EVARISTO PAYNAGA, petitioner-appellee, vs. GEORGE N.

WOLFE, Warden of Bilibid

Prison, respondent-appellant.

Solicitor-General Araneta for appellant.

G.E. Campbell for appellee.

COOPER, J.:

The petitioner, Evaristo Paynaga, applied to the Hon. B.S. Ambler, judge of the Court of First Instance, for
a writ of habeas corpus, and states in his application that he is unlawfully detained and imprisoned by
George N. Wolfe, Warden of Bilibid Prison, in the city of Manila.chanrobles virtual law library

On the 5th day of January, 1898, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced by the Spanish authorities to
two years' imprisonment for the crime of desertion from the Spanish army. He made his escape on the
18th day of October, 1898, and was rearrested on the 20th day of January, 1903.chanrobles virtual law
library

The answer to the petition and the commitment show that the petitioner had been sentenced by ordinary
court-martial to two years' prision correccional militar and that he should commence to serve his sentence
on January 5, 1898.chanrobles virtual law library

The petitioner claims that he comes within the provisions of the proclamation of amnesty and pardon
issued by the President of the United States on the 4th day of July, 1902, and prays for his discharge
under the same.chanrobles virtual law library

The judge of the Court of First Instance, after hearing the case, decidd that the petitoner came within the
amnesty proclamation, and directed that, upon taking the oath of allegiance required by the proclamation,
he be discharged from custody.chanrobles virtual law library

An appeal has been taken by Government from this decision.chanrobles virtual law library

It is contended by counsel for the petitoner that Act No. 654, providing for appeals in habeas
corpus proceedngs, is in the nature of an ex post facto law, and that having been enacted subsequent to
petitioner's right to petition for habeas corpus, this appeal should not be entertained.chanrobles virtual
law library

In the decison of this court in the case of Frank Mekin vs. George N. Wolfe, rendered on the 27th of
March, 1903, 1this question was passed upon by this court, and it was there held that habeas corpus is a
civil proceeding brought to enforce a civil right, and is entirely distinct from the criminal proceedings under
which the prisoner has been tried and convicted, and that the doctrine off ex post facto law can not be
applied to the case.chanrobles virtual law library

The Amnesty Proclamation grants a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all persons in the Philippine
Archipelago who have pzrticipated in the insurrection against the authority and sovereignty of the
Kingdom of spain at divers times from August, 1896, until the cession of the Archipelago by that Kingdom
to the United States, and those engaged in the insurrection against the authority and sovereignty of the
United States, or who have given aid and copmfort to persons participating in said insurrection, "for the
offenses of treason or sedition, and for all offenses political in their character committed in the course of
such insurrection pursuant to orders issued by the civil, military, or insurrectionary authorities or wich
grew out of internal political feuds or dissensions between Filipinos and Spaniards or the Spanish
authorities or which resulted from internal political feuds or dissensions among the Filipinos themselves
during either of said insurrections."chanrobles virtual law library

There is no claim whatever that the defendant participated in either of these insurrections, nor that the
charcter of the offense for which he was convicted was of the nature embraced in the proclamation. He
was convicted of desertion, a violation of the laws pertaining to the military establishment of
spain.chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant clearly is not entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation.chanrobles virtual law
library

It is not a case of this Government trying and convicting a person charged with desertion from the
Spanish army. The defendant was convicted during the Spanish sovereignty of the offense of desertion,
and is simply serving out his sentence for that offense.chanrobles virtual law library

Article XII of the Treaty of Peace between the United States and spain provides that judgments rendered
in criminal matters before the date of the treaty "shall be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due
form by competent authority in the territory within which such judgment should be carried out."chanrobles
virtual law library

Under this clause of the treaty, it is incumbent upon this government to execute the judgment in this
case.chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment of the Court of First Instance directing the discharge of the prisoner from custody is
reversed and the petitioner is remanded to the custody of the respondent, to be kept in his charge until
the expiration of the term for which the petitioner has been sentenced.chanrobles virtual law library
G.R. No. L-29169 August 19, 1968

ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN OF THE CITY
JAIL OF MANILA, respondents.

Estanislao E. Fernandez and Fausto Arce for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary petitions invoking jurisdiction of this Court is
that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his
conviction1 he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. There is his prayer, too,
that, should he fail in this, he be granted the alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his
appeal to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law.

The indictment in the court below — the third amended information — upon which the judgment of conviction herein
challenged was rendered, was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle, one (1) Thunderbird car, Motor No. H9YH-143003,
with Plate No. H-16648 Pasay City '62 together with its accessories worth P22,200.00. Accused were the following:
Petitioner herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias"Ging" Pascual,
Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie
Doe and Paul Doe.2

Averred in the aforesaid information was that on or about the 14th day of November, 1962, in Quezon City, the accused
conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence and without the consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim, in
asporting the motor vehicle above-described.

Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been identified nor apprehended, pleaded not
guilty.1äwphï1.ñët

On July 23, 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon
City.

The trial opened with the following dialogue, which for the great bearing it has on this case, is here reproduced:.

COURT:

The parties may proceed.

FISCAL GRECIA:

Our first witness is Roger Chavez [one of the accused].

ATTY. CARBON [Counsel for petitioner Chavez]:

I am quite taken by surprise, as counsel for the accused Roger Chavez, with this move of the Fiscal in presenting
him as his witness. I object.

COURT:

On what ground, counsel? .

ATTY. CARBON:
On the ground that I have to confer with my client. It is really surprising that at this stage, without my being notified
by the Fiscal, my client is being presented as witness for the prosecution. I want to say in passing that it is only at
this very moment that I come to know about this strategy of the prosecution.

COURT (To the Fiscal):

You are not withdrawing the information against the accused Roger Chavez by making [him a] state witness?.

FISCAL GRECIA:

I am not making him as state witness, Your Honor.

I am only presenting him as an ordinary witness.

ATTY. CARBON:

As a matter of right, because it will incriminate my client, I object.

COURT:

The Court will give counsel for Roger Chavez fifteen minutes within which to confer and explain to his client about
the giving of his testimony.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT: [after the recess]

Are the parties ready? .

FISCAL:

We are ready to call on our first witness, Roger Chavez.

ATTY. CARBON:

As per understanding, the proceeding was suspended in order to enable me to confer with my client.

I conferred with my client and he assured me that he will not testify for the prosecution this morning after I have
explained to him the consequences of what will transpire.

COURT:

What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.

And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including the
accused.

If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection and
the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would
incriminate him.

Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which would
incriminate him.

But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witnessstand.

ATTY. CARBON:
I submit.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. CRUZ [Counsel for defendants Pascual and Meneses]: .

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

This incident of the accused Roger Chavez being called to testify for the prosecution is something so sudden that
has come to the knowledge of this counsel.

This representation has been apprised of the witnesses embraced in the information.

For which reason I pray this court that I be given at least some days to meet whatever testimony this witness will
bring about. I therefore move for postponement of today's hearing.

COURT:

The court will give counsel time within which to prepare his cross-examination of this witness.

ATTY. CRUZ:

I labored under the impression that the witnesses for the prosecution in this criminal case are those only listed in
the information.

I did not know until this morning that one of the accused will testify as witness for the prosecution.

COURT:

That's the reason why the court will go along with counsels for the accused and will give them time within which to
prepare for their cross-examination of this witness.

The court will not defer the taking of the direct examination of the witness.

Call the witness to the witness stand.

EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

ROGER CHAVEZ, 31 years old, single, buy and sell merchant, presently detained at the Manila Police
Department headquarters, after being duly sworn according to law, declared as follows:

ATTY. IBASCO [Counsel for defendant Luis Asistio]:

WITH THE LEAVE OF THE COURT:

This witness, Roger Chavez is one of the accused in this case No. Q-5311.

The information alleges conspiracy. Under Rule 123, Section 12, it states:

'The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.'

COURT:

That is premature, counsel. Neither the court nor counsels for the accused know what the prosecution
eventsto establish by calling this witness to the witness stand.
 ATTY. IBASCO:

I submit.

COURT: The Fiscal may proceed.3

And so did the trial proceed. It began with the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez by "Fiscal Grecia".

