Beyond The Sociology of Religion?

Roland Robertson

Sociological Analysis, Vol. 46, No. 4. (Winter, 1985), pp. 355-360.

Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0038-0210%28198524%2946%3A4%3C355%3ABTSOR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6

Sociological Analysis is currently published by Association for the Sociology of Religion, Inc..

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained
prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in
the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/journals/asr.html.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic
journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,
and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take
advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

http://www.jstor.org
Sun Jul 1 06:02:39 2007
Beyond The Sociology Of Religion?
Roland Robertson
Universit? o j Pittsburgh

T h e views of Fenn and Beckford as to the present condition of the socioloa of religion are consid-
ered and expanded with respect to the modern functional analysis of religion and the institutionaliz-
ation of the latter. Fruitful aspects of neofunctionalism and new linkages between the sociologx of
religion and other foci are discussed.

Starting loosely from Richard Fenn's (1982) diagnosis of an epistemological crisis in

the sociology of religion and James Beckford's argument (in this issue) that the problem-
atic status of the contemporary sociology of religion stems from the pattern of its intel-
lectual and social institutionalization, I propose to argue here that while both of these
claims have their merits they need, at the very least, to be supplemented by discussion
of the kinds of problem which sociologists of religion study, the relationships between
religion and other aspects and spheres of sociocultural life, and the present condition
of sociology itself. I will be talking in the form of adding to the theses of Fenn and Beck-
ford, although there are some aspects of their deliberations about which I have reserva-
tions.
While regarding Fenn's attempt to display what might be called the deep structure-
or, in slightly different vein, the synthetic a priori-of the modern sociology of religion
as very noteworthy, I consider his claim that the present disarray in the analysis of reli-
gion originated in the collapse of a consensus regarding an intrinsically problematic
functionalism to be misleading.
There seems to run through Fenn's reading of the sociology of religion before "the
present crisis" a conception of functionalism as premised on notions of value consensus
(of which religious belief and religiously~centeredmorality are central components) and
"value-neutrality" on the part of the analyst. Present interpretations of the odyssey of
functionalism in sociology do not, however, indicate that such are distinguishing or in-
trinsic features of that style of analysis. Indeed, I would argue that each of the four styles
of analysis which Fenn now envisages (systemic-priestly; critical-prophetic; systemic-
prophetic; and critical-priestly) are compatible with a functionalist orientation; even
though empirically-but not logically-the first has been most closely identified with it.
Thus insofar as we may or should speak of a present crisis I consider the issue of func-
tionalism as Fenn invokes it to be misleading, mainly because he is concerned with a
level of analysis which is separable from the kinds of issue which have and continue to
be raised with respect to the merits of functionalism.
Beckford helps to clarify the problem of the functionalist past by, indeed, denying its
strength and also, more important, pointing out that it was so-called normative function-
alism which was primarily responsible for the assimilation of religion into the concep-
tion of a central value system-thus rendering religion as lacking in distinctiveness.
However, even though there is merit to the argument that a diffuse, normative function-
alism served as a kind of internal sacred canopy as far as American sociology of religion
 was concerned in the most crucial period of professionalization of the sub-discipline-
namely, the 1950s and 1960s-I doubt very much whether systematic research into that
period would show that functionalism specifically guided the substantive work of Amer-
ican sociologists of religion on any significant scale. Thus I would argue that functional-
ism-in the form of insisting on the functional definition of religion and its necessary
universality -served for the most part as a legitimating myth of and for American soci-
ology of religion, rather than as the central orientation of a research program. That is
not to say that there were not "true functionalists" among the leaders of the discipline.
For example, Milton Yinger produced his own brand of explicitly functionalist sociology
