The Political Economy of Segregation: The Case of Segregated Streetcars

THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
VOLUME XLVI DECEMBER 1986 NUMBER 4
The Political Economy of Segregation:

The Case of Segregated Streetcars
JENNIFER ROBACK
The introduction of segregation laws for municipal streetcars is examined. The

economics of private and public segregation is analyzed first, taking note of the
particular features of the streetcar industry, followed by a discussion of the
contemporary debates on streetcar segregation laws in a number of southern
cities. The evidence presented suggests that segregation laws were binding
constraints and not simply the codification of customary practice. Furthermore,
the streetcar companies were not the initiators of segregation and sometimes
actively resisted it. These findings are related to several major interpretations of
the origins of segregation.
In The Strange Career of Jim Crow, C. Vann Woodward set forth a

thesis that racial segregation did not emerge immediately after
Reconstruction. Rather, the rigid system of segregation arose in the
South in the 1890s, due to a changing set of political circumstances. The
Woodward thesis focuses on changes in political conditions rather than
on a fundamentally changed attitude between the races.'
Woodward and his students have explored the political developments
leading to disenfranchisement and legal segregation for many of the
southern states. In this research one often encounters the notion that
"laws are not an adequate index of the extent and prevalence of
segregation and discriminatory practices in the South. The practices
often anticipated and sometimes exceeded the laws."'2 But did the
practices actually anticipate the laws? I address this question using
racial segregation on municipal streetcars as an example. Did the
segregation ordinances simply codify existing social practices or were
Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLVI, No. 4 (Dec. 1986). ? The Economic History
Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507.
The author is Assistant Professor of Economics and Research Associate, Center for Study of
Public Choice, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia 22030. A version of this paper was
presented at the Social Science History Association Meetings in Chicago, November 22-24, 1985.
I am grateful to the participants in that session and to the members of the Public Choice Center and
the Austrian Economics Colloquium. The editor and referees of this JOURNAL also provided helpful
suggestions. Cheryl Hader provided research assistance.
1 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (Oxford, 1959).
2 Ibid., p. 87.
893
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894 Roback
the ordinances binding constraints on the behavior of the streetcar

companies and their patrons?
By examining contemporary newspaper accounts inferences about
the impact of segregation laws can be drawn. The contemporary record
also contains a wealth of information about the attitudes of streetcar
companies and their patrons toward segregation. Using this material, I
explore Woodward's contention that political factors were more impor-
tant than changed attitudes in the development of the Jim Crow system.
Several more recent interpretations can be evaluated with this mate-
rial as well. Howard Rabinowitz argues that segregation usually re-
placed black exclusion rather than integration.3 John W. Cell suggests
that segregation was initiated by elites, who were race moderates, as a
means of preempting more drastic measures.4
My evidence suggests that segregation laws did not simply codify an
already existing, well-established social custom. On the contrary,
contemporary reports indicate that whites and blacks customarily sat
where they chose on municipal streetcars in the absence of segregation
ordinances. Second, the streetcar companies frequently resisted segre-
gation, both as custom and law. The reason they most often gave was
that separate cars and sections would be too expensive. In addition,
there is little indication that pressure for segregation came from the
average white passenger.
Thus, the evidence supports Woodward's notion that changes in
attitudes were not the decisive factor in instituting segregation. On the
other hand, the evidence refutes Woodward's speculation that customs
anticipated the law. Rabinowitz's generalization that segregation re-
placed exclusion rather than integration does not hold for streetcar
segregation in the cities discussed here. Finally, my account offers
limited support for Cell's interpretation that the observed segregation
patterns were relatively moderate expressions of white supremacy.
THE ECONOMICS OF SEGREGATION ON MUNICIPAL STREETCARS
Streetcar segregation may take place in the absence of specific

legislation. A streetcar company could establish and enforce a policy of
separating the races on its cars. Alternatively, individual passengers
could segregate by their choice of seats. That is, whites could simply sit
down next to other whites and blacks next to other blacks, even if not
required to do so by company policy or law. What conditions favor
these forms of private segregation and, by contrast, what conditions
favor public or legal segregation?
I Howard N. Rabinowitz, Race Relations in the Urban South, 1865-1890 (Urbana, 1980).
4John W. Cell, The Highest Stage of White Supremacy (Cambridge, Mass., 1982).
Segregated Streetcars 895
To answer these questions, I draw on Gary Becker's economic theory

of discrimination.5 Becker defines "tastes for discrimination" as a
willingness to pay to avoid contact with the other race.6 By this
definition discrimination is costly. In a competitive economic environ-
ment discrimination should eventually disappear as those who indulge
in it are systematically outperformed by their nondiscriminating com-
petitors. More precisely, individuals with the least intense preferences
for discrimination have a comparative advantage in the ownership of
capital and the employment of labor. If workers or consumers prefer
discrimination, segregation rather than price differences will result from
the competitive process because a mixed labor force will be more costly
than a segregated one.
Becker's approach illuminates the issue of streetcar segregation
because the preferences of several different groups affect the ultimate
policy choice. First, white consumers who have a taste for discrimina-
tion should be willing to pay a higher price to ride in a car which either
excludes blacks or confines them to separate sections. Secondly, black
customers who have the opposite preference should be willing to pay
more for their transportation if permitted to sit anywhere in the car.
Finally, the white owners of capital (owners of streetcar companies)
who have a taste for discrimination should be willing to sacrifice profits
to segregate their cars or to exclude blacks completely.
Thus, the management of streetcar companies must balance compet-
ing concerns in deciding whether to adopt a policy of separating the
races. First, the direct costs include the costs of partitions and signs, as
well as the cost of the conductor's time and effort spent in assigning
seats. These enforcement difficulties are not necessarily trivial as the
following incident reported in the Richmond News-Leader suggests:
Henry Austin, janitor of the Federal Building, has reason to believe that the color line
is a bit irregular in the streetcars. Henry is partly of African descent-only partly. When
he showed his fair face in a car yesterday, the conductor cast a gleaming eye upon him
and said: "Move up!"
Henry knows his place and sat down in the rear.
"Git up," said the conductor, "and sit in front. It's the law."
Henry fidgeted, but finally moved up among the white folks with an apologetic shuffle.
Some of Henry's white friends made room for him and gave him a refuge from the
law. There were cacklings all along the line, but the conductor did not know that Henry
belonged in the rear seat. . ..
'Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (2nd edn., Chicago, 1973).