Came the judgment of February 1, 1965. The version of the prosecution as found by the court below may be briefly
narrated as follows:

A few days before November 12, 1962, Roger Chavez saw Johnson Lee, a Chinese, driving a Thunderbird car. With
Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor Romeo Vasquez) in mind, whom he knew was in the market for such a car, Chavez asked
Lee whether his car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively and left his address with Chavez. Then, on November 12,
Chavez met Sumilang at a barbershop informed him about the Thunderbird. But Sumilang said that he had changed his
mind about buying a new car. Instead, he told Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car for P10,000.00 to cover
an indebtedness in Pasay City. Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they went to see Luis Asistio, who he knew was lending
money on car mortgages and who, on one occasion, already lent Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00 on the same Buick car.
Asistio however told the two that he had a better idea on how to raise the money. His plan was to capitalize on Romeo
Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and, after the
deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person for a
profit. Chavez known to be a car agent was included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling
his Thunderbird. 1äwphï1.ñët

In the morning of November 14, Chavez telephoned Johnson Lee and arranged for an appointment. Sometime in the
afternoon. Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in his Thunderbird on Highway 54. Sumilang was introduced as the interested
buyer. Sumilang's driver inspected the car, took the wheel for a while. After Sumilang and Lee agreed on the purchase
price (P21.000.00), they went to Binondo to Johnson Lee's cousin, Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name the car was registered.
Thereafter, they went to see a lawyer notary public in Quezon City, known to Chavez for the drafting of the deed of sale.
After the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by Sumilang as the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok the vendor, and Sumilang's
driver and Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto.

As payment was to be made at Eugene's restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then drove in the Thunderbird car to that
place. The deed of sale and other papers remained in the pockets of Johnson Lee.

At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at the Dalisay Theater.
Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he
requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer. 4

Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who had left the table to pose for pictures with
some fans and come back, again left never to return. So did Chavez, who disappeared after he left on the pretext of
buying cigarettes. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place where the
Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the police. Much later, the NBI
recovered the already repainted car and impounded it.

Right after the meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant
at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf
set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On the 14th of November, the registration of the car was
transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan.

From the court's decision, Ricardo Sumilang's version, corroborated in part by Asistio, may be condensed as follows:

In the last week of September, 1962, Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a gas station. The latter informed him that there was
a Thunderbird from Clark Field for sale for a price between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00. Chavez said that it could be held
for him with a down payment of P10,000.00.

To raise this sum, Sumilang and Chavez, on October 1, went to the house of a certain Nena Hernaez de los Reyes who
wrote out a check for P5,000.00 as a loan to Sumilang. That check was exhibited in court. Sumilang and Chavez then
went to Pasay City to see a certain Mario Baltazar, an agent of the Pasay City Mayor, and Narsing Cailles, Chief of the
Fire Department. Sumilang asked the two for a P10,000-loan backed up by the P5,000.00-check aforesaid on condition
that it should not be cashed immediately as there were not enough funds therefor. Baltazar and Cailles agreed to give the
money the nextday as long as the check would be left with them and Sumilang would sign a promissory note for
P10,000.00. Baltazar later informed Sumilang that Chavez picked up the money the next day. Four or five days
afterwards, Chavez returned P4,000.00 to Sumilang because P6,000.00 was enough for the deposit. And so, Sumilang
gave back the P4,000.00 to Baltazar.

About the end of October or at the beginning of November, Chavez asked Sumilang for another P3,000.00. Sumilang sent
Chavez to Baltazar and Cailles, with a note requesting that they accommodate him once more. He also sent a check,
again without funds. Baltazar gave the money after verifying the authenticity of the note.

On November 14, Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news that the car was ready if Sumilang was ready with
the rest of the money. So Sumilang got P9,000.00 from his mother and another P4,000.00 from his aparador. He
immediately gave P6,000.00 to Chavez, intending to pay out the balance upon the car's delivery. It was then that Chavez
told Sumilang that the car was already bought by a Chinese who would be the vendor.

The purchase price finally agreed upon between Sumilang and Johnson Lee was P21,000.00, plus P500.00 agents
commission at the expense of the buyer. Sumilang told Lee that he already paid part of the price to Chavez.

At Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance. Sumilang accommodated. There, Sumilang, also saw a friend,
"Ging" Pascual. In the course of their conversation at the bar, Sumilang mentioned the proposed transaction thru Chavez.
Pascual warned that Chavez was a "smart" agent and advised that Sumilang should have a receipt for his money. A
certain Bimbo, a friend of Pascual, offered to make out a receipt for Chavez to sign.

After Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his fans, Bimbo showed him the receipt already
signed by Chavez. Sumilang requested Pascual and Bimbo to sign the receipt as witnesses. And they did. This receipt
was offered as an exhibit by the prosecution and by Sumilang.

When Sumilang was ready to leave Eugene's, Johnson Lee turned over to him the deed of sale, the registration papers
and the keys to the car. After shaking hands with Lee, Sumilang drove away in the car with his driver at the wheel.

Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his way to a film shooting at Bulacan. He saw
Asistio with many companions. Asistio liked his Thunderbird parked outside. Asistio offered to buy it from him for
P22,500.00. As the offer was good, and knowing Asistio's and his friends' reputation for always getting what they wanted,
Sumilang consented to the sale. Asistio tendered a down payment of P1,000.00; the balance he promised to pay the next
day after negotiating with some financing company. Before said balance could be paid, the car was impounded.

The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, strengthened by Baltazar's and Cailles' corroborations, that he paid
good money for the car. Sumilang was thus cleared. So was Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a mere buyer of
the car. And so, the prosecution's theory of conspiracy was discounted.

As to the other accused, the court found no case against Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita" and Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory".
The accused "Ging" Pascual was also acquitted for in the first place he was not identified by Johnson Lee in court.

As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. As a matter of
fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." 5 The trial court branded
him "a self-confessed culprit".6 The court further continued:

It is not improbable that true to the saying that misery loves company Roger Chavez tried to drag his co-accused
down with him by coloring his story with fabrications which he expected would easily stick together what with the
newspaper notoriety of one and the sensationalism caused by the other. But Roger Chavez' accusations of
Asistio's participation is utterly uncorroborated. And coming, as it does, from a man who has had at least two
convictions for acts not very different from those charged in this information, the Court would be too gullible if it
were to give full credence to his words even if they concerned a man no less notorious than himself.7

The trial court then came to the conclusion that if Johnson Lee was not paid for his car, he had no one but Roger Chavez
to blame.
The sum of all these is that the trial court freed all the accused except Roger Chavez who was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of not
less than ten (10) years, one (1) day, as minimum and not more than fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day as maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. The
Thunderbird car then in the custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo Sumilang, who was directed to
return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless the latter chose to pay P21,500.00, representing the balance of the contract
price for the car.

The foregoing sentence was promulgated on March 8, 1965. Roger Chavez appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On April 18, 1968, the Court of Appeals required Atty. Natividad Marquez, counsel for Roger Chavez, to show cause
within ten days from notice why Chavez' appeal should not be considered abandoned and dismissed. Reason for this is
that said lawyer received notice to file brief on December 28, 1967 and the period for the filing thereof lapsed on January
27, 1968 without any brief having been filed.

On May 13, 1968, Atty. Marquez registered a detailed written explanation. She also stated that if she were allowed to file
appellant's brief she would go along with the factual findings of the court below but will show however that its conclusion is
erroneous.8

On May 14, 1968, the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing explanation, resolved to dismiss the appeal. A move to
reconsider was unavailing. For, on June 21, 1968, the Court of Appeals, through a per curiam resolution, disposed to
maintain its May 14 resolution dismissing the appeal, directed the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by
virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to turn him over to Muntinlupa Bilibid Prisons pending
execution of the judgment below, and ordered remand of the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment.

It was at this stage that the present proceedings were commenced in this Court.

Upon the petitions, the return, and the reply, and after hearing on oral arguments, we now come to grips with the main
problem presented.

We concentrate attention on that phase of the issues which relates petitioner's assertion that he was compelled to testify
against himself. For indeed if this one question is resolved in the affirmative, we need not reach the others; in which case,
these should not be pursued here.

1. Petitioner's plea on this score rests upon his averment, with proof, of violation of his right — constitutionally entrenched
— against self-incrimination. He asks that the hand of this Court be made to bear down upon his conviction; that he be
relieved of the effects thereof. He asks us to consider the constitutional injunction that "No person shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself,"9 fully echoed in Section 1, Rule 115, Rules of Court where, in all criminal prosecutions, the
defendant shall be entitled: "(e) To be exempt from being a witness against himself." .

