DOLLARS, NOT DATA 1

Taylor Comerford
LSJ 434
Term Paper
12/13/2018

Dollars, not Data: The Strange Paradox of Saudi Disability Rights

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) can be understood through a series of

juxtapositions. It is a member state of the United Nations, but also depicted as an adversary to

human rights. It is a fundamentalist Islamic state, but also is an economic ally of the

Islamaphobic United States. It espouses principles like equality and justice, yet has restricted the

freedoms of its citizens and fostered a deeply hierarchical society. This conflict of external

narrative and internal reality is equally present within the realm of disability law.

Saudi Arabia ratified the United Nations Convention on Rights of Persons with

Disabilities (UNCRPD) and its optional protocol without reservations in June of 2008, only one

year after the treaty was opened for signatures (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2015, p. 4). In

2015, Saudi Arabia produced its first report to the United Nations to demonstrate the compliance

of the state to the UNCRPD, and more generally to the livelihoods and access to rights of Saudis

with disabilities (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2015, p. 4). However, this report provided a

paradoxical and unclear analysis of disability in the KSA. While it was asserted that the welfare

system and service programs provided to persons with disabilities were widespread, there was a

dearth of data available on disability within the state. The Saudi regime was (and still is) unable

to produce the most basic, accurate data on the rates of disability in the county. As an

autonomous state, it is unsurprising that the Saudi regime resisted some aspects of the treaty

(even without formal reservations). Nevertheless, from a Western perspective it is puzzling that

the state took on the costly and cumbersome process of providing extensive resources and

services, yet refused to implement the relatively minor process of collecting data. This paradox
DOLLARS, NOT DATA 2

begs the question, why has the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia been so willing to provide resources for

its disabled citizens, but failed to meet Article 31 of the UNCRPD in collecting adequate data on

disability? I assert the wealth of the Saudi regime, founded in nationalized oil resources, creates

an environment in which it is very easy to provide welfare and services to the Saudi populace.

However, because data collection is inhibited at a national level by the fear of international

accountability, the KSA has refused to meet Article 31.

In this paper I will first describe the cultural and political context of the Saudi

government, noting the widespread and often conflicting influences of Islam and totalitarianism

on the style of governance. This will contribute to my analysis of Saudi legislative structure,

which fosters a difficult, if not unique style of analysis surrounding disability law. Furthermore,

I will provide a comparison between disability legislation in the KSA, the tenets of UNCRPD as

international law, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as an example of foreign

national law. I will use this differentiation to discuss the socio-economic factors that have

influenced the unique application of disability law in Saudi Arabia. Finally, noting prominent

economic theory on the political structure of the Gulf states, I will assert the nationalization of

oil is responsible for the paradoxical condition of disability rights in Saudi Arabia.

Overarchingly, this will lead to the conclusion that, due to the cultural and economic context of

the KSA, it is much more difficult for the state to collect data on its citizens with disabilities,

than it is to provide them with various forms of aid.

Political Structure and Cultural Context

The political structure of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can be best understood by

breaking down its title. The word “Kingdom” refers to the institution of a monarchy, that has

been the composition of the regime since the inception of the state (Commins, 2012). “Saudi”
DOLLARS, NOT DATA 3

refers to the the ruling family, or regime, which has held power since the earliest national

aspirations of the state came to being (Commins, 2012). Finally, “Arabia”, refers to the

geographic location of the state on the Arabian Peninsula, where the state has held near absolute

power since the early 1930s (Commins, 2012).

The state is considered an absolute monarchy, which directly shapes the manner in which

legislation takes form. All law is produced by the King of Saudi Arabia at the time, with

consideration and input from the senior princes of the royal family (Lucas, 2004). In this

manner, ‘legislation’ takes place through a series of royal decrees that mirror the style of

Executive Orders of the President in the United States. Thus, decrees are short, succinctly

focused, and occur frequently, which differs from the time-consuming breadth of legislative

bodies in other states. Furthermore, these royal orders hold the same weight as legislation, and

are immediately applied by the relevant bureaucratic and legal bodies throughout the state

(Lucas, 2004). For the purpose of this paper, I will also consider ministerial orders and decrees

as legislation as well, as a secondary, and lesser form of law.

Islam as a religion also has an incredibly signification influence on the nature of the state.

The Arabian Peninsula is inarguably the most important region for Islamic history and culture.

