal acknowledgment made by PEA in its September 30, 2003 letter where it stated that: Your
ownership thereof was acknowledged by PEA when it did not object to your membership in the CBP-IA
Association, in which an owner of a piece of land in CBP-IA automatically becomes a member thereof.[56]
Section 26, Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him. The admissions of PEA which is the real party-in-interest in this case on the
nature of the land of Fermina Castro are valid and binding on respondent Republic. Respondents claim that
the disputed land is underwater falls flat in the face of the admissions of PEA against its interests. Hence, res
judicata now effectively precludes the relitigation of the issue of registrability of petitioners lot.
In sum, the Court finds that the reversion case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Paraaque RTC. Even if we treat said case as a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the case nevertheless has to be upheld because it is already barred
by laches. Even if laches is disregarded, still the suit is already precluded by res judicata in view of the
peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining therein.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 76212 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the August 7, 2002 Order of the Paraaque
City RTC, Branch 257 in Civil Case No. 01-0222 entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Fermina Castro, et
al. dismissing the complaint is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land Registration Authority, Petitioner,
vs.
KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001 decision 1 and August 20, 2001 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development Corporation of a concrete
perimeter fence around some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters
of prime land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name and which allegedly
originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.
ATO verified the authenticity of respondent’s titles with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). On May
17, 1996, Atty. Jose Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task Force of the LRA, submitted his
report. The Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT
No. 5450. The land allegedly covered by respondent’s titles was also found to be within Villamor Air Base
(headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.
By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on September 3, 1996, filed a complaint
for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
(as represented by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to Branch 114 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.
On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos,
Jr. as counsel for respondent.
Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with summons, the trial court ordered the
issuance of an alias summons by publication against him on February 19, 1997.
The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial,
postponements or continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to declare defendants in default and other
procedural matters.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and Human
Rights conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. In particular,
the legislative investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how respondent was able
to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606.
During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos,
respondent’s former counsel. He testified that he prepared respondent’s answer and transmitted an unsigned
78
draft to respondent’s president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was not his. He
authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who finally signed it.
With Atty. Garlitos’ revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion on December 3, 1998 to
declare respondent in default, 2 predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. The Republic argued that,
since the person who signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him, the
answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, 3 it was a
mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect.
On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting the Republic’s motion. 4 It found
respondent’s answer to be sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules. The trial court
ordered the answer stricken from the records, declared respondent in default and allowed the Republic to
present its evidence ex parte.
The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and formally offered its evidence.
Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February 19, 1999 resolution but the trial court denied
it.
Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari 5 seeking to
set aside the February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court. Respondent contended that the trial court erred
in declaring it in default for failure to file a valid and timely answer.
On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It found Atty. Garlitos’ statements in
the legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination. The appellate
court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos’ acts after the filing of the answer 6 and concluded that he assented to
the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may
have had. Hence, the appellate court granted respondent’s petition for certiorari. It directed the lifting of the
order of default against respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch. The Republic
moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court’s order which declared respondent in default for its
failure to file a valid answer? Yes, it did.
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another’s statement. 7 Where it appears
that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those
statements is admissible against him. 8 This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable
to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. 9 By
adoptive admission, a third person’s statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing
it. Adoptive admission may occur when a party:
(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another; 10
(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it; 11
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another; 12
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points which he or
she has heard the other make 13 or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another. 14
Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its case on them. At no instance
did it ever deny or contradict its former counsel’s statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty.
Garlitos’ testimony as well as its implications, as follows:
1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that the answer was signed. Hence, the
pleading could not be considered invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact that the person who signed
it was neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically authorized by him was immaterial. The important
thing was that the answer bore a signature.
2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or his counsel, it does not
prohibit a counsel from giving a general authority for any person to sign the answer for him which was what
Atty. Garlitos did. The person who actually signed the pleading was of no moment as long as counsel knew
that it would be signed by another. This was similar to addressing an authorization letter "to whom it may
concern" such that any person could act on it even if he or she was not known beforehand.
3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never disowned its contents and he resumed acting
as counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing. These circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos conformed
to or ratified the signing of the answer by another.
Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s
February 19, 1999 resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the Court of Appeals as well as in the
comment 15 and memorandum it submitted to this Court.
Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos’ statements as its own. Respondent’s adoptive
admission constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.
Contrary to respondent’s position, a signed pleading is one that is signed either by the party himself or his
counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or
counsel representing him.
Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading
from one that is unsigned to one that is signed.
Counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any
person.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay. 16 Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these
matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is reserved
exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to
another lawyer 17 but cannot do so
79
in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons, 18 something the
law strongly proscribes.
Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act
taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or ratified by
Atty. Garlitos’ subsequent acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the
signing of the answer by another "as long as it conformed to his draft." We give no value whatsoever to such
self-serving statement.
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer.
The trial court correctly ruled that respondent’s answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an
unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to
present evidence ex parte.
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were true that its answer
was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their own
valid raison d’ etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in
arbitrariness and injustice. 19
The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals 20 is relevant:
Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus
[enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the
application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate
the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper
cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons,
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. 21 In this case, respondent failed to show
any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the
ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible misconduct.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision and August 20, 2001
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
February 19, 1999 resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring respondent in
default is hereby REINSTATED.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for the commencement of disbarment proceedings against Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. for his
possible unprofessional conduct not befitting his position as an officer of the court.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 21911 September 15, 1924
EL VARADERO DE MANILA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. INSULAR LUMBER COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Ernesto Zaragoza for appellant.
Ross, Lawrence & Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr., for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
El Varadero de Manila completed satisfactorily certain repairs on the lighter Tatlo, the property of the
Insular Lumber Company. The work was performed pursuant to no express agreement, but with the implicit
understanding that the price would be as low as, or lower than, could be secured from any other
company.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Insular Lumber Company being of the opinion that the bill as presented by El Varadero de Manila was
grossly exorbitant and a proposed compromise having failed of realization, the matter was taken to court
with the result that in the Court of First Instance of Manila, El Varadero de Manila, the plaintiff, secured
judgment against the Insular Lumber Company, the defendant, in the amount of P5,310.70, with legal
interest from the presentation of the complaint, and costs. Still dissatisfied, the plaintiff has appealed to this
court and here as asked us to increase the amount of the judgment to P12,412.62.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
To arrive at as correct a judgment as is possible, it will first be necessary to set down a number of figures
and thereafter to seize upon a few salient facts as having influence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The itemized bill presented by the plaintiff, the amount which it still claims, totals P12,412.62. At one time
during the course of the negotiations, the plaintiff was willing to accept P10,241.37. (Exhibit I.) The
witnesses for the plaintiff naturally took the view that the bill was correct. But the trial judge was of the
opinion that it was excessive.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant, on the other hand, says that a reasonable figure for the work would be P5,310.70. Witnesses
were offered to substantiate this contention. Their testimony so impressed the trial judge that he adopted
their statements as his own. During the course of the abortive negotiations, however, the defendant
expressed a willingness to pay the plaintiff P8,070.12. (Exhibit G.) chanrobles virtual law library
Now to emphasize three points which will materially assist us in rendering judgment. The first point relates
to the offer of compromise which naturally, under the general rules of evidence, must be excluded, except
that as the amounts named in the offers to accept certain sums in settlement appear to have been arrived at as
a fair estimate of value, they are relevant. (City of Springfield vs. Schmook [1878], 68 Mo., 394; Daniels vs.
80
Town of Woonsocket [1874], 11 R. I., 4; Teasley vs. Bradley [1900], 110 Ga., 497.) Here, there was no
denial of liability and the only question discussed was the amount to be paid which the plaintiff insisted
should not be more than P8,070.12. The second point of interest relates to the testimony of Mariano Yengko,
inspector of vessels, admittedly a disinterested witness, who in one synopsis of a fair value of the repairs,
arrived at P5,134.20, but which, on cross-examination, he raised to between seven and eight thousand pesos.
And the third point is that the tacit understanding between the parties was that the cost of the repairs should
be approximately the same as what other companies would charge. The defendant admits that El Varadero
de Navotas would have done the work for about P8,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Basing our findings, therefore, on the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion that the reasonable
value of the repairs performed by El Varadero de Manila on the Tatlo owned by the Insular Lumber
Company, was something less than P8,000. We fix the sum definitely at P7,700.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Judgment is modified, and in lieu of the judgment rendered in the lower court, another shall issue in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant for the recovery of P7,700, with legal interest to begin to run from the
date when this judgment shall become final and to continue until payment, without express finding as to
costs in either instance. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8931 March 14, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN MAQUI, defendant-appellant.
Alejo Mabanag for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The appellant in this case was convicted in the court below of the theft of the caraballa and her calf, and
sentenced to imprisonment for the period of five years, to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law,
and to pay his share of the costs of the proceedings.
Counsel for the accused contends that the trial court erred in giving probative value to the testimony of one
Dagsa, the principal witness for the prosecution; in accepting proof as to certain extrajudicial admissions
alleged to have been made by the accused, including an offer to compromise the case by the payment of a
sum of money; and in declining to accept as true the testimony of the accused in his own behalf at the trial.
We find nothing in the record, however, which would justify us in disturbing the findings of the trial judge
as to the degree of the credit which should be accorded the various witnesses called at the trial.
Counsel rests his contention that the evidence as to the extrajudicial statements made by the accused should
have been excluded on the ground that, as counsel insists, there is no formal proof n the record that they
were made voluntarily, and that they were therefore inadmissible as proof in so far as they can be construed
as admission or confession of guilt. In answer to this contention it is sufficient to say that there is no
suggestion in the record in the court below that these extrajudicial statements were not made voluntarily, and
we are satisfied that if the evidence as to the circumstances under which these incriminating statements were
made be accepted as true it clearly rebuts the possibility that they were made involuntarily, or extorted by
force, threats, or promise of reward. The record clearly discloses that these extrajudicial statements were
made in the course of offers to compromise and that they were made by the accused voluntarily, though
doubtless these offers to compromise were made in the hope that it accepted he would escape prosecution.
The question as to the admissibility of offers to compromise in criminal cases has frequently been discussed
in the courts of the United States, and the practice there does not appear to be wholly uniform. We think,
however, that the weight both of authority and of reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to
compromise, but permits the accused to show that such offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt,
but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim
by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to
avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
Satisfaction to the owner of the goods stolen is admissible, as evidence against the accused, but if made
merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment, and not under a consciousness of guilt, it is not
evidence. (U. S. vs. Hunter, 1 Cranch, C. C., 317.)
In a prosecution for seduction, evidence that the accused had sought an adjustment with the prosecutrix is
inadmissible, if such offer of adjustment did not contain an admission of guilt. (Wilson vs. State, 73 Ala.,
527.)
On a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape upon a married woman, evidence is admissible on
behalf of the prosecution to show that the defendant sent a third person to the father of the prosecutrix to
ascertain if the case could be compromised. (Barr vs. People, 113 Ill., 471.)
In a larceny case, evidence is not admissible to show that defendant stated that he would pay $50 if it could
be settled, in reply to threats by the owner of the goods stolen that he would be prosecuted for damages, and
a solicitation to settle. (Frain vs. State, 40 Ga., 530.)
In a prosecution for larceny, evidence is not admissible that defendant paid a sum of money in settlement of
a civil action brought to recover the property alleged to have been stolen. (State vs. Emerson, 48 Iowa, 172.)
An offer of compromise, voluntarily made by the accused, without threat or promise, and the reply thereto,
are admissible in evidence upon his trial for a crime. (State vs. Bruce, 33 La. Ann., 186.)
An offer of compromise of a crime, unaccepted by the prosecutor, may be proven by the state as an
admission of guilt, or as disclosing possession of the property which is the subject of the burglary and
larceny charged in the indictment. (State vs. Rodriguez, 45 La. Ann., 1040; 13 Southern, 802.)
It may be shown that the prisoner sent a massage to the prosecutor, proposing to take a whipping and to be
let go. (State vs. DeBerry, 92 N. C., 800.)
We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, but we are opinion that in
imposing the penalty the trial court should have taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance the
manifest lack of "instruction and education" of the offender. It does not clearly appear whether he is or not
an uncivilized Igorot, although there are indications in the record which tend to show that he is. But in any
81
event, it is very clear that if he is not a member of an uncivilized tribe of Igorots, he is a densely ignorant
and untutored fellow, who lived in the Igorot country, and is not much, if any, higher that are they in the
scale of civilization. The beneficent provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code as amended by Act No. 2142
of the Philippine Legislature are peculiarly applicable to offenders who are shown to be members of these
uncivilized tribes, and to other offenders who, as a result of the fact that their lives are cast with such people
far away from the centers of civilization, appear to be so lacking in "instruction and education" that they
should not be held to so high a degree of responsibility as is demanded of those citizens who have had the
advantage of living their lives in contact with the refining influences of civilization.
It is true that this court has quite uniformly held that convicts of the crimes of theft and robbery are not
entitled to the benefits of the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code prior to its amendment by Act No.
2142, this on the theory that under the provisions of the article prior to its amendment the ground upon
which the courts were authorized in their direction to mitigate the penalties prescribed by the code was "the
circumstance of the offender being a native, mestizo, or Chinese." As to crimes of this nature we declined to
hold that the mere fact that one is a native of the Philippine Islands, a mestizo or a Chinese would justify a
claim that upon conviction of crimes such as theft or robbery he should be treated more leniently than the
members of any other race or people, no sounds presumption arising from the mere racial affiliation of the
convict that he was less or to resist the temptation to commit them than are they.
Under the provisions of the article as amended by Act No. 2142, the ground upon which the courts are
authorized to mitigate the prescribed penalties is not racial affiliation of the convict, but "the degree of
instruction and education of the offender;" and while mere ignorance or lack of education will not always be
sufficient to justify the mitigation of the prescribed penalties for crimes such as theft and robbery, there can
be no doubt that cases may and will arise wherein under all the "circumstances attending" the commission of
these offenses the exercise of a sound discretion will justify a more lenient treatment of an ignorant and
semicivilized offender, than that which should be accorded one who has the advantage of such a degree of
instruction and education as would justify the court in believing that he was capable of fully and properly
understanding and appreciating the criminal character of the offense committed by him.
We conclude, therefore, that under the provisions of article 111 as amended by Act No. 2142, the courts may
and should, even in cases of theft and robbery, take into consideration where it appears that under all the
circumstances attending the commission of the offense, he should not be held to the strict degree of
responsibility prescribed in the code for the ordinary offender.
The larceny of large cattle and falls within articles 517, 518, and 520 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act
No. 2030. According to those sections, as amended, the value of the animals stolen being 650 pesetas, a
penalty one degree higher than arresto mayor in its medium degree to presidio correccional in its minimum
degree should have been imposed; in other words, presidio correccional in its medium degree to presidio
mayor in its minimum degree. Giving the convict the benefit of the provisions of article 11 of the Penal
Code, as amended, this penalty should be imposed in its minimum degree — that is to say, the penalty
applicable in this case is that of presidio correccional in its medium degree.
Modified by imposing the penalty prescribed for the offense of which the defendant and appellant was
convicted in the minimum degree — that is to say, by, imposing upon the accused the penalty of two years
four months and one day of presidio correccional, in lieu of that of five years' imprisonment imposed by the
court below — the judgment convicting and sentencing him should be and is hereby affirmed, with the costs
of this instance against the appellant.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10566 August 20, 1915
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REGINO TORRES and PABLO PADILLA, defendants-appellants.
Ledesma, Clarin, Gabaldon and Recto for appellant Torres.
P.E. del Rosario for appellant Padilla.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The record in this case has come before us on appeal by both defendants from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu whereby they were convicted of a violation of Act No. 1761. Regino Torres was
sentenced to imprisonment for three years. Pablo Padilla to one year and one month, and each to pay one-
half of the costs. The three tins of opium, the corpus delicti, were ordered confiscated.
On examination of the record it appears:
That the testimony of George W. Walker and Juan Samson, secret service agents of the Cebu Customhouse
who arrested the defendants, and the seizure of the corpus delicti (Exhibits A, B, and C) were held by the
trial court to be conclusive evidence against defendants.
That Walker testified that he had received information that on the night of January 20, 1914, Regino Torres
would go to the house of the widow of one Franco to get some opium; that at 7:30 that evening they
stationed themselves in Calle de Colon, where the said house stood, and a short while afterwards saw the
two defendants come out of the door of the garage on the premises; that Samson seized Torres, and as
Padilla started to run away Walker went in pursuit of him and on passing by Samson and Torres saw two tins
of opium; that three times he ordered Padilla to halt, and, as the latter continued to run, after he had thrown
one tin over a fence; that, after the arrest of both defendants, Walker and Samson set out with lights to search
for the tins and found the one thrown by Padilla inside the inclosure, and the other two tins, about a meter
from the place where Samson had been holding Torres.
That the other officer, Samson, gave nearly the same testimony. He added, however, when questioned by the
defense as to whether Walker had said anything to him on his return from his pursuit of Padilla, that Walker
did say that he saw Regino Torres throw away two tins and that he was looking for them. He was also asked
by the defense whether Walker had proposed to the defendants that they pay a fine in the form of a
compromise, to which he replied that he had not, but that, on the contrary, it was the defendants who made
this offer.
That the defendant Regino Torres testified that Padilla told him that there was a large amount of opium, and
they agreed that at 6 o'clock in the evening they would go to the house above mentioned; that Padilla went to
Torres' house at 6 o'clock in the evening and hurried him up, saying: "Eat in a hurry, for the owner of the
opium needs money"; that when they arrived at the house of Franco's widow, Padilla entered the door of the
place where the automobiles were kept, and five minutes afterwards called witness to enter the garage and
82
there Padilla showed Torres a tin of opium, at the same time saying that it was first class and cost P60
without haggling; that witness replied that he would first show it to some trustworthy friends to determine its
class; that Padilla agreed and they both left for this purpose, but that when they had gone about ten brazas
from the door, he was seized by Samson and saw that Padilla had run away and was being pursued by
Walker. The court asked Torres whether he had wished to investigate first and buy afterwards, to which he
replied that he did, and that if he had been convinced of the quality of the opium he would have bought
about 20 or 25 tins. "But have you so much money?" inquired the judge. The defendant replied: "Yes, sir."
That, upon arraignment, Pablo Padilla pleaded guilty. "The defendant's counsel," says the trial court in his
decision, "requested that his client be permitted to state the circumstances that surrounded the case and
which induced this defendant to commit the crime under prosecution." The court further says therein: "It is
preferable that counsel himself state the circumstances that, in his opinion, attended the crime and which
may be considered as extenuating."
Pantaleon del Rosario, Padilla's counsel, stated that according to the information given by his client, the
latter is a poor man who accompanied the other defendant Regino Torres principally in order that, in case
they were caught by the authorities, Torres might transfer the material possession of the opium to counsel's
client and the latter would assume liability for such possession and suffer the legal consequences.
That the trial court took that statement into consideration in extenuation of the penalty he imposed upon
Padilla, concluding by saying that this defendant appeared to a be a poor man who, impelled by poverty, had
accompanied Torres for the purpose, as every probability indicated, of obtaining a relatively small share in
the business in which Torres was engaged; while, with respect to Torres, the court said that he played the