It has been said that forcing a man to be a witness against himself is at war with "the fundamentals of a republican
government"; 10 that [i]t may suit the purposes of despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of political
liberty and personal freedom."11 Mr. Justice Abad Santos recounts the historical background of this constitutional
inhibition, thus: " "The maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and
manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which has long obtained in the continental system, and, until
the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers for the protection of the
people against the exercise of arbitrary power, was not uncommon even in England. While the admissions of confessions
of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an
accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the
questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press, the witness unduly, to browbeat him if
he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident
in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the
system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that
particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the
courts in a popular demand. But, however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American
jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American
colonists that the states, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their
fundamental law, so that a maxim which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the
impregnability of a constitutional enactment." (Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S., 591, 597; 40 Law. ed., 819, 821)." 12 Mr.
Justice Malcolm, in expressive language, tells us that this maxim was recognized in England in the early days "in a revolt
against the thumbscrew and the rack." 13 An old Philippine case [1904] 14 speaks of this constitutional injunction as "older
than the Government of the United States"; as having "its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of
interrogating the accused person"; and as having been adopted in the Philippines "to wipe out such practices as formerly
prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to judicial examinations, and to give testimony regarding
the offenses with which they were charged."

So it is then that this right is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the
court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; 15 it is fundamental to our scheme of
justice. Just a few months ago, the Supreme Court of the United States (January 29, 1968), speaking thru Mr. Justice
Harlan warned that "[t]he constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent
and foresighted." 16

It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with unconcern. To repeat, it is
mandatory; it secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right. Tañada and Fernando (Constitution of the
Philippines, 4th ed., vol. I, pp. 583-584) take note of U.S. vs. Navarro, supra, which reaffirms the rule that the
constitutional proscription was established on broad grounds of public policy and humanity; of policy because it would
place the witness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury, and of humanity because it would be to extort a
confession of truth by a kind of duress every species and degree of which the law abhors. 17

Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a
court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the
crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to
remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine
will.

Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of
unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational
choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to
force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." 18

2. With the foregoing as guideposts, we now turn to the facts. Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case. He was called
by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner
objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened by the clear cut statement that he will not
testify. But petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to
ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that defense counsel "could not object to
have the accused called on the witness stand." The cumulative impact of all these is that accused-petitioner had to take
the stand. He was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. The foregoing situation molds a solid case
for petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the law, and jurisprudence.

Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may
be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot
at him, 19 and accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. 20 For,
in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. 21 The rule positively
intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence
necessary for his conviction." 22 This rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial.23

And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall not be compelled to furnish
evidence against himself "is not the probability of the evidence but it is the capability of abuse." 24 Thus it is, that it was
undoubtedly erroneous for the trial judge to placate petitioner with these words:.

What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.

And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including the
accused.

If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection and
the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would
incriminate him.
 Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which would
incriminate him.

But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand.

Paraphrasing Chief Justice Marshall in Aaron Burr's Trial, Robertsons Rep. I, 208, 244, quoted in VIII Wigmore, p.
355, 25 While a defendant's knowledge of the facts remains concealed within his bosom, he is safe; but draw it from
thence, and he is exposed" — to conviction.

The judge's words heretofore quoted — "But surely counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness
stand" — wielded authority. By those words, petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him of his will to
resist; they foreclosed choice; the realities of human nature tell us that as he took his oath to tell the truth, the whole truth
and nothing but the truth, no genuine consent underlay submission to take the witness stand. Constitutionally sound
consent was absent.

3. Prejudice to the accused for having been compelled over his objections to be a witness for the People is at once
apparent. The record discloses that by leading questions Chavez, the accused, was made to affirm his statement given to
the NBI agents on July 17, 1963 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 26 And this statement detailed the plan and execution
thereof by Sumilang (Vasquez), Asistio and himself to deprive the Chinese of his Thunderbird car. And he himself
proceeded to narrate the same anew in open court. He identified the Thunderbird car involved in the case. 27

The decision convicting Roger Chavez was clearly of the view that the case for the People was built primarily around the
admissions of Chavez himself. The trial court described Chavez as the "star witness for the prosecution". Indeed, the
damaging facts forged in the decision were drawn directly from the lips of Chavez as a prosecution witness and of course
Ricardo Sumilang for the defense. There are the unequivocal statements in the decision that "even accused Chavez"
identified "the very same Thunderbird that Johnson Lee had offered for sale"; that Chavez "testimony as witness for the
prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that Chavez is "a self-confessed culprit". 1äwphï1.ñët

4. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of
his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the
stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being
called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury or being
put under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him. His testimony is not of his own choice. To him it
was a case of compelled submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the
power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape testifying. The court made it
abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be taken right then and thereon the first day of the
trial.

It matters not that, after all efforts to stave off petitioner's taking the stand became fruitless, no objections to questions
propounded to him were made. Here involve is not a mere question of self-incrimination. It is a defendant's constitutional
immunity from being called to testify against himself. And the objection made at the beginning is a continuing
one. 1äwphï1.ñët

There is therefore no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently,
understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After a
claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain evidence." 28 The teaching
in Johnson vs. Zerbst 29 is this: "It has been pointed out that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver"
of fundamental constitutional rights and that we "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." A
waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Renuntiatio non
praesumitur.

The foregoing guidelines, juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky
defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the
privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection - even to the guilty. 30

5. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. 31 It is traditionally considered as
an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional
rights are disregarded. 32 Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction 33 and therefore invalidates the trial and
the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. 34 That void judgment of conviction may
be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. 35 This writ may issue even if another
remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. 36Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal
before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. 37 The writ may be granted upon a judgment already
final. 38 For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, 39 the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally
given effect 40 so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that
case, involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:

Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the assistance of Counsel,
compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a Federal Court's
authority. When this right is properly waived, the assistance of Counsel is no longer a necessary element of the
Court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence. If the accused, however, is not represented by Counsel
and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a
jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his liberty. A court's jurisdiction at the
beginning of trial may be lost "in the course of the proceedings" due to failure to complete the court — as the
Sixth Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not
intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth
Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereundermay obtain release of habeas
corpus. 41

Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of
disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly
provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

Just as we are about to write finis to our task, we are prompted to restate that: "A void judgment is in legal effect no
judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded
upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it
are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. ... " 42

6. Respondents' return 43 shows that petitioner is still serving under a final and valid judgment of conviction for another
offense. We should guard against the improvident issuance of an order discharging a petitioner from confinement. The
position we take here is that petitioner herein is entitled to liberty thru habeas corpus only with respect to Criminal Case
Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, under which he was prosecuted and convicted.

Upon the view we take of this case, judgment is hereby rendered directing the respondent Warden of the City Jail of
Manila or the Director of Prisons or any other officer or person in custody of petitioner Roger Chavez by reason of the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in Criminal Case Q-5311, entitled "People of the
Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Ricardo Sumilang, et al., accused," to discharge said Roger Chavez from custody, unless he is
held, kept in custody or detained for any cause or reason other than the said judgment in said Criminal Case Q-5311 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in which event the discharge herein directed shall be effected
when such other cause or reason ceases to exist.

No costs. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur. Castro, J., concurs in a
separate opinion.

Separate Opinions

CASTRO, J., dissenting :

In 1901, early in the history of constitutional government in this country, this Court reversed the conviction of an accused
who, having pleaded "not guilty," was required by the judge to testify and answer the complaint. The case was that
of United States v. Junio, reported in the first volume of the Philippine Reports, on page 50 thereof.
Resolution of the case did not require an extended opinion (it consumed no more than a page in the Reports). For indeed
the facts fitted exactly into the prohibition contained in The President's Instruction to the (Second) Philippine
Commission1 "that no person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.".

There was no need either for a dissertation on the Rights of Man, though occasion for this was not lacking as the
predominant American members of the Court were under a special commission to prepare the Filipinos for self-
government. The privilege against self-incrimination was fully understood by the Filipinos, whose own history provided the
necessary backdrop for this privilege. 2

The Supreme Court simply said, "The judge had no right to compel the accused to make any statement whatever," and
declared the proceedings void.