6 Some scholars have argued that white southerners had tastes for subordination of blacks rather
than tastes for physical distance from blacks. See, for example, Donald Dewey, "Negro
Employment in Southern Industry," Journal of Political Economy, 60 (Aug. 1952), pp. 279-93. For
a more recent discussion of the relative importance of tastes, see Jennifer Roback, "The Political
Economy of Discrimination," Working Papers in Public Choice, 85-33 (Fairfax, Aug. 1985).
7Richmond News-Leader, April 25, 1904. For additional examples of enforcement problems, see
the case studies in text for Augusta, Georgia and Mobile, Alabama.
896 Roback
In addition, black patrons may take offense at such a policy and use
the cars less frequently or even boycott them, also costly to the firm in
terms of foregone revenue.8 On the other side of the ledger, white
customers might be pleased by a policy of race separation. They might
be willing to ride more frequently, or at the margin, they might be willing
to pay a higher price to ride on a segregated car.
In economic terms, rules governing seating arrangements on street-
cars have several associated externalities. White passengers get nega-
tive externalities from an unsegregated car, if they find black riding
companions objectionable. On the other hand, a policy of segregation
imposes utility losses on black passengers. Segregation is profit maxi-
mizing if the revenue gained from white passengers outweighs the lost
revenue from black passengers and the direct costs of providing
segregation.
Profit maximization is Pareto efficient using the hypothetical compen-
sation principle. Applied to streetcar seating, it means that those who
dislike the rule could potentially be compensated by the additional
revenues generated by those who favor the rule.9 The hypothetical
compensation criterion is much weaker than an actual compensation
criterion, since black passengers do not literally receive compensation
for their utility losses from a segregated car, nor do white passengers for
unsegregated cars. Subject to this caveat, however, streetcar companies
have an incentive to choose an efficient rule because each externality
directly influences revenues. In effect, companies internalize the exter-
nalities.
There is considerable inferential evidence that streetcar operators
were aware of their role of internalizing the externalities involved in
segregation. In fact, most companies segregated streetcars, but along
different lines. Companies in most cities segregated smokers from
nonsmokers, usually by allowing smoking only in the last few rows or
sometimes, on outdoor platforms.10
Smoking segregation is quite similar to racial segregation in that
similar externalities must be balanced. Nonsmokers might prefer to ride
in a segregated car, while smokers might be offended by being confined
to a limited number of seats. The car companies evidently judged that
losses to smokers would be outweighed by gains to nonsmokers and
hence, that segregation on this criterion would produce a net profit. In
fact, one of the most common objections to segregation by race was that
8 The case studies below give numerous instances of black boycotts of the streetcars. See also,
August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, "The Boycott Movement Against Jim Crow Streetcars in the
South, 1900-1906," Journal of American History, 55 (Mar. 1969), pp. 756-75.
9 Charles K. Rowley and Alan T. Peacock, Welfare Economics: A Liberal Restatement (London,
1975), chap. 3.
'0Augusta Chronicle, May 21, 1900; Houston Daily Post, Nov. 2, 1903; and Atlanta Journal,
Sep. 13, 1906.
it made it difficult or impossible to segregate smokers from nonsmok-

ers. 11
In addition, segregation by social class or status frequently took place
privately, that is, as a matter neither of law nor of company policy. Jim
Crow policy interfered with this form of segregation, which people
evidently valued. For example, in Augusta, Georgia, the following
incident took place after the introduction of race separation on street-
cars. The rule was that white passengers must be seated from the front
toward the rear, while black passengers must be seated from the rear
forward.
Two ladies desired to board a car. There were three passengers on the front seat. They
were women of an objectionable character. The two ladies did not care to be crowded
into the same seat with them when the rest of the car was empty. They tried to sit in the
second seat, but the conductor insisted upon their taking the two vacant places on the
front seat. They simply refused to do it.12
These women objected so strongly to their proposed riding companions

that they left the car, and the company lost their revenue.
Segregation will occur privately when the demand for segregation is
large enough to offset the costs and inconvenience of separation, but
segregation may be provided publicly through local ordinance or
statewide statute using a different set of cost-benefit considerations.
Consider the suppliers and demanders of a public segregation ordi-
nance. The suppliers are the local politicians, members of the city
council, mayors, and possibly state legislators. The cost of providing a
segregation ordinance is the opportunity cost of performing some other
legislative or administrative function. An additional cost is the loss of
black votes, but recall that blacks were disenfranchised throughout
most of the South during the period. '3

The suppliers of a segregation ordinance are paid in the currency of
(white) votes. The cost of casting a vote in favor of a prosegregation
candidate is quite minimal in comparison with the cost of boycotting
streetcars or even of paying a slightly higher fare for each ride. Thus,
voters with even a very small demand for segregation, that is, those
willing to pay only a small private price to ride in a segregated car, might
be willing to vote in favor of a segregation law. Through this process, a
segregation ordinance could be passed, even though the policy would
not be initiated privately. This result will occur in a pure majority rule
system if the median voter's preference for segregation exceeds the cost
of casting a vote in favor of segregation. When blacks are disenfran-
II Augusta Chronicle, May 22, 1900; Memphis Commercial Appeal, Apr. 26, 1903; and Atlanta
Journal, Sep. 13, 1906.
12 Augusta Chronicle, May 24, 1900.
3 J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Estab-
lishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910 (New Haven, 1974).
898 Roback
chised, as they were at the turn of the century, the median preference
for segregation rises, and segregation ordinances are more likely to
pass.
Legislation and company policy can be thought of as alternative
means of providing the public good (or public bad) of segregation. Both
legislators and streetcar owners can be cast as respondents to public
demands for separation rather than as initiators of policy. The analysis
presented here suggests that consumers face a smaller cost of express-
ing their demand for segregation in the political arena than in the private
market. Therefore, for any given level of consumer demand, separation
restrictions are more likely to be the result of ordinance than of
company policy. Alternatively, a lower level of preference for segrega-
tion is needed to institute a segregation law than to sustain a profitable
segregation policy for a private streetcar firm.
The considerations outlined hold for private goods generally. The
structure of the streetcar industry raises additional issues. First, street-
cars share many properties of natural monopoly, because the fixed costs
are high and average costs are declining over much of the relevant
range. The marginal cost of providing additional rides is zero until the
car is full. These aspects of the cost structure suggest that competition
among streetcar lines is unlikely. (But the cases presented below
provide several exceptions to the case of natural monopoly.) In addi-
tion, the monopoly power of the streetcar company is mitigated by the
existence of alternative means of urban transportation, such as hack
lines and private vehicles.
Most streetcar companies were subject to local regulation, and while
the exact nature of the regulation is not completely clear from the
record, a few generalizations can be drawn.14 Routes were regulated
and companies needed permission to lay down track on city streets. The
companies were taxed, although the basis for taxation is unclear. Fares
may have been regulated, but again, the basis is obscure.
Details of the industry's operation modify the cost-benefit analysis of
private and public segregation. First, because streetcars were already
regulated, the marginal cost of introducing an additional regulation
governing the seating of passengers would be less costly than establish-
ing a principle of regulation. If fares were regulated, streetcar compa-
nies might be unable to increase fares even if some passengers were
willing to pay a higher fare for a particular seating rule. Regulated fares
could make a company policy of segregation unprofitable. Companies
could lobby for a rate increase as an alternative to lobbying against a
segregation ordinance.
14 The following discussion is based upon inferences drawn from newspaper accounts. Corre-
spondence with municipal authorities revealed that few systematic records of streetcar operations
remain.
The following case studies examine the origins of municipal streetcar

segregation initiated by law, rather than company policy. Frequent
complaints by the companies suggest that they believed separation
requirements would be costly to them in terms of foregone profits.
Moreover, companies did not argue for fare increases, but rather for
changes in the segregation ordinances. The cases span the geographic
range of the South and include Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Tennessee,
and Texas. The patterns described are not isolated incidents, nor are
they unique to a particular region of the South.
Georgia
A state law requiring separation of the races on all railroads operating

