PEOPLE V. CAYAT (1939) |EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.
t go measures of protection and security. Fourth, the act applies
G.R. No. L-45987, 68 Phil 12, May 5, 1939
DOCTRINE: Protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the
same class.
FACTS:
Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the non-Christian
tribe was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing
an intoxicating liquor (one bottle of gin) which is not a native wine.
Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member of
the non-Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess any intoxicating liquor other
than their so-called native wines. Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its
punishment.
Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violative of the due
process and it is an improper exercise of police power.
ISSUES:
Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?
RULING:
No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection clause.
Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classifications. The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the
same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the classification
rests on real and substantial distinctions. The non-Christian tribes refer not to the
religious belief, but in a way to the geographical and more directly to the natives
of the Philippines of a low grade of civilization. Second, Act No. 1639 was designed
to insure peace and order among the non-Christian tribes. The experience of the
past and the lower court observed that the use of highly intoxicating liquors by
the non-Christian tribes often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, which hamper
the efforts of the Government to raise their standard of life and civilization. Third,
the said act is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions exist.
Legislature understood that civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand
equally to all members of same class.
68 Phil. 12 (1939) PEOPLE V. CAYAT
Facts/Issue: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and
a member of the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and
3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an
intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law made it unlawful for any
native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the
meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent
spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called
native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed
to prior to the passage of the law. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act
1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of
the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.
Held: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the
equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based upon
“accident of birth or parentage,” as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon
the degree of civilization and culture. “The term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers, not
to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area and more directly, to
natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities.” (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of
Mindora, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was
intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.
The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order in and
among non-Christian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the class evident
from perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain
number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument
against the equality of its application.
Issues:
1. If said law is discriminatory and denies EP of laws;
2. If said law is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.
Held:
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1. Said statute does not deny EP of laws; the guaranty of the equal protection of increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth
the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based and prosperity is legitimate exercise of police power, unless shown to be
on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable: whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual. Act
1639 is designed to promote peace and order to non-Christian tribes and to
a. must rest on substantial distinctions;
eventually hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian
b. must be germane to the purposes of the law; brothers.
c. must not be limited to existing conditions only; and Ichong vs Hernandez G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
d. must apply equally to all members of the same class. Conflict with fundamental law; Police power
Act 1639 meets all such requirements. The classification rests on real and Facts:
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the
"accident of birth or parentage” but upon the degree of civilization and culture.
Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.”
"The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but to natives of the
The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:
Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship
apart from settled communities. (1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain
and
practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed
from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some (2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in
members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business.
to the paramount interests of the nation. The law, then, does not seek to mark the
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents,
non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an
measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them
action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime
rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in that enjoyment of
Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal
those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no
treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality
true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the
of the Act, contending that:
government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and
civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their
end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true liberty and property without due process of law.
equality.
The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure
The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
peace and order in and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in
Philippines.
lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise
their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to Issue/s:
conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of
principles.
the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-
Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the Discussions:
equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in
established.
good faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be
2. Said statute is not an improper exercise of the PPS. Any measure intended to upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being
promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people or to

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inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a
treaty.
Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case,
the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted
principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not
demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not.”
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally
accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this
case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and
with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “”does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced””; and, that the equal protection clause “”is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not.””
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an
exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away
or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer
assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.
Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act 1180 violates the equal protection of laws.
Held/Ruling:
No. According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also
then provided that police power cannot be bargained away through the medium
of a treaty or a contract. The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the State. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law
clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of
aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
Villegas vs. Hui Chiong Tsai Pao Ho
FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or
engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated
therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of
P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila,
filed a petition to stop the enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the
same null and void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence
this case.
ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule
of the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of
law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he
can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse
it at his will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the
Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines
as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is
admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee
includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process
and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.
Held: The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of
regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment.
The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider difference
in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time,
rank-and-file or executive.
[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and
unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to
life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down
any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus
conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]
ISSUES:
(1) Is the ordinance violative of the cardinal rule of uniformity of taxation?
(2) Does it violate the principle against undue designation of legislative power?
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(3) Does it violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution?
RULING:
(1) Yes. The P50 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because
it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens
who are required to pay it. The same amount of P50 is being collected from every
employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or
whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive.
(2) Yes. It does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the
exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a
municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the
action, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power, such
ordinance is invalid.
(3) Yes. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the
City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to
denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means
of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection
clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
Thus, the ordinance is invalid.
Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.
Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00
pesos to enable aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for
the purpose of regulation.
While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment
permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in
processing and approval or disapproval of application is regulatory in character,
the second part which requires the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a
regulatory but a revenue measure.
Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of
the basic human right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of
livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit
aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life
without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also
it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial
of an alien employment permit fee.
Dumlao v COMELEC G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order
Facts:
Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections
of January 30, 1980.
He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Constitution.
S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who
shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elecOted, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective
local office from which he has retired.
He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed insidiously against him, and
that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and,
therefore, class legislation.
His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidcay of a
person who was convicted of a crime given that there was judgment for conviction
and the prima facie nature of the filing of charges for the commission of such
crimes.
He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by respondent
COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is
contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a
"bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination." Apart form this, hey also attacked the term of
office and the election period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6, and Sec 1 of
BP 52.
Issue:
1. Did petitioners have standing
2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?
Held:
1. No
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.
Petition granted
Ratio:
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1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to determine
judicial review, three requisites are present:
a. actual case and controversy
b. proper party
c. existence of a constitutional question
a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been filed
for his disqualification. It was only a hypothetical question.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has yet
been adversely affected by the operation of the statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for
resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would
require that his suit be dismissed.
However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest involved
and the imminent elections.
2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification.
If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can
be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public
service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from
younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory
retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a
reasonable classification. Young blood can be encouraged to come in to politics.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already retired, there
is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office, as provided for in the
challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance.
The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself
tired an unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a
change of mind, he would like to assume again.
It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of
the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection,
neither does it permit such denial.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. hat constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
belonging to the same class.
The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local
governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it
cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the
objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.
Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional provision
that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt.
The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence,
as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone
that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It
condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of
proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and
one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would
be ineligible to run for public office.
A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been
filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already
convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory
penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence.
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and
therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because
the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts
of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence
against him.
A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be
substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's petition was meritorious.
Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the
Constitution and thus, should be declared null and void
Held: In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52
remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection
of the laws is subject to rational classification. One class can be treated differently
from another class. In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently
from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the “need for
new blood” in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it
should be declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. “Explicit is the
constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
5
heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An
accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The
challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that
charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns
before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no
distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one
against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be
ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on
the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same
category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto,
which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office
during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).”
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and
therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because
of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with
acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie
evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired
before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the
COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies,
to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided.
Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be
allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only
that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the
second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.
Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby
declared valid and that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the
constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
Ormoc Sugar vs Treasurer of Ormoc City (1968)
Facts: In 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance 4, imposing
on any and all productions of centrifuga sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc.
in Ormoc City a municpal tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the United States
and other foreign countries. The company paid the said tax under protest. It
subsequently filed a case seeking to invalidate the ordinance for being
unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause.
Held: The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the
Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance’s
enacted, the company was the only sugar central in Ormoc City. The classification,
to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The
taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as the present company,
from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up,
it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to the
company as the entity to be levied upon.
Issue:
Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the
equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed?
Held:
Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated
and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2)
these are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only
to present conditions, but also to future conditions substantially identical to those
present; and 4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same
class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not
meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time the ordinance was
enacted, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Was the only sugar central in the City of
Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to
future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and
exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central for the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot
be subject to a tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City
Sugar Company, Inc. As the entity to be levied upon.
Basco vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 91649) - Digest
Facts:
Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) Charter -- PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public
policy and order, and because it constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila Cit government’s right
to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law. For the same reason,
6
the law has intruded into the local government’s right to impose local taxes and
license fees. This is in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of
local autonomy.
Issue:
Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.
Ruling:
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes. Their charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that
power, otherwise the municipality cannot assume it. Its power to tax therefore
must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon
by the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax.”
The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that
“municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress”, which has the power to
“create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative
powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over the Local
governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
2. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been
revoked by P.D. No. 771 and vested exclusively on the National Government.
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue “license or
permits” for the operation of gambling.
3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National
Government. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling
casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an
agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by
a mere Local Government.
4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will
be violated by P.D. No. 1869.
Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:
“Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of
revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
government.”
SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government to “impose
taxes and fees” is always subject to “limitations” which Congress may provide by
law. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply
means “decentralization.” It does not make local governments sovereign within
the state.
Issue: Whether or not the city of Manila may levy taxes on PAGCOR.
Held: No. The city of Manila, being a mere municipal corporation has no inherent
right to impose taxes. Thus, the charter or statute must plainly show an intent to
confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it. Its power to tax therefore
must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon
by the state itself which has the inherent power to tax.
The city of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling has long been
revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling
thru the grant of “franchise, licenses or permits” was withdrawn by PD no. 771 and
was vested exclusively on the national government.
Therefore, only the national government has the power to issue “license or
permits” for the operation of gambling. Necessarily the power to demand or
collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of “licenses or permits”
is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
Local governments has no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the national
government.
The power of the local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject
to “limitations” which congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an
operative law until amended, repealed or revoked, its exemption clause remains
as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes
and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle
of local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means
“decentralization.” It does not make local governments sovereign within the state
or an “imperium in imperio.”
What is settled is that the matter of regulating; taxing or otherwise dealing with
gambling in a state concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the state to
retain it or delegate it to local governments.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because:
1.) it is contrary to morals, public policy and public order;
7
2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to improve taxes and
legal fees; and that the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of constitutional
principle of Local Autonomy;
3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in that it legalizes
gambling thru PAGCOR while most other forms are outlawed together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; and
4.) it is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government, away from
monopolistic and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization.