of religion in that period, as did Bryan Wilson (outside the American context).
Such considerations-which cannot, unfortunately, be explicated in detail here-are
important for a number of reasons. First, it is clearly desirable that we should have as
clear a sense of our own history as possible. Second, if we are to move forward, beyond
what some see as the present crisis, then we ought to know what we are moving away
from and why. Third, we have to be clear about a much more specific point about func-
tionalism (which is closely related to the second).
One particular body of thought is often considered to have been responsible for the
prevalence of functionalism in the 1950s and much of the decade of the 1960s-namely,
the "structural-functionalism" of Talcott Parsons and those directly influenced by him.
Thus there has been a very strong tendency to conflate discussion of functionalism with
talk of Parsons. This has had a most unfortunate consequence for the sociology of reli-
gion. The point I am making in this regard is not that one should segregate Parsons from
functionalism and certainly not from normative functionalism (in the sense that Beck-
ford uses that term); but rather that-as Alexander (1984) has shown-Parsons' own
functionalism, like other forms (such as the Marxist ones), was but one dimension of
his sociological activity (and a mutable one, at that). If we blame functionalism and
charge, however implicitly, Parsons with having provided us with that foundation, we
risk-to put it mildly-throwing-out the baby with the bathwater. For even though
there certainly were strands of Parsons' work which encouraged the diffuse functional
approach to religion and there was a brief moment in his work (in the 1950s) when he
hovered on the brink of a "value-consensus" theory of social systems (Robertson, 1982),
he did not, in fact succumb to either of those temptations. The growing neoparsonian-
or what is sometimes called neofunctionalist-sociology or religion is beginning to sub-
stantiate these points (although the crucial matter is not so much what Parsons "really
said," but rather what can be fruitfully done with his ideas). More substantively, I would
agree-and long ago emphatically stated (Robertson, 1970)-that much damage has
been done to our endeavors by the diffuse functionalist orientation, but that does not
mean that all work previously performed under the rubric of functionalism or work re-
garded accurately or inaccurately as tied to a functionalist outlook is now to be regarded
as suspect on its face.
There is a specific danger arising from such a negative attitude toward functionalism
which needs considerable emphasis. This has to do with the strides which have recently
been taken within certain neoparsonian or neofunctionalist circles towards multidimen-
sionality. Not unironically in the present context the import of this development (which
is also, less explictly, occuring in spheres of Marxist and neoMarxist analysis), as far as
 BEYOND THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION? 357
the sociology of religion is concerned, is that it is distinctively implausible to think that
one factor or dimension of human life can be used in order to account for another. Spe-
cifically, religion cannot be explained-nor can a specific religous hen omen on be ex-
plained-by another factor; nor, o n the other hand, can religion itself-or a specific reli-
gious phenomenon-explain another religious factor. This has an important bearing on
what I believe to have been one of the greatest-perhaps the most significant of the-
~ r o b l e m sin the practice of the sociology of religion. For while our general-disciplinary
paradigm has told us from early Comte onward (notwithstanding the religious quests
which Comte himself, and, inter alia, Durkheim, Freud, and Parsons undertook in their
later lives) that social science goes beyond religion and we have thus-at least in ~ r o f e s -
s i o n a l l ~claiming to be scientists of religion-sought to see religion as comprehensible
from the outside, we have at the same time exhibited collectively a remarkable propensity
to want to find religion everywhere. (Beckford's comments upon the institutionalization
of the sociology of religion tell us much about how this has come about.) In other words,
committed-at least in facing outward to fellow sociologists and the wider academic
community-to the sociology of religion, we have at the same time often shown more
interest in a sociology for religion. While the move toward explicit multidimensionality
will not in itself cancel this contradition-for that is what it must now be called-within
the sociology of religion (and which helps to sustain its sequestered status), it can d o
much to alleviate our present uncertainty. T o put the ~ r o b l e manother way: The sociol-
ogy (indeed, "the scientific study") of religion increasingly appears as a discipline whose