most important role, for he confessed to have sufficient means to purchase opium to the amount of twenty
tins at P60 a tin.
From the judgment of conviction Regino Torres bases his appeal on four assignments of error: (1) In that the
trial court concluded that two tins were taken from the appellant's possession; (2) in holding that the
appellant, in his testimony, confessed to having been engaged in the business of buying and selling opium,
and in grounding the judgment of conviction on the said confession; (4) in accepting, as evidence for the
prosecution, the compromise that it is asserted he proposed to the agent George Walker; and (5), in that the
penalty imposed upon the appellant was excessive.
Pablo Padilla bases his appeal only on this last assignment.
Errors 1, 2, and 3 will not lie. Where a person entertains an offer to sell, goes to the house where the sale is
to be affected, making haste because the vendor needs money and because he was urged to do so by the
agent who made him the offer, enters the house, examines the article, leaves the house with three tins which
contained the thing offered for sale and which is a prohibited article by reason of its being opium, and if the
purchaser is not a person authorized to have it in his possession, it can not be held that the purchaser took the
three tins with him to sample their contents; such a purpose must be proven and unless it is there can be no
other inference than that he carried away with him the thing purchased and that its acquisition was a
consummated fact, for the presumption is that the acts took place in the ordinary course of things and the
general routine of dealings between men, and it cannot be doubted that the person who had the control over
the opium at the moment it was seized, whoever it was that carried it, could be no other than the owner of
the money which the vendor so urgently desired to acquire on that day in exchange for the opium. Civil
possession is the holding of a thing by a person with the intention of acquiring ownership thereof (Civ.
Code, art. 430). It was Torres who had the intention of having the opium as belonging to him, and as he
intended, so he had it, and it was afterwards taken from him, as being a thing that he could not hold, possess
nor lawfully have as his own. Padilla was not the owner of the money which the person who sold the opium
needed. Padilla was but an agent who made the offer to Torres. Padilla had not intention of holding,
possessing and having as his own the opium which, on the part of another, he had offered to Torres. The
possession or material holding in this case gives way to the civil possession which, according to Torres'
confession, was the reason that took him to the house of Franco's widow, thus putting into effect the
intention to possess which he had a priori entertained as the cause of his presence in the place of the sale.
After all, the seizure of the two tins at a place one meter away from the spot where Torres was arrested by
Samson, and the seizure of one tin in the possession of Padilla, who had thrown it into an inclosure, are facts
held by the trial court to have been proven, and this finding, which does not violate any law and which we
do not find to be erroneous, should not be changed in this review of the evidence. We confirm the finding
and hold that it is in accord with the merits of the case.
With regard to the fourth cause of action, the facts are as follows: The witness, Walker, testified, among
other things, that Regino Torres endeavored to compromise the case and that he (Walker) was willing to
accept the compromise thought through the payment of P1,500, but subject to the approval of his superiors.
The defense asked that this testimony be stricken out, alleging that, in accordance with the Code of Civil
Procedure, the compromise in such cases must be made in writing. "When made in civil cases, it is proper;
but in criminal causes, it is not," the court said, and accordingly overruled the objection. The defense
excepted.
We have already seen above what Samson's testimony was concerning this point and how thereby he
corroborated that given by Walker.
An offer to compromise is not a confession of debt and is not admissible in evidence (Code of Civ. Proc.,
sec. 346). In a criminal cause for theft (U.S. vs. Maqui, 27 Phil. Rep., 97) this court said that the weight both
of authority and reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, in criminal cases,
but permits the accused to show that such offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to
avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the
accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the
legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of
public crimes which directly affect the public interest, in so far as public vengeance and private interests are
concerned, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action, however it may be
with respect to the civil liability. But section 25 of Act No. 1761, under which this cause was prosecuted,
expressly authorizes the Collector of Internal Revenue to compromise a case after action has been begun,
"instead of commencing or prosecuting suit thereon." The words in quotation marks are textual. A
compromise necessarily implies two elements, one of which is the offer and the other the acceptance, in
order that the penal action may be extinguished and there remain only the civil liability to deal with. Of
course ordinarily it is the defendant who makes the offer, — a lawful act sanctioned by law in this class of
prosecutions, — and because it is made, no presumption of guilt must be raised against the maker, as occurs
in other criminal causes for public crimes in which the offer is not lawful because it is a thing prohibited by
law. The offer may have been prompted simply to avoid the annoyance of a prosecution, as sometimes
happens in a civil case where a person involved in the litigation is perhaps entirely in the right but prefers to
lose a sum of money rather than commence and prosecute an action. This case is, therefore, on all fours with
that of section 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure, above cited. At all events, for the conviction of the
defendants it is not necessary to consider and weigh this evidence; it could only be considered as cumulative,
and it was not taken into account by the trial court.
With regard to the 5th assignment of error which alleges that the penalty was excessive, it must be
remembered that the trial court exercised his discretion in fixing the penalty within the limits established by
83
law and that, in principle, what is authorized by law cannot be held to be arbitrary. But the penalty imposed
by the trial court in his discretion will not necessarily have to stand for that reason. If such a principle
governed, appeals would be useless. This Supreme Court also exercises its discretion, and, in a higher
degree, by its right of review in criminal causes brought up on appeal or consultation and of high inspection
over the administration of justice, it has the power to modify within the limits of the penalty provided by
law, in order to maintain uniformity in its application. If judicial decisions vary in the different provinces of
the Archipelago, even in identical or at least analogous cases, it is principally due to the fact that the judges,
acquainted with the extent of crime in their respective jurisdictions, are justified, in order to suppress crime,
in applying the law more strictly and severely in some provinces than in others in accordance with the
greater or lesser propensity to disobey the laws and the peculiar circumstances that prevail in each locality.
But within the same province such variation would not be justifiable, as it would transgress the law which
fits the penalty to the crime. In the Province of Cebu the court sentenced Lao Lock Hing, for the possession
of 70 tins of opium, to five years' imprisonment and a fine of P10,000, or, in case of insolvency, to
subsidiary imprisonment; but this Supreme Court reduced the penalty to two years' imprisonment and a fine
of P3,000 (14 Phil. Rep., 861). In the same Province of Cebu, Miguel Villano was charged with having
bought and sold 190 tins of opium — although one of the charges was for 100 tins only, valued at P3,000,
because the 190 tins were received on different dates — and was sentenced on the charge for the 100 tins, to
one year and two months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,500, a judgment which was affirmed by this
Supreme Court (18 Phil. Rep., 3592). In another cause, also tried in Cebu against one Loo Chaw for the sale
of 30 tins of opium, the penalty imposed was one year's imprisonment and a fine of P2,000; this also was
affirmed by this Supreme Court (19 Phil. Rep., 3433).
The foregoing sentences are in notable contrast to the case at bar in which Regino Torres is sentenced to
three years' imprisonment for the possession of two tins of opium, valued at scarcely P120, and Pablo Padilla
to one year and one month for the possession of one tin of the same drug, worth probably P60.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the understanding that the imprisonment to be imposed upon
Regino Torres shall be that of nine months, and that upon Pablo Padilla, six months, each of them to pay the
costs of this instance in equal shares. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANNY GODOY, accused-appellant.
JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR. complainant,
vs.
MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR. and EVA P. PONCE DE LEON, respondents.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:
For separate resolution, as an incident arising from these criminal cases under automatic review by the court,
is a complaint1 filed by judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto
Princesa City, Branch 47, to cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso, Jr., a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce
de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial board, respectively, of the Palawan Times. His Honor's
plaint is based on an article written by respondent Reynoso, Jr. in his column, "On the Beat," and published
in the July 20, 1994 issue of said newspaper which is of general circulation in Puerto Princesa City.
The pertinent portions of the article complained of are hereunder reproduced, with the alleged contemptuous
statements italicized for ready identification as the particulars equivalent to the innuendo in a libel charge:
Isang maalab na issues (sic) pa ay ang DEATH THREATS laban kono kay Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. ng
mga pamilya ng kanyang sinentensiyahan ng Double Death Penalty. Sinabi ni Wilmar Godoy sa DWRM
programa na wala silang pagbabantang ginawa umano, at hindi nila ito kailan man isinaisip. Umaasa na
lamang sila sa magiging resulta ng review ng Korte Suprema. Ayon naman kay Gacott sa kanyang interview
sa DYPR ay totoong pinagbabantaan siya ng mga Godoy. Kaya ayon marami siyang Security na armado, in
full battle gear. Kung totoo ito, bakit hindi niya kasuhan ang mga ito? Ito rin ang katanungan ni Mr. Tony
Omaga Diaz, ang station manager ng DYPR. O bale ba gumawa siya ng sariling MULTO Pagkatapos ay
takot na takot siya sa multong kanyang ginawa.
Usap-usapan pa rin ang kaso ni Godoy. Ito raw ay isang open book maging sa kanyang mga co-teachers sa
Pulot na nagli-live in si Godoy at ang babaing si Mia Taha. Matagal na ang kanilang ugnayan. Meron ding
"balita" ewan kung totoo, na noong si Godoy daw ay nasa Provincial Jail pa ay dinadalaw siya ni Taha At
kumakain pa sila sa labas kasama ang isang Provincial Guard. Ito rin ang dahilan kung bakit ipinagpilitan ni
Judge Gacott na madala kaagad sa Muntinlupa sa National Bilibid Prisons si Godoy kahit na ang kaso ay
naka-apela pa.
xxx xxx xxx
Pero mayroon payo si Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr. sa mga mamamayan ng Palawan, mag-ingat kayo sa
paglalakad at baka kung hindi kayo madapa ay madulas daw kayo. Dahil ayon daw kay Judge Gacott, base
sa kanyang interview sa Magandang Gabi Bayan, "Tagilid na raw and mundo. Maraming nagpapatunay daw
dito, maski sa kapitolyo." Joke lang. Pero isang warning din sa may mga nobya, na mag-ingat sa pag-break
sa inyong girlfriend, dahil baka mademanda kayo at masentensyahan ng double death penalty, lalo na kung
kay Judge Gacott, dahil alam na ninyo, tagilid and laban diyan.
The complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the
administration of justice; that the article contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting,
offensive and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty of complainant as
a judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively and impartially, but is an imputation that he is
biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him; and that the article is sub judice because it is still pending
automatic review.
Respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. contends in his Comment2 that his article does not intend to impede nor
obstruct the administration of justice because the same was published after complainant had promulgated his
decision in the case; that such publication will not affect or influence the review by the Supreme Court of the
criminal case, considering that the Palawan Times is circulated only in the City of Puerto Princess and some
parts of Palawan; that the comments made therein were made in good faith and in the exercise of the
freedom of expression and of the press; that while the article may contain unfavorable comments about
complainant, it cannot be considered as having the tendency to degrade or impede the administration of
84
justice; and that the complaint, which is for contempt of a judge of a regional trial court, was erroneously
filed with the Supreme Court contrary to Section 4, Rule 71 of the rules of Court.
Respondent Eva P. Ponce de Leon, in her Comment3 and Supplemental Comment,4 asserts that the article is
merely in reaction to the television interview given by complainant in the show, "Magandang Gabi Bayan,"
last June 18, 1994 wherein the latter defended his decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640-41, entitled
"People vs. Godoy;" that the article is no longer sub judice as the same was published only after complainant
had rendered his decision and had already lost jurisdiction over the case; that the article cannot be
considered contemptuous and defamatory in the absence of a clear and present danger that it will tend
directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or ridicule the administration of justice; that it constitutes a valid
exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press; that a reading of the subject article in its
entirety will show that the same does not constitute contempt but, at most, is merely a fair criticism which
did not intend to malign nor place him in disrepute in the performance of his functions; and that respondent
Ponce de Leon cannot be held liable for contempt because she did not have either actual knowledge of, or
Personal connection with, the authorship or publication of the allegedly contemptuous article, since she had
just returned from the United States when the same was published.
On the issue of whether the specified statements complained of are contumacious in nature, we are inclined,
based on an overall perusal and objective analysis of the subject article, to hold in the negative. We have
read and reread the article in its entirety and we are fully convinced that what is involved here is a situation
wherein the alleged disparaging statements have been taken out of context. If the statements claimed to be
contumelious had been read with contextual care, there would have been no reason for this contempt
proceeding.
In our aforestated evaluation, we were sufficiently persuaded to favorably consider the following
explanation of respondent Ponce de Leon in her Supplemental Comment:
On the other hand, a reading of the subject article in its entirety will show that the same does not constitute
contempt, but at most, merely constitutes fair criticism.
The first portion of the article reads:
"Isang maalab na issues (sic) pa ay ang DEATH THREATS laban kono kay Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. ng
mga pamilya ng kanyang sinentensiyahan ng Double Death Penalty. Sinabi ni Wilmar Godoy sa DWRM
programa na wala silang pagbabantang ginawa umano, at hindi nila ito kailan man isinaisip. Ayon naman
kay Gacott sa kanyang interview sa DYPR ay totoong pinagbabantaan siya ng mga Godoy. Kaya ayon
marami siyang Security na armado, in full battle gear. Kung totoo ito, bakit hindi niya kasuhan ang mga ito?
Ito rin ang katanungan ni Mr. Tony Omaga Diaz, ang station manager ng DYPR. O bale ba gumawa siya ng
sariling MULTO Pagkatapos ay takot na takot siya sa multong kanyang ginawa."
The foregoing does not even deal with the merits of the case, but with the public accusations being made by
complainant that he is being given death threats by the family of the accused, Danny Godoy. The article only
makes a justifiable query as to why Complainant does not file the appropriate charges if his accusations are
true.
"Usap-usapan pa rin ang kaso ni Godoy. Ito raw ay isang open book maging sa kanyang mga co-teachers sa
Pulot na nagli-live in si Godoy at ang babaing si Mia Taha. Matagal na ang kanilang ugnayan. Meron ding
‘balita’ ewan kung totoo, na noong si Godoy daw ay nasa Provincial Jail pa ay dinadalaw siya ni Taha At
kumakain pa sila sa labas kasama ang isang Provincial Guard. Ito rin ang dahilan kung bakit ipinagpilitan ni
Judge Gacott na madala kaagad sa Muntinlupa sa National Bilibid Prisons si Godoy kahit na ang kaso ay
naka-apela pa." (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing is merely a report of rumors regarding the accused Danny Godoy. They are not presented as
facts by respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. In fact, he even goes to the extent of acknowledging that he
himself does not know if the rumors are true or not.
The subject article then offers the following analysis:
"Malaking epekto ang desisyon ng Korte Suprema sa dalawang tao, kay Danny Godoy at Judge Gacott.
Kung babaliktarin ng Supreme Court and decision ni Gacott, lalaya si Godoy, si Gacott naman ang masisira,
ang kanyang aspirations na maitaas sa Court of Appeals at eventually makasama sa mga miyembro ng korte
suprema ng bansa. Kung papaboran naman Gacott ay sigurado na ang kamatayan ni Godoy, at double pa
pero si Gacott maitataas pa ang puwesto. Tayo naman, hintay lamang tayo ng ano mang magiging
developments ng kaso."
The foregoing is nothing more than a fair analysis. For indeed, if the Honorable Court affirms the Decision
of Complainant, the accused Danny Godoy would be meted the death sentence. On the other hand, if the
decision is reversed, this may adversely affect the aspirations of Complainant to be promoted to the Court of
Appeals, and eventually to the Honorable Court.
Finally, the subject article reads:
"Pero mayroon payo si Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr. sa mga mamamayan ng Palawan, mag-ingat kayo sa
paglalakad at baka kung hindi kayo madapa ay madulas daw kayo. Dahil ayon daw kay Judge Gacott, base
sa kanyang interview sa Magandang Gabi Bayan, 'Tagilid na raw and mundo. Maraming nagpapatunay daw
dito, maski sa kapitolyo.' Joke lang. Pero isang warning din sa may mga nobya, na mag-ingat sa pag-break
sa inyong girlfriend, dahil baka mademanda kayo at masentensyahan ng double death penalty, lalo na kung
kay Judge Gacott, dahil alam na ninyo, tagilid and laban diyan."
Again, the subject article merely reports what Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr. allegedly said. But more
importantly, the foregoing is merely a reaction not so much to Complainant's Decision, but to the public
statements made by Complainant in the national television show "Magandang Gabi Bayan."
Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level of contumely which is actionable
under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Neither do we believe that the publication in question was intended to
influence this Court for it could not conceivably be capable of doing so. The article has not transcended the
legal limits for editorial comment and criticism. Besides, it has not been shown that there exists a substantive
evil which is extremely serious and that the degree of its imminence is so exceptionally high as to warrant
punishment for contempt and sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press.
It has been insightfully explained and suggested that a judge will generally and wisely pass unnoticed any
mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion, or at least pass it with simply a reproof. It is so that in
every case where a judge decides for one party, he decides against another; and oftentimes both parties are
beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The disappointment, therefore, is great, and it is not in human
nature that there should be other than a bitter feeling, which often reaches to the judge as the cause of the
supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient, and tolerate everything which appears as but the
momentary outbreak of disappointment. A second thought will generally make a party ashamed of such,
outbreak, and the dignity of the court will suffer none by passing it in silence.5
85
Prescinding from the foregoing adjudgment, the Court observes that there are two primary issues presented
in this incident which deserve a more extended disquisition, firstly, because of their importance and frequent
involvement in contempt proceedings filed in the courts, and, secondly, by reason of the fact that there are
numerous and variant pronouncements on the subject of contempt which need to be clarified. The principal
issues are (1) whether or not there can be contempt of court in case of post-litigation statements or
publications; and (2) which court has jurisdiction over a contempt committed against the trial court while the
case is pending on appeal. Other cognate and related issues must also be discussed so as to provide judicial
guidance on the present state of our statutory and case laws thereon.
Before we go into a more intensive analysis of said issues, however, it may be beneficial for purposes
thereof to preliminarily revisit and expound on the nature and implications of a special civil action for
contempt or of any initiatory pleading therefor filed as an incident in the main case. That exercise will
further explain and justify our disposition of the contempt charge herein.
I
Prefatorial Considerations
The exercise of the power to punish for contempt has a dual aspect, primarily, the proper punishment of the
guilty party for his disrespect to the court, and, secondarily, his compulsory performance of some act or duty
required of him by the court and which he refuses to perform. Due perhaps to this two fold aspect of the
exercise of the power to punish them, contempts are classified as civil or criminal.6 However, the line of
demarcation between acts constituting criminal contempt, as distinguished from civil contempt, is quite
indistinct. The confusion in attempts to classify civil and criminal contempts is due to the fact that there are
contempts in which both elements appear; or there are contempts which are neither wholly civil nor
altogether criminal, but partake of the characteristics of both; or it is also possible that the same act may
constitute both a civil and criminal contempt.
A. As to the Nature of the Offense
A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge
acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect.7 On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be
done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense
against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made.8
A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against
organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an issue
between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the
proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right of
private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of
the court.9
It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no one can be
punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. On the
contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the
defendant's intent in committing the contempt is immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to
violate the court's order is not a defense in civil contempt. 10
B. As to the Purpose for which the Power is Exercised
A major factor in determining whether a contempt is civil or criminal is the purpose for which the power is
exercised. Where the primary purpose is to preserve the court’s authority and to punish for disobedience of
its orders, the contempt is criminal. Where the primary purpose is to provide a remedy for an injured suitor
and to coerce compliance with an order, the contempt is civil. A criminal contempt involves no element of
personal injury. It is directed against the power and dignity of the court; private parties have little, if any,
interest in the proceedings for punishment. Conversely, if the contempt consists in the refusal of a person to
do an act that the court has ordered him to do for the benefit or advantage of a party to an action pending
before the court, and the contemnor is committed until he complies with the order, the commitment is in the
nature of an execution to enforce the judgment of the court; the party in whose favor that judgment was
rendered is the real party in interest in the proceedings. Civil contempt proceedings look only to the future.
And it is said that in civil contempt proceedings, the contemnor must be in a position to purge himself. 11
C. As to the Character of the Contempt Proceeding
It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by the relief sought, or the
dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily
punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial. 12
Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal actions.
They are punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their
prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court, and
to punish for disobedience of its orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings or
prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The proceeding has been
characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but
really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance
with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the
summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal
prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the
protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be
strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the
substantial rights of the accused are preserved. 13
Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are
proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing
required. As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and enforce
the rights of a private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit
such a party litigant. So a proceeding is one for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is
wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special order made in behalf of the other party and the
disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement of
obedience. The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions,
ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings. It has been held that a proceeding for contempt to
enforce a remedy in a civil action is a proceeding in that action. Accordingly, where there has been a
violation of a court order in a civil action, it is not necessary to docket an independent action in contempt or
proceed in an independent prosecution to enforce the order. It has been held, however, that while the
proceeding is auxiliary to the main case in that it proceeds out of the original case, it is essentially a new and
independent proceeding in that it involves new issues and must be initiated by the issuance and service of
new process. 14
86
In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or
someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In criminal contempt proceedings, it is
generally held that the State is the real prosecutor. 15
Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and
the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil
contempt, there is no presumption, although the burden of proof is on the complainant, and while the proof
need not be beyond reasonable doubt, it must amount to more than a mere preponderance of evidence. It has
been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal
"reasonable doubt" burden and the civil "fair preponderance" burden. 16
On the basis of the foregoing legal principles which are now well settled, it can be safely concluded that
under paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on indirect contempt, any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, constitutes
criminal contempt.
II
Whether or not Post-Litigation Publications can be the Subject of Contempt Proceedings
A. Effect of Freedom of Speech and Press Guaranties
In the case of In re Sotto, 17 this Court had the opportunity to define the relation between the courts and the
press, quoting there in the statements made by Judge Holmes in U.S. vs. Sullen, 18 thus:
The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred,
and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and
should cooperate uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its
prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized
and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary in order to
dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of
verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this Court will not hesitate to exercise its
undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This
right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the