HELD:
1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless allowed by law. But the
prohibition of gambling does not mean that the government can not regulate it in
the exercise of its police power, wherein the state has the authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare.
2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes. Its charter was created by Congress, therefore subject to its control.
Also, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government.
3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law, provided it is
not unreasonable or arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall
operate.
4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are within the domain of the
political branches of government and the people themselves as the repository of
all state power.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified,
it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
In this case, the grounds raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption. Therefore, it is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
Binay vs Domingo Case Digest
Equal Protection Clause, General Welfare Clause, Police Power, Powers of
Municipal Corporations
Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60
which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family
income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the
unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila
Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified
a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. However,
the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of
funds for the implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the resolution
has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the
inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed for public
purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will only
benefit a few individuals.
Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the
general welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause
Held:
1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on
the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema
lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and
convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation
of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of
the State.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause.
Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and
issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper
to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and
order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property
therein.
2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled
in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
8
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of
the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may
be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense
includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It
covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever
affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community,
it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so
as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public
convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the
preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed
inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the
limits of police power.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a
limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor
General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state
policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare,
social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for
the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long
been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably
classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts
of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus,
statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating
the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social
justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not
complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more
painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60
vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have
less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as
a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
(Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991)
Held:
Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power
under the general welfare clause. The police power is a governmental function, an
inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is
founded largely on the maxims, “Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas” (use your
property so as not to impair others) and “Salus populi est suprema lex” (the
welfare of the people is the supreme law). Its fundamental purpose is securing the
general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful
attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social
conditions. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The
support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the
promotion of the common good.
NPC (NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION) vs DE GUZMAN
FACTS: RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the Philippine National
Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government",
took effect on January 2, 1991. RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement system
for PNP members. Section 39 reads:
"SEC. 39.Compulsory Retirement. — Compulsory retirement, for officer and non-
officer, shall be upon the attainment of age fifty-six (56); Provided, That, in case of
any officer with the rank of chief superintendent, director or deputy director
general, the Commission may allow his retention in the service for an unextendible
period of one (1) year.
Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of retirement to private
respondents who are all members of the defunct Philippine Constabulary and have
reached the age of fifty-six.
Private respondents filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for the
issuance of an ex parte restraining order and/or injunction before the RTC of
Makati. They aver that the age of retirement set at fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of
RA 6975 cannot be applied to them since they are also covered by Sec. 89 thereof
which provides:
"Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within the transition
period of four (4) years following the effectively of this Act, the following
members of the INP shall be considered compulsorily retired:
"a)Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first year of the effectivity
of this Act.
"b)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the second year of the
effectivity of this Act.
"c)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third year of the
effectivity of this Act.
"d)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the fourth year of the
effectivity of this Act."
9
Respondents added that the term "INP" includes both the former members of the
Philippine Constabulary and the local police force who were earlier constituted as
the Integrated National Police (INP) by virtue of PD 765 in 1975.
On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year transition period
provided in Section 89 applies only to the local police forces who previously retire,
compulsorily, at age sixty (60) for those in the ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant or
higher, while the retirement age for the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56)
under the AFP law.
Respondent judge De Guzman issued a restraining order followed by a writ of
injunction. He declared that the term "INP" in Section 89 of the PNP Law includes
all members of the present Philippine National police, irrespective of the original
status of the present members of the Philippine National police before its creation
and establishment, and that Section 39 thereof shall become operative after the
lapse of the four-year transition period. Thus, the preliminary injunction issued is
made permanent. Moreover, he observed, among others, that it may have been
the intention of Congress to refer to the local police forces as the "INP" but the
PNP Law failed to define who or what constituted the INP. The natural recourse
of the court is to trace the source of the "INP" as courts are permitted to look to
prior laws on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents involved.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the
present Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of its present
members and that Section 39 of RA 6975 shall become applicable to petitioners
only after the lapse of the four-year transition period.
HELD: From a careful review of Sections 23 and 85 of RA 6975, it appears that the
use of the term INP is not synonymous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the
statute could have just made a uniform reference to the members of the whole
Philippine National police (PNP) for retirement purposes and not just the INP. The
law itself distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that "INP" as
used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC.
Contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that “the law failed to define
who constitutes the INP”, Sec. 90 of RA 6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus,
"SEC. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. — Upon the effectivity of this
Act, the present National police Commisdion and the Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National police shall cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary, which
is the nucleus of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National police shall cease
to be a major service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Integrated
National police, which is the civilian component of the Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National police, shall cease to be the national police force and lieu
thereof, a new police force shall be establish and constituted pursuant to this Act."
It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature failed to define
who the members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of no moment that the
legislature failed to categorically restrict the application of the transition period in
Sec. 89 specifically in favor of the local police forces for it would be a mere
superfluity as the PC component of the INP was already retirable at age fifty-six
(56).
Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have belabored on the
supposed dubious meaning of the term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such a
situation, courts are not without recourse in determining the construction of the
statute with doubtful meaning for they may avail themselves of the actual
proceedings of the legislative body. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a
statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative
deliberations may be adopted. Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the
letter of the law if it runs counter to the legislative intent.
The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section 89 of R.A.
6975 is applicable only to the local police force is clear. The question now is
whether the classification is valid. The test for this is reasonableness such that it
must conform to the following requirements:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only;
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class (People vs. Cayat, 68
Phil. 12 [1939]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of injunction issued on January 8,
1992 is hereby LIFTED and the assailed decision of respondent judge is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE
SHMAEL HIMAGAN,
petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11,
Davao City,respondents.
G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994
“Equal Protection”
– Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies
FACTS:
Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged
for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of
10
Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan
was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that
“Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance
against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law
is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the
accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment
of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of
the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days.
He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary
to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal
protection of laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the
Constitution.
HELD:
The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the
member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and
one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot
be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same
Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand
independently of each other.
The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from
within which the trial should be finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes
of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the
rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and
the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against
them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended
policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while
his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed
to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the
accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over
90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. Supposing the trial is not
terminated w/in 90 days from arraignment, the suspension of accused should NOT
be lifted. While the law uses the mandatory word “shall” before the phrase “be
terminated within ninety (90) days”, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that
the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated
within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the
period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and,
in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the
trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived
of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the
dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can
compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty
by habeas corpus.
The equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the
one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and
substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the law; applies to all
members of the same class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the
classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal
protection guarantee
Tablarin v. Gutierrez G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987
Facts:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for
the school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not
successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the
Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and administered by
the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with
a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The
petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from
enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking
and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and
from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future.
After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court
denied said petition. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously
scheduled.
Issue: whether Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend
against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of
legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by
the delegate, the Board of Medical Education
11
Held:
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule
making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education
are necessarily broad and highly abstract. The standard may be either expressed
or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard
though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly
the legislative objective is public safety.
In this case, the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical
Act: “the standardization and regulation of medical education” and in Section 5
(a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered
together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation
principle.
Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended,
and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum
scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines,
do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable
power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important
interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general community.
An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and
well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate
objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs
some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on
the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community,
on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling
that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public.
Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended,
and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum
scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines,
do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable
power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important
interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general community.
An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and
well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate
objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs
some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on
the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community,
on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling
that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the
medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of
admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to
those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of
maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development,
are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an
admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of
"upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to
hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the
protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease
or trauma.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the
respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Lim vs. Pacquing [G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995]
FACTS:
The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A.
No. 409).
On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority
to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements Board
(GAB).
On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless
passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled “An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To
12
Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain
And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions
And For Other Purposes.”
On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President
Marcos. The decree, entitled “Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local
Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or
Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And
Other Forms Of Gambling”, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing
franchises and permits issued by local governments.
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-
Alai. The government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and
invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises
and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local
governments. ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-
impairment clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
RATIO:
Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or
even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any
subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised
legislative powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADC’s
franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No.
115044, for the decision of the Court’s First Division in said case, aside from not
being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional,
since only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution.
And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from
contesting ADC’s possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the
State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or
agents. (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 771 is constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. PD No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid
and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this Court. Not only this;
Article XVIII Section 3 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been
repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance
(when the executive still exercised legislative powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADC's
franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No.
115044, for the decision of the Court's First Division in said case, aside from not
being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional,
since only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution.
And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from
contesting ADC's possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the
State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or
agents (see Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
Consequently, in the light of the foregoing expostulation, we conclude that the
republic (in contra distinction to the City of Manila) may be allowed to intervene
in G.R. No. 115044. The Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in the exercise,
not of its business or proprietary functions, but in the exercise of its governmental
functions to protect public morals and promote the general welfare.
PHIL JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS PRADO ENBANC
227 SCRA 703 G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1)
its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it
did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies
of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its
13
passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
RULING:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that
if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some
agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No.
7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system.
Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not
have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the
repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207,
PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720
or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference
Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have
differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill,
is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the
journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges
that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually
became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed
among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article
VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.
3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution
providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-
controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of
promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for
private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the
benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the
government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the
services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices
of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own
public functions.
HELD: There is violation of equal protection. All persons similarly situated should
be treated alike both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It does
not require universal application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction. This might in fact result in unequal protection. What the law requires
is equality among equals according to valid classification. The postal service office
claims that the expense from judiciary with regards frank mails amounts to
73,574,864 as compared to 90,424, 175 total. The respondents are in effect saying
that franking privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it much
at all but not to those who need it badly. The problem is not solved by retaining it
for some and withdrawing it from others especially where there’s no substantial
distinction. The distinction made is superficial. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the judiciary and the grantees of
the franking privilege.
Issue: Constitutionality of Sec. 35of RA 7354
Held: Hereby declared unconstitutional.
The EPC is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. According to a long line of
decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so
as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The equal
protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all
persons or things without distinction. In lumping the Judiciary with the other
offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has
placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of
Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize
14
a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why
the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee.