within the state of Georgia was passed in October 1891. Thus, this law
was passed prior to Plessey v. Ferguson (1896) which gave constitu-
tional sanction to the concept of separate but equal.15 The law clearly
applied to municipal streetcars lines as well as interurban railroads.
In Augusta, Georgia, the law was customarily ignored by the Augusta
Railway and Electric Company through at least 1898, as the following
response by the company's president to an inquiry by the Chairman of
the Police Commission of the Village of Summerville shows:
I take pleasure in ackowledging [your letter] . . . in which you call my attention to the
law requiring street railway companies to furnish separate transportation for white
people and negroes. In reply, I will state that I know of no such law on the statute books,
and will thank you to point the same out to me. There is a law on the statute books which
permits us to seat passengers, either white or colored, and that is the only law that I
have any knowledge of.'6
This letter illustrates two points. First, the Augusta Railway and
Electric Company had a definite policy of not separating the races on
their streetcars. Second, and perhaps more important, the company
believed that it had the legal right to separate the races if it chose to.
Thus, their failure to require segregation on their streetcar lines most
likely reflected business judgment about the tradeoffs between the
added expense and the possibility of antagonizing their customers of
either race.
What accounts for the Village of Summerville's sudden interest in
enforcing the law? Camp Dyer, the local military installation, had
15 Parts 526 and 527 of the Georgia criminal code, quoted in the Augusta Chronicle, May 15,
1900. The relevant passages of the law are as follows: Part 526: Railroads doing business in this
state shall furnish equal accommodations in separate cars or compartments for white and colored
passengers.... Part 527: Conductors or other employees in charge of such cars shall assign
passengers to their respective cars or compartments of cars, and conductors of dummy, electric
and streetcars shall assign all passengers to seats on the cars under their charge, so as to separate
the white and colored races as much as practicable and conductors of dummy, electric or streetcars
shall have police powers to carry out the provisions of this and the preceding section.
16 Cited in the Augusta Chronicle, Aug. 31, 1898.
900 Roback
recently been moved to Murray Hill which was located at the end of the
streetcar line running through Summerville. Because many black sol-
diers were stationed at Camp Dyer, the relocation of the base increased
the number of black passengers on this particular line.17 The officials of
Summerville were not as concerned with segregating the streetcar lines
generally as with segregating the lines which traveled through their own
village. The chairman of the village Police Commission expresses this
localized concern very clearly in his response to the company president:
In view of the fact that you have such heavy travel on the Hill line now it would be no
hardship for you to run separate cars for white and colored, but in any event we shall
expect you to obey the law as to the separation of them. We shall thank you to assign
the whites to the front of the open cars and the negroes to the rear, which request we
are sure you will consider reasonable for obvious reasons.18
The contemporary record indicates that the streetcar company began

to enforce the law in response to this exchange of letters. How
effectively they enforced it and how long they actively enforced it is
unknown. The streetcar segregation issue exploded into Augusta's
public eye in a sensational incident which occurred nearly two years
later.
In May of 1900, William B. Wilson, a young black man, fatally shot
Aleck Whitney, a young white man, on a crowded streetcar. The
descriptions of the shooting indicate that white and black passengers
were crowded together in essentially a random fashion. That is, the
segregation law was again not being enforced. The following is an
account by one E. J. Watson, a white apprentice:
I was on the rear platform, standing up, as the car was considerably crowded. Mr.
Whitney, Mr. Steiner, two other white men and a negro girl occupied the third seat from
the rear of the car. At Greene street a young negro man and a young woman boarded the
car. The woman crowded into the seat occupied by Messrs. Whitney and Steiner. The
negro man scrounged past the two women and attempted to sit down between the one
next to Mr. Whitney and Mr. Steiner. Mr. Whitney told him there was no more room.
The negro sat down anyway, partially in the young man's lap. He indignantly shoved
him up and slapped his face. This was not the negro who did the shooting. The negro
who did the shooting was sitting on the seat just in front of Mr. Whitney.'9
Wilson was arrested and was seized and later lynched by a mob while
being transported to a jail in Atlanta. The incident renewed public
demand for enforcement of the streetcar segregation ordinance. The
record suggests that this incident was the first such violent incident on
Augusta's streetcars in over a quarter of a century.20 Nevertheless, city
17 Ibid., Aug. 31, 1898 and Sept. 13, 1898.

18 Ibid., Aug. 31, 1898.
19 Ibid., May 15, 1900.
20 "The killing of young Whitney and the subsequent lynching of his murderer brings to mind a
council and the town's newspaper editors called for a specific city
ordinance requiring the strict separation of the races on local streetcars.
In addition, the grand jury, which was convened to bring an indict-
ment against Wilson, resolved that the streetcar company was partially
responsible for the tragedy.21 There was even talk of bringing a grand
jury indictment against Col. Dyer, president of the streetcar company,
and against Edward C. Jefferson, the conductor on the car at the time of
the shooting.22
The Augusta Railway and Electric Company had to respond to
demands that black and white passengers be separated. The company's
actions and words indicate a reluctance to enforce segregation on its
cars. The company's attorney, Boykin Wright, drafted a proposal for a
city ordinance, in an attempt to respond to the pressures on the
company. In a letter to the superintendent of the Village of Sum-
merville, Wright explains his company's position.
Every thoughtful man, certainly every deliberative body, called upon to consider this
question will realize the difficulties presented, not only to the Railway company, but to
the traveling public, in reaching a practical solution of the question. Travel is not
uniform. Congestion at times is inevitable. The hauling of empty cars is expensive....
To haul regularly two cars over the broad expanse of sparsely settled territory covered
by the line of this Railway company in Augusta would be to nearly double the cost of
transportation, and would be impracticable and unreasonable, and so far as we know,
unprecedented. ... A passenger ... would deem it intolerable to be passed simply
because the seats of the car are filled when plenty of standing room remains in the aisle
or between the seats. . . . What shall the Railway company do? When this question is
answered fairly and justly the Railway company will cheerfully respond.23
The statement indicates the company is willing to enforce the

segregation law which they had been ignoring for the last decade.
(However, the ordinance proposed by the company did not include any
penalties for violation, a fact which the Augusta Chronicle editor noted
with some irritation.24) But the company's actions tell a somewhat
different story.
On Sunday, May 20, 1900, the streetcar company began enforcing the
law. The plan was to seat blacks from the rear and whites from the front,
with the first two seats reserved exclusively for whites and the last two
reserved exclusively for blacks. The complaints about the policy poured
in almost immediately. The Chronicle's editor reported the following on
May 22:
similar tragedy in Augusta in August 1873, when Capt. Butler, a gallant confederate soldier was
shot dead by a negro Saturday night upon a Broad streetcar." Quoted in the Augusta Chronicle,
May 16, 1900. I surmise that if a similar violent act on a streetcar had occurred more recently, the
editor would have mentioned the more recent incident instead.
21 Ibid., May 15, 1900.
22 Ibid., May 23, 1900.
23 Ibid., May 20, 1900.
24 Ibid., May 18, 1900.
902 Roback
The only opposition to the law has come from white passengers. The negroes who have
used the cars have very quietly accepted the seats to which they were assigned, but
several of the conductors have met opposition from white passengers of both sexes.
Several white men have insisted on setting [sic] on the back seat to smoke, and one lady
who seated herself on the back seat insisted upon remaining there in spite of the
conductor's explanations and insistence upon her change of seat.
This is bad judgement. The regulation is being enforced by the street railway company
in answer to the demand of the white citizens of Augusta, and in the effort to comply
with the popular wish, the company should have the hearty cooperation and support of
the public.
From these reports alone, it is difficult to tell whether the white