Within the geography lies the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina, in which the early history of

the prophet and Islamic empire was produced (Brown, 2009). The revelations of the prophet, the

original Muslim Umma1, and the roots of the Islamic polity all occurred within the physical

landscape of the region (Brown, 2009). In modernity, Saudi Arabia controls the site and

attendance of the annual Hajj, one of the mandatory religious duties of all Muslims (Brown,

1
Historically, Umma refers to the original followers of the Prophet; in modernity, umma means
the global community of Muslims (Brown, 2009).
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2009). Each year millions of Muslims flood to Mecca in pilgrimage to the Kaaba2 to take part in

a tradition that extends to the actions of Muhammad himself (Brown, 2009).

It is unsurprising then, that as the hub of the Islamic faith, Saudi Arabia is a theocratic

regime as well. The Saudi regime asserts that the state is founded on the principles of the faith as

defined through the Quran and Sunnah3 (Basic Laws of Governance, 1992). In the Basic Laws

of Governance, the closest equivalent to a body of civil law, the state professes that “The

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State… [who’s] religion is Islam… [and

who’s] constitution is Almighty God's Book, The Holy Qur'an, and the Sunna of the Prophet”

(1992). This provides an extremely unique style of law. The Quran as a document is complex

and lyrically written, making it incredibly difficult to interpret and apply (Brown, 2009). There

are famous examples in which words used in the Quran have an unknown meaning, and thus

have inspired decades of scholarly debate4. Furthermore, the text is not comprehensively

written, especially in the modern context (Brown, 2009).

This has led to the collaborative understandings of Sharia and Fiqh. Sharia is a religious

concept that encapsulates all of Gods wants from humankind, and is the set of perfect

requirements for human action and behavior (Brown, 2009). Fiqh is the noble, but imperfect

attempt to attain Sharia using the limited information present in the Quran and Sunnah (Brown,

2009). Saudi Arabia is a state assertedly ruled through Sharia Law, however it is clear there is a

striking difference between Islamic Sharia and Saudi Sharia Law. Essentially, Islamic Sharia

2 A building in Mecca that has deep significance in the story of the prophet, and thus has become
a site of modern worship.
3 a record of the Prophet’s words and actions, used heavily to interpret the Quran and as an

example for pious action

4 For example, the word khamr was debated to mean wine, alcohol, or intoxicant within the

context of coffee prohibition (Brown, 2009).

DOLLARS, NOT DATA 5

refers to the culmination of fiqh scholarship produced by Islamic scholars, or muftis, who

produce legal rulings, or fatwas, through the application of Islamic texts (Brown, 2009).

However Saudi Sharia is most basically a fused religious and political system, in which the Saudi

regime functions as both religious and political leadership. Thus the rulings produced by the

Saudi king are assertedly the applications of religion, therefore all law is supposedly religious in

nature (Brown, 2009). While the two entities share similar names, it is apparent that they have

divergent methods, missions, and implications.

In the context of Saudi law regarding disability, it is crucial to understand the way Islam

understands the identity. Islam is a religion essentially built on the ideas of social justice and

equality (Brown, 2009). The prophet Muhammad’s campaign, that eventually developed into the

modern religious institution, focused specifically on the abolition of slavery and the

emancipation of women (Brown, 2009). It was in this context, that the Islamic tenet jihad was

produced (Brown, 2009). Although misappropriated in modern media portrayals, jihad refers

simply to the righteous fight against injustice and refused complacency in exploitation (Brown,

2009). In this manner, Islam as a faith values equality and tolerance for all persons and all

identities. In addressing minority status, Islam also has a long tradition of charity and public

works called waqf (Brown, 2009). In the Islamic context, marginality and vulnerability are

viewed through an economic lens. Thus disability, as a status considered in the Quran and

Sunnah, is culturally addressed through aid, welfare, and services.

The economic conceptualization of disability is crucial in the understanding of the

identity in Saudi Arabia. As an Islamic state, that relies on Islamic jurisprudence and ethics, the

KSA would be motivated to provide resources to its citizens with disabilities. It is also clear that
DOLLARS, NOT DATA 6

the values of autonomy and self-sufficiency that are central to the Western, social model of

disability, are not innately present in the Saudi culture.