In the SC’s view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege
was the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would
justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of
providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government and
the people. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the
franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all
agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not
solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where
there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not
need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved
by violating the Constitution.
Sison vs Ancheta (1984)
Facts: Batas Pambansa 135 was enacted. Sison, as taxpayer, alleged that its
provision (Section 1) unduly discriminated against him by the imposition of higher
rates upon his income as a professional, that it amounts to class legislation, and
that it transgresses against the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution as well as the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.
Issue: Whether BP 135 violates the due process and equal protection clauses, and
the rule on uniformity in taxation.
Held: There is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to a
conclusion that there was a violation of the due process and equal protection
clauses. Absent such showing, the presumption of validity must prevail. Equality
and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of
the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority
to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. Where the
differentitation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity, similar to
the standards of equal protection, it is not discriminatory within the meaning of
the clause and is therefore uniform. Taxpayers may be classified into different
categories, such as recipients of compensation income as against professionals.
Recipients of compensation income are not entitled to make deductions for
income tax purposes as there is no practically no overhead expense, while
professionals and businessmen have no uniform costs or expenses necessaryh to
produce their income. There is ample justification to adopt the gross system of
income taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of net
income taxation as regards professional and business income.
Issue: Whether or not the assailed provision violates the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Constitution while also violating the rule that taxes must be
uniform and equitable.
Held: The petition is without merit.
On due process - it is undoubted that it may be invoked where a taxing statute is
so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious example is
where it can be shown to amount to the confiscation of property from abuse of
power. Petitioner alleges arbitrariness but his mere allegation does not suffice and
there must be a factual foundation of such unconsitutional taint.
On equal protection - it suffices that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all
persons under similar circumstances, both in the privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed.
On the matter that the rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable - this
requirement is met when the tax operates with the same force and effect in every
place where the subject may be found." Also, :the rule of uniformity does not call
for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly unattainable."
When the problem of classification became of issue, the Court said: "Equality and
uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the
same class shall be taxed the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to
make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation..." As
provided by this Court, where "the differentation" complained of "conforms to
the practical dictates of justice and equity" it "is not discriminatory within the
meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform."
Issue: Whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net income derived
from business or profession than on compensation is constitutionally infirm.
(WON there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation)
Held: No. Petition dismissed
Ratio:
The need for more revenues is rationalized by the government's role to fill the gap
not done by public enterprise in order to meet the needs of the times. It is better
equipped to administer for the public welfare.
The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure the
performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds.
The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty and the strongest power of the
government. There are restrictions, however, diversely affecting as it does
property rights, both the due process and equal protection clauses may properly
15
be invoked, as petitioner does, to invalidate in appropriate cases a revenue
measure. If it were otherwise, taxation would be a destructive power.
The petitioner failed to prove that the statute ran counter to the Constitution. He
used arbitrariness as basis without a factual foundation. This is merely to adhere
to the authoritative doctrine that where the due process and equal protection
clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad
standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to
such a conclusion.
It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute
is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious example is
where it can be shown to amount to the confiscation of property. That would be
a clear abuse of power.
It has also been held that where the assailed tax measure is beyond the
jurisdiction of the state, or is not for a public purpose, or, in case of a retroactive
statute is so harsh and unreasonable, it is subject to attack on due process
grounds.
For equal protection, the applicable standard to determine whether this was
denied in the exercise of police power or eminent domain was the presence of the
purpose of hostility or unreasonable discrimination.
It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under
similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the
conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is
that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looks upon in terms
of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the
rest.
The equal protection clause is, of course, inspired by the noble concept of
approximating the ideal of the laws's benefits being available to all and the affairs
of men being governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the
very essence of the idea of law.
The equality at which the 'equal protection' clause aims is not a disembodied
equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins 'the equal protection of the laws,'
and laws are not abstract propositions. They do not relate to abstract units A, B
and C, but are expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties, addressed to
the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies. The Constitution
does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law
as though they were the same.
Lutz v Araneta- it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the
subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result
from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation.
Petitioner- kindred concept of uniformity- Court- Philippine Trust Company- The
rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because
this is hardly attainable
Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of
property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has
the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of
taxation
There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection for all that is
required is that the tax "applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations
placed in similar situation"
There was a difference between a tax rate and a tax base. There is no legal
objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by eliminating all deductible
items and at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate.
The discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to the
application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all taxpayers
within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied to all of them.
As there is practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to
make deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the same situation
more or less.
Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class.
On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and
businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce
their income. It would not be just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of
them zero deduction and indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates
on the basis of gross income.
There was a lack of a factual foundation, the forcer of doctrines on due process
and equal protection, and he reasonableness of the distinction between
compensation and taxable net income of professionals and businessmen not
being a dubious classification.
Nolasco v COMELEC
FACTS
A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-elect
Florentino Blanco for alleged performing acts which are grounds for
disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code – giving money to influence,
16
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions: for
committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for spending an
amount for his campaign in excess of what is allowed by the law.
The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position papers.
The case was decided against Blanco.
A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the
vice-mayor-elect took part as intervenor, urging that should Blanco be finally
disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned over to him. The parties were
allowed to file their memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco and Nolasco’s motions
thus this petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws
2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla
as the duly elected mayor
Held:
1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was
given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not
strong. Blanco’s contention that the minimum quantum of evidence was not met
is untenable. What RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require is a
mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending
a winning candidate’s proclamation.
2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a
settled principle in the case of Reyes v COMELEC that the candidate with the
second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an assumption that the second placer
would have received the other votes otherwise it is a judgment substituting the
mind of a voter. It cannot be assumed that the second placer would have won the
elections because in the situation where the disqualified candidate is excluded, the
condition would have substantially changed.
Issue: Whether the disqualification of the mayor-elect warrants the declaration of
any of the remaining qualified mayoral candidates, upon the canvassing of votes,
as mayor.
Held: In a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified. Permanent vacancies (i.e. when an elective local official fills a higher
vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from
office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office) in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor,
and Vice Mayor are governed by Section 44, Chapter 2 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 and Article 38 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991. Vice-Mayor Edgardo C. Nolasco was adjudged as Mayor
of Meycauayan, Bulacan in view of the disqualification of mayor-elect Florentino
P. Blanco.
TELEBAP vs. COMELEC
Facts:
TELEBAP and GMA Network together filed a petition to challenge the validity of
Comelec Time due to the fact that said provisions: (1) have taken properties
without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) it denied the radio
and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that
it is in excess of the power given to the Comelec to regulate the operation of media
communication or information during election period.
Held:
Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to assign. 9 A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things,
to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any
such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or
repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires."
Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the
franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the present case
was brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without
just compensation. Art. XII, §11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of
franchises for "the common good." What better measure can be conceived for the
common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but
even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed
of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."
Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that
broadcast stations give free air time. Even in the United States, there are
responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media
can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to
public affairs to further the system of free expression. For this purpose, broadcast
stations may be required to give free air time to candidates in an election.
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises,
do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast
17
signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them.
Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably
be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
Issue: Whether is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or
regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the
period of election.
Held: No. The petition is dismissed.
With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the
COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which
candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More
than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast
stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would clearly deprive
the people of their right to know. Art. III, §7 of the Constitution provides that “the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized,” while Art. XII, §6 states that “the use of property bears a social
function [and] the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises [is]
subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene
when the common good so demands.”
To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their
obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an
election is maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers
but entities with free speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the
duty of ensuring that the people have access to the diversity of views on political
issues. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media.
To affirm the validity of §92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people’s right to
information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social
function and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the common good.
Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever
altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for
that common good.
TIU V. CA (1999) | EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
G.R. No. 127410, 37 SCRA 99, January 28, 1971
DOCTRINES:
The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents. It is enough
that all persons under like circumstances or conditions are given the same
privileges and required to follow the same obligations.
The classification based on a valid and reasonable standard does not violate the
equal protection clause.
FACTS:
RA 7227 seeks to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into other
productive uses. Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone
(SSEZ), which includes the City of Olongapo, Municipality of Subic and the lands
occupied by the Subic Naval Base and granted special privileges.
Thereafter, EO 97 was issued to clarify the application of the incentives provided
by RA 7227. Sec. 1 of EO 97 provides for the tax and duty-free importations shall
only be applied raw materials, capital goods and equipment brought in by business
enterprises into the SSEZ. Except for these items, importations of other goods into
the SSEZ, whether by business enterprises, resident individuals are subject to the
taxes and duties under Philippine laws. The exportation or removal of tax and duty
free goods from the territory of the SSEZ to other parts of the Philippines shall be
subject to duties and taxes under Philippine laws.
Section 1.1 thereof grants the enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives to the
business and enterprises and residents within the presently fenced-in former Subic
Naval Base only. It excludes the the first two component cities as provided for by
Sec. 12 of RA 7227.
ISSUES:
Whether EO 97-A violates the equal protection of the laws?
RULING:
No, EO 97-A is not violative of the equal protection of the laws.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane
to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4)
apply equally to all members of the same class.
RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into
productive uses.
The Government provides enticements as to persuade and attract investors to
pour in capital with the said military bases. Among such enticements are: (1) a
separate customs territory within the zone, (2) tax-and-duty-free importations, (3)
restructured income tax rates on business enterprises within the zone, (4) no
foreign exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations on banking and finance, and
(6) the grant of resident status to certain investors and of working visas to certain
foreign executives and workers.
18
The purpose of the law is to convert former military base to productive use for the
benefit of the Philippine economy. Hence, there was no reasonable basis to
extend the tax incentives in RA 7227.
Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 278 (1999)
The constitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, that provides that the grant and
enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under RA 7227 were limited
to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic
Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), was questioned.
Nature of the case: A petition for review to reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals which upheld the constitutionality and validity of the E.O. 97-A.