traveling public actually opposed the regulation or whether they were
being obstinate about changing old habits. An additional possibility is
that the railroad company was enforcing the law more strictly than
necessary. Blacks were boycotting streetcars so there were few black
passengers. By strictly enforcing the law the company could ward off
possible charges of neglecting the law. Secondly, public annoyance with
the segregation policy could reverse the demand for a strict separation
ordinance.
The events reported in the following day's paper lend support for the
second interpretation. Conductor Norvell of the Augusta Railway and
Electric Company arrested a white ironworker, M. J. Dicks, for
violation of the segregation ordinance. (State law gave conductors
police power to enforce the law on their trains.) The case came before
the recorder's court and created quite a sensation. Mr. Dicks explained
his actions to the court:
When I got off from work yesterday afternoon I was feeling tough and looking tough. I
had on my overalls, and took the third seat from the rear end of the car, which is among
the ones set aside for white people. I saw some ladies up ahead and did not want to sit
by them looking like I was. The conductor told me to move up or he would put me off.
I said I was not going to get off and did not move up. In a few minutes the ladies got off
and I offered to move up then, but the conductor wouldn't let me and would not let me
get off. I offered him my fare but he wouldn't take it. He told me I was arrested and held
onto me. I was given to two policemen, and one held me while the other searched me.
The conductor reported that when he tried to hold Mr. Dicks under
arrest, that Dicks cursed him "for a d--- fool and said if I did not let him
go he would hit me between the eyes .... I was only trying to carry out
the instructions given me by the company." Besides being physically
threatened in this situation, the conductor came under fire in the court
room. The judge asked him what right he had to arrest passengers.
Conductor Norvell replied, "I don't know. The inspector said we had a
right to. I did not read the law." The judge chided Norvell for not using
more discretion in the enforcement of the law and dismissed the case
against Dicks.25
25 Ibid., May 23 and 24, 1900. The judge dismissed the case on the grounds that the law in
No explicit record of the company's motives in pursuing this policy

exists, but the local press and populace were quite convinced the
railroad was deliberately trying to scuttle the ordinance. In an editorial
entitled, "Wanted, A Little Common Sense," the editor of the Chron-
icle stated:
It was President Grant who said: "The best way to get rid of an obnoxious law is to
enforce it," and that seems to be the policy of the Street Car [sic] company with the
ordinance for separating white and negro passengers. It seems to be the policy of the
company to make the proposed law obnoxious by carrying it out in the most literal and
arbitrary way, without discretion or common sense in its administration.26
A letter writer who signed himself "Citizen of Summerville" was even

more explicit in his attack on the railroad company's motives.
The people are in no humor to be trifled with and the sooner the Augusta and
Summerville railway learn it the better it will be for their future patronage. We are not
prepared to believe it as yet, but it is asserted with a great deal of force by many of our
good citizens that the ridiculous procedure adopted by the street railway company . . .
is done with the motive of disgusting the people with having any rule on the subject at
all. It is said that the street railway people want to let the people see how impossible it
is to carry out regulations on this subject, and that the people will get worn out with the
whole matter and will say to Mr. Railway,"Take off the reins and let the races mingle
as before."
"Citizen of Summerville" ended his letter with a thinly veiled threat of

further regulation of the railroad company:
A public corporation can not afford to ignore the public, nor can it afford to trifle with
the public, because the public mean business, and know what they are entitled to and
they are going to have it.27
The railroad eventually succumbed to pressure and provided segre-

gated cars in a manner that was acceptable to white patrons. The
railroad company did not initiate the segregation policy and was not at
all eager to abide by it. State legislation, public agitation, and a threat to
arrest the president of the railroad were all required to induce them to
separate the races on their cars. These pressures were political, not
economic. That is, there was little or no concern that whites would stop
riding the cars if the railroad failed to comply. In addition, there is no
indication that the management was motivated by belief in civil rights or
racial equality. The evidence indicates their primary motives were
economic; separation was costly.
Thus, managers of the railroad company behaved as predicted by the
Becker model and the analysis above. Officials of the company may or
question was a state law, (the city ordinance was still in the proposal stages) and that he as a
municipal judge had no authority to enforce a state law.
26 Ibid., May 24, 1900.
27 Ibid., May 24, 1900.
904 Roback
may not have disliked blacks, but they were not willing to forego the
profits necessary to indulge such prejudice. Change occurred when the
legal environment made open streetcar seating more costly than segre-
gated seating.
Attempts were also made to enforce the state segregation law on
several streetcar lines in Savannah in 1899. One was the Thunderbolt
line which ran to a resort popular with blacks and to the State College
at Thunderbolt. The editor of the Augusta Chronicle explains the reason
for the interest in enforcing the law on this line.
This action was prompted on account of the fact that Thunderbolt is fast becoming a
negro resort, attracting the worst of the negro element, and the authorities merely
determined to put a stop to the privileges given them on the cars.28
The editor of the black paper in Savannah, The Savannah Tribune,

argued that Jim Crow was not the solution to the problems cited by the
Chronicle.
The observation of the general public is that the tough element of whites that visit
Thunderbolt is as rude and distasteful on the cars as are the blacks, and that it would
have shown a better sense of fairness and justice to promptly arrest and punish all
rowdies disturbing the comfort of respectable passengers by their unruly conduct and
offensive language. 29
The editor also argued that the streetcar companies did not want Jim
Crow rules on their cars. This claim was made with respect to the
Thunderbolt line and the Seaboard Air Line, the other line in Elbert
County:
We have always said that the railroad officials are not anxious to carry into effect the
unjust laws passed by the several states requiring separate cars for the races. To carry
this law into effect causes the roads to go to extra trouble and expense, hence the
nonanxiety to have the same enforced. This week in Elbert county attempt was made to
cause the Seaboard Air Line to furnish separate apartments for the races, while the road
has found it inconvenient to do so.30
With regard to the Thunderbolt line, the editor had this to say:
Everyone is aware of the fact that the Savannah, Thunderbolt and Isle of Good Hope
Road was forced into giving the colored patrons the back seat. It is not the intention of
the company in doing this but was compelled to do so by the authorities at Thunderbolt.
The company is anxious to have the matter amicably settled, and is willing to do
anything possible looking to this end. The present superintendent of the company, Mr.
H. M. Lofton has done much to have the matter ended and hopes to succeed.31
28Ibid., Sept. 13, 1899.

29 The Savannah Tribune, Sept. 16, 1899.
30 Ibid., Sept. 16, 1899. See also the editor's comment on Sept. 23, 1899.
31 Ibid., Oct. 14, 1899.
There was evidently no doubt in this black editor's mind that the two
railroad companies opposed segregation on their lines. By December 9,
the editor reports, "No more jim crow in Savannah. It has been
abolished." Once again, the Georgia state law requiring segregated
streetcars was not enforced by the local railroad companies. Savannah
apparently continued to ignore the state law until 1906, when the
following report appeared:
The Savannah Electric Company of this city is now facing a boycott from the negroes
on account of the putting into effect here yesterday of the law providing for the
separation of the whites and blacks on streetcars. The action on the part of the company
was not voluntary. The city council . . . passed a city ordinance forcing the company to
separate the races on the cars.32
Thus, the pattern of segregation in Savannah is consistent with my

hypotheses. Segregation took place by ordinance, rather than by local
custom or company policy. Moreover, streetcar companies avoided the
law for as long as possible.
The situation in Atlanta is complicated by the fact that the city had
two different streetcar companies in 1906, and the scattered reports
indicate somewhat different responses by each company. As late as
1906, segregation was at best partial in Atlanta, despite the presence of
a municipal ordinance requiring separation. The Atlanta Traction com-
pany had integrated smoking sections in the rear of their cars, and black
passengers could sit where they wished in the middle of the car. In
response to local pressure the company "reformed" the situation and
instituted more thorough segregation in September 1906.33
The Georgia Railway and Electric company also did not segregate
until September 1906. At that time, the president of the company
outlined the difficulties with the various proposals, stressing the costs to
the company while being careful to appear cooperative.
As to having entirely separate cars, I do not believe that any large part of Atlanta's
citizens would expect the company to go to such an expense. We would have to double
the number of cars, and also of employees, and in fact, such a system would practically
double our expenses, with no additional revenue.34
In spite of these hesitations, the Georgia Railway and Electric company

instituted a new plan for separating the races on its cars. Smoking was
prohibited entirely, blacks were seated from the rear and whites from
32 Atlanta Journal, Sept. 14, 1906.