right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.
Hence, a person charged with contempt of court for making certain utterances or publishing writings which
are clearly opprobrious may not, ordinarily, escape liability therefor by merely invoking the constitutional
guaranties of freedom of speech and press. Liberty of speech and the press must not be confused with an
abuse of such liberties. Obstructing, by means of the spoken or written word, the administration of justice by
the courts has been described as an abuse of the liberty of speech or the press such as will subject the abuser
to punishment for contempt of court.
Guaranties of free speech and a free press, as they appear in the Constitution, are frequently couched so as to
impute responsibility for any abuse of the privilege, and it is sometimes recognized that with respect to
whether an allegedly scandalous publication or utterance is to be treated as a contempt, a line must be drawn
between those speeches or writings which are protected by the privilege of free speech and a free press and
those which constitute an abuse of it.
The right of freedom of the press is only a specific instance of the general right of freedom of speech;
persons engaged in the newspaper business cannot claim any other or greater right than that possessed by
persons not in that business. 19
B. Different Doctrines or Schools of Thought
In the case of In re Francisco Brillantes, 20 Justice Perfecto explained in his dissenting opinion that "as to
whether contempt may be committed for criticizing a tribunal after the same has rendered decision or taken
final action on a matter which is the subject of criticism, there are two schools of thought represented,
respectively, by what we may call the English doctrine and the American doctrine, the first for the
affirmative and the last one for the negative. The question now is to determine which of the two doctrines is
more conformable to reason and justice and, therefore, should be, adopted and applied by our tribunals."
1. The English Doctrine
According to Justice Perfecto, the rule in England is that there can be contempt of court even after the case
has been terminated. He then proceeded to ramify:
In England comments upon the court's action in a concluded case, where libelous or calculated to bring the
court into disrepute, were freely punishable as contempt under the early common law. Distinction between
pending and concluded matters does not seem to have been made. Any comment impairing the dignity of the
court was punishable as contempt regardless of the time at which made.
xxx xxx xxx
The whole theory of the early common law of contempt is admirably delivered by Wilmot, J., in King vs.
Almon, . . . . The publication there complained of was a volume containing a diatribe against Lord Mansfield
for allowing an amendment of pleading as of course, and apparently from corrupt motives, in a concluded
case, and further charging him with having introduced a practice to defeat the efficacy of the writ of habeas
corpus. It is there said: "The arraignment of the justice of the judges is arraigning the King's justice; it is an
impeachment of his wisdom and goodness in the choice of his judges, and excites in the mind of the people a
general dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations, and indisposes their minds to obey them; and,
whenever men's allegiance to the laws is so fundamentally shaken, it is the most fatal and most dangerous
obstruction of justice, and, in my opinion, calls for a more rapid and immediate redress than any other
obstruction whatever — not for the sake of the judges as private individuals, but because they are the
channels by which the Kings' justice is conveyed to the people. To be impartial, and to be universally
thought so, are both absolutely necessary for giving justice that free, open, and uninterrupted current which
it has for many ages found all over this Kingdom, and which so eminently distinguishes and exalts it above
all nations upon the earth . . . . The constitution has provided very apt and proper remedies for correcting and
rectifying the involuntary mistakes of judges, and for punishing and removing them for any voluntary
perversions of justice. But, if their authority is to be trampled upon by pamphleteers and newswriters, and
the people are to be told that the power given to the judges for their protection is prostituted to their
destruction, the court may retain its power some little time; but I am sure it will instantly lose all its
authority, and the power of the court will not long survive the authority of it: Is it possible to stab that
authority more fatally than by charging the court, and more particularly the chief justice, with having
introduced a rule to subvert the constitutional liberty of the people? A greater scandal could not be published
. . . . It is conceded that an act of violence upon his person when he was making such an order would be
contempt punishable by attachment. Upon what principle? For striking a judge in walking along the streets
would not be a contempt of the court. The reason, therefore, must be, that he is in the exercise of his office,
and discharging the function of a judge of this court; and, if his person is under this protection, why should
87
not his character be under the same protection? It is not for the sake of the individual, but for the sake of the
public, that his person is under such protection; and, in respect of the public, the imputing of corruption and
the perversion of justice to him, in an order made by him at his chambers, is attended with much more
mischievous consequences than a blow; and therefore the reason of proceeding in this summary manner
applies with equal, if not superior, force, to one case as well as the other. There is no greater obstruction to
the execution of justice from the striking a judge than from the abusing him, because his order lies open to
be enforced or discharged, whether the judge is struck or abused for making it.
2. The American Doctrine
In American jurisprudence, the general rule is that defamatory comments on the conduct of a judge with
respect to past cases or matters finally disposed of do not constitute contempt, even though libelous and
reflecting on the integrity of the judge and the court. 21 It has been said that the power to punish as a
contempt a criticism concerning a case made after its termination is denied under the theory that such a
power is not necessary as a safeguard to the proper functioning of the court as a judicial tribunal. And it has
been said that comments, however stringent, relating to judicial proceedings which are past and ended are
not contempt of court even though they may be a libel against the judge or some other officer of the court.
There is even the view that when a case is finished, the courts and judges are subject to the same criticisms
as other people and that no comment published in connection with a completed case, however libelous or
unjust, is punishable as contempt of court. Thus it is said that the remedies of a judge who suffers abuse at
the hands of the press, not amounting to contempt, are the same as those available to persons outside the
judiciary. 22
To the same effect was the holding in People ex rel. Supreme Court vs. Albertson, 23 where it was declared
that —
The great weight of authority is to the effect that — in so far as proceedings to punish for contempt are
concerned — comment upon the behavior of the court in cases fully determined in the particular court
criticized is unrestricted under our constitutional guaranty of liberty of the press and free speech, especially
in the absence of a statute of direct application to the contrary. This view in brief is based upon the theory
that — keeping our constitutional guaranties in mind — libelous publications which bear upon the
proceedings of a court while they are pending may in some way affect their correct determination, and are
properly the subject of contempt proceedings. On the other hand, such publications or oral utterances of
entirely retrospective bearing come within the sphere of authorized comment unless they affect a judge
personally, when he has his remedy in an action of libel or slander, as does any other individual thus
offended. He has the right to bring an action at law before a jury of his peers.
Along similar lines, in Ex Parte Mcleod, 24 the court ruled that:
The right of a court to punish, as for contempts, criticisms of its acts, or even libels upon its officers, not
going to the extent, by improper publications, of influencing a pending trial, . . . would not only be
dangerous to the rights of the people, but its exercise would drag down the dignity and moral influence of
these tribunals. Such criticism is the right of the citizen, and essential not only to the proper administration
of justice, but to the public tranquility and contentment. Withdrawing power from courts to summarily
interfere with such exercise of the right of the press and freedom of speech deprives them of no useful
power.
Likewise, the State Supreme Court of Montana in State ex rel. Metcalf vs. District Court, 25 pointed out that
the legal proceeding involved therein was not pending when the alleged libelous article was published, then
referred to the guaranty of freedom of speech and the press, and eventually held that the publication involved
was not punishable as contempt. It declared that so long as the published criticism does not impede the due
administration of the law, it is better to maintain the guaranty of the Constitution than to undertake to
compel respect or punish libel by the summary process of contempt.
Finally, in holding that persons who had published newspaper articles alleging that a designated judge had
been intentionally partial and corrupt in the trial of certain causes which had been decided and were not
pending when the publication occurred could not be punished as for contempt the court, in State ex rel.
Attorney General vs. Circuit Court, 26 cited a number of cases supporting the view that libelous newspaper
comments upon the acts of a court in actions past and ended do not constitute contempt. It pointed out that
some of such decisions took the position that to punish such publications would constitute a serious invasion
of constitutional guaranties of free speech and a free press.
It ratiocinated in this manner: "Important as it is that courts should perform their grave public duties
unimpeded and unprejudiced by illegitimate influences, there are other rights guaranteed to all citizens by
our Constitution and form of government, either expressly or impliedly, which are fully as important, and
which must be guarded with an equally zealous care. These rights are the rights of free speech and of free
publication of the citizens' sentiments on all subjects. It seems clear to us that so extreme a power as to
punish for contempt because of libelous publications as to past litigation, is inconsistent with, and would
materially impair, the constitutional rights of free speech and free press."
However, even under American jurisprudence, as shall hereafter be demonstrated, the aforesaid rulings are
not without exceptions. There is ample authority that, under proper circumstances, constitutional guaranties
of freedom of speech and liberty of the press do not protect contemptuous publications relating to court
proceedings even though such publications are not made until after the pendency of the litigation in
question.27
3. The Philippine Doctrine
In the Philippine setting, as we have noted, there are conflicting views on this issue which have to be
analyzed and, if possible, reconciled. On that exordial indication, we have digressed into these aspects of the
law on contempt and seized upon this incident in the criminal cases at bar in order to essay a rapprochement
of such views into what we may call the Philippine doctrine.
In the early cases decided by this Court involving contempts through newspaper publications, the rule was
that contemptuous publications were actionable only if committed with respect to pending suits. Apparently,
the weight of authority then was to the effect that criticism of the conduct of a judge or a court with regard to
matters finally disposed of does not constitute contempt, even though it may be libelous.
That rule first found application in the case of In re Lozano, et al. 28 and was reiterated in the subsequent
cases of In re Abistado, 29 and People vs. Alarcon, et al, 30 where this Court, speaking through Justice
Malcolm, tersely stated:
The rule is well established that newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence
the courts in administering justice in a pending suit proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is
summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. . . . (6 R.C.L., pp. 508-
515).
It will be noted that the aforequoted conclusion was arrived at after a short discourse presented by the
ponente on the existing divergence of opinions on the matter between the English and American courts. But
the learned justice, notwithstanding his preference for and application of the American doctrine, nonetheless
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thereafter made the recommendatory observation that "(w)ith reference to the applicability of the above
authorities, it should be remarked first of all that this court is not bound to accept any of them absolutely and
unqualifiedly. What is best for the maintenance of the judiciary in the Philippines should be the criterion."
It seems that this view was shared by then Associate Justice Moran when he dissented from the majority
opinion in the aforecited case of People vs. Alarcon, et al., which upheld the doctrine enunciated in Lozano
and Abistado, in this wise: "I know that in the United States, publications about courts, after the conclusion
of a pending case, no matter how perverse or scandalous, are in many instances brought within the
constitutional protection of the liberty of the press. But while this rule may find justification in that country,
considering the American temper and psychology and the stability of its political institutions, it is doubtful
whether here a similar toleration of gross misuse of liberty of the press would, under our circumstances,
result in no untoward consequences to our structure of democracy yet in the process of healthful
development and growth."
Such perception could have probably impelled Justice Moran to deviate from the then accepted doctrine,
with this rationalization:
Contempt, by reason of publications relating to courts and to court proceedings, are of two kinds. A
publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by courts. This is
the rule announced in the cases relied upon by the majority. A publication which tends to degrade the courts
and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute,
constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. In the language of the majority,
what is sought, in the language of the majority, what is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influenced of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in
the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to
vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public
confidence in them. In the first, there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision
which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with
or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would
lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
That dissenting opinion was impliedly adopted in the subsequent case of In re Brillantes, 31 where the editor
of the Manila Guardian was declared in contempt of court for publishing an editorial, stating that the 1944
Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner, even after the case involving the validity of said
examinations had been terminated. This was followed by In re Almacen 32 where the Court stated
categorically that the rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated had lost much of its
validity, invoking therein the ruling in Brillantes and quoting with approval the dissenting opinion in
Alarcon.
It appears, therefore, that in the two latest cases decided by this Court, the general rule that there can be no
contempt in post-litigation publications is not necessarily all-embracing under certain situations. From the
shift in judicial approach in Brillantes to the position announced in Almacen, it can inevitably be concluded
that the termination of the case is not a guaranty of immunity from a contempt charge for publications or
utterances which are defamatory or libelous, depending on the purpose and effects thereof. In other words,
one may still be cited for contempt of court even after a case has ended, where such punitive action is
necessary to protect the court and its dignity and to vindicate it from acts or conduct intended or calculated
to degrade, ridicule or bring the court into disfavor and thereby erode or destroy public confidence in that
court.
This qualified distinction is not without justification and, in fact, was also foreshadowed by the concurring
opinion of Justice Briones in Brillantes wherein, after noting the conflicting views on the amenability of the
contemnor during the pendency or after the termination of the judicial proceeding in the court involved as
illustrated by the English and American doctrines thereon, he advanced the proposition that —
. . . esta distincion no tiene mucha importancia. Lo importante para mi es ver si la critica lanzada por el
recurrido es falsa y esta concebida en terminos tales que "tiende directamente a degradar la administracion
de justicia," . . . es indiferente si versa sobre un asunto o negociacion totalmente terminada o no; el desacato
existe entonces y debe ser castigado.
. . . Se trata simplemente de la facultad inherente en los tribunales de reprimir y castigar todo acto que tiende
a ambarazarles y obstruirles en su funcion de administrar justicia, . . . .
The rationale for making a qualification to the rule generally considered as the American doctrine, which
rule as herein qualified we now adopt and refer to as the Philippine doctrine on this issue, is profoundly and
eloquently explicated by Justice Moran in Alarcon, to wit:
It is true that the Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech and of the press. But license or abuse of that
freedom should not be confused with freedom in its true sense. Well-ordered liberty demands no less
unrelaxing vigilance against abuse of the sacred guaranties of the Constitution than the fullest protection of
their legitimate exercise. As important as is the maintenance of a free press and the free exercise of the rights
of the citizens is the maintenance of a judiciary unhampered in its administration of justice and secure in its
continuous enjoyment of public confidence. "The administration of justice and freedom of the press, though
separate and distinct are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts
have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and the
laws, from which the former receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction." (U.S. vs. Su liens, 38
Fed., 2d., 230.) Democracy cannot long endure in a country where liberty is grossly misused any more than
where liberty is illegitimately abridged.
xxx xxx xxx
If the contemptuous publication made by the respondent herein were directed to this Court in connection
with a case already decided, the effect of the rule laid down by the majority is to deny this court the power to
vindicate its dignity. The mischievous consequences that will follow from the situation thus sought to be
permitted, are both too obvious and odious to be stated. The administration of Justice, no matter how
righteous, may be identified with all sorts of fancied scandal and corruption. Litigants, discontented for
having lost their cases, will have every way to give vent to their resentment. Respect and obedience to Law
will ultimately be shattered, and, as a consequence, the utility of the courts will completely disappear.
It may be said that respect to courts cannot be compelled and that public confidence should be a tribute to
judicial worth, virtue and intelligence. But compelling respect to courts is one thing and denying the courts
the power to vindicate themselves when outraged is another. I know of no principle of law that authorizes
with impunity a discontented citizen to unleash, by newspaper publications, the avalanche of his wrath and
venom upon courts and judges. If he believes that a judge is corrupt and that justice has somewhere been
perverted, law and order require that he follow the processes provided by the Constitution and the statutes by
instituting the corresponding proceedings for impeachment or otherwise. As Mr. Justice Palmer, in speaking
of the duty of courts and court officers, has wisely said:
Would it be just to the persons who are called upon to exercise these powers to compel them to do so, and at
the same time allow them to be maltreated or libeled because they did so? How would a suitor like a
89
juryman trying his case who might expect he would be assaulted, beaten, his property destroyed, or his
reputation blasted, in case he decided against his opponent? Apply the same thing to judges, or the sheriff,
and how long could organized society hold together? With reference to a judge, if he has acted corruptly, it
is worse than a mere contempt. But it is apparent it would not be right that the court of which he is a member
should determine this, and consequently the law has provided a plain and easy method of bringing him to
justice by a petition to Parliament; but, while the law authorizes this, it does not allow infamous charges to
be made against him by persons, either in the newspapers or otherwise, with reference to how he has or shall
discharge the duties of his office. It must be apparent to all right thinking men that, if such were allowed to
be indulged in, it must end in the usefulness of the court itself being destroyed, however righteous its judges
may act. From what I have said it must not be supposed that I think that the decisions of the court, or the
actions of the judges, or other persons composing the court, are not to be discussed; on the contrary, I would
allow the freest criticism of all such acts if done in a fair spirit, only stopping at what must injure or destroy
the court itself and bring the administration of the law into disrepute, or be an outrage on the persons whose
acts are discussed, or when such discussion would interfere with the right decision of the cause before the
court.
We do not hesitate to hereby give our imprimatur to the aforequoted opinion which, we fully believe,
conforms to basic dogmatic teachings on judicial and professional conduct requiring respect for and the
giving of due deference to the judicial system and its members — ethical standards which this Court has,
time and again, been trying to inculcate in the minds of every member of the Bar and the public in general.
4. Cautela on the Balancing of Interests
On the bases of the foregoing authorities, it is evident that a line has to be drawn between those utterances or
writings which are protected by the privileges of free speech and a free press and those which constitute an
abuse thereof, in determining whether an allegedly scurrilous publication or statement is to be treated as
contempt of court. But to find the line where the permissible right of free speech ends and its reprehensible
abuse begins is not always an easy task. In contempt proceedings, it was held that this line must usually be
defined by the courts themselves, and in such cases its location is to be established with special care and
caution. 33
In so doing, it becomes necessary to give the subject that careful examination commensurate with its
importance, mindful that, on the one hand, the dignity and authority of the courts must be maintained, while,
on the other, free speech, a free press, and the liberty of the citizen must be preserved. Both are equally
valuable rights. If the court is shorn of its power to punish for contempt in all proper cases, it cannot
preserve its authority, so that even without any constitutional or statutory guaranty this power is inherent in
the court. But the Constitution itself, in the Bill of Rights, guarantees free speech and liberty of the press. Of
course, it was never intended, under the guise of these constitutional guaranties, that the power of the court
should be trenched upon. 34
How to determine whether an act or utterance is covered by the protective mantle of the constitutional
guaranty of liberty of the press or whether it is already outside or an abuse thereof, is an altogether different
matter. We have perforce to draw from tenets in American jurisprudence, although with discriminating
choice, since after all our present doctrines on contempt vis-a-vis constitutional limitations trace their roots
in the main to the lessons laid down and born of the social and judicial experience in that jurisdiction.
The liberty of the press consists in the right to publish with impunity the truth, with good motives and for
justifiable ends, whether it respects governments individuals; the right freely to publish whatever the citizen
may please and to be protected against any responsibility for so doing, except in so far as such publications,
from their blasphemy, obscenity, or scandalous character, may be a public offense, are as by their falsehood
and malice they may injuriously affect the standing, reputation, or pecuniary interests of individuals. The
true liberty of the press is amply secured by permitting every man to publish his opinion; but it is due to the
peace and dignity of society to inquire into the motives of such publications, and to distinguish between
those which are meant for use and reformation, and with an eye solely to the public good, and those which
are intended merely to delude and defame. To the latter description, it is impossible that any good
government should afford protection and impunity.
The liberty of the press means that anyone can publish anything he pleases, but he is liable for the abuse of
this liberty. If he does this by scandalizing the courts of his country, he is liable to be punished for contempt.
In other words, the abuse of the privilege consists principally in not telling the truth. There is a right to
publish the truth, but no right to publish falsehood to the injury of others with impunity. It, therefore, does
not include the right to malign the courts, to libel and slander and utter the most flagrant and indecent
calumnies about the court and its officers, nor to invade the sanctuaries of the temples. Such practices and
such miscreants ought to be condemned, and the courts would deserve condemnation and abolition if they
did not vigorously and fearlessly punish such offenders. Such practices are an abuse of the liberty of the
press, and if the slander relates to the courts, it concerns the whole public and is consequently punishable
summarily as a criminal contempt. It is therefore the liberty of the press that is guaranteed, not the
licentiousness. It is the right to speak the truth, not the right to bear false witness against your neighbor. 35
This brings to fore the need to make a distinction between adverse criticism of the court's decision after the
case is ended and "scandalizing the court itself." The latter is not criticism; it is personal and scurrilous abuse
of a judge as such, in which case it shall be dealt with as a case of contempt. 36
It must be clearly understood and always borne in mind that there is a vast difference between criticism or
fair comment on the one side and defamation on the other. Where defamation commences, true criticism
ends. True criticism differs from defamation in the following particulars; (1) Criticism deals only with such
things as invite public attention or call for public comment. (2) Criticism never attacks the individual but
only his work. In every case the attack is on a man's acts, or on some thing, and not upon the man himself. A
true critic never indulges in personalities. (3) True criticism never imputes or insinuates dishonorable
motives, unless justice absolutely requires it, and then only on the clearest proofs. (4) The critic never takes
advantage of the occasion to gratify private malice, or to attain any other object beyond the fair discussion of
matters of public interest, and the judicious guidance of the public taste. 37
Generally, criticism of a court's rulings or decisions is not improper, and may not be restricted after a case
has been finally disposed of and has ceased to be pending. So long as critics confine their criticisms to facts
and base them on the decisions of the court, they commit no contempt no matter how severe the criticism
may be; but when they pass beyond that line and charge that judicial conduct was influenced by improper,
corrupt, or selfish motives, or that such conduct was affected by political prejudice or interest, the tendency
is to create distrust and destroy the confidence of the people in their courts. 38
Moreover, it has been held that criticism of courts after a case is finally disposed of, does not constitute
contempt and, to this effect, a case may be said to be pending so long as there is still something for the court
to do therein. But criticism should be distinguished from insult. A criticism after a case has been disposed of
can no longer influence the court, and on that ground it does not constitute contempt. On the other hand, an
insult hurled to the court, even after a case is decided, can under no circumstance be justified. Mere criticism
or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a
pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; but to hurl the false charge that the Supreme Court has
been committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of its members, and consequently to lower or degrade
the administration of justice, and it constitutes contempt. 39
90

