THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 149335. July 1, 2003]

EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR, petitioner, vs. LUIS BUNDALIAN, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, Executive Secretary,
Office of the President, AND GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, Secretary, Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR assails the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated April 18, 2001, affirming the decision of the Office of the President in Administrative Order No. 12
ordering petitioners dismissal as Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for
unexplained wealth.
Petitioners dismissal originated from an unverified letter-complaint, dated July 15, 1995, addressed by private
respondent LUIS BUNDALIAN to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. Private
respondent accused petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained
wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019. Private respondent charged that in 1993, petitioner and his
wife purchased a house and lot at 907 North Bel Aire Drive, Burbank, Los Angeles, California, making a down payment
of US$100,000.00. He further alleged that petitioners in-laws who were living in California had a poor credit standing
due to a number of debts and they could not have purchased such an expensive property for petitioner and his
wife. Private respondent accused petitioner of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects.
Private respondent attached to his letter-complaint the following documents:
a) a copy of a Grant Deed, dated May 27, 1993, where spouses David and Judith Tedesco granted the
subject property to petitioner and his wife;
b) a copy of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by petitioner and his wife in California appointing
petitioners sister-in-law Estela D. Fajardo as their attorney-in-fact, to negotiate and execute all documents
and requirements to complete the purchase of the subject property; and,
c) an excerpt from the newspaper column of Lito A. Catapusan in the Manila Bulletin, entitled Beatwatch,
where it was reported that a low-ranking, multimillionaire DPWH employee, traveled to Europe and the
U.S. with his family, purchased an expensive house in California, appointed a woman through an SPA to
manage the subject property and had hidden and unexplained wealth in the Philippines and in the U.S.
Accordingly, the letter-complaint and its attached documents were indorsed by the Philippine Consulate General
of San Francisco, California, to the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) [1] for
investigation. Petitioner, represented by counsel, submitted his counter-affidavit before the PCAGC alleging that the
real owner of the subject property was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo. Petitioner explained that in view of the unstable
condition of government service in 1991, his wife inquired from her family in the U.S. about their possible emigration to
the States. They were advised by an immigration lawyer that it would be an advantage if they had real property in the
U.S. Fajardo intimated to them that she was interested in buying a house and lot in Burbank, California, but could not
do so at that time as there was a provision in her mortgage contract prohibiting her to purchase another property
pending full payment of a real estate she earlier acquired in Palmdale, Los Angeles. Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank
property and put the title in the names of petitioner and his wife to support their emigration plans and to enable her at
the same time to circumvent the prohibition in her mortgage contract.
Petitioner likewise pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar cases filed before the
Ombudsman.[2] He attached to his counter-affidavit the Consolidated Investigation Report[3] of the Ombudsman
dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence.
From May 29, 1996 until March 13, 1997, the PCAGC conducted its own investigation of the complaint. While
petitioner participated in the proceedings and submitted various pleadings and documents through his counsel, private
respondent-complainant could not be located as his Philippine address could not be ascertained. In the course of the
investigation, the PCAGC repeatedly required petitioner to submit his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
(SALN), Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and Personal Data Sheet. Petitioner ignored these directives and submitted only
his Service Record. He likewise adduced in evidence the checks allegedly issued by his sister-in-law to pay for the
house and lot in Burbank, California. When the PCAGC requested the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to furnish it with
copies of petitioners SALN from 1992-1994, it was informed that petitioner failed to file his SALN for those years.
After the investigation, the PCAGC, in its Report to the Office of the President, made the following
findings: Petitioner purchased a house and lot in Burbank, California, for US$195,000.00 (or P3.9M at the exchange
rate prevailing in 1993). The sale was evidenced by a Grant Deed. The PCAGC concluded that the petitioner could not
have been able to afford to buy the property on his annual income of P168,648.00 in 1993 as appearing on his Service
Record. It likewise found petitioners explanation as unusual, largely unsubstantiated, unbelievable and
self-serving. The PCAGC noted that instead of adducing evidence, petitioners counsel exerted more effort in filing
pleadings and motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. It also took against petitioner his refusal to submit
his SALN and ITR despite the undertaking made by his counsel which raised the presumption that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced. The PCAGC concluded that as petitioners acquisition of the subject
property was manifestly out of proportion to his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it recommended
petitioners dismissal from service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019.
On August 24, 1998, the Office of the President, concurring with the findings and adopting the recommendation of
the PCAGC, issued Administrative Order No. 12, [4] ordering petitioners dismissal from service with forfeiture of all
government benefits.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. His appeal to the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed.[5]
Hence, this petition for review where petitioner raises the following issues for resolution: first, whether he was
denied due process in the investigation before the PCAGC; second, whether his guilt was proved
by substantial evidence; and, third, whether the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the
administrative case before the PCAGC moot and academic.
On the issue of due process, petitioner submits that the PCAGC committed infractions of the cardinal rules of
administrative due process when it relied on Bundalians unverified letter-complaint. He gripes that his counter-affidavit