Facts of the case: The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said Order
claiming that they are excluded from the benefits provided by RA 7227 without any
reasonable standards and thus violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity and constitutionality and
denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue: WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
Arguments: Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of
Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly
occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, EO 97-A, according to them,
narrowed down the area within which the special privileges granted to the entire
zone would apply to the present “fenced-in former Subic Naval Base” only. It has
thereby excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from
enjoying the benefits granted by the law. It has effectively discriminated against
them, without reasonable or valid standards, in contravention of the equal
protection guarantee.
The solicitor general defends the validity of EO 97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA
7227 clearly vests in the President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds
of the SSEZ. He adds that the issuance fully complies with the requirements of a
valid classification.
Decision: Panganiban J., The Court held that the classification was based on valid
and reasonable standards and does not violate the equal protection clause.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the
purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane
to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4)
apply equally to all members of the same class.
Ruling: Petition denied. The challenge decision and resolution were affirmed.
301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 12809620 JAN 1999]
LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an
organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of
the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those
included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal
Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution
and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to
investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police
operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents
including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-
intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed
amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged
only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A.
7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
to cases where one or ore of the “principal accused” are government officals with
Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending
resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal
accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including
Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any
court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to
due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions
19
seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire
jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong
Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which
is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the
Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 8249 is constitutional. (YES)
2. Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. (NO)
HELD:
1. RA 8249 is constitutional.
The Court mainly stresses that the provisions are CONSTITUTIONAL because: (a)
there is presumption of validity of laws and no showing that the Congress
pinpointed solely the petitioners which would amount to a violation of the
Constitution’s Equal Protection clause, (b) using the doctrine in Calder v. Bull, the
same is not an ex post facto legislation and lastly, (c) law’s title is comprehensive
enough to fit in the one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution.
2. Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.
It’s QC RTC that has jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the
Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the
complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by
the allegations in the complaint or information,and not by the evidence presented
by the parties at the trial.
The multiple murder charge falls under Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249, which requires
that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his
office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.
An offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the
offense) is ‘intimately connected’ with the office of the offender and perpetrated
while he was in the performance of his official functions.
While the information states that Lacson, et al committed the crime of murder in
relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that
the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to
the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does NOT indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the
victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
While there is the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories
committed the offense “in relation to office as officers and members of the
(PNP),” the Court do not see the intimate connection between the offense
charged and the accused’s official functions. That phrase is merely a conclusion
between of law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy
between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused’s official duties.
What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would
indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused’s official duties
and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having
been committed in relation to public office.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statute R.A. 8249 may be considered as an ex post facto
law that may affect the petitioner’s right to due process?
HELD: No.
REASONING: There is nothing ex-post facto in R.A. 8249 – an ex post facto law
generally provides for a retroactive effect on penal laws. However, the Court
explains, R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. As the Court defines, ‘Penal laws are those
acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties thereof;
or those that defines crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment’. Republic Act 8249 is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not
penal in character, thus, may not be considered an ex post facto law. Therefore,
the argument of the petitioner that the law in question has retroactive effect and
may affect his right to due process is wrong.
SORIANO v. CA G.R. No. 123936 March 4, 1999
Payment of civil indemnity is not violative of the equal protection clause as this is
imposed by law as a consequence of the commission of a crime
Facts: On 7 December 1993, Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence resulting to homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to
property. On 8 March 1994, his application for probation was granted by the trial
court, which imposed upon him terms and conditions (1) to meet his family
responsibilities, (2) to devote himself to a specific employment and not to change
employment without prior notice to the supervising officer; and/or to pursue a
prescribed secular study or vocational training, and (3) to indemnify the heirs of
the victim Isidrino Daluyong in the amount of P98,560.00 as ordered by the Court.
On 26 April 1994, Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin A. Fadera filed a motion to cancel
Soriano's probation due to his failure to satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the
victim, and a supplemental motion alleging Soriano's commission of another crime
for which at that time he was awaiting arraignment. The Zambales Parole and
Probation Office filed a comment recommending that Soriano be allowed to
continue with his probation and that he be required instead to submit a program
of payment of his civil liability. On 20 June 1994, the trial court denied the
20
prosecutor's motion and directed Soriano to submit a program of payment of the his failure to comply. Since probation is not an absolute right, and that it is a mere
civil liability imposed upon him. Thereafter, probation officer Nelda Da Maycong privilege whose grant rests upon the discretion of the trial court. Its grant is
received information that Soriano's father, who owned the vehicle involved in the subject to certain terms and conditions that may be imposed by the trial court.
accident which killed Daluyong, received P16,500.00 as insurance payment. Said Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has the
amount was not turned over to the heirs of Daluyong. Da Maycong considered this power to order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate
a violation of the terms and conditions of the probation, and thus, submitted a circumstances.
manifestation to the trial court praying that Soriano be made to explain his non-
Loong v. COMELEC G.R. No. 133676, April 4, 1999
compliance with the court's order of 20 June 1994, or that he be cited for
contempt for such non-compliance. The trial court granted Da Maycong’s prayers Facts:
in its 15 August 1994 order, and ordered the Soriano once again to submit his
In a bid to improve our elections, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436 on December
program of payment. Soriano instead filed a motion for reconsideration explaining
22, 1997 prescribing the adoption of an automated election system. The new
that he did not receive any notice of the order dated 20 June 1994., as his counsel
system was used in the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous
failed to notify Soriano after he received a copy of said order on 23 June 1994. On
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty.
4 October 1994, the trial court issued an order declaring Soriano in contempt of
Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative
court for his failure to comply with its orders of 20 June 1994 and 15 August 1994,
oversight of the elections in Sulu. During the election it was noticed that there was
and revoked the grant of probation to Soriano and ordered that he be arrested to
an error in the printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the
serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. Soriano filed a special civil action
automated machines failed to read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition,
an emergency meeting of the local candidates and the military-police officials
holding that Soriano's "stubborn unwillingness" to comply with the orders of the
overseeing the Sulu elections. The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata
trial court "shows his refusal to reform himself and to correct a wrong." Soriano’s
should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. Some recommended a manual
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the appellate court. Soriano
count while other insisted on an automated count. In view of their differences in
filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
opinion, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. requested the parties to submit their written position
Issue: Whether the requirement to pay indemnity to the victim’s heirs, in light of papers. Petitioner argues that he automated counting is mandatory and could not
the convict’s application for probation, is violative of the equal protection clause be substituted by a manual counting. Where the machines are allegedly defective,
of the Constitution. the only remedy provided for by law is to replace the machine. Manual counting is
prohibited by law;
Held: The requirement to pay indemnity to the victim's heirs is not violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Soriano's application for probation Issue:
had already been granted. Satisfaction of his civil liability was not made a
Whether or not COMELEC had the authority to order a manual count.
requirement before he could avail of probation, but was a condition for his
continued enjoyment of the same. The trial court could not have done away with Held:
imposing payment of civil liability as a condition for probation. This is not an
YES. In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy
arbitrary imposition but one required by law. It is a consequence of Soriano’s
where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-
having been convicted of a crime, and petitioner is bound to satisfy this obligation
seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the
regardless of whether or not he is placed under probation. There is no reason why
COMELEC from levitating above the problem. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the
Soriano cannot comply with a simple order to furnish the trial court with a program
Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all
of payment of his civil liability. He may, indeed, be poor, but this is precisely the
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
reason why the trial court gave him the chance to make his own program of
referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to
payment. Knowing his own financial condition, he is in the best position to
have COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the
formulate a program of payment that fits his needs and capacity. Soriano’s refusal
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
to comply with orders cannot be anything but deliberate. He has refused to
Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining the
comply with the trial court's directive, by questioning instead the constitutionality
parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct of our elections. Our elections
of the requirement imposed and harping on his alleged poverty as the reason for
are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for public offices,
21
candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has to make
snap judgments to meet unforseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the will
of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable,
indeed, may even be debatable. We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair
criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult circumstances.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC
resolutions.
2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering
a manual count. (The main issue in the case at bar)
2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?
2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELEC
when it ordered a manual count?
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or
not it is proper to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.
HELD:
the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are
dismissed, there being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its
discretion in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-
1798. Our status quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted.
(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. The issue is not only legal but
one of first impression and undoubtedly suffered with significance to the entire
nation. It is adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner, the private respondents and
the intervenor to the position of governor of Sulu. These are enough
considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
(2a). A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on
automated election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section
2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election , plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to
give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or
whimsical. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read
correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata The technical experts of COMELEC
and the supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong the automated
machines. They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the National
Printing Office. It is plain that to continue with the automated count would result
in a grossly erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would
have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where
the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing.
We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from
levitating above the problem. . We cannot kick away the will of the people by
giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual
counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the
conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that
cannot count the result of an election.
It is also important to consider that the failures of automated counting created
post election tension in Sulu, a province with a history of violent elections.
COMELEC had to act desively in view of the fast deteriorating peace and order
situation caused by the delay in the counting of votes
(2c) Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied process. The Tolentino
memorandum clearly shows that they were given every opportunity to oppose the
manual count of the local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later
submitted written position papers. Their representatives escorted the transfer of
the ballots and the automated machines from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers
observed the manual count from beginning to end.
3. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is
completely off-line. The plea can only be grounded on failure of election. Section
6 of the Omnibus Election Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the
date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would
affect the result of the election, the Commission shall on the basis of a verified
petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election, not held, suspended or which resulted in
a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of
such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
22
There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To
hold a special election only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and
will violate the right of private respondent to equal protection of the law. The
records show that all elected officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and are now
discharging their powers and duties. These officials were proclaimed on the basis
of the same manually counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is illegal, their
assumption of office cannot also be countenanced. Private respondent's election
cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.
The plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this
Court.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting
Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as
the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL
SCHOOL, INC., respondents.,
G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a
domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign
diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the
School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it
either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel
being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their
employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of
employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-
hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a
legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty
members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign
and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should
be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock
between the parties.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB,
the matter reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.