Part I: Foreign and International Legal Comparison

In order to appropriately analyze Saudi law and compare it with international and foreign

national law, it is important to establish the nature and structure of this comparison. Because

Saudi law, and American and international human rights law have extremely different structures

the comparison will take on a unique nature. As aforementioned, Saudi national law, and

disability specific law, take form through a series of singular decrees. It is the collection of these

statements that make up the body of Saudi disability law. For sake of efficiency, I will not

discuss the collection of decrees in entirety, rather first introduce American and international

legislation, then pair it with the relevant Saudi orders (when available). This is a further suitable

mechanism for comparison, as the Saudi law is notably less thorough than the commensurate

legislation in question.

The ADA

The Americans with Disabilities Act5 was a historic and internationally influential body

of disability law. Written in 1989 and passed in 1990, the law created a legal framework to

prevent discrimination against persons with disabilities in the United States (Weber, 2007). One

of the most impactful pieces of the ADA is its definition of disability, which engages with the

social model of disability, and has influenced the understanding of disability worldwide. Under

the ADA a person with a disability is an individuals who “has a physical or mental impairment

5
For the sake of brevity, I will only be analyzing Title I, II, and III of the ADA as the most
essential and utilized components of the legislation
DOLLARS, NOT DATA 7

that substantially limits one or more major life activities…who has a history or record of such an

impairment, or… who is perceived by others as having such an impairment” (The Americans

with Disabilities Act of 1990). This verbiage notes that the experience of disability is created by

structures, both physical and intangible, that generate barriers for persons with impairments.

This understanding forms the basis of the legal protections of the law, as discrimination is

viewed as functioning based on limitations imposed by the non-disabled community.

In Saudi law, Royal Decree M/37, which has been labeled as the Disability Care Law,

defines disability as “persons who experience full or partial impairment, over a prolonged period

of time, of their physical, sensory, intellectual, communication, learning or mental capabilities to

an extent that reduces their ability to meet their daily needs in the same way as non-disabled

persons” (2000). The implications of the definition are almost antipodal to the definition in the

ADA. Firstly, this language insinuates that the experience of disability is the fault of the

person’s impairment, not that of surrounding society. Furthermore, it suggests that persons with

disabilities are innately lesser in terms of ability and self-sufficiency than the non-disabled

community. This differentiation and asserted dependence fundamentally conflicts with the ADA

and its protections.

Title I of the ADA provides protections in employment (The Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990). This section of the law aims to protect persons with disability from discrimination

in hiring, work conditions, and firing. Notably the law applies to all employers with 15 or more

employees (The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990). The crux of Title I is the term

“reasonable accommodation” which asserts that employers must provide assistance and make

efforts to remove disabling barriers in cases where doing so does not cause “undue hardship”

(The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990). As discussed in case law, this standard has been
DOLLARS, NOT DATA 8

applied both to the nature of the physical landscape, and to intangible aspects of the position in

question. At essence, Title I takes on the perspective that persons with disabilities have the

necessary skills and qualifications for employment, and focuses on removing subsidiary barriers

that prevent these individuals from effectively engaging in their work.

While Saudi Arabia does not have comparable, disability specific legislation to the ADA

or Title I, much of the same issues are addressed in Article 28 of the Saudi Labor and Workmen

Law (1969). Much like Title I, it has a minimum number of employees that an entity must have

in order for the law to be applicable6 (Labor and Workmen Law, 1969). There is also a

conception of reasonable accommodation, although it does not use the same language, and is

much more limited than in the ADA. Article 28 ensures that employers make alternations to

their facilities to make them accessible, and provide assistive equipment when applicable (Labor

and Workmen Law, 1969). Accommodation in the labor law focuses on the physical nature of

the environment, and would not apply to intangible aspects of the position that may also be

inhibiting. This sentiment is further emphasized in the role of quotas in Article 28. Four percent

of employees at entities covered by the Labor Law must have a disability (Labor and Workmen

Law, 1969). While this could be seen as a standard for holding companies accountable in hiring

discrimination, language like “within their capabilities” and positions individuals are “qualified

for” has prominent implications (Labor and Workmen Law, 1969). Quotas and job access in the

Saudi law tokenize employees with disability, and intrinsically view them as a less capable work

force. In this manner, access to employment for persons with disabilities in Saudi Arabia takes

on the form of charity.

6
In Saudi Arabia the number is 25 or more, rather than 15
DOLLARS, NOT DATA 9

Title II of the ADA refers to discrimination in state and local governments, as well as the

institutions funded by these entities. Under this section, the “reasonable modification” standard

is imposed (The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990). However, the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia does not have state or local governments, because it is a monarchy with a single, central

government. However, both Saudi law and Title II address aspects of public transportation, as a

service provided by local governments in the United States, and by the central government in

Saudi Arabia. Public busses, trams, etc. in both states must be physically accessible to persons

with disabilities. In Saudi Arabia this is guaranteed through Council of Ministers Resolution No.