should have been given more weight as the unverified complaint constitutes hearsay evidence. Moreover, petitioner
insists that in ruling against him, the PCAGC failed to respect his right to confront and cross-examine the complainant
as the latter never appeared in any of the hearings before the PCAGC nor did he send a representative therein.
We find no merit in his contentions. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to
explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. [6] In the case at
bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residence could not be
located.[7] Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due process because he failed to confront
and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in
the proceedings before it. He was duly represented by counsel. He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary
evidence, attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. 12 issued by the President
and eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active participation in every step of the investigation
effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process
requirement. He cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation. [8]
Neither can we sustain petitioners contention that the charge against him was unsupported by substantial
evidence as it was contained in an unverified complaint. The lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the
non-appearance of the complainant at the investigation did not divest the PCAGC of its authority to investigate the
charge of unexplained wealth. Under Section 3 of Executive Order No. 151 creating the PCAGC, complaints involving
graft and corruption may be filed before it in any form or manner against presidential appointees in the executive
department.Indeed, it is not totally uncommon that a government agency is given a wide latitude in the scope and
exercise of its investigative powers. The Ombudsman, under the Constitution, is directed to act on any complaint
likewise filed in any form and manner concerning official acts or omissions.The Court Administrator of this Court
investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but even anonymous complaints filed against court
employees or officials for violation of the Code of Ethical Conduct. This policy has been adopted in line with the serious
effort of the government to minimize, if not eradicate, graft and corruption in the service.
It is well to remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough
that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. [9] This was afforded to the
petitioner in the case at bar.
On the second issue, there is a need to lay down the basic principles in administrative investigations.
First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his
complaint.[10] Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might
conceivably opine otherwise.[11]
Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts
made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the
reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its
judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence.
Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross
abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the
sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to
receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned.[12]
In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that the subject property was in his name. However, he insisted that it was
his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo who paid for the property in installments. He submitted as proof thereof the checks
issued by Fajardo as payment for the amortizations of the property.His evidence, however, likewise fail to convince us.
First, the record is bereft of evidence to prove the alleged internal arrangement petitioner entered into with
Fajardo. He did not submit her affidavit to the investigating body nor did she testify before it regarding her ownership of
the Burbank property.
Second, the checks allegedly issued by Fajardo to pay for the monthly amortizations on the property have no
evidentiary weight as Fajardos mere issuance thereof cannot prove petitioners non-ownership of the property. Fajardo
would naturally issue the checks as she was appointed by petitioner as attorney-in-fact and the latter would naturally
course through her the payments for the Burbank property.
Third, petitioners own evidence contradict his position. We cannot reconcile petitioners denial of ownership of the
property with the loan statement[13] he adduced showing that he obtained a loan from the World Savings and Loan
Association for $195,000.00 on June 23, 1993 to finance the acquisition of the property.
Then, three (3) years later, on May 30, 1996, petitioner and his wife executed a Quitclaim Deed [14] donating the
Burbank property to his sisters-in-law Estela and Rose Fajardo allegedly to prove his non-ownership of the property. It
is obvious that the Quitclaim Deed is a mere afterthought, having been executed only after a complaint for unexplained
wealth was lodged against petitioner. Why the Quitclaim Deed included Rose Fajardo when it was only Estela Fajardo
who allegedly owned the property was not explained on the record. Petitioners evidence failed to clarify the issue as it
produced, rather than settled, more questions.
Petitioner admitted that the Grant Deed over the property was in his name. He never denied the existence and due
execution of the Grant Deed and the Special Power of Attorney he conferred to Estela Fajardo with respect to the
acquisition of the Burbank property. With these admissions, the burden of proof was shifted to petitioner to prove
non-ownership of the property. He cannot now ask this Court to remand the case to the PCAGC for reception of
additional evidence as, in the absence of any errors of law, it is not within the Courts power to do so. He had every
opportunity to adduce his evidence before the PCAGC.
Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioners stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the
Ombudsman rendered the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic.
To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this
review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers.[15]
Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank
property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged
misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative
power and control of the President over him.
As the PCAGCs investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no
application in the case at bar.
Thus, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly sustained petitioners dismissal from service as the complaint and
its supporting documents established that he acquired a property whose value is disproportionate to his income in the
government service, unless he has other sources of income which he failed to reveal. His liability was proved by
substantial evidence.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.

