EN BANC

[G.R. No. 31339. November 27, 1929.]

THOS. N. POWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Defendant-

Appellant.

Roman J. Lacson, for Appellant.

Alva J. Hill, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. MORTGAGE; CREDITS, PREFERRED AND ORDINARY. — A mortgage creditor who is at the

same time a holder of promissory notes for the value of fertilizers used in the cultivation of the
mortgaged lands, and who collects the products thereof and applies them to his mortgage credit, waives
the preferential right to said products granted to him by article 1922, case 6, of the Civil Code, the
amount of said promissory notes becoming an ordinary credit.

2. ID., JUDGMENT DEBTOR’S RIGHT TO FRUITS OF PROPERTY EXECUTED. — The judgment

debtor in possession of a land is entitled to collect its fruits and rents during the year fixed by the law
for the redemption. (Riosa v. Verzosa and Bulan, 26 Phil., 85; Velasco v. Rosenberg’s Incorporated, 32
Phil., 72.)

3. ID.; CONSOLIDATION OF OWNERSHIP. — If the period for redemption expires without the
judgment debtor having made use of his right, the ownership of the land sold becomes consolidated in
the purchaser, who thereupon becomes entitled to collect its fruits and rents, paying the judgment
debtor the expenses of cultivation, harvesting and preservation (article 356, Civil Code).

DECISION

VILLA-REAL, J.:

The present appeal was taken by the Philippine National Bank from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo ordering it to pay the sum of P7,926.18 to the plaintiff, Thomas N. Powell, together
with the legal interest thereon from October 9, 1928 until fully paid, with the costs of the trial.

In support of its appeal, the bank assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the lower court
in its decision, to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The lower court erred: jgc:chanrobl es.com.ph

"1. In not holding that the fact that the fertilizer purchased by Severino Aldeguer of Felipe Gomez was
used on the sugar cane planted on the land in question, has created a lien upon said sugar cane to secure
the payment of the promissory notes issued for the fertilizers.

"2. In holding that there is no legal provision in force in these Islands applicable to said lien.

"3. In not holding that the provisions of articles 356 and 1922 of the Civil Code are applicable to the
instant case.

"4. In not absolving the Philippine National Bank from the complaint with costs against the plaintiff." cralaw virtua1aw library

The following facts, agreed upon by the parties, are pertinent and necessary to the solution of the
questions raised in this appeal: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On December 17, 1920, in order o secure the payment of the sum of P17,000 with 12 per cent interest
per annum, Severino P. Aldeguer executed a mortgage deed in favor of the Philippine National Bank on
lots Nos. 1318 and 470 of the cadastral survey of Pontevedra, Occidental Negros, appearing upon the
original certificates of title Nos. 10977 and 10978, issued by the registrar of deeds of said Province of
Occidental Negros (Exhibit E).

On July 5, 1923, after a liquidation of accounts between Severino P. Aldeguer and the Philippine
National Bank, from which it appeared that the former owned the latter the sum of P33,348.75, the
former mortgage deed (Exhibit E) was amended making the mortgaged property liable for the new
amount with 8 per cent interest per annum, and retaining the other conditions of the contract (Exhibit
F).

On July 6, 1923, in order to secure the payment to the Philippine National Bank of the additional sum
of P12,000 with interest, Severino P. Aldeguer executed a second mortgage in favor of said bank of the
said lots, Nos. 1318 and 470 of the Pontevedra cadastre, and a first mortgage on the sugar-cane harvest
of 1923-1924 on said land, as well as on twenty-two head of labor cattle (Exhibit G).

On February 23, 1925, in pursuance of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, dated October 31, 1924, in civil case No. 25663 of said court, wherein the Asia Banking
Corporation was the plaintiff, and Severino P. Aldeguer and others were the defendants, the sheriff of
the Province of Occidental Negros levied execution on the aforementioned lots, Nos. 1318 and 470,
mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit B).

Following the procedure prescribed by law, the provincial sheriff of Occidental Negros on March 30,
1925 sold at public auction, all Severino P. Aldeguer’s rights, title and interest in said lots Nos. 1318
and 470 to the Asia Banking Corporation, as the highest bidder for the sum of P4,000. The writ of
execution was for the sum of P4,625 with interest at 9 per centum per annum from September 20, 1920,
plus the cost, which amounted to P58.52 (Exhibits C and D). The sheriff issued a deed of sale of said
lands, which were described in certificates of title Nos. 10977 and 10978, in favor of the Asia Banking
Corporation and sent it to the register of deeds of Occidental Negros by registered main on May 29,
1925, having been recorded upon receipt thereof in Bacolod.

On March 28, 1925, Severino P. Aldeguer bought 40 tons of fertilizer from Felipe Gomez for use in the
cultivation of the two parcels of land mortgaged by him to the Philippine National Bank, executing a
promissory note for P5,200 payable on February 28, 1926.

On February 15, 1926, Severino P. Aldeguer again bought 3 tons of fertilizer from Felipe Gomez for
use upon the said land, executing a promissory note for P390, payable on January 15, 1927.

These promissory notes were endorsed by Felipe Gomez to the Philippine National Bank.

For some reason or other Severino P. Aldeguer failed to exercise his right of repurchase, and on April
23, 1928, the provincial sheriff of Occidental Negros executed the final deed of sale of Severino P.
Aldeguer’s land mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, in favor of the Asia Banking Corporation
(Exhibit 1).

On April 25, 1928, the Asia Banking Corporation sold said lots Nos. 1318 and 470 to Urquijo
Hermanos for P45,000, after undertaking to liberate them from all liens (Exhibit J).

On April 25, 1928, the Philippine National Bank furnished the Asia Banking Corporation the following
statement of Severino P. Aldeguer’s account up to April 25, 1928:

To remaining balance of P/Note signed by

Mr. Severino P. Aldeguer on July 5, 1923

for P32,373.64 P29,500.00

To interest unpaid up to August 31 1924 756.18

To interest due on P29,500 from September 1,

1924 to April 25, 1928, at 8% per annum

(3 yrs. 7 months and 25 days) 8,636.24

————

9,392.42

Less: Payment made on April 4, 1928 2,074.06 7,318.36

——— ————

Total 36,818.35
On April 26, 1928, the Asia Banking Corporation, through its attorneys tendered the Philippine
National Bank a check for P29,307 in payment of Severino P. Aldeguer’s debt to the latter, secured by
the mortgage of the lands abovementioned.

On April 27, 1928, the Philippine National Bank returned the check to the Asia Banking Corporation
with the following statement of Severino P. Aldeguer’s account with it:
To remaining balance of P/Note signed

by Mr. Severino P. Aldeguer on July 5,

1923 for P32,373.64 P29,500.00

To interest unpaid up to August 31, 1924 P756.18

To interest on P29,500 from September 1,

1924 to February 28, 1926 at 8%

per annum (1 yr. and 6 months) 3,540.00

To interest on P29,500 from March 1,

1926 to April 27, 1928, at 9% per

annum (2 yrs. 1 month and 27 days) 5,737.75

————

10,033.93

Less: Payment made on April 4, 1926 2,074.06 7,959.87

————

Total 37,459.87
Upon receipt of said statement, and on the same day, April 27, 1928, the attorneys of the Asia Banking
Corporation addressed a letter to the Philippine National Bank requesting the reconsideration thereof.

The Philippine National Bank declined to make the reconsideration but expressed its willingness to
accept an additional sum of P7,511.36 in full payment.

In order to comply with its obligation to Urquijo Hermanos, the Asia Banking Corporation was forced
to pay the Philippine National Bank the amount of P7,511.36 under protest, made in a letter dated April
28, 1928.

On receipt of said amount, the Philippine National Bank, on May 3, 1928, executed in favor of the Asia
Banking Corporation a release of the mortgages on the lands in question (Exhibit H).

The real and exact state of accounts of Severino P. Aldeguer with the Philippine National Bank from
September 4, 1924 to April 25, 1928, is as follows:
1. Unpaid balance, as of April 11,

1924, of his B/Note, of July 5, 1923,

for P32,373.64 P29,500.00

Unpaid interest due thereon at 8% to

April 25,1928 9,392.42 P38,982.42

2. His promissory note, dated March 28,

1925, signed in favor of Felipe Gomez,

payable on February 28, 1926, negotiated

with us on September 8, 1925 5,200.00

Unpaid interest due thereon at 10% from

February 28, 1926 to April 25, 1928 1,122.33 6,322.33

3. His promissory note, dated

February 15,1926, signed in favor of

Felipe Gomez, payable on January 15,

1927, negotiated with us on June 30, 1926 300.00

Unpaid interest due thereon at 10%

from February 15, 1927 to April 25, 1928 49.93 439.93

——— ————

Total 45,654.68

LESS PAYMENTS MADE: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

September 4, 1924 from his 1923/24

C/Loan 239.37

August 5, 1925 from his 1924/25

C/Loan 756.18

August 5, 1925 from his 1924/25

C/Loan 1,010.68

September 5, 1925 from his 1924/25

C/Loan 27.18

October 24, 1925 from his 1924/25

C/Loan 129.96

November 25, 1925 from his 1924/25

C/Loan 1,209.07

April 22, 1927 from Ynchausti & Co.

surplus of his 1926/27 C/Loan a/c with said

Company 2,166.75

May 24, 1927 do 1,193.50

June 24, 1927 do 1,193.49

April 4, 1928 from Ynchausti & Co. 2,074.06 10,000.24

———— ————

Balance, April 25, 1928 35,654.44

With respect to the first assignment of error, the pertinent part of article 1922 of the Civil Code states: jgc:chanrobl es.com.ph

"ART. 1922. With respect to determinate personal property of the debtor, the following are preferred: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

"6. Credits for seed and expenses of cultivation and harvesting, advanced to the debtor, with respect to
the fruits of the crops which they were used to produce;
x x x

"If the personal property, with respect to which the preferences is allowed, has been removed, the
creditor may claim it from the person who has the same, within the terms of thirty days counted from
the time it was so removed." cral aw virtua1aw library

According to this legal provision, the Philippine National Bank, having acquired the promissory notes
executed by Severino P. Aldeguer is payment of the fertilizer used in the cultivation of the two parcels
of land mortgaged to said Bank, had a preferred right to the crops harvested on said lands from
February 28, 1926 and January 15, 1927, on which dates the promissory notes fell due, and also the
dates in which the crops produced by the fertilizer were presumably harvested. According to the agreed
statement of facts, Ynchausti & Co. delivered to the Philippine National Bank sugar milled in its
central from the cane grown upon Severino P. Aldeguer’s land mortgaged to said bank. Instead of
applying that sugar to the payment of the promissory notes acquired by it from Felipe Gomez, applied
it to the payment of its credit against Severino P. Aldeguer secured by the two parcels of land that
produced said crops. In doing so, it waived its preferred right to said sugar for the payment of said
promissory notes, because that preferred right subsisted in so far as the sugar continued to belong to the
debtor. From the time the Philippine National Bank applied it to the payment of its credit against
Severino P. Aldeguer, with the latter’s consent, said sugar ceased to belong to said Severino P.
Aldeguer, and became the property of the aforesaid Philippine National Bank. (12 Manresa, 685.)

With regard to the defendant-appellant’s contention that Severino P. Aldeguer had a right to compel the
Philippine National Bank to apply said sugar to the payment of the promissory notes for the fertilizer,
such debts being the most burdensome to him, in accordance with the provisions of articles 1172 and
1174 of the Civil Code, suffice it to say that such application should have been made at the time of
payment, and not afterwards, when his account with the bank had already been credited.

The second question to be decided in this appeal is whether the Asia Banking Corporation had any right
to the fruit and rents of the lands purchased at public auction, up to the 25th of April, 1928, when the
sheriff of Occidental Negros issued the final deed of sale of said lands in its favor.

The pertinent part of the English text of section 463 of the Code of Civil Procedure, says: jgc:chanrobl es.com.ph

"SEC. 463. Sale of real property and certificate thereof. — Upon a sale of real property, the purchaser
shall be substituted, to, and acquire all the right, interest, title, and claim of the judgment debtor thereto,
subject to the right of redemption as hereinafter provided. . . ." cral aw virtua1aw library

In the case of Riosa v. Verzosa and Bulan (26 Phil., 86), this court laid down the following doctrine: jgc:chanrobl es.com.ph

"SALE OF REALTY UNDER EXECUTION; RIGHT OF OWNER TO RETAIN POSSESSION

DURING PERIOD OF EQUITY OF REDEMPTION; EJECTMENT OF OWNER BY PURCHASER.
— When real estate is sold under an execution and the owner is in possession thereof, he is entitled to
remain in possession of the property sold and to collect the rents and profits of the same during the
period of the equity of redemption. (Section 464, 465, 468, and 469 of Act No. 190; De la Rosa v.
Santos, 10 Phil., 148.) By virtue of the provisions of section 469 (Act No. 190) where the land is in
possession of a tenant at the time of the sale under execution, a different rule prevails." cral aw virtua1aw library

In the case of Velasco v. Rosenberg’s Incorporated (32 Phil., 72), this court like wise laid down the
following doctrine: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"EXECUTION SALE; RIGHT OF PURCHASER TO COLLECT RENT DURING PERIOD OF

REDEMPTION. — The judgment debtor who is in possession of property sold under execution cannot
be required to pay the purchaser rent for such property, during the period of redemption." cralaw virtua1aw library

And in the case of Pabico v. Ong Pauco (43 Phil., 572), this court also laid down the following
doctrine:jgc:chanrobl es.com.ph

"1. SHERIFF’S EXECUTION SALES; PLACING PURCHASER IN POSSESSION. — The doctrine

of caveat emptor applies to execution sales and the sheriff has no authority to place a purchaser of land
under such a sale in possession. In attempting to do so he becomes a trespasser and an action for
forcible entry and detainer may be maintained against the person so placed in possession.

"2. TRANSLATION. — Correction of the Spanish translation of section 463 of the Code of Civil
Procedure." cral aw virtua1aw library
Section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure, provides as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 465. Time and manner of redemption. — The judgment debtor, or redemptioner, may redeem the
property from the purchaser, at any time within twelve months after the sale, on paying the purchaser
the amount of his purchase, with one per cent per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of
redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid
thereon after purchase, and interest on such last-named amount at the same rate. . . ." cral aw virtua1aw library

According to the doctrines quoted above, the purchaser of a debtor’s real property at public action by
virtue of a writ of execution of a judgment, has no right to collect the rents or receive the products
thereof during the period of legal redemption where said debtor is in possession of them. Nothing could
be more just or equitable; for, if by section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure quoted above, the debtor
must pay 1 per centum monthly interest on the purchase price, at the time of the redemption, the
purchaser would profit twice, if in addition to said interest he were entitled to the rents and fruits of the
land sold which remained in the possession of the debtor. It the debtor is unable to make the
repurchase, the interest of the purchaser’s capital during the period of redemption, is compensated by
the difference between the true value of the land sold and the purchase price; for, it is well-known that
the price obtained at judicial sales for land subject to execution is usually less than the market value.

Now then, from what time is the purchaser entitled to the fruits and rents of the real property purchased
remaining in possession of the debtor in case the debtor failed to take advantage of his right to
repurchase?

Section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure, quoted above, provides that the judgment debtor may
redeem the thing sold from the purchaser within twelve months following the day of the sale, by paying
the selling price plus interest at the rate of one per centum per month; and section 466 of the same law
provides that if within the twelve months following the sale no redemption is made, the purchaser or
his successor in interest is entitled to the proper deed of conveyance, or, what amounts to the same
thing, the purchaser becomes the owner of the property purchased, otherwise he would not be entitled
to the proper deed of conveyance. As absolute owner of the land, the purchaser is entitled to its
possession and to receive the rents and fruits thereof, and the judgment debtor is obliged to deliver said
land, together with the fruits and rents collected since the ownership was consolidated by reason of
failure of redemption, except that he is entitled to reimbursement for expenses of cultivation,
harvesting, and preservation, according to article 356 of the Civil Code.

In the instant case, while it is true that the judgment debtor Severino P. Aldeguer was entitled to retain
possession of the parcels of land acquired by the Asia Banking Corporation at public auction by virtue
of execution, and to collect the fruits and rents pending the expiration of the period of redemption,
inasmuch as he failed to exercise his right of redemption within the twelve months following the day of
the sale, which took place on March 30, 1925, the ownership of the same became consolidated in the
purchasers, the Asia Banking Corporation, and from March 30, 1926, said bank was entitled to collect
the fruits and rents of said lands, until the final delivery of the latter to it own April 23, 1928, when the
final deed of sale of the lands was executed in favor of said Asia Banking Corporation.

According to the statement of Severino P. Aldeguer’s account with the Philippine National Bank,
submitted by the latter to the Asia Banking Corporation, all the products of said lands up to April 4,
1928 were delivered by Ynchausti & Co. to said Philippine National Bank, and credited to said
Severino P. Aldeguer’s account with the latter. When said Philippine National Bank, then applied the
products of the lands mortgaged to it to secure the payment of Severino P. Aldeguer’s mortgage debt,
from 1927 to 1928, said products already belonged to the Asia Banking Corporation.

Summarizing, then: (1) When the Philippine National Bank, as mortgage creditor of Severino P.
Aldeguer and assignee of Felipe Gomez’s right to the promissory notes for the fertilizer used by
Severino P. Aldeguer in the cultivation of the lands mortgages to said bank, applied the products of said
lands to the payment of its mortgage credits, it waived its preferential right over said products for the
amount of the aforesaid promissory notes; (2) from March 30, 1925 when Severino P. Aldeguer’s right
of the redemption of the two parcels of land in question was sold at public auction to the Asia Banking
Corporation by virtue of execution, until March 30, 1926, when the period of redemption expired, the
fruits and rents collected from said lands belonged to said Severino P. Aldeguer as judgment debtor in
possession thereof; and 93) that from March 30, 1926, when the ownership of the Asia Banking
Corporation was consolidated, the latter the purchaser at public auction of Severino P. Aldeguer’s right
of redemption, until April 23, 1928, when the final deed of sale of the fruits and rents was issued in
favor of said Asia Banking Corporation, the said fruits and rents from said lands, belonged to the last
mentioned banking corporation.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That a mortgagee who, at the same time, is a holder of
promissory notes for the value of fertilizer used in the cultivation of the mortgaged lands, and who
collects said products and applies them to his mortgage credit, waives the preferential right granted to
him by articles 1922, case 6, of the Civil Code, upon said products, the amount of said promissory
notes becoming an ordinary credit: (2) that the judgment debtor in possession of land by virtue of
execution is entitled to collect its fruits and rents during the year fixed by the law for the redemption
(Riosa v. Verzosa and Bulan, 26 Phil., 86; Velasco v. Rosenberg’s Incorporated, 32 Phil., 72); and (3)
that if the period for redemption expires without the judgment debtor having made use of this right, the
ownership of the land sold becomes consolidated in the purchaser, who thereupon becomes entitled to
collect its fruits and rents, paying the judgment debtor the expenses of cultivation, harvesting and
preservation (article 356, Civil Code).

As to the question of procedure raised by the defendant- appellant, who contends that to affirm the
judgment appealed from would amount to ordering Severino P. Aldeguer, who is not a party in this
case, to pay the amount of said judgment, we hold that there is no merit in such contention, because, as
he is not a party to this case, the decision cannot affect him; and, furthermore, as he is not a necessary
party for the final solution of the questions raised by the parties herein between themselves, he need not
be impleaded.

For the foregoing considerations, and finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is
affirmed in its dispositive part, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Villamor and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Johns, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

AVANCEÑA, C.J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Certain realty was sold at public auction by virtue of a writ of execution of a judgment rendered against
the debtor. One year elapses after this sales during which the debtor failed to exercise the right of
redemption granted to him by section 463 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The majority holds that
notwithstanding such failure to exercise the right of redemption, the purchaser is not entitled to the
fruits of the property purchased by him from the time the sale is made, but only after the lapse of the
one year fixed by the law for redemption.

I differ with the majority upon this point.

Section 463 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Spanish translation of which has been corrected in the
case of Pabico v. Ong Pauco (43 Phil., 572), reads: jgc:chanrobl es.com.ph

"Upon a sale of real property, the purchaser shall be substituted to, and acquire, all the right, interest,
title, and claim of the judgment debtor thereto, subject to the right of redemption as hereinafter
provided. The officer must give to the purchaser a certificate of sale containing: . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

In spite of the fact that this section expressly provides that upon the sale being made, the purchaser
shall be substituted to, and acquire all the rights of the judgment debtor thereto, subject solely to the
right of redemption, the majority opines that in no case does the purchaser acquire all the rights of the
judgment debtor after the sale, but only after the lapse of the one-year period for redemption. If the
debtor exercises the right of redemption, the sale is resolved and this resolution is retroactive to the
very date of the sale, the purchaser being under obligation to return the fruits and rents of the property
purchased, if he collected them, receiving in exchange the interest upon the price paid by the debtor. If
the right of redemption is not exercised, the purchaser, according to the majority opinion is only
entitled to collect the fruits of the property he purchased, after the lapse of the year prescribed for the
redemption. It is obvious, then, that according to the doctrine laid down by the majority, the purchaser
does not in any cases acquire the rights of the vendor after the sale, contrary to the provision of section
463 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