" Charles Crowe, "Racial Violence and Social Reform: Origins of the Atlanta Riot of 1906,"
Journal of Negro History, 53 (July 1968), p. 245. See also the discussion in Joel Williamson, The
Crucible of Race: Blick White Relations in the American South Since Emancipation (New York,
1984), pp. 209-20.
34 Atlanta Journal, Sept. 4, 1906.
906 Roback
the front. In addition, only whites could use the front door of the
streetcars.35
In addition to the streetcar companies, Atlanta was also served by the
Atlanta and Northern Railway company which ran a line between
Atlanta and Marietta. It also evidently ran some lines within the city of
Atlanta. Segregation on the line is mentioned in passing during a city
council meeting devoted primarily to a discussion of whether the
railroad was paying all the taxes it owed the city. At the end of its report
of the meeting, the newspaper account reads: "Action was postponed
on the petition of citizens to force the company to separate the races. '36
Evidently, the Atlanta and Northern was not separating the races on its
lines as late as October 1906.
The Woodward hypothesis is essentially sound for Atlanta also.
Streetcars were not segregated until 1906, some thirty years after the
end of Reconstruction.
Atlanta differs from the other examples because race relations were
poor during the period. The city was torn by a major race riot on
September 23, 1906. In the weeks leading up to the riot, the state
legislature was disenfranchising black voters, the press was attacking
black vagrancy, and the police were raiding black saloons.37 Thus,
sorting out political and economic forces is difficult for Atlanta at this
time. There was indeed public outcry for streetcar segregation, but the
demand was not directed uniquely at streetcars. Moreover, explaining
the public demand requires an understanding of the pressures that led to
the Atlanta race riot, a question that is not likely to be resolved soon.
Events in Atlanta do shed light on Cell's contention that segregation
was actually a relatively moderate expression of white supremacy.38
The demand for segregation included frequent calls for separate cars.
The form of segregation actually instituted was simply a rigidly enforced
separation within cars. The remarks of the railway president indicate
the separate-compartment plan was much more desirable from the
company's point of view than separate cars. These events are consistent
with Cell's interpretation.
Texas
The record for Houston is not as detailed as one would like, but there
is enough information to draw a few inferences with confidence. The
segregation ordinance was effective because prior to its passage, blacks
and whites sat where they wished on streetcars. Also, the ordinance was
35 Ibid., Sept. 13 and 15, 1906.

36 Ibid., Oct. 6, 1906.
3 Crowe, "Racial Violence and Social Reform," p. 234-56. See also, the Atlanta Journal, during
Sept. 1906.
38 Cell, The Highest Stage of White Supremacy.
costly to the Houston Electric railway. Unfortunately, the attitudes of

the company toward segregation can not be inferred with certainty.
The city of Houston passed an ordinance requiring separate compart-
ments for white and black passengers on streetcars in 1903. The
company complied by installing screens separating the cars into two
sections. There was some doubt initially as to whether these screens
strictly satisfied the terms of the law, but evidently the screens were
deemed satisfactory to the framers of the law and the white citizens of
Houston.39
The black citizens of Houston were far from satisfied. They boycotted
streetcars immediately. The boycott was almost entirely peaceful; the
only reports of "violence" were of a gang of small black boys who
threw stones at the streetcars in the early days of the boycott. As far as
can be told from the record, blacks organized no political protests. They
simply used the economic tool of a boycott as a protest.40
Their boycott is almost a textbook example of the competitive
process. Blacks withdrew their patronage from the municipal streetcar
line, and individual blacks organized their own "hack lines" to serve
black customers. The boycott was evidently quite effective, lasting at
least through June 1904, and it proved costly to the Houston Electric
railroad company.
By March 1904, the company was complaining to the city council for
some kind of amendment to the segregation ordinance. In his remarks to
the city council, H. K. Payne, manager of the railroad, "did not disguise
the fact that the present negro boycott was crippling the receipts of the
company.'"4' The company proposed a revision to the ordinance which
would allow them to remove the screens and simply seat whites from the
front and blacks from the rear. The company's contention was that this
would still keep the races separate, but would relieve the company from
the requirement of setting aside seats for blacks which the blacks had
largely refused to use. As Mr. Payne said in his letter to the city council:
Under the requirements of the present ordinance, the company has to haul around a
good deal of empty space that is assigned to the colored people and not available to both
races. We desire, in the event that the colored people do not avail themselves of the
opportunity to ride, that the same can be used for white people.42
The city council not only refused the company's suggestion but they
refused to even formally consider their petition. Payne reported that it
was "the first time in the history of the company, as far as he knew, that
the courtesy of a hearing before a committee was refused and that was
39Houston Daily Post, Nov. 1, 1903.

40Ibid., Nov. 1, 1903.
41 Ibid., Mar. 8, 1904.
42 Ibid., Mar. 8, 1904.
908 Roback
all the petition asked." He attributed this refusal to the "depth of race
prejudice which, for the moment, got the council beyond its usual
conservative course."43 So screens remained in the streetcars.
Three months later, the streetcar company had additional worries.
Their employees went on strike. The black boycott of the cars was still
going on, so black hack lines were still in operation. This lead to the
rather surprising situation of the black traveling public being almost
completely unaffected by the strike while whites were quite inconve-
nienced. The Houston Daily Post gives the following account:
An amusing feature ... was the frequent passing of the crude omnibus lines of the
negroes constantly used by them in their boycott against the street railway company, on
since the beginning of the enforcement of the separate compartment ordinance in
October last. The dusky-hued occupants of these certainly had the laugh on the "po'
white trash" and in some instances the whites were hurrahed good-naturedly by
acquaintances among the blacks.
One well known businessman tells this on himself. "I live away out in the South End
and having neither horse nor carriage was forced to foot it to town. A conveyance came
along driven by a negro and I asked him for a lift.
"Looking at me and grinning, he said, 'Boss, Ise bliged ter fuse yer de faver. De city
council won't let de white folks and de black folks ride together and I ain't got my
compartment sign up yet,' and with that he drove on."
The negroes seemed to enjoy the predicament of the whites hugely and along toward
noon many of their conveyances could be seen driving about the streets with a space in
the rear some two feet in length blocked off by a piece of cardboard bearing the legend,
"For Whites Only."44
From this account it is evident that the segregation ordinance was

effective. Whatever the company's policy had been prior to the ordi-
nance, it had not been particularly offensive to its black patrons. The
separate compartments ordinance resulted in a loss of black ridership
and a significant loss in revenue to the company. The company's
attempt to change the ordinance indicates that they were not eager to
forego revenue to satisfy the community's desire for separation on the
streetcars.
Unfortunately, the strength of the company's preferences for profits
relative to prejudice can not be inferred. Nor does the evidence permit
a determination of the magnitude of the tradeoff between the loss in
black ridership due to segregation and the potential loss in white
ridership if the company refused to segregate. If the company had
opposed segregation in general, stronger inferences about these matters
could be drawn. However, there is no evidence that the company
opposed segregation in general, only that they opposed this particular
ordinance.
43 Ibid., Mar. 8,41904.