[1] Created under Executive Order No. 151, dated January 11, 1994, by then President Fidel V. Ramos and was
subsequently abolished by his successor, former President Joseph Estrada through E.O. 253, dated July 18,
2000.
[2] OMB-0-94-1172, OMB-0-94-1329 and OMB-0-94-1560.
[3] Rollo at 162-173.
[4] Id. at 54-60.
[5] Decision, dated April 18, 2001; Penned by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and concurred in by Associate
Justices Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole;Rollo at 41-50.
[6] Umali vs. Guingona, Jr., 305 SCRA 533 (2000); Audion Electric Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, 308 SCRA 340 (2000).
[7] See Letter of PCAGC Chairman Dario Rama to the Solicitor General, dated April 4, 2002; Rollo at 90.
[8] Emin vs. Chairman Corazon Alma de Leon, G.R. No. 139794, February 27, 2002.
[9] Ocampo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 322 SCRA 17 (2000).
[10] Lorena vs. Encomienda, 302 SCRA 632 (1999); Cortez vs. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 423 (1998).
[11] Enrique vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 180 (1994).
[12] Ramos vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 55 SCRA 330 (1974).
[13] See Supplement to the Petition; Rollo at 74.
[14] Id. at 75-78.
[15] Dinsay vs. Cioco, 264 SCRA 703 (1996).

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 157684. April 27, 2005]

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, petitioner, vs. PRISCILLA G. CAMPOSANO, ENRIQUE L. PEREZ, and IMELDA Q.
AGUSTIN, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions, the disciplining authority must
make an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its face, a decision imposing administrative sanctions
must show the bases for its conclusions. While the investigation of a case may be delegated to and conducted by
another body or group of officials, the disciplining authority must nevertheless weigh the evidence gathered and
indicate the applicable law. In this manner, the respondents would be informed of the bases for the sanctions and thus
be able to prepare their appeal intelligently. Such procedure is part of the sporting idea of fair play in a democracy.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 19, 2003
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 67720. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the CSC are
hereby SET ASIDE.

The Department of Health is hereby ordered to:

1) Reinstate petitioners without loss of seniority rights but without prejudice to an administrative
investigation that may be undertaken against them by the DOH should the evidence warrant; and
2) Pay petitioners their back salaries from the time their preventive suspension expired. Mandatory
leave credits shall not be charged against their leave credits.[3]

The Facts

The facts are narrated by the CA as follows:

[Respondents] are former employees of the Department of HealthNational Capital Region (hereinafter DOH-NCR).
They held various positions as follows: [Respondent] Priscilla B. Camposano (hereinafter Camposano) was the
Finance and Management Officer II, [Respondent] Imelda Q. Agusin (hereinafter Agustin) was an Accountant I, and
[Respondent] Enrique L. Perez (hereinafter Perez) was the Acting Supply Officer III.

On May 15, 1996, some concerned [DOH-NCR] employees filed a complaint before the DOH Resident Ombudsman
Rogelio A. Ringpis (hereinafter the Resident Ombudsman) against Dir. IV Rosalinda U. Majarais, Acting Administrative
Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and [respondents], arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500
bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth P330,000.00 from Lumar
Pharmaceutical Laboratory on May 13, 1996.

On August 6, 1996, the Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health
recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against [respondents]
and their co-respondents.

On August 8, 1996, the Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the [respondents] and their co-respondents for
Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019. On October 25, 1996, then Executive Secretary Ruben D.
Torres issued Administrative Order No. 298 (hereafter AO 298) creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the
administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential Commission
Against Graft and Corruption (hereafter PCAGC) on October 26, 1996. The same reads:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, for your information and guidance, a certified copy of Administrative Order No.
298 dated October 25, 1996 entitled CREATING AN AD HOC COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES FILED AGAINST NCR HEALTH DIRECTOR ROSALINDA U. MAJARAIS AND OTHER
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION.

