The Administration of the Empire

Author(s): E. Badian
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Greece & Rome, Second Series, Vol. 12, No. 2, Alexander the Great (Oct., 1965), pp.
166-182
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association
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 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE
By E. BADIAN

HEN Alexander invaded Asia, he almost certainly had no idea

W how far he would go or what the end would be.' For the moment,
Antipater was left in complete charge of Macedon and (with ill-defined
powers) of the 'free' Greek allies and other European dependants; it
was only towards the end of his life that the King began to worry about
the excessive power that Antipater had fashioned for himself; and by
then, as it turned out, it was too late to deal with him and Alexander
died without doing so.2 As far as Asia was concerned, there were no
blueprints on how to organize it. This is not mere conjecture, but can
be proved. One point of policy was inherited from Philip and inescap-
able: the 'Hellenic crusade', to liberate the Greeks of Asia and to punish
the barbarian for the events of 480. It might be thought that on this
point Alexander had little freedom of action. Yet it is precisely here
that we see him proceeding-within the elastic framework of 'liberation'
-slowly and pragmatically.3 Bypassing Greek cities that he knew were
unfriendly, he did not take one (Zelea) until after the battle of the
Granicus: the Zeleans were 'forgiven' for having helped the enemy
under compulsion, but got no special concessions (A. i. 12. 6; 17. 2).
After his stay at Sardis-which will occupy us soon-he entered
Ephesus. This city had been occupied by Parmenio in his invasion of
Asia before Philip's death. He had established democracy (since the
Persians had ruled through a narrow oligarchy), and the grateful citizens
had set up Philip's statue in the great temple of Artemis ('Diana of
the Ephesians'). But a counter-revolution had brought the city under
Persian control and undone Parmenio's work. Alexander could do no
less than restore the democracy that welcomed the son of Philip. As
for the tribute paid to Persia (and presumably, for a time, to Philip), he
ordered it to be paid henceforth to Artemis (A. i. 17. 9 ff.)-a gesture
befitting both his religious feeling and his love of display. He offered
to do more: to finish the restoration of the temple (which had been burnt
Too much has been made of his reported gesture in throwing a spear into Asia:
Diodorus' explanation that it implied a claim to the whole of Asia is clearly absurd and
ex post facto. Such a ceremonial claim has no parallel. The true parallel is perhaps
Roman fetial procedure (see Walbank, JHS lxx [1950], 8o).
2 See JHS lxxxi (1961), 36 ff.
3 What follows anticipates the conclusions reached in my contribution to Studies
in Ancient Society and Institutions in Honour of V. Ehrenberg (forthcoming, I966),
where the evidence is presented and analysed in greater detail.
 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE 167
down the night he was born) and dedicate it in his name, and he was
prepared to pay for this honour; but the Ephesians politely declined
(Strabo xiv. x. 22).
It was at this point that events forced him to commit himself towards
the Greeks in Asia. Already impressed by the strength of the demo-
cratic movement in Ephesus, he was now approached by envoys of
neighbouring Magnesia and Tralles, asking him to occupy their cities-
no doubt also after a democratic revolution. He sent Parmenio to do so,
and he now knew what his policy must be: Alcimachus, with a small
force, was instructed to liberate the Greek cities of Ionia and Aeolis, to
set up democracies and to free them from tribute (A. i. 18. I). The
pattern had emerged. The cities were to be democracies, since demo-
cracies were anti-Persian;' they were to be free from tribute and from
the governor's control2 and, on the whole, left to run their own affairs.
They were, of course, expected to subordinate themselves to Alexander,
to accept garrisons (where required) and to pay a war contribution
(syntaxis). And they had to consult the King on all matters of real im-
portance. Unfortunately there is not much evidence on the details of
their status: once Alexander had passed through Asia Minor, our Greek
sources were not very interested in what happened there; while inscrip-
tions are few. But the case of Aspendus-reminiscent of recent events
in satellite states-shows the true interpretation of their freedom. The
citizens had submitted to Alexander, no doubt expecting reasonable
terms; but the King-genuinely short of money and supplies-ordered
them to pay him the tribute of horses that they had paid to Darius, as
well as the fantastic sum of 50 talents in cash. Shocked by what they
regarded as a breach of trust, they refused; whereupon Alexander laid
siege to the city and, on its surrender, doubled the savage contribution,
subjected the city to tribute and to the governor and probably mulcted it
of territory.3
The only documents strictly relevant concern Priene-a city that
granted Alexander his cherished wish of dedicating a temple. There an
inscription survives exempting the city from the war contribution
originally imposed and making some (uncertain) provision about the
I
This, as the author of [Dem.] xvii points out, was contrary to the state of affairs
in European Greece, where Macedonian control was in many cities maintained through
pro-Macedonian oligarchies. Loyalty to Macedon was the only consideration.
2 Clear from the punishment of Aspendus (see next note, with text).
3 A. i. 26. 2-27. 4. For comparison, the total original tribute assessment of the
Delian League is given by Thucydides as 46o talents and the tribute revenue in 432
as 6oo talents--and both figures are reduced by up to one-third by some modern
scholars (see Chambers, CP liii [I1958], 26 f.).
168 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE

garrison.' It can be shown that this inscription should be dated after

Issus-perhaps even much later (331/330?). It follows that, when
Alexander passed that way in 334, a garrison and a regular contribution
had been imposed; and this shows the true application of the order
to Alcimachus. Moreover, the inscription contains a royal ruling on
Priene's port of Naulochum-showing exactly the kind of royal inter-
vention in major internal affairs that is also known from some of the
island cities.2 The status of the Greek cities after their liberation is thus
clear.
What is not clear is whether the Greeks of Asia (or, for that matter,
those of the off-shore islands) were members of the Hellenic League.