Nor was there a similar judicial error likely to be committed in the years to come, what with the constant reminder of a Bill
of Rights enshrined in successive organic acts intended for the Philippines. 3 This is not to say that the Philippine history of
the privilege ended with the Junio case. To be sure, violations of the privilege took other, and perhaps subtle, forms 4 but
not the form directly prohibited by the privilege. Even in the recent case of Cabal v. Kapunan5 it was assumed as a
familiar learning that the accused in a criminal case cannot be required to give testimony and that if his testimony is
needed at all against his co-accused, he must first be discharged.6 If Cabal, the respondent in an administrative case, was
required by an investigating committee to testify, it was because it was thought that proceedings for forfeiture of illegally
acquired property under Republic Act 13797 were civil and not criminal in nature. Thus Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice)
Concepcion could confidently say:

At the outset, it is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse not only to answer incriminatory
questions but also to take the witness stand. (3 Whartons Criminal Evidence, pp. 1959-1960; 98 C.J.S., p. 264).
Hence, the issue before us boils down to whether or not the proceedings before the aforementioned Committee is
civil or criminal in character.

Today, perhaps because of long separation from our past, we need what Holmes called "education in the obvious, more
than investigation of the obscure."8 The past may have receded so far into the distance that our perspectives may have
been altered and our vision blurred.

When the court in the case at bar required the petitioner to testify, it in effect undid the libertarian gains made over half a
century and overturned the settled law. The past was recreated with all its vividness and all its horrors: John Lilburne in
England in 1637, refusing to testify before the Council of the Star Chamber and subsequently condemned by it to be
whipped and pilloried for his "boldness in refusing to take a legal oath;"9 the Filipino priests Gomez, Burgos and Zamora in
1872 condemned by the Inquisition to die by their own testimony. 10

It is for this reason that I deem this occasion important for the expression of my views on the larger question of
constitutional dimension.

No doubt the constitutional provision that "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself" 11 may, on
occasion, save a guilty man from his just deserts, but it is aimed against a more far reaching evil — recurrence of the
Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality. Prevention of the greater evil was deemed of more
importance than occurrence of the lesser evil. 12 As Dean Griswold put the matter with eloquence:.

[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized
... [W]e do not make even the most hardened criminal sign his own death warrant, or dig his own grave, or pull the
lever that springs the trap on which he stands. We have through the course of history developed considerable
feeling of the dignity and intrinsic importance of the individual man. Even the evil man is a human being. 13

The Government must thus establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured; it can not by coercion prove a
charge against an accused out of his own mouth. 14

This is not what was done here. What was done here was to force the petitioner to take the witness stand and state his
part in the crime charged as "star witness for the prosecution," to use the very words of the decision, and, by means of his
testimony, prove his guilt. Thus, the trial court said in its decision:

Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as a witness for the prosecution
establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The petitioner has been variously described by the trial court as "a car agent ... well versed in this kind of chicanery" "a
self-confessed culprit," and "a man with at least two convictions for acts not very different from those charged in [the]
information." But if he has thus been described it was on the basis of evidence wrung from his lips. If he was ultimately
found guilty of the charge against him it was because of evidence which he was forced to give. In truth he was made the
"star witness for the prosecution" against himself.

But neither torture nor an oath nor the threat of punishment such as imprisonment for contempt can be used to compel
him to provide the evidence to convict himself. No matter how evil he is, he is still a human being.

The fact that the judgment of conviction became final with the dismissal of the appeal to the Court of Appeals for failure of
the petitioner's former counsel to file a brief,15 is of no moment. That judgment is void, and it is precisely the abiding
concern of the writ of habeas corpus to provide redress for unconstitutional and wrongful convictions. Vindication of due
process, it has been well said, is precisely the historic office of the Great Writ. 16

In many respects, this case is similar to that of Fay v. Noia. 17 Noia was convicted of murder in 1942 with Santo Caminito
and Frank Bonino in the County Court of Kings County, New York, in the killing of one Hemmeroff during the commission
of a robbery. The sole evidence against each defendant was his signed confession. Caminito and Bonino, but not Noia
appealed their convictions to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. These appeals were unsuccessful
but subsequent legal proceedings resulted in the releases of Caminito and Bonino upon findings that their confessions
had been coerced and their conviction therefore procured in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although Noia's
confession was found to have been coerced, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that, because of Noia's failure to appeal, he must be denied reliefin view of the provision of 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254 that "An
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not
be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State. ..." The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court and ordered Noia's conviction set
aside, with direction to discharge him from custody unless given a new trial forthwith. From that judgment the State
appealed.

As the Supreme Court of the United States phrased the issue, the "narrow question is whether the respondent Noia may
be granted federal habeas corpus relief from imprisonment under a New York conviction now admitted by the State to rest
upon a confession obtained from him in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, after he was denied state post-conviction
relief because the coerced confession claim had been decided against him at the trial and Noia had allowed the time for a
direct appeal to lapse without seeking review by a state appellate court."

In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Brennan, spoke
in enduring language that may well apply to the case of Roger Chavez. Said the Court: 1äwphï1.ñët

Today as always few indeed is the number of State prisoners who eventually win their freedom by means of
federal habeas corpus. These few who are ultimately successful are persons whom society has grievously
wronged and for whom belated liberation is little enough compensation. Surely no fair minded person will contend
that those who have been deprived of their liberty without due process of law ought nevertheless to languish in
prison. Noia, no less than his co-defendants Caminito and Bonino, is conceded to have been the victim of
unconstitutional state action. Noia's case stands on its own; but surely no just and humane legal system can
tolerate a result whereby a Caminito and a Bonino are at liberty because their confessions were found to have
been coerced yet Noia, whose confession was also coerced, remains in jail for life. For such anomalies, such
affronts to the conscience of a civilized society, habeas corpus is predestined by its historical role in the struggle
for personal liberty to be the ultimate remedy. If the States withhold effective remedy, the federal courts have the
power and the duty to provide it. Habeas Corpus is one of the precious heritages of Anglo-American civilization.
We do no more today than confirm its continuing efficacy.

A fitting conclusion of this separate opinion may perhaps be found in two memorable admonitions from Marjorie G.
Fribourg and Justice William O. Douglas.

Mrs. Fribourg, in her inimitable phrase, warns us that —

... Time has taught its age-old lesson. Well-meaning people burnt witches. Well-meaning prosecutors have
convicted the innocent. Well-meaning objectives espoused by those not grounded in history can lure us from
protecting our heritage of equal justice under the law. They can entice us, faster than we like to believe, into
endangering our liberties.18
And these are the unforgettable words of Justice Douglas:

The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy our system of
government, but from men of goodwill - good men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that
what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.

xxx xxx xxx

The motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is that preservation of
liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppressor be a
reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is constant alertness to infractions of the
guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment
makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one. 1äwphï1.ñët

xxx xxx xxx

The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.

xxx xxx xxx

In short, the liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.

But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because we belong to a group
that is important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less
fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must observe.
IN THE MATTER OF THE G.R. No. 167193
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
Present:

PUNO,* J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,**
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
ENGR. ASHRAF KUNTING,
Petitioner. Promulgated:

April 19, 2006

x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan and
General Robert Delfin,[1] Philippine National Police (PNP) Intelligence Chief, to bring petitioner Ashraf Kunting before this Court and
show cause why he is illegally detained.

The antecedents are as follows:

On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal Security Act. On
June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task
Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City, Basilan, Branch 2, Ninth
Judicial Region. Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC under
separate Amended Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3674-1187, 3537-1129, 3608-1164, and 3611-1165.

Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp Crame for booking and custodial
investigation.

In a letter dated July 3, 2003, Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Jr., Police Superintendent and Chief of the Legal Affairs Division,
PNP-IG, informed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already in the custody of the PNP-IG.
Atty. Danipog requested for Kuntings temporary detention at the PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City due to the high security risks
involved and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding commitment order.