187, produced in 1981. This legislation also provides a 50 percent discount on public

transportation for persons with disabilities and one companion (Council of Ministers Resolution

No. 187, 1981). This service can be seen as exceeding what is provided in the United States. It

reflects the knowledge of the reliance of persons with disabilities on public transportation to fully

realize their rights to mobility, as well as the financial disadvantage that is found prevalently in

the disability community. It also strongly reflects the cultural importance of charity and service

discussed previously, which is a common facet of Saudi law.

Title III of the ADA covers public accommodations and private entities, overarchingly to

prevent discrimination in the access of persons with disabilities to these locations. This section

of the ADA also utilizes the “reasonable modification” standard, which has taken form most

commonly in physical alterations to allow persons with disabilities to effectively enter and

receive service at these locations (The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990). Recently, this

law has been expanded through cases, such as Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., to apply the ADA

to intangible forms of accessibility, which include communication and access to internet services

provided by these entities (2017).

DOLLARS, NOT DATA 10

Royal Decree M/37 of Saudi Arabia also address accessibility, but in a much more

limited context (2000). The law only addresses physical access to the environment, specifically

elevators and bathrooms within buildings, and roads and sidewalks publicly (Mulazadeh and Al-

Harbi, 2016). Furthermore, even in the constrained context of physical accessibility, the Saudi

regime has not implemented this legislation. Modifications to the environment take place within

the small portion of the state that is urban, including the state’s capital Riyadh (Mulazadeh and

Al-Harbi, 2016). However, in a 2016 study of 130 buildings and 6 major roads in Riyadh, even

urban structures failed to meet legislative standards (Mulazadeh and Al-Harbi, 2016). Only 3

buildings studied were over 50% accessible, and none of the 6 roads were considered accessible

(Mulazadeh and Al-Harbi, 2016). As an example of data collection that contradicts the reality

asserted by the state, one can see how crucial independent study is to the full understanding of

disability rights within Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia not provided as expansive of a network of

protection as the ADA, and further failed to implement its limited legislation into reality.

The UNCRPD

In utilizing the 2015 report of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations, there are several

notable trends in the relative compliance of the state to the UNCRPD (The Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia, 2015). It is through these trends that one is able to first understand the sharp

juxtaposition in the extent of welfare and services provided by the state with the lack of data

collected about disability.

Firstly, there is an overarching lack of disability specific legislation in Saudi Arabia.

Article 15 which prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment; Article 16

prohibits exploitation, violence and abuse; Article 18 guarantees movement and nationality;

Article 21 guarantees freedom of expression and opinion, and access to information; Article 29
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grantees participation in political and public life; and Article 30 guarantees participation in

cultural life, recreation, leisure and sport, but all unsupported by disability specific legislation

(The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2015, p. 24-53). Saudi Arabia asserts that these rights are all

realized through preexisting legislation in which disability is included as a relevant group, or not

explicitly noted at all (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2015, p. 24-53).

In addition, the Saudi regime has overwhelmingly relied on the equitable and just values

of Islam and Sharia in guaranteeing rights in the UNCRPD. Article 5 which guarantees equality

and non-discrimination; Article 6 which discuses women with disabilities; Article 10 which

guarantees the right to life; Article 11 which discusses situations of risk and humanitarian

emergency; Article 12 that guarantees equal protection under the law; Article 14 that protects the

life and security of person; Article 17 that guarantees the integrity of the person; Article 22

which guarantees right to privacy; and Article 23 that guarantees respect for family and home are

viewed as being met simply through the Islamic nature of law in Saudi Arabia (The Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia, 2015, p. 11-33). While it is clear those principles are espoused by the Quran and

Sunnah, there is no guarantee that the Saudi regime will produce rulings as such. These rights

focus on civil, political and social protections, and are perhaps the most important tenets of the

UNCRPD. Without an explicit legal framework for the protection of rights, or for use as the

basis of legal claims, the condition of disability rights in the KSA is uncertain.