44 Ibid., June 3, 1904.
Florida
The case of Jacksonville, Florida, has two interesting features. First,

the streetcar company is once again in the background of the main story.
Second, competition in the local transit business played a significant and
interesting role in the effectiveness of the black boycott of the law.
The first streetcar segregation ordinance in Jacksonville was passed in
November 1901. Local black citizens, including a black member of the
city council, protested the ordinance in the proposal stage. They
particularly objected to the portion of the law giving the conductors
police power to enforce the ordinance. Several white councilmen shared
the view that giving the conductors this power was inviting trouble and
voted against the ordinance.45
It was also reported at this meeting that the attorney for the street
railway company had attended a committee meeting at which the
proposed bill was unanimously agreed upon. It is tempting to infer that
the railroad company favored the bill or at least did not oppose strongly.
However, a few days later, the president of the railroad wrote the
following letter to the city council:
The petition of the Jacksonville Street Railroad Company respectfully represents that in
deference to what it believed to be the public sentiment it submitted to your honorable
body at a meeting held on the 5th day of November, 1901, a petition asking that police
powers be given to its conductors and motormen to the end that it might conserve the
peace and good order necessary for the comfort of its patrons. Being made mindful since
that the vestment of such powers in the employees named is viewed with alarm and
apprehension by a large number of its patrons, and desiring to act in entire harmony with
the people and not be instrumental in the smallest degree in fomenting or giving the
slightest cause for any unrest or unease in the community, it hereby respectfully
withdraws it application to have its employees given police powers, and will rely
entirely upon the police of the city for the enforcement of good order and proper
conduct on its cars.46
The letter was undoubtedly a response to the protests of the black

community. Black leaders had met with the mayor to protest the bill and
plans for a boycott of the streetcars were underway.47
The letter may have been a announcement to both the public and the
police that the company intended to ignore the law. Or perhaps the
company attempted to enforce the law for a time and gave it up in the
face of the black boycott. This view is taken by the "Exchange" column
of the Indianapolis Freeman, a black newspaper.48 Whatever their
reasons, the company officials did not enforce the law until 1905.
5 Florida Times-Union, Nov. 6, 1901. The final vote was 11 in favor of the ordinance, 6 opposed.
46 Ibid., Nov. 14, 1901.
47 Ibid., Nov. 8 and 9, 1901.
48 The column comments that: "The backbone of the opposition originated with the women, who
threatened a boycott of the men of the race if they dared to ride in the separate cars. The company
has taken off the separate cars and all passengers are treated alike. Too much praise can not be
given these women." Indianapolis Freeman, Mar. 22, 1902.
910 Roback
In that year, the separate-car ordinance became an issue in the

mayoral race. The challenger, Wiley 0. Toomer, asserted his opponent
had not enforced the ordinance during his term. Mayor Nolan did not
deny the charge, but argued the ordinance was unconstitutional and
impossible to enforce. He also claimed his predecessors had not
enforced the ordinance either. There is no doubt the law was essentially
a dead letter between November 1901 and May 1905.49
Just as the race was coming to a close, the Florida state legislature
passed a statute requiring separation of the races on municipal street-
cars. Public comments on the bill, as well as comments made during the
mayoral campaign, suggest railroad companies were widely perceived
as opposed to the legislation. For example, one of the challenger's
supporters, Judge Dodge, claimed the incumbent mayor failed to
enforce the municipal law as a favor to the streetcar company.
Judge Dodge stated that it was done apparently to favor the streetcar company, and
whether or not this was the case, at the last primary Manager Tucker and his employees
were out working hard for the reelection of Mayor Nolan. Judge Dodge claimed that
Manager Tucker was operating the Lincoln Park sideshow as a private enterprise in
connection with the street railway management in this city and that to enforce the law
would have brought a boycott on the part of the colored people, as it did when the law
was enforced by Mr. Fletcher when that gentleman was Mayor. To Judge Dodge, it
looked perfectly natural under the circumstances for Manager Tucker to be out on
election day working for his friend. 5
There is no report of Mayor Nolan denying the charge. In addition, the

newspaper later reported the streetcar company intended to enforce the
new state law despite the fact that:
it was passed by the Legislature much against the will of the streetcar companies
operating in the state. The fact that the streetcar company in this city has always
accorded to the colored people who have patronized their lines the most careful and
generous treatment, and that the law was not passed at the instigation of the company,
it is thought that there will be no concerted efforts on the part of the colored people of
Jacksonville to boycott the streetcars.51
In fact, blacks did boycott the Jacksonville Street railway. At this

point competition in the local transportation market becomes important.
A second streetcar company in Jacksonville, the North Jacksonville
Street railway company ran lines in the northern part of the city to "the
negro settlements" and was patronized almost exclusively by blacks.52
The boycott did not extend to the North Jacksonville lines, partly
because blacks regarded it as their railroad. Although the company was
owned by whites, its conductors were black. The Jim Crow law was
"Florida Times-Union, May 3, 16, and 30, 1905.

50Ibid., Jun. 6, 1905.
51 Ibid., Jun. 30, 1905.
52 Ibid., July 2, 1905.
enforced by giving front seats to blacks and back seats to the few white
riders. Because the line served some black neighborhoods, the boycott
of its competitor was not nearly as inconvenient to blacks as it might
have been.53
As a result of the boycott, receipts of the Jacksonville Street Railway
company diminished on several of its lines, while the "colored line"
was as busy as ever. In fact, the North Jacksonville company attempted
to expand its lines into other parts of the city during the boycott. A
restraining order prevented it from crossing the tracks of its rival
company. Not surprisingly, the restraining order resulted from a peti-
tion by the Jacksonville Street Railway.54
In the meantime, both streetcar companies were challenging the
validity of the law. Each had been charged with violating the ordinance
on the grounds that the policy of seating one race from the rear and the
other from the front did not meet the requirement that the races be
separated. The white company responded to the charge by installing
movable signs which said "white" on one side and "colored" on the
other. The signs were inserted wherever the relative loads of black and
white passengers required. Their solution minimized the expense of
compliance but there was still some doubt whether the arrangement was
satisfactory.
The "black" railroad responded somewhat differently. The white-
owned company immediately installed movable screens between the
sections on the cars. The screens clearly satisfied the law and were
relatively inoffensive to the predominantly black clientele because they
rode in front. Probably the main reason they went to the trouble of
complying fully with the law was to generate a test case. An earlier test
case on the white line had been thrown out by the court on the grounds
that the seating policy did not comply with the law. In fact, this abortive
test case led to charges that neither company was complying with the
law.56
Blacks initiated a test case by having a black sit in the white section
of one of the cars on the black line, which was clearly complying with
the law. The attorneys were able to fight the spirit of the law rather than
53 August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, "The Boycott Movement"; Florida Times-Union, July 3,
1905. It is also interesting to note that competition was mentioned during the 1901 boycott. At the
first meeting at which the blacks discussed the possibility of a boycott, the newspaper reports that
there was an "explanation of the hack system by which the negro race could ride from one end of
the city to another for the same fare as on the streetcars, and also have the benefits of the transfer
system. There were also a number of hackmen present, and also the president and secretary of the
Coachman's Union and they made brief speeches and offered suggestions." Florida Times-Union,
Nov. 8, 1901.
54 Ibid., July 3, 1905 and July 19, 1905.
55 Ibid., July 14, 18 and 19, 1905.
56 Ibid., July 18 and 19, 1905.
912 Roback
argue about details of the law's requirements as the white company was
essentially doing.57
An interesting controversy arose in the court battle which followed.
Black leaders found it necessary to deny they were receiving financial
assistance for their fight from the railroad companies. Evidently, the
county solicitor published a statement asserting the railroads were
behind the movement to overturn the law. The black attorney who
brought the case vehemently denied the claim:
This case has been instigated by the colored people of Jacksonville, through the colored
pastors of Jacksonville, who are furnishing money to fight the case. . . . The idea that
we are in cahoots with the railroad lines in Jacksonville can not be maintained when it
is known that we are not patronizing the cars. The colored people do not like the law,
and the colored people here and in all parts of the State are to assist us in making the
fight.58
The implication is that the railroad companies were widely perceived as