One of the arguments advanced in the majority decision is the following: If the right of redemption is
exercised, it is both just and equitable that the judgment debtor should receive the fruits of the property
sold, inasmuch as the law requires him, by way of compensation, to pay the purchaser the interest upon
the price paid by the latter. Following the same reasoning, we might say that if the purchaser is not paid
the interest upon the price which he paid, it would be just and equitable that he should receive the fruits
of the property he purchased, for the same reason of compensation. When the right of redemption is not
exercised, the law does not required the judgment debtor to pay the purchaser the interest upon the
price he paid, and, as a matter of fact, the majority does not in the instance case require the judgment
debtor to make such payment. Consequently, it would be both just and equitable that in the present case
the purchaser receive the fruits of the property purchased, from the date of the purchase. Otherwise, we
should have the anomaly of a purchaser who paid the price, and yet he is denied the right to receive the
fruits of the property purchased, and a vendor, a judgment debtor, who receives the price immediately
after the sale and make use of the same to settle his debt, thus exempting himself from paying interest
upon the same, and who, furthermore, has the right during one year after the sale and his receipt of the
price, to receive the fruits of the property thus old. Such an anomaly is not justified by the statement
that the compensation in this case in favor of the purchaser is in the difference between the price he
paid and the market value, because the price usually obtained at an execution sale is less than the
market value. It is not justified, because in cases where the price paid is the market value, there is no
such compensation. The law must be so construed as not to be unjust in any case. On the other hand,
the price obtained at public auction sales is exactly the market value, for, as the public is given a chance
to bid, it is presumed that the price obtained is the best obtainable on the date and the place where the
auction is held.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4013 February 4, 1909
JUSTO GUIDO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
AGUSTIN DE BORJA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
W.A. Kincaid, for appellants.
Pedro Concepcion, for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
This action was instituted by the heirs and successors of Francisco Guido and Dominga Santa Ana, to
recover the ownership and possession of the hacienda of Angono, against the defendant, who, being
tenants of the said hacienda until the year 1903, denied the ownership of the plaintiffs and themselves
pretended to be the owners of the hacienda. The Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal
rendered final judgment, the findings of which, impugned upon appeal by the defendants, are the
following:
1. That the ownership and possession of the hacienda of Angono, as it appears described in the decision
of said court, in accordance with the amended complaint, pertains to Justo Guido, Juliana Guido,
Buenaventura Guido and other participants with them in said hacienda; by virtue thereof the court
below ordered the defendants to restore said possession to the plaintiffs.
2. That the fruits or crops and plantings of the defendants on the said hacienda of Angono do not belong
to the plaintiffs, and in lieu thereof the court below sentences each one of the defendants respectively to
pay the plaintiffs and their participants such sums in money and paddy as they may owe them, as
itemized in the statements attached to the complaint under numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4. A list of the names of
the defendants with the statement of the respective amounts to the payment of which they were
sentenced, follows.
3. That the costs of this suit should be paid by the defendants. By virtue of their appeal to this court the
defendants and appellants presented in their brief the following assignment of errors:
I. The lower court erred in considering that all the defendant appellants are properly joined in
the complaint of the plaintiff appellees.
II. The lower court erred in holding that it had jurisdiction of the claim brought by the plaintiff
appellees.
III. The lower court erred in declaring that the ownership and possession of the land in question
by the plaintiff appellees had been proven.
IV. The lower court erred in declaring that it had been proven that all the defendant appellants
were tenants and lessees on shares of the hacienda on Angono.
V. The lower court erred in considering as proven that the defendant appellants owe the plaintiff
appellees for ground rent, or for lease on shares, the amounts in money and in products which
are itemized in the statements Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 attached at the complaint.
The two first errors are of form or procedure, and the three following deal with the merits of the case;
beginning with the last three, let us discuss the third error:
THIRD ERROR.
The ownership of the appellees, with respect to the hacienda of Angono, is discussed in this point; the
appellants produce the documentary evidence, Exhibits A, B, C, 6, 7, 8, 9, and D, which constitute
principally the titles of ownership of the appellees; and in brief, they saw that it is necessary to consider
the Hacienda as divided in two parts — one half corresponding to Francisco Guido and the other half to
Dominga Santa Ana, the principals, as has been said, of the appellees.
With regard to the whole of the Hacienda and of the original titles of acquisition thereto, which are in
no way impugned, it is now alleged by the appellants: 1. That originally the estancia or small farm of
Angono was granted to General Don Domingo Antonio de Otero Bermudez, who was a Spaniard, to the
prejudice of the inhabitants of Angono, who were Indios, in violation of laws 7 and 8, title 12, book 3
[4], of the Recopilacion de las Leyes de Indias; and that when the title was issued, with royal approval,
in favor of the Alferez Real Don Andres Blanco Bermudez, as successor to Don Domingo Antonio de
Otero Bermudez, it was done without prejudice to third persons who might show a better right, which
indicates that the ownership and possession of Don Andres Blanco Bermudez were not absolute.
With reference to the half of the Hacienda derived from Francisco Guido, the appellants allege that the
said half is not entered in the registry of property, and that, according to article 23 of the Mortgage
Law, the titles can not prejudice third persons. The said article provides that:
The instruments mentioned in article 2 and 5 which are not duly recorded or entered in the
registry can not prejudice third persons.
The record of real property and property of rights, acquired through an inheritance or legacy,
shall not prejudice third persons until five years have elapsed since the date thereof, excepting
in cases of testate or intestate inheritances, legacies and additions thereto (mejoras), when left to
legal heirs.
Therefore, the defendants being third parties with respect to the plaintiff, the titles of property presented
by the latter can not prejudice the former.
With respect to the other half derived from the succession of Dominga Santa Ana, it is alleged that,
although the possession is recorded in the registry of property, as such registration dates only from the
15th of July, 1899, it can not convert the title of possession into a title of ownership except at the
expiration of twenty-years, according to the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage Law, and
consequently the present title is not one of ownership.
The original title to the whole hacienda of Angono is by composicion and royal approval issued on the
16th of December, 1749, and 15th of September, 1752; the former being an order of the following
tenor:
ORDER. — In the farmhouse of the Hacienda of Angono, which is in the Province of La
Laguna de Bay, on the 16th day of the month of December in the year 1749, the Señor
Licenciado Don Pedro Calderon Enriquez, of His Majesty's council, oidor (associate justice) of
the Real Audiencia of these Islands and special judge of the Commission for the sale and
composition of lands in the whole district thereof. Having seen the instruments of title that
General Don Domingo Antonio de Otero Bermudez has produced for the purpose of
substantiating the legitimate ownership and possession and that he has of the so-called hacienda
of Angono, together with the other lands and estancia of Binangonan and the lime quarries of
San Guillermo, all of them consolidated under the name of hacienda and estancia of Angono,
with the acknowledgment and declaration which, in view of the said original documents, was
 made by Señor Don Juan de Ozaeta y Oro, who was a member of His Majesty's council, oidor
of the Real Audiencia of these Islands, and special judge of the said land commission for the
year 1699, approving the said titles and holding of the same to be good; and having also seen
the record of the proceedings instituted by the natives of the town of Binangonan before the
Superior Government of these Islands, wherein they claim to be entitled to certain lands
belonging to said estancia, which record was forwarded to this land court; and bearing also in
mind the proceedings upon the visit, demarkation and survey just made of the limits of said
hacienda, together with the claims of the natives leading to the greater and better knowledge of
the true boundaries of the said hacienda, the said oidor said: That it was his duty to declare, and
he does hereby declare, that the titles presented by the said General Don Domingo Bermudez
are good and legitimate, and in consequence thereof the true limits of the said hacienda run
through the places and localities stated in the proceedings in connection with the demarkation
and survey just made.
ORDER — At the city of Manila on the 15th day of the month of September, 1752, Señor Don
Pedron Calderon Enriquez, of His Majesty's council, oidor and alcalde del crimen of the Real
Audiencia of the Islands and special judge of the Commission for the sale and composition of
land in the whole of its territory, having seen the record of proceedings in which are described
the demarkation and survey of the estancia of Angono, with the prayer of the Alferez Real Don
Andres Blanco Bermudez, who succeeds to said lands by reason of the death of said General
Don Domingo de Otero Bermudez, his uncle to the effect that his title to the said estancia and
lime quarries be affirmed by means of resolution, and after examining everything that was
proper to see and examine the said gentlemen stated that it was his duty to order, and that he
does hereby order that title of confirmation in due form be issued to the said Alferez Real of this
most noble city, Don Andres Blanco Bermudez of the aforesaid titles, and in view of the said
instruments and declaratory order above inserted he directed that the present title of
confirmation of the said titles be issued in proper form in order that may be held and considered
as such true and legitimate titles, and the Alferez Real Don Andres Blanco Bermudez as the
lawful possessor and owner of the said hacienda, and he hereby orders every one not to presume
to molest, disturb the legitimacy or the aforesaid titles: Provided, however, That they shall not
prejudice third persons having a better right, and that the said declaratory orders and this
confirmation shall be observed by all judges and their substitutes until His Majesty may order
otherwise.
The first order was at the same time a resolution entered in the proceedings had before the Superior
Government of these Islands by the people of Binangonan, and, in connection with the proceedings the
said order contains this declaration:
That the said natives do not possess, nor have they produced any lawful title to prove the
ownership or possession of the lands belonging to said hacienda which they took and occupied
by force of arms in the year 1745, at a time when several towns mutinied and revolted, and that
none of the said natives, although they were summoned and saw the tape passed through the
limits and neighborhood of their town, came forward to claim, contradict, or protest in any way
or point out a different stream or river named Mabalan, and the said gentleman ordered that the
inhabitants of the said town be notified to abstain in future from working the lands that they
occupied and which are separated by said stream, as otherwise they would be punished for
inference and for again occupying them without the will and consent of the owner thereof; for
the same act the gobernadorcillo, officials and cabezas de barangay are sentenced to be
deprived of their offices and to be confined with hard labor, in the Cavite Prison on ration and
without salary, and otherwise as may be proper.
From the foregoing it appears that the absolute ownerships granted by the State to the first persons to
acquire the property, Otero and Blanco, is fully proven; their titles of ownership are made final by
virtue of the provision of the real cedula of October 15, 1754, article 5 of which reads as follows:
Neither shall possessors of lands sold or adjusted by the various subdelegates from the year
1700 to the present time be molested, disturbed, or denounced, now or at any other time, with
respect to such possession, if such sales or adjustments shall have been confirmed by me, or by
the viceroy or the president of the court of the district in which the lands are located, while
authorized to exercise this power. In cases where the sales of adjustments shall not have been so
confirmed, the possessors will present to the courts of their respective districts and to the other
officials hereby empowered to receive the same, a petition asking for the confirmation of said
sales and adjustments. After the proceedings outlined by the subdelegates in their order with
respect to the measurement and valuation of the said lands, and with reference to the title issued
officials will make an examination of the same for the purpose of ascertaining whether the sale
or adjustment has been made without fraud or collusion, and for an adequate and equitable
price, and a similar examination shall be made by the prosecuting attorney of the district, to the
end that, in view of all the proceedings, etc., there will be issued to the possessor, in my royal
name, a confirmation of his title, by authority of which his possession and ownership of lands
and waters represented will be fully legalized, to the end that at no time will be or his heirs or
assigns be distributed or molested therein. (Cited in the case of Andres Valenton vs. Manual
Murciano, 3 Phil. Rep., 537, 546.)
The said titles are therefore absolute and unconditional notwithstanding the clause, of mere matter of
form, of "without prejudice to third persons who may prove a better right." The natives or residents of
the town of Angono could never be such persons with a better right either as against Otero, or Blanco,
nor against their successors Miguel Cacho, Pascual Santa Ana, and Francisco Guido, because, in the
first place, they constituted a town within the same Estancia or Hacienda of Angono, and they could
hardly constitute a different entity which for the time being — that is, at the commencement of the
hacienda — might invoke a right of its own, when those tenants of the hacienda had but a precarious
right in opposition to the owners thereof; and in the second place, because similarly to those of
Binangonan who expressed their opposition, it may be said and shown as stated and established in the
judgment appealed from, that up to this day they have not been able to produce their title of ownership
or of possession.
It must be added to this that if they ever had any right, they can not exercise it except in the form and
manner prescribed in article 8 of the royal decree of the 26th of January, 1889, and article 5 of the royal
decree of the 26th of October, 1881; they could only direct their claims against the administration, and
in no wise against the grantees of the land. (Valenton vs. Murciano, 3 Phil. Rep., 537, 554, 555.)
With respect to the half of the hacienda that according to the last transfers, was derived from Francisco
Guido, the appellants have only alleged, as has been seen, that at the present time said titles of
ownership lack force as against third persons, such as they hold themselves to be, for the reason that
they are not registered in the registry of property.
It is frequent error to mistake the third person of the civil law for the third person of the Mortgage Law;
this error arises from the lack of knowledge, evidenced in many cases which have been heard by this
Supreme Court, of the character of the latter law which operates in favor of third persons against third
persons, in relation to the solemnity and efficiency of the registration of a real right, in no wise in favor
of a person who turns out to be and calls himself a third party because there are two other prior parties
between whom some act or contract of acquisition or conveyance of ownership or of some other real
right exists; the appellants themselves have cited a paragraph of the commentaries to the Mortgage Law
by Galindo and Escosura, of which the first lines reveal the intent and purposes of said law: "The object
of the present mortgage system was to protect the rights of the person who register his property against
him who has not registered ...." (2, p. 419), and Manresa, the commentator of the Civil Code, in
speaking of the Mortgage Law, says:
The law always tends to protect registered rights, to favor him who registers, and therefore, that
the registration made shall prejudice those who have not registered. As a general rule it may be
affirmed that where the law speaks of prejudice to a third person, said third person is the one
defined by article 27, as he who has not registered, nor participated in the act or contract that
was registered; and whenever it says that a third person can not be prejudiced such third person
is he who bases his right on a registered title. (4 Civil Code, 302.)
The different persons who may generally be considered as third parties with respect to each act
or contract, are divided by the Mortgage Law into two groups; third parties of the effects of the
civil law, and third parties for the effects of the Mortgage Law. While no registered title exist
the civil law governs; real rights arise or not independently of the registration, and the third
parties may or may not be prejudiced without the intervention of the Mortgage Law. From the
time that a written act or contract exists, there are third parties for the effects of said law, and
registration, determines preference and acquisition of rights to their prejudice. (Ibid., 302.)
The provisions of the Mortgage Law are absolutely inapplicable to the present contention because the
matter at issue does not fall within the purpose of said law; no one of the rights that are contested is
registered; they are rights which can only be discussed and decided under the precepts of the civil law
or of the Civil Code now in force; and in the force of the Civil Code in force, against the titles of
ownership put forward by the appellees, for the purpose of effecting the recovery of possession of the
hacienda of Angono, the residents of said town, the appellants herein, set up no title whatever, either of
ownership or of possession; they only oppose the mere fact of the material possession of certain parcels
of land of the said hacienda, which they held on lease or lease on shares until the year when, as one of
the appellees states, they rose against the ownership of the hacienda.
FOURTH AND FIFTH ERRORS.
The court below has no erred in considering as proven that all the appellants are tenants or lessees on
shares of the hacienda of Angono.
Neither has it erred in considering as proven that they own the appellees for ground rent, tenancy, or
lease on shares, the amounts in money or in products itemized in the statements Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 filed
with the complaint.
These allegations of error are based on the lack of identity of the defendants herein as such tenants or
lessees on shares of the hacienda of Angono. It is admitted in the brief that out of 155 defendants 51 are
shown to be tenants according to the documentary evidence offered and admitted at the trial; it appears
therein that they subscribed to proceedings served in February, 1898, on them personally as such
tenants of the said hacienda, to compel them to deposit what they respectively had to pay for ground
rent, tenancy, or lease on shares; but that it has not been proven that the others are such tenants, except
by the testimony of one witness and the four statements which accompany the complaint.
For the purpose of deciding this question, the reason alleged by the appellees in their answer is
conclusive.
The identity said in the brief of the adverse party to be lacking with respect to some of the
defendant appellants is altogether unnecessary and immaterial from the moment that the
defendants, all of them, have appeared before the lower court and answered the complaint by
their own names, as they are named in the complaint. No question has been raised in the court
below with respect to any of the names of the defendant appellants; on the contrary, as has been
 said they all appeared, and all of them answered the complaint by the same names that appear
therein, which fact show their admission of and conformity to this part of the complaint. (Brief,
17.)
FIRST ERROR.
The court below did not err in considering that all the defendants are properly joined in the complaint
of the plaintiff appellees.
The appellants allege that they are not united in one sole contract so that by reason thereof, they may be
sued jointly, and that the parcels of land which they respectively hold constitute matter for separate and
distinct causes of action.
The accumulation of parties in this case is a result of the unity of action, unity of object, and unity of
defense. Unity of action inasmuch as, in view of the attitude of the defendants, who seek to obtain the
ownership of the hacienda, the complaint has for its object the recovery of possession of the lawful
owners who, until 1903, allowed the defendants to remain in possession of certain parcels thereof under
contract of lease or lease on shares; unity of object, which can not be less than the entire hacienda,
because it is detained in its entirety by the defendants, united together with the manifest intent for the
purpose; and unity of defense, because the pretension of the defendants is one, to wit, that of being
themselves the owners of the hacienda. Joinder could not have been more imperative even if, after
considerable expense and delay, a separate action had been brought against each one of the tenants who
now detain the hacienda. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which the court below took into
consideration, is applicable herein:
Any person should be made a defendant who has or claims an interest in the controversy or the
subject-matter thereof adverse to the plaintiff, or who is necessary party to a complete
determination or settlement of the questions involved therein.
Exhibit P, offered in evidence by the plaintiffs and admitted by the lower court over the exception of
the defendants, which exception however, has not been brought before this court, is a notarial act drawn
up at the instance of one of the plaintiffs, Justo Guido, for the purpose of obtaining a copy of the
resolution agreed upon by the tenants, and which Guido testified was delivered to him by Dominador
Gomez, to whom the original was returned. It reads thus:
. . . all the residents of this town (Angono) attended a meeting, and, being assembled, Councilor
Januario Villamayor, as president, took the floor and informed those present at the meeting that
in consequence of the oppressed condition of this town, the inhabited portion of which is
surrounded by an hacienda possessed by the heirs of Doña Dominga Santa Ana, an investigation
and search for documentary proofs to permit those who claim to be the owners to exercise acts
of ownership was contemplated ... ; hence, in order to avoid, as much as possible, disturbing the
peace of the inhabitants as always happens in litigious questions of this kind, it is the opinion of
the majority of the residents that an agreement should be entered into between the latter and the
owners of the former, with the intervention of the Honorable W. Kincaid and Doctor Gomez,
who promise to settle this matter peacefully upon an offer to pay them with one-half of the level
lands of the Hacienda within a reasonable period of time. Thereupon all parties present, after an
extensive discussion of the matter, assented to said agreement being carried out and that
adequate and clear contracts should be drawn up and subjected to sound and indulgent
criticism . . . .
It is evident that they unanimously promised to dispose of one-half of the hacienda in payment for their
defense as though they were co-owners, knowing that they disposed of one-half of the hacienda which
as they say, "surrounds the inhabited portion of the town," "the hacienda that is possessed by the heirs
of Doña Dominga Santa Ana," whom "within a reasonable period of time," they purposed to spoliate of
the whole of it, and immediately thereafter to dispose of one-half of its level lands in order to pay their
lawyer and the above-named Doctor Gomez.
SECOND ERROR.
Neither has the court below erred in holding that it had jurisdiction to hear the claim brought by the
plaintiff appellees — that is to say, the second cause of action with reference to the prayer that the
defendants, now the appellants, be sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the amounts owing for ground rent,
tenancy, or lease on shares, as itemized in the statements filed with the complaint as a part thereof.
The argument on appeal consists of the citation of paragraph 3, section 56 of Act No. 136, and of the
fact that, "from the same judgment appealed from, it has been fully demonstrated that, with the
exception of Felix Miranda, none of the other defendants owe any one or all of the plaintiffs any
amount in money or in products equal to the sum of 100 dollars or more, excluding interest," which is
the amount fixed by said section with reference to the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance.
In proof of jurisdiction the court below cites section 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the
appellees cite in corroboration section 427 of the Code of California, according to which plaintiff may
join several causes of action in complaint when they are based on "claims to recover a specific piece of
realty, with or without damages for its retention or injury, and the rents and products of the same."
The natural effect of an action for recovery is the restoration of the thing together with the fruits,
accessories, and payment of damages. In the second finding of the judgment appealed from, the
plaintiffs were not granted the fruits or crops and plantings of the defendants on the hacienda of
Angono, but in exchange, each of them was sentenced to pay the amounts in cash and in palay (paddy)
which they appeared to be owing, as specified in the statements attached to the complaint as a part
thereof.
The fruits that the defendants are obliged to restore, together with the thing not belonging to but
retained by them, are not only the naturals fruits, which have justly been denied by the judgment
appealed from, but also the civil fruits which consist of the rent for the buildings and the price of the
lease of the lands. (Civil Code, 335.)
Beginning with fact that the crops or products of the detained lands are fruits obtained by those who, as
tenants, worked the lands, it was not proper to deprive them of the same; but from the moment that they
desired to usurp the ownership of the hacienda, and commenced to act in the bad faith with which they
present retain possession, instead of owing those fruits they owe the civil, not, however, by virtue of a
contract which they now disown, but by virtue of the right of accession which accompanies the right of
recovery. And if they were sued as one sole party for the restitution of the hacienda, they must be sued
as such for the restitution of its civil fruits, in their character of accessories not as matter of compliance
with a lease contract; for all of which reasons the finding in the judgment is fully in accordance with
the law.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with the costs of this instance
against the appellants.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Willard, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 35223 September 17, 1931
THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., ET AL., defendants-appellees.
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, intervenor-appellant.
Roman J. Lacson for intervenor-appellant.
Mariano Ezpeleta for plaintiff-appellee.
Nolan and Hernaez for defendants-appellees Talisay-Silay Milling Co. and Cesar Ledesma.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
This proceeding originated in a complaint filed by the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., against the Talisay-
Silay Milling Co., Inc., for the delivery of the amount P13,850 or promissory notes or other instruments
or credit for that sum payable on June 30, 1930, as bonus in favor of Mariano Lacson Ledesma; the
complaint further prays that the sugar central be ordered to render an accounting of the amounts it owes
Mariano Lacson Ledesma by way of bonus, dividends, or otherwise, and to pay the plaintiff a sum
sufficient to satisfy the judgment mentioned in the complaint, and that the sale made by said Mariano
Lacson Ledesma be declared null and void.
The Philippine National Bank filed a third party claim alleging a preferential right to receive any
amount which Mariano Lacson Ledesma might be entitled to from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. as
bonus, because that would be civil fruits of the land mortgaged to said bank by said debtor for the
benefit of the central referred to, and by virtue of a deed of assignment, and praying that said central be
ordered to delivered directly to the intervening bank said sum on account of the latter's credit against
the aforesaid Mariano Lacson Ledesma.
The corporation Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., answered the complaint stating that of Mariano Lacson
Ledesma's credit, P7,500 belonged to Cesar Ledesma because he had purchased it, and praying that it
be absolved from the complaint and that the proper party be named so that the remainder might be
delivered.
Cesar Ledesma, in turn, claiming to be the owner by purchase in good faith an for a reconsideration of
the P7,500 which is a part of the credit referred to above, answered praying that he be absolved from
the complaint.
The plaintiff Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., answered the third party claim alleging that its credit against
Mariano Lacson Ledesma was prior and preferential to that of the intervening bank, and praying that
the latter's complaint be dismissed.
At the trial all the parties agreed to recognize and respect the sale made in favor of Cesar Ledesma of
the P7,500 part of the credit in question, for which reason the trial court dismissed the complaint and
cross-complaint against Cesar Ledesma authorizing the defendant central to deliver to him the
aforementioned sum of P7,500. And upon conclusion of the hearing, the court held that the Bachrach
Motor Co., Inc., had a preferred right to receive the amount of P11,076.02 which was Mariano Lacson
Ledesma's bonus, and it ordered the defendant central to deliver said sum to the plaintiff.
The Philippine National Bank appeals, assigning the following alleged errors as committed by the trial
court:
1. In holding that the bonus which the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., bound itself to pay the
planters who had mortgaged their land to the Philippine National Bank to secure the payment of
the debt of said central to said bank is not civil fruits of said land.
 2. In not holding that said bonus became subject to the mortgage executed by the defendant
Mariano Lacson Ledesma to the Philippine National Bank to secure the payment of his personal
debt to said bank when it fell due.
3. In holding that the assignment (Exhibit 9, P.N.B.) of said bonus made on March 7, 1930, by
Mariano Lacson Ledesma to the Philippine National Bank to be applied to the payment of his
debt to said Philippine National Bank is fraudulent.
4. In holding that the Bachrach Motor Co. Inc., in civil case No. 31597 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila levied a valid attachment upon the bonus in question.
5. In admitting and considering the supplementary complaint filed by the Bachrach Motor Co.,
Inc., alleging as a cause of action the attachment of the bonus in question which said Bachrach
Motor Co., Inc., in civil case No. 31821 of the Court of First Instance of Manila levied after the
filing of the original complaint in this case, and after Mariano Lacson Ledesma in this case had
been declared in default.
6. In holding that the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., has a preferential right to receive from the
Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., the amount of P11,076.02 which is in the possession of said
corporation as the bonus to be paid to Mariano Lacson Ledesma, and in ordering the Talisay-
Silay Milling Co., Inc., to deliver said amount to the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc.
7. In not holding that the Philippine National Bank has a preferential right to receive from the
Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., the amount of P11,076.02 held by said corporation as Mariano
Lacson Ledesma's bonus, and in not ordering said Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., to deliver said
amount to the Philippine National Bank.
8. In not holding that the amended complaint and the supplementary complaint of the Bachrach
Motor Co., Inc., do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., and against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., or against the
Philippine National Bank.
The appellant bank bases its preferential right upon the contention that the bonus in question is civil
fruits of the lands which the owners had mortgaged for the benefit of the central giving the bonus, and
that, as civil fruits of said land, said bonus was assigned by Mariano Lacson Ledesma on March 7,
1930, by virtue of the document Exhibit 9 of said intervening institution, which admitted in its brief
that "if the bonus in question is not civil fruits or rent which became subject to the mortgage in favor of
the Philippine National Bank when Mariano Lacson Ledesma's personal obligation fell due, the
assignment of March 7, 1930 (Exhibit 9, P.N.B.), is null and void, not because it is fraudulent, for there
was no intent of fraud in executing the deed, but that the cause or consideration of the assignment was
erroneous, for it was based upon the proposition that the bonus was civil fruits of the land mortgaged to
the Philippine National Bank." (P. 31.)
The fundamental question, then, submitted to our consideration is whether or not the bonus in question
is civil fruits.
This is how the bonus came to be granted: On December 22, 1923, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.,
was indebted to the Philippine National Bank. To secure the payment of its debt, it succeeded in
inducing its planters, among whom was Mariano Lacson Ledesma, to mortgage their land to the
creditor bank. And in order to compensate those planters for the risk they were running with their
property under the mortgage, the aforesaid central, by a resolution passed on that same date, i.e.,
December 22, 1923, undertook to credit the owners of the plantation thus mortgaged every year with a
sum equal to two per centum of the debt secured according to yearly balance, the payment of the bonus
being made at once, or in part from time to time, as soon as the central became free of its obligations to
the aforesaid bank, and of those contracted by virtue of the contract of supervision, and had funds
which might be so used, or as soon as it obtained from said bank authority to make such payment.
(Exhibits 5, 6; P.N.B.)
Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First, the rents of buildings; second,
the proceeds from leases of lands; and, third, the income from perpetual or life annuities, or other
similar sources of revenue. It may be noted that according to the context of the law, the phrase "u otras
analogas" refers only to rent or income, for the adjectives "otras" and "analogas" agree with the noun
"rentas," as do also the other adjectives "perpetuas" and "vitalicias." That is why we say that by "civil
fruits" the Civil Code understands one of three and only three things, to wit: the rent of a building, the
rent of land, and certain kinds of income.
As the bonus in question is not rent of a building or of land, the only meaning of "civil fruits" left to be
examined is that of "income."
Assuming that in broad juridical sense of the word "income" it might be said that the bonus in question
is "income" under article 355 of the Civil Code, it is obvious to inquire whether it is derived from the
land mortgaged by Mariano Lacson Ledesma to the appellant bank for the benefit of the central; for it
is not obtained from that land but from something else, it is not civil fruits of that land, and the bank's
contention is untenable.
It is to be noted that the said bonus bears no immediate, but only a remote accidental relation to the
land mentioned, having been granted as compensation for the risk of having subjected one's land to a
lien in favor of the bank, for the benefit of the entity granting said bonus. If this bonus be income or
civil fruits of anything, it is income arising from said risk, or, if one chooses, from Mariano Lacson
Ledesma's generosity in facing the danger for the protection of the central, but certainly it is not civil
fruits or income from the mortgaged property, which, as far as this case is concerned, has nothing to do
with it. Hence, the amount of the bonus, according to the resolution of the central granting it, is not
based upon the value, importance or any other circumstance of the mortgaged property, but upon the
total value of the debt thereby secured, according to the annual balance, which is something quite
distinct from and independent of the property referred to.
Finding no merit in this appeal, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without express finding as to
costs. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30240 August 23, 1929
AQUILINA TACAS, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
EVARISTO TOBON, defendant-appellant.
Simeon Ramos, Benito Soliven and J. Belmonte for the appellant.
Vicente Paz for appellee.
VILLAMOR, J.:
This is an action to recover from the defendant the ownership and possession of three parcels of land
described in the sketch attached to the complaint, together with the fruits collected by him during the
time he was in possession of said land that is, since January, 1912, it being alleged that the defendant
unlawfully took said parcels upon the death of Francisco Dumadag, predecessor in interest of the
plaintiffs; and that he remained in possession, enjoying the fruits to the value of P700 annually.
In his answer the defendant alleges that he is the owner of said lands, having purchased from one
Exequiel or Gil Tacas, deceased, about fifteen years before the amended answer dated December 5,
1924.
At the trial the parties adduced their respective evidence, and thereafter the trial court declared it
sufficiently proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the three parcels of land under discussion,
were parts of an estate belonging to Francisco Dumadag, whose title is a possessory information
recorded in the registry of deeds of Ilocos Sur, having inherited them from his parents (Exhibit H); that
during his lifetime, said Francisco Dumadag was in possession of the land as owner from many years,
until his death on November 17, 1911, enjoying its fruits, consisting in rice, corn, tobacco, and
vegetables; that said Francisco Dumadag had filed a declaration for tax purposes in his own name; that
the land tax had been paid by Francisco Dumadag during the years 1908 and 1911, and in his name in
the years from 1912 to 1914 (Exhibits I to P); that in January, 1912, during the season for planting
tobacco immediately following the death of Francisco Dumadag, Evaristo Tobon took possession of the
three parcels of land in question planting them with tobacco; that from 1912 up to the present, the
defendant Evaristo Tobon has been collecting the fruits therefrom, consisting of 300 sheaves of rice and
300 manos of first, second, and third-class tobacco each year, at the approximate rate of P0.30 for each
sheaf of rice, and P 3 for each mano of first-class tobacco, P 2.50 for second-class tobacco, and P 2 for
third-class tobacco. There is no evidence of record regarding the amount and price of the corn collected
by the defendant. And by virtue thereof, the trial court declared the plaintiffs to be the absolute owners
of the three parcels of land in litigation, and ordered the defendant Evaristo Tobon to deliver said
parcels of land to the plaintiffs, together with the fruits collected each year since 1912 until the
complete termination of this case, and in default thereof, to pay to said plaintiffs the sum of P 11,040,
which is the total value of the rice and tobacco from 1912 to 1927, at P 0.30 per sheaf of rice, and P 2
per mano of tobacco. From this judgment, the defendant duly appealed in time, prosecuting his appeal
to this court by the proper bill of exceptions.
The appellant had made several assignments of error. In the first place, he contends that the identity of
the pieces of land in litigation has not been established. We find no merit in this contention. It appears
from the allegations of the complaint and the answer, that the case refers to the lands held by defendant
and alleged by the latter to have been purchased from one Exequiel or Gil Tacas, brother to the plaintiff
Aquilina Tacas.
With regard to the probatory value of the documents presented by the parties, to wit, Exhibit H of the
plaintiffs, and Exhibits 1 and 2 of the defendant, it is well to note that Exhibit H is a possessory
information record duly approved on March 22, 1895 and inscribed in the registry of deeds of Ilocos
Sur on November 4, 1917 in favor of Francisco Dumadag, covering some land situated in the sitio of
Sisin, municipality of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur.
On the other hand, Exhibit 1 of the defendant is an instrument executed on January 17, 1905 whereby
one Exequiel or Gil Tacas sold three parcels of farm land in the place called Sisin to Evaristo Tobon for
P 300 conan. And Exhibit 2 of the same defendant is another instrument executed on May 15, 1909
from which it appears that Francisco Dumadag and his brother-in-law, Gil Tacas, agreed that the three
parcels of land belonging to the latter, together with the two parcels of the former in Anteng, Barrio of
Carisquis, would be put in Dumadag's name in the possessory proceedings.
The court below made a detailed analysis of the signature of Ramon G. Tolentino who, as justice of the
peace, signed the ratification of the document Exhibit 1, comparing it with the unquestioned signatures
of the same person, appearing in Exhibit 2, and concludes that the instrument Exhibit 1 is false.
It is unnecessary to descend to the discussion of the characteristics of Ramon G. Tolentino's signature,
he being the justice of the peace who ratified the document Exhibit 1, for, even granting that said
instrument is genuine, it appears that Gil or Exequiel Tacas could not validly convey the lands in
question to the defendant Evaristo Tobon, inasmuch as according to the possessory information, said
lands belong to and were in possession of Francisco Dumadag even before 1895, until his death, which
took place in November, 1911.
The document Exhibit 2 argues nothing against our conclusion, for it is a contradiction to hold that in
1909 Francisco Dumadag agreed with his brother-in-law, Exequiel Tacas, that the three parcels of land
belonging to the latter should be included in the former's possessory proceeding, considering that the
latter had already been approved by this order of March 22, 1895. In the ordinary course of events, if
such an agreement had already been entered into, it should have been at the time of the institution of
the possessory proceeding. Dumadag did not know how to sign his name, and besides, no one had
identified said document, Exhibit 2.
There is another reason why Exhibit 1 cannot prevail over Exhibit H, namely, that supposing that a sale
was made in favor of the defendant in 1905, it was only in 1909 that Exhibit 2 was drawn in order to
legalize the alleged transfer. Besides, despite the transfer of the lands in favor of the defendant having
taken place in 1905, according to Exhibit 1, the defendant did not enter upon the possession of said
lands until after the death of the original owner Francisco Dumadag, which occurred in November,
1911.
Another error alleged by the appellant is that the trial court ordered him to deliver to the plaintiffs the
fruits of the land from 1912 to 1927, or to pay their value, P 11,040.
The complaint in this case was filed on February 1, 1918. The bill of exceptions does not show when
the defendant was summoned but it does not show that the letter docketed his answer to the complaint
on April 11, 1918.
Evidence being lacking to show that when he entered upon the possession of the lands in question, he
was aware of any flaw in his title or mode of acquiring it, he is deemed a possessor in good faith
(article 433, Civil Code), and in accordance with article 451 of the Civil Code, the fruits of said lands
were his, until he was summoned upon the complaint, or until he has filed his answer thereto. (Saul vs.
Hawkins, 1 Phil., 275; Javier vs. Javier, 6 Phil., 493; Cleto vs. Salvador, 11 Phil., 416; Valencia vs.
Jimenez and Fuster, 11 Phil., 492; Araujo vs. Celis, 16 Phil., 329; Alcala and Alviedo vs. Hernandez
and Pacleb, 32 Phil., 628; Tolentino vs. Vitug, 39 Phil., 126; Aquino vs. Tañedo, 39 Phil., 517; Rivera
vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 40 Phil., 717; and Velasquez vs. Teodoro, 46 Phil., 757.)
Art 451 of the same Code provides:
Art. 451. Fruits received by one in possession in good faith before possession is legally
interrupted become his own.
Natural and industrial fruits are deemed to have been received as soon as they are gathered and
harvested.
Civil fruits are deemed to accrue from day to day, and belong to the possessor in good faith in
this proportion.
In his comments upon this article of the Civil Code, Manresa, among other things, says:
But to every possessor in good faith there comes a time when he is considered a possessor in
bad faith. When the owner or possessor with a better right comes along, where he becomes
 aware that what he had taken for granted is at least doubtful, and when he learns the grounds in
support of the adverse contention, good faith ceases. The possessor may still believe that his
right is more secure, because we resign ourselves with difficulty to the sight of our vanishing
hopes; but when the final judgment of the court deprives him of the possession, all illusion
necessarily disappears. Although he may not have been convinced of it before, the possessor
becomes aware that his possession is unlawful from the time he learns of the complaint, from
the time he is summoned to the trial. It is at this time that his possession is interrupted,
according to article 1945, and that he ceases to receive the fruits, according to the first
paragraph of article 451. The ruling of the court retroacts to that time; but shall good faith be
deemed to cease then ? Although there is a great difference between requiring the possessor in
good faith to return the fruits he received from the time when his possession was legally
interrupted, and considering him a possessor in bad faith for all legal purposes from that time,
the law had to establish a definite rule in the matter, which is none other than that deducible
from a combination of articles 452, 1945 and 435. Whether or not the defendant be a possessor
in bad faith, for there is no doubt that he can be, and the law makes no attempt to deny it, from
the service of judicial summons, there exists an act that this possessor knows that his right is not
secure, that someone disputes it, and that he may yet lose it; and if the court holds that
restitution be made, that time determines all the legal consequences of the interruption, the time
when the possession in good faith ceased to be so before the law.
The decisions of April 27, 1877, April 22, May 10 and June 13, 1878, February 11, and October
5, 1885, March 17, 1891, March 4, and May 17, 1893, held that good faith ceased when the
answer to the complaint was filed, taking this doctrine from the Partidas. By analogy, the
service of the summons, doubtless more certain and more difficult to evade, is now admitted,
according to articles 451 and 1945 of the Code, and it is in this sense that the decisions of the
Supreme Court of January 28, 1896, December 7, 1899, November 23, 1900, and July 11, 1903,
must be understood, all of them holding that even the possessor in good faith must return the
fruits received from the time the answer to the complaint was filed, that is, from the time he
became aware that he was in undue possession. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil
Code, vol. 4, pp. 270, 271.)
By virtue of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby, affirmed in so far as it
holds that the plaintiffs are the owners of the lands in question, and that the defendant is bound to
return to them the former.
And with regard to the award of damages, said judgment is hereby modified so that the defendant is
only bound to return to the plaintiffs the fruits received from April, 1918 to 1927, that is, 300 sheaves
of rice and 300 manos of tobacco, with the right to deduct the expenses of planting and harvesting (art.
365 of the Civil Code), which shall be determined by the trial court, after hearing both parties.
The appellant shall pay the costs of this trial. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 99338-40 February 1, 1993