This is particularly relevant in relation to Article 12, which can be considered the

unofficial backbone of the UNCRPD. Equal protection under the law both ensures that persons

with disabilities are included in the rights and protections of domestic law, as well as have

avenues to challenge the violation of their rights (United Nations Convention on the Rights of

Persons with Disabilities art. 12, para. 1). In the United States, supplementary legislation like the
DOLLARS, NOT DATA 12

ADA further ensures that persons with disabilities have the legal grounds to assert and protect

their rights. Because the KSA does not possess legislation to protect the rights embodied by

Article 12, the legal and political access of Saudis with disabilities is vulnerable.

However, overarchingly Saudi Arabians do not have access to civil and political rights in

practice. Many of the rights associated with democratic governments, including the right to vote

and run for office, are not realized simply because of the structure of the Saudi government.

Furthermore, the widespread reduction of civil rights, such as speech, expression, and assembly,

has impacted all Saudi citizens. A prominent and current example of this is the killing of

journalist Jamal Khashoggi by state-sponsored forces for his outspoken criticism of the Saudi

regime (Haake and Clark 2018). As a totalitarian regime, Saudi Arabia has frequently violated

and effectively removed the civil and political rights of its citizens. In this manner, a lack of

realization of Article 12 of the UNCRPD is not a facet of disability discrimination, but of an

oppressive regime. Regardless, it is clear there is no effective mechanism for Saudi citizens with

disabilities to obtain and protect these rights.

While there are many areas in which Saudi Arabia does explicitly comply with the

UNCRPD, the government has addressed tenets of the Convention in a small number of ways.

These state actions can be organized under the provision of welfare, of physical goods, and of

government services. Remarkably, and as previously mentioned, no disability specific

legislation in the KSA provides access to civil or political protections. Rather the entirety of

Saudi Arabia’s addressal of disability is through the provision of economic rights.

Under the umbrella of welfare, Council of Ministers Decision No. 76 and No. 82 both

provide persons with disabilities with housing grants. These allowances aim to meet Article 19

of the UNCPRD, which asserts the right to independent living (2004; 2014). Furthermore, 2007
DOLLARS, NOT DATA 13

Royal Decree provides annual benefits between $4,000-$20,000 annually in order to meet the

guarantees to an adequate standard of living and social protection under Article 28 (The

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2015, p. 50). The provision of goods is ensured under Royal Decree

No. M/12 for aid and accommodation in court settings (2013). While this attempts to address

Article 13 of the UNCRPD, the language of the law indicates that its goal is to aid witnesses with

disabilities, not defendants with impairments. Article 19 is also addressed by Prime Ministers

Ordinance No. 7/1285, under which the state will modify vehicles so they can be driven

exclusively with hands, and Prime Ministers Ordinance No. 7852/1, which grantees the provision

prosthetics to persons with disabilities (1989; 2008).

The primary addressal of the Saudi state is the provision of services to persons with

disabilities. Pertaining to Article 7 of the UNCRPD, Council of Ministers Decree No. 227 and

Minister of Health Decision No. 14021 address the provision of institutional services to children

with disabilities (2007; 2004). This notably is not a full embodiment of Article 7 or the

UNCRPD, which stresses the need for integrated living when possible. Article 20, which

delineates the right to mobility, is supposedly addressed by the Ministries of Social Affairs,

Labor, and the Interior, however there is no specific legislation regarding their functioning for

persons with disabilities (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2015, p. 30). The same is true for

Article 24, the right to education, and Article 25, the right to health, which are addressed by the

Ministries of Education and Health respectively (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2015, p. 33-41).

Under the rights to habitation and rehabilitation addressed by Article 26, Royal Decree M/37 and

Council of Ministers Decisions No. 34 and 291 assert government funding for state and

nongovernmental social habitation services (2000; 1980; 2012). Overarchingly, the state has
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produced services and aid to address disability without providing adequate legal protection for

civil and political rights in law.

Part II: Article 31 and the Political Economy of the KSA

Article 31 of the UNCRPD outlines the collection, handing, and dissemination of data on

disability. Outside of the tenets of the article that address the ethical collection of data, much of

its verbiage discusses the use and accessibility of this information. Importantly, Article 31

asserts that statistics and data should be used to create better policies within the state regarding

disability, and that persons and groups with disabilities should be able to access this information.