favoring the overturn of the law.
Streetcar segregation in Jacksonville followed the pattern hypothe-
sized above. Segregation was not instituted by the streetcar companies,
they did not adopt it voluntarily as company policy, they ignored the law
for as long as possible, and they certainly did not support legislative
efforts to require segregation. Moreover, they did their best to minimize
their cost of segregating by complying with the law in the most limited
way possible.
The major railroad in Jacksonville faced more competition than did
railroads in other cities. The company dealt with competition by
restraining its rival from competing.
As a final note on the Jacksonville case, there is some limited
evidence that the majority of white opinion was indifferent about Jim
Crow streetcars, or, at the very least, that many whites were unwilling
to invest substantial resources of their own to bring about segregation
on streetcars. The newspaper account of the test case includes the
following comment: "There were only a few white people present, [in
the courtroom] showing the lack of interest they are showing in this
case, which was an issue in the last mayoral campaign."59 One
interpretation is that the many white people wanted segregation in an
abstract way but were not willing to expend their own resources to
implement it. Such people would favor segregation as long as its costs
were borne by someone else, either the invariably unpopular railroad
company or political entrepreneurs who hoped to gain election by
57 Ultimately the law was declared unconstitutional because of a clause which made an exception
for black nurses traveling with their charges. This was held to be class legislation. Ibid., July 26 and
30, 1905.
58 Ibid., July 23, 1905.
59 Ibid., July 25, 1905.
providing publicly a "good," namely segregation, which would be

difficult to provide privately. The next case illustrates this possibility
even more dramatically.
Alabama
The general council of the city of Mobile passed a streetcar segrega-

tion ordinance on October 15, 1902, to be effective on November 1,
1902. There is no doubt whatever about the attitudes of the streetcar
company toward this ordinance since the company flatly refused to
enforce it on their cars.
The city seems to have contemplated the possibility that the company
would refuse to cooperate from the beginning. On November 1, the
police chief wrote to the president of the Mobile Light and Railroad
Company, advising him that the ordinance would be enforced by the
police force if necessary.60 By November 4, there were reports that the
conductors were having difficulty enforcing the law because white
passengers refused to sit in their assigned seats.
One conductor said that the only trouble he had was with one white man who replied
when asked to sit in the forward seat, "What in the ---- is that for?" He moved his seat,
however. Another case was given in which a dentist left the car in preference to moving
his seat. A third passenger refused to move until he was asked to do so by a policeman,
but he is said to have been under the influence of liquor.6"
In addition, the blacks organized a boycott and so patronage fell

substantially.
By December 2, the company announced that it intended to ignore the
law. The manager of the company explained the new policy to a
reporter.
He said the reason for the [new policy] was because the whites would not obey the law
and were continually giving the conductors trouble by refusing to sit where they were
told. He said that if the law had been enforced it would have resulted in the arrest of the
wife and daughter of one of the city officials and that there was hardly a car on which
the whites did not cause trouble by refusing to move when they were asked to do so. He
said if the law continued in force he would have to take off cars or cut the pay of his
men.62
The claim that whites refused to cooperate with the law was denied by
the newspaper editor on two separate occasions. The editor, who was
obviously a supporter of the law, claimed that economic losses caused
by the boycott were the real reason the company refused to enforce the
law.63 In any event, the company refused to enforce segregation. One of
60 Mobile Daily Register, Nov. 1, 1902.

61 Ibid., Nov. 4, 1902.
62 Ibid., Dec. 2, 1902.
63 Ibid., December 2 and 3, 1902.
914 Roback
its conductors was arrested and fined on December 12. There is no

further mention of the Jim Crow cars for the remainder of the year.64
Besides the company's obvious reluctance to enforce the law, the
other interesting feature of the case is the lack of cooperation from the
white public. Indeed, it is not clear from the record who favored the
ordinance other than the newspaper editor. The claim that whites gave
conductors trouble must be partially discounted because neither offi-
cials of the railway company nor the newspaper editor can be regarded
as detached observers. However, there does not appear to be any
evidence that the majority of whites were enthusiastic about the law.
The editor, who favored the law himself, reported support for the law
but only in vague generalities.
The city of Montgomery passed a municipal ordinance requiring
segregation on streetcars in July 1900. Blacks of Montgomery boycotted
the streetcars immediately. The boycott continued for nearly two years.
During that time, the company's receipts fell by 25 percent according to
one account and 47 percent by another account.65 By July 5, 1902, the
Cleveland Gazette reported triumphantly:
Our people in Montgomery, Alabama have won in their fight against the "Jim Crow" car
law, as it affected the trolley cars. They stopped riding and walked, thus causing the
company's business to be unprofitable. The result is that the company, to save itself
from ruin, is now allowing them to ride in any part of its cars.
Tennessee
The state of Tennessee passed a Jim Crow law in 1903. The act
applied to counties of 150,000 people or more and hence only affected
Memphis, in Shelby county. It is reported that the "bill when it was
presented in Nashville by its author was contested bitterly by the
[Memphis Street Railway] company and by representatives from Shelby
county." Hence, the two constituents most affected by this law, the
streetcar company and representatives from the Memphis area, op-
posed the law.66
Nevertheless, when the act was passed, the company made plans to
enforce it. They issued their employees detailed instructions regarding
correct procedures for enforcing the law with a minimum of inconve-
I According to Meier and Rudwick ("The Boycott Movement," p. 758), the streetcar boycott
was "temporarily successful" in Mobile. It is not clear whether they are referring to the company's
refusal to enforce the law as the temporary success.
65 Atlanta Constitution, Sept. 20, 1900. The 47 percent figure comes from the Cleveland Gazette,
a black newspaper, on March 16, 1901. Since the information comes from a visitor to Montgomery
corresponding with his friends back in Cleveland, the accuracy of his figures is questionable.
However, the 25 percent figure comes from the Atlanta Constitution, a prestigious white paper
which would have no incentive to exaggerate the plight of the railway company.
1 1903 Tenn. Pub. Acts p. 75; Memphis Commercial Appeal, May 30, 1903.
nience to passengers. They also purchased elaborate screens to divide

the cars in accordance with the law.67
The law was to go into effect on May 5, 1903. On April 26, the
newspaper reported:
No matter if the white compartment is crowded and there is no one in the colored
compartment, no whites will be allowed to enter it. The law is expected to develop
innumerable petty troubles and much trouble is anticipated in its enforcement. The
nearer the time comes for the beginning of the new law the more ominous are the threats
of court resistance to its provisions. A revolution of present conditions is expected.68
The "revolution" anticipated was in the traveling habits of the public

who were accustomed to sitting where they pleased. It is not clear,
however, who threatened to go to court. On May 6, the company
announced a delay in enforcing the new law due to difficulties in
acquiring the equipment necessary for separating cars. It was also
reported that: "The public awaits the first test with much interest.
Rumors of injunction proceedings and also of trouble and friction has
sharpened the curiosity of the public as to the results." 69 Once again,
the report does not identify the parties seeking an injunction.
By the end of the month it is evident who threatened court action. The
Memphis Street Railway company pleaded guilty to violating the law
and requested the court rule on the law's constitutionality as soon as
possible. The company believed that the law was "against the wishes of
the majority of its patrons.' 70 It is possible the company's earlier
announcements of plans to enforce the law and to purchase the
equipment to separate the cars were intended as demonstrations of good
faith with respect to a law the company had publicly and vehemently
opposed:
if the law is constitutional the sentence against the streetcar company which will be
accepted here today, will be affirmed. If not the case will be dismissed and the law will
be declared unconstitutional. In the former event, the screens which have already been
ordered will be placed at once in all of the cars of the company and the law will be lived
up to. The streetcar company does not seek to evade the law if it is constitutional, but
it does not desire to impose unnecessary hardships, as it believes will be entailed by the
enforcement of the Hancock law.71
The law was eventually declared unconstitutional, and the railroad

company junked the partitions it had purchased. Evidently, no attempt
was made to enforce this state law again.72
67Ibid., Mar. 27, Apr. 26, 1903.

