US VS.

PANLILIO

DOCTRINE: The orders, rules and regulations of an administrative officers or

body issued pursuant to a statute have the force of law but are not penal in
nature and a violation of such orders is not a offense punishable by law unless
the statute expressly penalizes such violation.

FACTS: In Feb. 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to accused, Panlilio having
been exposed to the dangerous and contagious disease known as rinderpest,
were, in accordance with an order of duly-authorized agent of the Director of
Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of Masamat, Pampanga;
that, on said place, Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without being
authorized so to do, and while the quarantine against said carabaos was still in
force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which
they were then quarantined and conducted from one place to another; that by
virtue of said orders of the accused, his servants and agents took the said
carabaos from the said corral and drove them from one place to another for the
purpose of working them.

The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining
of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. The accused contends that the facts
alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation
of Act No. 1760

ISSUE: Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the
Bureau of Agriculture?

HELD: NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment
for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act No. 1760 provides that any
person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be
punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and
pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall
within any of them. A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as
authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The
orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the
force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of
such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a
violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a
violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is
such violation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate
Art. 581, par 2 of the Penal Code which punishes any person who violates
regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease among animals.

Ang Tibay vs. CIR

FACTS: Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers. There was a shortage
of leather soles, and it was necessary to temporarily lay off members of the
National Labor Union. According to the Union however, this was merely a
scheme to systematically terminate the employees from work, and that the
shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of unjust
labor practice because the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against the
National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National Workers Brotherhood,
which was allegedly sympathetic to the employer. The Court of Industrial
Relation decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion
for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for
opposing the said motion.

The motion for new trial was raised because according to NLU, there are
documents that are so inaccessible to them that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. That these documents, which NLU
have now attached as exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect
that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of
the judgment rendered therein.

ISSUE: WON the union was denied due process by CIR

HELD: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR.
The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of
its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court
of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is
invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant,
the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more
active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees
but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any
question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting
employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-
laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it
may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and
submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

SC said there was a failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved due to
failure to receive all relevant evidence. Thus, the motion for a new trial was
granted and the entire record of this case is remanded to the CIR.