Saudi Arabia has been frequently criticized by medical practitioners, social scientists, and non-

governmental organizations for its clearly incomplete and inaccurate statistics keeping on

disability. In the 2000 Saudi Census, disability was found to have a prevalence of 3.6% within

the population (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2010, p. 55). This assertion is clearly inaccurate,

as the global incidence of disability is around 15.6% of the population, while the United States

has a 19% incidence rate (Al-Jadid, 2013). Furthermore, in Saudi Arabia about 56% of all

marriages are consanguineous, a rate that is much higher than in the United States (Al-Jadid,

2013). This is known to cause genetic abnormalities and disease, often resulting in intellectual

and developmental disabilities (Al-Jadid, 2013). In this manner, it is clear that the Saudi

population should have a much higher prevalence of disability reflected in statistics keeping.

This inaccuracy in state-sponsored data collection can be further demonstrated in

comparison to data collected by non-governmental sources. The most significant example of

such projects is the 2007 World Health Organization study, which found that 21.6% of the Saudi

populace had was what considered to be an “extreme disability” (Al Jumah Sultan Al Mubarak,

2013). This rate does not include more minor impairments. In this context, it is clear not only
DOLLARS, NOT DATA 15

that there is an incredibly high rate of disability in the KSA, but also that state conducted surveys

have been unable or unwilling to produce accurate data. As prevalence is a very simple statistic

to measure relative to data that demonstrates the quality of life for persons with disabilities, the

KSA dramatically in violated Article 31.

The one area of research on disability with depth is the study of children with disability.

The majority of data collection within the KSA has surrounded the prevalence and classification

of disability within children (Al-Jadid, 2013). This can be considered problematic for several

reasons. Firstly, the over-emphasis of data collection in this age range takes away from studies

on the adult population. Thus, there is a large proportion of the Saudi population with

disabilities that has and currently is being excluded from research. Furthermore, statistics

keeping that could demonstrate Saudi compliance with tenets of the UNCRPD, including

employments and education rates, cannot be gathered from young children under the care of their

parents. For example, one cannot observe if the Saudi government has put adequate mechanisms

in place for independent living if the only data available is on children who live under the care of

their parents (as is age-appropriate). Finally, the persons who could use such statistics to

mobilize for better access to their rights are adults with disabilities. As none of the statistics

available reflect the conditions of adult Saudis with impairments, these individuals are less able

to make a compelling case for their rights.

Although the mechanisms and labor to collect data is extensive, it is not the most change-

intensive tenet of the UNCRPD. For example, one could assert that providing a widespread

network of free or low cost medical services, or providing extensive annual allowances would be

much more cumbersome. However, I believe the economic context of the Saudi regime puts the

state in a position where the allocation of money and services to citizens is not only
DOLLARS, NOT DATA 16

advantageous, but commonplace. In contrast, the accurate collection of data could contradict the

aims of the regime.

The Saudi Arabian Oil Company, a nationalized industry, brought in $34 billion dollars

just within the first two financial quarters of 2017 (Denning, 2017). Overarchingly, Saudi Oil is

worth over $1 trillion (Denning, 2017). Saudi Arabia has the second most valuable reserve of

natural resources of any state (Denning, 2017). I assert this wealth positions Saudi Arabia to

take part in a process described by the political-economic theory of the “resource curse”. As a

facet of international study, the concept describes states with extremely valuable, nationalized

natural resources (Ross, 1999). These states not only are more likely to become autocratic

regimes, but also more likely to maintain totalitarian power (Ross, 1999). The prevalence of

resource wealth is deeply linked to the restriction of rights, and the implementation of unpopular

government policies (Ross, 1999). Scholars assert this is due to the wealth of the state, which

allows such governments to “buy off their citizens” in “[providing] them with benefits with

virtually no taxation” (Ross, 2011). Subsidies, “handouts” in the form of monetary allowances

or goods, tax-cuts, etc. are all provided without strain from the government, appeasing the

populace and manufacturing political stability (Ross, 2011). The cost of dissent in this context is

high, as are the benefits of remaining complacent. The economic conditions of the Saudi regime

due to their oil industry are deeply analogous with the environment of the resource curse.

While this theory has been tested over time, it has never been more validated than in the

Middle East and North Africa. The wealth of oil is so profound, political-economist Micheal L.