RULING:
NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is
entitled to “humane conditions of work.” These conditions are not restricted to
the physical workplace – the factory, the office or the field – but include as well
the manner by which employers treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code.
Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in
regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.
The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates “to afford labor
full protection”. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between
labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed
with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements
included, must yield to the common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-
hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or
less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the
employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of
the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the
will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’
interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3)
prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The
basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their
intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective
bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these
groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-
hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions
under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded
certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These benefits are
23
reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the
former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires
would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective
bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED
IN PART.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify
its claim of parity.
RULING: Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably
institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for
equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort
and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is
that these employees perform equal work. If the employer pays one employee less
than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the
others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence
here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-
hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform
under similar working conditions.
Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent
School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires
to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the
services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
HELD:
Public policy abhors inequality and discrimination. The Constitution directs the
State to promote “equality of employment opportunities for all.” Similarly, the
Labor Code provides that the State shall “ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed.”
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code.
Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser
compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal
value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization. The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in
this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of “equal pay for equal work.”
Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule
applies to the School, its “international character” notwithstanding. In this case,
employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle
long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental
notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold today.
De Guzman vs. Comelec GR No. 129118. July 19, 2000
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the
validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The
Voters Registration Act of 1996".
SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in
a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer
who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has
served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall
automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the
original congressional district.
Petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, were reassigned to
different stations by the COMELEC.
Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it violates the
equal protection clause guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution because it singles out
the City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from
holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They
maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them and other
COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the
objective of the provision of law under attack.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal protection clause.
HELD:
No.
The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election
officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their
place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Lutz vs. Araneta: "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to
a policy of all or none".
24
This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It
may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners are
exposed to the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. However, in this
case, it can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law
would be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of
corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section
3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the highest officials or authorized
representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to say that
without the complicity of such officials, large-scale anomalies in the registration of
voters can hardly be carried out.
The petition is dismissed and upheld the constitutionality of Section 44 of RA 8189.
DIMAPORO V. HRET
FACTS:
This is a petition brought by Congressman Dimaporo seeking to nullify the twin
Resolutions of the HRET which denied his Motion for Technical Evaluation of the
Thumbmarks and Signatures Affixed in the Voters Registration Records and
Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution Denying the Motion for Technical
Examination of Voting Records.
Pursuant to the 1998 HRET Rules Congressional candidate Mangotara Petition of
Protest (Ad Cautelam) seeking the technical examination of the signatures and
thumb the protested precincts of the municipality of Sultan Naga Dimaporo (SND).
Mangotara alleged that the massive substitution of voters and other electoral
irregularities perpetrated by Dimaporo’s supporters will be uncovered and
proven. From this and other premises, he concluded that he is the duly-elected
representative of the 2ndDistrict of Lanao del Norte.
Noting that “the Tribunal cannot evaluate the questioned ballots because there
are no ballots but only election documents to consider” HRET granted
Mangotara's motion and permitted the latter to engage an expert to assist him in
prosecution of the case, NBI conducted the technical examination.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Dimaporo was deprived by HRET of Equal Protection when the latter denied
his motion for technicalexamination.2. W/N Dimaporo was deprived of procedural
due processor the right to present scientific evidence to show the massive
substitute voting committed in counter protested precincts.
RULING:
1.
Resolution of HRET did not offend equal protection clause. Equal protection
simply means that all persons and things similarly situated must be treated alike
both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. It follows that the
existence of a valid and substantial distinction justifies divergent treatment.
According to Dimaporo since the ballot boxes subject of his petition and that of
Mangotara were both unavailable for revision, his motion, like Mangotara’s,
should be granted. The argument fails to take into account the distinctions extant
in Mangotara’s protest
vis-à-vis
Dimaporo’s counter-protest which validate the grant of Mangotara’s motion and
the denial of Dimaporo’s.
First.
The election results in SND were the sole subjects of Mangotara’s protest. The
opposite is true with regard to Dimaporo’s counter-protest as he contested the
election results in all municipalities but SND. Significantly, the results of the
technical examination of the election records of SND are determinative of the final
outcome of the election protest against Dimaporo. The same cannot be said of the
precincts subject of Dimaporo’s motion.
It should be emphasized that the grant of a motion for technical examination is
subject to the sound discretion of the HRET. In this case, the Tribunal deemed it
useful in the conduct of the revision proceedings to grant Mangotara’s motion for
technical examination. Conversely, it found Dimaporo’s motion unpersuasive and
accordingly denied the same. In so doing, the HRET merely acted within the
bounds of its Constitutionally-granted jurisdiction. After all, the Constitution
confers full authority on the electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives
and the Senate as the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and
exclusive.
2. Anent Dimaporo’s contention that the assailed
Resolutions denied him the right to procedural due process and to present
evidence to substantiate his claim of massive substitute voting committed in the
counter-protested precincts, suffice it to state that the HRET itself may ascertain
the validity of Dimaporo’s allegations without resort to technical examination. To
this end, the Tribunal declared that the ballots, election documents and other
election paraphernalia are still subject to its scrutiny in the appreciation of
evidence. It should be noted that the records are replete with evidence,
documentary and testimonial, presented by Dimaporo. Dimaporo’s allegation of
denial of due process is an indefensible pretense. The instant petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
GR No. 148208 | Central Bank Employees (Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Association
vs Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary | Dec 15, 2004
25
FACTS:
The Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc, filed a Petition for
Prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President,
to restrain respondents from further implementing the last provisio in Section 15
(c), Article II of RA No 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
BACKGROUND:
July 3, 1993, RA No 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the
old Central Bank of the Philippines and created a new BSP.
Article II, Section 15 (c) RA 7653: A compensation structure based on job evaluation
studies and wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted
as an integral component of the Bank Sentrals human resource development
program. Provided that the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform
as closely as possible with the principles provided for under RA No 6758 (Salary
Standardization Act). Provided, however, that compensation and wage structure
of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in
accordance with the rates prescribed under RA No 6758.
7 Subsequent Laws were enacted exempting all other rank-and-file employees of
Government Financial Institutions from the SSL. These are: RA No 7907 (1995) –
LBP, RA No 8282 (1997) – SSS, RA No 8289 (1997) – SBGFC, RA No 8291 – GSIS, RA
No 8523 (1998) – DBP, RA No 8763 (2000) – HGC, and RA No 9302 (2004) – PDIC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, runs
afoul of the constitutional mandate that “No person shall be … denied equal
protection of the laws”
HELD:
The last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, is unconstitutional.
RULING:
With the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of the other
government financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last
provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on
the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation
of its classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found
reasonable because there were substantial distinction that made real differences
between the 2 classes.
The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in
circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation
of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653. This relates to the
constitutionality of classifications between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7
other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply
equally to all members of the class. The provisio may be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so
as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without
differences.
The inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each
exemption rests on the policy determination by the legislature. The policy
determination argument may support the inequality of treatment between the
rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of
treatment between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs who are
similarly situated.
The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results of
Congress inconsistent and unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and
the 7 other GFIs. The challenge to the constitutionality of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No
7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by
Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated.
In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws” includes the prohibition against enacting laws that
allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principles is that equal protection and security shall be
given to every person under circumstance which, if not identical are analogous.
Doctrines:
Elements of valid class legislation: (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class
Relative Constitutionality. The fact that a statute is constitutional at first does not
mean it is constitutional forever. The subsequent changes in the original
circumstance surrounding the law would affect its validity.
Issue: WON the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection
clause.
Held:
YES, the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause.
26
Equal protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes
of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate – so long as the
classification is not unreasonable. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons themselves, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of
officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP’s lack of
competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was
not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file and the resulting
discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and
entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. However, in the subsequent passages of
the amendment on the charters of other GFI, the surrounding circumstances of
the case changed.
The subsequent amendments of the other GFIs’ charter (i.e., express
authorization to determine and institute its own compensation and wage
structure, and explicit exemption – without distinction as to salary grade or
position – all employees of the GFI from the SSL) resulted to the oppressive results
of Congress’ inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and
those of the seven other GFI. In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as
regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to
the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-
and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting
one). The distinction made by the law is not only superficial, but also arbitrary. It
is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the
BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
The subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued
denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees of the exemption from SSL breached
the latter’s right to equal protection.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Coconut Oil Refiners vs Torres GR 132527 29 July 2005
Facts: This is a Petition to enjoin and prohibit the public respondent Ruben Torres
in his capacity as Executive Secretary from allowing other private respondents to
continue with the operation of tax and duty-free shops located at the Subic Special
Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). The petitioner
seeks to declare Republic Act No. 7227 as unconstitutional on the ground that it
allowed only tax-free (and duty-free) importation of raw materials, capital and
equipment. It reads:
The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate
customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within,
into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide
incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and
equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the
Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be
subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other
relevant tax laws of thePhilippines [RA 7227, Sec 12 (b)].
Petitioners contend that the wording of Republic Act No. 7227 clearly limits the
grant of tax incentives to the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment
only thereby violating the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
He also assailed the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A for being
violative of their right to equal protection. They asserted that private respondents
operating inside the SSEZ are not different from the retail establishments located
outside.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7227 is valid on the ground that it violates
the equal protection clause.
Decision: The SC ruled in the negative. The phrase ‘tax and duty-free importations
of raw materials, capital and equipment was merely cited as an example of
incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public
respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their restrictive
interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example.
The petition with respect to declaration of unconstitutionality of Executive Order
No. 97-A cannot be, likewise, sustained. The guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws is not violated by a legislation based which was based on reasonable
classification. A classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinction,
(2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions
only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Applying the
foregoing test to the present case, this Court finds no violation of the right to
equal protection of the laws. There is a substantial distinctions lying between the
establishments inside and outside the zone. There are substantial differences in a
sense that, investors will be lured to establish and operate their industries in the
so-called ‘secured area and the present business operators outside the area. There
is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives
accorded in R.A. 7227.