The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the
court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court, even
though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two circumstances: (1)
where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the court; 40 or (2) where
there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be impeded. And this brings us to
the familiar invocation of freedom of expression usually resorted to as a defense in contempt proceedings.
On the first ground, it has been said that the right of free speech is guaranteed by the Constitution and must
be sacredly guarded, but that an abuse thereof is expressly prohibited by that instrument and must not be
permitted to destroy or impair the efficiency of the courts or the public respect therefor and the confidence
therein. 41
Thus, in State vs. Morril, 42 the court said that any citizen has the right to publish the proceedings and
decisions of the court, and if he deems it necessary for the public good, to comment upon them freely,
discuss their correctness, the fitness or unfitness of the judges for their stations, and the fidelity with which
they perform the important public trusts reposed in them; but he has no right to attempt, by defamatory
publications, to degrade the tribunal, destroy public confidence in it, and dispose the community to disregard
and set at naught its orders, judgments and decrees. Such publications are an abuse of the liberty of the
press; and tend to sap the very foundation of good order and well-being in society by obstructing the course
of justice. Courts possess the power to punish for contempt libelous publications regarding their
proceedings, present or past, upon the ground that they tend to degrade the tribunals, destroy public
confidence and respect for their judgments and decrees, so essentially necessary to the good order and well-
being of society, and most effectually obstruct the free course of justice.
Then, in In re Hayes, 43 it was said that publishers of newspapers have the right, but no higher right than
others, to bring to public notice the conduct of the courts, provided the publications are true and fair in spirit.
The liberty of the press secures the privilege of discussing in a decent and temperate manner the decisions
and judgments of a court of justice; but the language should be that of fair and honorable criticism, and
should not go to the extent of assigning to any party or the court false or dishonest motives. There is no law
to restrain or punish the freest expressions of disapprobation that any person may entertain of what is done in
or by the courts. Under the right of freedom of speech and of the press the public has a right to know and
discuss all judicial proceedings, but this does not include the right to attempt, by wanton defamation,
groundless charges of unfairness and stubborn partisanship, to degrade the tribunal and impair its efficiency.
Finally, in Weston vs. Commonwealth, 44 it was ruled that the freedom of speech may not be exercise in
such a manner as to destroy respect for the courts, the very institution which is the guardian of that right. The
dignity of the courts and the duty of the citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to the administration
of justice. Denigrating the court by libelous attacks upon judicial conduct in an ended case, as well as one
which is pending before it, may seriously interfere with the administration of justice. While such an attack
may not affect the particular litigation which has been terminated, it may very well affect the course of
justice in future litigation and impair, if not destroy, the judicial efficiency of the court or judge subjected to
the attack.
Anent the second ground, the rule in American jurisprudence is that false and libelous utterances present a
clear and present danger to the administration of justice. 45 To constitute contempt, criticism of a past action
of the court must pose a clear and present danger to a fair administration of justice, that is, the publication
must have an inherent tendency to influence, intimidate, impede, embarrass, or obstruct the court's
administration of justice. 46 It is not merely a private wrong against the rights of litigants and judges, but a
public wrong, a crime against the State, to undertake by libel or slander to impair confidence in the judicial
functions. 47
Elucidating on the matter, this Court, in Cabansag vs. Fernandez,
et al., 48 held as follows:
. . . The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or
utterance must be ''extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before the utterance can
be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the "substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil
is primarily the "disorderly and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be published. Under this rule, the advocacy
of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy
will harm the administration of Justice.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of this rule, the Supreme Court of the United States
said: "Clear and present danger of substantive evils as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding
judicial proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press only if
the evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. . . . The possibility of
engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the published criticism of a judge is not such a
substantive evil as will justify impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press." . . .
No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish for contempt in relation to the freedom of
speech and press. We quote: "Freedom of speech and press should not be impaired through the exercise of
the power to punish for contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a
serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. A judge may not hold in contempt one who
ventures to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or to belittle him. The vehemence of the
language used in newspaper publications concerning a judge's decision is not alone the measure of the power
to punish for contempt . The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to
the administration of justice." . . .
And in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by newspaper criticism against the free
speech to determine whether such may constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that "freedom
of public comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence
pending cases." . . .
The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. . . .
Although Cabansag involved a contempt committed during the pendency of a case, no compelling reason
exists why the doctrines enunciated therein should not be made applicable to vituperative publications made
after the termination of the case. Whether a case is pending or not, there is the constant and ever growing
need to protect the courts from a substantive evil, such as invective conduct or utterances which tend to
impede or degrade the administration of justice, or which calumniate the courts and their judges. At any rate,
in the case of In re Bozorth, 49 it was there expressly and categorically ruled that the clear and present
danger rule equally applies to publications made after the determination of a case, with the court declaring
that a curtailment of criticism of the conduct of finally concluded litigation, to be justified, must be in terms
of some serious substantive evil which it is designed to avert.
91