HEIRS OF NICOLAS Y. OROSA, (Represented herein by their Attorney-in-Fact, RICARDO Q. OROSA), petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. EUTROPIO MIGRINO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, M.M. Branch 151 and GOLDENROD, INC., respondents.

Romero, Lagman, Valdecantos & Arreza Law Offices for petitioner

Eliseo M. Cruz for Heirs of F. Alma Sr.

Adoracion J. Mirandilla for Goldenrod, Inc.

FELICIANO, J.:

In Maria Mayug Vda. de Cailles v. Dominador Mayuga, et. al.,1 the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 31887-R, confirming
ownership over a fifty-three (53) hectare parcel of land located in Las Piñas, Rizal, more particularly referred to as Lot 9 Psu-11411 Amd-2, in favor of one
Dominador Mayuga. The Court also extended the benefit of such confirmation to the latter's successor-in-interest, the late Nicolas Orosa.

After the case was remanded to Branch 151 of theRegional Trial Court, Pasig, where it was originally docketed in 1958 as Land Registration Case ("LRC") No.
2839, the heirs of Nicolas Orosa (petitioners herein) moved for execution of judgment. This motion was granted by the lower court in its Order dated 25 October
1989, directing the Land Registration Authority ("LRA") to submit the property's amended technical description for approval.2

However, the LRA did not comply with said order because, among others, its records indicated that the property had previously been decreed in favor of one
Jose T. Velasquez, to whom was issued Original Certificate of Title No. 6122.3

On 10 September 1990, Goldenrod, Inc. ("Goldenrod") filed a motion for leave to intervene in the execution proceeding, alleging an interest in the property which
is the subject matter of LRC No. 2839.4

Petitioners opposed Goldenrod's motion, without success. The lower court permitted Goldenrod to file its pleading in intervention through its Order dated 7
December 1990. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration therefrom was likewise denied in an Order dated 11 April 1991.5

Hence this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.

After reviewing the comment required of private respondent Goldenrod, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and to issue a temporary restraining
order to enjoin the public respondent lower court from taking further action in LRC No. 2839. Upon filing of petitioner's reply to said comment, the case was
submitted for decision.

Two (2) ultimate issues are posed for the Court's consideration in this case: 1) whether Goldenrod has shown in its pleadings in intervention a sufficient legal
interest in the land which is the subject matter of LRC No. 2839; and 2) whether the legal interest actually shown by Goldenrod over the land can be protected in
a Proceeding separate from LRC No. 2839.

In respect of the first issue, the Court must observe that the lower court had evaded resolving this matter before permitting Goldenrod's intervention:

The Orosa heirs also contend that the purported intervenor failed to establish its alleged legal interest in these proceedings to the subject
parcel of land. Precisely, this case has to be set for hearing to enable Goldenrod to prove its claim to the land in question . 6 (Emphasis
supplied).

As the Court understands it, Goldenrod attempts to augment the ruling of the lower court by showing in its pleadings in intervention, as well as in its comment
before the Court, the existence of a legal interest in the land sufficient to justify its intervention.

Goldenrod claims that in 1977, during the pendency of this case before the Court in G.R. No. L-30859, Delta Motors Corporation (Delta) acquired for value the
contingent rights of Nicolas Orosa over the property, as well as the conflicting claims thereto of one Jose Velasquez. 7 In 1980, the land registration court trying
Jose Velasquez' claims in LRC No. N-5416 excluded therefrom the land referred to as Lot 9 Psu-11411 Amd-2 in G.R. No. L-30859.8 Meanwhile, Delta somehow
managed to obtain transfer certificates of titles over the land and sold this acquisition to Goldenrod in 1987.9 The latter then succeeded in obtaining issuance in
its favor of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 4893 and 4901, whose technical descriptions overlapped "big portions" of the land referred to as Lot 9 Psu-11411
Amd-2 in G.R. No. L-30859.10 In February 1989, Goldenrod sold the land covered by said transfer certificates of title to a consortium composed of Fil Estate
Management Inc., Arturo Y. Dy, Megatop Realty Development Inc., Peaksun Enterprises and Export Corporation, and Elena D. Jao ("Consortium"). 11 The
contract of sale contained an undertaking on Goldenrod's part to "defend the title of the VENDEES to the property against claims of any third person
whatsoever."12 It is on the basis of this stipulation that Goldenrod seeks to intervene in the execution Proceedings of LRC
No. 2839.

Taking Goldenrod's own admissions at their face value, it is quite apparent that whatever direct and actual legal interest it may have had over the land had been
disposed of by it for value in favor of the consortium in 1989 and that whatever residual legal interest in the property can be premised on Goldenrod's contractual
undertaking, actually an express warranty against eviction, is expectant or contingent in nature. Presently, Goldenrod has no legal interest in the property and its
warranty can only be enforced by the consortium if the latter is dispossessed of the land by virtue of a proper action instituted by the Orosa heirs as registered
owners thereof. 13

But, the legal interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit must be actual and material, direct and immediate. A party seeking to intervene in a pending
case must show that he will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of a judgment. 14

In the present case, Goldenrod has failed to meet this criteria and the lower court gravely abused its discretion in permitting intervention after having overlooked
this matter.

One of the other reasons invoked by the public respondent in permitting intervention at the execution stage of LRC No. 2839 follows:

The Orosa heirs contend that intervention can not be allowed at this stage of the proceedings in this case. They forget that in a land
registration case even when the decree has been issued, the case can be re-opened within (1) year from issuance of said decree to
enable any prejudiced party to present evidence in support of his claim. 15

It appears that the lower court cited Section 32 of P.D. 1529.16 permitting the reopening of a decree of registration within one year after its entry, if the same was
procured through actual fraud and a person is thereby deprived of any interest over the affected land.

The difficulty with this view is that, as earlier noted, Goldenrod had not shown any actual interest in the land of which it could have been deprived, on the basis of
an actual or extrinsic fraud perpetrated by petitioners in the course of procuring their decree of confirmation. Goldenrod had merely alleged, rather ambiguously,
a cause of action against petitioners in that they "suddenly breached and disregarded the 1977 Agreement" (the sale between Nicolas Orosa and Delta). 17 Even
the public respondent made no finding that Goldenrod was the apparent victim of an actual fraud. Hence its invocation of the remedy provided in Section 32 of
P.D. 1529 was bereft of basis.

The action of the lower court in permitting Goldenrod's intervention at this late stage of the proceedings in LRC No. 2839 is also flawed by another, more serious
defect. It must be remembered that upon entry of the Court's judgment in G.R. No. L-30859, the confirmation of a registerable title, and the consequent
adjudication of ownership over Lot 9 Psu-11411 Amd-2, in favor of petitioners' predecessors-in-interest became a final and settled matter. 18 Such entry of
judgment operated, ipso facto to divest the lower court of its general jurisdiction to act in LRC No. 2839, save for the limited matter of supervising the process of
executing the Court's decision. The public respondent simply cannot, as it appears to be trying to do in this case, interpret or reverse the implication of this
Court's ruling that petitioners are entitled to a Torrens title over Lot 9 Psu-11411 Amd-2, just because Goldenrod seeks to recall execution by making a
supervening allegation that petitioners are no longer the owners thereof. 19

Goldenrod attempted to broaden the jurisdiction of the lower court, so as to enable the latter to take cognizance of its motion for intervention, by invoking the
Court's ruling in Suson v. Court of Appeals: 20

It cannot be overlooked that the hearing before the respondent court on the motion for demolition (emphasis supplied by the Court) was in
connection with the implementation or execution of a final judgment in Civil Case No. R-14351. Petitioner was precisely given an
opportunity to intervene in order to guide the court in disposing of private respondent's motion for demolition in the light of petitioner's
claim that his house was erected on the disputed lot (emphasis supplied by the Court), and yet, he was not an original party to the action.
Petitioner was thus given a chance to raise and prove his claim of ownership over a part of the lot in question (emphasis supplied by the
Court), but he ignored such opportunity. He cannot now complain that he was denied due process. "A case in which an execution has
been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the
court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries with it the right
to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution." (Emphasis supplied by Goldenrod).

But it is evident that Goldenrod's reliance upon the Suson case is misplaced because the intervenor therein had a direct and actual legal interest in the property
sought to be recovered by the prevailing party at execution. Consequently, the executing court thereat had to accord the intervenor a full hearing on whatever
claim he might seek to make, disregarding the rules of procedure limiting intervention to the period before or during a trial of a case, 21 in the interest of observing
due process as an aspect of substantial justice.

Here, these considerations do not obtain and the lower court, in permitting intervention, caused needless complication, expense and delay in the execution
proceedings of LRC No-2839, to the prejudice of petitioners' right to a speedy disposition thereof.

Turning to the second issue posed in this case, given the remote and contingent nature of Goldenrod's legal interest over the real property which is the subject
matter of LRC No. 2839, the Court believes that Goldenrod can and should protect such interest in a separate proceeding.

The public respondent invoked the following to support its view that the execution stage of the land registration proceeding was the proper venue within which
Goldenrod can protect its interest in the property.22

Movants also contend that the granting of leave to intervene will unduly delay the disposition of this case. The adjudication of Goldenrod,
Inc.'s interest in the subject parcel of land in the instant case would be for the benefit not only of Goldenrod, Inc . itself, (but) also of the
Orosa heirs, because thereafter there will be no cloud in the title of the party to whom the ownership of said parcel of land may be
adjudicated.

Finally, the movants contend that the intervenor's interest can be protected in a separate proceedings ( sic). The Court doubts if this is true.
In any event, as above adverted to, everybody will be benefited by this Court adjudicating in this case the claim of the intervenor .
(Emphasis supplied).

It would appear that the public respondent premised its ruling solely on the belief that a cloud had descended on the title over the real property which is the
subject matter of LRC No. 2839 and that this cloud had to be removed.

This justification does not persuade. Under Article 447 of the Civil Code,23 the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or an
interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Evidence of Goldenrod's capacity on this point is inexistent because Goldenrod is not
asserting a claim to the property.24 On the contrary, it had admitted having alienated its interest in the land referred to as Lot 9 Psu-11411 Amd-2 to the
consortium. Thus, Goldenrod is not an interested party capable of instituting an action to quiet title, either by intervening in LRC No. 2839 or by instituting a
separate action. The right to commence such a separate action pertains to its Vendee, if the latter wishes to defend the validity of its 1987 purchase from
Golderrod and to hold the Vendor Goldenrod liable on its warranty of title.

WHEREFORE. the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby GRANTED. The Orders of the public respondent dated 7 December 1990 and 11 April 1991,
being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The public respondent's Order dated 25
October 1989 is hereby REINSTATED and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court in this case is correspondingly LIFTED. In view of the long
pendency of LRC No. 2839, the public respondent is hereby enjoined to terminate the proceeding as soon as possible by completing the execution of the Court's
Decision in G.R. No. L-30859 with all deliberate speed. This Decision is immediately executory. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

1 G.R. No. L-30859, 20 February 1989, 170 SCRA 347.

2 Rollo, pp. 39-40.

3 Id., 144-146.

4 Id., p. 41.

5 Id., pp. 26-28 and 43.

6 Order, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 26-27.

7 Rollo, pp. 117-118 and 157.

8 Id., pp. 79-80, 83 and 87-88.

9 Id., p. 118.

10 Id., pp. 118-119, and 138.

11 Id., p. 119.

12 Rollo, pp. 119 and 195. The contractual stipulations relevant to Goldenrod's motion in intervention appear to be the following:
 6. That the VENDOR shall defend the title of the VENDEES to the property against claims of any third persons whatsoever and that in the
event of suits filed concerning the ownership of the property, the VENDEES shall have the right to suspend the payment of any amount
provided herein, and any and all period (sic) under this agreement shall be deemed automatically suspended and shall only commence to
run upon final settlement of said suits or claims, and if by reason of said suits the VENDEES is compelled to litigate all expenses for the
same and the damages occasioned thereby shall be for the VENDOR's account.

xxx xxx xxx

9. It is hereby emphasized that the VENDEES has (sic) entered into this transaction on the representation and commitments by the
VENDOR that all pending claims, liens, litigations involving the subject property hereof have all been finalized, settled, terminated or
otherwise dismissed and that the property shall be delivered cleared of any claims whatsoever. (Emphasis supplied).

13 Articles 1557 and 1558, Civil Code.

Article 1557. The warranty cannot be enforced until a final judgment has been rendered whereby the vendee loses the thing acquired or
part thereof.

Article 1558. The vendor shall not be obliged to make good the proper warranty, unless he is summoned in the suit for eviction at the
instance of the vendee.

14 See Garcia v. David, 67 Phil. 279, 284-285 (1939); see also Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Republic, 188 SCRA 785-
787 (1990) and Saw v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 740, 744-745 (1991).

15 Rollo, p. 26.

16 Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. —

The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the
government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation or title
obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] a petition for reopening or review of the
decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such
petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may
be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

Upon expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any
person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any
other persons responsible for the fraud. (Emphasis supplied).

17 Rollo, p. 137.

18 See Chua Huat v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 1, 14 (1991).

19 See Tan v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 212, 222-223 (1991), Shell Company of the Phils., Ltd. v. Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Agusan del Norte, 198 SCRA 254, 265 (1991) and Cruz v. Nicholas, 194 SCRA 639, 643 (1991).

20 172 SCRA 70, 75 (1989); Comment, pp. 20-22; Rollo, pp. 134-136.

21 Sec. 2, Rule 12.

Sec. 2. Intervention. — A person may, before or during a trial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has
a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as
to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied.)

22 Rollo, pp. 27.

23 Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or an interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. He
need not be in possession of said property. (Emphasis supplied).

24 See Binalay v. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374, 387 (1991).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21783 March 25, 1970

PACIFIC FARMS, INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO G. ESGUERRA, ET AL., defendants, CARRIED LUMBER COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:

Subject of this resolution is a motion filed by the plaintiff-appellee Pacific Farms, Inc. for reconsideration of our decision of November 29, 1969.

Briefly stated, the plaintiff-appellee's first argument is that it should not have been found liable for the payment of the unpaid portion of the procurement price of
the lumber and construction materials furnished by the appellant to its predecessor-in-interest, the Insular Farms, Inc., because it was a purchaser for value and
in good faith of the six buildings in question. The flaw in this argument lies in its assumption that the reason we held the appellee liable is that it was not a buyer
in good faith and for value, which is incorrect. When we applied article 447 of the Civil Code by analogy to this case, we did so on the assumption that the
plaintiff-appellee was in good faith. Thus, after quoting said article, we stated:

Although it does not appear from the records of this case that the land upon which the six buildings were built is owned by the appellee,
nevertheless, that the appellee claims that it owns the six buildings constructed out of the lumber and construction materials furnished by
the appellant, is indubitable. Therefore, applying article 447 by analogy, we perforce consider the buildings as the principal and the lumber
and construction materials that went into their construction as the accessory. Thus the appellee, if it does own the six buildings, must bear
the obligation to pay for the values of the said materials; the appellant — which apparently has no desire to remove the materials, and,
even if it were minded to do so, cannot remove them without necessarily damaging the buildings — has the corresponding right to recover
the value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials. (Decision, pp. 4-5; emphasis supplied)

Indeed, because we assumed that the appellee was in good faith, we did not pronounce it liable for the reparation of damages but only for the payment of the
unpaid price of the lumber and construction materials due to the appellant as unpaid furnisher thereof. Based on this same assumption, we likewise held that the
appellant has no right to remove the materials but only to recovery the value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials. Thus, since the appellee benefited
from the accession, i.e., from the lumber and materials that went into the construction of the six buildings, it should shoulder the compensation due to the
appellant as unpaid furnisher of materials, pursuant to the rule we cited in our decision that compensation should be borne by the person who has been
benefited by the accession.

Under the overall environmental circumstances of the case, considering that although the appellee was in a better position to protect its own interest it took no
action to intervene in the suit filed by the appellant against the Insular Farms, Inc. or to hold the latter to account therefor, notwithstanding that it concededly
acquired knowledge, after its purchase from the Insular Farms, Inc., on March 21, 1958 of the six buildings in question; of the filing and pendency of the
appellant's suit for payment of the unpaid balance of the price of the lumber and construction materials delivered to the Insular Farms, Inc. and used in the
construction of the said buildings, the Court believes that its decision upholding the sheriff's sale of the six buildings but granting the appellee the option of
redeeming the same by paying to the appellant the unpaid balance with interest owing to it as supplier of the construction materials, is completely in consonance
with justice and equity.

ACCORDINGLY, the plaintiff-appellee's motion for reconsideration dated December 12, 1969 is hereby denied.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44606 November 28, 1938
VICENTE STO. DOMINGO BERNARDO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CATALINO BATACLAN, defendant-appellant.
TORIBIO TEODORO, purchaser-appellee.
Pedro de Leon for plaintiff-appellant.
Angel H. Mojica and Francisco Lavides for defendant appellant.
Jose Y. Garde for appellee.