In a letter dated July 9, 2003, Emilio F. Enriquez, Acting Clerk of Court of the RTC, replied to the request of Atty. Danipog,
thus:

xxx

The undersigned referred the matter to Hon. Danilo M. Bucoy, Presiding Judge of this Court, who issued
the Alias Warrant of Arrest in the herein mentioned case (Criminal Case No. 3674-1187) and per his instruction,
accused As[h]raf Kunting y Barreto [may be] temporarily detained thereat by virtue of the Alias Warrant of Arrest
issued in this case, however considering that the accused is a high security risk, he should be brought
to Isabela, Basilan as soon as the necessary security escort can be provided for his transfer, where the proper
commitment order can be issued as the herein mentioned case is about to be submitted by the prosecution.

Thank you ever so much for your usual cooperation extended to the Court.[2]

On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division,
PNP-IG, to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation.

On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo,
Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of the venue of the trial
from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons: (1) Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG
stating that utmost effort will be exerted by the Abu SayyafGroup (ASG) to recover the custody of Kunting from the PNP considering
his importance to the ASG; and (2) there is a big possibility that Kuntingmay be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained
in Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of the ASG.
On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision against petitioners co-accused in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos.
3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165, finding 17 of the accused, who were tried, guilty of the crime/s charged.

On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying KuntingsMotion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation since the
PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent
and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to turn over Kunting to the court.
In a letter dated February 22, 2005, Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan reiterated the request to Chief State
Prosecutor JovencitoR. Zuo to facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of Kuntings case, citing the same grounds in the previous
letter. He added that if Kunting had been transferred to Isabela City, Basilan, he could have been one of the escapees in a jail break
that occurred on April 10, 2004 as suspected ASG members were able to go scot-free.

On March 15, 2005, Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, filed with the RTC a
Motion to Defer Implementation of the Order dated February 11, 2005, citing, among other grounds, the existence of a pending
motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial of Criminal Case No. 3537-1129 against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the
DOJ before this Court. Police Inspector Barbasaprayed that the Order of the RTC dated February 11, 2005, directing the turnover
of Kunting to the court, be suspended until the motion for the transfer of venue is resolved.

On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Kunting stated that he
has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by Police Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and assisted
by PNP Intelligence Chief, General Robert Delfin. He alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against him until he
requested his family to research in Zamboanga City. It was discovered in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared in
the list of accused who allegedly participated in the kidnapping incident which occurred on June 2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan.

Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he promptly filed an Urgent Motion for
Reinvestigation on

September 8, 2003. He was aware that the PNP-IG requested Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo for representation to file a
motion with this Court for the transfer of venue of his case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. Having no further information on
the status of his case, he filed a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation on January 26, 2005. He stated that since no action
was taken by the trial court or the DOJ, he filed this petition to put an end to his illegal detention classified in the records as for
safekeeping purposes only.

The main issue is whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to all case of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person,[3] and if found
illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee. [4] If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpusproceedings
terminate.[5]

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall
not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in
the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. [6]

In this case, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue
of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-
IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court.

Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case
Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be
issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals[7] holds that
once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.

Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Order dated February 11, 2005 reiterated its Order dated September 15,
2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, to turn
over Kunting to the court. TThe trial court has been waiting for two years for the PNP-IG to turn over the person of Kunting for the
trial of his case. The PNP-IG has delayed the turn over because it is waiting for the DOJ to request for the transfer of venue of the trial
of the case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. In the absence of evidence that the DOJ has indeed filed a motion for the transfer
of venue, In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General stated that the PNP-IG is presently awaiting the resolution of the Motion
for Transfer of Venue it requested from the DOJ. In this regard, t the Police Chief Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take
positive steps towards action on said motion.comply with the Order of the trial court, dated February 11, 2005, to turn over the body
of petitioner Kunting to the trial court..

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(On Leave)
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chairperson
Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
 FIRST DIVISION

MARTIN GIBBS FLETCHER, UDK-14071

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU

OF CORRECTIONS or his
representative,
Respondent. Promulgated:
July 17, 2009

x---------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

Petitioner Martin Gibbs Fletcher seeks his release from prison in this petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. He claims
that his prison sentence of 12 to 17 years was commuted by then President Fidel V. Ramos to nine to 12 years. Since he had already
served 14 years, three months and 12 days, including his good conduct allowance, his continued imprisonment is illegal. [1]

In its return to the writ, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posited that the petition should be denied for failure to comply with
Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. In particular, the petition was neither signed nor verified by petitioner or a person on his
behalf or by his purported counsel. Moreover, it was not accompanied by a copy of the cause of petitioners detention or commitment
order.

The OSG further opposed the issuance of the writ on the following grounds: petitioners prison sentence was never commuted by then
President Ramos; he had not been granted the status of a colonist; there were other pending cases against him warranting his continued
detention[2] and he was put under custody by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
We disagree with the OSG insofar as it argues that the petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court. Strict compliance with the technical requirements for a habeas corpus petition as provided in the Rules of Court
may be dispensed with where the allegations in the application are sufficient to make out a case for habeas corpus. In Angeles v.
Director of New Bilibid Prison,[3] we held that the formalities required for petitions for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally. The
petition for the writ is required to be verified but the defect in form is not fatal.[4] Indeed, in the landmark case of Villavicencio v.
Lukban,[5] this Court declared that it is the duty of a court to issue the writ if there is evidence that a person is unjustly restrained of his
liberty within its jurisdiction even if there is no application therefor. So long as this Court sits, technicality cannot trump
liberty. Therefore, a petition which is deficient in form, such as petitioners petition-letter in this case, may be entertained so long as its
allegations sufficiently make out a case for habeas corpus.[6]

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint.[7] The writ exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom.[8]

Where the restraint of liberty is allegedly authored by the State, the very entity tasked to ensure the liberty of all persons (citizens and
aliens alike) within its jurisdiction, courts must be vigilant in extending the habeas corpus remedy to one who invokes it. To strictly
restrict the great writ of liberty to technicalities not only defeats the spirit that animates the writ but also waters down the precious
right that the writ seeks to protect, the right to liberty. To dilute the remedy that guarantees protection to the right is to negate the right
itself. Thus, the Court will not unduly confine the writ of habeas corpus in the prison walls of technicality. Otherwise, it will betray its
constitutional mandate to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. [9]

Nonetheless, we agree with the OSG that petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of the writ.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty.[10] However, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
 Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment,
or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything
in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)

Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient
cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid
judgment.[11]
It is undisputed that petitioner was convicted of estafa in Criminal Case No. 95-995.[12] On June 24, 1996, he was sentenced
to imprisonment of 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal as maximum, with
payment of actual damages of P102,235.56.[13]

Based on petitioners prison records,[14] he began serving his sentence on July 24, 1997. He claims that after having served
good conduct time allowance for 14 years, three months and 12 days, [15] he should now be released from prison.

We disagree.

A convict may be released on parole after serving the minimum period of his sentence. However, the pendency of another
criminal case is a ground for the disqualification of such convict from being released on parole. [16] Unfortunately, petitioner is again
on trial in Criminal Case No. 94-6988 for estafa.[17] The case was filed as early as 1996 but he wasarraigned only on October 6, 2008.
He pleaded not guilty to the charge against him. Pre-trial was set on January 26, 2009.[18] Clearly, he is disqualified from being
released on parole and consequently must serve out the entirety of his sentence.

We note the issuance of a warrant for petitioners arrest on March 8, 1996, the date he was first set for arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 94-6988. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ cannot be issued and petitioner cannot be
discharged since he has been charged with another criminal offense. [19] His continued detention is without doubt warranted under the
circumstances.

Petitioner asserts that his sentence in Criminal Case No. 95-995 was commuted by then President Ramos. However, he
presented no proof of such commutation. Other than indorsements by the Chief Justice,[20]Public Attorneys Office[21] and
Undersecretary of the Department of Justice,[22] no document purporting to be the commutation of his sentenceby then President
Ramos was attached in his petition and in his subsequent missives to this Court. His barren claim of commutation therefore deserves
scant consideration, lest we be accused of usurping the Presidents sole prerogative to commute petitioners sentence in Criminal Case
No. 95-995.[23]

Having established that petitioners continued imprisonment is by virtue of a valid judgment and court process, we see no
need to discuss petitioners other arguments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25899 November 29, 1969

LOURDES ZACARIAS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FERNANDO A. CRUZ, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan Branch and HON. BENJAMIN AQUINO,
Provincial Fiscal, Province of Rizal, respondents.

Juan T. David for petitioner.