Adverting again to what was further said in State vs. Shepherd, supra, let it here be emphasized that the
protection and safety of life, liberty, property and character, the peace of society, the proper administration
of justice and even the perpetuity of our institutions and form of government, imperatively demand that
everyone — lawyer, layman, citizen, stranger, newspaperman, friend or foe — shall treat the courts with
proper respect and shall not attempt to degrade them, or impair the respect of the people, or destroy the faith
of the people in them. When the temples of justice become polluted or are not kept pure and clean, the
foundations of free government are undermined, and the institution itself threatened.
III
Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings where the Alleged Contumely is Committed Against a Lower Court
while the Case is Pending in the Appellate or Higher Court
In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in
such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. As a
matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction has been felt properly to rest in only one tribunal at a
time with respect to a given controversy. Partly because of administrative considerations, and partly to visit
the full personal effect of the punishment on a contemnor, the rule has been that no other court than the one
contemned will punish a given contempt. 50
The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule that the power to punish for contempt rests with
the court contemned is that contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by the court against
whose authority the contempt are charged; 51 the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of
enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments,
orders and processes: 52 and in order that a court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right
to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of disobedience to
another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency. 53
There are, however, several jurisprudentially and statutorily recognized exceptions to the general rule, both
under Philippine and American jurisprudence, viz.:
1. Indirect contempt committed against inferior court may also be tried by the proper regional trial
court, regardless of the imposable penalty. 54
2. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may be caused to be investigated by a prosecuting
officer and the charge may be filed in and tried by the regional trial court, or the case may be referred to it
for hearing and recommendation where the charge involves questions of fact. 55
3. In People vs. Alarcon, et al., supra, this Court ruled that "in the interrelation of the different courts
forming our integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or representative of another and may not,
for this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the authority and decorum which are not its own. The
appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court , and this last court becomes thereby charged with the
authority to deal with contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal." The apparent reason is that
both the moral and legal effect of a punishment for contempt would be missed if it were regarded as the
resentment of personal affronts offered to judges. Contempts are punished as offenses against the
administration of justice, and the offense of violating a judicial order is punishable by the court which is
charged with its enforcement, regardless of the court which may have made the order. 56 However, the rule
presupposes a complete transfer of jurisdiction to the appellate court, and there is authority that where the
contempt does not relate
to the subject matter of the appeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in the trial court. 57
4. A court may punish contempts committed against a court or judge constituting one of its parts or
agencies, as in the case of a court composed of several coordinate branches or divisions. 58
5. The biggest factor accounting for the exceptions is where the singular jurisdiction of a given
matter has been transferred from the contemned court to another court. One of the most common reasons for
a transfer of jurisdiction among courts is improper venue. The cases involving venue deal primarily with the
question whether a change of venue is available after a contempt proceeding has been begun. While
generally a change of venue is not available in a contempt proceeding, some jurisdictions allow such a
change in proper circumstances. 59
6. A new court wholly replacing a prior court has jurisdiction to punish for violations of orders
entered by its predecessor, although where the successor court is created by a statute which does not
extinguish jurisdiction in the predecessor, an affirmative transfer of jurisdiction before the contempt occurs
is necessary to empower the successor court to act. 60
7. Transfers of jurisdiction by appellate review have produced numerous instances where contempt
against the trial court has been punished in the appellate court, and vice versa. Some appellate courts have
taken the view that a contempt committed after an appeal is taken is particularly contemptuous of the
appellate court because of the tendency of such contempts to upset the status quo or otherwise interfere with
the jurisdiction of such court. 61
8. A judge may disqualify himself, or be disqualified, on a contempt hearing or in the main case,
which circumstance may require a transfer of jurisdiction, but where a judge is disqualified only in the main
case, because of matters which do not disqualify him in a contempt proceeding, the regular judge should sit
in the contempt proceeding. Likewise, where the regular judge, is absent or otherwise unavailable and an
order is entered by another judge and made returnable to the proper court, the regular judge may punish for
violations of orders so entered. 62
9. Where the same act is a contempt against two or more courts, it is no bar to contempt proceedings
in one of them that there is also a contempt against the other. 63
10. While professional disciplinary proceedings have been resorted to as a punishment for contempt,
the more recent view is that punishment is of secondary importance to the need to protect the courts and the
people from improper professional practice. To the substantial extent that disciplinary action remains a
punishment, disciplinary measures imposed by another court than the one contemned furnish an exception to
the rule against punishing for contempt of another court. 64
11. Some contemptuous acts are also crime, usually misdemeanors, which are often punishable in
other courts than those against which the contemptuous act was done. 65
12. Finally, a conviction for contempt against another court has been allowed to stand on the basis that
the failure of the defendant to make timely objection operated as a waiver of the right to be tried before the
court actually contemned. 66
The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present incident, is that where the entire case has
already been appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the appellate court where the appeal
completely transfers the proceedings thereto or where there is a tendency to affect the status quo or
otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Accordingly, this Court having acquired
92
jurisdiction over the complaint for indirect contempt against herein respondents, it has taken judicial
cognizance thereof and has accordingly resolved the same.
IV
Appropriate Remedies where the Alleged Contemptuous Statement is also Claimed to be Libelous
Under the American doctrine, to repeat, the great weight of authority is that in so far as proceedings to
punish for contempt are concerned, critical comment upon the behavior of the court in cases fully
determined by it is unrestricted, under the constitutional guaranties of the liberty of the press and freedom of
speech. Thus, comments, however stringent, which have relation to judicial proceedings which are past and
ended, are not contemptuous of the authority of the court to which reference is made. Such comments may
constitute a libel against the judge, but it cannot be treated as in contempt of the court's authority.
On this score, it is said that prosecution for libel is usually the most appropriate and effective remedy. 67
The force of American public opinion has greatly restrained the courts in the exercise of the power to punish
one as in contempt for making disrespectful or injurious remarks, and it has been said that the remedy of a
judge is the same as that given to a private citizen. 68 In such a case, therefore. the remedy of a criminal
action for libel is available to a judge who has been derogated in a newspaper publication made after the
termination aid a case tried by him, since such publication can no longer be made subject of contempt
proceedings.
The rule, however, is different in instances under the Philippine doctrine earlier discussed wherein there may
still be a contempt of court even after a case has been decided and terminated. In such case, the offender may
be cited for contempt for uttering libelous remarks against the court or the judge. The availability, however,
of the power to punish for contempt does not and will not prevent a prosecution for libel, either before,
during, or after the institution of contempt proceedings. In other words, the fact that certain contemptuous
conduct likewise constitutes an indictable libel against the judge of the court contemned does not necessarily
require him to bring a libel action, rather than relying on contempt Proceedings. 69
The fact that an act constituting a contempt is also criminal and punishable by indictment. or other method
of criminal prosecution does not prevent the outraged Court from punishing the contempt. 70 This principle
stems from the fundamental doctrine that an act may be punished as a contempt even though it has been
punished as a criminal offense. 71 The defense of having once been in jeopardy, based on a conviction for
the criminal offense, would not lie in bar of the contempt proceedings, on the proposition that a contempt
may be an offense against the dignity of a court and, at the same time, an offense against the peace and
dignity of the people of the State. 72 But more importantly. adherence to the American doctrine by insisting
that a judge should instead file an action fur libel will definitely give rise to an absurd situation and may
even cause more harm than good.
Drawing also from American jurisprudence, to compel the judge to descend from the plane of his judicial
office to the level of the contemnor, pass over the matter of contempt, and instead attack him by a civil
action to satisfy the judge in damages for a libel, would be a still greater humiliation of a court. That conduct
would be personal; the court is impersonal. In our jurisdiction, the judicial status is fixed to such a point that
our courts and the judges thereof should be protected from the improper consequences of their discharge of
duties so much so that judicial officers have always been shielded, on the highest considerations of the
public good, from being called for questioning in civil actions for things done in their judicial capacity.
Whenever we subject the established courts of the and to the degradation of private prosecution, we subdue
their independence, and destroy their authority. instead of being venerable before the public, they become
contemptible; and we thereby embolden the licentious to trample upon everything sacred in society, and to
overturn those institutions which have hitherto been deemed the best guardians of civil liberty. 73
Hence, the suggestion that judges who are unjustly attacked have a remedy in an action for libel, has been
assailed as being without rational basis in principle. In the first place, the outrage is not directed to the judge
as a private individual but to the judge as such or to the court as an organ of the administration of justice. In
the second place, public interests will gravely suffer where the judge, as such, will, from time to time, be
pulled down and disrobed of his judicial authority to face his assailant on equal grounds and prosecute cases
in his behalf as a private individual. The same reasons of public policy which exempt a judge from civil
liability in the exercise of his judicial functions, most fundamental of which is the policy to confine his time
exclusively to the discharge of his public duties, applies here with equal, if not superior, force. 74
V
Whether or not the Same Contemptuous Conduct of a Member of the Bar can be the Subject of both a
Contempt Proceeding and an Administrative Disciplinary Action
With the foregoing discussion of the appropriate remedies available to a judge, we feel that this issue with
respect to proper remedies against an erring member or the Bar should consequentially be addressed, by way
of reiteration, since conflicting and erroneous remedies are sometimes resorted to by aggrieved tribunals or
parties.
The basic rule here is that the power to punish for contempt and the power to disbar are separate and distinct,
and that the exercise of one does not exclude the exercise of the other. 75 A contempt proceeding for
misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of a
disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve
and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such
office. 76 The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the
functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive
principle. 77 The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to
assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly
administration of justice. 78
Moreover, it has been held that the imposition a fine as a penalty in a contempt proceeding is not considered
res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct. 79 In the same manner an attorney's
conviction for contempt was not collaterally estopped by reason of a subsequent disbarment proceeding in
which the court found in his favor on essentially the same facts leading to conviction. 80 It has likewise been
the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt cannot be
considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering
that they have distinct objects and for each of them a different procedure is established. Contempt of court is
governed by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in
the Practice of law are governed by file 138 and 139 thereof. 81
Although apparently different in legal bases, the authority to punish for contempt and to discipline lawyers
are both inherent in the Supreme Court and are equally incidents of the court's basic power to oversee the
proper administration of justice and the orderly discharge of judicial functions. As was succinctly expounded
in Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.: 82
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here: the
Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the
93
Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be
committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a
lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme
Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which
the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does
not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the
Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the court's exclusive power of admission to the bar. A
lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in
the task and responsibilities of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which
visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both
professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious
conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
With this rounding out of the subordinate and principal issues in resolving the incident, we feel that the
guidelines we have laid down will provide assertive references for the lower courts in disciplinary matters
arising before them. Coming back to the incident fore resolution, arising as a spin-off from the criminal
cases at bar, we reiterate what we have declared at the outset, absolving judge for the reasons therein stated.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the complaint for indirect contempt against herein respondents
Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. and Eva P. Ponce de Leon is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 125180-81. April 22, 1998]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DENNIS DE GUZMAN, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The Court is once again confronted with the dilemma of having to choose between the testimony of a mother
and her teen-age son and that of the man they claim is responsible for the violent demise of their familys
breadwinner and first-born son.
For the death of Ernesto Trilles and his son Edwin, accused-appellant Dennis de Guzman and two others
who remain at large[1] were charged with two counts of murder[2] before the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City on June 14, 1994, to wit:
That on or about the 13th day of April, 1994, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all armed with handguns, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another for a common purpose, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and with treachery and abuse of superior strength, shoot with a handgun one ERNESTO TRILLES,[3]
thereby inflicting upon the latter injuries which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his
heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Rosita and Anthony Trilles to shed light on the
incident. Their combined narration follows.
On the night of April 13, 1994, while Rosita was preparing supper in their modest home at Sitio Malangka,
Taysan, Legazpi City, a young man whom she knew by face but whose name she did not know barged in
through the kitchen door and shot her husband Ernesto in the head with a short firearm. As Ernesto lay
sprawled on the kitchen floor, the man shot him again on the chest.[4] The man, who was later identified as
accused-appellant Dennis de Guzman, then faced the horrified oldest son and asked him if he was Edwin.
When the latter said yes, he too was shot and hit near the collar bone.[5] Before he was shot, his uncle who
was Rositas brother, Loreto Aringo, was seen near the eaves of the house. Addressing him, Edwin pleaded
for his life saying, Tio, do not shoot me. I did not do anything wrong. Because Edwin had punched him the
night before, Aringo ignored his nephew and even egged on the gunman, shouting, Anong tio-tio gadanon an
(What Tio, Tio, he should be killed).[6] Anthony, the other son of Rosita who was hiding under the table,
heard his brother pleading with de Guzman, Dont kill me Tio.[7]
In a short while, Rosita fled and on her way out, espied her cousin, Adriano Casiban, standing near the
kitchen door.[8] Then she heard more gunshots, the same gunshots heard by Anthony who at the time was
still under the table.[9] Like his mother, he, too, was allowed to escape by his uncles and the man whose
name he did not know but whom he knew was staying with his uncle Adriano. Rosita sought refuge at the
house of her sister, Hedelyn Bandoquillo and spent the night there. This was confirmed by the latter, who
testified as a rebuttal witness for the prosecution.[10]
In the morning, Rosita reported the incident to Barrio Captain Nelson Aringo, another cousin, who
accompanied her to the police headquarters. Mother and son failed to mention the names of Aringo and
Casiban to the police during the investigation, and both declared at the time that the suspect was unknown or
unidentified.[11] When confronted later with these earlier statements, they explained that at the time of the
incident, although they recognized the face of Dennis de Guzman, they were not aware of his identity, which
is why they told the police that the suspect was unknown or unidentified.[12] In her confusion, Rosita even
said that it was Casiban who shot the boy. Later, she was not even sure if Casiban fired a gun or if he had a
gun at all, because she was at the moment already running away.[13]
Aringo and Casiban, having gone into hiding, only the defense of de Guzman was heard at the trial. Dennis
de Guzman denied all the accusations against him and set up an alibi for his defense. He relied on the
testimonies of four witnesses, all close friends of his family,[14] to support his story that on the date and
time of the occurrence, he was at a party at San Jose, Maslog, Legazpi City, which is about three kilometers
from Taysan.[15]
Dennis de Guzman claimed that he and his mother Adelina went to her hometown of San Jose, Maslog,
Legazpi City on April 5, 1994, to visit his ailing grandmother. They stayed with his grandmother whose
name he did not even know, and during his free time, he helped with some chores and played with friends
like Charlie Padilla. On April 13, 1994, Charlies mother Estelita, a childhood friend of Adelinas, celebrated
her 52th birthday, and she decided to treat her town mates to a free dance. Charlie, Dennis, and her brothers,
Felicito and Jerry Watiwat, helped in setting up the light and sound systems for the dance. They started at
around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon and finished by 6:30 p.m. After a dinner break at 7:00 oclock, the two
youngsters manned the music station until midnight.[16] On cross-examination, de Guzman admitted that
his mothers sister Lolita was the wife of Adriano Casiban.[17]
Hedelyn Bandoquillo was presented by the prosecution to debunk de Guzmans claim that he stayed with his
grandmother when he was in the province. She said that on at least four occasions, she saw him at his uncle
94
Adrianos house at Sitio Polot, Taysan, Legazpi City, which is about half a kilometer from Sitio Malangka
and was sure he was staying there.[18]
After trial on the merits, Judge Gregorio A. Consulta of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 4,
rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings and left no choice but to follow in complete obedience
the stenosis of a rigorous law that in spirit demands an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, (LEX TALIONIS)
after being convinced beyond a wisp of a doubt of the guilt of accused DENNIS DE GUZMAN, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer in Criminal Case No. 6717 the penalty of
DEATH
and likewise to suffer in Criminal Case No. 6718 the penalty of
DEATH
and to indemnify Rosita Trilles and Anthony Trilles in the sum of P100,000.00 in each case.
With respect to Loreto Aringo and Adriano Casiban who are at large, let a complete reproduction by
XEROX of the complete records of both cases be sent to the ARCHIVE, in lieu of the originals which are
hereby ordered transmitted within twenty (20) days from promulgation to the Hon. Supreme Court on
automatic review together with the person of DENNIS DE GUZMAN who shall be confined at the National
Penitentiary in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila pending final resolution of such review.
Issue alias warrants for the arrest of Loreto Aringo and Adriano Casiban pursuant to existing circular on the
matters and the cases shall be revived, insofar as they are concerned, upon their apprehension or of any of
them.
The Clerk of Court is directed to provide the necessary expenses for the reproduction of the records by
XEROX.
SO ORDERED.
In this automatic review, Dennis de Guzman argues that the trial court erred in appreciating the evidence and
in concluding that he was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses.
After going through the records and evidence of this case, we are convinced that Dennis de Guzman was
correctly convicted by the trial court for the death of Ernesto and Edwin Trilles.
Accused-appellant makes much of the failure of the eyewitnesses to give his name or even his description
during the initial police investigation of the incident. When Rosita reported the shooting of her husband and
son to the police in the morning of April 14, 1994, she stated that they were shot by an unknown suspect,
and made no mention of either her older brother Loreto Aringo or her cousin Adriano Casiban.[19] For his
part, Anthony executed an affidavit dated April 19, 1994, referring to the assailant as an unidentified man.
He also did not implicate his uncles, Aringo or Casiban.[20]
The Court believes that the eyewitnesses to the crimes did identify accused-appellant as the man who shot
the victims. In the first place, when they testified at the trial they positively pointed out to de Guzman as the
malefactor.[21] Any doubt cast by their earlier statements was laid to rest when they were put on the witness
stand. In the case of Jacobo v. Court of Appeals,[22] we affirmed the doctrine that an affidavit cannot
prevail over testimonial evidence uttered in open court, viz.:
An affidavit being taken ex parte is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial
suggestion, and sometimes from want of suggestion and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may
be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion
of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject.[23]
Thus, while an affiant usually merely signs an affidavit which was prepared by another, in this case,[24] the
Assistant City Prosecutor, a witness testifies in court with more spontaneity, drawing from a memory no
longer befuddled by the initial shock of the occurrence, uttering his own words with minimum guidance or
coaxing. If testimonial evidence is superior to an affidavit, then with more reason should it prevail over a
mere police report which is not even under oath.
In the second place, in her affidavit dated April 19, 1994,[25] Rosita made a more complete narration of the
incident and implicated Aringo and Casiban. She even managed to identify de Guzman by his surname.[26]
Anthony, on the other hand, stated in his affidavit that although the suspect was unidentified, he could
recognize the latter if spotted, and that is precisely what he did when he testified on November 8, 1995.
Finally, when confronted with their initial reports, both witnesses explained that although they said the
suspect was unknown or unidentified, they were merely referring to his name. As far as physical attributes
were concerned, they had no doubt that they could recognize the man who snuffed out the life of their loved
ones in the blink of an eye.
Through all these, de Guzman could only deny the charges and come up with an alibi which falls short of the
standards set through time for its acceptability as a foolproof defense.
He was allegedly at the dance held at San Jose, Maslog, Legazpi City when the crime was being committed
at Sitio Malangka, Taysan. Yet, the records show that Maslog is a mere three kilometers from Taysan and
there are even well-trodden shortcuts which could drastically reduce travel time from one town to the other.
If anything, it signifies that it was still possible for him to have been at the crime scene even as he claims
that he was elsewhere at the time. In this regard, his defense of alibi must fail.[27]
Furthermore, the positive identification of de Guzman as the man who shot the victims cannot be overcome
by his denial and alibi. The fact that he was not immediately named by the eyewitnesses when they reported
the incident to the police is likewise of no moment considering that they knew him by face and even
identified him in open court. As we reiterated in the recent case of Bautista v. Court of Appeals:[28]
Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of
the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[29]
In view of these disquisitions, the Court agrees with the court a quo that the guilt of Dennis de Guzman in
the slaying of Ernesto and Edwin Trilles on the night of April 13, 1994, has been proved by the prosecution
beyond any reasonable doubt.
The Court, however, differs with the trial court in its imposition of the death penalty in the two cases under
review. It must be noted that this penalty was decreed because (f)irearms were used, as alleged in the
(i)nformation.[30] It is undeniable that an accused cannot be held liable for a crime not alleged in the
95
information, and the information filed by the prosecution in this case was for murder qualified by treachery,
not for murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
Under R.A. No. 7659, the crime of murder shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed
with, among other circumstances, treachery, as that alleged in the information dated June 14, 1994. We
agree with the court a quo that alevosia attended the commission of the crime and that this has been duly
proved by the Peoples evidence. The Trilles family was preparing to sup on the night of April 13, 1994,
when de Guzman suddenly barged into their house from the kitchen door and, without uttering a word, shot
Ernesto, not once, but twice. With the same coldbloodedness, he shot Edwin even after the boy pleaded for
his life. Neither of the victims was armed at the time, and they could not have resisted the attack even if they
wanted to because of its suddenness and precision. At no time was de Guzman open to retaliation by his
victims. As we held in Bautista:
An unexpected and sudden attack under circumstances which render the victim unable and unprepared to
defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack constitutes alevosia, and the fact that
the attack was frontal does not preclude the presence of treachery.[31]
Apart from treachery, we find no other circumstance, aggravating or mitigating, which would affect the
imposition of the appropriate penalty in the case at bar. Under these premises, therefore, the punishment that
may be properly meted out against the accused-appellant is the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua because
(w)hen there are (as in this case) neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.[32]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated June 6, 1996, in Criminal Case No. 6717 and No. 6718 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is reduced from death to reclusion perpetua in both
cases for the reasons aforestated and the indemnity to Rosita Trilles and Anthony Trilles reduced to P
50,000.00 each Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117702. February 10, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISPIN YPARRAGUIRRE, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Accused-appellant Crispin Yparraguirre was charged with the crime of rape in an Information that reads as
follows:
"That on or about July 6, 1990, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a hunting knife, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
AAA, against her will."[1]
The prosecution established that AAA was a housemaid of appellant and his wife; that on or about 7:00 in
the evening of July 6, 1990 at the spouses' room in Panabo, Davao, AAA was cooking porridge for the
spouses' two children, one aged four years old and the other nine months old. Accused-appellant arrived
from work and found the two children asleep. He approached AAA and gave her a small white envelope
said to contain medicine for her skin disease. AAA was afflicted with rashes on her thighs and stomach
which she allegedly contracted from one of the children. AAA opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15)
tablets inside. As instructed by appellant, AAA took all the tablets. A few minutes later, she felt weak and
fell down. Suddenly, she realized that appellant was dragging her to the spouses' bed. She tried to get up
but appellant pushed her down the bed and pointed a hunting knife at her neck. He ordered AAA not to
move or he would kill her. Then he removed her clothes and went on top of her. He kissed her face, breasts,
stomach and private parts and then entered her. AAA cried out in pain but appellant continued entering her.
After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled out and punched AAA in the stomach. She lost
consciousness.Exsm
A few minutes later, AAA woke up and saw blood in her private parts. She wiped the blood and changed
her clothes. Seeing her awake, appellant threatened to kill her should she report the incident to her parents.
Appellant then left the house.[2]
AAA did not say a word about the incident. She continued serving the Yparraguirres for one month before
leaving them to return to her mother's house in Barrio YYY. Her mother found AAA in a state of shock.
She could not eat nor talk, neither could she perform ordinary daily functions such as dressing herself. In
short, AAA became helpless. She was brought to the Municipal Health Officer by her mother for
examination. On August 22, 1990, the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Imelda T. Bendijo, interviewed the girl
and found her unresponsive and unable to talk. She conducted a physical examination and also found that:
"x x x Physical examination externally no abnormal findings;
Pelvic examination -- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00 [position]; hymen not intact;
Internal examination -- admits one finger;
Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic] psychiatrist.
x x x."[3]
Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, AAA was confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital for
observation and treatment. After a week of treatment, AAA began to talk and revealed that she was raped
by appellant.[4]
Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime charged. He claimed that on the night of the alleged rape he
was selling fish at the public market. Allegedly, he was at the market at 4:00 in the morning, and worked
straight until 8:00 in the evening. He never left the fish stall until after 8:00 in the evening because of his
many customers.[5]
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered him
to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages and pay P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, thus:
"WHEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds accused Crispin Yparraguirre guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
96
Correspondingly, the court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer and undergo the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs.
Accused Crispin Yparraguirre is also ordered to indemnify the victim Rosita Bacaling the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus payment of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED."[6]
In this appeal, accused-appellant contends that:
I
"THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
RAPE;
II
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT WITNESS MARY ANN YPARRAGUIRRE WENT TO THE
MOTHER OF THE ACCUSED ON NOVEMBER 23, 1990 TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE DROPPING OF
THE CASE."[7]
The appeal has no merit. After reviewing the records, we find that the prosecution evidence, which rests
mainly on the testimony of AAA, is credible, reliable and trustworthy. AAA testified in a straightforward,
spontaneous and candid manner and never wavered even on cross-examination and rebuttal. The
inconsistencies in her testimony are minor which tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion that her
testimony was not contrived.[8]
The question of whether AAA contracted the skin disease from the children of appellant is not important.
The undisputed fact is that she was afflicted with the disease and that appellant gave her tablets for treatment
of the disease. Appellant's allegation that AAA should have fallen asleep for hours after ingesting the tablets
is speculative. There is no evidence that the tablets were sleeping tablets. They, however, weakened AAA
and prevented her from making any resistance to appellant's lewd acts.[9] The delay in filing the complaint
does not in any way affect AAA's credibility.[10] She was afraid of appellant's threat to her life. The
complaint was filed three months after AAA told her mother of the incident, and three months is not too long
a period to file a complaint for rape.
AAA was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school dropout. She was also the breadwinner of the
family.[11] It is hard to believe that AAA would fabricate a story of defloration, open herself to public trial
and place her family, who depended on her, in a very humiliating and compromising situation for no reason
at all.[12] AAA suffered psychologically from the incident. Before the rape, she had been working for the
Yparraguirres for two months[13] and the spouses actually found her to be a good worker.[14] When AAA
returned to her family, however, she lost her speech and could not perform ordinary daily functions that she
had to seek psychiatric treatment. Indeed, AAA's psychological condition could not have been the product
of ill-motive and fabrication.
Anent the second assigned error, there is evidence that after AAA revealed the rape to her mother,
appellant's wife, Mary Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, BBB, fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00) to dissuade her from filing the complaint.[15] When BBB refused, Mary Ann increased the
offer to twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00). Still BBB refused to accept it.[16] As pointed out by
appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at the time the compromise offer was made. Nevertheless,
the rape incident was already known to appellant's wife. Mary Ann herself testified that BBB told her about
it on November 3, 1990, the day when Mary Ann first offered the money.[17] An offer to compromise does
not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against the
offeror.[18] What is required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an
offer to compromise and such offer is proved.
The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist prevails over his defense of alibi.[19] It was not
physically impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime. The public market was merely a
ten-minute walk from their rented room[20] and during work breaks, appellant would sometimes go home to
bring food to his children.[21]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision dated May 10, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Panabo,
Davao is affirmed. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 133066-67. October 1, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROMEO H. LAMBID, appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On automatic review is the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal
Cases Nos. CBU-45672 and CBU-45673 finding Romeo H. Lambid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of qualified rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death for each count.[1]
In her two separate Complaints dated November 4, 1997 and November 5, 1997, complainant Lyzel S.
Lambid, accuses Romeo H. Lambid of raping her, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45672:
The undersigned complainant, LYZEL S. LAMBID, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with
law, hereby accuses ROMEO H. LAMBID of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of October, 1997, at about 5:00 A.M., and for sometime subsequent thereto, in
the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by
means of force and intimidation upon undersigned complainant to wit, by forcibly placing himself on top of
the victim, and at the same time threat her with death if she would shout, then removed her panty, did then
and there have carnal knowledge of the undersigned against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45673:
The undersigned complainant, LYZEL S. LAMBID, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with
law, hereby accuses ROMEO H. LAMBID of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
97
That on or about the 1st day of November, 1997, at about 5:00 A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation upon
undersigned complainant to wit, by forcibly placing himself on top of the victim, and at the same time threat
her with death if she would shout, then removed her panty, did then and there have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Upon his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The cases were consolidated and tried
jointly.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: Lyzel Lambid, the complainant; Mary Ann Lambid, a sister of
Lyzel; and Dr. Aster Khosravibabadi, the physician who conducted a physical examination on the
complainant.
The facts established by the prosecution are as follows:
On October 31, 1997, 14-year old Lyzel was sleeping in their house located at Inayawan, Cebu City together
with her father, herein appellant, and two sisters. Around 5:00 in the morning, she woke up and noticed her
father lying beside her. Then, her father started removing her panty at the same time warning her not to tell
her mother what he was doing. After her father succeeded in removing her panty, he went on top of her and
started inserting his penis into her vagina. She initially tried to resist the sexual advances of her father by
kicking him and by moving her body from left to right and vice versa. She stopped resisting when her father
stared hard at her and threatened to kill her (Lyzel). Her father succeeded in inserting his penis into her
vagina. The following day, November 1, 1997, she was again roused from her sleep and noticed her father
lying beside her. Repeating what he did the previous day, her father removed her panty. Thereafter, he
successfully inserted his penis into her vagina. Lyzel did nothing out of fear. She did not tell anybody about
these two incidents.[4]
However, her sister, Mary Ann, aged 13, witnessed both incidents. She was awakened around 5:00 in the
morning of October 31, 1997 when she heard their father say to her sister Lyzel: Dont tell this to your
mother or else I will kill you. Their father was then lying beside Lyzel. Afterwards, she saw him stand up
and go to urinate. About 5:00 in the morning of the succeeding day, November 1, 1997, she was sleeping
beside her sister Lyzel. She was awakened while their father was pulling her blanket. Suspicious of their
fathers actuation, she kicked him. After kicking him, she laid near the foot of her sister Lyzel. Their father
then covered her with a blanket but she peeped through the blanket. She saw their father who was only
wearing an underwear place himself on top of Lyzel. Her father covered himself and Lyzel with a blanket,
after which Mary Ann saw their fathers whole body shake and heard him breathing hard. She again heard
their father warn Lyzel not to relate the incident to their mother, otherwise he will kill her (Lyzel).
On November 2, 1997, Mary Ann informed three of their neighbors about the incidents she witnessed. Their
neighbors brought her to the president of their local association for assistance and on that same day their
father was arrested.[5]
Dr. Aster Khosravibabadi conducted a physical examination of Lyzel on November 3, 1997 and found that
Lyzels vagina had new hymenal lacerations with raw edges at 5 oclock position. The doctor asserted that
Lyzel might have sustained the lacerations within six days prior to her examination. The test for the presence
of spermatozoa yielded negative results.[6]
The defense presented appellant as its lone witness. On the witness stand, when asked about the truth of her
daughters complaint, appellant simply stated that if he had committed the crimes of rape against his
daughter, he asks for forgiveness because during that time he was drunk. He asked the court to impose upon
him a lesser penalty considering that his children are still under his care.[7]
The trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Romeo H. Lambid guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, defined and penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and
Republic Act No. 7659 known as the Death Penalty Law and sentences him to suffer two supreme penalties
of Death for the two (2) crimes of rape committed against her own daughter Lyzel Lambid, with inherent
accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify the victim the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages and
to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Hence, the present automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ALLEGE THE AGE AND
RELATIONSHIP OF THE VICTIM AND THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[9]
At the outset, it is noted that since the crimes were committed on October 31, 1997 and November 1, 1997,
the applicable law is R.A. 8353, otherwise known as The Anti-Rape Law of 1997[10] which took effect on
October 22, 1997.[11] Under this law, rape has been reclassified from a private crime or crime against
chastity into a crime against persons. Consequently, the prosecution for the crime of rape was removed from
the ambit of Chapter Five, Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code and Section 5, Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure which required that in crimes against chastity, the complaint must be filed by
the offended party, or her parents, godparents or guardian, as the case may be under the law. Thus, effective
October 22, 1997, R.A. No. 8353, it is required that prosecution for the crime of rape, as in any other public
crimes, is commenced in court by the filing of an information by the public prosecutor and no longer by a
mere complaint filed by the offended party, parents, godparents or guardian.
In the present cases, the indictments charging appellant with the crimes of rape were each captioned as a
Complaint signed by Lyzel herself; but, there is a Certification on the second page of each of the complaints
by the investigating prosecutor treating the complaint as an information, to wit:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45672:
CERTIFICATION
98
I hereby certify that the foregoing information is filed pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, the accused not having opted to avail of his right to a preliminary
investigation and not having executed a waiver pursuant to Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. I further
certify that this information is being filed with the prior authority of the City Prosecutor.
Cebu City, Philippines, November 4, 1997.
(signed)
JOSE R. PEDROSA
Prosecutor II, Cebu City[12]
(Emphasis supplied)
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45673:
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that the foregoing information is filed pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, the accused having opted to avail of his right to a preliminary investigation
and having executed a waiver pursuant to Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. I further certify that this
information is being filed with the prior authority of the City Prosecutor.
Cebu City, Philippines, November 5, 1997.
(signed)
JOSE R. PEDROSA
Prosecutor II, Cebu City[13]
The apparent defect in the form of indictment, that is by way of a complaint by the offended party, is merely
one of form which does not invalidate the proceedings had in the trial court. The certification converted the
complaints into informations filed by the prosecutor.
Moreover, under Section 8, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,[14] the governing law at the
time of the filing of the indictments, for his failure to move to quash the same prior to his arraignment,
appellant was deemed to have waived his right to question the complaints filed by Lyzel on the ground that
it is defective in form per Section 3(d), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.[15]
Coming to the merits of the case, appellant, in support of the first assigned error, attacks the credibility of the
complainant. He harps upon the fact that although Lyzel was sure of the dates when appellant raped her, she
failed to recall the days of the week upon which these dates fell. Appellant also points out the apparent
inconsistency as to the date Lyzels mother arrived from Leyte and the date she accompanied Lyzel to report
the incident to the police authorities.
We agree with the contention of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the failure of complainant to
correctly pinpoint the day of the week when she was raped and to recall the exact date of her mothers arrival
from Leyte are inconsequential matters. It is a settled rule that discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to
the elements of the crime, such as the exact time of the commission of the crime, are not grounds for
acquittal.[16] To be material, discrepancies in the testimony of the victim should refer to significant facts
which are determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.[17] In the present case, the mental lapse on
the part of Lyzel in failing to accurately recall the exact days of the week when she was raped and the date of
her mothers arrival from Leyte does not detract from her credibility. It only indicates that her account is
spontaneous, neither rehearsed nor contrived.[18] What is important is that she was able to clearly recall
how she was raped and testify on this matter in a categorical and straightforward manner.
Moreover, Lyzels testimony is strongly corroborated by her sister Mary Ann[19] and buttressed by physical
evidence. The physicians findings on her physical examination conducted on November 3, 1997 indicated
the presence of fresh lacerations on her hymen. Laceration of the hymen, whether fresh or healed, is the best
physical evidence of defloration.[20] In the present case, the doctor estimated that the lacerations could have
been sustained by Lyzel within six days prior to the date of her examination.[21] This estimate is consistent
with Lyzels claim that she was raped on October 31, 1997 and November 1, 1997.
Under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, rape is
committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through fear, threat or intimidation.
Appellant would have us to believe that if he had carnal knowledge with her daughter Lyzel, it was done
without force and intimidation, citing her testimony that she did nothing while she was supposedly being
sexually abused by him.
We are not convinced in the light of Lyzels testimony, pertinent portions of which we quote verbatim, as
follows:
Q At about 5:00 oclock in the morning of October 31, 1997 can you recall of any unusual incident that
transpired inside the house where you were residing?
A Yes there was sir.
Q Please tell the Court Lyzel what was the unusual indicent?
A While I was still asleep I was awaken when my father sleep beside me.
Q If your father was laying beside you did he do anything?
A There was sir.
Q What did your father do to you?
A He remove my panty.
Q And after your father remove your panty what did he do?
A He lift out his penis and let it enter into my vagina.
Q And did your father succeeded in inserting his penis into your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do when your father was still removing your panty and before he placed himself on top of
you and inserted his penis into your vagina?
A He told me not to reveal to my mother what he did
...
99
COURT: Q At about the same time on November 1, 1997 at about 5:00 oclock in the morning was there anything
unusual that happened inside your house?
Q What did you do when your father was doing all these things that you have told to us?
A There was.
A Nothing.
Q Now. Please tell this Honorable Court what unusual incident happened on that particular date and time.
FISCAL LABORTE:
A While I was still asleep there was somebody lying beside me I thought it was my sister but when I was
Q Why? awaken it was my father.