LAUREL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by both the plaintiff and the defendant from the order of September 26, 1935,
hereinabove referred to, of the Court of First Instance of Cavite in Civil Case No. 2428.
There is no controversy as to the facts. By a contract of sale executed from Pastor Samonte and others
ownership of a parcel of land of about 90 hectares situated in sitio Balayunan, Silang, Cavite. To secure
possession of the land from the vendors the said plaintiff, on July 20, 1929, instituted Civil Case No.
1935 in the Court of First Instance of Cavite. The trial court found for the plaintiff in a decision which
was affirmed by this Supreme Court on appeal (G.R. No. 33017). 1 When plaintiff entered upon the
premises, however, he found the defendant herein, Catalino Bataclan, who appears to have been
authorized by former owners, as far back as 1922, to clear the land and make improvements thereon. As
Bataclan was not a party in Case No. 1935, plaintiff, on June 11, 1931, instituted against him, in the
Court of First Instance of Cavite, Civil Case No. 2428. In this case, plaintiff was declared owner but the
defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith, entitled to reimbursement in the total sum of
P1,642, for work done and improvements made. The dispositive part of the decision reads:
Por las consideraciones expuestas, se declara al demandante Vicente Santo Domingo Bernardo
dueño con derecho a la posesion del terreno que se describe en la demanda, y al demandado
Catalino Bataclan con derecho a que del demandante le pague la suma de P1,642 por gastos
utiles hechos de buena fe en el terreno, y por el cerco y ponos de coco y abaca existentes en el
mismo, y con derecho, ademas a retener la posesion del terreno hasta que se le pague dicha
cantidad. Al demandante puede optar, en el plazo de treinta dias, a partir de la fecha en que
fuere notificado de la presente, por pagar esa suma al demandado, haciendo asi suyos el cerco y
todas las plantaciones existentes en el terreno, u obligar al demandado a pagarle el precio
terreno, a razon de trescientos pesos la hectarea. En el caso de que el demandante optara por que
el demandado le pagara el precio del terreno, el demandado efectuara el pago en el plazo
convenientes por las partes o que sera fijado por el Juzgado. Sin costas.
Both parties appealed to this court (G. R. No. 37319). 2 The decision appealed from was modified by
allowing the defendant to recover compensation amounting to P2,212 and by reducing the price at
which the plaintiff could require the defendant to purchase the land in question from P300 to P200 per
hectare. Plaintiff was given by this court 30 days from the date when the decision became final within
which to exercise his option, either to sell the land to the defendant or to buy the improvements from
him. On January 9, 1934, the plaintiff manifested to the lower court his desire "to require the defendant
to pay him the value of the land at the rate of P200 per hectare or a total price of P18,000 for the whole
tract of land." The defendant informed the lower court that he was unable to pay the land and, on
January 24, 1934, an order was issued giving the plaintiff 30 days within which to pay the defendant
the sum of P2,212 stating that, in the event of failure to make such payment, the land would be ordered
sold at public auction "Para hacer pago al demandante de la suma de P2,212 y el remanente despues
de deducidos los gastos legales de la venta en publica subasta sera entregado al demandante." On
February 21, 1934, plaintiff moved to reconsider the foregoing order so that he would have preference
over the defendant in the order of payment. The motion was denied on March 1, 1934 but on March 16
following the court below, motu proprio modified its order of January 24, "en el sentido de que el
demandante tiene derecho preferente al importe del terreno no se vendiere en publica subasta, a razon
de P200 por hectares y el remanente, si acaso lo hubiere se entregara al demandado en pago de la
cantidad de P2,212 por la limpieza del terreno y las mejoras introducidas en el mismo por el citado
demandado." On April 24, 1934, the court below, at the instance of the plaintiff and without objection
on the part of the defendant, ordered the sale of the land in question at public auction. The land was
sold on April 5, 1935 to Toribio Teodoro, the highest bidder, for P8,000. In the certificate of sale issued
to said purchaser on the very day of sale, it was stated that the period of redemption of the land sold
was to expire on April 5, 1936. Upon petition of Toribio Teodoro the court below ordered the provincial
sheriff to issue another certificate not qualified by any equity of redemption. This was complied with
by the sheriff on July 30, 1935. On September 18, 1935, Teodoro moved that he be placed in possession
of the land purchased by him. The motion was granted by order of September 26, 1935, the dispositive
part of which is as follows:
Por tanto, se ordena al Sheriff Provincial de Cavite ponga a Toribio Teodoro en posesion del
terreno comprado por el en subasta publica y por el cual se le expidio certificado de venta
definitiva, reservando al demandado su derecho de ejercitar una accion ordinaria para reclamar
del demandante la cantidad de P2,212 a que tiene derecho por la limpieza y mejoras del terreno
y cuya suma, en justicia y equidad, debe ser descontada y deducida de la suma de P8,000 que ya
ha recibido el demandante.
The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored principles of the law of property. One of these is the
principle of accession whereby the owner of property acquires not only that which it produces but that
which is united to it either naturally or artificially. (Art. 353.) Whatever is built, planted or sown on the
land of another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land (art.
358). Where, however, the planter, builder, or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises
between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without
causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating what Manresa
calls a state of "forced coownership" (vol. 3, 4th ed., p. 213), the law has provided a just and equitable
solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the
proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper
rent (art. 361). It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is
older and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing
(3 Manresa, 4th ed., p. 213). In the case before us, the plaintiff, as owner of the land, chose to require
the defendant, as owner of the improvements, to pay for the land.
The defendant states that he is a possessor in good faith and that the amount of P2,212 to which he is
entitled has not yet been paid to him. Therefore, he says, he has a right to retain the land in accordance
with the provisions of article 453 of the Civil Code. We do not doubt the validity of the premises stated.
"Considera la ley tan saarada y legitima la deuda, que, hasta que sea pagada, no consiente que la
cosa se restituya all vencedor." (4 Manresa, 4th ed, p., 304.) We find, however, that the defendant has
lost his right of retention. In obedience to the decision of this court in G.R. No. 37319, the plaintiff
expressed his desire to require the defendant to pay for the value of the land. The said defendant could
have become owner of both land and improvements and continued in possession thereof. But he said he
could not pay and the land was sold at public auction to Toribio Teodoro. The law, as we have already
said, requires no more than that the owner of the land should choose between indemnifying the owner
of the improvements or requiring the latter to pay for the land. When he failed to pay for the land, the
defendant herein lost his right of retention.
The sale at public auction having been asked by the plaintiff himself (p. 22, bill of exceptions) and the
purchase price of P8,000 received by him from Toribio Teodoro, we find no reason to justify a rapture
of the situation thus created between them, the defendant-appellant not being entitled, after all, to
recover from the plaintiff the sum of P2,212. lawphi1.net
The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified by eliminating therefrom the reservation made
in favor of the defendant-appellant to recover from the plaintiff the sum of P2,212. In all the respects,
the same is affirmed, without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial and Diaz, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Promulgated December 6, 1930, not reported.
2 Promulgated December 2, 1933 (59 Phil., 903).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-175 April 30, 1946
DAMIAN IGNACIO, FRANCISCO IGNACIO and LUIS IGNACIO, petitioners,
vs.
ELIAS HILARIO and his wife DIONISIA DRES, and FELIPE NATIVIDAD, Judge of First
Instance of Pangasinan, respondents.
Leoncio R. Esliza for petitioners.
Mauricio M. Monta for respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for certiorari arising from a case in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan between
the herein respondents Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres as plaintiffs, and the herein petitioners
Damian, Francisco and Luis, surnamed Ignacio, as defendants, concerning the ownership of a parcel of
land, partly rice-land and partly residential. After the trial of the case, the lower court, presided over by
Hon. Alfonso Felix, rendered judgment holding plaintiffs as the legal owners of the whole property but
conceding to defendants the ownership of the houses and granaries built by them on the residential
portion with the rights of a possessor in good faith, in accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code.
The dispositive part of the decision, hub of this controversy, follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring:
(1) That the plaintiffs are the owners of the whole property described in transfer certificate of
title No. 12872 (Exhibit A) issued in their name, and entitled to the possession of the same;
(2) That the defendants are entitled to hold the position of the residential lot until after they are
paid the actual market value of their houses and granaries erected thereon, unless the plaintiffs
prefer to sell them said residential lot, in which case defendants shall pay the plaintiffs the
proportionate value of said residential lot taking as a basis the price paid for the whole land
according to Exhibit B; and
(3) That upon defendant's failure to purchase the residential lot in question, said defendants
shall remove their houses and granaries after this decision becomes final and within the period
of sixty (60) days from the date that the court is informed in writing of the attitude of the parties
in this respect.
No pronouncement is made as to damages and costs.
Once this decision becomes final, the plaintiffs and defendants may appear again before this
court for the purpose of determining their respective rights under article 361 of the Civil Code,
if they cannot come to an extra-judicial settlement with regard to said rights.
Subsequently, in a motion filed in the same Court of First Instance but now presided over by the herein
respondent Judge Hon. Felipe Natividad, the plaintiffs prayed for an order of execution alleging that
since they chose neither to pay defendants for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot, said
defendants should be ordered to remove the structure at their own expense and to restore plaintiffs in
the possession of said lot. Defendants objected to this motion which, after hearing, was granted by
Judge Natividad. Hence, this petition by defendants praying for (a) a restraint and annulment of the
order of execution issued by Judge Natividad; (b) an order to compel plaintiffs to pay them the sum of
P2,000 for the buildings, or sell to them the residential lot for P45; or (c), a rehearing of the case for a
determination of the rights of the parties upon failure of extra-judicial settlement.
The judgment rendered by Judge Felix is founded on articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code which are
as follows:
ART. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or planting, after the payment of
 the indemnity stated in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
ART. 453. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in
good faith may retain the thing until such expenses are made good to him.
Useful expenses shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with the same right of
retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the
amount of the expenses or paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired in
consequence thereof.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the
possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453. The owner of the
land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell his
land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the
building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is
erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party
fails to pay for the same. But this is not the case before us.
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to remove their
buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay
for such buildings not to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought
to be executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code.
There is, however, in the decision of Judge Felix a question of procedure which calls for the
clarification, to avoid uncertainty and delay in the disposition of cases. In that decision, the rights of
both parties are well defined under articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code, but it fails to determine the
value of the buildings and of the lot where they are erected as well as the periods of time within which
the option may be exercised and payment should be made, these particulars having been left for
determination apparently after the judgment has become final. This procedure is erroneous, for after the
judgment has become final, no additions can be made thereto and nothing can be done therewith except
its execution. And execution cannot be had, the sheriff being ignorant as to how, for how much, and
within what time may the option be exercised, and certainly no authority is vested in him to settle these
matters which involve exercise of judicial discretion. Thus the judgment rendered by Judge Felix has
never become final, it having left matters to be settled for its completion in a subsequent proceeding,
matters which remained unsettled up to the time the petition is filed in the instant case.
For all the foregoing, the writ of execution issued by Judge Natividad is hereby set aside and the lower
court ordered to hold a hearing in the principal case wherein it must determine the prices of the
buildings and of the residential lot where they are erected, as well as the period of time within which
the plaintiffs-respondents may exercise their option either to pay for the buildings or to sell their land,
and, in the last instance, the period of time within which the defendants-petitioners may pay for the
land, all these periods to be counted from the date the judgment becomes executory or unappealable.
After such hearing, the court shall render a final judgment according to the evidence presented by the
parties.
The costs shall be paid by plaintiffs-respondents.
Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon and Briones, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57288 April 30, 1984
LEONILA SARMINETO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ENRIQUE A. AGANA, District Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh
Judicial District, Branch XXVIII, Pasay City, and SPOUSES ERNESTO VALENTINO and
REBECCA LORENZO-VALENTINO, respondents.
Mercedes M. Respicio for petitioner.
Romulo R. Bobadilla for private respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This Petition for certiorari questions a March 29, 1979 Decision rendered by the then Court of
First Instance of Pasay City. The Decision was one made on memoranda, pursuant to the
provisions of RA 6031, and it modified, on October 17, 1977, a judgment of the then Municipal
Court of Paranaque, Rizal, in an Ejectment suit instituted by herein petitioner Leonila
SARMIENTO against private respondents, the spouses ERNESTO Valentino and Rebecca
Lorenzo. For the facts, therefore, we have to look to the evidence presented by the parties at
the original level.
It appears that while ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the latter's mother had told him the
couple could build a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on a lot of 145 sq. ms., being Lot D of a
subdivision in Paranaque (the LAND, for short). In 1967, ERNESTO did construct a
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on the LAND at a cost of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00. It was probably
assumed that the wife's mother was the owner of the LAND and that, eventually, it would
somehow be transferred to the spouses.
It subsequently turned out that the LAND had been titled in the name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C.
Santo, Jr. who, on September 7 , 1974, sold the same to petitioner SARMIENTO. The
following January 6, 1975, SARMIENTO asked ERNESTO and wife to vacate and, on April
21, 1975, filed an Ejectment suit against them. In the evidentiary hearings before the
Municipal Court, SARMIENTO submitted the deed of sale of the LAND in her favor, which
showed the price to be P15,000.00. On the other hand, ERNESTO testified that the then cost
of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE would be from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00. The figures were not
questioned by SARMIENTO.
The Municipal Court found that private respondents had built the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE in
good faith, and, disregarding the testimony of ERNESTO, that it had a value of P20,000.00. It
then ordered ERNESTO and wife to vacate the LAND after SARMIENTO has paid them the
mentioned sum of P20,000.00.
The Ejectment suit was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Pasay where, after the
submission of memoranda, said Court rendered a modifying Decision under Article 448 of the
Civil Code. SARMIENTO was required, within 60 days, to exercise the option to reimburse
ERNESTO and wife the sum of 40,000.00 as the value of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, or the
option to allow them to purchase the LAND for P25,000.00. SARMIENTO did not exercise any
of the two options within the indicated period, and ERNESTO was then allowed to deposit the
sum of P25,000.00 with the Court as the purchase price for the LAND. This is the hub of the
controversy. SARMIENTO then instituted the instant certiorari proceedings.
We agree that ERNESTO and wife were builders in good faith in view of the peculiar
circumstances under which they had constructed the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE. As far as they
knew, the LAND was owned by ERNESTO's mother-in-law who, having stated they could
build on the property, could reasonably be expected to later on give them the LAND.
In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the Code provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith,
shall have the right
to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or
to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the
building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms
of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
(Paragraphing supplied)
The value of the LAND, purchased for P15,000.00 on September 7, 1974, could not have
been very much more than that amount during the following January when ERNESTO and
wife were asked to vacate. However, ERNESTO and wife have not questioned the
P25,000.00 valuation determined by the Court of First Instance.
In regards to the valuation of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, the only evidence presented was
the testimony of ERNESTO that its worth at the time of the trial should be from P30,000.00 to
P40,000.00. The Municipal Court chose to assess its value at P20,000.00, or below the
minimum testified by ERNESTO, while the Court of First Instance chose the maximum of
P40,000.00. In the latter case, it cannot be said that the Court of First Instance had abused its
discretion.
The challenged decision of respondent Court, based on valuations of P25,000.00 for the
LAND and P40,000.00 for the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, cannot be viewed as not supported by
the evidence. The provision for the exercise by petitioner SARMIENTO of either the option to
indemnify private respondents in the amount of P40,000.00, or the option to allow private
respondents to purchase the LAND at P25,000.00, in our opinion, was a correct decision. têñ.
£îhqwâ£
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is
entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his
building, under article 453 (now Article 546). The owner, of the land. upon, the
other hand, has the option, under article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for
the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as
respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and
compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected.
He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land,
the other party fails to pay for the same. (Emphasis ours)
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-
 petitioners to remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-
respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor
to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought
to be executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 (now Article 448)
and 453 (now Article 546) of the Civil Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605,
608 [1946]).
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby ordered dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25462 February 21, 1980
MARIANO FLOREZA, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA D. de EVANGELISTA and SERGIO EVANGELISTA, respondents.
R.D. Hipolito & B. P. Fabir for petitioner.
E.G. Tanjuatco & Associates for respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
23516-R) promulgated on November 4, 1965, entitled "Maria de Evangelista and Sergio
Evangelists, (now the respondents) vs. Mariano Floreza (petitioner herein)," reversing the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered on July 17, 1957, and instead
ordering petitioner to vacate respondents' residential lot, to remove his house at his own
expenses and to pay rental from May 5, 1956.
Plaintiffs Maria de Evangelista and Sergio Evangelista, who are mother and son, (the
EVANGELISTAS, for short) are the owners of a residential lot located at Sumilang St., Tanay,
Rizal, with an area of 204.08 sq. ms., assessed at P410.00. In May 1945, the
EVANGELISTAS borrowed from FLOREZA the amount of P100.00. On or about November
1945, with the consent of the EVANGELISTAS, FLOREZA occupied the above residential lot
and built thereon a house of light materials (barong- barong) without any agreement as to
payment for the use of said residential lot owing to the fact that the EVANGELISTAS has then
a standing loan of P100.00 in favor of FLOREZA. 1
On the following dates, the EVANGELISTAS again borrowed the indicated amounts:
September 16, 1946 — P100.00; 2 August 17, 1947 — P200,00; 3 January 30, 1949 —
P200.00; 4 April 1, 1949 — P140.00, 5 or a total of P740.00 including the first loan. The last
three items are evidenced by private documents stating that the residential lot stands as
security therefor and that the amounts covered thereunder are payable within six years from
date, without mention of interest. The document executed on September 16, 1946 stated
specifically that the loan was without interest "walang anumang patubo."
On January 10, 1949, FLOREZA demolished this house of light materials and in its place
constructed one of strong materials assessed in his name at P1,410.00 under Tax Declaration
No. 4448. FLOREZA paid no rental as before. 6
On August 1, 1949, the EVANGELISTAS, for and in consideration of P1,000.00 representing
the total outstanding loan of P740.00 plus P260.00 in cash, sold their residential lot to
FLOREZA, with a right to repurchase within a period of 6 years from date, or up to August 1,
1955, as evidenced by a notarial document, Exh. B, registered under Act 3344 on December
6, 1949, as Inscription No. 2147. 7
On January 2, 1955, or seven months before the expiry of the repurchase period, the
EVANGELISTAS paid in full the repurchase price of P1,000.00.
On April 25, 1956, the EVANGELISTAS, through their counsel, wrote FLOREZA a letter 8
asking him to vacate the premises as they wanted to make use of their residential lot besides
the fact that FLOREZA had already been given by them more than one year within which to
move his house to another site. On May 4, 1956, the EVANGELISTAS made a formal written
demand to vacate, within five days from notice, explaining that they had already fully paid the
consideration for the repurchase of the lot. 9 FLOREZA refused to vacate unless he was first
reimbursed the value of his house. Hence, the filing of this Complaint on May 18, 1956 by the
EVANGELISTAS.
The EVANGELISTAS prayed that: 1) they be declared the owners of the house of strong
materials built by FLOREZA on their residential lot, without payment of indemnity; or, in the
alternative to order FLOREZA to remove said house; 2) that FLOREZA pay them the sum of
P10.00 per month as the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the same from
January 2, 1955 (the date the repurchase price was paid) until FLOREZA removes the house
and delivers the lot to them; and 3) to declare the transaction between them and FLOREZA
as one of mortgage and not of pacto de retro.
In his Answer, FLOREZA admitted the repurchase but controverted by stating that he would
execute a deed of repurchase and leave the premises upon payment to him of the reasonable
value of the house worth P7,000.00.
In a Decision dated July 17, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Rizal opined that the question
of whether the transaction between the parties is one of mortgage or pacto de retro is no
longer material as the indebtedness of P1,000.00 of the EVANGELISTAS to FLOREZA had
already been fully paid. And, applying Article 448 of the Civil Code, 10 it rendered a decision
dispositively decreeing:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders
judgment granting the plaintiffs the right to elect, as owners of the land, to
purchase the house built, on the said lot in question by the defendant for P2,500
or to sell their said land to e defendant for P1,500. In the event that the plaintiffs
shall decide not to purchase the house in question the defendant should be
allowed to remain in plaintiffs' premises by, paying a monthly rental of P10.00
which is the reasonable value for the use of the same per month as alleged by
plaintiffs in their complaint. The Court also orders the defendant to pay a
 monthly rental of P10.00 for the use of the land in question from May 18, 1956,
the date of the commencement of this action. The counterclaim of the defendant
is hereby ordered dismissed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 11
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On November 4, 1965, the Court of Appeals concluded that Article 448 of the Civil Code,
supra, was inapplicable; that FLOREZA was not entitled to reimbursement for his house but
that he could remove the same at his expense; and accordingly rendered judgment thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) adjudging the defendant-
appellant Mariano Floreza to vacate plaintiffs' residential lot described in the
complaint and to pay rental of P10.00 a month from May 5, 1956, until he
(defendant) shall have vacated the premises; (2) ordering defendant to remove
his house from the land in question within 30 days from the time this decision
becomes final and executory; (3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
cancel inscription No. 2147, Page 210, Vol. 36, in the Registration Book under
Act 3344 upon payment of his lawful fees; and (4) taxing the costs in both
instances against defendant-appellant Mariano Floreza. 12
Hence, this Petition for Review on certiorari by FLOREZA, seeking a reversal of the
aforestated judgment and ascribing the following errors:
1) That the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner Floreza was a
builder in bad faith without likewise holding that respondents as owners of the
land in dispute, were likewise in bad faith and therefore both parties should in
accordance with Art. 453 of the New Civil Code be considered as having acted
in good faith.
2) That the Court of Appeals erred in completely ignoring the issue raised on
appeal as to whether or not respondents as owners of the questioned lot, were
in bad faith in the sense that they had knowledge of and acquiseced to the
construction of the house of petitioner on their lot.
3) That the Court of Appeals erred in not applying Art. 448 of the New Civil Code
in the adjudication of the rights of petitioner and respondent.
4) That the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that petitioner is not entitled to
reimbursement for the value of his house and that he should instead remove the
same at his expense.
5) That the Court of Appeals erred in adjudging petitioner to vacate respondents'
lot in question and to pay rentals commencing from May 5, 1956, until he shall
have vacated the premises, notwithstanding that petitioner is entitled under Arts.
448 and 546 of the New Civil Code, to retention without payment of rental while
the corresponding indemnity of his house had not been paid.
6) That the Court of Appeals erred in taxing costs against petitioner.
7) That the Court of Appeals erred in not awarding petitioner's counterclaim.
During the pendency of this appeal, petitioner Maria D. de Evangelista died and was ordered
substituted by her son, petitioner Sergio, as her legal representative, in a Resolution dated
May 14, 1976.
On October 20, 1978. the EVANGELISTAS filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that FLOREZA
had since died and that his heirs had voluntarily vacated the residential lot in question. The
date FLOREZA passed away and the date his heirs had voluntarily vacated the property has
not been stated. Required to comment, "petitioner (represented by his heirs)", through
counsel, confirmed his death and the removal of the house and manifested that thereby the
question of reimbursement had moot and academic. He objected to the dismissal of the case,
however, on the ground that the issue of rentals still pends. On January 21, 1980, complying
with a Resolution of 'his Court, the EVANGELISTAS clarified that the dismissal they were
praying for was not of the entire case but only of this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
We are not in agreement that the question of reimbursement of the value of the improvement
erected on the subject property has become moot. Petitioner's right of retention of subject
property until he is reimbursed for the value of his house, as he had demanded, is inextricably
linked with the question of rentals. For if petitioner has the right to indemnity, he has the right
of retention and no rentals need be paid. Conversely, if no right of retention exists, damages
in the form of rentals for the continued use and occupation of the property should be allowed.
We uphold the Court of Appeals in its conclusion that Article 448 of the Civil Code is
inapplicable to the factual milieu herein. Said codal provision applies only when the builder,
planter, or sower believes he had the right so to build, plant or sow because he thinks he
owns the land or believes himself to have a claim of title. 13 In this case, petitioner makes no
pretensions of ownership whatsoever.
Petitioner concedes that he was a builder in bad faith but maintains that' the EVANGELISTAS
should also be held in bad faith, so that both of them being in bad faith, Article 453 of the Civil
Code 14 should apply. By the same token, however, that Article 448 of the same Code is not
applicable, neither is Article 453 under the ambiance of this case.
Would petitioner, as vendee a retro, then be entitled to the rights granted iii Article 1616 of the
Civil Code (Art. 1518 of the old Code)? To quote:
Art. 1616. The vendor cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without
returning to the vendee the price of the sale, and in addition:
(1) The expenses of the contract, and any other legitimate payments made by
reason of the sale;
(2) The necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold.
The question again calls for a negative answer. It should be noted that petitioner did not
construct his house as a vendee a retro. The house had already been constructed as far back
as 1949 (1945 for the house of light materials) even before the pacto de retro sale in 1949.
Petitioner incurred no useful expense, therefore, after that sale. The house was already there
at the tolerance of the EVANGELISTAS in consideration of the several loans extended to
them. Since petitioner cannot be classified as a builder in good faith within the purview of
Article 448 of the Civil Code, nor as a vendee a retro, who made useful improvements during
the lifetime of the pacto de retro, petitioner has no right to reimbursement of the value of the
house which he had erected on the residential lot of the EVANGELISTAS, much less to
retention of the premises until he is reimbursed.The rights of petitioner are more akin to those
of a usufructuary who, under Article 579 of the Civil (Art. 487 of the old Code), may make on
the property useful improvements but with no right to be indemnified therefor. He may,
however, remove such improvements should it be possible to do so without damage to the
property: For if the improvements made by the usufructuary were subject to indemnity, we
would have a dangerous and unjust situation in which the usufructuary could dispose of the
owner's funds by compelling him to pay for improvements which perhaps he would not have
made. 15
We come now to the issue of rentals. It is clear that from the date that the redemption price
had been paid by the EVANGELISTAS on January 2, 1955, petitioner's right to the use of the
residential lot without charge had ceased. Having retained the property although a redemption
had been made, he should be held liable for damages in the form of rentals for the continued
use of the subject residential lot16 at the rate of P10.00 monthly from January 3, 1955, and
not merely from the date of demand on May 4, 1956, as held by the Court of Appeals, until the
house was removed and the property vacated by petitioner or his heirs.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the modification that
payment of rentals by the heir, of Mariano Floreza, who are hereby ordered substituted for
him, shall commence on January 3, 1955 until the date that the residential lot in question was
vacated.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Exh. A, p, 1, Record of Exhibits

2 Exh. 9, p. 29, Ibid.

3 Exit 10, p. 30, Ibid.

4 Exh. 2, p. 24. Ibid,

5 Exh. 3, p. 25, Ibid.

6 Exh. 11, p. 31, Ibid.

7 Pp. 3-4, Ibid.

8 Exh- 5, P. 27, Ibid.

9 Exh. 6, p. 28, Ibid.

10 ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as
his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land. and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be aged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the tease and in
case of disagreement. the court shall fix the terms thereof.

11 Amended Record on Appeal, p.22.

12 Decision, pp. 9-10.

13 Alburo vs. Villanueva, 7 Phil. 277 (1907); Quemuel vs. Olaes, I SCRA 1159 (1961); Racaza vs. Susana Realty, Inc., 18 SCRA 1172
(1966).

14 ART. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed on the land of another, but also on the
part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.

It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the Ian downer whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition
on his part.

15 Tolentino, Civil Code, citing Castan 237, citing de Diego Vol. pp, 315-316, 1972 ed.

16 Cho Chun Chac vs. Garcia, 47 Phil. 530 (1925).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57348 May 16, 1985
FRANCISCO DEPRA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN DUMLAO, defendant-appellant.
Roberto D. Dineros for plaintiff-appellee.
Veil D. Hechanova for defendant-appellant.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Order of the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo to the then
Court of Appeals, which the latter certified to this instance as involving pure questions of law
Plaintiff-appellee, Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T3087, known as Lot No. 685, situated in the municipality of
Dumangas, Iloilo, with an area of approximately 8,870 square meters. Agustin Dumlao,
defendant-appellant, owns an adjoining lot, designated as Lot No. 683, with an approximate
area of 231 sq. ms.
Sometime in 1972, when DUMLAO constructed his house on his lot, the kitchen thereof had
encroached on an area of thirty four (34) square meters of DEPRA's property, After the
encroachment was discovered in a relocation survey of DEPRA's lot made on November
2,1972, his mother, Beatriz Depra after writing a demand letter asking DUMLAO to move back
from his encroachment, filed an action for Unlawful Detainer on February 6,1973 against
DUMLAO in the Municipal Court of of Dumangas, docketed as Civil Case No 1, Said
complaint was later amended to include DEPRA as a party plain. plaintiff.
After trial, the Municipal Court found that DUMLAO was a builder in good faith, and applying
Article 448 of the Civil Code, rendered judgment on September 29, 1973, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
Ordering that a forced lease is created between the parties with the plaintiffs, as
lessors, and the defendants as lessees, over the disputed portion with an area
of thirty four (34) square meters, the rent to be paid is five (P5.00) pesos a
month, payable by the lessee to the lessors within the first five (5) days of the
month the rent is due; and the lease shall commence on the day that this
decision shall have become final.
From the foregoing judgment, neither party appeal so that, ff it were a valid judgment, it would
have ordinarily lapsed into finality, but even then, DEPRA did not accept payment of rentals
so that DUMLAO deposited such rentals with the Municipal Court.
On July 15,1974, DEPRA filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against DUMLAO before the
then Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV (Trial Court), involving the very same 34
square meters, which was the bone of contention in the Municipal Court. DUMLAO, in his
Answer, admitted the encroachment but alleged, in the main, that the present suit is barred by
res judicata by virtue of the Decision of the Municipal Court, which had become final and
executory.
After the case had been set for pre-trial, the parties submitted a Joint Motion for Judgment
based on the Stipulation of Facts attached thereto. Premised thereon, the Trial Court on
October 31, 1974, issued the assailed Order, decreeing:
 WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that the thirty four (34) square
meters subject of this litigation is part and parcel of Lot 685 of the Cadastral
Survey of Dumangas of which the plaintiff is owner as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3087 and such plaintiff is entitled to possess the same.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Rebutting the argument of res judicata relied upon by DUMLAO, DEPRA claims that the
Decision of the Municipal Court was null and void ab initio because its jurisdiction is limited to
the sole issue of possession, whereas decisions affecting lease, which is an encumbrance on
real property, may only be rendered by Courts of First Instance.
Addressing out selves to the issue of validity of the Decision of the Municipal Court, we hold
the same to be null and void. The judgment in a detainer case is effective in respect of
possession only (Sec. 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court). 1 The Municipal Court over-stepped its
bounds when it imposed upon the parties a situation of "forced lease", which like "forced co-
ownership" is not favored in law. Furthermore, a lease is an interest in real property,
jurisdiction over which belongs to Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) (Sec.
44(b), Judiciary Act of 1948; 2 Sec. 19 (2) Batas Pambansa Blg. 129). 3 Since the Municipal
Court, acted without jurisdiction, its Decision was null and void and cannot operate as res
judicata to the subject complaint for Queting of Title. Besides, even if the Decision were valid,
the rule on res judicata would not apply due to difference in cause of action. In the Municipal
Court, the cause of action was the deprivation of possession, while in the action to quiet title,
the cause of action was based on ownership. Furthermore, Sec. 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainer case "shall not bar an action between the
same parties respecting title to the land. " 4
Conceded in the Stipulation of Facts between the parties is that DUMLAO was a builder in
good faith. Thus,
8. That the subject matter in the unlawful detainer case, Civil Case No. 1, before
the Municipal Court of Dumangas, Iloilo involves the same subject matter in the
present case, the Thirty-four (34) square meters portion of land and built thereon
in good faith is a portion of defendant's kitchen and has been in the possession
of the defendant since 1952 continuously up to the present; ... (Emphasis ours)
Consistent with the principle that our Court system, like any other, must be a dispute resolving
mechanism, we accord legal effect to the agreement of the parties, within the context of their
mutual concession and stipulation. They have, thereby, chosen a legal formula to resolve their
dispute to appeal ply to DUMLAO the rights of a "builder in good faith" and to DEPRA those of
a "landowner in good faith" as prescribed in Article 448. Hence, we shall refrain from further
examining whether the factual situations of DUMLAO and DEPRA conform to the juridical
positions respectively defined by law, for a "builder in good faith" under Article 448, a
"possessor in good faith" under Article 526 and a "landowner in good faith' under Article 448.
In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built sown or planted in good
faith,
shall have the right
to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
 indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or
to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the
building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms
of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof
(Paragraphing supplied)
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, DEPRA has the option either to pay for the encroaching
part of DUMLAO's kitchen, or to sell the encroached 34 square meters of his lot to DUMLAO.
He cannot refuse to pay for the encroaching part of the building, and to sell the encroached
part of his land, 5 as he had manifested before the Municipal Court. But that manifestation is
not binding because it was made in a void proceeding.
However, the good faith of DUMLAO is part of the Stipulation of Facts in the Court of First
Instance. It was thus error for the Trial Court to have ruled that DEPRA is "entitled to
possession," without more, of the disputed portion implying thereby that he is entitled to have
the kitchen removed. He is entitled to such removal only when, after having chosen to sell his
encroached land, DUMLAO fails to pay for the same. 6 In this case, DUMLAO had expressed
his willingness to pay for the land, but DEPRA refused to sell.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is
entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his
building, under article 453 (now Article 546). The owner of the land, upon the
other hand, has the option, under article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for
the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot as
respondents here did refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and
compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it erected. He
is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land. the
other party fails to pay for the same (italics ours).
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-
petitioners to remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-
respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor
to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought
to be executed and is. furthermore, offensive to articles 361 (now Article 448)
and 453 (now Article 546) of the Civil Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605,
608[1946]).
A word anent the philosophy behind Article 448 of the Civil rode.
The original provision was found in Article 361 of the Spanish Civil Code; which provided:
ART. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown or planted
in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or
planting, after the payment of the indemnity stated in Articles 453 and 454, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent.
As will be seen, the Article favors the owner of the land, by giving him one of the two options
mentioned in the Article. Some commentators have questioned the preference in favor of the
owner of the land, but Manresa's opinion is that the Article is just and fair.
. . . es justa la facultad que el codigo da al dueno del suelo en el articulo 361, en
el caso de edificacion o plantacion? Algunos comentaristas la conceptuan
injusta, y como un extraordinario privilegio en favor de la propiedad territorial.
Entienden que impone el Codigo una pena al poseedor de buena fe y como
advierte uno de los comentaristas aludidos 'no se ve claro el por que de tal pena
. . . al obligar al que obro de buena fe a quedarse con el edificio o plantacion,
previo el pago del terreno que ocupa, porque si bien es verdad que cuando
edifico o planto demostro con este hecho, que queria para si el edificio o plantio
tambien lo es que el que edifico o planto de buena fe lo hizo en la erronea
inteligencia de creerse dueno del terreno Posible es que, de saber lo contrario,
y de tener noticia de que habia que comprar y pagar el terreno, no se hubiera
decidido a plantar ni a edificar. La ley obligandole a hacerlo fuerza su voluntad,
y la fuerza por un hecho inocente de que no debe ser responsable'. Asi podra
suceder pero la realidad es que con ese hecho voluntario, aunque sea inocente,
se ha enriquecido torticeramente con perjuicio de otro a quien es justo
indemnizarle,
En nuestra opinion, el Codigo ha resuelto el conflicto de la manera mas justa y
equitativa y respetando en lo possible el principio que para la accesion se
establece en el art. 358. 7
Our own Code Commission must have taken account of the objections to Article 361 of the
Spanish Civil Code. Hence, the Commission provided a modification thereof, and Article 448
of our Code has been made to provide:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546
and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot
be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the
building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.
The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Additional benefits were extended to the builder but the landowner retained his options.
The fairness of the rules in Article 448 has also been explained as follows:
Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights
arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of
the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of
the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has
provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the
improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or
planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay for the proper rent. It is the
owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is
older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership
of the accessory thing. (3 Manresa 213; Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 37 Off. Gaz.
 1382; Co Tao vs. Chan Chico, G.R. No. 49167, April 30, 1949; Article applied:
see Cabral, et al vs. Ibanez [S.C.] 52 Off. Gaz. 217; Marfori vs. Velasco, [C.A.]
52 Off. Gaz. 2050). 8
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial Court is hereby set aside, and this case is hereby
ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo for further proceedings consistent with
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, as follows:
1. The trial Court shall determine
a) the present fair price of DEPRA's 34 square meter area of land;
b) the amount of the expenses spent by DUMLAO for the building of the kitchen;
c) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square meters
may have acquired by reason thereof, and
d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably more than that of the
kitchen built thereon.
2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the Regional, Trial
Court shall render judgment, as follows:
a) The trial Court shall grant DEPRA a period of fifteen (15) days within which to
exercise his option under the law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to
appropriate the kitchen as his own by paying to DUMLAO either the amount of
tile expenses spent by DUMLAO f or the building of the kitchen, or the increase
in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square meters may have
acquired by reason thereof, or to oblige DUMLAO to pay the price of said area.
The amounts to be respectively paid by DUMLAO and DEPRA, in accordance
with the option thus exercised by written notice of the other party and to the
Court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen (15) days from such notice of the
option by tendering the amount to the Court in favor of the party entitled to
receive it;
b) The trial Court shall further order that if DEPRA exercises the option to oblige
DUMLAO to pay the price of the land but the latter rejects such purchase
because, as found by the trial Court, the value of the land is considerably more
than that of the kitchen, DUMLAO shall give written notice of such rejection to
DEPRA and to the Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of DEPRA's option
to sell the land. In that event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen (15)
days from such notice of rejection within which to agree upon the terms of the
lease, and give the Court formal written notice of such agreement and its
provisos. If no agreement is reached by the parties, the trial Court, within fifteen
(15) days from and after the termination of the said period fixed for negotiation,
shall then fix the terms of the lease, provided that the monthly rental to be fixed
by the Court shall not be less than Ten Pesos (P10.00) per month, payable
within the first five (5) days of each calendar month. The period for the forced
lease shall not be more than two (2) years, counted from the finality of the
judgment, considering the long period of time since 1952 that DUMLAO has
occupied the subject area. The rental thus fixed shall be increased by ten
percent (10%) for the second year of the forced lease. DUMLAO shall not make
any further constructions or improvements on the kitchen. Upon expiration of the
two-year period, or upon default by DUMLAO in the payment of rentals for two
 (2) consecutive months, DEPRA shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease,
to recover his land, and to have the kitchen removed by DUMLAO or at the
latter's expense. The rentals herein provided shall be tendered by DUMLAO to
the Court for payment to DEPRA, and such tender shall constitute evidence of
whether or not compliance was made within the period fixed by the Court.
c) In any event, DUMLAO shall pay DEPRA an amount computed at Ten Pesos
(P10.00) per month as reasonable compensation for the occupancy of DEPRA's
land for the period counted from 1952, the year DUMLAO occupied the subject
area, up to the commencement date of the forced lease referred to in the
preceding paragraph;
d) The periods to be fixed by the trial Court in its Precision shall be inextendible,
and upon failure of the party obliged to tender to the trial Court the amount due
to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall be entitled to an order of
execution for the enforcement of payment of the amount due and for compliance
with such other acts as may be required by the prestation due the obligee.
No costs,
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Plana, Relova, De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., * J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 "Rule 70