On December 2, 1996, the PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH. After the investigation, it issued a
resolution on January 23, 1998 disposing [respondents] case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission finds Respondents Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G.
Camposano, Financial Management Chief II, Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting Administrative Officer V, Imelda Q. Agustin,
Accountant I and Enrique L. Perez, Acting Supply Officer III, all of the Department of Health National Capital Region
(DOH-NCR) guilty as charged and so recommends to his Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos that the penalty of
dismissal from the government service be imposed thereon.

SO ORDERED.

On April 20, 1998, President Ramos issued [Administrative Order No. 390 (hereinafter AO 390)] that reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Dr. Rosalinda U. Majarais is hereby found guilty as charged and, as
recommended by the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption, is meted the Penalty of dismissal from the
service. The records of the case with respect to the other respondents are remanded to Secretary Carmencita N.
Reodica, Department of Health for appropriate action.
Thereafter, on May 8, 1998, the Secretary of Health issued an Order disposing of the case against [respondents] and
[Horacio Cabrera]. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Resolution rendered by the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PCAGC) dated 23 January 1998 on the above-captioned case, respondents Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial
Management Chief II, Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting Administrative Officer V, Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant I and
Enrique L. Perez, Acting Supply Officer III, all of the Department of Health NCR are hereby DISMISSED from the
service.

SO ORDERED.

On May 28, 1998 [respondents] filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order. The Secretary of Health denied the
same on June 5, 1998. Thus, [respondents] filed a Notice of Appeal on June 29, 1998.

On July 17, 1998, [respondents] filed their appeal with the CSC. The appeal was denied by the CSC on May 21, 1999.
Horacio Cabrera filed a separate appeal with the CSC which was denied on August 17, 1999. [Respondents] motion for
reconsideration was denied on September 30, 1999. While Cabreras motion for reconsideration was denied on
January 27, 2000. [Respondents], however, received the resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on
November 2001. Thus, Horacio Cabrera was able to appeal to [the CA] the CSCs resolutions ahead of [respondents].
The petition of Cabrera was granted [by the CA] in a decision dated October 15, 2001 with a dispositive portion which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are hereby
SET ASIDE.

Petitioner Horacio D. Cabrera is exonerated of the administrative charges against him. The Civil Service Commission is
hereby ORDERED[:]

(1) To reinstate petitioner immediately, without loss of seniority rights; and

(2) To pay petitioners back salaries from the time his preventive suspension expired. Mandatory leave credits shall not
be charged against his leave credits.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Not satisfied with the denial by the CSC (Civil Service Commission) of their appeal, respondents brought the
matter to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

While the herein assailed Decision made no reference to the separate appeal of Horacio Cabrera, the CA
nonetheless used the same legal bases for annulling the CSCs Resolution against respondents.[5]
The appellate court held that the PCAGCs jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only to presidential
appointees. Thus, the Commission had no power to investigate the charges against respondents. [6] Moreover, in simply
and completely relying on the PCAGCs findings, the secretary of health failed to comply with administrative due
process.[7]
Hence, this Petition.[8]

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following grounds for our consideration:

I
The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) did not
have jurisdiction to investigate the anomalous transaction involving respondents.

II

The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the authority to investigate and decide was relinquished by the Secretary
of Health and that the Secretary of Health merely performed a mechanical act when she ordered the dismissal of
respondents from government service.

III

The Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the fact that an exhaustive investigation was already conducted by the
Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) which resulted in the finding that the anomalous
contract for the purchase of medicines without the required public bidding is patently illegal. [9]

The second and the third grounds will be discussed together, as they are necessarily intertwined.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Jurisdiction to Investigate

Executive Order (EO) No. 151[10] granted the PCAGC the jurisdiction to investigate administrative complaints
against presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft and corruption. From a cursory reading of its provisions, it is
evident that EO 151 authorizes the PCAGC to investigate charges against presidential, not non-presidential,
appointees. In its Preamble, specifically in its Whereas clauses, the EO specifically tasked [the PCAGC] to x x x
investigate presidential appointees charged with graft and corruption x x x. More pointedly, Section 3 states that the
Commission shall have jurisdiction over all administrative complaints involving graft and corruption filed in any form or
manner against presidential appointees x x x. We quote the pertinent provisions below:

Section 3. Jurisdiction. The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all administrative complaints involving graft and
corruption filed in any form or manner against presidential appointees, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations. (emphasis supplied)

Section 4. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Commission shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

(a) Investigation The Commission shall have the power to investigate administrative complaints against presidential
appointees in the executive department of the government, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, charged with graft and corruption. In the exercise thereof, the Commission is (1) authorized to summon
witnesses, administer oaths, or take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation by subpoena ad testificandum
and subpoena duces tecum, and do such other acts necessary and incidental to the discharge of its function and duty
to investigate the said administrative complaints; and (2) empowered to call upon and secure the assistance of any
department, bureau, office, agency, or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

The Commission shall confine itself to cases of graft and corruption involving one or a combination of the following
criteria:

1. Presidential appointees with the rank equivalent to or higher than an Assistant Regional Director;

2. The amount involved is at least Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00);

3. Those which threaten grievous harm or injury to the national interest; and
4. Those which may be assigned to it by the President.[11]

The Commission may refer to the Office of the Ombudsman, when warranted and necessary, any case calling for the
investigation and/or prosecution of the party or parties concerned for violation of anti-graft and corruption laws.

Administrative investigation of complaints against presidential appointees currently undertaken by various presidential
committees or government agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations shall continue
notwithstanding the creation and organization of the Commission. This, however, shall be without prejudice to the
Commission, in its discretion, taking over the investigation if the matter under investigation is within its jurisdiction.

(b) Coordination The Commission shall coordinate with different government agencies for the purpose of eradicating
opportunities and the climate favorable to the commission of graft and corruption. x x x. [12] (emphasis supplied)

On the basis of the foregoing verba legis approach, respondents claim that the PCAGC did not have jurisdiction
over them, because they were not presidential appointees.
The Court notes, however, that respondents were not investigated pursuant to EO 151. The investigation was
authorized under Administrative Order No. 298 dated October 25, 1996, which had created an Ad Hoc Committee to
look into the administrative charges filed against Director Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G. Camposano, Horacio D.
Cabrera, Imelda Q. Agustin and Enrique L. Perez.
The Investigating Committee was composed of all the members of the PCAGC: Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo,
Commissioner Dario C. Rama and Commissioner Jaime L. Guerrero. The Committee was directed by AO 298 to follow
the procedure prescribed under Section 38 to 40 of the Civil Service Law (PD 807), as amended. It was tasked to
forward to the Disciplining Authority the entire records of the case, together with its findings and recommendations, as
well as the draft decision for the approval of the President.
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law.[13] With AO 298 as mandate,
the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the
PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
Parenthetically, the perceived vacuum in EO 151 with regard to cases involving non-presidential appointees was
rectified in Executive Order No. 12,[14] which created the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). Non-presidential
appointees who may have acted in conspiracy, or who may have been involved with a presidential appointee, may now
be investigated by the PAGC.[15]

Second and Third Issues:

Validity of Health Secretarys Decision

The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under the formers jurisdiction. [16] Thus, the health secretary
had disciplinary authority over respondents.
Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the jurisdiction of the President, in line
with the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. [17] While the Chief Executive directly
dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless recognized the health secretarys disciplinary authority over
respondents when he remanded the PCAGCs findings against them for the secretarys appropriate action.[18]
As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report
the facts from which a decision may be based. [19] In the present case, the secretary effectively delegated the power to
investigate to the PCAGC.
Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the power
to impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their authority was limited to conducting investigations and preparing
their findings and recommendations. The power to impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, who had to
observe due process prior to imposing penalties.
Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the
respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be
observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support
itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal
must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply
accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would
know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.[20]
The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in the present factual milieu.
Noncompliance with the sixth requisite is equally evident from the health secretarys Order dismissing the respondents
thus:

ORDER

This refers to the Resolution of the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAG[C]) on the above
captioned case dated January 23, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission finds Respondents Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G.
Camposano, Financial Management Chief II, [Horacio] D. Cabrera, Acting Supply Officer III, all of the Department of
HealthNational Capital Region (DOH-NCR) guilty as charged and so recommends to his Excellency President Fidel V.
Ramos that the penalty of dismissal from the government be imposed thereon.