Benjamin H. Aquino for and in his own behalf as respondent.
Assistant Provincial Carlos Goco for other respondent.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Petitioner Lourdes Zacarias seeks, by the present petition for habeas corpus, to nullify respondent judge's order of arrest
issued against her in Criminal Case C-1320 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan Branch. Her ground is that
respondent judge issued the same without personally examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and the
witnesses in said case in alleged violation of Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution.

Concededly, the order of arrest issued on January 24, 1966 by respondent judge was upon a criminal information for
estafa filed in court against petitioner following a preliminary investigation conducted by respondent fiscal.

If only for the reasons that follow, the petition should be dismissed. She is at liberty upon a P10,000-bail bond. She has
heretofore pleaded to the information.

Posting of a bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest of a person, 1 estops him from discussing
the validity of his arrest.2 In the recent case of Luna vs. Plaza (1968), 26 SCRA 310, 321-322, our ruling is that where
petitioner has filed an application for bail and waived the preliminary investigation proper, "he had waived his objection to
whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination conducted . . . prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest."3 It
makes eminent sense to say that an accused in a criminal case who is at liberty on bail and who had thus secured by
judicial decree release which the high prerogative writ of habeas corpus is intended to afford, may no longer avail of that
remedy.

And then, nothing in the record suggests that petitioner herein ever moved to quash the information upon the ground that
by the defective arrest the court acquired no jurisdiction over her person. And again, she is deemed to have waived lack
of jurisdiction over her person.4

There is the other fact that petitioner has already entered a plea of not guilty to the information charging her with estafa.
She is deemed to have foregone her right to preliminary investigation and to have abandoned her right to question any
irregularity that surrounds it. By now, this is settled law. 5

To be underscored here is that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of a criminal
information, does not otherwise render it defective, does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case. 6

WHEREFORE, the petition for the writ of habeas corpus is denied; the respondent judge's order of arrest here complained
of is hereby affirmed; and petitioner's prayer to restrain respondents judge and fiscal from further proceeding with Criminal
Case C-1320 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan Branch, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus
Lourdes F. Zacarias, Accused," is likewise denied.

Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents.Mesm

[G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000]

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA

ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in
conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal
dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by[1]

which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. Slx
[2]

"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to
produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause
of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge
awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf."
[3]

It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of which is the
liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. It is issued when one
[4]

is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising legal custody over another
person. [5]

The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio is to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
[6] [7]

its resolution dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her
[8]

husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife.

On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio is to annul that portion of the
[9]

decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband
and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.

The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx

Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.

Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at

millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board
and President of Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived
together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for
undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City
when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in
Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.

Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55);
Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and
Shereen (age 39).

On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he stayed with
Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin),
alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead
of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As
a consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated.

On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a
petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the
[10]

latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.

On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio
did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. Slxsc

On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to
have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents refused
[11]

petitioners demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from
returning to Antipolo City.

After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision the dispositive
portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, judgment is hereby

rendered:

"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioners

manifestation, respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap,
the administrator of Cleveland Condominium or anywhere in its place, his
guards and Potenciano Ilusorios staff especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to
allow visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorios wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her
children, notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, under penalty of
contempt in case of violation of refusal thereof; xxx

"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued be recalled
and the herein petition for habeas corpus be DENIED DUE COURSE, as it is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of
the petition.
 "SO ORDERED." [12]

Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly decided.

As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled
[13]

thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of

his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are
not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally
valid has later become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
[14]

relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. Jksm
[15]

The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner
of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.[16]

To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
[17]

effective, not merely nominal or moral. [18]

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not
necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age
or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on
his liberty.

The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the
administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from
seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to seeing them.

As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that he was
of sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of
the court.

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this
case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live
with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are
choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of
Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that
declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the
findings of the Court of Appeals.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not
be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of
his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional
right. Es m

The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition
for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not
consistent with the finding of subjects sanity.

When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same
shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such
assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.

The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to
visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to
see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty
attached to the exercise of his right.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpuscarried out by
sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is
best left to the man and womans free choice.

WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit.
No costs.

In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of the Court
of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Ilusorio vs Bildner
Ilusorio vs. Bildner

GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For
many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda
Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant),
Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati
every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the
other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The
children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latter’s
health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and
property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May
1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of
his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited
Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

HELD:

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an
illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective
not merely nominal or moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would
justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily
render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity
having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will
be deprived of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband.
In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or
any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.
 SECOND DIVISION

HERALD BLACK DACASIN, G.R. No. 168785

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.

SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, Promulgated:

Respondent. February 5, 2010
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

For review[1]is a dismissal[2]of a suit to enforce a post-foreign divorce child custody agreement for lack of jurisdiction.

The Facts

Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in
Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and
obtained from the Circuit Court, 19thJudicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner.[3] In its
ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and
retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.

On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement [4]) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The
parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to
obtain from the Illinois court an order relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts.

In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement.
Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.

Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois courts retention of
jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondents motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The
trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to
enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on
petitioner following the nationality rule prevailing in this jurisdiction; [5]and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035,
paragraph 5 of the Civil Code[6]prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction.[7]

Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree obtained by respondent is void. Thus, the
divorce decree is no bar to the trial courts exercise of jurisdiction over the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that unlike in the case of respondent, the divorce
decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his nationality.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the validity of the Agreement to justify its enforcement by the trial court: (1)
the Agreement novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms of child custody from sole (maternal) to joint;[8]or (2) the
Agreement is independent of the divorce decree obtained by respondent.

The Issue

The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint
custody of the parties child.

The Ruling of the Court

The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioners suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual and
equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioners suit and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of
Stephanies custody.

Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction

to Enforce Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on
Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. [9]An action for specific
performance, such as petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions. [10]Thus,
jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.

Indeed, the trial courts refusal to entertain petitioners suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its
thinking that the Illinois courts divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court
retained was jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for
Dissolution.[11]Petitioners suit seeks the enforcement not of the various provisions of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce
Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois courts so-called retained jurisdiction.

Petitioners Suit Lacks Cause of Action

The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is contrary to law.

In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the minimum ban on
stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. [12]Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence,
deemed inexistent and void from the beginning.[13]For lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary
Philippine substantive law serve as default parameters to testthe validity of the Agreements joint child custody stipulations.[14]
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years
old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the laws of the
United States because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in
law[15] (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother x x x.[16] (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody [17]to the mother is mandatory,[18]grounded on
sound policy consideration,[19]subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here. [20]) Clearly then, the Agreements object
to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old
contravenes Philippine law.

The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she
refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because
the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together. [21]However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother
takes sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law
suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within
this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to take care of
the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in
the Family Code on the maternal custody of children below seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who
is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a
child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime
under the second paragraph of Article 213.[22]

It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to judicial custodial
agreements based on its text that No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. To limit this provisions enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while placing private
agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children under seven years old of separated
parents. This effectively empowers separated parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative policy
vesting to the separated mother sole custody of her children under seven years of age to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen
her baby torn away from her.[23]This ignores the legislative basis that [n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is
deprived of her child of tender age.[24]

It could very well be that Article 213s bias favoring one separated parent (mother) over the other (father) encourages
paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental custody, robs the parents of custodial options, or hijacks decision-making
between the separated parents.[25]However, these are objections which question the laws wisdom not its validity or uniform
enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At any rate, the rules seeming
harshness or undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such as granting the father
visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under the second
paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the mother final authority on the care and custody of the minor under seven years
of age, in case of disagreements.

Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting only until the childs
seventh year. From the eighth year until the childs emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual
contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that petitioner and respondent are
not barred from entering into the Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting
sole custody over Stephanie. Respondents act effectively brought the parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in the
second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on respondent sole custody of Stephanie.

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decrees alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that
the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse [26]- to support the Agreements
enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v.
Romillo[27]settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. [28]There, we
dismissed the alien divorcees Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission
that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage.

xxxx

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied)

We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera[29]to dismiss criminal complaints for adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who
obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse because he no longer qualified as offended spouse entitled to
file the complaints under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as much
validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the aliens nationality, irrespective of
who obtained the divorce.