raison d'etre is the definition of its own subject matter (or "object"). Much of our intellec-
tual and organizational efforts are put into defining or getting "control over" that-which-
we-study.
What is meant by multidimensionality? For a start, it should be emphasized that the
term is used here in quite a loose way and that its advocates are certainly open to the
kind of scrupulous critique which Wallace (1984) has recently provided. Specifically, it
is used in the present context to refer to the multifaceted nature of social action and
patterns of interaction and the ways in, and degrees to which, different spheres of life
interpenetrate. Concern with the interpenetration of religion and other spheres inhibits
the taking of the phrase "sociology of religion" too seriously; which is to be greatly wel-
comed, insofar as it has both symbolized and promoted the ongoing dilemma of our sub-
discipline-namely, whether to explain religion (and thus, so many say, reduce it) or in-
flate religion as an independent variable (and thus run the risk of reducing "everything"
to religion).
Beckford has elegantly and cogently shown that coming to terms with the present
condition of the sociology of religion requires inter alia, a serious interest in the circum-
stances of its institutionalization. For the most part, Beckford's argument centers upon
the perception that the sequestered status of the sociological study of religion has been
part consequence and part cause of the inability of sociologists of religion to convey to
the non-specialist the social significance of religion. The adoption within the self-elected
body of specialists of the theoretical perspectives of normative functionalism and func-
tionalist phenomenology and the substantive concern with the secularization thesis
have, so argues Beckford, constituted the mode of distantiation in that regard. The dis-
tance and marginality of the sociology of religion have, however, been historically pro-
duced and aggravated by three features of the institutionalization of the subdiscipline.
First, the sociological study of religion predated the emergence of (and has not been
greatly changed by) the professional subdiscipline of the sociology of religion (unlike the
situation in a number of other special areas of sociological inquiry). Second, the profes-
sional associations of sociologists of religion have been heavily populated by "religion-
ists" and "confessionalists." Third, the work acknowledged as important by specialists
in the sociology of religion has, for many years, been published in specialist journals.
What I think is missing from Beckford's excellent discussion is consideration of the
large amount of important sociological work o n religion which has in fact been pro-
duced in recent years outside the institutional context(s) of the sociology of religion per
se. Without paying much attention to debates inside "the" sociology of religion, such
sociologists as Luhmann, Schluchter, Bell, Habermas, Turner and quite a few others
have made important contributions to the analysis of religion, while many significant
contributions have been made over the years o n more specific topics without their
authors being much recognized within the subdiscipline. For example, in my view Ivan
Vallier was one of the most important sociologists of religion of the twentieth century,
yet his work has not figured significantly in professional discussion.
In spite of Beckford's pessimism concerning the marginal status of the sociology of reli-
gion in the discipline of sociology (which has, in a number of respects, itself been mar-
ginalized in the modern academy), there can be little doubt that focus on religion has
significantly increased among sociologists during the last ten years or so. If one points
also to the remarkable flowering of interest in religion in other disciplinary areas, such
as history, the puzzle as to why the sociology of religion remains marginal is increased.
The main \vav In which we can account for this is, I believe, bv drawing attention to
the forms in which religion is analyzed among those who have fruitfully studied it out-
side the subdiscipline. Most important, religion has been thematized among nonspecial-
ists by placing it within the frame of sociological problems which in and of themselves
are not, so to say, religion-centered. While most of the Problemstellungen of institutional-
ized sociology of religion have been specific to the discussion of religion per se, those
of the nonspecialist have had largely to do with the characteristics and discontents of
modernity and post-modernity. With this development-ivhich is, more than inciden-
tally, very much in line with the way in which religion was discussed by the classical
sociologists and by Parsons-specialized sociology of religion now confronts an amplifi-
cation of its marginal status; in the sense that within the profession at large it is not