A I was entertaining fear considering that he stared his eyes towards me. Q And while your father was lying beside you did he do anything?

Q Aside from staring at you what else if any did your father do to in staring on you? A Yes.

A He said as follows: Dont tell anybody, if you still somebody I would kill you. Q Please tell the Court Lyzel what did your father do to you?

COURT: A He removed my panty sir.

Q Did you not move your body away from him so that he would not succeed in doing such thing to you? Q And after your father removed your panty what did he do next?

A I moved my body but he kept on holding me. A He lift out his penis and inserted into my vagina.

FISCAL LABORTE: ...

Q On the following day Lyzel November 1, 1997 where did you sleep? FISCAL LABORTE:

A At our house sir. Q Did your father succeed in inserting his penis into your vagina?

Q The same house where you sleep the day before? A Yes.

A Yes, sir. Q Now what did you do when your father inserted his penis into your vagina?

COURT: A Nothing.

Q Why did you still sleep in that house after that experienced you had with your father the preceding night. Q Why?
Why did you not run away from that house.
A Because I was entertaining fear.
A Because he will be looking for me, Your Honor.
COURT:
FISCAL LABORTE:
Q Why were you afraid of your father?
Q And again Lyzel who were your companions if any on November 1, 1997 at your house when you were
sleeping? A Because his eyes were starring at me.

A My two younger sister sir. Q Was his bolo was still there?

Q Who else if any? A Yes, Your Honor.

A My father. FISCAL LABORTE:

100
Q Did you tell somebody Lyzel on what your father did to you on October 31, 1997 as well as on November Q But you did not shout?
1, 1997?
A No, sir.
A No, sir.
Q Because of fear?
Q Why did you not tell anybody about what your father did to you?
A Thats right sir.
A Because I was entertaining fear all the time.[22] (Emphasis supplied)
Q Inspite your fear you managed to kick your father two times?
On cross-examination, Lyzel further testified:
A Thats right sir.
ATTY. GUBALANE:
COURT:
Q How long did it take by your father in removing your panty on October 31, 1997?
Q You kick for two times, did you do this on the first rape or on the second rape?
A About one minute sir.
A The first rape, Your Honor.
Q Do your remember what were your wearing on October 31, 1997?
Q Why did you not kick him any more in the second time?
A Yes I remember sir.
A Because he stared his eyes towards me (gisigahan ko sa iyang mata).[23] (Emphasis supplied)
Q What were you wearing then?
Lyzel very clearly testified that in the first incident, she tried to resist the sexual advances of appellant by
A Short pants sir. kicking him and by trying to move her body but when appellant threatened to kill her, she, who was only
fourteen years old, was easily cowed into submitting herself to appellants carnal desire. When appellant
Q When you noticed your father on October 31, 1997 sleep beside you and before he remove your panty raped her the following day, her fear of her father and of the previous threat that he would kill her still
why did you not shour for help? pervaded causing her to do nothing the second time. Her harrowing experience the day before in the hands
of her father coupled with a threat on her life was sufficient to envelop her with fear and paralyze her into
A Because I was entertaining fear sir. submission even if appellant merely stared at her when he raped her again the following morning. Lyzels
failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance during the second incident does not demolish her claim that she
COURT: was raped. As we have held in People vs. Rodriguez:

Q Fear of what? The defense argument that the accused has not employed force upon his daughter in order to have sex with
him does not at all persuade. The force or violence necessary in rape is a relative term that depends not only
A Entertaining fear to my father, Your Honor. on the age, size, and strength of the persons involved but also on their relationship to each other. In a rape
committed by a father against his own daughter, the formers parental authority and moral ascendancy over
ATTY. GUBALANE: the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation who, expectedly, would just cower in fear and resign to the
fathers wicked deeds. It would be plain fallacy to say that the failure to shout or to offer tenacious resistance
Q Is it not true then that Mary Ann is sleeping beside you at your foot? makes voluntary the victims submission to the criminal act of the offender.[24]

A Thats correct sir. and in People vs. Flores, to wit:

Q Did you not kick you father? Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the perception of the victim at the time of the commission of the
crime, not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produced fear fear that if she did not yield
A I kicked him sir. to the bestial demands of her revisher, some evil could happen to her at that moment or even thereafter.

Q How many times did you kick your father? The fact that complainant bore no physical evidence of any force used against her person is of no moment.
The absence of any external sign of injury does not necessarily negate the occurrence of rape, proof of injury
A Two times. not being an essential element of the crime. What is important is that because of force and intimidation, the
victim was made to submit to the will of appellant. As stated in People vs. Maglente, the test is whether the
101
treat or intimidation produces fear in the mind of a reasonable person that if one resists or does not yield to ...
the desires of the accused, the threat would be carried out.[25]
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
Besides, no less than Lyzels younger sister Mary Ann positively testified that she heard her father threaten aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
Lyzels life on both occasions. Appellants threat on the life of his 14-year old child and the fear it instilled in
her clearly repudiate his claim that there was no force or intimidation employed against her in both 1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
occasions. guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the
parent of the victim;
Appellant further questions the credibility of Lyzel in enabling him to rape her in two successive days. He
contends that after Lyzel was raped for the first time on October 31, 1997, her logical reaction should have ...
been to immediately seek the help of other people; that despite her opportunity to do so, she did not. We are
not persuaded. It is a settled rule that the workings of the human mind under emotional stress are 3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or other relatives within
unpredictable and there is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident.[26] the third civil degree of consanguinity; (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, under emotional stress, the human mind is not expected to follow a predictable path.[27] Indeed,
Lyzel must have been shocked and utterly confused by the fact that her own father, committed such an act of ...
bestiality against her. More importantly, it is established by competent evidence that appellant threatened to
kill Lyzel if she told anybody about the rape. That alone is sufficient explanation why she did not make In both cases, the prosecution has established by competent evidence that Lyzel was fourteen years old and
known to other people the first time that she was raped by her father. appellant is her father. In Criminal Case No. CBU-45673, it is likewise established that appellant raped his
daughter Lyzel in full view of his other minor daughter Mary Ann, thus:
Appellant raised no defense whatsoever. He virtually admitted his guilt. A review of the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during his direct and cross examinations shows that he never disowned the acts FISCAL LABORTE:
imputed against him.[28] Appellant merely claimed that he was drunk and he asked for forgiveness from
Lyzel, if he had really raped her and for compassion from the trial court. In People vs. Alvero, we held that a Q The following day November 1, 1997 at about the same time 5:00 a.m., can you recall where were you?
plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise and an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.[29] Thus, by A Yes, I can.
asking for forgiveness, appellant has admitted his guilt.
Q Where were you on that particular date and time?
As to the second assigned error, the OSG agrees with appellant. We sustain the arguments of both appellant
and the OSG. The trial court erred in imposing the death penalty. A At our house.

Articles 266-A and 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, provide: Q Again, can you tell the Court if there was any unusual incident that transpired?

Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed.- Rape is committed: A Yes, sir.

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: Q What was that unusual incident?

a) Through force, threat or intimidation; A While I was sleeping beside my sister my father pulled that blanket and then I kicked him. That is why I
transferred lying at the foot sir of my sister.
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
Q You said that when your father pulled the blanket you kicked him why did you kick you father?
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
A Because I was suspicious on his actuations sir considering that because I noticed what he said to my sister
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the by saying dont tell to your mother. If you tell your mother I would kill you.
circumstances mentioned above are present.
Q What was that something which your father dont want to let your sister do, if you know?
...
A When he abused my sister.
Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua. Q Now, after you kicked your father and transferred sleeping at the foot of your sister what happened next?

102
A While I was lying at that time and when he covered me with a blanket I saw my father rose placed himself
on top of my sister. FISCAL LABORTE:

Q While your father was already on top of your sister what did you do? Q Now, after your father, according to you, sexually abused your sister Lyzel did your father say anything to
your sister?
A He made a sexual intercourse with my sister.
A Yes, there was. He threatened my sister.
COURT:
Q What was this threat?
Q Were you not dreaming?
A He told my sister as follows: dont tell your mother and if you tell your mother I will kill you.
A No, Your Honor.
Q And after that what happened?
Q Are your sure you were wide awake at that time?
A He keep on sexually abusing my sister.
A Yes, I am sure.
Q For how long?
COURT:
A For quite a time.
Proceed.
Q Did you notice, if your sister, ever resisted to the sexual intercourse done by your father to her?
FISCAL LABORTE:
A My sister moaned.
Q According to you Mary Ann you covered yourself you covered yourself with a blanket how were you able
to witness, to see what all your father did to your sister when you were inside the blanket? Q How about you Mary Ann considering that you actually saw your father abusing your sister what did you
do?
A Because I peeped sir.
A I cried.
Q Why did you peep when there was no partition or room inside that house?
Q Did you not try to stop your father from abusing your sister?
A The breathing of my father. As a matter of fact, he kicked me.
A No, sir because he placed a bolo beside him when he sleep.
Q You said you saw what your father did to your sister because you peeped from where did your peep?
Q On October 31, 1997 did your father place a bolo beside him when he sleep?
A I peeped through the blanket.
A Yes, sir.
Q Whose blanket?
Q How about on November 1, 1997 did he also place the bolo beside him when your father sleep?
A My blanket.
A Yes, he place the bolo beside him every night.[30]
COURT:
However, the complaints/informations in those two cases fail to allege Lyzels minority or appellants
Q Are you made to understand you have covered yourself with a blanket and removed a part so you can relationship to her. Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires that both
peeped? qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in the complaint or information. Existing
jurisprudence instructs that the death penalty may be imposed only if the complaint or information has
A That is right Your Honor. alleged and the evidence has proven both the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender by
the quantum of proof required for conviction.[31] In the present case, not only were the minority of the
COURT: complainant and her relationship with appellant not alleged in the two complaints/informations filed against
appellant, but, also, the aggravating/qualifying circumstance that the second rape was committed in full view
Proceed. of appellants daughter. Consequently, appellant may be convicted only of simple rape; hence, the trial court
103
erred in imposing death penalty in both cases. The appropriate penalty which could be imposed on the
appellant is reclusion perpetua in each count.
Let us now consider the civil aspect of the criminal cases.
It is a settled rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it
becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct an error as may be found in the appealed judgment,
whether or not it is made the subject of assignment of errors.[32]
While the trial court correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, it failed to award civil
indemnity.
Civil indemnity is distinct from moral damages as it is based on different jural foundations and assessed by
the court in the exercise of its sound discretion.[33] The award of civil indemnity is mandatory upon the
finding of fact of rape.[34] Based on existing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity for the victim in simple rape
shall not be less than P50,000.00.[35]
It is settled that the presence of an aggravating circumstance justifies an award for exemplary damages under
Article 2230[36] of the Civil Code even in the absence of an allegation of the aggravating circumstance in
the Information.[37] The award of exemplary damages should serve to deter other fathers with perverse
tendencies and aberrant sexual behavior from preying upon and sexually abusing their daughters.[38] Thus,
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 for each count of rape should be awarded to the victim in
view of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of relationship and dwelling.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, dated December 22, 1997
in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45672 and CBU-45673 finding appellant Romeo H. Lambid guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS to the effect that in each
case, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay complainant Lyzel S.
Lambid the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages in addition to the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
awarded by the trial court as moral damages or a total of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30423 November 7, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y CUDILLAN, MELECIO
CUDILLAN y ARCILLAS, and JESUS MEDALLA y CUDILLAN, defendants-appellants.
ANTONIO, J.:
This is an automatic review of a decision of the court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District,
Branch VII, Pasay City finding all the accused, namely, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y
Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, guilty of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing them as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Melecio Cudillan, ,Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre, and Mario
Comayas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, committed with four (4)
aggravating circumstances, not offset by any mitigating circumstance, and hereby sentences all of them to
suffer the penalty of death, to be carried out pursuant to the applicable provisions of law, to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of Adlina Sajo in the amount of P350,000.00, representing the value of the
pieces of jewelry unrecovered, to pay jointly and severally also the heirs of Adelina Sajo the amount of
P12,000.00. and to pay the costs.
With or without appeal, let this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to law.
During the pendency of this appeal, Melecio Cudillan died on arrival at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on
August 16, 1970, and the case as against the said accused, insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, was
dismissed on August 29, 1974. This decision, therefore, is limited to appellants Ramiro Alegre, Mario
Comayas and Jesus Medalla.
This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found in
her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla compound, Ignacio Street, Pasay City, in the early morning
of July 26, 1966. According to the Necropsy Report, she died of asphyxia by manual strangulation, and the
time of her death was placed between eighteen to twenty-two hours before 12:30 p.m. of July 26, 1966.
Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and several
cabinets were open, and some personal garments, hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No
witness saw the commission of the crime. Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in
one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police
headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, but was later released that same day for lack of
any evidence implicating him in the crime.
During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of
pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into
possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Adlina
Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29,
1966 (Exhibits "F", "F-1" and "F-2"). In this statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio
Cudillan implicated a certain "Esok" of Villalon, Calubian, Leyte; Jesus Medalla, of Villahermosa, Calubian,
Leyte; Mario Cudillan, also of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; one "Danny" Fernandez, of Balaquid,
Cabucgayan, Biliran Sub-province; and one "Rammy, " another Leyteno. When brought to Metro Manila
and while he was inside the Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again executed an
extrajudicial confession (Exhibits "A ", "A-1 " to "A-6" on July 31, 1966. This was sworn to before the
Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966. In this second statement, he narrated in detail the
participation in the commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario."
According to said statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section,
Secret Service Division, and Identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas as the persons he
referred to as Jesus Medalla, "Rami" and "Mario" in his declaration. On the basis of the aforementioned
extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan, an Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed by the
Special Counsel of Pasay City against Celso Fernandez, alias "Esok," Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, Ramiro
Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas, and one John Doe."
104
 Witness points to the fellow in the second row, fourth from the left who, upon being asked, gave his name as
When arraigned on August 10, 1966, Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla and Ramiro Alegre Ramiro Alegre.
entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however, testified
on the actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts contained in the decision under review was based ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
principally and mainly on the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan. Thus, the details of the planning
and the execution of the crime were taken from the "Pasay Sworn Statement" (Exhibits "A", "A-1" to "A- Q. Did you have any occasion to talk to Ramiro Alegre?
6"). The only evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellants are the
testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo. A. Yes, sir.

The testimony of Sgt. Mariano Isla of the Pasay City police is to the effect that when he was investigating Q. Where?
Melecio Cudillan, the latter pointed to Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla as his companions
in the commission of the crime. According to him, said appellants "just stared at him (Melecio Cudilla) and A. In the city jail because our cells are also near each other.
said nothing."
Q. And what did you and Ramiro Alegre talk about?
Q. In what particular place in the Police Department did you have to confront the accused Melecio
Cudillan with the other suspects'? A. Concerning his case and he told me that he has also anticipated in the commission of the killing of
Adelina Sajo.
A. In the office of the Secret Service Division.
Q. By the way, when did you talk with Ramiro Alegre, more or less?
Q. When you said there was a confrontation between the accused Melecio Cudillan and other suspects
whom do you refer to as other suspects? A. About the middle of June.

A. Jesus Medalla, Celso Fernandez, Rosario Dejere and Mario. There was another person Eduardo Q. And what else did Ramiro Alegre tell you, if any?
Comayas. He was also one of those suspects but Melecio Cudillan failed to point to him as his companion.
A. That he was also inside the room when they killed Adelina Sajo.
Q. Who were those persons or suspects pointed to by Melecio Cudillan in the Police Department of
Pasay City as his companions? Q. Now, regarding that conversation you had with the accused Jesus Medalla, when did that take
place, more or less?
A. To Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre and Mario Comayas.
A. About that month also of June, about the middle of June.
Q. When Melecio Cudilla pointed to these persons what did these three persons do?
Q. What year?
A. They just stared at him and said nothing. (t.s.n., pp. 15-16, Hearing of October 28, 1966).
A. 1967.
According to the trial court, had the appellants "really been innocent (they) should have protested vigorously
and not merely kept their silence." Q. Do you know the other accused Mario Comayas?

Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner in the Pasay City jail, declared that the three (3) appellants admitted A. Yes, sir.
to him that they took part in the robbery and homicide committed in the residence of the deceased, viz.:
Q. Why do you know him?
ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
A. He is also one of the prisoners and our cells are near each other. Q. If he is inside the courtroom,
Q. Do you know the other accused Ramiro Alegre? will you please point him out?

A. Yes, sir. INTERPRETER:

Q. If he is inside the court room, will you please point him out? Witness indicating to the fellow who gave his name as Mario Comayas.

INTERPRETER: ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

105
Q. Did you have any occasion to talk with the accused Mario Comayas? Witness may answer, there is already a basis.

A. Yes, sir. A. That they were the ones who planned and killed Adelina Sajo. (t.s.n., pp. 286-289, Hearing of July
21, 1967).
Q. When was that, more or less?
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn
A. In the month of June, about the middle part also of June. statements as the product of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by counsel when he
was investigated by the police. Appellants Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas denied any involvement in the
Q. And what did you talk about? crime. They testified that at the time of the incident in question. they were attending the internment of the
deceased child of Ciriaco Abobote. According to Jesus Medalla, he and his companions left the Maravilla
A. Regarding this case of Adelina Sajo and he admitted to me that he was one of those who planned compound at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of July 25, 1966 to attend the internment. 'They left the cemetery
and killed Adelina Sajo. at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and proceeded directly to his house at Leveriza Street where he stayed
the whole night. Mario Comayas confirmed that he and Jesus Medalla were at the house of Ciriaco Abobote
Q. I see! And what, else did he tell you, if any? in the morning of July 25, 1966, until after 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon when he returned to the bakery
where he was employed to resume his work.
A. That while the killing was being perpetrated upstairs he was told to by the door.
Appellant Ramiro Alegre did not testify but presented three (3) witnesses to support his defense. Thus,
Q. How about the other accused Melencio Cudillan, do you know him? Urbano Villanueva testified that he was a sub-contractor of Jose Inton for the welding project of David M.
Consunji at the Sheraton Hotel construction; that Ramiro Alegre began working at the construction as a
A. Yes, sir. welder on July 13, 1966, and that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Alegre
worked in the project and that he knew this because he is the foreman and timekeeper in the project. He
Q. If he is in court, will you please point him out? Identified the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1"). Rodolfo Villanueva and Romeo Origenes
testified that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning up to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 25, 1966, appellant
INTERPRETER: Ramiro Alegre was at the Sheraton Hotel construction at Roxas Boulevard. Their testimony is confirmed by
the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1") which contained the number of hours he actually worked at
Witness pointing to the accused who gave his name as Melecio Cudillan. the Sheraton Hotel construction project.

ATTY. DEPASUCAT: Appellants now contend that the lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio
Cudillan (now deceased) as evidence against herein appellants; in concluding from the alleged "Silence" of
Q. Why do you know Melecio Cudillan? appellants when allegedly pointed to by Melecio Cudillan as "his companions" in the commission of the
crime, an admission of guilt; and in giving undue weight and credence to the testimony of an inmate of the
A. Because he is with me in one cell. Pasay City Jail that appellants admitted to him their participation in the crime.