Ross has differentiated the phenomenon within the region, calling it the “oil curse” (2011). As

composed of states with large, but varying oil deposits, the region is ideal for studying the

influence of oil wealth on political action. Since the region overarchingly nationalized its oil
DOLLARS, NOT DATA 17

deposits in the 1900s, the states with the smallest reserves of oil have provided the greatest

access to political and social “freedom” (Ross, 2011). Countries with less than $100 per capita

in oil wealth are three times more likely to have democratic governments (Ross, 2011). During

the Arab Spring, in which there was mass mobilization for democratization across the Gulf and

North Africa, there was a direct correlation with the oil wealth of governments and the speed and

success of democratization (Mitchell, 2011). With true democracy representing the zenith of

access to civil and political rights, the suppression of democratization by regimes within the

Middle East and North Africa can be seen as exemplifying unpopular restriction of their citizen’s

rights. As the states who successfully prevented democratic revolutions are the most richly

endowed with oil, it is clear the “oil curse” has deeply characterized the politics of the region.

As previously demonstrated, the Saudi Arabian regime has one of the wealthiest

aggregate resource deposits in the world. Thus the state has the capability to engage in this

process. Furthermore, the regime has historically and currently distributed this wealth to the

populace. For example, in 2011 alone, Saudi Arabia dedicated $136 billion to increasing wages

in the public sector, unemployment benefits, and housing subsidies (Ross, 2011). This enormous

allocation of wealth to the public sector is a textbook process of the oil curse. Even more

crucially, this flood of public expenditure followed the peak of the Arab Spring protests in Saudi

Arabia, and is considered one of the few concessions made by the government in relation to the

democratic mobilization of that period (Ross 2011). Thus, the use of Saudi oil wealth can be

tangibly linked to the creation of political stability and the maintenance of power. The

overwhelming economic benefit Saudi citizens receive from the government makes dissent less

likely and costlier. Furthermore, as these protests were directly linked to the democratization of

the state, and thus the expansion of human rights, it can be asserted that the resource wealth of
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the state has been used to maintain the repression of rights. It is apparent that the Saudi Arabian

populace has fallen prey to the oil curse, in that their government has been able to maintain

absolute power and stability despite mobilization for civil and political rights.

While the oil curse is discussed within the general political context, it is applicable to

disability rights in Saudi Arabia. Since it is easy and commonplace for the Saudi regime to

provide subsidies and goods to the entire population, providing services and welfare for a small

niche of the population is not relatively costly. Furthermore, these “handouts” have a politically

expedient purpose- the maintenance of power. Because persons with disabilities are assertedly

able to access healthcare, housing, education, etc. without cost, they are less likely to mobilize

against the government. Thus the provision of welfare and services to this portion of the

population serves the same purpose as the benefits provided to all Saudis- to pacify the citizenry.

With the extreme wealth of the Saudi government, the costs of providing services and welfare

are low, whereas the benefits of maintaining political stability are extremely high. Thus it can be

asserted that the Saudi addressal of disability is merely a reflection of their general strategy of

governance.

One could assert that the disability community in Saudi Arabia is too small a minority to

elicit this response. Clearly the small proportion of the population that identifies as having a

disability, around 4 percent, is not powerful enough to overthrow the Saudi government.

Especially with the strong stigma against disability in the KSA, the dissent of this small

community would not create political unrest equivalent to that experienced during the Arab

Spring. Thus the application of the oil curse to the context of disability could be considered

extreme.
DOLLARS, NOT DATA 19

However, the domestic populace is not the only base of support the Saudi government

must appeal to. Firstly, as a member state of the United Nations, Saudi Arabia has to

demonstrate a minimum effort to comply with human rights standards. As demonstrated in the

creation of the United Nations Sustainable Development goals, the addressal of disability is a

priority of the supranational organization (2015). The Saudi regime could simply ignore the

rights of its disabled citizens, and falsify its reports to the United Nations in terms of UNCRPD

compliance. However, if the disability community was to mobilize or protest, this could pose

repercussions for the regime and its standing within the international community.

Furthermore, as an economic ally of the United States, the KSA also has to demonstrate

some commitment to human rights. Again if dissent was to occur, thus disrupting the narrative

provided by the Saudi regime, the American government would face increased pressure to sever

economic partnerships with the state. Although it is unlikely that the United States would

abandon Saudi Arabia as an extremely valuable trade partner, there are apparent motivations that

would lead the KSA to provide benefits to the disability community. While the oil curse is used

within a domestic context, it can be seen that sustaining political stability within Saudi Arabia is

important to the relationship of the state with its international partnerships. As a state that value

autonomous rule and lack of foreign intervention, it is clear that creating an image of citizen

satisfaction is a motivating factor in the allocation of resources to Saudis with disabilities.