Acting on the aforequoted resolution of the PCAGC[,] His Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative
Order No. 390 dated [A]pril 20, 1998, resolving thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Dr. Rosalinda U. Majarais is hereby found guilty as charged and, as
recommended by the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption, is meted the penalty of dismissal from the
service. The records of the case with respect to the other respondents are remanded to Secretary Carmencita N.
Reodica, Department of Health for appropriate action.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Resolution rendered by the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PCAGC) dated January 23, 1998 on the above captioned case, respondents Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial
Management Chief II; Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting Administrative Officer V; Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant I; and
Enrique G. Perez, Acting Supply Officer III; all of the Department of HealthNCR, are hereby DISMISSED from the
service.[21]

Concededly, the health secretary has the competence and the authority to decide what action should be taken
against officials and employees who have been administratively charged and investigated. However, the actual
exercise of the disciplining authoritys prerogative requires a prior independent consideration of the law and the facts.
Failure to comply with this requirement results in an invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and
solely rely on an investigators recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered. There
can be no shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the reputation, and the livelihood of the person administratively
charged.
In the present case, the health secretarys two-page Order dismissing respondents pales in comparison with the
presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Prior to the issuance of his seven-page decision, President Fidel V.
Ramos conducted a restudy of the doctors case. He even noted a violation that had not been considered by the
PCAGC.[22] On the other hand, Health Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica simply and blindly relied on the dispositive
portion of the Commissions Resolution. She even misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the recommendation with
regard to Respondents Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.
The Order of Secretary Reodica denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration also failed to correct the
deficiency in the initial Order.[23] She improperly relied on the Presidents findings in AO 390 which, however, pertained
only to the administrative charge against Dr. Majarais, not against respondents. To repeat, the Chief Executive
recognized that the disciplinary jurisdiction over respondents belonged to the health secretary, [24] who should have
followed the manner in which the President had rendered his action on the recommendation.
The Presidents endorsement of the records of the case for the appropriate action of the health secretary[25] did not
constitute a directive for the immediate dismissal of respondents. Like that of President Ramos, the decision of
Secretary Reodica should have contained a factual finding and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable
respondents to know the bases for their dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so desired.
To support its position, petitioner cites American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents.[26] However, this case merely
authorized the delegation of the power to investigate, but not the authority to impose sanctions. Verily, in requiring the
disciplining authority to exercise its own judgment and discretion in deciding a case, American Tobacco supports the
present respondents cause. In that case, the petitioners objected to the appointment of hearing officers and sought the
personal hearing of their case by the disciplining authority. [27] The Court, however, sustained the right to delegate the
power to investigate, as long as the adjudication would be made by the deciding authority.
By the same token, the Constitution[28] grants the Supreme Court disciplinary authority over all lower court justices
and judges, as well as judicial employees and lawyers. While the investigation of administrative complaints is delegated
usually to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), [29] the Court
nonetheless makes its own judgments of the cases when sanctions are imposed. It does not merely adopt or solely rely
on the recommendations of the OCA or the IBP.
Inasmuch as the health secretarys twin Orders were patently void for want of due process, the CA did not err in
refusing to discuss the merit of the PCAGCs (or the Ad Hoc Committees) recommendations. Such a discussion should
have been made by the health secretary before it could be passed upon by the CA.
In representation of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General insists that respondents are guilty of the charges
and, like Dr. Majarais, deserve dismissal from the service. Suffice it to stress that the issue in this case is not the guilt of
respondents, but solely due process.
In closing, the Court reiterates the oft-quoted aphorism that the end does not justify the means. Guilt cannot be
pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless due process is first observed. This is the essence of fairness and the rule of
law in a democracy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in
the sense that the authority of the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under Administrative Order 298
is SUSTAINED. Being violative of administrative due process, the May 8, 1998 and the June 5, 1998 Orders of the
health secretary are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be REMANDED to the Department of
Health, so that proper steps can be taken to correct the due-process errors pointed out in this Decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 18-71.