Issue: Whether EO 97-a, section 5 of EO. 80, and section 4 of BCDA Resolution no.
93-05-034 are unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.
Held: No, Petitioners’ contention cannot be sustained. It is an established principle
of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not
27
violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took
valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the effect on August 23, 1994.
law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the
members of the same class. Applying the foregoing test to the present case, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent
finds no violation of the right to equal protection of the laws. First, contrary to
Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH). Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides,
petitioners’ claim, substantial distinctions lie between the establishments inside
Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks – All commercial blood banks shall be
and outside the zone, justifying the difference in their treatment. The Court found
phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act,
substantial differences between the retailers inside and outside the secured area,
extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary. ” Section 23.
thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification. Certainly, there are
Process of Phasing Out. — The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all
substantial differences between the big investors who are being lured to establish
commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum
and operate their industries in the so-called “secured area” and the present
period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend
business operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion-
shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and
peso investments and thousands of new jobs. On the other hand, definitely none
demand and public safety.”
of such magnitude. In the first, the economic impact will be national; in the second,
only local. Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners
“secured area” are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the have already been operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517,
law, which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of entitled “An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood,
the Philippine economy. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to and the Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing
them the benefits and incentives accorded in R.A. 7227. It is well-settled that the Laboratories.”
equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long
The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and
as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no
operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood processing
violation of the constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, including the
laboratories.
petitioners, possessing the requisite investment capital can always avail of the
same benefits by channeling his or her resources or business operations into the On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they
fenced-off free port zone. filed a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules
Beltran vs Secretary of Health GR 133640 25 November 2005
of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and
Facts: The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. The National Blood
Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in order to
promote and preserve public health and safety. Issue: Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 and its implementing rules is valid on
the ground that it violates the equal protection clause.
Decision: Petition granted. The assailed law and its implementing rules are
What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question
constitutional and valid. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection
not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated.
of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every
Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but
case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring
classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is
others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made
permitted.
arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into
The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial
law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by
distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of
promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country.
the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply
It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was
equally to each member of the class.

28
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for The Committee of Citizen’s challenged the constitutionality of the law on behalf
the promotion of public health and welfare. Based on the foregoing, the of Plessy, claiming it violated the equal protection law under the 14th Amendment.
Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable
The Supreme Court held that the Louisiana Law was constitutional because it was
discrimination and inequality shall be allowed.
“separate but equal.”
To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood
Note: “Separate but equal” was later overturned as Justice Harlan predicts in his
banks/centers and commercial blood banks. We deem the classification to be valid
dissent.
and reasonable for the following reasons: First, it was based on substantial
distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical Plessy v. Ferguson Case Brief
service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly
Statement of the Facts:
encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of
commodity. Second, the classification, and the consequent phase out of A Louisiana state law (the Separate Car Act) permitted separate railway cars for
commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide African Americans and Caucasians. Homer Plessy, a 1/8 African American citizen,
the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood was considered African American under the legislation. After taking a seat in the
donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service Caucasian section, Plessy was asked to move to the African American railway car.
rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial In response, Plessy refused and was imprisoned. Plessy and the Committee of
blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they Citizens challenged his arrest and conviction; however, Judge Ferguson found the
source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe arrest and conviction to be sound.
compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on
Procedural History:
the Philippine blood banking system. Third, the Legislature intended for the
general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar
circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing
The Committee of Citizens appealed the decision of Judge Ferguson to the
conditions. Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without
Louisiana Supreme Court. The state Supreme Court Affirmed. The Committee of
exception.The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State.
Citizens petitioned to United States Supreme Court on behalf of Plessy. The Court
The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern.
granted certiorari.
Issue and Holding:
Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the
Is a state law providing for separate railway cars for African Americans and
State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.
Caucasians valid without violating the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause?
Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of
Yes.
the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to over overcome the Judgment:
presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a
Affirmed. The Louisiana state law was deemed constitutional.
wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for Congress
to determine. Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:

ISSUE: WON RA 7719 (National Blood Services Act) constitutes as unlawful Racial classifications do not violate the Equal Protection Clause as long as the
deprivation of personal liberty and property. public accommodations are “separate but equal.”

HELD: No. It was a VALID legislation. The interest of commercial blood banks must Reasoning:
yield to a greater interest of the public. The Supreme Court held that the law is constitutional because if the civil rights of
Case Summary of Plessy v. Ferguson: each race are separate but equal, one race cannot be considered inferior on either
a political or social level.
Plessy, a Louisiana citizen of African American descent, was asked to move from
the Caucasian railway car. He refused.
29
The Court stated that the 14th Amendment could not have been intended to
enforce social equality since Caucasians and African Americans do not desire to be
commingled. The legislature cannot force desegregation to encourage race
equality because it must occur organically.
Distinguishing a separate railway car based on race does not imply the inferiority
of one race to another because each railway car is “separate but equal.”
Concurrence or Dissent:
Dissent (Harlan):
The state law should have been invalidated. Governmental bodies should not take
into consideration the race of citizens when making legislative civil rights decisions
regarding those citizens. The underlying reason for a separate railway car is
obviously a belief by the Louisiana legislature that African Americans are an
inferior race. The Louisiana law and the majority misinterpret the civil rights
protected in our color-blind constitution.
Significance:
The decision in Plessy v. Ferguson continued to permit public segregation under
the guise of “separate but equal.” It ultimately set back civil rights in the United
States and resulted in many businesses defining themselves as “serving whites
only.” Plessy v. Ferguson was eventually overturned in 1954. (Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
Question
Does the Separate Car Act violate the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
The Court held that the state law was constitutional. In an opinion authored by
Justice Henry Billings Brown, the majority upheld state-imposed racial
segregation. Justice Brown conceded that the 14th Amendment intended to
establish absolute equality for the races before the law, but held that separate
treatment did not imply the inferiority of African Americans. The Court noted that
there was not a meaningful difference in quality between the white and black
railway cars.
In short, segregation did not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination.
In dissent, John Marshall Harlan argued that the Constitution was color-blind and
that the United States had no class system. Accordingly, all citizens should have
equal access to civil rights.
U.S. Supreme Court
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
Craig v. Boren
No. 75-628
Argued October 5, 1976
Decided December 20, 1976
429 U.S. 190
Syllabus
Appellant Craig, a male then between 18 and 21 years old, and appellant Whitener,
a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive
relief, claiming that an Oklahoma statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of
"nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the
age of 18 constituted a gender-based discrimination that denied to males 18-20
years of age the equal protection of the laws. Recognizing that Reed v. Reed, 404
U. S. 71, and later cases establish that classification by gender must substantially
further important governmental objectives, a three-judge District Court held that
appellees' statistical evidence regarding young males' drunk-driving arrests and
traffic injuries demonstrated that the gender-based discrimination was
substantially related to the achievement of traffic safety on Oklahoma roads.
Held:
1. Since only declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the gender-
based differential was sought, the controversy has been mooted as to Craig, who
became 21 after this Court had noted probable jurisdiction. See, e.g., DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312. P. 429 U. S. 192.
2. Whitener has standing to make the equal protection challenge. Pp. 429 U. S. 192-
197.
(a) No prudential objective thought to be served by limitations of jus tertii standing
can be furthered here, where the lower court already has entertained the
constitutional challenge and the parties have sought resolution of the
constitutional issue. Pp. 429 U. S. 193-194.
(b) Whitener in any event independently has established third-party standing. She
suffers "injury in fact," since the challenged statutory provisions are addressed to
vendors like her, who either must obey the statutory provisions and incur
economic injury or disobey the statute and suffer sanctions. In such
circumstances, vendors may resist efforts to restrict their operations by
advocating the rights of third parties seeking access to their market. See, e.g.,
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438. Pp. 429 U. S. 194-197.
30
3. Oklahoma's gender-based differential constitutes an invidious discrimination
against males 18-20 years of age in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Appellees' statistics (the most relevant of which show only that .18% of females
and 2% of males in the 18-20-year-old age group were arrested for driving while
under the influence of liquor) do not warrant the conclusion that sex represents
an accurate proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving. Pp. 429 U. S. 199-204.
4. The operation of the Twenty-first Amendment does not alter the application of
equal protection standards that otherwise govern this case. The Court has never
recognized that application of that Amendment can defeat an otherwise
established claim under the Equal Protection Clause, the principles of which
cannot be rendered inapplicable here by reliance upon statistically measured but
loose-fitting generalities concerning the drinking tendencies of aggregate groups.
Pp. 429 U. S. 204-210. 399 F.Supp. 1304, reversed.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MARSHALL,
POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and in all but Part II-D of which BLACKMUN, J.,
joined. POWELL, J., post, p. 429 U. S. 210, and STEVENS, J., post, p. 429 U. S. 211,
filed concurring opinions. BLACKMUN, J., filed a statement concurring in part,
post, p. 429 U. S. 214. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post, p. 429 U. S. 214. BURGER, C.J., post, p. 429 U. S. 215, and REHNQUIST, J., post,
p. 429 U. S. 217, filed dissenting opinions.
Case summary for Craig v. Boren:
Craig, an Oklahoma liquor vendor challenged the constitutionality of an Oklahoma
statute which prohibited the sale of “nonintoxicating” 3.2 percent beer to males
under the age of 21.
The district court upheld the statute and Craig appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States.
The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause.
A gender based classification is subject to intermediate scrutiny, which means the
classification must be substantially related to achieving an important government
purpose. The Court did not find that the classification was substantially related to
achieving that stated government interest.
Craig v. Boren Case Brief
Statement of the facts:
In Oklahoma, a state statute was passed which prohibited the sale of
“nonintoxicating” 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21. An Oklahoma
liquor vendor brought suit against state official Boren claiming the law violated
the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause. Statistical evidence was offered
in support of the discrimination based on gender and the state claimed the
discrimination was substantially related to achieving the government’s interest in
traffic safety.