Forcible Entry and Detainer

"Sec. 7. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. The judgment rendered in an
action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building,
nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving
possession."

2 "Sec. 44. Original jurisdiction. ...

(b) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of real property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impose or
assessment, except actions of forcible entry into and detainer on lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act
upon city and municipal courts; "

3 "Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil ease ...

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into
and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

4 Supra.

5 Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605 (1946).

6 Ibid.

7 3 Manresa, 7th Ed., pp. 300-301.

8 II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 ed., p. 97.

* Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. took no part, having been one of the two members of a Court of Appeals' Division of Five Justices who
dissented from the majority opinion certifying this case to this Court.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 3003 January 2, 1907
LORENZA ALBURO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CATALINA VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Ledesma, Sumulong & Quintos for appellant.
Hipolito Magsalin for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
In this case no motion for a new trial was filed on the ground that the findings of fact of the trial judge
were manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence, and the facts found must be accepted as set out
in the opinion of the lower court.
It appears that the plaintiff is the owner, by inheritance from her grandfather, of a certain lot of land in
the city of Manila, which, by written contract, was rented on the 23d of January, 1892, to one Antonio
Susano Goenco, for a term of six years, with the privilege of renewal for a second term of six years;
that the defendant, who is the wife of the said Goenco, came into possession by virtue of this rental
contract; that the defendant had her husband expended a considerable sum of money filling in and
leveling the lot and that they built a house of hard materials thereon; and that the rental contract, while
it expressly permitted the tenant to build upon the lot, is silent as to the disposition of the house at the
expiration of the rental term and makes no express provision as to improvements to be made upon the
land by way of leveling or otherwise.
The defendant having refused to surrender the lot in question of the expiration of the rental term, this
action was brought to recover possession thereof and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, reserving
to the defendant the right to remove the house from the lot.
Counsel for the defendant contends that she is entitled to a renewal of the rental contract for a third
term of six years; or if this be denied, to be reimbursed for expenditures in filling in and leveling the
lot, and to have the benefits of the provisions of article 361 of the Civil Code, wherein it is provided
that —
The owner of the land on which building, sowing, or planting is done in good faith shall have a
right to appropriate as his own work, sowing, or planting, having previously paid the indemnity
mentioned in articles four hundred and fifty-three and four hundred and fifty-four, or to oblige
the person who has built or planted to pay him the value of the land.
It is said that this rental contract should be construed in accordance with the provisions of articles 1281,
1282, 1288, and 1289 of the Civil Code so as to give the defendant the right to renew the contract for a
third term of six years, and so on indefinitely so long as she faithfully paid the rent, but we are of the
opinion that there is no room for interpretation in accordance with the provisions of these articles since
the contract expressly provides for a term of a definite number of years, with a privilege of renewal for
a second term of definite number of years. This is a very usual form of rental contract and its terms are
so clear and explicit that they do not justify an attempt to read into it any alleged intention of the parties
other than that which appears upon its face.
In support of her claim for reimbursement for expenses in filling in and leveling the lot, defendant
relies on the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 1554 of the Civil Code, wherein it is provided that the
landlord is obliged "during the lease to make all necessary repairs in order to preserve the thing rented
in condition to serve for the purpose to which it was destined." But, as Manresa points out, this article
is strictly limited in its effect to repairs necessary to preserve the thing rented in a condition suitable to
the use agreed upon ( para el uso pactado). A repair implies the putting of something back into the
condition in which it was originally and not an improvement in the condition thereof by adding
something new thereto, unless the new thing be in substitution of something formerly in existence and
is added to preserve the original status of the subject-matter of the repairs; the filling in of a vacant lot
can not be regarded as a repair as the word is used in this article; and even though it could be so
considered, the remedy of the tenant under the provisions of article 1556, when the landlord fails to
make necessary repairs, is by demand for the annulment of the contract and indemnity by way of
damages or without demanding annulment of the contract by demand for damages for negligence on
the part of the landlord; and the tenant is not authorized to make such repairs at the expense of the
landlord, except when it is a matter of the most urgent necessity (reparacion urgentisima) "where the
slightest delay would involve grave damages," when the tenant may take the absolutely necessary
means to avoid the loss, at the cost of the owner, doing only that which is required by the force of
circumstances and no more, but this on the ground that "he had acted by virtue of the social duty of
mutual aid and assistance." (Manresa, vol. 10, p. 473.)
It has been suggested that the claim of the defendant for compensation for the filling in and leveling of
the lot may be based upon article 453 of the Civil Code which provides that "necessary expenditures
will be repaid to all persons in possession (los gastos necesarios se abonan a todo poseedor)." It may
be doubted, however, whether the "possessor" referred to in this provision can be said to include one
who stands in relation of tenant to his landlord, for the above-cited article 1554 of the Civil Code, and
the chapter wherein it occurs, seem to provide for such cases; and in any event we do not think that the
filling in and improvement of a lot can be brought under the head of necessary expenses (gastos
necesarios) as used in this connection. Manresa in his commentaries upon this article says that gastos
necesarios are no others than those made for the preservation of the thing upon which they have been
expended.
The contention that the defendant is entitled to the benefits of the provisions of article 361 of the Civil
Code can not be maintained because the right to indemnification secured in that article is manifestly
intended to apply only to a case where one builds or sows or plants an land in which he believes
himself to have a claim of title and not to lands wherein one's only interest is that of tenant under a
rental contract; otherwise it would always be in the power of the tenant to improve his landlord out of
his property. The right of a tenant in regard to improvements (mejoras) is expressly provided for in
article 1573 read in connection with article 487, wherein it is provided that the tenant may make such
improvements, either useful or convenient, as he considers advantageous, provided he does not alter the
form and substance of the thing rented, but that he will have no right for indemnification therefor,
though he can take away such improvements if it is possible to do so without injury or damage to the
thing rented.
The trial court authorized the removal of the house, apparently relying on the provisions of this article,
but since no objection was made by the plaintiff in the court below, we are not authorized to review his
action in this connection.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. After the
expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the
record in this case be remanded to the court of its origin for execution.
Arellano, C.J. Torres, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
 Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32974 July 30, 1979
BARTOLOME ORTIZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. UNION C. KAYANAN, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, Branch IV; ELEUTERIO ZAMORA, QUIRINO COMINTAN, VICENTE FERRO,
AND GREGORIO PAMISARAN, respondents.
Salonga, Ordoñ;ez, Yap, Sicat & Associates and Salvador, Ulgado & Carbon for petitioner.
Jose A. Cusi for private respondents.

ANTONIO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction to nullify the Order of
respondent Judge directing the execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. C-90, entitled
"Bartolome Ortiz vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, et al.," and the Writ of
Execution issued to implement said Order, allegedly for being inconsistent with the judgment
sought to be enforced.
Civil Case No. C-90 was filed by Bartolome Ortiz who sought the review and/or annulment of
the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, giving preference to the
sales applications of private respondents Quirino Comintan and Eleuterio Zamora over Lot
No. 5785, PLS-45, located at Barrio Cabuluan, Calauag, Quezon.
I
The factual background of the case, as found by respondent Court, is as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£
... The lot in controversy was formerly the subject of Homestead Application No.
122417 of Martin Dolorico II, plaintiff's ward who died on August 20, 1931; that
since then it was plaintiff who continued the cultivation and possession of the
property, without however filing any application to acquire title thereon; that in
the Homestead Application No. 122417, Martin Dolorico II named his uncle,
Martin Dolorico I as his heir and successor in interest, so that in 1951 Martin
Dolorico I executed an affidavit relinquishing his rights over the property in favor
of defendants Quirino Comintan and Eleuterio Zamora, his grandson and son-in-
law, respectively, and requested the Director of Lands to cancel the homestead
application; that on the strength of the affidavit, Homestead Application No.
122417 was cancelled and thereafter, defendants Comintan and Zamora filed
their respective sales applications Nos. 8433 and 9258; that plaintiff filed his
protest on November 26, 1951 alleging that he should be given preference to
purchase the lot inasmuch as he is the actual occupant and has been in
continuous possession of the same since 1931; and inspite of plaintiff's
opposition, "Portion A" of the property was sold at public auction wherein
defendant Comintan was the only bidder; that on June 8, 1957, investigation
was conducted on plaintiff's protest by Assistant Public Lands Inspector
Serapion Bauzon who submitted his report to the Regional Land Officer, and
who in turn rendered a decision on April 9, 1958, dismissing plaintiff's claim and
 giving due course to defendants' sales applications on the ground that the
relinquishment of the homestead rights of Martin Dolorico I in favor of Comintan
and Zamora is proper, the former having been designated as successor in
interest of the original homestead applicant and that because plaintiff failed to
participate in the public auction, he is forever barred to claim the property; that
plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of this decision which was denied by
the Director of Lands in his order dated June 10, 1959; that, finally, on appeal to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the decision rendered by
the Regional Land Officer was affirmed in toto. 1
On March 22, 1966, respondent Court rendered judgment in the afore-mentioned civil case,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby
rendered awarding Lot No. 5785-A of PLS-45, (Calauag Public Land
Subdivision) one-half portion of the property in litigation located at Bo. Cabuluan,
Calauag, Quezon, in favor of defendant QUIRINO COMINTAN, being the
successful bidder in the public auction conducted by the bureau of Lands on
April 18, 1955, and hereby giving due course to the Sales Application No. 9258
of defendant Eleuterio Zamora over the other half, Lot No. 5785-B of PLS-45,
Calauag, without prejudice to the right of plaintiff BARTOLOME ORTIZ to
participate in the public bidding of the same to be announced by the Bureau of
Lands, Manila. However, should plaintiff Bartolome Ortiz be not declared the
successful bidder thereof, defendants Quirino Comintan and Eleuterio Zamora
are ordered to reimburse jointly said plaintiff the improvements he has
introduced on the whole property in the amount of THIRTEEN THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO (P13,632.00) PESOS, the latter having the right to
retain the property until after he has been fully paid therefor, without interest
since he enjoys the fruits of the property in question, with prejudice and with
costs again the plaintiff.2
Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
Two (2) years after the rendition of the judgment by the court a quo, while the case was
pending appeal and upon petition of private respondents Quirino Comintan and Eleuterio
Zamora, respondent Court appointed respondent Vicente Ferro, Clerk of Court, as Receiver
to collect tolls on a portion of the property used as a diversion road. On August 19, 1969, the
Court of Appeals issued a Resolution annulling the Order appointing the Receiver.
Subsequently, on February 19, 1970, the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court. A petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals was denied by
this Court on April 6, 1970. At this point, private respondents filed a petition for appointment of
a new receiver with the court a quo. This petition was granted and the receiver was
reappointed. Petitioner sought the annulment of this Order with the Court of Appeals, but said
Court ruled that its decision had already become final and that the records of the case were to
be remanded to the trial court.
Not satisfied with such denial, petitioner filed a petitioner for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction before this Court, 3 praying for the annulment of the
Order reappointing the Receiver. On July 13, 1970, the petition was dismissed by this Court
on the ground of insufficient showing of grave abuse of discretion.
II
The judgment having become final and executory private respondents filed a motion for the
execution of the same, praying as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to order the
issuance of a writ of execution in accordance with the judgment of this
Honorable Court, confirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court,
commanding any lawful officer to deliver to defendants Comintan and Zamora
the land subject of the decision in this case but allowing defendants to file a
bond in such amount as this Honorable Court may fix, in lieu of the P13,632.00
required to be paid to plaintiff, conditioned that after the accounting of the tools
collected by plaintiff, there is still an amount due and payable to said plaintiff,
then if such amount is not paid on demand, including the legal interests, said
bond shall be held answerable.
Ordering further the plaintiff to render an accounting of the tolls he collected
from March of 1967 to December 31, 1968 and from September 1969 to March
31, 1970, and deliver said tolls collected to the receiver and if judgment is
already executed, then to Quirino Comintan and Eleuterio Zamora; and,
Finally, to condemn plaintiff to pay moral damages for withholding the tools
which belong to your movant in an amount this Court may deem just in the
premises.4
Acting upon the foregoing motion, respondent Judge issued an Order, dated September 23,
1970, stating, among others, the following: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The records further disclosed that from March 1967 to December 31, 1968,
piaintiff Bartolome Ortiz collected tolls on a portion of the propertv in question
wherein he has not introduced anv improvement particularlv on Lot No. 5785-A;
PLS-45 awarded to defendant Quirino Comintan, thru which vehicular traffic was
detoured or diverted, and again from September 1969 to March 31, 1970, the
plaintiff resumed the collection of tools on the same portion without rendering
any accounting on said tolls to the Receiver, who, was reappointed after
submitting the required bond and specifically authorized only to collect tolls
leaving the harvesting of the improvements to the plaintiff.
xxx xxx xxx
ln virtue of he findings of this Court as contained in the dispositive portion of its
decision, the defendants are jointly obligated to pay the plaintiff in the amount of
P13,632.00 as reasonable value of the improvements he introduced on the
whole property in question, and that he has the right of retention until fully paid.
It can be gleaned from the motion of the defendants that if plaintiff submits an
accounting of the tolls he collected during the periods above alluded to, their
damages of about P25,000.00 can more than offset their obligation of
P13,362.00 in favor of the plaintiff, thereafter the possession of the land be
delivered to the defendants since the decision of the Supreme Court has already
become final and executory, but in the interregnum pending such accounting
and recovery by the Receiver of the tolls collected by the plaintiff, the
defendants pray that they allowed to put up a bond in lieu of the said P13,632.00
to answer for damages of the former, if any.
On the other hand, plaintiff contends in his opposition, admitting that the
 decision of the Supreme Court has become final and executory; (1) the offer of a
bond in lieu of payment of P13,632.00 does not, and cannot, satisfy the
condition imposed in the decision of this Court which was affirmed in toto; (2) the
public sale of Portion "B" of the land has still to take place as ordained before
the decision could be executed; and, (3) that whatever sums plaintiff may derive
from the property cannot be set off against what is due him for the
improvements he made, for which he has to be reimbursed as ordered.
xxx xxx xxx
Let it be known that plaintiff does not dispute his having collected tolls during the
periods from March 1967 to December 31, 1968 and from September 1969 to
March 31, 1970. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of this Court its
findings that said tolls belong to the defendant, considering that the same were
collected on a portion of the land question where the plaintiff did not introduce
any improvement. The reimbursement to the plaintiff pertains only to the value of
the improvements, like coconut trees and other plants which he introduced on
the whole property. The tolls collected by the plaintiff on an unimproved portion
naturally belong to the defendants, following the doctrine on accretion. Further,
the reappointment of a Receiver by this Court was upheld by the Supreme Court
when it denied the petition for certiorari filed by the plaintiff, bolstering the legal
claim of defendants over said tolls. Thus, the decision of the Supreme Court
rendered the decision of this Court retroactive from March 22, 1966 although
pending accounting of the tolls collected by the plaintiff is justified and will not
prejudice anybody, but certainly would substantially satisfy the conditions
imposed in the decision. However, insofar as the one-half portion "B" of the
property, the decision may be executed only after public sale by the Bureau of
Lands shall be accomplished.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion for Execution filed by the defendants to be
meritorious, the same is granted; provided, however, that they put up a bond
equal the adjudicated amount of P13,632.00 accruing in favor of the plaintiff,
from a reputable or recognized bonding or surety company, conditioned that
after an accounting of the tolls collected by the plaintiff should there be found out
any balance due and payable to him after reckoning said obligation of
P13,632.00 the bond shall be held answerable therefor.5
Accordingly, a Writ of Execution was issued after private respondent Quirino Comintan had
filed the required bond. The writ directed the Sheriff to enforce the decision of the Court, and
stated, part in, the following:têñ.£îhqwâ£
But should there be found any amount collectible after accounting and deducting
the amount of P3,632.00, you are hereby ordered that of the goods and chattels
of Bartolome Ortiz of Bo. Kabuluan, Calauag, Quezon, be caused to be made
any excess in the above-metioned amount together with your lawful fees and
that you render same to defendant Quirino Comintan. If sufficient personal
property cannot be found thereof to satisfy this execution and lawful fees
thereon, then you are commanded that of the lands and buildings of the said
BARTOLOME ORTIZ you make the said excess amount in the manner required
by the Rules of Court, and make return of your proceedings within this Court
within sixty (60) days from date of service.
 You are also ordered to cause Bartolome Ortiz to vacate the property within
fifteen (15) days after service thereof the defendant Quirino Comintan having
filed the required bond in the amount of THIRTEEN THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO (P13,632.00) PESOS. 6
On October 12, 1970, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order and
Writ of Execution, alleging:têñ.£îhqwâ£
(a) That the respondent judge has no authority to place respondents in
possession of the property;
(b) That the Supreme Court has never affirmed any decision of the trial court
that tolls collected from the diversionary road on the property, which is public
land, belong to said respondents;
(c) That to assess petitioner a P25,000.00 liability for damages is purely punitive
imposition without factual or legal justification.
The foregoing Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge per Order dated
November 18, 1970. Saod Order states, in part:têñ.£îhqwâ£
It goes without saying that defendant Comintan is entitled to be placed in
possession of lot No. 5785-A of PLS-45 (Calauag Public Land Subdivision) and
enjoyment of the tolls from March, 1967 to March, 1968 and from September,
1969 to March 31, l970 which were received by plaintiff Bartolome Ortiz,
collected from the property by reason of the diversion road where vehicular
traffic was detoured. To defendant Comintan belongs the tolls thus collected
from a portion of the land awarded to him used as a diversionary road by the
doctrine of accretion and his right over the same is ipso jure, there being no
need of any action to possess said addition. It is so because as consistently
maintained by the Supreme Court, an applicant who has complied with all the
terms and conditions which entitle him to a patent for a particular tract of publlic
land, acquires a vested right therein and is to be regarded as equitable owner
thereof so that even without a patent, a perfected homestead or sales
application is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffectcd by the fact that the
paramount title is still in the Government and no subsequent law can deprive
him of that vested right The question of the actual damages suffered by
defendant Comintan by reason of the unaccounted tolls received by plaintiff had
already been fully discussed in the order of September 23, 1970 and the Court
is honestly convinced and believes it to be proper and regular under the
circumstances.
Incidentally, the Court stands to correct itself when in the same order, it directed
the execution of he decision with respect to the one-half portion "B" of the
property only after the public sale by the Bureau of Lands, the same being an
oversight, it appearing that the Sales Application of defendant Eleuterio Zamora
had already been recognized and full confirmed by the Supreme Court.
In view thereof, finding the motion filed by plaintiff to be without merit, the Court
hereby denies the same and the order of September 23, 1970 shall remain in full
force subject to the amendment that the execution of the decision with respect to
the one-half portion "B" shall not be conditioned to the public sale by the Bureau
of Lands.
 SO ORDERED.7
III
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition, contending that in having issued the Order and Writ of
Execution, respondent Court "acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, and/or with grave
abuse of discretion, because the said order and writ in effect vary the terms of the judgment
they purportedly seek to enforce." He argued that since said judgment declared the petitioner
a possessor in good faith, he is entitled to the payment of the value of the improvements
introduced by him on the whole property, with right to retain the land until he has been fully
paid such value. He likewise averred that no payment for improvements has been made and,
instead, a bond therefor had been filed by defendants (private respondents), which, according
to petitioner, is not the payment envisaged in the decision which would entitle private
respondents to the possession of the property. Furthermore, with respect to portion "B",
petitioner alleges that, under the decision, he has the right to retain the same until after he
has participated and lost in the public bidding of the land to be conducted by the Bureau of
Lands. It is claimed that it is only in the event that he loses in the bidding that he can be
legally dispossessed thereof.
It is the position of petitioner that all the fruits of the property, including the tolls collected by
him from the passing vehicles, which according to the trial court amounts to P25,000.00,
belongs to petitioner and not to defendant/private respondent Quirino Comintan, in
accordance with the decision itself, which decreed that the fruits of the property shall be in
lieu of interest on the amount to be paid to petitioner as reimbursement for improvements.
Any contrary opinion, in his view, would be tantamount to an amendment of a decision which
has long become final and executory and, therefore, cannot be lawfully done.
Petitioner, therefore, prayed that: (1) a Writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued enjoining the
enforcement of the Orders of September 23, 1970 and November 18, 1970, and the Writ of
Execution issued thereto, or restoring to petitioner the possession of the property if the private
respondents had been placed in possession thereof; (2) annulling said Orders as well as the
Writ of Execution, dissolving the receivership established over the property; and (3) ordering
private respondents to account to petitioner all the fruits they may have gathered or collected
from the property in question from the time of petitioiier's illegal dispossession thereof.
On January 29, 1971, this Court issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On January 30,
1971, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Modification of the Order
dated January 29, 1971. This was followed by a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
and Manifestation on February 3, 1971. In the latter motion, private respondents manifested
that the amount of P14,040.96, representing the amount decreed in the judgment as
reimbursement to petitioner for the improvements, plus interest for six months, has already
been deposited by them in court, "with the understanding that said amount shall be turned
over to the plaintiff after the court a quo shall have determined the improvement on Lot 5785-
A, and subsequently the remaining balance of the deposit shall be delivered to the petitioner
(plaintiff therein) in the event he loses the bid for Lot 5785-B in favor of private respondent
Eleuterio Zamora."8 The deposit is evidenced by a certification made by the Clerk of the
Court a quo.9 Contending that said deposit was a faithful compliance with the judgment of the
trial court, private respondent Quirino Comintan prayed for the dissolution of the Writ of
Injunction.
It appears that as a consequence of the deposit made by private respondents, the Deputy,
Sheriff of Calauag, Quezon ousted petitioner's representative from the land in question and
put private respondents in possession thereof. 10
On March 10, 1971, petitioner filed a "Comment on Respondents' 'Motion for Reconsideration'
dated January 29, 1971' and 'Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation,'"
contending that the tender of deposit mentioned in the Suplemental Motion was not really and
officially made, "inasmuch as the same is not supported by any official receipt from the lower
court, or from its clerk or cashier, as required by law;" that said deposit does not constitute
sufficient compliance with the judgment sought to be enforced, neither was it legally and
validly made because the requisites for consignation had not been complied with; that the
tender of legal interest for six months cannot substitute petitioner's enjoyment of the fruits of
the property as long as the judgment in Civil Case No. C-90 has not been implemented in the
manner decreed therein; that contrary to the allegations of private respondents, the value of
the improvements on the whole property had been determined by the lower court, and the
segregation of the improvements for each lot should have been raised by them at the
opportune moment by asking for the modification of the decision before it became final and
executory; and that the tolls on the property constituted "civil fruits" to which the petitioner is
entitled under the terms of the decision.
IV
The issue decisive of the controvery is—after the rendition by the trial court of its judgment in
Civil Case No. C-90 on March 22, 1966 confirming the award of one-half of the property to
Quirino Comintan—whether or not petitioner is still entitled to retain for his own exclusive
benefit all the fruits of the property, such as the tolls collected by him from March 1967 to
December 1968, and September 1969 to March 31, 1970, amounting to about P25,000.00. In
other words, petitioner contends that so long as the aforesaid amount of P13,632,00 decreed
in the judgment representing the expenses for clearing the land and the value of the coconuts
and fruit trees planted by him remains unpaid, he can appropriate for his exclusive benefit all
the fruits which he may derive from the property, without any obligation to apply any portion
thereof to the payment of the interest and the principal of the debt.
We find this contention untenable.
There is no question that a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the
possession is legally interrupted. 11 Possession in good faith ceases or is legally interrupted
from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous
evidence or by the filing of an action in court by the true owner for the recovery of the
property.12 Hence, all the fruits that the possessor may receive from the time he is
summoned in court, or when he answers the complaint, must be delivered and paid by him to
the owner or lawful possessor. 13
However, even after his good faith ceases, the possessor in fact can still retain the property,
pursuant to Article 546 of the New Civil Code, until he has been fully reimbursed for all the
necessary and useful expenses made by him on the property. This right of retention has been
considered as one of the conglomerate of measures devised by the law for the protection of
the possessor in good faith. Its object is to guarantee the reimbursement of the expenses,
such as those for the preservation of the property,14 or for the enhancement of its utility or
productivity.15 It permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not been
reimbursed by the person who defeated him in the possession for those necessary expenses
and useful improvements made by him on the thing possessed. The principal characteristic of
the right of retention is its accessory character. It is accessory to a principal obligation.
Considering that the right of the possessor to receive the fruits terminates when his good faith
ceases, it is necessary, in order that this right to retain may be useful, to concede to the
creditor the right to secure reimbursement from the fruits of the property by utilizing its
proceeds for the payment of the interest as well as the principal of the debt while he remains
in possession. This right of retention of the property by the creditor, according to Scaevola, in
the light of the provisions of Article 502 of the Spanish Civil Code,16 is considered not a
coercive measure to oblige the debtor to pay, depriving him temporarily of the enjoyment of
the fruits of his property, but as a means of obtainitig compensation for the debt. The right of
retention in this case is analogous to a contract of antichresis and it cati be considered as a
means of extinguishing the obligation, inasmuch as the right to retain the thing lasts only for
the period necessary to enable the creditor to be reimbursed from the fruits for the necessary
and useful expenses. 17
According to Manresa, the right of retention is, therefore, analogous to that of a pledge, if the
property retained is a movable, and to that of antichresis, if the property held is immovable. 18
This construction appears to be in harmony with similar provisions of the civil law which
employs the right of retention as a means or device by which a creditor is able to obtain the
payment of a debt. Thus, under Article 1731 of the New Civil Code, any person who has
performed work upon a movable has a right to retain it by way of pledge until he is paid.
Similarly, under Article 1914 of the same Code, the agent may retain in pledge the things
which are the object of the agency until the principal effects reimbursement of the funds
advanced by the former for the execution of the agency, or he is indemnified for all damages
which he may have suffered as a consequence of the execution of the agency, provided he is
free from fault. To the same effect, the depositary, under Article 1994 of the same Code, may
retain the thing in pledge until the full payment of what may be due him by reason of the
deposit. The usufructuary, pursuant to Article 612 of the same Code, may retain the property
until he is reimbursed for the amount paid for taxes levied on the capital (Article 597) and tor
extraordinary repairs (Article 594).
In all of these cases, the right of retention is used as a means of extinguishing the obligation.
As amply observed by Manresa: "El derecho de retencion, lo hemos dicho, es el derecho de
prenda o el de anticresis constituido por la ley con independencia de las partes." 19 In a
pledge, if the thing pledged earns or produces fruits, income, dividends or interests, the
creditor shall compensate what he receives with those which are owing him.20 In the same
manner, in a contract of antichresis, the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an
immovable of his debtor with the obligation to apply them to payment of the interest, if owing,
and thereafter to the principal of his credit. 21 The debtor can not reacquire enjoyment of the
immovable until he has actually paid what he owes the creditor. 22
Applying the afore-cited principles to the case at bar, petitioner cannot appropriate for his own
exclusive benefit the tolls which he collected from the property retained by him. It was his duty
under the law, after deducting the necessary expenses for his administration, to apply such
amount collected to the payment of the interest, and the balance to the payment of the
obligation.
We hold, therefore, that the disputed tolls, after deducting petitioner's expenses for
administration, belong to Quirino Comintan, owner of the land through which the toll road
passed, further considering that the same was on portions of the property on which petitioner
had not introduced any improvement. The trial court itself clarified this matter when it placed
the toll road under receivership. The omission of any mention of the tolls in the decision itself
may be attributed to the fact that the tolls appear to have been collected after the rendition of
the judgment of the trial court.
The records further reveal that earnest efforts have been made by private respondents to
have the judgment executed in the most practicable manner. They deposited in court the
amount of the judgment in the sum of P13,632.00 in cash, subject only to the accounting of
the tolls collected by the petitioner so that whatever is due from him may be set off with the
amount of reimbursement. This is just and proper under the circumstances and, under the
law, compensation or set off may take place, either totally or partially. Considering that
petitioner is the creditor with respect to the judgment obligation and the debtor with respect to
the tolls collected, Comintan being the owner thereof, the trial court's order for an accounting
and compensation is in accord with law. 23
With respect to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by Comintan, it appears that the
dispositive portion of the decision was lacking in specificity, as it merely provided that
Comintan and Zamora are jointly liable therefor. When two persons are liable under a contract
or under a judgment, and no words appear in the contract or judgment to make each liable for
the entire obligation, the presumption is that their obligation is joint or mancomunada, and
each debtor is liable only for a proportionate part of the obligation. 24 The judgment debt of
P13,632.00 should, therefore, be pro-rated in equal shares to Comintan and Zamora.
Regarding Lot 5785-B, it appears that no public sale has yet been conducted by the Bureau
of Lands and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to remain in possession thereof. This is not
disputed by respondent Eleuterio Zamora. 25 After public sale is had and in the event that
Ortiz is not declared the successful bidder, then he should be reimbursed by respondent
Zamora in the corresponding amount for the improvements on Lot 5785-B.
WHEREFORE, in view hereof, the Order of respondent Court of November 18, 1970 is
hereby modified to conform to the foregoing judgment. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
dated January 29, 1971, is hereby dissolved. Without special pronouncement as to costs.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr. and Guerrero, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Aquino, J., concurs in the result.
Santos and Abad Santos, JJ., are on leave.
Guerrero, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division