There has been endless argument about this, even though it soon
ceased to be of fundamental importance. It can only be clearly stated
(a) that there is no conclusive evidence either way (on this most scholars
would agree); (b) that an important a priori consideration puts the onus
of proof firmly on those who would deny membership:3 if the proclaimed
purpose of the crusade was the liberation of the Greeks of Asia, the
frontier between these Greeks and their kinsmen in Europe had to fall-
they had to be reunited in a common political system, and this could
only be the League. It would take positive evidence to shake this pre-
sumption; and there is none-indeed, there is a little in its favour.4
The syntaxeis are surely most readily explained as the equivalent of the
military service performed by European Greeks.s
It will be convenient, at this point, to summarize later administrative
changes as far as they affected the Greeks of Asia. (In Europe there
were none-only unofficial deterioration.) Before crossing the Euphrates,
Alexander made two rather mysterious appointments (A. iii. 6. 4):
Coeranus of Beroea was appointed to collect the tribute of Phoenicia,
Philoxenus that of 'Asia on this side of Taurus'. As often, Arrian's
language is vague and non-technical. The functions of the two men
have been variously reconstructed. They are clearly pure finance
officers of some sort, and it has been claimed that they were to collect
I
On Priene, see Tod 184-5; and cf. my discussion, op. cit. (p. 166, n. 3).
2
Chios: Tod 192; Eresus: Tod 191.
3 See Larsen, CP xxi (1926), 58, clearly making this important point.
* The word o(rvrattswas used in the Second Athenian Confederacy for allied 'con-
tributions', to avoid the suspect p6pos(Harp., s.v.
aivra••i).
s It will be recalled that a good 120 years earlier these same cities had commuted
service for tribute to Athens. As for Europe and the islands, we simply do not know
whether some of the smaller states preferred contributions to service; but it is quite
likely. Alexander-desperately short of money at this time--would prefer whatever
they could afford to pay, to a dozen men each from an assortment of petty states. Money
was homogeneous.
 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE 169
the tributes of large areas from the satraps, who were subordinated to
them: all of Asia Minor in one case; Syria, Phoenicia, and Cilicia in the
other. This would be a considerable departure from what we know of
the Persian satrapy system-and an unnecessary piece of bureaucratiza-
tion: satraps, in all other respects, were directly in touch with the King.
The source, too, is strongly against such a view. The two appointments
are parallel, and in one case only Phoenicia is mentioned. This gives
us the clue. For Phoenicia did not have a satrap. There, as among the
Greeks, there were city states with a considerable amount of indepen-
dence: the King of Sidon was at least as 'free' as the People of Priene.
With Alexander about to leave for the East, it became necessary to
co-ordinate the collection of the sums paid by these city states, which
would not be able to arrange for the separate dispatch of their few
talents to the King over large distances. This was the only work to be
done in Phoenicia, and Coeranus (clearly) was to do it. But a similar
task needed to be performed for the Greek cities in Asia Minor. It
follows that this was the task of Philoxenus (whose appointment is
parallel to that of Coeranus).
After winning Gaugamela, the King seized Babylon, Susa, and Perse-
polis and appropriated the vast treasures of the Persian kings. Mean-
while many of the European Greeks had joined Agis III of Sparta in
a supreme challenge to Macedonian power. The rebellion began early
in 331, and it can be seen in Arrian's account how seriously Alexander
took this war. After tensely waiting for news of it at Persepolis, he
finally heard of its end on his march from Persepolis to Ecbatana in
the spring of 330; and at Ecbatana he took the consequences. The
Hellenic crusade was closed and the European contingents-no longer
needed as fighters or as hostages-were sent home. The old slogan was
now a positive encumbrance. It follows-though, as usual, it does not
happen to be attested-that the corresponding 'contributions' of the
Greeks in Asia must also have been remitted. The King now had more
money than he knew how to use. He could afford to be just. Henceforth
the Greeks were probably free of financial burdens.' The question
remained, what to do with Philoxenus ? There he was, at Sardis, his
contacts with the cities well established and his authority inevitably
acknowledged by them. He still had a useful task to perform. The solu-
tion, apparently, was to give him certain powers of supervision over the
Greek cities of Asia and the eastern Aegean-powers corresponding to
those of Antipater in Europe, whose own supervision could not easily
On the end of the Hellenic crusade and its connexion with that of Agis' war, see
my forthcoming article in Hermes xciv (1966).
 170 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE
stretch so far. Shortly before the end of the reign, we find Philoxenus
holding a varied assortment of eastern Greeks imprisoned at Sardis,
intervening at Ephesus, and arresting a fugitive on Rhodes.' The
League, by now, was a mere formality: Alexander's order to the cities
to receive their exiles back (in 324) shows what he thought of it. After
his death, the leaders bargaining at Babylon quietly ignored it: the Greek
cities apparently became part of their respective provinces.
We have had to anticipate, for the sake of coherence. We must now
turn to Alexander's relations with barbarians. His first real contact
with them was bound to be significant. The prophets of the Hellenic
crusade (especially Isocrates) had seen the war as a means of gaining
Lebensraum for Greeks at the expense of enserfed barbarians.2 The
future of the world (we may say) depended on whether he would take
their advice. It would have meant, perhaps, undreamt-of prosperity for
Greeks, and the thorough penetration of a small area by Greek civiliza-
tion-a very different world from that which in fact followed Alexander.
For when he took Sardis, he at once showed his wider ambitions: he
would not enslave barbarians. Perhaps he even considered 'liberating'
them, after a fashion: the Lydians were allowed to be 'free' and to use
their traditional laws. A Macedonian-Asander, a brother of Parmenio
-was substituted for the Persian satrap, a garrison left in the citadel,
and arrangements made for a Greek (Nicias) to collect the tribute.3
Nothing had changed.