Procedural History:
At trial, the district court upheld the statute. Craig then appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:
Gender discrimination is subject to intermediate scrutiny and is therefore
constitutional if it is substantially related to achieving an important government
interest.
Issue and Holding:
Does a statue denying the sale of alcohol to an individual based on gender violate
the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause? Yes.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court.
Reasoning:
The Court held that the appropriate standard of review of discrimination on the
basis of gender is intermediate scrutiny. Under this level of scrutiny, the
classification must be substantially related to achieving an important government
purpose. Here, Boren claims the statute is related to achieving the government’s
goal of traffic safety through statistical evidence. The evidence shows that .18
percent of females under the age of 21 are arrested for driving under the influence,
in contrast 2 percent of males in the same age bracket are arrested.
The Court held that the difference is significant, but it is not enough to justify a
broad rule to prohibit the sale of alcohol to males and not females in the relevant
age group. The Court also pointed out that no evidence has been offered to show
the dangerousness of 3.2 percent alcohol use as opposed to simply alcohol. As a
result, no justification exists and the Oklahoma law equates to a denial of Equal
Protection to males between the ages of 18 and 20.
Concurring or Dissenting opinion:
Concurring (Stevens):
The statistics provided do not conclusively show males are more likely to drive
drunk than females.
Concurring (Powell):
Classifications based on gender are subject to strict scrutiny, not intermediate.
31
Concurring (Blackmun):
Classifications should be subject to intermediate scrutiny and the 21st Amendment
does not save the Oklahoma statute.
Dissenting (Burger):
Classifications based on gender should be subject to rational basis review. The
legislature did not act irrationally in reaching their decision based on statistical
evidence.
Dissenting (Rehnquist):
The majority should have applied a rational basis level of review. Case law and the
Equal Protection Clause do not establish that regulations based on gender “must
be substantially related to an important government purpose.”
Significance:
Craig v. Boren established the level of scrutiny under which discrimination based
on gender must be subjected to. The intermediate level of scrutiny is still used for
classifications based on gender today.
Question
Did an Oklahoma statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause by establishing different drinking ages for men and women?
Conclusion
Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the statute made unconstitutional
gender classifications. The Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of
Oklahoma were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the law
and the maintenance of traffic safety. Generalities about the drinking habits of
aggregate groups did not suffice. The Court also found that the Twenty-first
Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal Protection Clause in the
case.
In striking down the Oklahoma law, the Court established a new standard for
review in gender discrimination cases. More demanding than the lowest standard
for review -- rational basis -- but less demanding than the highest standard -- strict
scrutiny, the majority articulated an in-between standard -- intermediate scrutiny.
Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
School Segregation, Equal Protection
Facts of the case
This case was the consolidation of cases arising in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia,
Delaware, and Washington D.C. relating to the segregation of public schools on
the basis of race. In each of the cases, African American students had been denied
admittance to certain public schools based on laws allowing public education to
be segregated by race. They argued that such segregation violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs were denied relief
in the lower courts based on Plessy v. Ferguson, which held that racially
segregated public facilities were legal so long as the facilities for blacks and whites
were equal. (This was known as the “separate but equal” doctrine.)
Question
Does the segregation of public education based solely on race violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The
Supreme Court held that “separate but equal” facilities are inherently unequal and
violate the protections of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court reasoned that the segregation of public education based
on race instilled a sense of inferiority that had a hugely detrimental effect on the
education and personal growth of African American children. Warren based much
of his opinion on information from social science studies rather than court
precedent. The decision also used language that was relatively accessible to non-
lawyers because Warren felt it was necessary for all Americans to understand its
logic.
"We conclude that the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal." —Chief Justice Earl Warren
In Topeka, Kansas in the 1950s, schools were segregated by race. Each day, Linda
Brown and her sister had to walk through a dangerous railroad switchyard to get
to the bus stop for the ride to their all-black elementary school. There was a school
closer to the Brown's house, but it was only for white students. Linda Brown and
her family believed that the segregated school system violated the Fourteenth
Amendment and took their case to court. Federal district court decided that
segregation in public education was harmful to black children, but because all-
black schools and all-white schools had similar buildings, transportation, curricula,
and teachers, the segregation was legal. The Browns appealed their case to the
Supreme Court, stating that even if the facilities were similar, segregated schools
could never be equal to one another. The Court decided that state laws requiring
separate but equal schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
[ GR No. 198271, Apr 01, 2014 ]
32
ARNALDO M. ESPINAS v. COA +
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari[1] is respondent Commission on Audit's (CoA)
Decision No. 2011-039[2] dated August 8, 2011 which affirmed Notice of
Disallowance No. 09-001-GF(06)[3] dated July 21, 2009 covering petitioners'
reimbursement claims for extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses for the
period January to December 2006.
The Facts
The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) is a government-owned and
controlled corporation (GOCC) created[4] pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 198,[5] as amended, otherwise known as the "Provincial Water Utilities Act
of 1973."
Petitioners are department managers of the LWUA who, together with 28 other
LWUA officials, sought reimbursement of their extraordinary and miscellaneous
expenses (EME) for the period January to December 2006. According to
petitioners, the reimbursement claims were within the ceiling provided under the
LWUA Calendar Year 2006 Corporate Operating Budget approved by the LWUA
Board of Trustees and the Department of Budget and Management.[6]
On April 16, 2007, the Office of the CoA Auditor, through Priscilla DG. Cruz, the
Supervising Auditor assigned to the LWUA (SA Cruz), issued Audit Observation
Memorandum (AOM) No. AOM-2006-27,[7] revealing that the 31 LWUA officials
were able to reimburse P16,900,705.69 in EME, including expenses for official
entertainment, service awards, gifts and plaques, membership fees, and
seminars/conferences.[8] Out of the said amount, P13,110,998.26 was reimbursed
only through an attached certification attesting to their claimed incurrence
("certification").[9] According to the AOM, this violated CoA Circular No. 2006-
01[10] dated January 3, 2006 (CoA Circular No. 2006-01), which pertinently states
that the "claim for reimbursement of such expenses shall be supported by receipts
and/or other documents evidencing disbursements."[11]
During the CoA Exit Conference held sometime in April 2007, LWUA management
officials, including herein petitioners, manifested that they were unaware of the
existence of CoA Circular No. 2006-01, particularly during the period January to
December 2006.[12]
After the post-audit of the LWUA EME account for the same period, SA Cruz issued
Notice of Disallowance No. 09-001-GF(06)[13] dated July 21, 2009, disallowing the
EME reimbursement claims of the 31 LWUA officials, in the total amount of
P13,110,998.26, for the reason that they "were not supported by receipts and/or
[other] documents evidencing disbursements as required under [Item III(3)] of
[CoA Circular No. 2006-01]."[14]
Pursuant to the CoA's 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure, petitioners appealed the
notice of disallowance to the CoA Cluster Director (Corporate Sector - Cluster
B),[15] contending that the "certification" they attached in support of their EME
reimbursement claims was originally allowed under Section 397 of the
Government Accounting and Auditing Manual, Volume I (GAAM - Vol. I),[16] which
is a reproduction of Item III(4) of CoA Circular No. 89-300[17] dated March 21, 1989
(CoA Circular No. 89-300), viz.:
4. x x x The corresponding claim for reimbursement of such expenses shall be
supported by receipts and/or other documents evidencing disbursement, if these
are available, or, in lieu thereof, by a certification executed by the official
concerned that the expenses sought to be reimbursed have been incurred for any
of the purposes contemplated under Section 19 and other related sections of RA
6688 (or similar provision[s] in subsequent General Appropriations Acts) in
relation to or by reason of his position. In the case of miscellaneous expenses
incurred for an office specified in the law, such certification shall be executed
solely by the head of the office. [18] (Emphasis supplied)
Further, petitioners alleged that CoA Circular No. 2006-01 is violative of the equal
protection clause since officials of GOCCs, such as the LWUA officials, are, among
others, prohibited by virtue of the same issuance from supporting their
reimbursement claims with "certifications," unlike officials of the national
government agencies (NGAs) who have been so permitted.[19] To this end,
petitioners argued that the employees of NGAs and GOCCs are similarly situated
and that there exists no substantial distinction between them.[20]
Finally, petitioners submitted that CoA Circular No. 2006-01 was not duly published
in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation and thus,
unenforceable.[21]
The CoA Cluster Director's Ruling
Petitioners' appeal was denied by CoA Cluster Director IV Divinia M. Alagon (CoA
Cluster Director Alagon) in Decision No. 2010-003[22] dated April 13, 2010, thereby
affirming Notice of Disallowance No. 09-001-GF(06).