the sociologist of religion per se but rather the sociologist treating religion as part of a
larger set of problems who may well be seen as most relevant to the discipline as a whole.
While continuing to emphasize that the broadly-sociological study of religion is blos-
soming rather than wilting, we should nevertheless consider n further reason for pessi-
mism as far as the sociology of religion as such is concerned. I speak of the fact that
in spite of the growing public interest in the topic of religion it is not for the most part
the "expert sociologist" who is called upon to interpret the salience of religion in many
parts of the modern world, the only major exception to that being the case of very spe-
cific "social problems" attendant upon religion (most notably the "cultic brainwashing"
issue.) That task is usually given to the people who are seen to be ft*lly involved in the
 B E Y O N D T H E S O C I O L O G Y O F RELIGION? 359
study of religion-namely, those working in seminaries, divinity schools and depart-
ments of religious studies.
I have, in effect, painted a picture of the sociology of religion as a subdiscipline with-
out a series of sociological ~ r o b l e m sof what Weber called value-relevance. Bearing in
mind that that characterization does not accurately capture all of the work which we
are doing, I would like to indicate a few specific ways in which we can do more to make
our work more widely relevant.
I am doubtful whether, even if we agreed that we should engage in a massive effort
to deinstitutionalize the sociology of religion (which is one way of interpreting Beckford's
leanings) we could realistically expect to be successful. O n the assumption that the soci-
ology of religion will continue to be ~ u r s u e din what has sometimes been called sectarian
terms, we could, nonetheless, d o much more than we presently do to promote the soci-
ological study of religion and related topics-for example, by forming committees whose
special purpose is to d o precisely that. In other words, we may well need to develop a
specific focus on the state of the subdiscipline in relation to the discipline of sociology,
even to other social sciences. Such a focus would include attention to patterns of recruit-
ment, article publishing, book reviewing, curriculum development, and so on.
More important, however, is what we do about the intellectual substance of the soci-
ology of religion. T o some extent this problem is being "solved" for us (along with some
of the institutional problems), in that there seems to be developing a series of interests
in particular thematic conjunctions, such as politics and religion, economics and reli-
gion, and so on. In other words, new minidisciplinary foci are being established and in-
stitutionalized-foci which center precisely on the kind of interpenetrative processes of
which I have already spoken.
Nothing that I have said should be interpreted as a plea for the protection of the soci-
ology-of-religion community per se. Rather, it should be thought of as the basis for a
set of arguments concerning the relevance of religion to the human condition. In order,
however, to demonstrate the latter we need an "angle" which allows us specifically to ad-
dress the theme of religion and the human condition. I strongly believe that success in
that respect will not come about through discussion of religion per se. Rather, we need
more discussions of the kind which Fenn has undertaken; dealing not merely with the
deep structure of analysis of "religion and life," but also with the master issues of our
time-on a global scale. Thus we are returned to the classical legacy not of secularization
per se but the "mourning" (Homans, 1984) attendant upon secularization and its work-
ing-out in different cultural contexts. We are keen on talking about revitalization these
days. We would do well to apply the concept not merely to the sociology of religion
but also to sociology itself in order that we may do the concept justice.

REFERENCES
Alexander, Jeffrey C. 1984. Theoretical Logrc rn Sociolog,, Vol. IV. The Modern Reconstructron of Classical
Thought: Talcott Parsons. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Fenn, Richard K. 1982. "The Sociology of Religion: a C l i n ~ c a lSurvev," pp. 101-127 In T . Bortomore,
S. Nowak a n d M. Sokolowska eds. Socrolog?: The State o j the Art. London a n d Beverly Hills: Sage Publica-
rlons.
 Homans, Peter. 1984. "Once Again, Psycholanalysis, East and West: A Psychoanalytic Essay o n Religion,
Mourning and Healing." Histor? of Reltgions 24 (2):133-154.
Robertson, Roland. 1970. The Soc~ologicalInterpretation of Religion. New York: Schocken.
-. 1982. "Parsons o n the Evolutionary Significance of American Religion." Sociological Analysis
43(Winter):30i-32i.
Wallace, Walter L. 1984. "Alexandrian Sociology. Amerlcan Journal of Sociology 90 (3):640-653.