[2] Id., pp. 73-80. Seventeenth Division. Penned by Justice Juan Q. Enriquez Jr., with the concurrence of Justices
Bernardo P. Abesamis (Division chairman) and Edgardo F. Sundiam.
[3] Assailed Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 79.
[4] Id., pp. 2-4 & 8-10.
[5] See Cabrera v. Department of Health, CA-GR SP No. 57615, October 15, 2001; CA rollo, pp. 147-163.
[6] Assailed Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 11.
[7] Id., pp. 6 & 12.
[8] The case was deemed submitted for decision on March 29, 2004, upon this Courts receipt of petitioners
Memorandum, signed by Solicitor Elma M. Rafallo-Lingan and Associate Solicitor Josephine de Sagon Mejia.
Respondents Memorandum, signed by Atty. Gil D. Genorga Jr., was received by this Court on March 3, 2004.
[9] Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 13-14; rollo, pp. 364-365.
[10] Creating a Presidential Commission to Investigate Administrative Complaints Involving Graft and Corruption, issued
on January 11, 1994.
[11] Petitioner incorrectly used this provision to argue that EO 151 covered non-presidential appointees. Since this
provision belongs to paragraph (a), its applicability is limited to presidential appointees only. Necessarily, a
case assigned to the PCAGC should refer to a presidential appointee.
EO 151 should be read in its entirety, each part or section construed together as a harmonious whole. The
jurisdiction conferred on PCAGC refers to the investigation of charges against presidential appointees. This
was the intention of the Executive Order, as articulated in the Whereas clause and as provided in 3 and 4.
[12] As amended by Executive Order No. 151-A, Amending Executive Order No. 151 Dated 11 January 1994, enacted
on January 21, 1995.
[13] 17, Article VII, Constitution; 1, Chapter 1, Title I, Book III, Executive Order 292. See also Rodriguez v. Santos (119
Phil. 723, 727, February 29, 1964), in which the Court sustained the Presidents power to appoint a fact-finding
investigator, notwithstanding the lack of disciplining authority over the public official concerned.
[14] Creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and Providing for its Powers, Duties and Functions and for Other
Purposes, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on April 16, 2001. The PAGC took over the National
Anti-Corruption Commission which, under President Joseph Ejercito Estradas Executive Order No. 268 dated
July 18, 2000, had replaced the PCAGC.
[15] The pertinent provision states:
Section 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions.
xxxxxxxxx
(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the authority to investigate or hear administrative
cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the government and any of its agencies and
instrumentalities x x x occupying the position of assistant regional director, or an equivalent rank, and higher,
otherwise classified as Salary Grade 26 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758). In the same manner, the Commission shall have jurisdiction to investigate a
non-presidential appointee who may have acted in conspiracy or may have been involved with a presidential
appointee or ranking officer mentioned in this subsection. x x x.
[16] Paragraph (2), 47, Chapter 6, Book V, Executive Order 292.
[17] See Umali v. Guingona, 365 Phil. 77, 86, March 29, 1999; Larin v. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713, 725,
October 16, 1997. See also David v. Villegas, 81 SCRA 642, 648, February 28, 1978.
[18] AO 390, p. 7; rollo, p. 109.
[19] Mollaneda v. Umacob, 411 Phil. 159, 173, June 6, 2001; American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA
287, 295, October 14, 1975. See Lupo v. Administrative Action Board, 190 SCRA 69, 75, September 26, 1990;
see also paragraph (3), 47, Chapter 1, Book V, Executive Order 292. The department secretary is specifically
empowered to delegate the investigation of complaints to subordinates or other officials for their report and
recommendation.
[20] Singson v. National Labor Relations Commission, 274 SCRA 358, 364, June 19, 1997; Eastern Broadcasting
Corporation v. Dans, 137 SCRA 628, 634, July 19, 1985; Doruelo v. Commission on Elections, 133 SCRA 376,
382, November 21, 1984; Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 644, February 27, 1940.
[21] Rollo, pp. 110-111.
[22] The President noted that the Memorandum of Agreement executed by Dr. Majarais with the suppliers arrogated the
mandated duty of the Bids and Awards Committee to award a contract to the winning bidder in the form of a
Resolution. AO 390, p. 6; rollo, p. 108.
[23] Order on the Motion for Reconsideration, DOH v. Dr. Rosalinda U. Majarais, dated June 5, 1998; rollo, pp. 112-113.
[24] AO 390, p. 6; rollo, p. 108.
[25] AO 390, p. 7; rollo, p. 109.
[26] 67 SCRA 287, October 14, 1975.
[27] Id., p. 291.
[28] 6, Article VIII, Constitution; 5, pars. (5) & (6), Article VIII, Constitution. See also Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464,
467, April 22, 1993; In re Edillon, 84 SCRA 554, 568, August 3, 1978.
[29] The Office of the Court Administrator was created to assist the Supreme Court in the exercise of the latters
administrative supervision over all the courts. (PD 828, as amended by PD 842, enacted on November 18,
1975). See Rule 139-B, Rules of Court, for the procedu