Applying the statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis,[23] CoA Cluster
Director Alagon held that a certification executed by the official concerned for the
purpose of claiming EME cannot be construed to fall under the phrase "other
documents evidencing disbursements" as provided under Item III(3) of CoA
Circular No. 2006-01.[24] She explained that a certification is not of the same class
as a receipt because the latter is issued by a third person, while the former is issued
by the claimant, and usually self-serving.[25] Moreover, certifications are not
evidence of disbursements but are just assertions made by the claimants that they
have spent a fixed amount every month for meetings, seminars, public relations
33
and the like.[26] In this relation, CoA Cluster Director Alagon noted that CoA must refer to documents that evidence disbursement, of which the certifications
Circular No. 2006-01 is stricter as it does not mention a certification as an being mere general statements that the certified amount was used as EME, and is
alternative supporting document for the claim for reimbursement.[27] This is within the prescribed ceiling therefor are not.[38]
based on the observation that boards of GOCCs and government financial
It further debunked petitioners' reliance on the provisions of Section 397 of GAAM
institutions (GFIs) are invariably empowered to appropriate through resolutions
- Vol. I and Item III(4) of CoA Circular No. 89-300 as these issuances actually show
such amounts as they deem proper for EME.[28] Thus, the exclusion of said
the contrary intention to include "certifications" in the phrase "other documents
certifications in CoA Circular No. 2006-01 is a control measure purposely integrated
evidencing disbursements" as among the documents sufficient to support the
thereto to regulate the incurrence of these expenditures and to ensure the
claim for EME reimbursement under Item III(3) of CoA Circular No. 2006-01. The
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
"certification" is separate and distinct from the term "other documents
unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds.[29]
evidencing disbursements" whether under Section 397 of GAAM - Vol. I or Item
CoA Cluster Director Alagon also opined that there lies no violation of the equal III(4) of CoA Circular No. 89-300. The certification under these issuances is "in lieu
protection clause since GOCCs and GFIs are empowered to appropriate EME of" the receipts and/or other documents evidencing disbursement. Moreover, the
through board resolutions, while the EME for NGAs must be provided in a law CoA observed that if the term "certification" is intended to be included in the term
enacted by Congress (i.e., the General Appropriations Act [GAA]).[30] Accordingly, or among the "other documents evidencing disbursements" that will support a
there is a reasonable classification which is germane to the purpose of CoA Circular claim for EME reimbursement, then Section 397 of GAAM - Vol. I and Item III(4) of
No. 2006-01.[31] CoA Circular No. 89-300 would have stated so; however, the latter provisions did
not. Besides, the CoA pointed out that CoA Circular No. 2006-01 specifically applies
Finally, CoA Cluster Director Alagon stated that CoA Circular No. 2006-01 was
to GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiaries, while CoA Circular No. 89-300, from which
published in the Manila Standard Today in its February 24, 2006 issue; hence,
Section 397 of GAAM - Vol. I was lifted, exclusively applies to NGAs.[39]
petitioners' assertion on this score was found to be baseless.[32]
Finally, the CoA maintained that there is a substantial distinction between the
Unconvinced, petitioners elevated the ruling to the Commission Proper, docketed
officials of NGAs and the officials of the GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiaries insofar
as CoA CP Case No. 2010-101,[33] averring that: (a) the principle of ejusdem generis
as their entitlement to EME is concerned. The former's EME is sourced from the
does not apply since there is no enumeration of things followed by general words
annual GAA, while the latter's EME is provided by their corporate operating
in CoA Circular No. 2006-01;[34] (b) the certifications fall under the category of
budget approved by their respective governing boards. In connection therewith,
documents evidencing disbursements under Item III(3) of the same issuance,
the CoA emphasized that the issuance of CoA Circular No. 2006-01 is pursuant to
which, in any case, have been previously allowed under Section 397 of GAAM - Vol.
its exclusive constitutional authority to promulgate accounting and auditing rules
I and CoA Circular No. 89-300;[35] and (c) there exists no valid classification
and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
between officials of NGAs and officials of GOCCs and GFIs.[36] Petitioners'
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of
previous contention on the circular's lack of publication was no longer raised in
government funds. It is therefore within the purview of its mandate and the
their petition to the Commission Proper.
above-stated distinctions that CoA Circular No. 2006-01 must be interpreted.[40]
The Commission Proper's Ruling
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed the present certiorari petition, imputing grave abuse
In its Decision No. 2011-039[37] dated August 8, 2011, the CoA affirmed Notice of of discretion on the part of the CoA.
Disallowance No. 09-001-GF(06) but differed from CoA Cluster Director Alagon's
The Issue Before the Court
reasoning.
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not grave abuse of
The CoA agreed with petitioners that the principle of ejusdem generis was not
discretion attended the CoA's ruling in this case.
applicable since CoA Circular No. 2006-01 does not contain any enumeration of
specific terms which are followed by a general word or phrase. However, it held The Court's Ruling
that the principle's non-applicability does not necessarily buttress petitioners'
The petition lacks merit.
main argument that the phrase "and/or other documents evidencing
disbursements" includes the "certifications" issued to support the claim for EME The CoA's audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to
reimbursement. This is because the "other documents evidencing disbursements" the check-and-balance system inherent in our system of government.[41] As an

34
essential complement, the CoA has been vested with the exclusive authority to
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties. This is
found in Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides
that:
Sec. 2. x x x.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this
Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques
and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of
government funds and properties. (Emphases supplied)
As an independent constitutional body conferred with such power, it reasonably
follows that the CoA's interpretation of its own auditing rules and regulations, as
enunciated in its decisions, should be accorded great weight and respect. In the
recent case of Delos Santos v. CoA,[42] the Court explained the general policy of
the Court towards CoA decisions reviewed under certiorari[43] parameters:[44]
[T]he CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the
proper use of the government's, and ultimately, the people's property. The
exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that
gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.
x x x [I]t is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative
authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not
only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their
presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the
decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.
x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The concept is well-entrenched: grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or
to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law
and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism.[45] Not every error in the
proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse
of discretion. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent
or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.[46]
Viewed in the foregoing light, the Court finds that the CoA did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion as its affirmance of Notice of Disallowance No. 09-001-
GF(06) is based on cogent legal grounds.
First off, the Court concurs with the CoA's conclusion that the "certification"
submitted by petitioners cannot be properly considered as a supporting document
within the purview of Item III(3) of CoA Circular No. 2006-01 which pertinently
states that a "claim for reimbursement of [EME] expenses shall be supported by
receipts and/or other documents evidencing disbursements." Similar to the word
"receipts," the "other documents" pertained to under the above-stated provision
is qualified by the phrase "evidencing disbursements." Citing its lexicographic
definition, the CoA stated that the term "disbursement" means "to pay out
commonly from a fund" or "to make payment in settlement of debt or account
payable."[47] That said, it then logically follows that petitioners' "certification," so
as to fall under the phrase "other documents" under Item III(3) of CoA Circular No.
2006-01, must substantiate the "paying out of an account payable," or, in simple
term, a disbursement.[48] However, an examination of the sample
"certification"[49] attached to the petition does not, by any means, fit this
description. The signatory therein merely certifies that he/she has spent, within a
particular month, a certain amount for meetings, seminars, conferences, official
entertainment, public relations, and the like, and that the certified amount is
within the ceiling authorized under the LWUA corporate budget. Accordingly,
since petitioners' reimbursement claims were solely supported by this
"certification," the CoA properly disallowed said claims for failure to comply with
CoA Circular No. 2006-01.
The CoA also correctly rejected petitioners' invocation of the provisions of Section
397 of GAAM - Vol. I and CoA Circular No. 89-300 since, at the outset, such rules
are applicable only to NGAs, and not to GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiaries which
are specifically governed by CoA Circular No. 2006-01.[50] A perusal of CoA Circular
No. 89-300, from which Section 397 of GAAM - Vol. I was merely reproduced,
clearly indicates in Item II thereof, captioned "Scope and Coverage," that the rules
thereunder applies to "appropriations authorized under [the GAA of 1989] for
National Government agencies [that] may be used for incurrence of extraordinary
and miscellaneous expenses at the rates and by the offices and officials specified
therein for, among others x x x."[51] A similar inference may be reached from a
reading of Item I of CoA Circular No. 89-300, captioned as "Rationale," which
states that the circular was made in response to the "increasing number of queries
and requests for clarification as to the real import and true intent of [the
provisions of the GAA of 1989] authorizing the use by certain national government
officials of appropriations authorized for their agencies for extraordinary and
miscellaneous expenses."[52] On the other hand, Item II of CoA Circular No. 2006-
35
01, captioned as "Scope and Coverage," explicitly states that "[t]his circular shall WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Accordingly, Notice of Disallowance No.
be applicable to all GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiaries" and shall cover their 09-001-GF(06) dated July 21, 2009 is hereby AFFIRMED.
"extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses and other similar expenses."[53] Item
SO ORDERED.
I of CoA Circular No. 2006-01, captioned as "Rationale," also mentions the CoA's
declared policy to "prescribe rules and regulations specifically for government
corporations to regulate the incurrence of these expenditures and ensure the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds" considering that
"[g]overning boards of [GOCCs/GFIs] are invariably empowered to appropriate
through resolutions such amounts as they deem appropriate for extraordinary and
miscellaneous expenses."[54] Based on the foregoing, it is readily apparent that
petitioners' reliance on Secton 397 of GAAM - Vol. I and Item III(4) of CoA Circular
No. 89-300 was improper, hence, the CoA's apt dismissal of the same.
Lastly, the Court upholds the CoA's finding that there exists a substantial
distinction[55] between officials of NGAs and the officials of GOCCs, GFIs and their
subsidiaries which justify the peculiarity in regulation. Since the EME of GOCCs,
GFIs and their subsidiaries, are, pursuant to law, allocated by their own internal
governing boards, as opposed to the EME of NGAs which are appropriated in the
annual GAA duly enacted by Congress, there is a perceivable rational impetus for
the CoA to impose nuanced control measures to check if the EME disbursements
of GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiaries constitute irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable government expenditures. Case in point is the
LWUA Board of Trustees which, pursuant to Section 69 of PD 198, as amended, is
"authorized to appropriate out of any funds of the Administration, such amounts
as it may deem necessary for the operational and other expenses of the
Administration including the purchase of necessary equipment." Indeed, the Court
recognizes that denying GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiaries the benefit of
submitting a secondary-alternate document in support of an EME reimbursement,
such as the "certification" discussed herein, is a CoA policy intended to address
the disparity in EME disbursement autonomy. As pertinently stated in CoA Circular
No. 2006-01, the consideration underlying the rules and regulations contained
therein is the fact that "[g]overning boards of [GOCCs/GFIs] are invariably
empowered to appropriate through resolutions such amounts as they deem
appropriate for extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses."[56] Hence, in due
deference to the CoA's constitutional prerogatives, the Court, absent any
semblance of grave abuse of discretion in this case, respects the regulation, and
consequently dismisses the petition. With these pronouncements, the Court finds
it unnecessary to delve on the other ancillary issues raised by the parties in their
pleadings. Notice of Disallowance No. 09-001-GF(06) dated July 21, 2009 is
therefore upheld and the persons therein held liable are ordered to duly return the
disallowed amount of P13,110,998.26.

36