The next stage is marked by Alexander's arrival in Caria. There the
rightful queen (Ada), ousted by a pretender who had Persian support,
was holding out in a mountain fortress. She was an obvious ally:
probably there were previous contacts. Restored to her royal title, she
adopted Alexander as her son and successor. The cities of Caria (except
for the strongly held Halicarnassus) welcomed him as a liberator, and
The evidence (Paus. ii. 33. 4; Polyaen. vi. 49; Plut. Phoc. I8; Mor. 333A, 531A)
is fully discussed in my article (cit., p. I66, n. 3). It is conclusive. Philoxenus' title
is variously given, but was perhaps the old Persian one rendered by Greeks as
0J-rapxos 'Icovias.
(or orrpa-rqy6b)
2 See Isocr.
Paneg. There is probably no truth in the report that Aristotle had
advised Alexander to treat barbarians as slaves (cf. Historia vii [1958], 440 ff.): his
Letters to Alexander, read in antiquity, are unlikely to have been genuine.
3 A. i. 17. 3 f. (On the subordinate appointments, see the general remarks, p. 173,
with n. 5, below.) This did not mean any change-for better or worse-in the con-
dition of the Lydians. The Persians had permitted subject peoples the use of their
own laws and institutions, unless this was politically dangerous; Alexander merely
refrained from exercising the full rights of the conqueror. On the meaning of 'freedom'
in this context, see Tibiletti, Athenaeum, xxxii (1954), 3 ff. Calas (a relative of Har-
palus, later probably a victim of the great purge (see below)) had been appointed satrap
of Dascylium (A. i. 17. I). But we know nothing about arrangements for that province,
except that its tribute was unchanged and that Zelea was 'forgiven' for aiding Persia.
 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE 171
he left small forces there under a Macedonian commander.' Essentially,
this was again imitation of Persian precedent: the great Carian dynasts
had won the royal title and wide de facto independence in return for
recognition of the Great King's suzerainty (i.e. from his point of view
they were hereditary satraps). It was only after the death of two of
Maussollus' sons that the Persians took the opportunity of a conflict
between his daughter Ada and her youngest brother to intervene on
his-the weaker-side so as to increase direct control. For the first
time Alexander had found a barbarian people incensed against Persia,
and, with his characteristic political tact, he had adapted Persian methods
to attach them firmly to himself. After Ada's death Alexander duly
succeeded and sent a governor, as he was entitled to do.
For some time henceforth Alexander followed the convenient pattern
of substituting his own satrap for the King's. But he remained adaptable
and undogmatic. We have seen the special status of Phoenicia: the
winning of loyalty was the chief concern.2 It was only in Egypt that
a radical departure from all precedent was made. Here Alexander's
happy opportunism can be seen at its best. Egypt-protected by Nile,
sea, and desert-had successfully maintained its independence against
Persian attacks for sixty years, until a Greek mercenary leader at last
recaptured it for the King in 343. The recapture was followed by severe
punishment. As a result of this, when Alexander approached a few
years later, the upper class was so eager for liberation that the vast
fortress surrendered without a blow.3 When Alexander, after visiting
Ammon and having himself crowned Pharaoh in Memphis, came to
settle Egypt (winter 332/I), two principles were applied: the favour of
the natives was safeguarded, and power was (as far as possible) divided.
Arrian (iii. 5) tells us the facts. There was no satrap or single commander.
The traditional regions of Upper and Lower Egypt were each put under
an Egyptian 'nomarch', to rule according to native custom. The army
was divided into two sections under Macedonian officers, and garrison
and mercenary commanders were separately appointed (though no
doubt subordinated to the two generals); while the Nile fleet was again
separate. On the eastern and western frontiers two military districts
were established under independent commanders, and one of these
men-the Egyptian Greek Cleomenes of Naucratis-was asked to col-
lect the tribute from the nomarchs, who had to collect it at the source.
I
A. i. 23; more detail in P. 22; D. xvii. 24.
2 See p. 169, above; cf. Berve i. 284 f.
3 On all this (not requiring detailed discussion here) see, conveniently, CAH vi.
ch. 6.
172 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE
One of the nomarchs refused to act, and the other was permitted to
govern the whole country: having neither army nor independent
treasury, he could never be a danger. The whole scheme was perfectly
designed to achieve its purposes: the country was held securely, yet
without a nucleus for rebellion; and the odium of immediate tax collec-
tion fell on Egyptians and not on the conquerors.
The sequel is also interesting, as showing Alexander's lack of any
political or strategic dogmatism. Not long after Alexander's departure
we find Cleomenes as satrap.I That this was done without Alexander's
knowledge, by clever use of his money and troops, has often been sug-
gested and remains possible. But there is no doubt that official recogni-
tion was ultimately accorded:2 the Greek from Naucratis, loyal and
competent as he showed himself, could never rise to be a serious danger
to his King. It turned out, after all, to be best to let him take efficient
charge of the province, to his own vast profit and Alexander's.
On his return to Phoenicia (spring 331), before setting out for the
Euphrates, Alexander made his final dispositions for the provinces so
far won (A. ii. 6. 4 ff.). We have commented on Coeranus and Philoxe-
nus, chosen (it seems) to collect the tribute or 'contributions' of cities.
These men were qualified for their posts. Before the battle of Issus they
had apparently taken over the King's central treasury from his friend
Harpalus, who, perturbed at the loss of Alexander's confidence, had
fled to Megara.3 He was now recalled and put in charge of the treasury
once more. Alexander had recognized that this post (however dangerous
the power it gave) could not be split. Harpalus-one of his oldest and
closest friends-was apparently to receive the tribute surplus from
satraps and collectors. We shall have to come back to him. Meanwhile
the King left for the East, where he won the battle of Gaugamela and,
a few days later, occupied Babylon.