The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding

Justify Remand

Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioners suit, the logical end to its lack of cause of action, we remand the case for the trial court
to settle the question of Stephanies custody. Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the
mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default standard on child custody
proceedings the best interest of the child.[30]As the question of custody is already before the trial court and the childs parents,
by executing the Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the interest of swift and efficient
rendition of justice to allow the parties to take advantage of the courts jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial
arrangement best serving Stephanies interest, and let the trial court render judgment. This disposition is consistent with
the settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the childs best interest. [31]

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60.
The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO G.R. No. 182165

CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS
ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO Present:
BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO
DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, PUNO, CJ,
ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO CARPIO,
PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. CORONA*
MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. CARPIO MORALES,
DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO CHICO-NAZARIO,
L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO VELASCO, JR.,*
ESGUERRA, TISOY, and JOHN NACHURA,
DOES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
Petitioners, BRION,
PERALTA,*
BERSAMIN,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON

T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. Promulgated:
CRUZ,
Respondents. November 25, 2009

X--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.

Petitioners[1], employees and members of the local police force of the City Government of Malolos, challenge the March 28, 2008
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Branch 10 in a petition for issuance of writs of amparo and habeas
data instituted by respondents.

The factual antecedents.

Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated
at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of
Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects.

The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before the then Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan.

By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz, which judgment, following its affirmance
by the RTC, became final and executory.
The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused to vacate the property. They thereupon
filed cases against the Province[2] and the judges who presided over the case. [3] Those cases were dismissed except their petition for
annulment of judgment lodged before Branch 18 of the RTC of Malolos, and a civil case forinjunction 833-M-2004 lodged before
Branch 10 of the same RTC Malolos.
The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction to prevent the execution of the final
and executory judgment against them.

By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes allegation that subsequent events changed the situation of the
parties to justify a suspension of the execution of the final and executory judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 10, 2004 is
hereby GRANTED. Order dated August 10, 2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Further, the
verified petition dated November 05, 2002 are hereby REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT until the MTC-
Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves the pending motions of petitioners with the same determines the metes and
bounds of 400 sq. meters leased premises subject matter of this case with immediate dispatch.
Accordingly, REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the petitioners on the issued writ of demolition to
the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan.
SO ORDERED.[4] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a suspensive condition for the lifting of the permanent injunction, the
determination ofthe boundaries of the property, the Province returned the issue for the consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic
Engineers Report submitted to the MTC on August 31, 2007, the metes and bounds of the property were indicated.

The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent injunction which the RTC issued is
ineffective. On motion of the Province, the MTC, by Order of January 21, 2008, thus issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition.
On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz filed a motion before Branch 10 of the RTC for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which it set for hearing on January 25, 2008 on which date, however, the demolition
had, earlier in the day, been implemented. Such notwithstanding, the RTC issued a TRO.[5] The Spouses Cruz, along with their sons-
respondents Nixon and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed several container vans and purportedly represented
themselves as owners of the property which was for lease.

On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in
compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to protect, secure and maintain
the possession of the property, entered the property.

Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however.Insisting that the RTC July 19, 2005 Order of Permanent
Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their
indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats.

Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data, docketed as Special
Civil Action No. 53-M-2008, which was coincidentally raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC Malolos.

Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully entered the property with the use of heavy
equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents,[6] and arrested them when they resisted petitioners entry; and that as early as in
the evening of February 20, 2008, members of the Philippine National Police had already camped in front of the property.

On the basis of respondents allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the RTC, by Order of March 4, 2008,
issued writs of amparo and habeas data.[7]

The RTC, crediting respondents version in this wise:

Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the alleged offenses examined
into on Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data that there have been an on-going hearings on the verified Petition for
Contempt, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 306-M-2006, before this Court for alleged violation by the
respondents of the Preliminary Injunction Order dated July 16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil Action No. 833-M-2002,
hearings were held on January 25, 2008, February 12 and 19, 2008, where the respondents prayed for an April 22,
2008 continuance, however, in the pitch darkness of February 20, 2008, police officers, some personnel from the
Engineering department, and some civilians proceeded purposely to the Pinoy Compound, converged therein and
with continuing threats of bodily harm and danger and stone-throwing of the roofs of the homes thereat from voices
around its premises, on a pretext of an ordinary police operation when enterviewed [sic] by the media then present,
 but at 8:00 a.m. to late in the afternoon of February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the petitioners, subjecting them to
bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and the debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the martial law
police brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen,[8]

rendered judgment, by Decision of March 28, 2008, in favor of respondents, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commitment Orders and waivers in Crim. Cases Nos. 08-77 for Direct
assault; Crim. Case No. 08-77 for Other Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case No. 08-78 for Light Threats are
hereby DECLARED illegal, null and void, as petitioners were deprived of their substantial rights, induced by duress
or a well-founded fear of personal violence. Accordingly, the commitment orders and waivers are hereby SET
ASIDE. The temporary release of the petitioners is declared ABSOLUTE.

Without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[9] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 19 [10] of The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC),[11]which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).[12]

In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for

giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when from the allegations of the petition, the same
ought not to have been issued as (1) the petition in [sic] insufficient in substance as the same involves property
rights; and (2) criminal cases had already been filed and pending with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1,
City of Malolos. (Underscoring supplied)

The petition is impressed with merit.

The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.[13] In
view of the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued
and took effect on October 24, 2007 which coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed the Courts commitment
towards internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data was promulgated.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omissionof a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of
a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security. And the
writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo[14] teaches:

As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.Extralegal
killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On
the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or
 indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law.[15] (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted)

To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a
property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of
and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the
property.

Apropos is the Courts ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:[16]

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a
remedy supplemental to these Rules.What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its
issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations
of fact, to wit:

xxxx

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts
determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or
violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. [17] (Emphasis
and italics in the original, citation omitted)

Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the petitioners therein branding as acts of terrorism
the therein respondents alleged entry into the disputed land with armed men in tow. The Court therein held:

On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and unsworn is the overriding involvement of
property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the
private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent
that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the
extent of the treats and harassments implied from the presence of armed men bare to the waist and the alleged
pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to
the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing. [18](Emphasis in the
original; underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and
security. Bare allegations that petitioners in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and
feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and
arrested the herein petitioners (respondents)[19] will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue
confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest. [20]

Although respondents release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence
or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or
intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.

That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is gathered from their Joint Affidavit, viz:

xxxx

11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy equipment na hawak hawak ang nasabing kautusan ng
RTC Branch 10 (PERMANENT INJUNCTION at RTC ORDERS DATED February 12, 17 at 19 2008) upang
ipaglaban ang dignidad ng kautusan ng korte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo ng SELF-HELP at batas ukol sa PROPERTY
 RIGHTS, Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming IN
POSSESSION. (Underscoring supplied)

Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting
or storing data or information regarding their person, family, home and correspondence.

As for respondents assertion of past incidents[21] wherein the Province allegedly violated the Permanent Injunction order, these
incidents were already raised in the injunction proceedings on account of which respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against
petitioners.[22]

Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on February 22, 2008, petitioners even instituted a petition
for habeas corpuswhich was considered moot and academic by Branch 14 of the Malolos RTC and was accordingly denied by Order
of April 8, 2008.

More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data before the
Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats by petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RTC, which
petition was dismissed for insufficiency and forum shopping.

It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full advantage of the legal system with the filing of
civil, criminal and administrative charges.[23]

It need not be underlined that respondents petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which
cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute.

AT ALL EVENTS, respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparoand habeas data should have been barred, for criminal
proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with
Section 6, Rule 112[24] of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set
up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may,
however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings. [25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and its March 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Special Civil Action
No. 53-M-2008 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED
Castillo v Cruz (2009) Gr No 182165
J. Morales

Facts:
Respondent Cruz spouses leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos. They refused to vacate the
property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan which intended to utilize it for local projects.
The local government filed charges in the MTC, which in turn decided against the spouses.
RTC affirmed the decision.
The spouses didn’t vacate and continued to file cases in the Malolos RTC. The court suspended the demolition against
the property, a determination of the property bounds, and a remanding of the case by means of a writ of injunction.
The respondents filed a MFR in the MTC. The court ruled in their favor and issued another demolition order.
In order to stop the demolition, the spouses parked container vans around the property.
Superintendent Castillo was told by the mayor to enter the property for maintaining its possession.
Respondents refused. The y filed for a Petition for a writ of amparo and habeas data in Malolos RTC
The same people claimed that the respondents entered the property forcefully with heavy equipment and arrested them.
RTC ruled in their favor.