#Footnotestêñ.£îhqwâ£

1 Annex "B", Petition, pp. 26-27. Rollo.

2 Ibid, pp. 35-36, Rollo. Emphasis supplied.

3 Docketed as G.R. No. L-32206, entitleed "Bartolome Ortiz vs. Hon. Union C. Kaynan, Eleuterio Zamora, Quirino Comintan and Vicente
Ferro."

4 Annex "D", Petition, p. 48, Rollo.

5 Annex "A", Petition, pp. 17-20, Rollo.

6 Annex "C", Petition, p. 38, Rollo.

7 Annex "G ", Petition, pp. 69-71, Rollo.

8 Private respondents' Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation, pp. 87-88, Rollo.

9 Annex "B" of above Supplemental Motion, p.9l, Rollo.

10 Manifestation of Deputy Sheriff Gregorio B. Pamisaran, p. 95, Rollo.

11 Article 544, New Civil Code.

12 Tacas v. Tobon, 53 Phil. 356; Article 528, New Civil Code.

13 Araujo v. Celis, 16 Phil. 329.

14 IV Manresa, 1951 Ed., pp. 293-294.

 15 Ibid., pp. 316- 318.

16 Now Article 594, New Civil Code.

17 Notese en este caso una singularidad: En la situacion juridica prevista por el art. 502, la retencion se considera, no como medio
coercitivo para obligar al deudor al pago, privandole temporalmente de los beneficios que el goce de su propiedad pudiera reportarle, sino
como medio de obtener una compansacion. La retencion tiene en este caso mucha analogia con el pacto anticretico, y podemos
considerarla como medio extintivo de una obligacion, puesto que el derecho de retener la cosa dura solo el tiempo necessario para
compensar con los frutos el coste de las reparaciones extraordinarias indespensables para la subsistencia de la cosa usufructuada. El
Codigo se desvia conscientemente de las propiedades genuinas del ius retentionis, pero la desviacion es racionally va derecha al logro
de una finalidad juridica. ' (8 Scaevola, Codigo, Civil, 1948 Ed., p. 478.)

18 Facil es deducir, descartando el art. 494, por su menor relacion con el caso en que nos encontramos, que el Codigo asimila el derecho
de retencion en los bienes muebles a la prenda, y en los bienes inmuebles a la anticresis, que confiere al acreedor el derecho de percibir
los frutos de un inmueble con la obligacion de aplicarlos, al pago de los intereses, si se debieren, y despues al de capital de su credito
(art. 1.881).

An tratandose de cosas muebles, la ley hace cuanto esta a su alcance para hacer util o provechoso este derecho. De aqui el articulo
1.868: 'Si la prenda produce intereses, compensara el acreedor los que perciba con los que se le deben; y si no se le deben, o en cuanto
excedan de los legitimamente debidos, los imputara al capital.'

Respecto a la anticresis, veanse los articulos 1.882 y 1.883: 'El acreedor, dice el primero, salvo pacto en contrario, esta obligado a pagar
las contribuciones v cargas que pesen sobre la finca. Lo esta asimismo a hacer los gastos necesarios para su conservacion y repacion.
Se deduciran de los frutos las cantidades que emplee en uno u otro objeto'. 'El deudor, dice el 1.883, no puede readquirir el goce del
inmueble sin haher pagado antes enteramente lo que debe a su acreedor.'

La posesion puede recaer en cosas muebles o inmuebles; la retencion de que habla el art. 453 puede, pues, recaer sobre unas o otras
indistintamente. De aqui tal vez la generalidad de la expresion: retener hasta el pago. Pero en el art. 453 se trata de gastos
reembolsables, de una deuda, como en los articulos 502, 522, 1.600, 1.730. 1. 780, 1.866 y 1.881. Debemos deducir de aqui, como
alguien lo hace, que el derecho de retencion en el poseedor se reduce a un simple deposito en los bienes muebles y a una mera
administracion en los muebles? Que bentaja reportaria esa deduccion al poseedor ni al propietario, al acreedor ni al deudor, al vencedor
ni al vencido? No es mas logico equiparar el derecho de retencion a la prenda o a la anticresis? La Idea del Codigo es mas bien esta que
la otra; propietario y poseedor ganan mas con ella. ( IV Manresa. 1951 Ed., pp. 328-329.)

19 IV Manresa, 1951 Ed., p. 330.

20 Article 2102, New Civil Code.

21 Article 2132, Ibid.

22 Article 2136, Ibid

23 Cf. Articles 1278, 1279 and 1283, Ibid

24 Cacho v. Valles, 45 Phil, 107; Ramos v. Gibbon, 67 Phil. 371.

25 Memorandum for Respondents, p. 195, Rollo.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law FoundationRepublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-49167 April 30, 1949
CO TAO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOAQUIN CHAN CHICO, defendant-appellant.
Manuel V. San Jose for petitioner.
Padilla, Carlos & Fernando for respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals.
According to the finding of said Court, in 1927 respondent Joaquin Chan Chicobuilt a house on his lot
No. 7, described in transfer certificate of title No.24239. When that house was constructed, Prudencia
Rodriguez was yet the owner of the adjoining lot No. 6 belonging now to petitioner Co Tao. About a
year after the petitioner bought lot No. 6, he built a house thereon and he used lumber that butted in
respondent's house. Respondent protested and his protest was resented by petitioner. Hence, the present
suit.
It is now claimed that the respondent's house took a portion of petitionerland. The Court of Appeals,
after examining the evidence, found that respondent's house occupies 6.97 square meter of petitioner's
lot, but that respondent acted in good faith. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals declared "that the
plaintiff (petitioner) has the right to elect to purchase thatportion of the defendant's (respondent's) house
which protrudes into the plaintiff's property, or to sell to the defendants the land upon which the said
portion of the defendant's house is built." And the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance
"with direction to require the plaintiff to make the election as herein provided, within the time that the
Court shall fix, and thereafter to reset the case for the admission of the evidence onthe value of the
improvement, in case the plaintiff elects to buy the same,or the value of the land, in case he elect to sell
it, and to render decisionas the result of the new trial shall warrant." From this decision
petitionerappealed by certiorari to this Court.
All the questions raised by the petitioner are unmeritorious. He alleges, for instance, that respondent
could not have acted in good faith in building aportion of his house beyond the limits of his land,
because he ought to knowthe metes and bound of his property as stated in his certificate of title. But, as
rightly stated by the Court of Appeals: "It is but stating the obvious to say that outside of the
individuals versed in the science ofsurveying, and this is already going far, no one can determine the
preciseextend or location of his property by merely examining his paper title. Thefact is even surveyors
cannot with exactitude do so. The disagreement among the three surveyors in the case at hand who
have made a resurvey of the groundwith the aid of scientific devices and of their experience and
knowledgeof surveying, is a graphic and concrete illustration of this truth."
And there is another circumstance showing respondent's good faith. The Court of Appeal found that
"the defendant's title dated back to March 12, 1923, and he built his house as early as 1927. When this
was done, it was done, it hasalso been shown, there was a stone wall which had existed since as early
as1902, and inside which the defendant's house is contracted. Prudencia Rodriguez herself, who was
still the owner of the adjoining land when the defendant built his house in 1927, must have been under
the same impression,since, as has been stated, she allowed the construction without makingany protect
during or after the construction."
Petitioner alleges that it is not fair for him to pay for the building erected on his lot which is not only
prejudicial but is certainly a nuisanceto his property. The petitioner is indeed overlooking the
circumstance thathe is not being forced to buy the building for he has the option to sell theportion of his
lot occupied by that building. The provisions of article 361 of the Civil Code admit of no distinction.
Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with costs against the petitioner.
Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
FERIA, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
Under Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, appeal by certiorari from a judgment or decision of the Court of
Appeals under said Rule lies only in cases inwhich question or questions of law are involved, because
"only questions of law may be said be raised therein, and consequently this Court can not review the
findings of fact of said court.
In all judicial cases, the justiciable question is always either one of fact and law, or of law only if the
facts on which it is predicated are admittedor not in issue. It can never be a questioned of fact only,
because the administration of justice consist in the application of the law to the factsof each case
submitted to the Court for decision. The facts are the minor premise of the syllogism, the law
applicable to them the mayor premise, and the conclusion drawn from the syllogism is the conclusion
or finding of lawnecessary for the decision of cases or lawsuits by the courts.
If the facts as found by the Court of Appeals are not questioned or in issue, and only the law applicable
to the case or the conclusion of law to be drawn from such application is in issue in an appeal, the
question involved is of law and the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review and pass upon the
conclusions or findings of law of the Court of Appeals. However, if not only the law applicable and,
consequently, the inference or conclusion to be drawn from the application thereof, but the findings of
fact of Court of Appeals are in issue, the question involved in the appeal is not of law but of fact,
because no question of law may arises before the facts to which the law be applied have been finally
determined or found.
In the present appeal, the questions involved are of fact because the issueis whether or not the findings
of the Court of Appeal discussed and passedupon by the majority in the decision are supported by the
respondent actedin good faith in building his house on part of the lot claimed by the petitioner, which
depends upon whether or not the respondent knew then that part of the lot on which he erected the
building belonged to the petitioner.
The questioned whether or not it is fair for the petitioners to pay for the building erected on his lot,
defends also on the questioned of fact whether the building was erected on it by the respondent in good
or bad faith.
This Supreme Court has, therefore, no jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
present case, because the appeal does involve not a question of law but of fact, and this Court has no
power to review the findings of fact in the decision of the said Court of Appeals, as already stated
above. A decision of the said Court on questions of fact is final and no appealable.
We should have dismissed the petition for certiorari by way of appeal from the start filed in this case,
but the fact that we have given it due course in order to determine whether appeal lies after hearing the
adverse party, does not necessarily authorize us to pass upon the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals and affirm or reverse the decision appealed from. To affirm or reverse a judgment of the Court
of Appeals in this case presupposed a review by us of the findings of fact on which it is based, which
we have power to do.
Petition for certiorari by way of appeal is therefore dismissed. We can not review and affirm or reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-80838 November 29, 1988
ELEUTERIO C. PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Esteban C. Manuel for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CORTES, J.:
Petitioner Eleuterio Perez raises both procedural and substantive issues in this petition to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
04789 dated October 8, 1987 and its resolution of November 12, 1987 denying his motion for reconsideration.

The facts of this case are undisputed.

On October 21, 1974 Yolanda Mendoza filed a criminal complaint against Eleuterio Perez for Consented Abduction docketed as Criminal Case No. 618 of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch VI. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. On June 28, 1980 a judgment of conviction was
rendered against Perez.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, and acquitted Perez of the crime of Consented Abduction. In said decision, promulgated on October 29, 1982, the
Court of Appeals made the following statement:

xxx xxx xxx

This is not to say that the appellant did nothing wrong. With promises of marriage, appellant succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
her, twice, that night before they returned. She was seduced by appellant, as it turned out that he made those promises just to accomplish
his lewd designs That was "seduction and not abduction," as explained by Justice Ramon Aquino. (Rollo, p. 40.)

xxx xxx xxx

Subsequent to petitioner's acquittal complainant Yolanda Mendoza filed another criminal complaint against Perez on July 22, 1983, this time for Qualified
Seduction, docketed as Criminal Case No. 83-8228 of the Municipal Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch VI. * Petitioner Perez filed a motion to quash invoking
double jeopardy and waiver and/or estoppel on the part of the complainant. However, this motion and petitioner's motion for reconsideration were denied.

Whereupon, petitioner Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 68122 questioning the denial of his
motions to quash and for reconsideration filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Criminal Case No.
83-8228. In a resolution of the Second Division dated August 8, 1984, the Court referred the case to the Intermediate Appellate Court.

On December 16, 1985 the Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the petition, without prejudice to its refiling in the proper Regional Trial Court. Said the
Intermediate Appellate Court:

As the order sought to be annulled is that of an inferior court, the petition in this case should have been filed with the appropriate Regional
Trial Court in accordance with Rule 65, Sec. 4. We have already ruled in several cases that BP 129, See. 9, in giving this court jurisdiction
over applications for writs of certiorari and prohibition "whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction," was never meant to authorize the
filing of petitions which, conformably to Rule 65, Sec. 4, should be filed with the Regional Trial Courts because they relate to acts of
inferior courts. The purpose of BP 129 is to enable this Court to take cognizance of petitions which, because of the limitation imposed by
the requirement that the petition must be "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" could or only be filed before with the Supreme Court (Diocese
of Cabanatuan v. Delizo, AC-G.R. SP No. 06410, Oct. 28, 1985; Uy v. Antonio, AC G.R R. SP No. 05568, March 7, 1985; De Guzman v.
Andres, AC-G.R. SP No. 04494, Oct. 25, 1984). [Rollo p. 70.]

Complying with this, Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga docketed as Special Civil Case No. 7623. Upon
evaluation of the case, the court dismissed this petition and Perez' motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Perez thereafter filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. In a decision dated October 8, 1987 this petition was denied, being inappropriate,
aside from the fact that the decision sought to be reviewed had become final and executory. As explained by the Court of Appeals:

xxx xxx xxx

... it is to be observed that what petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court was an original petition for certiorari and prohibition which was
dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. The appropriate remedy for such dismissal is an appeal from said
decision (by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC concerned), and not a petition for review. Under the 1983 Interim Rules of Court, all
appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases where a record on appeal is required, must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment, order, resolution or award appealed from. (par. 19). <äre||anº•1àw> An appeal from the Regional Trial Courts
to the Court of Appeals in actions or proceedings originally filed in the former shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court that
rendered the judgment or order appealed from (par. 20, 1983 Interim Rules of Court) ...

For not having filed a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, the decision of said court in the petition
for certiorari and prohibition ... has become final and executory (CIR v. Visayan Electric Co., 19 SCRA 696, 698) on July 12, 1987, fifteen
(15) days after receipt by petitioner of the decision of said court on May 18, 1987, deducting the period during which his motion for
reconsideration of said decision was pending resolution before said court. ... Petitioner might plead liberality in the interpretation of the
rules of procedure, but this plea cannot be conceded because it involves the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. It has been repeatedly
held that compliance with the manner and period for perfecting an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional Garganta vs. Cabangon, 109
Phil. 150 [1960]; Bilbao vs. Republic, 80 SCRA, 177 [1977]; Volkschen Labor Union vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 98 SCRA
314, 322 [1980]) [Rollo, pp. 93-94.]

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review.

I. Petitioner claims that what he filed with the Regional Trial Court was not an original petition for certiorari and prohibition but an appeal from the resolutions of
the Municipal Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 83-8228 denying his motions to quash and for reconsideration. Hence, when the Regional Trial Court dismissed
his certiorari and prohibition case, he invoked the proper remedy which is a petition for review.

There is no merit in petitioner's claim.

Well-established is the rule that appeal is not the proper remedy from a denial of a motion to quash [People v. Macandog, G.R. Nos. 18601-2, January 31, 1963,
7 SCRA 195; Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 63559, May 30, 1986,142 SCRA 171; Milo v. Salanga, G.R. No. 37007, July 20, 1987,
152 SCRA 113.] This is so because an order denying a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and does not finally dispose of a case. Under the Rules on
Criminal Procedure prior to its amendment in 1985, ** after the denial of defendant's motion to quash, he should immediately enter his plea and go to trial and, if
convicted, raise on appeal the same question covered by his motion to quash [See Sec. 1 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court and Chuatoco v. Aragon, G.R. No.
20316, January 30, 1 968, 22 SCRA 346.]

Further, the record shows that what petitioner actually filed was a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition as evidenced by his prayer for (1) the annulment
and setting aside of the municipal trial judge's resolutions of April 11, 1984 and June 11, 1984 denying his motions to quash and for reconsideration, respectively,
and, (2) the prohibition of the same judge from further taking cognizance of the criminal case for Qualified Seduction [Annexes "K" and "L".]

A special civil action for certiorari is an original or independent action and not a continuation or a part of the trial resulting in the rendition of the judgment
complained of [Palomares v. Jimenez, 90 Phil. 773, 776 (1952).] The same holds true in case of a special civil action for prohibition. These writs may be issued
by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court [Art. X, Sec. 5 (1) of the 1987 Constitution and Secs. 9 (1) and 21 (1) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.]

In a special civil action for certiorari, the petitioner seeks to annul or modify the proceedings of any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions that has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion [Rule 65, sec. 1.] On the other hand, in a petition for prohibition directed against any
tribunal, corporation, board, or person whether exercising judicial or ministerial functions who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the
petition [Rule 65, Sec. 2]
From a denial of a petition for certiorari and prohibition by the trial court, as in this case, the losing party's remedy is an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals
by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment or order appealed from [Sec. 20, Interim Rules of Court.] Failure to appeal within fifteen (15)
days from rendition of judgment renders the appealed decision final and executory.

A petition for review of a judgment of the regional trial court is proper only when the judgment sought to be reviewed is an appeal from the final judgment or order
of a municipal, metropolitan or municipal circuit trial court [Sec. 22 (b), Interim Rules of Court].

Petitioner likewise faults the respondent Court of Appeals for dismissing his petition for certiorari which "gave rise to the confusion caused by the case being
tossed around from one court to another ending in its dismissal on mere technicality, thereby depriving [him] of his right to constitutional due process" [Rollo, p.
133.]

Petitioner's assertion that he was consequently denied due process in unfounded. Respondent court did not foreclose his right to seek his remedy elsewhere as
it is clear from its decision that "the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED, without prejudice to its refiling in the proper Regional Trial Court" [Rollo.
p. 70.] Thus, petitioner was never denied recourse to the appropriate court. On the contrary, the Intermediate Appellate Court pointed the direction for petitioner
to take.

II. Petitioner invokes double jeopardy to question the filing against him of an information for Qualified Seduction after he was acquitted for Consented Abduction.

The rule on double jeopardy is that, "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" [Article IV, Sec. 22 of the 1973 Constitution,
Article III, Sec 21 of the 1987 Constitution.] The term "same offense" means Identical offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof or any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. The rule on double jeopardy under
the Rules of Court is explicit:

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.—When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information
or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information. [Sec. 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court Procedure, now Sec. 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure.]

xxx xxx xxx

There is no question that petitioner was validly charged with the crime of Consented Abduction before a court of competent jurisdiction. That he had been
arraigned and had pleaded not guilty to the charge for which he was subsequently acquitted is likewise undisputed. In the case at bar, the only issue posed by
petitioner relates to the Identity of the two offenses of Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction.

In support of his argument that the filing of the subsequent information for Qualified Seduction is barred by his acquittal in the case for Consented Abduction,
petitioner maintains that since the same evidence would support charges for both offenses a trial and conviction for one, after he was acquitted for the other,
would constitute double jeopardy. Stated otherwise, petitioner would rely on the "same evidence" test in support of his claim of double jeopardy.

It is true that the two offenses for which petitioner was charged arose from the same facts. This, however, does not preclude the filing of another information
against him if from those facts, two distinct offenses, each requiring different elements, arose. As this Court stated:

xxx xxx xxx

A single act may be an offense against two statutes and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and conviction under the other . [U.S. v.
Capurro, 7 Phil. 24, 34 (9106) citing In re Hans Neilsen (131 U.S. 176); Emphasis supplied.]

xxx xxx xxx

The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever
closely they may appear to be connected in fact. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for
the same offense or Identical offense. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if
one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the
information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code)
define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the
same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other . [People v. Doriquez, G.R. Nos.
24444-45, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 163, 171-172; Emphasis supplied.]

xxx xxx xxx

An examination of the elements of these two crimes would show that although they may have arisen from the same set of facts, they are not Identical offenses as
would make applicable the rule on double jeopardy.

There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she must be over
twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age. However, two elements differentiate the two crimes. Consented Abduction, in addition to the two common
elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and, (2) the taking
away of the offended party must be with lewd designs. On the other hand, an information for Qualified Seduction also requires that: (1) the crime be committed
by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.

Moreover, the very nature of these two offenses would negate any Identity between them. As this Court has stated:

xxx xxx xxx

... the gravamen of the offense of the abduction of a woman with her own consent, who is still under the control of her parents or
guardians is "the alarm and perturbance to the parents and family" of the abducted person, and the infringement of the rights of the parent
or guardian. But-in cases of seduction, the gravamen of the offense is the wrong done the young woman who is seduced. ... [U.S. v.
Jayme, 24 Phil. 90, 94 (1913).]

xxx xxx xxx

III. Finally, petitioner avers that the complaint for Qualified Seduction is barred by waiver and/or estoppel on the part of Yolanda Mendoza, the latter having opted
to consider the case as Consented Abduction. He also alleges that her delay of more than nine (9) years before filing the second case against him is tantamount
to pardon by the offended party.

Petitioner's stance is unmeritorious. The complainant's filing of a subsequent case against him belies his allegation that she has waived or is estopped from filing
the second charge against petitioner. Neither could she be deemed to have pardoned him, for the rules require that in cases of seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, pardon by the offended party, to be effective, must be expressly given [Rule 110, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court, Ruled 110, Sec. 5 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] Moreover the length of time it took her to file the second case is of no moment considering that she filed it within the ten
(10)-year prescriptive period provided by Article 90 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code for crimes punishable by a correctional penalty such as Qualified Seduction
[See Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code.]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* The crimes of consented abduction and qualified seduction are both punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods [Article 342 and 337 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively] or 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. The seeming
discrepancy as to what court these two cases were filed notwithstanding similar penalties can be explained however by the reorganization
and renaming of the courts by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in 1981 when the jurisdiction to hear criminal case punishable with imprisonment
of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months was lodged with the inferior courts.