Gaugamela changed everything. The battle of Issus had shown him
that he could beat Darius. The result was a first claim to the Achae-
menid throne, in a remarkable letter quoted by Arrian.4 Gaugamela
I
Amply attested: Paus. i. 6. 3; Arr. Succ. 5 (decisive parallel with Ptolemy); [Arist.]
Oecon. ii. 33 ff. (written within a generation).
2 Certainly by the time of the notorious letter forgiving all his sins (A. vii. 23. 6 f.:
see Hamilton, CQ N.s. iii [19531, 157), but probably much earlier. One might suggest
the time (330, it seems) when Philoxenus' authority in Asia Minor was strengthened.
Cleomenes and Antigonus were the only satraps with long tenure left in undisturbed
possession of their provinces to the end of the reign.
3 See Historia ix
(i96o), 245 f.
* A. ii. 14. 4 f. It is widely accepted as genuine in outline: its argument, progressing
from the 'Hellenic crusade' to the charge that Darius was a usurper whom the gods and
his own people had now abandoned for Alexander, precisely mirrors the development
 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE 173
made it certain. The new Great King had entered upon his heritage.
He is now called 'King' by the Greeks and he soon wears the royal
costume of Persia (in adapted form).' At Babylon we see the first
results.
Babylon was not really friendly to Persian rule, for the Persians had
destroyed the temple of Bel and failed to respect local religion as Cyrus
had done in his day. The Persian Mazaeus, hitherto loyal to the King,
surrendered the disaffected city without resisting. Alexander, inevitably,
took full advantage of this sentiment. He conspicuously honoured the
Chaldean priests and ordered the temple to be rebuilt. As a result, he
was extremely popular.2 But when it came to organizing the province
he accomplished a master-stroke.3 Ignoring the Babylonian upper class,
he made Mazaeus himself satrap and (it is said) even gave him the Per-
sian satrap's traditional right to coin in silver.4 A tax-collector was also
appointed, as in Lydia. (Other such appointments may well have been
made elsewhere: our sources do not always mention minor figures.)
In view of the honour in which Mazaeus was held, it is reasonable to
assume that the collector was subordinated to the satrap, as Nicias at
Sardis surely was to Parmenio's brother. He would in any case be
a useful watchdog.5 More important: the Amphipolitan Greek Apollo-
dorus-brother of a soothsayer of high standing-was made 'commander

of Alexander's policies and propaganda, as we see it in his actions; and this was not-
as far as we know-appreciated by anyone in antiquity who might have forged the
letter (and certainly not by Arrian).
I On the title see Tod ii, p. 264; Dittenberger, SIG3 i, p. 381, n. I. Tarn puts the
change c. 330 (i. 34), which seems as near as we can get. On the royal costume, see
D. xvii. 77. 5; C. vi. 6. 4; P. 45.
2 A. iii. 16. 4 f.; C. v. I. 36 f. (disapproving of the excessive feasting).
3 This account follows Arrian, omitting the less significant appointments and routine
changes. The other sources are confused and certainly in error over appointments at
Babylon and in adjacent areas.
4 Thus the numismatists, e.g. A. R. Bellinger, Essays on the Coinage of Alexander the
Great (1963), 61 f., with authoritative discussion of the numismatic background (but
some historical inaccuracies). They do not, however, make it clear what the evidence
is that proves the coins of Mazaeus to have been issued under Alexander. Since it is
very likely (see p. 175, below) that Mazaeus had governed Babylonia (or rather,
Mesopotamia) at an earlier time, might not the coins date back to that time? Numis-
matists have not (to my knowledge) discussed this question, which I am not competent
to decide. For the coins, see the example, Plate II. That Mazaces also coined in
Babylonia seems to be a numismatists' myth.
5 If Mazaeus did issue coins, it is incredible that he should not have had supreme
control of finance. In any case, Asclepiodotus (like Nicias in Sardis: see p. 5) is an
insignificant person, not heard of again. Royal appointees in hierarchically subordinate
posts are a traditional Achaemenid feature: like garrison commanders, tax-collectors
and other high officials may always have been thus appointed by the King. (For a
different view, see G. T. Griffith, Proc. Camb. Philol. Soc. 190 (1964), 23 ff.-which
I have considered, but cannot accept.)
174 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE
of the soldiers left behind with Mazaeus'.' No doubt a loyal Greek-
a Macedonian could perhaps not yet be trusted to co-operate with a
Persian satrap!-would ensure that the soldiers were used in Alexander's
interest. Whether he was technically Mazaeus' subordinate is not stated
(nor is it on similar occasions later). Historically it does not matter: he
would co-operate with the satrap as long as the latter was loyal and act
against him if he was not. Also, it probably took a Greek or Macedonian
to give the actual orders to Greek or Macedonian soldiers: they might
not obey a Persian. But we in fact have no reason to doubt that the
satrap was technically commander-in-chief in his province, as in Persian
days. For one thing, the appointment of European commanders with
Iranian satraps, though henceforth common, was not universal. In
some cases (e.g. Oxydates, Arsaces, Artabazus) no strategus is men-
tioned.2 And the case of Artabazus seems to show that an Iranian could
command (as least) Greek troops, though he would act through a Euro-
pean. Also, the wording of the source does not suggest that Mazaeus
had nothing to do with the soldiers: they are left 'with him' (not, e.g. 'in
Babylon'). In any case, we know that satraps still commanded their
provincial levies: there was no question of depriving them of military
authority. Those most trusted were freely used in important operations;
and they were probably also allowed to enrol mercenaries.3 In fact, in
two cases the generals are called o-rricrKoTroo4-which indicates a subor-
dinate position; and in view of Arrian's known habits of word usage,
there is no reason to suppose that he meant to distinguish these two from
the cr-rpccTryoi elsewhere. Again Alexander was probably following (and
perhaps extending) the tried Achaemenid custom of making subordinate
appointments royal, so as to have irremovable and trusted watchdogs in
the satrapies. This must obviously be the position in the case of the
garrison commanders of important cities (it is inconceivable that the

On Apollodorus, see Berve ii. 55, no. Ioi. On the whole subject, see the careful
discussion by O. Leuze, Die Satrapieneinteilung in Syrien und im Zzweistromlande
(1935), 431 [z= 275 of offprint] ff.