68 Ibid., Apr. 26,1903.
69 Ibid., May 6, 1903.
70 Ibid., May 30, 1903.
71 Ibid., May 30, 1903.
72Ibid., June 8, 1903; Meier and Rudwick, "The Boycott Movement," p. 757.
916 Roback
Reports on the Jim Crow streetcars are quite limited for Chattanooga,
but some information can be gleaned from the record. Blacks boycotted
segregated lines and formed their own hack companies. These compa-
nies evidently did not provide enough competition to damage profits of
the established streetcar companies. There is some evidence that city
officials attempted to prosecute the black hack lines on the grounds that
they were "using old, wornout animals from early morning until late at
night and are only half feeding them."73 It is not possible to ascertain if
the charges were founded or if the officials were simply harassing black
operators.
There is only one mention of streetcar companies which gives a clue
about their attitudes. The editor of the paper, arguing that blacks should
not boycott streetcars, commented:
Generally speaking, the negroes accepted the matter good naturedly, the more sensible
ones among them discrediting the boycott for the reason that the railway companies are
not responsible for the law and are therefore not to be punished for its conservative
enforcement. .
One defect is noticed and has been complained of by patrons of both colors, and
which is that the Rapid Transit seats the colored people in the front and the electric road
seats them in the rear. There should be a uniform rule and both companies ought to
adopt it.74
This report is not sufficient to prove the railroad companies in

Chattanooga resisted or disliked segregation, but it does suggest that
they did not initiate it.
CONCLUSION
The basic Woodward thesis is sound for streetcar segregation in the

cities studied. Segregation on streetcars emerged in the late 1890s and
early 1900s, well after the conclusion of Reconstruction. Moreover,
segregation ordinances were not initially successful in many cities.
Streetcar companies either ignored the law or blatantly refused to
enforce it. It is unlikely that practice anticipated law in this area, in
contrast to Woodward's suggestion. The Becker thesis receives confir-
mation from my account. Many streetcar companies refused to- enforce
the law because they believed it would be too expensive. There is little
indication that streetcar companies initiated legislation or that they
would have segregated in the absence of legislation.
Some of the cases support Cell's contention that segregation was a
means of warding off more drastic measures. Streetcar companies
seemed to have responded to the call for separate sections as an
alternative to running entirely separate cars.
"Chattanooga Daily Times, July 26, and 28, 1905. Meier and Rudwick, "The Boycott
Movement," p. 765.
74 Chattanooga Daily Times, July 17, 1905.
The evidence presented contrasts most sharply with the Rabinowitz

interpretation of the origins of segregation. Segregation did not replace
exclusion on streetcars in the cities discussed. Moreover, segregation
law appears to have replaced a private practice of at least partial
integration. While Rabinowitz reports examples of streetcar segregation
occurring prior to law, he also says that "race relations in public
accommodations were relatively fluid."75
The evidence presented strongly suggests that streetcar segregation
formed a genuine exception to the patterns Rabinowitz describes. Most
of the services Rabinowitz discusses were provided by government,
while streetcars were privately owned at the turn of the century. The
analysis presented above suggests the public and private sectors will
have different patterns of racial segregation and exclusion, and thus, the
contrast between Rabinowitz's results and mine are not surprising.
I focus here exclusively on the early origins of Jim Crow streetcars.
Eventually, this practice was adopted throughout the South. Why was
it eventually adopted in places which had once resisted it? Did the
attitudes of the streetcar companies change, or did the political forces
favoring segregation become more powerful? Who favored segregation
enough to work for its adoption? The analysis and evidence presented
here raise these interesting questions without answering them. Despite
these unresolved issues, my evidence establishes several crucial points.
Streetcar segregation ordinances did not simply codify existing cus-
toms. Streetcar companies did not initiate segregation legislation and
often actively resisted it.
75 Rabinowitz, Race Relations, pp. 192-94.

The Political Economy of Segregation: The Case of Segregated Streetcars

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The Political Economy of Segregation: The Case of Segregated Streetcars

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THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY

VOLUME XLVI DECEMBER 1986 NUMBER 4

The Political Economy of Segregation:

The introduction of segregation laws for municipal streetcars is examined. The

In The Strange Career of Jim Crow, C. Vann Woodward set forth a

the ordinances binding constraints on the behavior of the streetcar

THE ECONOMICS OF SEGREGATION ON MUNICIPAL STREETCARS

Streetcar segregation may take place in the absence of specific

To answer these questions, I draw on Gary Becker's economic theory

'Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (2nd edn., Chicago, 1973).

it made it difficult or impossible to segregate smokers from nonsmok-

These women objected so strongly to their proposed riding companions

most of the South during the period. '3

The following case studies examine the origins of municipal streetcar

A state law requiring separation of the races on all railroads operating

The contemporary record indicates that the streetcar company began

17 Ibid., Aug. 31, 1898 and Sept. 13, 1898.

The statement indicates the company is willing to enforce the

From these reports alone, it is difficult to tell whether the white

No explicit record of the company's motives in pursuing this policy

A letter writer who signed himself "Citizen of Summerville" was even

"Citizen of Summerville" ended his letter with a thinly veiled threat of

The railroad eventually succumbed to pressure and provided segre-

The editor of the black paper in Savannah, The Savannah Tribune,

28Ibid., Sept. 13, 1899.

Thus, the pattern of segregation in Savannah is consistent with my

In spite of these hesitations, the Georgia Railway and Electric company

32 Atlanta Journal, Sept. 14, 1906.

35 Ibid., Sept. 13 and 15, 1906.

costly to the Houston Electric railway. Unfortunately, the attitudes of

39Houston Daily Post, Nov. 1, 1903.

From this account it is evident that the segregation ordinance was

43 Ibid., Mar. 8,41904.

The case of Jacksonville, Florida, has two interesting features. First,

The letter was undoubtedly a response to the protests of the black

In that year, the separate-car ordinance became an issue in the

There is no report of Mayor Nolan denying the charge. In addition, the

In fact, blacks did boycott the Jacksonville Street railway. At this

"Florida Times-Union, May 3, 16, and 30, 1905.

The implication is that the railroad companies were widely perceived as

providing publicly a "good," namely segregation, which would be

The general council of the city of Mobile passed a streetcar segrega-

In addition, the blacks organized a boycott and so patronage fell

60 Mobile Daily Register, Nov. 1, 1902.

its conductors was arrested and fined on December 12. There is no

nience to passengers. They also purchased elaborate screens to divide

The "revolution" anticipated was in the traveling habits of the public

The law was eventually declared unconstitutional, and the railroad

67Ibid., Mar. 27, Apr. 26, 1903.

This report is not sufficient to prove the railroad companies in

The basic Woodward thesis is sound for streetcar segregation in the

The evidence presented contrasts most sharply with the Rabinowitz

75 Rabinowitz, Race Relations, pp. 192-94.

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