Q. Were you able also to talk with Melecio Cudillan? I

A. Most of the time because we used to talk about our case. The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (Exhibits "A", "A- I " to "A-6" and "F", "F-1" and "F-2"),
on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in
Q. When have you talked with Melecio Cudillan, more or less? question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and
Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet" 1 there being no
A. Three days after my confinement and subsequently thereafter up to about the first week of June, independent evidence of conspiracy. 2 As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused,
1967. although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is
merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. 3 While there are recognized exceptions
Q. And what did the accused Melecio Cudillan tell you about this case? to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such
exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit
ATTY. RAMIREZ: admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their
purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
Objection, Your Honor, leading.
II
COURT:

106
The next question to be resolved is whether or not the silence of appellants while under police custody, in
the face of statements of Melecio Cudillan implicating them as his companions in the commission of the
crime, could be considered as tacit admission on their part of their participation therein.
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify,
may not be taken as evidence against him, 4 and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. 5 It
has also been held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against
him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him,
otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory. 6 The leading case of Miranda v. Arizona7 held that the
prosecution may not use at trial the fact that an individual stood mute, or claimed his privilege against self-
incrimination, in the face of an accusation made at a police custodial interrogation. Prior to Miranda, it was
the view of many authorities that a man to whom a statement implicating him in a crime is directed may fail
to reply if he is in custody under a charge of the commission of that crime, not because he acquiesces in the
truth of the statement, but because he stands on his constitutional right to remain silent, as being the safest
course for him to pursue and the best way out of his predicament. 8 Other courts have held that the
circumstance that one is under arrest by itself does not render the evidence inadmissible, and that an
accusation of a crime calls for a reply even from a person under arrest or in the custody of an officer, where
the circumstances surrounding him indicate that he is free to answer if he chooses. 9
We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements
by another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to
such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the
commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to deny the
statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self-incrimination.
The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against self- incrimination is a fundamental right. It is a
personal right of great importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably. The privilege against self-
incrimination is an important development in man's struggle for liberty. It reflects man's fundamental values
and his most noble of aspirations, the unwillingness of civilized men to subject those' suspected of crime to
the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; the fear that self-incriminating statements may be
obtained by inhumane treatment and abuses, and the respect for the inviolability of the human personality
and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life." 10
In the words of Chavez v. Court of Appeals: 11
... this right is 'not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the
court;' it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is fundamental to our
scheme of justice ...
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his
guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable
against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime.
Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand —
with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.
It must be stressed here that even under a regime of martial law, the operations of our laws governing the
rights of an accused person are not open to doubt. Under the code for the administration of detainees, all
officers, civilian and military personnel are sworn to uphold the rights of detainees. Among such
fundamental rights are the right against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination, the right, when under
investigation for the commission of an offense, to remain silent, to have counsel, and to be informed of his
rights; the right not to be subjected to force, violence, threats, intimidation and degrading punishment or
torture in the course of one's detention, and the safeguard that any confession obtained in violation of the
foregoing rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. 12 The 1973 Constitution gives explicit constitutional
sanction to the right to silence. Thus, in Section 20 of Article IV of the Constitution, there is this categorical
mandate: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
This privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Constitution protects, therefore, the right of a
person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no
penalty for such silence. 13
This aspect of the right has been comprehensively explained by then Associate Justice Enrique M. Fernando,
now Chief justice, in Pascual Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 14 thus:
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to
declare: 'The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of
his guilt.' Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed
the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant 'to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses
to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.'
Identifying the right of an accused to remain silent with right to privacy, this Court, in Pascual explained that
the privilege against self-incrimination "enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government
may not force to surrender to its detriment."
We hold, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to draw from appellants' silence while under police
custody, in the face of the incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid
appellants had tacitly admitted their guilt. We hold, further, that in view of the inadmissibility of the
extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan implicating herein appellants, the remaining evidence against
them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo, is insufficient to sustain the
judgment of conviction. Indeed, it is inherently improbable that herein appellants would have readily
confessed their participation in the commission of a heinous crime to a casual acquaintance in a prison
detention cell, considering that on the same occasion they strongly denied any involvement in such crime
before the police authorities.
WHEREFORE, the judgement appealed from is reversed, and appellants Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo,
Mario Comayas y Cudillan and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime with which
they are charged. Their immediate release from detention is ordered, unless they or any one of them is
otherwise held for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119005. December 2, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL
and AMADO PONCE, accused, SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL, accused-appellants.
DECISION
107

REGALADO, J.:
The court a quo found herein accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel, as well as accused
Amado Ponce, guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of Agapito Gambalan, Jr. the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his
death, and the amount of P1,500.00 representing the value of the stolen revolver.[1] The Raquel brothers
now plead for their absolution in this appellate review.
In an information dated August 27, 1986, the aforementioned accused were indicted for robbery with
homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch 16,[2] allegedly committed on July
4, 1986 in Barangay Osias of the Municipality of Kabacan.
Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress, however, and
before he could give his testimony, accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail.[3]
The factual antecedents of the case for the People, as borne out by the evidence of record and with page
references to the transcripts of the court hearings, are summarized by the Solicitor General in the appellees
brief:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan, Jr.
Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen.
Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him.
(pp. 4-6, TSN, January 25, 1988)
Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husbands lifeless (sic) while a man took her
husbands gun and left hurriedly. (p. 7, ibid.)
She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other men
ran away. (p. 9, ibid.)
George Jovillano responded to Juliets plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police came
and found one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victims house.
He was identified as Amado Ponce. (pp. 5-7, TSN, October 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN, March 21, 1988)
Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police station. (p. 27, ibid.)
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the
perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their residence. However, the police failed to find
them there since appellants fled immediately after the shooting incident. (pp. 12-14, ibid.)
Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions. (pp. 5-6, TSN, April 2, 1991) [4]
Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense, on the bases of facts which are presented in
their brief in this wise:
Accused Valeriano Raquel testified that on July 2, 1986, with the permission of his parents he left Paatan,
Kabacan, Cotabato and went to Tunggol Pagalungan, Maguindanao. He stayed in the house of his sister-in-
law, the wife of his deceased brother. Together with Boy Madriaga and Corazon Corpuz, he harvested palay
on July 3 and 4. On July 5, while he was still asle(ep), police authorities accompanied by his father arrested
him and brought him to the municipal jail of Kabacan, Cotabato. He already heard the name of accused
Amado Ponce, to be an owner of a parcel of land in Paatan.
On cross-examination, he admitted that their house and that of Gambalan are located in the same Barangay.
Before July 4, he entertained no grudge against victim Agapito Gambalan. (TSN, April 2, 1991, pp. 2-20)
Antonio Raquel, 64 years old, testified that on July 2, 1986 he was at home when his son Valeriano Raquel
told him that he was going to Tunggol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao to harvest palay. On (the) same date, his
other son, Sabas Raquel, also asked his permission to leave since the latter, a soldier, was going to his place
of assignment at Pagadian. On July 5, 1986, several policemen came over to his house, looking for his two
(2) sons. He gave them pictures of his sons and even accompanied them to Tunggol where they arrested his
son Valeriano. (TSN, April 3, 1991, pp. 3-26)
T/Sgt. Natalio Zafra, of the 102 Brigade, Aurora, Zamboanga, testified that on July 4, 1986, he was assigned
in the 2nd Infantry Battalion, First Infantry Division, Maria Cristina, Iligan City. Sabas Raquel was under his
division then, and was on duty on July 4, 1986. (TSN, Nov. 6, 1992, pp. 2-20).[5]
On August 10, 1993, the trial court, as stated at the outset, rendered judgment finding all of the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them accordingly.[6]
Not satisfied therewith, herein appellants filed a notice of appeal wherein they manifested that they were
appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals.[7] The lower court ordered the transmittal of the records of
the case to the Court of Appeals.[8] In view of the penalty imposed, the Court of Appeals properly
forwarded the same to us.[9]
Before us, the defense submits a lone assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in convicting accused
Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel of the crime charged, despite absence of evidence positively implicating
them as the perpetrators of the crime.
We find such submission to be meritorious. A careful review and objective appraisal of the evidence
convinces us that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the
perpetrators of, much less the participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged.
The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband. In her
testimony on direct examination in court she declared as follows:
Q: You said you shouted right after the incident and pip (sic) at the window, did you see any when you pip
(sic) at the window?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you see if you were able to see anything?
A: I saw a person who fel(l) down beside the water pump and I saw again two (2) persons who were running
away, sir.
Q: Were you able to identify this persons who fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump and two (2) persons
running away?
xxx
Q: Now, you said somebody fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump, who is this person?
A: I do not know sir. I have known that he was Amado Ponce when the Police arrived.[10] (Italics ours.)
On cross-examination she further testified:
108