2 Arsaces: A. iii. 25.
7; 29. 5. (On the name see Berve ii. 8o, no. 146.) Artabazus:
A. iii. 29. I (satrap of Bactria-Sogdiana, with no strategus-cf. A. iii. 23. 9; 28. 2 for his
employment as superior to Europeans). Phrataphernes: see next note. (His appoint-
ment is not recorded.)
3
Phrataphernes: A. iii. 28. 2; iv. i8. I f. (see Berve ii. 401 for Arrian's error);
v. 20. 7 (commanding Thracians). Tyriaspes: A. v. 20. 7. Mercenaries: Alexander's
order to dismiss them (D. xvii. io6. 3; I I1. i) gives no indication that their enrolment
had been illegal. We cannot prove that satraps like Phrataphernes were in this respect
equal to Europeans; but it seems likely in the light of their other powers, especially
since Alexander could not spare enough troops of the main army to leave with all of
them.
4 Berve i. 265 f.; 278.
 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE 175
satrap should not have been able to use these as required) and is almost
certainly true, as we have seen, of the tax-collectors.
The pattern of organization for the Iranian satrapies over the next
year or two followed the arrangements in Babylon.' But we must now
return to Mazaeus. The appointment of this great Persian noble was,
of course, a proclamation of Alexander's future policy: the lawful suc-
cessor to the Achaemenids was calling for the co-operation of the Iranian
aristocracy-the traditional administrators of the Empire, without whose
help he could not hope to run it. However, there is more to be said
about Mazaeus. As it happens, he had several sons, two of whom are
named in our sources in Hellenized form: Antibelos (or Brochubelos)
and Artiboles. Now, these are Babylonian names.Z Mazaeus, probably
at some time satrap of Mesopotamia,3 had strong Babylonian connexions,
unusual for a highly placed Persian. (We recall that the temple of Bel
had been destroyed by the Persians.) It is reasonable even to conjecture
a Babylonian wife: two sons with Babylonian names can hardly be
otherwise explained. This will be why he stayed behind in Babylon
and surrendered it, to save it from destruction. We can now appreciate
Alexander's remarkable good luck and his genius in using it: embodying
the last gesture of 'liberation' and the first act of the new Great King,
Mazaeus is a living symbol of Alexander's policies in transition.
During the next year or two, as we have seen, the new policy is con-
sistently followed. Alexander is now clearly Great King, with the
proper court of eunuchs, concubines, and other attendants.4 He was
also still Macedonian king-and many difficulties ensued, which do
not concern us here. Something, however, must be said about the court
in its administrative functions. Alexander, like all ancient kings and
emperors, did far more in person (attending even to quite petty matters)
than a modern head of state would: this was expected of a monarch.
Nevertheless, he had to have his helpers. In proper Macedonian style,
he was surrounded by his 'Companions' (Ftralpoi)--Macedonians and
some Greeks, who spent most of their time with him, dining and

It was in Babylon that Alexander tried-along the lines of his new policy-to send
a loyal Persian to take over Armenia. When he failed to displace the hereditary satrap
Orontes, the latter seems to have been recognized, acknowledging Alexander's formal
suzerainty. See Berve ii. 260, no. 516; 262, no. 524; 395, no. 593. (Orontes continued
to call himself satrap.)
2 Berve ii. 40, no. 82; 84, no. 154. 'Antibelos' is clearly corrupted by the influence
of the Greek prefix. Curtius (v. 13. ii) has 'Brochubelos' (various spellings in the
manuscripts)-a good Semitic name ('Blest by the Lord'), which may well be correct.
3 Berve ii. 244, as corrected by Leuze, op. cit. (n. 28) 41o [= 2541 ff.
4 C. iii. 3. 23 f.; vi. 6. 8; D. xvii. 77. 6 (see Welles's note ad loc. in the Loeb edition:
they were necessary for proper royal display).
176 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE
drinking with him, fighting by his side, and advising him on matters of
state.' Some-e.g. Hephaestion and Nearchus-were his friends, loyal
to him ever since the troubles of his youth; others-e.g. Philip the
soothsayer, or his namesake the physician-had official duties; others,
whatever the King's feelings towards them, were there as of right, by
reason of their eminence-e.g. Alexander the Lyncestian and Parmenio.
These men were his personal staff: those not holding permanent senior
posts were always prepared to undertake important missions at short
notice, to take charge of a garrison or a city, or (as on the Hydaspes) to
perform expensive services on his behalf. When with the King, they
could normally expect free access to him-screened, at the most, by
the 'bodyguards' (acopa-roq~lAaKe&), eminent nobles who combined staff
commissions with their traditional function of guarding the King.2
And they were specially distinguished on official occasions-notably,
of course, at the Susa marriages (A. vii. 4; Ath. xii. 538b). Alexander's
Persian court, on the other hand, also included bodyguards (8opuq6poi)
and 'kinsmen' (ovyyEvEis): the latter had the right to a royal kiss (cf.