As seen in the comparison between Saudi law and the UNCRPD, the KSA heavily relies

upon the provision of services and welfare to assert compliance with the treaty (The Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia, 2015). In the context of the “oil curse” this the easiest demonstration of

compliance.
DOLLARS, NOT DATA 20

In contrast, data collection has potential negative repercussions for the political stability

and power monopoly of the regime. Overarchingly these statistics, if accurate, hold the potential

to disrupt the narrative of disability rights provided by the KSA to the international community.

Currently the dearth of data makes it nearly impossible to understand the context of disability in

Saudi Arabia. At the most basic level, there is no accurate measure of the percentage of the

Saudi population with disability. While the state provides an asserted breath of services,

including health care, housing, and allowances, there is no way to discern if most persons with

disabilities are accessing these resources. If the gap in data between the Saudi census and WHO

survey is correct, only approximately one-seventh of the disability community is acknowledged

by the government, and thus can access these resources. The proportion could be, and most

likely is, lower. In this manner, a lack of data is actually to the benefit of the regime. Whereas

providing services appears to be a form of compliance, the realization of Article 31 could counter

this asserted obedience. This would not only undermine the Saudi position with the United

Nations, but also potentially provoke domestic unrest.

In addition, providing statistics on the level of education, employment rates, average

annual income, etc. for Saudis with disabilities could further disrupt the reported nature of

disability rights in the state. This can be best understood in the context of UN soft law. The

Sustainable Development Goals, as aforementioned, distinctly include improvements for persons

with disabilities (2015). While Goals 4 (quality education), 8 (decent work and economic

growth), 10 (reduced inequality), and 11 (sustainable cities and communities) all explicitly

mention disability, Goal 17, which includes the development of statistics-keeping instruments, is

considered to be the backbone of the collection (Sustainable Development Goals, 2015). In this

manner, the UN Sustainable Development Goals tacitly acknowledge what is implicitly evident
DOLLARS, NOT DATA 21

in the UNCRPD- that without data collection, it is impossible to judge the extent to which

progress has been made. Both in accordance with United Nations soft and hard law, Saudi

Arabia has failed to provide the infrastructure through which they can be held accountable.

There is currently no manner of discerning if the Saudi policies have met their intended aims or

if their funding is allocated to the most pressing needs of the community. However, this

obscurity is to the benefit of the regime.

Even if the Saudi government is able to point to programs and funding for persons with

disabilities, there is no way to measure if these organizations have had any tangible impact.

Thus the status of persons with disabilities in Saudi Arabia is empirically unknown, and the

global community is forced to rely on the narrative provided by the Saudi regime. For a state

that has manicured political stability for nearly a century, autonomy is deeply valued. Thus the

provision of data which could prompt both national mobilization and international intervention is

obviously disincentivized. While it is clearly politically salient and unchallenging for Saudi

Arabia to provide resources for citizens with disabilities, collecting data would provide costs

with no foreseeable benefit for the regime.

Conclusion

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia possesses one of the most valuable collections of natural

resources in the world. This nationalized wealth provides unparalleled conditions for totalitarian

control and sustained order. Generally, this has allowed the state to provide tax-free benefits to

its citizens in exchange for the restriction of civil and political rights. In terms of disability

rights, this has allowed the regime to assert compliance to the UNCRPD through a network of

services and welfare provided to Saudis with disabilities. In this manner, the KSA has been able

to appease its Western allies and solidify its position globally without foreign or supranational
DOLLARS, NOT DATA 22

interference. In contrast, compliance to Article 31 of the UNCRPD through the collection of

data on disability would provide no benefit to the Saudi regime. Such statistics, if accurate, have

the potential to challenge the narrative of disability rights, and human rights, asserted by the

Saudi regime. Currently, and without such information, it is impossible to measure the

compliance of the KSA with the UNCRPD or the Sustainable Development Goals. While the

cost of implementing statistical studies on disability may be less than providing services, it is

clear the monetary cost is not what is most influential to Saudi action. Rather it is the

implications on the maintenance of power and stability. Thus the Saudi government has

provided an extensive network of services and welfare for the disability community because it is

politically expedient. In contrast, the implicit refusal of the KSA to comply with Article 31

occurs because data collection is potentially dangerous to the regime.

Based on these findings, it is important for the United States to consider their role in

contributing the oil wealth of the Saudi regime. In continuing to purchase larger amounts of oil

from the KSA, the United States is indirectly enabling the Saudi government to enact a style of

governance that directly contradicts American values. This connection should be further

discussed in foreign policy and economic regulation.

DOLLARS, NOT DATA 23

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