Q: For the first time when you shouted for help, where were you?
A: I was at the Veranda sir and I started shouting while going to our room.
Q: In fact you have no way (of) identifying that one person who was mask(ed) and got the gun of your
husband because he was mask(ed), is that not right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In fact, you saw only this one person got inside to your house and got this gun?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And this Amado Ponce cannot be the person who have got this gun inside?
FISCAL DIZON:
Already answered.
She was not able to identify, your Honor.
Q: You only saw this Amado Ponce when (h)e was presented to you by the police, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.[11]
xxx
Q: You testified in direct testimony you pip (sic) in jalousie after you shouted for help and you saw two (2)
person(s) running, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you saw these persons running on the road, is that not right?
A: I saw them running sir going around.
Q: These two (2) persons were running going around?
A: They were running towards the road.
ATTY. DIVINO:
Going to the road.
Q: And you cannot identify these two (2) persons running towards the road?
A: No, sir.[12] (Emphases supplied.)
Even the corroborating witness, George Jovillano, in his testimony made no mention of who shot Agapito
Gambalan. In fact, in his sworn statement executed in the Investigation Section of the Kabacan Police
Station on July 5, 1986, he declared that:
19 Q: By the way, when you saw three persons passing about 5 meters away from where you were then
drinking, what have you noticed about them, if you ever noticed any?
19 A: I noticed that one of the men ha(d) long firearm which was partly covered by a maong jacket. The
other one wore a hat locally known as kipis meaning a hat made of cloth with leaves protruding above the
forehead and seemed to be holding something which I failed to recognize. The other one wore a shortpant
with a somewhat white T-shirt with markings and there was a white T-shirt covering his head and a part of
his face as he was head-down during that time.
20 Q: Did you recognize any of these men?
19 A: No. Because they walked fast.[13] (Italics supplied.)
A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein appellants as
the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his
co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused escaped from jail before he could testify in
court and he has been at large since then.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter,
unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-
accused on the latters extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said
accused.[14] That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.
Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused which
implicates his co-accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant,
while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal.[15]
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible
against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a
mans own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations.
Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the
acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.[16]
Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions,[17] those exceptions do not
however apply to the present case.
Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no evidence whatsoever
linking appellants to the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellant Sabas
Raquel was wounded and went to the clinic of Dr. Anulao for treatment using the name Dante Clemente,[18]
was negated by Dr. Anulao himself who testified that he treated no person by the name of Danny
Clemente.[19]
Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was made in violation
of the constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce. This was unwittingly admitted in the testimony of the
same Sgt. Andal S. Pangato who was the chief of the intelligence and investigation section of their police
station:
Q: During the investigation did you inform him (of) his constitutional right while on the process of
investigation?
A: No sir, because my purpose was only to get the information from him. . . . And after that I checked the
information that he gave.
Q: Of course, you know very well that the accused should be assisted by counsel?
A: What I know is if when a person is under investigation you have in mind to investigate as to against (sic)
him, and you have to inform his constitutional right but if the purpose is to interrogate him to acquire
information which will lead to the identity of the other accused we do not need to inform him.
Q: Dont you know that under the case of PP vs. Galit, the accused should be (re)presented by counsel that is
the ruling of the Supreme Court?
A: I do not know if it is actually the same as this case.
Q: But it is a fact that you did not even inform him (of) his right?
A: No sir.
Q: At the time when you asked him he has no counsel.
A: No counsel, sir.[20]
Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are
inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be
109
waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel.[21] These rights, both constitutional and
statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.
A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt.[22] Without the
positive identification of appellants, the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to them.[23] While admittedly the alibi of
appellants may be assailable, the evidence of the prosecution is probatively low in substance and
evidentiarily barred in part. The prosecution cannot use the weakness of the defense to enhance its case; it
must rely on the strength of its own evidence. In fact, alibi need not be inquired into where the prosecutions
evidence is weak.[24]
It would not even have been necessary to stress that every reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be
resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty
of guilt. In the instant case, the test of moral certainty was neither met nor were the standards therefor
fulfilled.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and accused-appellants Sabas
Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 115439-41. July 16, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO
V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks the annulment of the resolution of
respondent Sandiganbayan, promulgated on December 22, 1993, which denied petitioners motion for the
discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be utilized as a state witness, and its resolution of March 7,
1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of its preceding disposition.[1]
The records show that during the dates material to this case, respondent Honrada was the Clerk of Court and
Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan
del Sur. Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of
the same province, and is at present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who
served as counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the present
recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes applied for a free patent over
Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His application was approved and,
pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an original certificate of title was issued in his favor for that lot
which is situated in the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action[2] for the cancellation of respondent Paredes patent
and certificate of title since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site in the aforementioned
subdivision survey. The trial court rendered judgment[3] nullifying said patent and title after finding that
respondent Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application.
Pertinently, respondent Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.[4]
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the subsequent complaint of the Sangguniang
Bayan and the preliminary investigation conducted thereon, an information for perjury[5] was filed against
respondent Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.[6] On November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal
was, however, directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground
inter alia of prescription, hence the proceedings were terminated.[7] In this criminal case, respondent
Paredes was likewise represented by respondent Sansaet as counsel.
Nonetheless, respondent* Paredes was thereafter haled before the Tanodbayan for preliminary investigation
on the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of
Lands officials to favorably act on his application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended. For the third time, respondent Sansaet was Paredes counsel of record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution[8] recommending the criminal prosecution of
respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his aforenamed co-respondent, moved for reconsideration
and, because of its legal significance in this case, we quote some of his allegations in that motion:
x x x respondent had been charged already by the complainants before the Municipal Circuit Court of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on detention in 1984 under the same set of facts and the same
evidence x x x but said case after arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the court upon recommendation of
the Department of Justice. Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of arraignment and the recommendation
of the Department of Justice are hereto attached for ready reference; thus the filing of this case will be a case
of double jeopardy for respondent herein x x x.[9] (Italics supplied.)
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan[10] charging respondent Paredes with a
violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. However, a motion to quash filed by the
defense was later granted in respondent courts resolution of August 1, 1991[11] and the case was dismissed
on the ground of prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft charges against
respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the three respondents herein
for falsification of public documents.[12] He claimed that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein
co-respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of
arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the
arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge.[13] These falsified documents were annexed to respondent
Paredes motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him,
in order to support his contention that the same would constitute double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of arraignment was ever
received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in connection with that perjury case; and a
certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario that said perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment
stage since action thereon was suspended pending the review of the case by the Department of Justice.[14]
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently discarded and repudiated the
submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of Explanations and
Rectifications,[15] respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have the graft case under
preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it that the perjury case had
been dismissed by the trial court after he had been arraigned therein.
110
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent Sansaet in the preliminary
investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the house of respondent
Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the
instigation and inducement of respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his discharge as a
government witness in the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed by the prosecution
pursuant to their agreement.
Withal, in a resolution[16] dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification
charges against all the herein private respondents. The proposal for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a
state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on this evaluative legal position:
x x x Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of his stature, in the absence of deliberate
intent to conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime. As counsel for the accused
in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had control over the case theory and the evidence which the defense
was going to present. Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty. Sansaet falls under the mantle of
privileged communication between the lawyer and his client which may be objected to, if presented in the
trial.
The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution[17] and, ostensibly to forestall any further
controversy, he decided to file separate informations for falsification of public documents against each of the
herein respondents. Thus, three criminal cases,[18] each of which named one of the three private
respondents here as the accused therein, were filed in the graft court. However, the same were consolidated
for joint trial in the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge of respondent
Sansaet as a state witness. It was submitted that all the requisites therefor, as provided in Section 9, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court, were satisfied insofar as respondent Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was
that, except for the eyewitness testimony of respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to prove
the confabulated falsification of documents by respondents Honrada and Paredes.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the attorney-client
privilege adverted to by the Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private respondents in their
opposition to the prosecutions motion, resolved to deny the desired discharge on this ratiocination:
From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and lawyer relationship existed
between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period alleged in the
information. In view of such relationship, the facts surrounding the case, and other confidential matter must
have been disclosed by accused Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his professional
capacity. Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts surrounding the offense charged in the
information is privileged.[19]
Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied,[20] the controversy was elevated to this
Court by the prosecution in an original action for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari against
respondent Sandiganbayan.
The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar actually turns are therefore (1) whether or
not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client
privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to testify as a
particeps criminis.
I
As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client relationship which existed
between herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods, the facts surrounding the case
and other confidential matters must have been disclosed by respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent
Sansaet, as his lawyer. Accordingly, it found no reason to discuss it further since Atty. Sansaet cannot be
presented as a witness against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latters consent.[21]
The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts
thereof and the actuations of both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule. For a clearer
understanding of that evidential rule, we will first sweep aside some distracting mental cobwebs in these
cases.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in
connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification before respondent court, and this may
reasonably be expected since Paredes was the accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that
Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada was as
eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal statements being made to him by Paredes as to the fact
and purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to
any communication, without distinction or qualification.[22]
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken, there is no particular mode by
which a confidential communication shall be made by a client to his attorney. The privilege is not confined
to verbal or written communications made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to information
communicated by the client to the attorney by other means.[23]
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and existing relations as counsel
and client and, further, in view of the purpose for which such falsified documents were prepared, no word at
all passed between Paredes and Sansaet on the subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this
conclusion is the undisputed fact that said documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as
annexes to the motion for reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft case before the
Tanodbayan.[24] Also, the acts and words of the parties during the period when the documents were being
falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his house and
allowed him to witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the instance of Paredes in the criminal act for
which the latter stands charged, a distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to
past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is
admitted that the announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences
which his attorney is bound to respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe that in the instant case
it is dealing with a past crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts of
respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already been committed and consummated.
The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true that by
now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are concerned, those crimes were
necessarily committed in the past. But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the
period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the
attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be
committed in the future. In other words, if the client seeks his lawyers advice with respect to a crime that the
111
former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the
attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the clients consent. The same
privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit
thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyers advice.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made by a party
who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily, the
unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney and client having to
do with the clients contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak
of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client.[25] (Emphases
supplied.)
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the
communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he and
Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of
falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the
criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential
communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of
falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his
present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those
communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of falsification which he,
Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well settled that in order that a
communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in
furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.[26]
In fact, it has also been pointed out to the Court that the prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and
client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a
client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge,
but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of
justice.[27]
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful
communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless covered by the so-
called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was
later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be
one of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.
II
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential inquiry as to whether respondent Sansaet
qualifies, as a particeps criminis, for discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to testify for the State.
Parenthetically, respondent court, having arrived at a contrary conclusion on the preceding issue, did not
pass upon this second aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution which are now submitted for our
resolution in the petition at bar. We shall, however, first dispose likewise of some ancillary questions
requiring preludial clarification.
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon the query as to whether or not respondent
Sansaet was qualified to be a state witness need not prevent this Court from resolving that issue as prayed
for by petitioner. Where the determinative facts and evidence have been submitted to this Court such that it
is in a position to finally resolve the dispute, it will be in the pursuance of the ends of justice and the
expeditious administration thereof to resolve the case on the merits, instead of remanding it to the trial
court.[28]
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private respondents here stand charged in three separate
informations. It will be recalled that in its resolution of February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman recommended
the filing of criminal charges for falsification of public documents against all the respondents herein. That
resolution was affirmed but, reportedly in order to obviate further controversy, one information was filed
against each of the three respondents here, resulting in three informations for the same acts of falsification.
This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the deliberations in this case by the
following discussion thereof by Mr. Justice Davide, to wit:
Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaets discharge as state witness, he can,
nevertheless, be discharged even if indicted under a separate information. I suppose the three cases were
consolidated for joint trial since they were all raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. Section
2, Rule XV of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows consolidation in only one Division of cases
arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common questions of law and fact.
Accordingly, for all legal intents and purposes, Sansaet stood as co-accused and he could be discharged as
state witness. It is of no moment that he was charged separately from his co-accused. While Section 9 of
Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure uses the word jointly, which was absent in the old
provision, the consolidated and joint trial has the effect of making the three accused co-accused or joint
defendants, especially considering that they are charged for the same offense. In criminal law, persons
indicted for the same offense and tried together are called joint defendants.
As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the same vein, there having been a
consolidation of the three cases, the several actions lost their separate identities and became a single action
in which a single judgment is rendered, the same as if the different causes of action involved had originally
been joined in a single action.[29]
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation (w)hen two or more persons are charged
with the commission of a certain offense was too broad and indefinite; hence the word joint was added to
indicate the identity of the charge and the fact that the accused are all together charged therewith
substantially in the same manner in point of commission and time. The word joint means common to two or
more, as involving the united activity of two or more, or done or produced by two or more working together,
or shared by or affecting two or more.[30] Had it been intended that all the accused should always be
indicted in one and the same information, the Rules could have said so with facility, but it did not so require
in consideration of the circumstances obtaining in the present case and the problems that may arise from
amending the information. After all, the purpose of the Rule can be achieved by consolidation of the cases as
an alternative mode.
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification, and the rule is that since
in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the same penalty shall be imposed on all members of the
conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a state witness is that he does not appear to be the most
guilty.[31] not that he must be the least guilty[32] as is so often erroneously framed or submitted. The query
would then be whether an accused who was held guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible
to be a state witness.
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al.[33] we find this obiter:
112
It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is believable that he persuaded the others to
rob Paterno, not to kill him for a promised fee. Although he did not actually commit any of the stabbings, it
was a mistake to discharge Bagispas as a state witness. All the perpetrators of the offense, including him,
were bound in a conspiracy that made them equally guilty.
However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al.,[34] two conspirators charged with five others in three
separate informations for multiple murder were discharged and used as state witnesses against their
confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[35] one of the co-conspirators
was discharged from the information charging him and two others with the crime of estafa. The trial court
found that he was not the most guilty as, being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by his two
co-accused to open the account with the bank and which led to the commission of the crime.
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate court that Lugtu was just as guilty as his
co-accused, and should not be discharged as he did not appear to be not the most guilty, is untenable. In
other words, the Court took into account the gravity or nature of the acts committed by the accused to be
discharged compared to those of his co-accused, and not merely the fact that in law the same or equal
penalty is imposable on all of them.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicitly articulated found expression in People vs.
Ocimar, et al.,[36] which we quote in extenso:
Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy the conditions for the discharge of a co-
accused to become a state witness. He argues that no accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and
utilized as a state witness, for not one of them could satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the most
guilty. Appellant asserts that since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is equally guilty as the
others.
We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez. For, despite the
presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of them could positively identify the accused except Bermudez
who was one of those who pulled the highway heist which resulted not only in the loss of cash, jewelry and
other valuables, but even the life of Capt. Caeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of Bermudez that clinched
the case for the prosecution. Second, without his testimony, no other direct evidence was available for the
prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony could be, as indeed it was, substantially
corroborated in its material points as indicated by the trial court in its well-reasoned decision. Fourth, he
does not appear to be the most guilty. As the evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party
without having any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway robbery. But even assuming that he later
became part of the conspiracy, he does not appear to be the most guilty. What the law prohibits is that the
most guilty will be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty will be sent to jail. And by most guilty
we mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and not
necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by
reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if We take into account his degree of
participation in the perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
xxx
Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule on the discharge of an accused to
be utilized as state witness clearly looks at his actual and individual participation in the commission of the
crime, which may or may not have been perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused. Since Bermudez
was not individually responsible for the killing committed on the occasion of the robbery except by reason
of conspiracy, it cannot be said then that Bermudez appears to be the most guilty. Hence, his discharge to be
a witness for the government is clearly warranted. (Italics ours.)
The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators found guilty of a criminal offense is
based on the concurrence of criminal intent in their minds and translated into concerted physical action
although of varying acts or degrees of depravity. Since the Revised Penal Code is based on the classical
school of thought, it is the identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant consideration and,
therefore, warrants the imposition of the same penalty on the consequential theory that the act of one is
thereby the act of all.
Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated with the procedural rule on the
discharge of particeps criminis. This adjective device is based on other considerations, such as the need for
giving immunity to one of them in order that not all shall escape, and the judicial experience that the candid
admission of an accused regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully. For those
reasons, the Rules provide for certain qualifying criteria which, again, are based on judicial experience
distilled into a judgmental policy.
III
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other requisites for the discharge of respondent
Sansaet as a state witness are present and should have been favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of the falsification charged
in the criminal cases pending before respondent court, and the prosecution is faced with the formidable task
of establishing the guilt of the two other co-respondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest
their innocence. There is thus no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of the case, hence there
is absolute necessity for the testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for that purpose. Said
respondent has indicated his conformity thereto and has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed the
substance of his projected testimony in his Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications.
His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points by reputable witnesses, identified in
the basic petition with a digest of their prospective testimonies, as follows: Judge Ciriaco C. Ario, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur; Provincial Prosecutor and Deputized Ombudsman
Prosecutor Claudio A. Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who initiated the criminal cases through
his letter-complaint; Alberto Juvilan of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur, who
participated in the resolution asking their Provincial Governor to file the appropriate case against respondent
Paredes, and Francisco Macalit, who obtained the certification of non-arraignment from Judge Ario.
On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that respondent Sansaet has at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the requirements for the
discharge of this respondent, both the Special Prosecutor and the Solicitor General strongly urge and propose
that he be allowed to testify as a state witness.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect, the prosecution may propose
but it is for the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to determine the merits of the proposal and
make the corresponding disposition. It must be emphasized, however, that such discretion should have been
exercised, and the disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts and issues herein discussed, and not
merely on the sole issue of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.
113
This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan eventually assumed, after the retirement of
two members of its Second Division [37]and the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely anticlimactic
Manifestation and Comment [38] dated June 14, 1995, as required by this Court in its resolution on
December 5, 1994, the chairman and new members thereof [39] declared:
4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and March 7, 1994 upon which the Petition for
Certiorari filed by the prosecution are based, was penned by Associate Justice Narciso T. Atienza and
concurred in by the undersigned and Associate Justice Augusto M. Amores;
5) That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed and passed upon by the Second Division
in the aforesaid Resolution, however, after going over the arguments submitted by the Solicitor-General and
re-assessing Our position on the matter, We respectfully beg leave of the Honorable Supreme Court to
manifest that We are amenable to setting aside the questioned Resolutions and to grant the prosecutions
motion to discharge accused Generoso Sansaet as state witness, upon authority of the Honorable Supreme
Court for the issuance of the proper Resolution to that effect within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the impugned
resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed and given
due course by respondent Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 146111. February 23, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROLENDO GAUDIA @ LENDOY or DODO,
appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
There can be no greater violation of a persons right to feel safe and secure than the crime of rape. When one
commits such a horrible act on another, he degrades not only that persons body; more importantly, he defiles
that persons mind. When the victim is a little child, the act and the perpetrator himself assume a bestiality
beyond the comprehension of normal human beings. Yet, the law must apply equally upon saints and sinners
alike, even to the most salacious ruffian.
Before us is the Decision[1] dated 10 July 2000 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao
del Sur, finding appellant Rolendo Gaudia[2] guilty of the crime of rape, meting upon him the penalty of
death, and ordering him to pay to private complainant Remelyn Loyola the amounts of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and costs of suit.
The Information filed against the accused-appellant reads as follows:
That on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, in the Municipality of Hagonoy,
Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will to her damage and prejudice.
The prosecution presented Remelyns mother, Amalia Loyola, as its primary witness. Amalia testified that on
24 March 1997, she left her two children Remelyn (3 1/2 years old)[3]and Kimberly (1 year old)[4] at their
house in Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur to gather pigs food at Bulatukan. At the time, her husband was
working in Tulunan, South Cotabato. At about 4:00 in the afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not
find Remelyn. She went to fetch water and proceeded to a neighbor to ask about the whereabouts of
Remelyn. Nobody could provide her any information. On her way home, she shouted and called out
Remelyns name. At about 6:00 p.m., Amalia heard Remelyn calling out to her, Ma, I am here, from a grove
of ipil-ipil trees.[5] Amalia rushed toward the place, but was met by Remelyn at the mango trees, some thirty
(30) meters from their house.[6] She found Remelyn crying, naked, nagbakaang (walking with her legs
spread apart) and with fresh and dried blood on her body. Ipil-ipil leaves clung to her forehead. Blood was
oozing from her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and washed her. Upon closer inspection, she
found a whitish mucus-like substance coming from Remelyns private organ.[7]
The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the house of a certain Tiya Coring, a quack
doctor, for treatment. Among the people present in the premises were the relatives and parents of the
appellant.[8] The quack doctor found both dried blood and fresh blood oozing in Remelyns vagina, and told
Amalia, Hoy! Amalia, your daughter was being (sic) raped.[9] At about 10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a neighbor,
came and informed Amalia that he had seen the appellant pass by her house and take Remelyn.[10] At this
point, the parents of appellant told Amalia, Mal, let us talk about this matter, we will just settle this, we are
willing to pay the amount of P15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed.[11] Police officers came and
brought Amalia, Remelyn and two barangay officials (kagawads) to the police precinct of Hagonoy for
investigation. Amalias statement was taken.[12]
On 25 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the Hagonoy Health Center in Davao del Sur. Dr. Patricio
Hernane, the municipal health officer,[13] conducted a genital examination of Remelyn, and made the
following findings:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Absence of Pubic Hair (Tanner Stage I). No contusions are noted on the external genitalia. Dried blood are
(sic) noted on the labia minora. Fresh hymenal lacerations are noted at 12, 3, 6, 10 oclock (sic) are noted
with fresh vaginal laceration noted at the posterior commissure but not extending to the perineum. No
lacerations were noted at the anal opening.
Speculum examination is not done because even exposure of the labia minora make the child cry. (sic)
CONCLUSION: Physical virginity lost.[14]
The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the insertion of a foreign object, such as
the penis of a man.[15]
On 26 March 1997, Amalia executed her affidavit complaint.[16] Amalia stated therein that Remelyn had
told her Buang Lendoy iya kong lugos.[17] (Meaning crazy lendoy he forced me in the Visayan dialect.)
Amalia confirmed in her testimony that two weeks after the incident, Remelyn told her, Ma, Lendoy is
crazy, she (sic) brought me to the ipil-ipil trees.[18]
The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyns neighbor and a barangay kagawad in their area. Mik
testified that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he and his wife were on their way home after registering
at the COMELEC office. They were in a hurry as their child was running a fever. Mik saw appellant
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carrying a small girl in his arms.[19] He identified the little girl as Remelyn Loyola, daughter of Amalia
Loyola. Appellant and Remelyn were on their way toward the ipil-ipil trees.[20]
The next morning, 25 March 1997, at about 7:00 a.m., a neighbor informed Mik that Remelyn had been
raped. He proceeded to the house of the quack doctor where Amalia brought Remelyn for examination.
Amalia confirmed to Mik that Remelyn had been raped. Mik told Amalia that appellant committed the
crime. Mik then informed Barangay Official Rodrigo Malud[21] and the other tanods of the incident. They
were instructed to locate the appellant. They passed to the police the information that appellant was in
Barangay Mahayahay. The policemen came and took appellant for investigation. [22]
The appellant, ROLENDO GAUDIA, interposed the defense of alibi. He averred that on 24 March 1997, at
about 4:00 p.m., he went to the Barangay Center to register at the COMELEC for the National Elections.
With him was Totong Loyola, the brother-in-law of Amalia Loyola. They finished at 5:00 p.m., left and
repaired to the house of Catalina Cabano, appellants aunt, to ask for vinegar for their kinilaw (a dish
composed of raw fish steeped in vinegar). They found Daylen Cabano, the small grandchild of Catalina,
alone at her house. Daylen was crying, hence, they brought her with them as they proceeded to the place
where Catalina was collecting tuba (fermented coconut wine). It was appellant who carried Daylen.[23]
They reached Catalinas place after 5:00 p.m. Thereafter, they went to the house of appellant. Dodo Malon
and appellants parents were in the house. At around 9:00 p.m., Totong and Dodo Malon left, after partaking
of the kinilaw. Appellant stayed home. The following morning (25 March 1997), appellant and Dodo Malon
went to the river to fish. At about 12:00 noon, appellant repaired to the house of his aunt, Victoria Gayod, in
Mahayahay to drink tuba. He was located by the police and investigated.[24] He claimed that it was Daylen
and not the victim Remelyn whom he was carrying.
As corroborative witness, appellant presented Alex Totong Loyola. Totong testified that on 24 March 1997,
at about 4:00 p.m., they registered as voters in the barangay. After registering, they went home to appellants
house, but again left to get vinegar from his aunt Catalina Cabano, for their kinilaw. In Catalinas house, they
found her drunk husband, her 10-year old daughter, and her 3-year old grandchild Daylen.[25] Catalinas
daughter directed them to the place where she was gathering tuba. As Daylen was crying, appellant carried
her on their way to Catalina. It was then about 4:00 p.m. After Catalina finished gathering tuba, the four of
them appellant, Totong, Catalina and Daylen, left together and repaired to Catalinas house for the vinegar.
Appellant and Totong returned to appellants house where they spent the night.[26] Totong woke up at 6:00
a.m. the following day, and left appellants house. Totong came to know of appellants arrest the following
day.[27]
Catalina Cabano also corroborated appellants story. She relates that on 24 March 1997, she was gathering
tuba, at a place around 2 kilometers from her house. She left Maritess, her youngest child and Daylen, her
grandchild, at her house.[28] At about 5:30 p.m., appellant and Totong arrived. Appellant was carrying
Daylen. They waited for Catalina to finish gathering tuba until 6:00 p.m. Appellant and Totong went to the
formers house, had a drinking spree, and then parted ways at about 6:30 p.m. That night, according to
Catalina, she talked to Tulon Mik at the premises near the house. Mik was looking for Remelyn. At that
time, appellant was already at the house of Catalinas younger sister, which is located across the river, about
4 kilometers away.[29]
After trial, the trial court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict appellant for the
crime of rape with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven years of age. Appellant was
sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify the victim the sums of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
In his Brief[30] to the Court, appellant assigned the following errors in the judgment of the trial court:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, ROLANDO (sic)
GAUDIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II.
EVEN GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT STILL ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY
OF DEATH DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO STATE WITH CERTAINTY THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF AGE IN THE INFORMATION.
We convict appellant for simple rape, and not for qualified rape.
Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, conviction may be based on circumstantial
evidence provided three requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The ruling case law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient
to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with
every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.[31]
The first circumstantial evidence against the appellant is the testimony of prosecution witness Tulon Mik
that at 4:00 p.m. on 24 March 1997, he saw him carrying Remelyn toward the direction of the ipil-ipil grove,
some 130 meters from her house.[32] As a neighbor and relative of Remelyns stepfather, Mik had sufficient
familiarity with the child Remelyn. The possibility that he could have been mistaken in identifying the
victim is nil.
The second circumstantial evidence against the appellant is Amalias testimony that Remelyn emerged naked
from the same ipil-ipil grove, with ipil-ipil leaves clinging to her forehead. Remelyn was crying and walking
with her legs spread far apart. Remelyns private organ was bleeding and excreting a white mucus-like
substance.[33]
The third circumstantial evidence against appellant is Remelyns statement to her mother that it was appellant
who had brought her to the ipil-ipil grove[34] and forced her to do something against her will.[35]
There is no question that Remelyn was violated. After examining Remelyn, Dr. Patricio Hernane, the
Municipal Health Officer of Hagonoy, found her to have a broken hymen, as well as fresh vaginal
lacerations.
From these, the culpability of the appellant can be inferred with moral certainty. All the aforementioned
circumstances have been indubitably proven, both by the testimonial and documentary evidence presented
by the prosecution, and by the inability of the appellant to discredit their veracity.
The attempt of appellant to discredit the circumstantial evidence against him is futile. Appellant contends,
first, that Tulon Miks testimony is weak, on the ground that Mik is a relative of the husband of Amalia.[36]
He also questions the credibility of Mik because of his failure to confront appellant when he saw him
carrying Remelyn. Neither did Mik inform Amalia about what he saw when Amalia was looking for
115
Remelyn. Appellant insists that it was Daylen whom he carried and not Remelyn. Second, he stresses the
fact that Remelyn did not make any categorical statement that he sexually molested her. Third, he maintains
that the accusation of flight against him is false. Fourth, he avers that the offer of compromise by his parents
as tendered to Amalia Loyola should not be taken against him,[37] while the offer of compromise he
allegedly made to Amalias husband, as relayed by Amalia in her testimony, should be excluded as evidence
for being hearsay.[38] Finally, he submits that inconsistencies in the testimony of Alex Loyola and Cabano
should not be counted against him on the ground that any finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the
prosecutions evidence.
We reject appellants arguments.
First, appellants attempt to discredit the testimony of Mik cannot succeed. It is true that Mik is a relative by
affinity of Amalia Loyola. It is hoary jurisprudence, however, that mere relationship to one of the parties,
without a showing of any other improper motive, is not sufficient basis to impair the credibility of the
witness.[39] In the case at bar, appellant cannot impute any ill motive for Mik to testify adversely against
him.
Appellant questions the failure of Mik to challenge him why he was carrying Remelyn. Also, he assails Mik
for failing to inform Amalia Loyola of such a sight. Mik had an explanation for the inadvertence. He said his
own child was down with a fever, and he and his wife were hurrying home.[40] For this same reason, he
revealed the fact that he saw appellant carrying Remelyn toward the ipil-ipil grove only when he learned of
Remelyns fate. But thereafter, he lost no time in reporting the matter to the barangay chairman.[41] As a
barangay kagawad, he also assisted in the pursuit and arrest of appellant at Barangay Mahayahay.[42] These
subsequent actions strengthen Miks credibility.
The trial court accorded more credence to Miks narration of the events over the testimonies of Cabano and
Loyola. It is a cornerstone of our jurisprudence that the trial judge's evaluation of the testimony of a witness
and its factual findings are accorded not only the highest respect, but also finality, unless some weighty
circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood which could alter the result of the judgment rendered. In
the case at bar, there is no irregularity in the assessment of evidence by the lower court. It granted utmost
credibility to Miks testimony. Given the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand, the trial
judge was in a vantage position to assess his demeanor and determine if he was telling the truth or not.[43]
The trial court found Miks testimony more worthy of credence over those of Catalina and Loyola. We have
no reason to reverse its findings.
Next, appellant tried to capitalize on the fact that Remelyn never made any statement that he sexually
molested her. This is a specious argument. Remelyn had told her mother, Crazy Lendoy forced me.[44]
Remelyn was 3 1/2 years old at the time. At such an infantile age, she could not be expected to have a
comprehension of the concept of rape. Studies show that children, particularly very young children, make
the perfect victims. They naturally follow the authority of adults as the socialization process teaches children
that adults are to be respected. The childs age and developmental level will govern how much she
comprehends about the abuse and therefore how much it affects her. If the child is too young to understand
what has happened to her, the effects will be minimized because she has no comprehension of the
consequences. Certainly, children have more problems in providing accounts of events because they do not
understand everything they experience. They do not have enough life experiences from which to draw upon
in making sense of what they see, hear, taste, smell and feel. Moreover, they have a limited vocabulary.[45]
The fact that Remelyn called appellant Buang or crazy shows that he did something which she knew was not
right or proper. By saying iya kong lugos, Remelyn clearly conveyed that he forced her to do something bad.
With her limited comprehension, the child could not have a perfect way of relating that she had been
sexually abused. Finally, it must also be considered that there is no actual counterpart for the word rape in
Visayan parlance.
Appellants charge that the trial court erred when it ruled that he fled arrest, even if correct, is not pivotal to
his guilt. There are enough pieces of circumstantial evidence to convict him. Neither will it affect the penalty
or the award of damages rendered against him.
Similarly, appellants charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to
Amalia, and by the appellant himself to Amalias husband should not have been taken against him by the trial
court, even if sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise allegedly made by
appellant to Amalia Loyolas husband is hearsay evidence, and of no probative value. It was only Amalia
who testified as to the alleged offer,[46] and she was not a party to the conversation which allegedly
transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal
knowledge or perception.[47] The offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellants parents to Amalia
may have been the subject of testimony[48] of Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter alios
acta alteri nocere non debet,[49] the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a
party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them
to the mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as evidence against appellant but we reiterate that
these errors are not enough to reverse the conviction of the appellant.
Appellants defense hardly impresses. It is interesting to note that appellant and his witnesses claim that it
was at around 5:00 p.m. when appellant carried the child Daylen toward her grandmother Catalina at the
place where she was gathering tuba. Mik testified that it was around 4:00 p.m. when he saw appellant
carrying Remelyn toward the ipil-ipil grove. Given the 130-meter distance between the ipil-ipil grove and
the houses of appellant and of Amalia Loyola, appellant could have easily taken Remelyn from her house,
raped her at the ipil-ipil grove, and left her there, all in a matter of a few minutes. Sometime past 4:00 p.m.,
he could then have returned to his house, and together with Alex Loyola, proceeded to the COMELEC office
to register, and did all the subsequent acts he claims to have done.
The Court also notes the inconsistencies in the testimonies of Catalina and Loyola. The discrepancies in the
witnesses narration as to the time of arrival of appellant at the place where Catalina was gathering tuba, his
time of arrival at his own house, and the time when Loyola and appellant actually parted ways, are not mere
trivial details which could be forgotten by witnesses because of the passage of time. To make matters worse,
the appellants testimony was, at times, contradicted by his own witnesses. Particularly telling was the
conflict between appellants statement that Totong had already left his house on the night of 24 March 1997
and Totong and Catalinas own averments that Totong had stayed the night at appellants house. These
contradictory testimonies only made more incredulous appellants tale.
We now review the penalty of death imposed upon appellant. In the case at bar, the Information states that
appellant, by means of force and intimidationwillfully, unlawfully and feloniously (had) carnal knowledge
with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will to her damage and prejudice.[50] (emphasis ours) The
Information did not allege that Remelyn was below seven years old when she was violated. Appellant was
therefore charged with simple rape, under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law). Upon its passage, R.A. No. 7659 introduced seven new attendant
circumstances, which when present, will transform the crime to qualified rape, punishable by death. We
again stress that these new attendant circumstances must be properly pleaded in the information to justify the
imposition of the death penalty. The facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime for
which the accused stands charged and for which he must be tried.[51] The main purpose of requiring all the
elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. It
would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a
116
denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable
with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment
was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.[52]

We now review the damages awarded by the trial court. Time and again, we have ruled that when there is a
finding that rape had been committed, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory.[53] If the death
penalty has been imposed, the indemnity should be P75,000.00; otherwise the victim is entitled to
P50,000.00 for each count of rape.[54] Thus, the appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity to Remelyn Loyola.[55]

We affirm the award of moral damages. This is automatically awarded in rape cases without need of further
proof other than the commission of the crime, as it is assumed that a rape victim has suffered moral injuries
entitling her to such an award.[56]

We also find the award of exemplary damages made by the lower court in favor of complainant as proper
because complainant has been correctly granted moral damages and the offense against her was committed
with the aggravating circumstance[57] of age. However, the amount awarded must be reduced to P25,000.00
in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[58]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, of Digos, Davao del Sur
in Criminal Case No. 213(97) is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found guilty of the crime of simple rape,
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay to complainant Remelyn
Loyola the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

117