A. vii. I 1. 6 f.). Our sources-chiefly interested in Greeks and Mace-
donians-tell us little about them; but Alexander must have used them
extensively in his dealings with the native populations, and the Oriental
satraps were no doubt of their number, just as European satraps were
'Companions'. In due course-perhaps before the Indian campaign-
Hephaestion was promoted to the office of 'Chiliarch' (traditionally
a Grand Viziership, evidently intended to co-ordinate the Macedonian
and Persian parts of the court and endowed with high administrative
functions); and after his death Perdiccas de facto succeeded him. It is
a pity that the sources give us no details of their functions. Eumenes
of Cardia, the Chief Secretary, must have had many dealings with
Hephaestion (whom he hated) and with Perdiccas (with whom he got
on exceedingly well, if we may judge by their relations after Alexander's
death). Eumenes, with many friends and connexions, was a key figure
in the background: after the death of his enemy Hephaestion he was
promoted to a hipparchy, and he was the only Greek who, in due course,
played an important part in the struggles of the Successors. We should
also like to know more about Chares of Mytilene, the Minister of Proto-
col, whose importance appears on such occasions as the proskynesis
affair. (It is not his fault that we do not: he wrote a book, which survives
only in a few interesting fragments.)
In provincial organization, the system of appointing Iranian satraps
I
References are innumerable. For a council of 'Companions', see A. i. 25. 4; ii.
2 See Berve i. 27 f.
25. 2; et al.
 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE 177
did not work well. Alexander's sole piece of serious misfortune-his
failure to catch Darius alive-following upon his sole serious error of
judgement--the burning of the palace at PersepolisI'-largely vitiated
his claim to legitimate kingship. Eastern Iran proved difficult and
rebellious. In the winter of 330, after the first stage of Satibarzanes'
revolt, Menon (a Greek or Macedonian) was appointed satrap of
Arachosia (A. iii. 28. I; C. vii. 3- 5). In 329 the unsatisfactory Arsaces
had to be replaced by Stasanor (A. iii. 29. 5). But this time-the time
of the King's conspiracy against Philotas and Parmenio-was not one
when Macedonians were greatly trusted. Menon-if a Macedonian at
all-is a shadowy figure, a mere name; Stasanor is a Cypriot Greek: they
had no quarrel with the King. When the great north-eastern frontier
province of Bactria-Sogdiana was organized, it went to the loyal Arta-
bazus, greatest and most Hellenized of the satraps. Paropamisus-the
key to India-was given first to Proexes, then to Tyriaspes, both
Iranians. They proved-at least for a time-more satisfactory than the
Macedonian strategus Niloxenus, who soon had to be replaced.z But
the supply of trustworthy Iranians was running out; on the other hand,
after the death of Clitus the Macedonians proved to be well in hand.
Mazaeus, who died in 328, was succeeded by Stamenes, an Oriental
(A. iv. 18. 3). But when Artabazus retired-worn out with age and
service-in the same year, his difficult province went to Amyntas,
a Macedonian.3 These were the last appointments before India.
Alexander had no reliable Orientals left. The eastern part of Iran-
Bactria-Sogdiana, Aria, and Arachosia-formed a solid layer of pro-
vinces strongly held by Greeks or Macedonians, watching over western
Iran (in Oriental hands) and guarding Alexander's rear for the Indian
campaign.
It is at this point that we must say a few words-only a few, relevant
to our subject-about Alexander's cities. His activity as a founder of
cities is well known, though ill attested in detail. Even in his youth,
with Philip's permission and Aristotle's advice, he had founded one in
Thrace.4 In Egypt, of course, with his splendid eye for terrain, he
On this incident, see my discussion, art. cit. (p. 169, n. I).
2 See Berve i. 266-7, with references to his prosopography in vol. ii. On the size
and importance of Bactria, cf. C. v. 10. 3.
3 Berve ii. 30, no. 60. We are told-perhaps not reliably-that the post had been
intended for Clitus (C. viii. I. 19 f.; 2. 14-meant to heighten the tragedy of Clitus'
death): there is no mention of it in Arrian, even though he deals with Clitus' death at
some length. We cannot tell whether it is true. Amyntas did not distinguish himself
in the province.
4 Alexandropolis (P. 9). On Aristotle's tract irrp1avro{Kcov
(?)-probably to be assigned
to this occasion-see Historia vii (1958), 442.
3871.2 N
178 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE
planned Alexandria (though its greatness is due to the Ptolemies).
Altogether the canon of his cities later comprised 70 (Plut. Al. fort. i.
328E), and several partial lists survive. It was an ancestry that was
cherished and-like all such-tended to be claimed on poor credentials.
Forts and garrison posts might later become flourishing cities, claiming
Alexander as city founder; and the Successors added to the confusion
by naming cities after their master. The details do not matter here.,
But the first foundation (apart from the two we have mentioned) that
is actually reported in the sources on Alexander is 'Alexandria in
Caucasus' (i.e. Hindu Kush) in Paropamisus. From that point on,
foundations multiply. Not all are 'cities' in a true sense, by any means.
Several are garrisons of soldiers and veterans controlling vital routes.
Most of the real cities in fact have this purpose as well. A few-like
Alexandria in Egypt and Charax-Alexandria at the mouth of the Tigris
--were founded with an eye to trade and communications. Those that
interest us most here are the administrative capitals in districts that
had no proper cities-Paropamisus is a good example. Their population
was normally a mixture of Macedonian veterans, Greek mercenaries,
and natives (especially, of course, women). Whether any of these and
other cities were given proper Greek institutions and a shadow of inde-
pendence (like the Greeks in Asia Minor) we do not know. It is likely
that at least the larger of them were. But in fact, as is clear from the
great revolt of the settlers in Bactria (C. ix. 7. I ff.; D. xvii. 99. 5 ff.),
these settlers were conscripts and the cities subject to satrapal authority.
