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FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 118075 September 5, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were charged with violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known
as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while armed with a firearm and a bladed
weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and intimidation, wilfully and feloniously attacked,
assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of
Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing boat, to their damage and prejudice. 1

The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo"
guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan appealed.
2

In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave
coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.

The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June 1993, the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr.,
18, were fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught up with them.
One of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano Catantan, bearded the pump boat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene.
With his gun, Catantan struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and Juan Jr. to "dapa." Then Catantan told Ursal to
3

follow him to the pumpboat of the Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the bottom of the boat, covered him
with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other
pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together with its passengers one of whom was visibly tied.

Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that they were now off-course but Catantan told Eugene
to keep quiet or he would be killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene asked to be set free
so he could help but was not allowed; he was threatened with bodily harm instead.

Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the open sea the engine stalled again. This time
Eugene was allowed to assist his brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs were tied to the outrigger. At the point of a tres
cantos held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
4

As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked whose boat that was and the Pilapils told him that it was
operated by a certain Juanito and that its engine was new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the
boat cautioning them however not to move or say anything.

On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new" pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take
them to Mungaz, another town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull up his net and harvest his catch,
Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose between the two, or I will kill you." Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed
5

and Ursal hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined Catantan.

But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front part of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked
hard its prow; it broke. The jolt threw Eugene into the sea and he landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs
and the two swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately another pumpboat passed by and towed them safely ashore.

Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part
thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member
of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and
punished as hereinafter provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree as "any vessel or watercraft used
for transport of passengers and cargo from one place to another through Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and types of vessels
or boats used in fishing (emphasis supplied).

On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any person who, without authority
of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against
his will, whether it be right or wrong."

Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He
claims that he and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but merely
boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already on board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some
other place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking possession or depriving complainants of
their boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the brothers right away to approach that boat so they
could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.

We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal
Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go
elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of
Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel through force and intimidation. The direct testimony of
Eugene is significant and enlightening —

Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of Tabogon at that time,
was there anything unusual that happened?

A: Yes.

Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?

A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the passengers of that
pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.

Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were riding in that pumpboat?

A: Four.

Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat, how did they do that?

A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard the pumpboat (emphasis supplied).

Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?

A: Only one.

Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat?

A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us (emphasis supplied).

Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you?

xxx xxx xxx

A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (emphasis supplied).

COURT:

Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?

A: He aimed the revolver on me.

TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:

Q: What else did he do?

A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat.

Q: What did he do with his revolver?

A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye.

Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do?

A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place.

Q: To what place did he order you to go?

A: To Daan Tabogon. 6

To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel
cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil
testified, the accused suddenly approached them and boarded their pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered
complaining witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and then struck his face with a revolver, hitting the
lower portion of his left eye, after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.

The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance of another pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers
to them, easily intimidated the Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to submit in complete surrender to the marauders. The moment
Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full control of his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to
submission. Hence the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert situations like the case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in
Philippine waters. Thus we cite the succeeding "whereas" clauses of the decree —
Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts of
depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to
another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social
progress of the people;

Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway robbery/brigandage which are among the
highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries; and,

Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredations by
imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacle to the
economic, social, educational and community progress of the people.

The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in sea waters. They brave the natural elements and
contend with the unknown forces of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these small fishermen that the townspeople
depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would be to deprive them of their very subsistence, and the likes of the accused
within the purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to the "economic, social, educational and community progress of the people." Had it
not been for the chance passing of another pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone helpless in a floundering, meandering
outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-out engine in open sea, could not be ascertained.

While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils permanently of their boat, proof of which they left
behind the brothers with their boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke down
and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would take them back to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new"
pumpboat ran out of gas so they were apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.

The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime.
The fact remains, and we state it again, that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation the pumpboat of
the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the conviction of accused-appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN y
TAYONG for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 1.

2 Decision penned by Judge Renato C. Dacudao, RTC-Br. 14, Cebu, 26 May 1994.

3 To lie down.

4 A 3-bladed knife.

5 Rollo, p. 14.

6 TSN, 13 January 1994, pp. 5-6.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI, accused-appellants.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Basilan, Judge Jainal D. Rasul as ponente, imposing
the death penalty.

In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI
were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder said to have been committed according to the information as
follows:

That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Mataja Is.,
Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above named accused, being strangers and without
lawful authority, armed with firearms and taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring and confederating
together, aiding and assisting one with the other, with intent to gain and by the use of violence or intimidation against
persons and force upon things, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, fire their guns into the air and
stop the pumpboat wherein Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de Guzman were
riding, traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas, boarded the said pumpboat and take, steal
and carry away all their cash money, wrist watches, stereo sets, merchandise and other personal belongings
amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine Currency; that the said accused, on the occasion of the
crime herein above-described, taking advantage that the said victims were at their mercy, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them to jump into the water, whereupon, the said accused, fired
their guns at them which caused the death of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and wounding
one Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused have performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of Qualified Piracy with Quadruple Murder, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons of causes in
dependent of their will, that is, said Antonio de Guzman was able to swim to the shore and hid himself, and due to the
timely medical assistance rendered to said victim, Antonio de Guzman which prevented his death. (Expediente, pp. 1-
2.)