** Applicable to the instant case because the denial of petitioner's motion to quash happened in 1984.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 115814 May 26, 1995

PEDRO P. PECSON, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JUAN NUGUID and ERLINDA NUGUID, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32679 affirming in part the order 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 101, in Civil Case No. Q-41470.

The factual and procedural antecedents of this case as gathered from the record are as follows:

Petitioner Pedro P. Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot located in Kamias Street, Quezon City, on which he built a four-door two-storey apartment building.
For his failure to pay realty taxes amounting to twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00), the lot was sold at public auction by the city Treasurer of Quezon City to
Mamerto Nepomuceno who in turn sold it on 12 October 1983 to the private respondents, the spouses Juan Nuguid and Erlinda Tan-Nuguid, for one hundred
three thousand pesos (P103,000.00).

The petitioner challenged the validity of the auction sale in Civil Case No. Q-41470 before the RTC of Quezon City. In its decision of 8 February 1989, the RTC
dismissed the complaint, but as to the private respondents' claim that the sale included the apartment building, it held that the issue concerning it was "not a
subject of the . . . litigation." In resolving the private respondents' motion to reconsider this issue, the trial court held that there was no legal basis for the
contention that the apartment building was included in the sale.3

Both parties then appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 2931. In its decision of 30 April 1992, 4 the Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the assailed decision. It also agreed with the trial court that the apartment building was not included in the auction sale of the commercial
lot. Thus:

Indeed, examining the record we are fully convinced that it was only the land — without the apartment building — which was sold at the
auction sale, for plaintiff's failure to pay the taxes due thereon . Thus, in the Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property To Purchaser (Exh.
K, p. 352, Record) the property subject of the auction sale at which Mamerto Nepomuceno was the purchaser is referred to as Lot No. 21-
A, Block No. K-34, at Kamias, Barangay Piñahan, with an area of 256.3 sq. m., with no mention whatsoever, of the building thereon. The
same description of the subject property appears in the Final Notice To Exercise The Right of Redemption (over subject property) dated
September 14, 1981 (Exh. L, p. 353, Record) and in the Final Bill of Sale over the same property dated April 19, 1982 (Exh. P, p. 357,
Record). Needless to say, as it was only the land without any building which Nepomuceno had acquired at the auction sale, it was also
only that land without any building which he could have legally sold to the Nuguids. Verily, in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered
Land executed by Mamerto Nepomuceno in favor of the Nuguids on October 25, 1983 (Exh. U, p. 366, Record) it clearly appears that the
property subject of the sale for P103,000.00 was only the parcel of land, Lot 21-A, Blk. K-34 containing an area of 256.3 sq. meters,
without any mention of any improvement, much less any building thereon. (emphases supplied)

The petition to review the said decision was subsequently denied by this Court.5 Entry of judgment was made on 23 June 1993.6

On November 1993, the private respondents filed with the trial court a motion for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building, citing article 546 of
the Civil Code.7 Acting thereon, the trial court issued on 15 November 1993 the challenged order8 which reads as follows:

Submitted for resolution before this Court is an uncontroverted [sic] for the Delivery of Possession filed by defendants Erlinda Tan, Juan
 Nuguid, et al. considering that despite personal service of the Order for plaintiff to file within five (5) days his opposition to said motion, he
did not file any.

In support of defendant's motion, movant cites the law in point as Article 546 of the Civil Code . . .

Movant agrees to comply with the provisions of the law considering that plaintiff is a builder in good faith and he has in fact, opted to pay
the cost of the construction spent by plaintiff. From the complaint itself the plaintiff stated that the construction cost of the apartment is
much more than the lot, which apartment he constructed at a cost of P53,000.00 in 1965 (par. 8 complaint). This amount of P53,000.00 is
what the movant is supposed to pay under the law before a writ of possession placing him in possession of both the lot and apartment
would be issued.

However, the complaint alleges in paragraph 9 that three doors of the apartment are being leased. This is further confirmed by the affidavit
of the movant presented in support of the motion that said three doors are being leased at a rental of P7,000.00 a month each. The
movant further alleges in his said affidavit that the present commercial value of the lot is P10,000.00 per square meter or P2,500,000.00
and the reasonable rental value of said lot is no less than P21,000.00 per month.

The decision having become final as per Entry of Judgment dated June 23, 1993 and from this date on, being the uncontested owner of
the property, the rents should be paid to him instead of the plaintiff collecting them. From June 23, 1993, the rents collected by plaintiff
amounting to more than P53,000.00 from tenants should be offset from the rents due to the lot which according to movant's affidavit is
more than P21,000.00 a month.

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the Motion, the Court hereby grants the following prayer that:

1. The movant shall reimburse plaintiff the construction cost of P53,000.00.

2. The payment of P53,000.00 as reimbursement for the construction cost, movant Juan Nuguid is hereby entitled
to immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the Lot and improvements thereon.

3. The movant having been declared as the uncontested owner of the Lot in question as per Entry of Judgment of
the Supreme Court dated June 23, 1993, the plaintiff should pay rent to the movant of no less than P21,000.00 per
month from said date as this is the very same amount paid monthly by the tenants occupying the lot.

4. The amount of P53,000.00 due from the movant is hereby offset against the amount of rents collected by the
plaintiff from June 23, 1993, to September 23, 1993.

SO ORDERED.

The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the order but it was not acted upon by the trial court. Instead, on 18 November 1993, it issued a writ of
possession directing the deputy sheriff "to place said movant Juan Nuguid in possession of subject property located at No. 79 Kamias Road, Quezon City, with all
the improvements thereon and to eject therefrom all occupants therein, their agents, assignees, heirs and representatives."9

The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the order of 15 November 1993, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32679. 10 In its decision of 7 June 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part the order of the trial court citing Article 448 of the
Civil Code. In disposing of the issues, it stated:

As earlier pointed out, private respondent opted to appropriate the improvement introduced by petitioner on the subject lot, giving rise to
the right of petitioner to be reimbursed of the cost of constructing said apartment building, in accordance with Article 546 of the . . . Civil
Code, and of the right to retain the improvements until he is reimbursed of the cost of the improvements, because, basically, the right to
retain the improvement while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which they
are built . . . [2 TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (1992) p. 112]. With the facts extant and the settled principle as guides,
we agree with petitioner that respondent judge erred in ordering that "the movant having been declared as the uncontested owner of the
lot in question as per Entry of Judgment of the Supreme Court dated June 23, 1993, the plaintiff should pay rent to the movant of no less
than P21,000 per month from said date as this is the very same amount paid monthly by the tenants occupying the lot.

We, however, agree with the finding of respondent judge that the amount of P53,000.00 earlier admitted as the cost of constructing the
apartment building can be offset from the amount of rents collected by petitioner from June 23, 1993 up to September 23, 1993 which was
fixed at P7,000.00 per month for each of the three doors. Our underlying reason is that during the period of retention, petitioner as such
possessor and receiving the fruits from the property, is obliged to account for such fruits, so that the amount thereof may be deducted from
the amount of indemnity to be paid to him by the owner of the land, in line with Mendoza vs. De Guzman, 52 Phil. 164 . . . .

The Court of Appeals then ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, while it appears that private respondents have not yet indemnified petitioner with the cost of the improvements, since
Annex I shows that the Deputy Sheriff has enforced the Writ of Possession and the premises have been turned over to the possession of
private respondents, the quest of petitioner that he be restored in possession of the premises is rendered moot and academic, although it
is but fair and just that private respondents pay petitioner the construction cost of P53,000.00; and that petitioner be ordered to account for
any and all fruits of the improvements received by him starting on June 23, 1993, with the amount of P53,000.00 to be offset therefrom.

IT IS SO ORDERED.11

Aggrieved by the Court of Appeals' decision, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

The parties agree that the petitioner was a builder in good faith of the apartment building on the theory that he constructed it at the time when he was still the
owner of the lot, and that the key issue in this case is the application of Articles 448 and 456 of the Civil Code.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals, as well as the parties, concerned themselves with the application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. These
articles read as follows:

Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his
own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in
case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has
been reimbursed therefor.
 Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in
the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have
acquired by reason thereof. (453a)

By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some works, or sown or planted
something. The building, sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in bad faith. The rule on good faith laid down in Article 526 of the Civil Code
shall be applied in determining whether a builder, sower or planter had acted in good faith. 12

Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation.
This Court said so in Coleongco vs. Regalado: 13

Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not applicable in this case, for Regalado constructed the house on his own land before he sold said
land to Coleongco. Article 361 applies only in cases where a person constructs a building on the land of another in good or in bad faith, as
the case may be. It does not apply to a case where a person constructs a building on his own land, for then there can be no question as to
good or bad faith on the part of the builder.

Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.

Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by
analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties, including the two courts below, in the
main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although they differ as to the basis of the
indemnity.

Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful improvements should be determined. The respondent court and the private respondents
espouse the belief that the cost of construction of the apartment building in 1965, and not its current market value, is sufficient reimbursement for necessary and
useful improvements made by the petitioner. This position is, however, not in consonance with previous rulings of this Court in similar cases. In Javier vs.
Concepcion, Jr., 14 this Court pegged the value of the useful improvements consisting of various fruits, bamboos, a house and camarin made of strong material
based on the market value of the said improvements. In Sarmiento vs. Agana, 15 despite the finding that the useful improvement, a residential house, was built
in 1967 at a cost of between eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) to ten thousand pesos(P10,000.00), the landowner was ordered to reimburse the builder in the
amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), the value of the house at the time of the trial. In the same way, the landowner was required to pay the "present
value" of the house, a useful improvement, in the case of De Guzman vs. De la Fuente, 16 cited by the petitioner.

The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila 17 that the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece
of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him.
Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would
unjustly enrich the private respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly
amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon which the trial
court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the landowner.

The trial court also erred in ordering the petitioner to pay monthly rentals equal to the aggregate rentals paid by the lessees of the apartment building. Since the
private respondents have opted to appropriate the apartment building, the petitioner is thus entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the apartment building,
until he is paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the portion of the lot where the building has been constructed. This is so because the right to retain the
improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted or sown. 18 The
petitioner not having been so paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of the building and, necessarily, the income therefrom.

It follows, too, that the Court of Appeals erred not only in upholding the trial court's determination of the indemnity, but also in ordering the petitioner to account
for the rentals of the apartment building from 23 June 1993 to 23 September 1993.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32679 and the Order of 15 November 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 101,
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-41470 are hereby SET ASIDE.

The case is hereby remanded to the trial court for it to determine the current market value of the apartment building on the lot. For this purpose, the parties shall
be allowed to adduce evidence on the current market value of the apartment building. The value so determined shall be forthwith paid by the private respondents
to the petitioner otherwise the petitioner shall be restored to the possession of the apartment building until payment of the required indemnity.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Quiason, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 12-21. Per Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Manuel C.
Herrera and Ruben T. Reyes.

2 Id., 40-42. Per Judge Pedro T. Santiago.

3 Rollo, 34.

4 Annex "A" of the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 32679; Id., 31-39. Per Associate Justice Lorna S. Lombos-De la Fuente, with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Eduardo R. Bengzon and Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr.

5 Memorandum For Petitioners, 2; Rollo, 70.

6 Rollo, 70.

7 It provides:

Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has
been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in
the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have
acquired by reason thereof.
 8 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 40-42.

9 Rollo, 17-18.

10 Annex "B" of Petition; Id., 22-30.

11 Rollo, 19-21.

12 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. II, 1983 ed., 103.

13 92 Phil. 387, 395 [1952]. See EDGARDO L. PARAS, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, vol. Two, Eleventh ed. [1984], 192.

14 94 SCRA 212 [1979].

15 129 SCRA 122 [1984].

16 55 Phil. 501 [1930].

17 40 Phil. 717 [1920].

18 TOLENTINO, op. cit., 104.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law FoundationRepublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23497 April 26, 1968
J.M. TUASON and CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
ESTRELLA VDA. DE LUMANLAN and the COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTH DIVISION),
respondents.
Tuason and Sison for petitioner.
Jose Chuico and Wilfredo E. Dizon for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. petitioned for a review by certiorari of the decision issued by the Court of
Appeals (Fifth Division) in its case CA-G.R. No. 27259-R, reversing the judgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. Q-4243) that ordered defendant (now respondent)
Estrella Vda. de Lumanlan to vacate the lot occupied by her in Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision, barrio
Tatalon, Quezon City, and to remove therefrom the house and other structures constructed thereon,
paying P240.00 a month until restoration of the premises to plaintiff.
The facts are stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals (accepted by both parties) in this
wise:1äwphï1.ñët
. . . That in the complaint filed in this case by plaintiff, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., hereinafter
called Tuason, on 30 April, 1969, the basis is that it being the registered owner of the property
known as Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision, situated at Barrio North Tatalon, Quezon City,
herein defendant sometime in April, 1949 unlawfully entered into possession of 800 square
meters, and therein constructed his house so that plaintiff prayed for ejectment and damages for
the occupancy; and defendant in her answer set forth affirmative defense that on 12 March,
1949, she had bought the property she was occupying from one Pedro Deudor, and that in a
compromise agreement between Pedro and Tuason on 16 March 1953, approved by the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City, she was one of the buyers therein recognized, so that she asked
that her rights be recognized and the complaint dismissed; but on the basis of the evidence
presented by both parties in the trial, Lower Court sustained plaintiff, holding that Tuason being
the registered owner, and the question being purely one of possession, therefore, defendant's
said evidence was "completely immaterial". . . . (Page 2 of Decision, Annex "A" of Petition.)
Upon the facts thus stated, the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals held that, pursuant to this
Supreme Court's ruling in Evangelista vs. Deudor, L-12826, September 10, 1959, the Compromise
Agreement (Exh. 2) between the petitioner Tuason & Co. and the Deudors constituted a valid defense
against the possessory action filed by Tuason & Co.; that under paragraph 7 of said Compromise
Agreement, petitioner bound and committed itself to sell to respondent Lumanlan the lot occupied by
her at a reasonable price; that said respondent had a right to compel petitioner to accept payment for the
lot in question; and that the compromise agreement legalized the possession of respondent.
These pronouncements are assailed by the petitioner in this appeal as legally incorrect and contrary to
the decisions of this Court.
The terms of the compromise agreement between the heirs of Telesforo Deudor and J. M. Tuason &
Co. have been taken cognizance of in many decisions of this Court (Evangelista vs. Deudor, jam. cit;
Deudor vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., L-18768, May 30, 1961, and L-20105, Oct. 31, 1963; J. M. Tuason vs.
Jaramillo, et al., L-18932-34, Sept. 30, 1963; J. M. Tuason vs. Macalindong, L-15398, Dec. 29, 1962
and others). The Deudors had therein recognized the registered title of Tuason & Co. over the lands
claimed by them, and received payment of certain sums of money; but as the Deudors had, prior to the
compromise, sold their possessory rights to various persons, paragraph seventh of the compromise
agreement (case Q-135 of the court of origin) provided:
That the sales of the possessory rights claimed by the DEUDORS, are described in the lists
submitted by them to the OWNERS which are attached hereto marked Annexes "B" and "C"
and made part hereof. Whatever amounts may have been collected by the DEUDORS on
account thereof, shall be deducted from the total sum of P1,201,063.00 to be paid to them. It
shall be the joint and solidary obligation of the DEUDORS to make the buyer of the lots
purportedly sold by them to recognize the title of the OWNERS over the property purportedly
bought by them, and to make them sign, whenever possible, new contracts of purchase for said
property at the current paces and terms specified by the OWNERS in their sales of lots in their
subdivision known at "Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision." The DEUDORS HEREBY advised the
OWNERS that the buyer listed in Annex "B" herein with the annotation "continue" shall buy the
lots respectively occupied by them and shall sign contracts, but the sums already paid by them
to the DEUDORS amounting to P134,922.84 (subject to verification by the Court) shall be
credited to the buyers and shall be deducted from the sums to be paid to the DEUDORS by the
OWNERS. The DEUDORS also advise the OWNERS that, the buyers listed in Annex "C"
herein with the annotation "Refund" have decided not to continue with their former contracts or
purchases with the DEUDORS and the sums already paid by them to the DEUDORS
TOTALLING P101,182.42 (subject to verification by the Court) shall be refunded to them by
the OWNERS and deducted from the sums that may be due to the DEUDORS from the
OWNERS (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Jaramillo, L-18932, Sept. 30, 1963);
Careful analysis of this paragraph of the compromise agreement will show that while the same created
"a sort of contractual relation" between the J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and the Deudor vendees (as ruled
by this Court in Evangelista vs. Deudor, ante), the same in no way obligated Tuason & Co. to sell to
those buyers the lots occupied by them at the price stipulated with the Deudors, but at "the current
prices and terms specified by the OWNERS (Tuason) in their sales of lots in their subdivision known as
'Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision'". This is what is expressly provided. Further, the paragraph plainly
imports that these buyers of the Deudors must "recognize the title of the OWNERS (Tuason) over the
property purportedly bought by them" from the Deudors, and "sign, whenever possible, new contracts
of purchase for said property"; and, if and when they do so, "the sums paid by them to the Deudors . . .
shall be credited to the buyers." All that Tuason & Co. agreed to, therefore, was to grant the Deudor
buyers preferential right to purchase "at current prices and terms" the lots occupied by them, upon their
recognizing the title of Tuason & Co., Inc., and signing new contracts therefor; and to credit them for
the amounts they had paid to the Deudors.
Nowhere in her answer did the respondent Estrella Vda. de Lumanlan claim that she had signed a new
contract with J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. for the purchase of the lot occupied. What is worse, instead of
recognizing the title of the owners (Tuason & Co.) as required by the aforementioned compromise
agreement, she charged in paragraph 6 of her special defense (Rec. on Appeal, p. 10) that "Pedro
Deudor and his co-owners and the plaintiff herein . . . conspired together and helped each other . . . by
entering into a supposed Compromise" whereby "Pedro Deudor and his co-owners renounced, ceded,
waived and quitclaimed all their rights, title and interest in the property including the land sold to
herein defendant, in favor of the plaintiff J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., in consideration of the sum of
P1,201,063.00, without the knowledge and consent, and much less the intervention of the herein
defendant." In other words, the respondent Lumanlan in her answer repudiated and assailed the
compromise between the Deudors and J. M. Tuason & Co. How then can she now claim to take
advantage and derive rights from that compromise?
Without the compromise agreement, Lumanlan must justify her possession on the basis of a pretended
superiority of the Deudors' old Spanish informacion posesoria over Tuason's Certificate of Title No.
1267, traceable back to the original Certificate of Title No. 735 of Rizal, issued under the Registration
Act No. 496. But, as ruled by this Court in previous cases, Lumanlan is by now barred from assailing
the decree of registration in favor of Tuason & Co., Inc.'s predecessors twenty years after its issuance
(Tiburcio vs. PHHC, L-13429, Oct. 31, 1959; Tuason & Co. vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 107; Tuason & Co.
vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 622-623; Tuason & Co. vs. Macalindong, supra; Tuason & Co. vs. Jaramillo, L-
16827, Jan. 31, 1963).
It is thus apparent that no legal basis exists for the pronouncement in the appealed decision that Tuason
& Co. had committed itself to sell to Lumanlan the lot occupied by her at a reasonable price, or that the
compromise agreement legalized the possession of the respondent, since the latter does not rely on the
compromise but, on the contrary, she assails it.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the price to be paid by Lumanlan to Tuason & Co., Inc., is governed by
Article 1474 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides that:
Where the price cannot be determined in accordance with the preceding articles, or in any other
manner, the contract is inefficacious. However, if the thing or any part thereof has been
delivered to and appropriated by the buyer, he must pay a reasonable price therefor. What is a
reasonable price is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each particular case.
Since there has been no contract between petitioner Tuason & Co. and respondent Lumanlan for the
sale of the lot occupied by the latter, and by paragraph 7 of the Compromise Agreement (assuming that
respondent-appellee still has the right to invoke the same, and seek refuge thereunder), Tuason & Co.
did not consider itself bound by the sales made by the Deudors, but demanded that the Deudor buyers
should sign new contracts with it at current prices specified for the sales of lots in "Sta. Mesa Heights
Subdivision" (ante) the aforequoted Article 1474 can have no bearing on the case, Lumanlan not being
a buyer from Tuason & Co.
As to Lumanlan's allegation in her counterclaim that she should be deemed a builder in good faith, a
similar contention has been rejected in Tuason & Co. vs. Macalindong, L-15398, December 29, 1962,
where we ruled that there being a presumptive knowledge of the Torrens titles issued to Tuason & Co.
and its predecessors-in-interest since 1914, the buyer from the Deudors (or from their transferees) can
not, in good conscience, say now that she believed her vendor had rights of ownership over the lot
purchased. The reason given by the Court is that —
Had he investigated before buying and before building his house on the questioned lot, he
 would have been informed that the land is registered under the Torrens system in the name of J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc., If he failed to make the necessary inquiry, appellant is now bound
conclusively by appellee's Torrens title (Sec. 51, Act 496; Emas vs. Zuzuarregui, 35 Phil. 144)
(Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, ante).
Lumanlan had chosen to ignore the Torrens title of Tuason & Co., Inc. and relied instead upon the
Deudors' claim of ownership, perhaps because such course appeared to her as more advantageous;
hence, she has only herself to blame for the consequences now that the Deudors' claim has been
abandoned by the Deudors themselves, and can not pretend good faith. The Court of First Instance,
therefore, did not err in holding that she was not a rightful possessor and sentencing her to vacate.
Respondent could have asked that she recover or be credited with the amounts paid by her to the
Deudors, but as no claim to such credit was ever advanced by her in the trial Court, no pronouncement
can be made thereon in this appeal. Equity demands, however, that her right to claim such return, or to
have the amount offset against the sums she was sentenced to pay, should be, as it is, reserved.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the Court of First Instance
reinstated. Costs against respondent, Estrella Vda. de Lumanlan.
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Angeles, J., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21921 October 4, 1924
ATKINS, KROLL & COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SANTIAGO DOMINGO, defendant-appellee.
W. A. Armstrong for appellant.
Pablo Lorenzo and Laurel, Alas & De la Rosa for appellee.

STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga by Atkins, Kroll & Company,
Inc., against Santiago Domingo, for the purpose of enforcing recognition of its alleged right of
ownership over lot No. thirty-eight (38) of the cadastral plan of the Zamboanga townsite, expediente
No. 7880, and to recover possession of the same from the defendant, and at the same time to secure a
partition of lots Nos. 36 and 55 in the same plan, according to the proportional interests pertaining to
the plaintiff and defendant as joint owners thereof. Upon hearing the cause the trial court entered a
judgment recognizing the rights of the plaintiff as tenant in common with the defendant in respect to
the land in all of said lots to the full extent claimed by the plaintiff and made an appropriate order for a
division thereof, but the court at the same time held that the buildings on lots Nos. 36 and 38 are of the
exclusive ownership of the defendant, Santiago Domingo, and that before the plaintiff can obtain
possession of said buildings the defendant is entitled to be reimbursed for their value, which the court
fixed at P18,000, in accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code. At the same time the court denied
the right of the plaintiff to recover any part of the rents received by the defendant for said houses,
though it recognized the obligation of the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff for the defendant's share
of the taxes paid by the plaintiff on all of the properties. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed, and
under its assignment of error so much of the decision is called in question as relates to the title to the
buildings on lost Nos. 36 and 38 and to the right of the plaintiff to an accounting for rents which have
been collected exclusively by the defendant on all of the lots.
The appeal is concerned principally with the question of the title to the improvements on lots Nos. 36
and 38, as distinguished from the title to the land, and the manner in which this question arises can be
most readily exhibited in brief history of the registered title.
On June 24, 1912, the Court of Land Registration, sitting in the Province of Zamboanga, adjudicated
the three lots already mentioned, Nos. 36, 38, and 55, to Buenaventura Domingo. No mention was
made in the decision of the improvements on said lots, but when the corresponding decrees of
registration were issued on October 4, thereafter, the words "with all the improvements existing
thereon" were inserted, as is the common practice in cases where the improvements have not been
expressly declared by the court to belong to some other person than the owner of the land. The same
phrase appeared in the respective certificates of title covering the lots, with the result that according to
the Torrens certificates Buenaventura Domingo was the owner not only of each of said lots but also of
the improvements existing thereon.
Buenaventura Domingo died intestate on October 21, 1912, leaving a widow and a number of children
and grandchildren as heirs. One of his sons, namely, Santiago Domingo, the defendant in this case,
qualified on October 29, 1914, as administrator of his estate. Another son, named Leon Domingo, died
on August 21, 1913, and Santiago Domingo likewise qualified as administrator of Leon's estate. In the
course of the administration of the estate of Buenaventura Domingo, the defendant, as his
administrator, submitted a project of partition to the court, in which lots Nos. 36, 38 and 55 are
mentioned as properties pertaining to the decedent. In this project no mention was made of
improvements on any of said lots with the exception of a small house of strong materials on lot No. 38,
the title to which is not in question and may be dismissed from consideration. On August 8, 1918, the
court duly approved the project of partition. No objection to this action appears to have been made by
any person interested in the estate.
The share of Santiago Domingo in his father's estate, so far as affects lots Nos. 36 and 55, has remained
undisturbed and said interest is still vested in him. It is different with lot No. 38, for on February 17,
1922, the said Santiago Domingo sold his entire interest in lot No. 38, "with all the improvements
existing thereon," by contract of sale with pacto de retro to one Ong Kong. The interest thus sold was
subject to repurchase within the period of one year, but redemption was never effected; and on
February 17, 1923, the property was duly consolidated in Ong Kong. On February 19, 1923, Ong Kong
sold his entire interest in the lot and improvements thereon to the present plaintiff, Atkins, Kroll & Co.
The shares pertaining to the other heirs in lots Nos. 36, 38, and 55 suffered a number of mutations as to
ownership; but in the end, through various transactions, the authenticity, legality, and good faith of
which are not questioned either in the pleadings or in the proof, all of said interests came to rest in the
plaintiff, Atkins, Kroll & Co. Each step in all of these mutations of title was accompanied by the
corresponding proper changes in the Torrens certificates of title Nos. 3433, 3843, 3435, showing the
present ownership of the lots and improvements. From these certificates it appears that the plaintiff,
Atkins, Kroll & Co. is the owner of three-fourths of lot No. 36, with the improvements thereon; of the
whole of lot No. 38, with the improvements thereon; and of three-fourths of lot No. 55, excluding the
improvements.
It appears that the defendant, Santiago Domingo, is now in possession of said property and has at all
times been in possession since the plaintiff acquired its interest therein, and he has during the same
period exclusively enjoyed the use of all the lots, with the income derived from the buildings thereon.
This circumstance, coupled with this refusal to admit the plaintiff's claim as coowner, resulted, as
already stated, in the institution of the present action by the plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering
possession of lot No. 38 and to secure a partition of lots Nos. 36 and 55, with an accounting for the
plaintiff's proper proportion of the profits. This brings us to consider the origin and nature of the
defendant's claim to the exclusive ownership of the buildings on lots Nos. 36 and 38. 1awph!l.net
In this connection it appears that the buildings referred to were erected in the latter months of the year
1912 and first half of 1913, and the defendant asserts that they were built by him with his own money
and with the consent of his father. Upon this circumstance in connection with article 361 and related
provisions of the Civil Code, the defendant bases his claim to the exclusive ownership of said
buildings.
We note that this claim was first put forth by the defendant in what he called an explanatory report
submitted to the court in the administration of the estate of Buenaventura Domingo on February 1,
1919. In that writing the defendant asked that the buildings on lots Nos. 36 and 38 be segregated from
the mass of the property left by his father and that he himself be declared to be the exclusive owner of
the buildings. This move was opposed by Zoila Domingo, a daughter and sole heir of Leon Domingo.
In the end the court, upon July 19, 1922, entered a resolution ignoring the defendant's claim and
ordering that the project of partition be carried into effect. If it be true, as the defendant claims, that the
houses referred to were built with his money, it must strike one as remarkably strange that he should
have waited for nearly seven years, or until February 1, 1919, before formulating his claim or taking
any step whatever to protect his title to said buildings.
But assuming, as we may, that the buildings in question were in fact constructed by the defendant with
his own money, and with the consent of his father as owner of the land, it is clear that the defendant's
right to the buildings in controversy has been lost, except in so far as he is owner of an undivided one-
fourth interest by inheritance; and the interests of the two parties to this litigation in the properties in
question must be taken to be exactly as they are stated in the existing certificates of title. This results
from the fact that the plaintiff is a purchaser for value who has acquired the interests shown on the
existing Torrens certificates upon the faith of the registered title, and the defendant is in no position to
arrest the effect of these documents.
But is it insisted that the plaintiff has been affected with the notice of the defendant's right by the filing
of a lis pendens. This requires a few words of explanation. Going back to August 18, 1920, we find that
on said date the defendant filed with the register of deeds a notice of lis pendens, setting forth his claim
of ownership as to the improvements in question, and referring to the controversy planted in his
explanatory report in the administration proceedings. Notice of said lis pendens was noted on the back
of the corresponding certificates of title. Upon the date stated the plaintiff had already acquired a
mortgage upon the interest of Zoila Domingo in the estate of her grandfather, Buenaventura Domingo;
and by the foreclosure of that mortgage all of her interest in lots Nos. 36 and 38 became vested in the
plaintiff as purchaser. The remaining interests acquired by the plaintiff in the same properties appear to
have been acquired by it after the notice of lis pendens was filed.
As will be seen, the filing of the lis pendens was intended to affect third persons with notice of the
claim which the defendant had asserted in his explanatory report in the proceedings over the state of
Buenaventura Domingo. But it will be remembered that the efforts of the defendant to get his claim
recognized in those proceedings completely failed of effect. For this reason the lis pendens must be
considered to have lost its efficacy. The effect of notice by lis pendens is, of course, to charge the
stranger with notice of the particular litigation referred to in the notice, and, if the notice is effective,
the stranger who acquires the property affected by the lis pendens takes subject to the eventuality of the
litigation. But when the adverse right fails in such litigation, the lis pendens becomes innocuous.
It should be noted that the defendant, supposing his claim to have been made in good faith, might have
protected it, at any time before the property had passed into the hands of a third person, by a
proceeding under section 112 of Act No. 496. Said section declares that any person may at any time
apply by petition to the court, where "new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear
upon the certificate," and procure such interests to be noted. Such a petition must be filed and entitled
in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered. (Sec. 112, par. 2, Act No. 496.)
In Blass vs. De la Cruz and Melendres (37 Phil., 1), this court held that the registration of land in the
name of a particular person vests in him not only the title to the land but also the title to the
improvements thereon, unless special reservation is noted with respect to the improvements. In that
case the improvements which became the subject of controversy had been placed on the land before it
was registered and the decree of registration was res judicata as to the improvements. In the case
before us the buildings which are the subject of controversy were placed on the land after the decree of
registration. This circumstance made a proceeding under section 12 of Act No. 496 all the more
necessary in order to protect the new interest thus created. So far as registered land is concerned, the
right recognized in article 361 and related provisions of the Civil Code is subject to the contingency
that it shall be noted in the registered title before the property passes into the hand of a purchaser for
value.
The considerations so far adduced apply alike to the improvements on lots Nos. 36 and 38, but there is
another circumstance which is fatal to the defendant's claim to any of the improvements on lot No. 38.
This is found in the fact that he sold his interest in said lot, including the improvements, to Ong Kong,
the plaintiff's predecessor in interest. It is evident that the defendant is estopped by his own deed from
claiming any interest in the buildings on this lot, whatever might have been the law governing his claim
to the buildings on the other lot.
From what has been said it is evidence that the trial court was in error in declaring the defendant to be
the owner of the buildings on lots Nos. 36 and 38 and in failing to require the defendant to account; and
in order to clarify the situation we declare: (1) That the ownership of the lots Nos. 36, 38, and 55, is as
stated in the Torrens certificates of title Nos. 3433, 3843, and 3435 (Exhibits A, B, and C of the
plaintiff); (2) that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of lot No. 38 and that partition must be made of
lots Nos. 36 and 55 in the manner provided by law; (3) the plaintiff is further entitled to recover of the
defendant such portion of the defendant and which shall have been paid by the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff
shall also recover of the defendant such portion of the rents of said properties as correspond to the
interests of the plaintiff since its acquisition of the same.
The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this
opinion, without express pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Johnson, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3007 March 30, 1908
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH, ET AL., plaintiffs,
vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF BADOC, ET AL., defendants.
Hartigan and Rohde for plaintiffs.
Buencamino and Diokno Deogracias Reyes, and Teodoro Gonzalez for defendants.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
This is an action brought by the Roman Catholic Church against several municipalities of the Province
of Ilocos Norte, Don Gregorio Aglipay, Obispo Maximo of the Independent Philippine Church, and
several others, demanding the restitution of certain properties.
Paragraph V of the complaint establishes the following fact:
That from time immemorial the churches, conventos, cemeteries, and other properties used in
connection with the churches, conventos, and cemeteries hereinafter specified have existed in
the above-named towns of Badoc, Paoay, Pasuquin, San Miguel de Sarratt, Batac, Piddig,
Dingras, Bacarra, Bangui, and Laoag, of the aforesaid Province of Ilocos Norte, and at the
present time there exist also the paraphernalia of the churches and conventos specified in the
complaint. All of these churches, conventos, and cemeteries dedicated to the practice of the
Roman Catholic religion, have been so dedicated from the immemorial time of their
construction until a few years ago, when the defendants unlawfully took possession of the said
churches, conventos, cemeteries, and other properties, and they now continue in possession
thereof, dedicating them to the use of the Independent Philippine Church, in violation of the
rights of the plaintiff.
In paragraph VI is claimed the following:
IN THE TOWN OF BADOC.
(a) A church; (b) a churchyard adjoining the church; (c) a parish house and its dependencies; (d) the
walls of a demolished building called the convento; (e) an old cemetery; (g) a parcel of land used as a
cemetery in the sitio of Paratong; and (h) all appurtenances of the church described in the complaint.
The statements in the complaint are proved by the testimony of the municipal vice-president, Antonio
Cagigal, who states that the above-mentioned property was dedicate to the use of the Catholic Church
until the year 1901, when the municipality claimed to have a right to the church, convento, and
cemetery, and turned over the administration thereof to Mariano Espiritu, a clergyman who, being a
Catholic priest and having acted as a Catholic parish priest until the year 1902, confirms the same, it
being only since said year that he has refused to obey his superiors in order to continue to administer
the properties in the name of the people, the latter representing the Government.
From the property claimed in the complaint the building lot marked (f), situated within the town, must
be eliminated, as, according to the provisions of Act No. 1376, and several decisions of this court in
similar cases it can not be considered in a suit of this kind, it being without the jurisdiction of this court.
VII.
TOWN OF PAOAY.
There is claimed (a) a church; (b) a convento; (c) a tower with four bells; (d) a courtyard adjoining the
convento; (e) a churchyard attached to the church and walled in; (f) a cemetery in the sitio of Payog; (k)
the altars, images, sacred cups, ornaments, and all other paraphernalia used in the religious exercises, as
found in the complaint; and (g) a building lot adjoining the convento yard verified by the now adverse
parish priest as belonging to the convento.
The present curate Quirino Evangelista, was placed there by Gregorio Aglipay, and, according to his
own statement, owed obedience to the Pope until 1902. He affirms that the description contained in the
complaint is correct, and like the municipal president, certifies that the property and other things
claimed were used in the exercise of the Catholic religion.
The property marked in the complaint under the letters (h), (i), and (j) are eliminated as being without
the original jurisdiction of this court, they being parcels of land or building lots, and described as such
in the complaint but not being described as adjuncts to said buildings even though they may belong to
the church of Paoay.
VIII.
PASUQUIN.
(a) A church; (b) a churchyard; (c) a new convento; (d) a parish house adjoining the convento; (e) a
cemetery; (f) a tower with six bells; (i) ornaments, utensils, fittings for public worship.
Notwithstanding the fact that the municipal president only certifies as to the existence of the cemetery,
the description of which, according to the adverse curate Esteban Paz is correct, the witnesses Pablo
Aguinaldo, Tomas Ibalio, and Fruto Aguinaldo testify to the existence of the convento and church, to
which they are accessions.
It only remains for us to eliminate from the property claimed those parcels marked (g) and (h), for the
reasons already set forth.
The above-mentioned curate proves by means of documents that he was appointed by an American
Army officer.
IX.
SAN MIGUEL DE SARRATT.
(a) A church; (b) a convento; (c) the present cemetery; (d) another cemetery in Pacni; (e) a tower with
its bells; (f) one plot of land, a portion of which is occupied by the church, churchyard, and convento;
and (h) the altars, images, sacred cups, the existence of which is acknowledged and partly rectified by
the present adverse curate. The ownership and use are well proven.
For the reasons already set forth, the garden indicated by the letter (g) is eliminated.
X.
PIDDIG.
(a) A church; (b) a convento; (c) a cemetery; (d) a tower; (g) articles used in the services in the church,
the existence of which has been verified by the adverse parochial priest.
That the above mentioned property belongs to the plaintiff church, and that it is used for the purposes
of public worship, is proven.
The parcels of land marked (e) and (f) are eliminated.
All that is claimed by the municipal president and by the adverse curate is that the aforesaid buildings
belong to the Government, and that the former curates administered them because they received a
salary from the Government.
XI.
DINGRAS.
The properties marked (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), and (o) are eliminated from the complaint
for the reason already stated, that they are without the original jurisdiction of this court.
The properties marked (a), the church of Dingras; (b), the churchyard; (c), a convento; (d), a tower; (e),
a cemetery in the sitio called Campo Santo and all of those designated under the letter (p) in the
complaint, belong to the Roman Catholic Church by reason of the purposes to which they devoted.
The municipal vice-president, Doroteo Vives, testifies to the effect that the parish house of Dingras is
occupied by the municipality and the parish priest, Pedro Noriega; that the municipality does not claim
to have a right to the church; that, although the parish house is not inventoried as the property of the
municipality, it is, however, occupied by it as being the property of the Insular Government.
SOLSONA.
The town of Solsona is annexed to the municipality of Dingras, and as property therein pertaining to
the plaintiff church, there is claimed (a) the foundations for a church; (b), a convento; (c), a cemetery;
(d), a tower.
The dominium thereof is well proven, and even so by the declaration of the present curate, Clemente
Edralin, who belongs to the adverse communion.
For the reasons so often repeated, the field marked (e) is eliminated from the complaint.
XII.
BACARRA.
(a) A church; (b) a churchyard; (c) a convento; (d) a cemetery in the sitio of Dayas; (e) a tower; the
property described in letter (d); (g) an old cemetery adjoining the church. It appears that the whole of
said property belonged to the plaintiff church before the unlawful retention thereof by the municipality
and the Philippine church.
The municipal president, Antonio Alvano, testifies as to the antiquity of the church and convento whose
existence dates back eighty years, the cemetery being sixty years old. He says that the municipality
considers the cemetery as its own and administers it in consequence.
The curate of the adverse communion is Servando Castro and he gives almost the same testimony.
VINTAR.
Annexed to Bacarra is now the old civil town of Vintar in which there is a church and a convento,
administered at the present time by the curate Platon Villanueva, and a cemetery administered by the
municipality of Bacarra.
But in addition to the above, there is claimed (d) a stone tower; (f) a parcel of land called the old
cemetery, and the property described in letter (g).
XIII.
LAOAG.
The following are claimed: (a) A church; (b) a churchyard; (c) a stone tower; (d) a parish house; (c) a
cemetery in Cacatudayan; (f) a building lot which was formerly a cemetery; and (g) all the property
described and carefully detailed.
The dominium of the whole of the above properties is fully proven as well as the fact that the plaintiff
church has always been in possession of the same until the recent unlawfully retention thereof by the
priests of the Philippine church; the municipality, according to its president, Esteban Castro, claiming
no right whatever beyond the collection of rent for the cemetery.
The fact that the registration of the church of this town was denied in the registry of property, is offered
as evidence, as well as the so often denied circular of January 10, 1903, on the strength of which certain
individuals of the dissenting church took possession thereof.
XIV.
BATAC AND BANNA.
In the municipality of Batac there is claimed the church with all its dependencies, the convento, tower,
and cemetery described under the letters (a), (b), (c), and (d), and in the town of Banna, annexed to the
former municipality, a plot of land whereon exists a provisional church, a convento built of wood and
bamboo, and an old cemetery [letters (a), (b), and (c)].
The complaint appears as fully proven.
With regard to the church of Banna, although according to its curate, Juan Cadiz, it was built in 1902, it
appears, however, that it is erected on the old site of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church.
The property which appears as belonging to the parish of Banna marked (d), (e), (f), and (g), is
eliminated from the complaint for the reasons already stated.
XV.
BANGUI AND NAGPARTIAN.
In the municipality of Bangui, the church with all its dependencies as detailed, churchyard, parish
house, and cemetery are claimed [letters (a), (b), (c), (d), and (g)].
And in that of Nagpartian the church with all articles used in public worship, the parish house,
cemetery, and tower [letters (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e)].
The religious use thereof in the exercise of the Catholic religion as was practiced prior to the unlawful
retention by the municipality of Bangui and the curates Sinforoso Bonoan of Bangui, and Juan
Figuracion of Nagpartian, was fully proven.
The property marked with the letters (e) and (f) in Bangui, and in Nagpartian, the tower, letter (d),
which, according to the said curate, has fallen down, should be eliminated from the complaint; the land
occupied by the same should, however, be respected.
The defense offered by the defendants may be synthesized as follows: That the properties claimed as
parochial, consisting of churches, conventos, and cemeteries, were constructions set apart for such use
by the Spanish Government; that the construction thereof, and later the repair and rebuilding of the
same, was carried out by virtue of the tax called the prestacion personal of the residents of every town
and at the expense of the Government; that at the time the parish priests were public functionaries of
rank, and received compensation under the said estimates; that they were but administrators of said
property; and the Spanish Government, who constructed it, preserved and kept it under its inspection
and patronage, being the owner thereof.
The plaintiff church had simply the mere precarious possession in fact under the name of ecclesiastical
administration subordinated to the royal vice-patronage exercised by the general government of these
Islands; and upon the disappearance of said government such ecclesiastical administration was
abandoned, and the same was substituted by that which the people, who seized the property, saw fit to
establish or administer on the assumption that it was property transmitted by the Crown of Spain to the
Government of the United States, and by the latter to the municipalities of these Islands. And a circular
issued by the Government of these Islands for the mere purpose of inspiring mutual respect for the
present possession is even cited as an order for the municipalities and dissenting priests and curates to
enter the parishes by their own right.
In a case similar to this one, also of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church vs. The Municipalities of
Tarlac and Victoria (9 Phil. Rep., 450), this court said: "It will thus be seen that upon this branch of the
case the only question presented either by the answer or by the brief is the question as to whether the
property in controversy is or is not owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands, and the brief is
devoted principally to an argument of this question, a question which has been discussed and decided
adversely to the claim of the defendants in the cases of Barlin vs. Ramirez (7 Phil. Rep., 41), Roman
Catholic Church vs. Santos (7 Phil. Rep., 66), and the City of Manila vs. The Roman Catholic Church
(8 Phil. Rep., 763).
It was there held that the King of Spain was not the owner of the property involved in those
cases, and that the title thereto did not, therefore, pass by the treaty of Paris to the Government
of the United States. It was further held that the municipalities were not the owners of such
property and had no right or interest therein. Applying the principle of those cases to this case,
the result is that the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment for possession as prayed for in the
complaint.
The abandoned conditioned in which the parishes may have found themselves through the revolution
and the war is no reason for changing the condition of things, not for considering that the juridical
possession has been lost by some and acquired by others by their own will, without a legislative or
judicial act, without a law, judgment, or decree authorizing such changes of rights which, whatever
they may have been, stood for centuries and constituted institutions which do not disappear except by
their abrogation or material of formal extinction.
One of the witnesses of the defendants, Policarpio Soriano, the "present provincial fiscal of the
province," when on the stand, on being asked by Delgado —
Who had the contract or government, possession, and administration of the property in question,
churches, or temples, conventos, and cemeteries? Was it the juridical entity, the Roman Catholic
Church, whose head is the Pope in Rome, or the Spanish Government by means of its
employees or public functionaries called bishops, parish curates, appointed by the same
Government?" answered, "The Roman Catholic Church by means of its priests who were
renumerated in accordance with the laws then in force.
Another witness for the plaintiffs, Candido Espiritu, cross-examined by the defense:
And did they issue the commission or appointment for said priests? — answered, "I do not
know, but as the church has authority to create offices for its administration and make rules for
the exercise thereof, and organize the course to be followed in ecclesiastical matters, I believe
that, without the acquiescence or consent of the bishops, they could not be detailed to perform
the duties of parish priests.
Q. Is it not true that the Spanish Government in its estimates of disbursements of the
Insular Government annually included sums for the renumeration of said priests? — A.
Yes, sir; in compliance with the agreements entered into between the Spanish
Government and the Pope.
In connection with the pretended change of ecclesiastical administration, the record does not disclose
any further reasons than those given by the witness Gregorio Aglipay who stated that he was "47 years
of age, Obispo Maximo of the Philippine Independent Church."
Q. Until the year 1898 what religious body celebrated its rites in the various churches of
the Province of Ilocos Norte? — A. The religion of the state.
Q. Do you designated the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion as the religion of the state?
— A. I do not know, sir. The religion that was observed here in the Philippines prior to
the year 1898, the religion of the state, and if said religion of the state was the Roman
Church, then I agree to that.
Q. You were a priest of the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion, were you not? — A.
Prior to the year 1898; yes, sir.
 Q. What right has the Philippine Independent Church to the buildings and parish houses
of the several towns of Ilocos Norte? — A. By virtue of the priesthood of these
individuals, by virtue of the American Government, and of the rights of the Filipino
people.
Q. Yourself, personally, or as Obispo Maximo of the Philippine Independent Church,
what title have you to the above-mentioned buildings or to the administration of the
same? — A. As to title, I have none; but I do have the right to the administration by
virtue of the right of the people and of the Government constituted in these Islands.
Q. Have both the people and the Government granted you the right of administration? —
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How, when, and where? — A. Since the Spanish Government with its adored church
disappeared, the Filipino people stood by itself until the liberal and generous assistance
of the Americans came.
Q. Could you not point out to us the act whereby you were granted said administration?
— A. As the people of the Philippines is composed of priests and those who are not
priests, it was natural that they should make use of this priestly virtue which they
received in their ordination to satisfy the necessities of their countrymen. This ordination
is due to one of the sacraments instituted by Jesus Christ, and we do not indebted for it
to anyone else but Jesus Christ, and we may use it whenever we obey the will, that is,
the teachings and doctrines of Jesus Christ, without depending on anyone, all the more if
said "anyone" had gone to the bottom of the ocean by virtue of the power of the
American guns.
Q. Then, father, you still pretend to have the right to administer the said property by
virtue of your ordination as priest of the Roman Catholic Church, in part at least? — A.
The sacrament of the ordination does not pertain to the Roman Church, because the
same was not instituted by it but Jesus Christ can hardly be attributed now to the Roman
Church. As to pretensions, I have no other than the claim of the American Government,
and of the Filipino people.
The argument deduced from the refusal of the registrar of Ilocos Norte during the Spanish regime, to
register the church of the town of Laoag as the property of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church is
peculiar to this case; upon this fact the defendants base their contention that the parochial churches, as
things of public domain, were the property of the Spanish Government. The refusal of the registrar was
based on article 25 of the regulation for the enforcement of the Mortgage Law of the colonial
provinces.
Knowing the history of the legislation, one can at once understand the lack of reasoning in the
argument. Said article 25, as well as articles 24 and 26 of said regulation, are taken from the royal
decree of the 11th of November, 1864.
In the former regulation for Cuba and Porto Rico article 54 thereof is article 14 of the said royal decree,
the tenor of which is the following: "Real estate or real right possessed or administered by the State or
civil or ecclesiastical corporations and which should be alienated in accordance with the laws of
desamortization shall not be recorded in the registries of property except in the case of the sale or
redemption thereof in favor of private persons, even though in the meantime the ownership of the same
be transferred to the Government in consequence of the exchanges agreed to with the Holy See."
It is an historical fact that the laws permitting the sale of previously unalienable property were not
made applicable to the Philippines in things ecclesiastical. And, the said article 25 being a general legal
provision for the colonial provinces, it can only be made applicable to those two where said laws were
enforced and made applicable also to things ecclesiastical.
Certain writers have with good reason said that: "If the property that the Government possesses or
ought to possess by virtue of the leyes desamortizadoras, were not recorded in favor of the corporations
from which they came, and if the corporations should later essay to register their old title deeds, under
he general principles of law, we find no reason to prevent such registry even though registration be
afterwards denied to the documents of title which, by virtue of the property being registered in their
favor, might be executed by such corporations to the prejudice of the rights which the leyes
desamortizadoras have conferred upon the Government."
In the case cited above against the municipalities of Tarlac and Victoria, the argument against the
unconstitutionality of the act of the Commission regulating such controversies has already been
explained; therefore, the doctrine established therein should be considered as reproduced in this case.
For all of the foregoing reasons we find that we should hold, and we do hereby hold, that the
possession and administration of all the property recognized in the foregoing conclusions as properly
claimed by the plaintiff church, appertain to the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, with the exclusion
of such items as have been expressly eliminated therefrom.
Thus, with regard to the property demanded in the town of Badoc:
We hereby order and direct that immediate restitution be made to the plaintiff church, or to its
representative in the diocese of Nueva Segovia, of the following property as specified in the complaint:
(a) One church; (b) one churchyard adjoining the church; (c) one parochial house and its dependencies;
(d) the walls of a demolished building called the convento; (e) an old cemetery; (g) one parcel of land
used as a cemetery in the sitio of Parabong; and (h) all the church belonging described in this paragraph
of the complaint.
Let a writ of possession be issued by this court in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 190
against the defendants who hold in their possession and administer said property at the present day,
Gregorio Aglipay, Mariano Espiritu, and the municipality in Badoc:
As to the property situated in Paoay:
We order and direct that immediate restitution be made to the plaintiff, or to its representative as
previously stated, of the following property as detailed in the complaint: (a) One church; (b) one
convento; (c) one tower with four bells; (d) a convento yard; (e) a churchyard; (f) a cemetery in the sitio
of Payong; (k) the altars and other fitting described in this paragraph of the complaint; and (g) a
building lot adjoining the convento yard, acknowledged by the present curate as pertaining to the
convento.
Let an identical writ of possession be issued against Gregorio Aglipay, Quirino Evangelista, and the
municipality of Paoay.
As to the town of Pasuquin:
We order and direct that immediate restitution be made to the plaintiff church, or to its representative,
of the following property so described in the complaint: (a) One church; (b) a churchyard; (c) a new
convento; (d) an adjoining parochial house; (e) one cemetery; (f) a tower with six bells; (i) the articles
included in this paragraph of the complaint.
Let the corresponding writ of possession be issued against the persons detaining them, Gregorio
Aglipay, Esteban Paz, and the municipality of Pasuquin.
As to San Miguel de Sarratt:
We order and direct that restitution be made to the plaintiff church, or to its representative as aforesaid,
of the property specified in the complaint: (a) One church; (b) one convento: (c) the present cemetery;
(d) another cemetery in Pacni; (e) one tower; (f) a parcel of land partly occupied by the church,
churchyard, and convento; and (g) the property described in this paragraph of the complaint.
Let a proper writ of possession be issued against Gregorio Aglipay, Servando Castro, and the
municipality of San Miguel de Sarratt.
As to Piddig:
We order and direct that immediate restitution be made to the plaintiff church, or to its said
representative, of the following property detailed in the complaint: (a) One church; (b) one convento;
(c) one cemetery; (d) one tower; and (g) the property comprised under this letter as rectified by the
present curate.
Let a writ of possession be also issued against Gregorio Aglipay, Jose Castro, and the municipality of
Piddig.
As to Dingras:
We order and direct that immediate restitution be made to the plaintiff church as aforesaid of the
property detailed in the complaint: (a) One church; (b) a churchyard; (c) one convento; (d) one tower;
(e) one cemetery; and (p) the property stated under this letter.
Let a proper writ of possession be issued against Gregorio Aglipay, Pedro Noriega, and the
municipality of Dingras.
As to Solsona:
We order and direct that immediate restitution be made to the plaintiff church of the following
property: (a) The stone foundations and the land belonging to the church; (b) one convento; (c) one
cemetery; (d) one tower.
Let writ of possession be issued against Gregorio Aglipay, Clemente Edralin, and the municipality of
Dingras.
As to Bacarra:
We order and direct that immediate restitution be made to the plaintiff church of the property detailed
in the complaint: (a) One church; (b) a churchyard; (c) one convento; (d) one cemetery in Dayas; (e)
one tower; (f) the personal property stated in this paragraph; and (g) an old cemetery adjoining the
church.
As to the annexed town of Vintar:
We order and direct that immediate restitution be made to the plaintiff church of: (a) One church; (b) a
churchyard; (c) one convento; (d) one tower; (e) one cemetery; (f) another cemetery, an old one; and (g)
the property described in this paragraph.
Let writ of possession be issued for the property claimed in said two towns of Bacarra and Vintar,
against Gregorio Aglipay, Servando Castro, Platon Villanueva, and the municipality of Bacarra.
As to Laoag:
We order and direct that immediate restitution be made to the plaintiff church of the property detailed
in the complaint: (a) One church; (b) a churchyard; (c) a stone tower; (d) a parochial house; (e) one
cemetery; (f) a building lot, formerly a cemetery; and (g) the property described in this paragraph under
the headings of "silver and gold jewelry," "silver jewelry," and "copper jewelry."
Let writ of possession be issued against Gregorio Aglipay, Salvador Gallano, and the municipality of
Laoag.
As to Batac:
We order and direct that immediate restitution be made to the plaintiff church of the following property
as set forth in the complaint: (a) One church; (b) a convento; (c) one tower; (d) one cemetery, and all
the personal property described under this letter.
Let writ of possession be issued against Gregorio Aglipay, Lucas Albano, and the municipality of
Batac.
As to the annexed town of Banna:
We order and direct that immediate restitution be made to the plaintiff church of the following
property: (a) The building lot, the temporary church erected on said separate lot; (b) one convento; (c)
one cemetery;
Let writ of possession be issued against Gregorio Aglipay, Lucas Albano, Juan Cadiz, and the
municipality of Batac.
As to Bangui:
We order and direct that immediate restitution be made to the plaintiff church of (a) One church; (b) a
churchyard; (c) a parochial house; (d) one cemetery; and (g) the property described under this letter.
As to the annexed pueblo of Nagpartian:
We order and direct that immediate restitution be made to the plaintiff church of (a) one church; (b) a
parochial house; (c) one cemetery; (d) the lot which was occupied by the tower; (e) the property
described under this letter.
Let writ of possession be issued against Gregorio Aglipay, Sinforoso Bonoan, Juan Figuracion, and the
municipality of Bangui.
The defendants in each of the above-mentioned pueblos and municipalities are hereby sentenced to pay
the costs. So ordered.
Torres, Mapa, and Willard, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring in the result:
In line with what was said in the concurring opinion in the case of the Roman Catholic Church vs.
Certain Municipalities of Ilocos Sur,1 I agree with the disposing part of the majority opinion, except in
so far as it appears to deny the present occupants the privileges touching improvements secured to
possessors in good faith under the provisions of the Civil Code.

Footnotes
CARSON, J., concurring in the result:
1 Page 1, supra.