Yet their importance in holding the Empire together by fulfilling their
various functions cannot be overstressed.
We left Alexander about to enter India. India was a new beginning.
Greeks had never penetrated there in any numbers, and the Achaemenids
had not ruled any of it for generations (and not much then). Alexander,
uncertain even how far it stretched and how far he would go, had to
improvise as he went along. It turned out simple enough: the small
native rulers, if friendly, were left in charge of their own territories,
with those of hostile rulers added to them. Essentially it was the same
system as in other tribal provinces. Sisicottus is a good example of such
a man. He met Alexander in Bactria and was finally rewarded with
Assacenia, west of the Indus. We need not multiply instances. Before
the crossing of the Indus, Nicanor was made satrap of all the territory
See A. H. M. Jones, The Greek City (Oxford, 1940), 1-5; Tarn ii. 232 f. Best
discussion of principles in Berve i. 291 f. and V. Tscherikower [= Tcherikover], Die
hellen. Stddtegriindungen von Alexander d. Gr. bis auf die R6merzeit (Philologus, Suppl.
19. I [1927]), 138 f. Since the evidence is presented in all these works, I am dispensing
with detailed references.
 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE 179
won so far, with all the princes subordinated to him. This secured
a reasonable arrangement: the natives were under their accustomed
rulers, who in turn were strictly supervised. The same system was
followed between the Indus and the Hydaspes, with Taxiles the most
prominent of the native princes and Philip son of Machatas as satrap.
Beyond the Hydaspes, the 'good' Porus received an immense territory,
extending (finally) from the Indus, for some distance along its left bank,
to the Hyphasis-i.e. a large part of Kashmir: Alexander proclaimed
him King of 'all the land conquered in India so far' (A. vi. 2. I), with
supervision over the other princes. Technically his position was like
that of the Carian dynasts under the Achaemenids-both king and
satrap (as Plutarch calls him).' But Alexander left none of his own troops
with Porus, and this made an essential difference: he realized that he
could not in fact control this north-eastern outpost of his empire and
could only hope for a strong and friendly buffer-state. The upper Indus
and the Hydaspes were to be the true frontier, held (as frontiers of
ancient empir'es usually were) with a powerful bridgehead and glacis
beyond.
Philip took over the satrapy of Nicanor west of the Indus. Before
long, the Oxydracae and Malli were subdued and added to his satrapy,
assuring control of the Indus and the Acesines for some distance north
of their confluence. That point was to be Philip's southern limit. He
was given Macedonian and Thracian troops, and an Alexandria was
founded there as a frontier fortress.2 Philip's satrapy, unlike that of
Porus, was to be strongly held. To assure its communications, the King
made an important change in the strategic Paropamisus command:
removing Tyriaspes (who had disgraced himself and was executed),
he handed it to Oxyartes, father of his own wife Roxana (A. vi. 15. 3;
C. ix. 8. 9). The weak link between Iran and India had been removed:
Alexander's father-in-law securely held the passes between the strong
eastern satrapies of Iran and the equally strong India of Philip son of
Machatas. The king could now sail down the Indus, confidently allotting
southern India-not yet conquered-to Peitho son of Agenor.3 The
conquest and settlement followed as a matter of course, though after
hard fighting.
See Berve ii. 344, no. 683, with good discussion. (But his rejection of the title
'satrap' is unfounded.) Berve puts Porus' western limit at the Hydaspes; but probably
territory on the upper Indus was included: Arrian uses 'India' for country beyond the
Indus (v. 4. 3 f.). On Philip, see further below. On Alexander in India, see, in general,
pp. 155 ff.
2 A.
vi. 2. 3 (see Berve ii. 276); vi. 15. 2.
3 A. vi. 15. 4; cf. 17. I f. A mention of Oxyartes has crept into Arrian's text, whether
through the historian's carelessness or through a scribe's.
 I80 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE
There is no need for us to repeat the story of the Gedrosian desert or to
go into the details of Alexander's arrangements in Gedrosia and Carmania
(given to obscure Greeks or Macedonians). I have tried elsewhere' to
piece together the ugly tale of the reign of terror that followed the return
of Alexander-defeated and suspicious-from India and the desert.
This story is more relevant to the typology of absolute power than to
the history of administration. When it was all over, obscure Mace-
donians and perhaps Greeks held most of the satrapies; though some of
the old Macedonian and Iranian nobles finally survived, shorn of their
mercenaries. Essentially there was no change, and the time of trouble
passed without a stir of serious revolt in the vast territories occupied.
As Alexander's thoughts now turned to new worlds to conquer in the
West, India faded in importance-an experience best forgotten. Alex-
ander had no wish to return to the scene of his humiliation. When
Philip son of Machatas died (late 325)-in a mercenary rebellion very
convenient for Alexander: Philip was related to Harpalus, against whom
the King was just preparing to act-his vast satrapy, the keystone of the
Indian settlement, was converted into a satrapy kingdom like that of
Porus. Taxiles was appointed satrap, with one Eudemus as strategus.
This measure, announced as temporary, was still in force well over a year
later, at Alexander's death.2 It shows Alexander's increasing preoccupa-
tion with his last plans.
Finally, we must return to Harpalus and finance. Harpalus had been
left behind at Ecbatana with the main treasure and forces to protect it.3
The King, obviously, could not have his main treasure follow him
through Bactria and India: he largely lived on the land and local tribute.
There is no sign of his having any large sums at his disposal between
his departure for Hyrcania after Darius' death to his return to Susa in
324, when his sudden new affluence clearly contrasts with his use of
windfalls on his It was no doubt Harpalus' task to collect
campaigns.4
the provincial surpluses. Since the movement of bullion, coin, or even
tribute in kind was a major operation (far better avoided when possible),
JHS lxxxi (1961), 16-43.