Issue: Is the writ of amparo and habeas data the correct remedy for the spouses predicament?

Held: No. Petition dismissed

Ratio:
The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights.
As a response to extrajudicial killings, the court promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Amparo on Oct. 24, 2007 and the
Rule on Habeas Data on 2008. This power was inherent in the Constitutional grant to the courts to promulgate rules for
human rights.
Definitions of the Writs:
a. Writ of Amparo- an available course of action “to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity”
b. Writ of Habeas Data- a course that can be taken when the “right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person”.
The limitation of the writs was in the protection of rights of life, liberty, and security.
Sec of National Defense v Manalo- limitation of the Amparo was to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
There must be a violation of these rights by means of an unlawful act. There must be a connection between the acts and
effects of the aforementioned rights.
Tapuz v Del Rosario- “What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a
writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.”
The same case states that the court will only issue the writ after determining the facts ‘ existence from the supporting
affidavits of thNotably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and
security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing.”
There was no threat to the said rights by the petitioners use of force. They were only protecting property rights. Their
affidavit said: “Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming “IN POSSESSION.”
Regarding habeas data, there was no allegation of the data collection requirement.
The writs cant be used to stall the execution of a property dispute decision.
The filing should have been barred after their arrest. This was due to the institution of criminal proceedings running first.
They may avail of the reliefs as a motion.
Obiter:
The filed the writs in the Sandiganbayan, but dismissed for form shopping and insufficiency.
G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008

ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA, petitioners,

vs.
NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS’N., I – XIII, INC., ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, R.T., J.:

THE present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo upon the following premise:

Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in our
Constitution, as the result of these nefarious activities of both the Private and Public Respondents. This ardent
request filed before this Honorable Supreme Court is the only solution to this problem via this newly advocated
principles incorporated in the Rules – the "RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO."1

It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City. Their
dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished
pursuant to a court judgment.

While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent and spurious land titles, to wit:

Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they can, to unearth these so-called
"syndicates" clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with the "squatting syndicates" - - - - the low so
defines. If only to give its proper meanings, the Government must be the first one to cleans (sic) its ranks from
these unscrupulous political protégées. If unabated would certainly ruin and/or destroy the efficacy of the Torrens
System of land registration in this Country. It is therefore the ardent initiatives of the herein Petitioners, by way of
the said prayer for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo, that these unprincipled Land Officials be summoned
to answer their participation in the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in the hands
of the Private Respondents. The Courts of Justice, including this Honorable Supreme Court, are likewise
being made to believe that said titles in the possession of the Private Respondents were issued untainted
with frauds.2

what the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Court’s dismissal of petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768,
177701, 177038, thus:

That, Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for reconsideration for the second or third
time to be filed before this Honorable Supreme Court. As such therefore, Petitioners herein are aware of the
opinion that this present petition should not in any way be treated as such motions fore reconsideration. Solely,
this petition is only for the possible issuance of the writ of amparo, although it might affect the previous rulings of
this Honorable Supreme Court in these cases, G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the
powers of the Supreme Court of the Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside, even its own previous
decision, that can not be thwarted nor influenced by any one, but, only on the basis of merits and
evidence. This is the purpose of this petition for the Writ of Amparo.3

We dismiss the petition.

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)

The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed with
finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the enumeration of rights as
stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their
dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right
to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners’ claim to the land in question is not alleged in the petition at all. The
Court can only surmise that these rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled in the four cases cited
above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the
right sought to be protected.

Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only if on its face, the court
ought to issue said writ.

Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order
the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the
court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and
may deputize any officer or person to serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven
(7) days from the date of its issuance.

Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be issued and the petition will be
dismissed outright.

This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest
possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort
on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and
effort on matters not covered by the writ.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Canlas et. al., vs NAPICO Homeowners Association

GR No 182795 June 5, 2008

Facts:
Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land. Their dwellings have been demolished or is about to be demolished
pursuant to a court judgment. They filed a petition for writ of amparo to summon some unprincipled Land Officials as they
allege to answer their participation in the issuance of fraudulent titles to NAPICO.

Issue:
Whether or not writ of amparo is proper in this case.

Ruling:
No, writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The threatened demolition is not included among the enumeration of rights protected by the writ. Their claim to their
dwelling does not constitute right to life, liberty, and security.
REV. REYES VS GONZALES (2009)

10 Dec 2017

[606 scra 580; G.R. No. 182161; December 3, 2009] Constitutional Law| Right to Travel| Writ of Amparo| Bill of Rights
Reverend Father ROBERT P. REYES,
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ et. al.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Rev. Reyes was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 2007 and together with fifty (50)
others, they were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. On December 2007, a Hold Departure Order List was
issued ordering the Immigration to include the name of petitioner and 49 others for the alleged crime of Rebellion, in the interest of
national security and public safety.

Petitioner’s counsel wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO, in view of the dismissal of his client’s criminal case on
rebellion. That, the DOJ Secretary has not acted on their request, petitioner then next recourse was for the availment of the writ of
amparo because of his alleged continued restraint of right to travel.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the HDO, which would entitle
him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.

HELD:
No. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a
consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his
right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and
security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.

The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. Where, as in
this case, there is no clear showing that the right to life, liberty or security of the petitioner is immediately in danger or threatened, or
that the danger or threat is continuing. Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely speculative.

Petition is dismissed.
FACTS:

Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by

military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that
they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18
months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on
August 13, 2007.

Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for

Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to
stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of
their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said
case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect
on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a
manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing
petition as amparo petition.

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the

privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary
of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to
furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and
unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody,
confirm the present places of official assignment of two
military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and
records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody.
The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the
AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the
decision promulgated by the CA.

HELD:

In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that

there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to security.
xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to
any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been
violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission by public officials or employees and by private
individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape,
the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by
private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and
security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction,
detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion
that there is an apparent threat that they will again be
abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These
constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life,
actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court
explained. (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense
v. Manalo, October 7, 2008)

Distinguish the production order under the Rule on the Writ of

Amparo from a search warrant.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo

should not be confused with a search warrant for law
enforcement under Art. III, sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It
said that the production order should be likened to the
production of documents or things under sec. 1, Rule 27 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure which states that “upon motion of any
party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an
action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on
behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence material to any matter involved in the action and
which are in his possession, custody or control.” (GR No.
180906, The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October
7, 2008)
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ V HON. JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. 182484 | June 17, 2007 | J. Brion

FACTS:

1. The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan MCTC a complaint for forcible entry and damages with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners and other John Does
numbering about 120.

2. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners of the disputed land; (2) they
were the disputed land’s prior possessors when the petitioners – armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and
together with unidentified persons – entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents’
permission and against the objections of the private respondents’ security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo
structure.

3. In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material allegations and essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and
prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private
respondents’ certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and
interposed a counterclaim for damages.

4. The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the private respondents’ favor, finding prior possession
through the construction of perimeter fence in 1993.

5. The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC.

6. On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents’ motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction upon posting of a bond. The writ – authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision – was
actually issued by respondent Judge del Rosario after the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for
demolition.

7. The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners’ MR and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction.

8. Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special
Order a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff’s written notice to the petitioners to
voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.

9. The petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition
in CA.

10. Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari with writs of amparo and habeas data.

ISSUE: W/N petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and habeas data is proper

HELD:
No. We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in
form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and
substance.

Based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed
RTC orders has been filed out of time. Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been
guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping. In sum, the
petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule,
for having been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to
these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we
shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands – requires that every petition
for the issuance of the Writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact.

On the whole, what is clear from these statements – both sworn and unsworn – is the overriding involvement of property
issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If
at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past
violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and
harassments implied from the presence of “armed men bare to the waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons.
Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the
petitioners is imminent or is continuing.

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition
fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy
related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for
information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The
necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure
information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the
“fishing expedition” that this Court – in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data – had in mind in defining what the
purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data is fully in order. PETITION DENIED.