2 A. vi. 27. 2; C. x. I. 21 (both inaccurate: see Berve ii. 154, no. 311; 371, no. 739,
with evidence establishing Taxiles' control of the satrapy).
3 A. iii. 19. 7. On his position as central treasurer, see p. 172, above.
4 D. xvii. 3 f. (in fact even before Darius' death? cf. A. iii. 19. 5); A. vii. 4. 4-5. 6
74-
(the 'prize-giving', the marriages (cf. Ath. xii. 538b) and the settlement of the debts).
For windfalls on campaigns, cf. C. viii. 4. 18 f. (the herds of Sisimithres). That
Alexander paid his soldiers only at the end of a campaign (therefore presumably not
during the Indian campaign, but only on his return to Susa) is clear not only from the
exorbitant debts they had incurred, but from D. xvii. 74. 3. In between, they had
plenty of booty to live on (though it was apparently not enough). He thus needed
little cash in the further East.
 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE i8i
we may assume-though we have no real evidence-that the local
satrap or collector transmitted only the local surplus, whether a fixed
proportion or an accounting surplus. Such as it was, the system was
no doubt taken over from the Achaemenids, for whom it had piled up
the treasures that Alexander captured in the centres of the Empire.
Naturally, it was Harpalus-and this we do know-who had to pay for
expensive supplies needed by Alexander.' Both for safety and for con-
venience, Harpalus (again like the Achaemenids) spread the vast central
treasure over various 'capitals'. He had been left at Ecbatana; but when
the summer palace of the Persian Kings proved too dull, he moved to
Babylon. We may take it that both places held parts of the treasure; so
would Susa and perhaps the two Persian cities, all connected by good
roads. The central army, under Parmenio and (after his death) under
his murderers, until they fell in the great purge,2 was within easy reach
of all these places; and they also had garrisons (nearly all attested).
Harpalus' own soldiers were no doubt scattered over these cities. All
this must be set out to explain why, when forced (without much warning)
to flee from the great purge, Harpalus could take only 6,000 mercenaries
and the equivalent of 5,000 talents of silver (much of it, no doubt,
actually in gold) with him: he would obviously take most of what was
available in Babylon at the time.3 Harpalus' successor was Antimenes
of Rhodes, known only from the pseudo-Aristotelian Economics.4
Whatever his powers in detail, he was efficient, but a nonentity, and,
unlike Harpalus, could never be a danger. Alexander had at last found
the answer to the political problem of the central treasury.
Perhaps we should say a few words on coinage, closely connected with
finance. Unfortunately little is known in detail about its administration.s
Before Gaugamela, there was a royal coinage, struck for Alexander at
Pella, Amphipolis, and at various Asian mints, chiefly barbarian. This
was later extended to Babylon. The traditional Greek coinages con-
tinued. After the capture of the Persian treasures, a flood of new coinage
in the East might have been expected-but has not been traced.
I See C. ix.
3. 21: 25,000 suits of armour engraved in gold and silver, conveniently
escorted by 7,000 infantry travelling at the same time.
2 See JHS lxxxi (1961), zi f.
3 Sources in Berve ii.
78. Cf. art. cit. (last note).
4 On this man see Berve ii. 44, no. 89. The corrupt t••t68ios (influenced by the
preceding 'P65ito and hence insoluble) in [Arist.] Oecon. I352b28 probably hides
information that would be useful.
s See the careful discussion in Bellinger's recent book (cited, p. 173, n. 4), admitting
our almost total ignorance. Bellinger denies (he does not make clear why) that Harpalus
had anything to do with coinage. There are no known facts on which to argue the
matter.
182 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE
Bellinger suggests that it may have been in traditional Persian darics (not
yet sufficiently analysed).' This suggestion would fit in very well with
what we have seen was Alexander's chosen image after Gaugamela;
but it still awaits testing. It is as easily possible that Alexander found
all the darics he needed-i.e. that enough of the treasure, for his pur-
poses, was in coined money.2
This survey has only given a short outline of a difficult subject, on
which we have far from sufficient evidence. Much more is said in
Berve's great work, which collects nearly all the evidence there is.3 The
subject, naturally, mirrors the development of Alexander's thinking
about his empire. That is why we should like to know much more than
we do. It also shows him-except where fears and passions impinge-
at his best: empirical, adaptable, even opportunist; making the best use
of what he found when it served the purpose of the moment, and the
minimum of change when it did not or when the purpose itself had
changed; achieving simplicity and utility rather than uniformity; and,
though ready enough to delegate responsibility, retaining ultimate
control and exercising it, where he thought it necessary, with speed and
determination. Alexander has often been worshipped, by biographers
ancient and modern, for virtues he lacked. He deserves greater credit
for those he possessed.
Op. cit. 72 ff. His ideas about the transport of vast amounts of coined money to
Alexander during his stay in the further East seem to me, however, both unplausible
and unnecessary. (Cf. p. I8o, n. 4, and text, above.)
2 The
sources, on the whole, do not specify; or, where they do, they are contra-
dictory and thus unreliable in detail. (See list in Bellinger, op. cit. 68, n. 148.) Much
of the Persian treasure would, of course, remain buried as a reserve, just as it had been
under the Achaemenids. There is no reason to believe (as Rostovtzeff and others do)
that all or even much of it was spent, in view of the continuing tribute and the vast
booty that fed the actual campaigns. It was probably only in the expensive wars and
cold wars of the Successors that these huge reserves were seriously tapped.
3 Volume ii of that work (the 'Prosopography') collects the references to all persons
with whom Alexander had any direct or indirect contact. Details on men incidentally
referred to in this article will easily be found there, and I have saved space by not giving
all the relevant references.