An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only Julaide Siyoh and Omar-kayam Kiram were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)

After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion.

WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this Court finds the accused Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide
Siyoh guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murder as
defined and penalized under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 532, and hereby sentences each one of them to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. However, considering the provision of Section 106 of the Code of Mindanao
and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or extreme poverty of the accused who are members of the cultural minorities,
under a regime of so called compassionate society, a commutation to life imprisonment is recommended. (Id, p. 130.)

In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM
KIRAM AND JULAIDE SIYOH HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)

The People's version of the facts is as follows:

Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at the Larmitan Public Market, in the province of
Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July 7, 1979 and on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro
and Anastacio de Guzman received goods from his store consisting of mosquito nets, blankets, wrist watch sets and
stereophono with total value of P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn). The goods were received under an agreement
that they would be sold by the above-named persons and thereafter they would pay the value of said goods to Aurea
and keep part of the profits for themselves. However these people neither paid the value of the goods to Aurea nor
returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15, 1979, Aurea was informed by Antonio de Guzman that his group
was held up near Baluk- Baluk Island and that his companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn). On July 16, 1979, the bodies
of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman were brought by the PC seaborne patrol to Isabela,
Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only Antonio de Guzman survived the incident that caused the death of his companions.

It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who were also travelling merchants like
him, were on their way to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan, to sell the goods they received from Alberto Aurea. The
goods they brought with them had a total value of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m.
of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that night in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at
Pilas Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).

The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together with Kiram and Julaide Siyoh, started selling their
goods, They were able to sell goods worth P 3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the group, again accompanied by Kiram
and Siyoh, went to sell their goods at another place, Sangbay, where they sold goods worth P 12,000.00 (pp. 40-42,
tsn). They returned to Pilas Island at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and again slept at Kiram's house. However that
night Kiram did not sleep in his house, and upon inquiry the following day when Antonio de Guzman saw him, Kiram
told the former that he slept at the house of Siyoh.

On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went to Baluk-Baluk, a place suggested by Kiram. They
were able to sell goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island for the night but Kiram did not
sleep with them (p. 47, tsn).

The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-Baluk accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50
t.s.n), They used the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh were at that time armed with 'barongs'. They arrived at
Baluk-Baluk at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and upon arrival at the place Kiram and Siyoh going ahead of the
group went to a house about 15 meters away from the place where the group was selling its goods (pp. 50-53, tsn).
Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group talking with two persons whose faces the group saw but could not recognize
(pp. 53-54, tsn). After selling their goods, the members of the group, together with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to
return to Pilas Island. They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at the front while Kiram operated the
engine. On the way to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and green about 200
meters away from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after" Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat.
Thereafter two shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved towards them (pp. 57-58, tsn). There were two
persons on the other pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized them to be the same
persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat came close to them, Kiram
threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to
Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of their money and their goods by Kiram (pp.
59-61, tsn). Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to undress. Taking fancy on the
pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on. With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'.
After that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped
into the water. As he was swimming away from the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram fired at him, injuring his
back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But he was able to reach a mangrove where he stayed till nightfall. When he left the mangrove,
he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a
fishing boat and brought to the Philippine Army station at Maluso where he received first aid treatment. Later he was
brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province (pp. 66-68, tsn).

On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf, de Guzman saw Siyoh and
Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram was
wearing the pants he took from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial Jail to get
back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn).

Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan and findings
showed: 'gunshot wound, scapular area, bilateral, tangenital' (Exh. C, prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime M.
Junio, Provincial Health Officer of Basilan, examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen and
issued the corresponding death certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution). (pp. 137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-
11.)

As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the credibility of witnesses. Who should be believed Antonio de Guzman
who was the lone prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and Kiram the accused-appellants who claims that they were also the victims of the
crime? The trial court which had the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and how they testified assigned credibility
to the former and an examination of the record does not reveal any fact or circumstance of weight and influence which was overlooked
or the significance of which was misinterpreted as would justify a reversal of the trial court's determination. Additionally, the following
claims of the appellants are not convincing:

1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the Kiram house or on any of the occasions when they
were travelling together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at Kiram's house would make Kiram and his family immediately
suspect and robbing the victims before they had sold all their goods would be premature. However, robbing and killing the victims while
at sea and after they had sold all their goods was both timely and provided safety from prying eyes.

2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does not support this assertion. For as the prosecution
stated: "It is of important consequence to mention that the witness presented by the defense are all from Pilas Island and friends of the
accused. They claimed to be members of retrieving team for the dead bodies but no PC soldiers were ever presented to attest this fact.
The defense may counter why the prosecution also failed to present the Maluso Police Daily Event book? This matter has been brought
by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or Police but to an army detachment. The Army is known to have no docket book, so why take
the pain in locating the army soldiers with whom the report was made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this
observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the defense to be true, why the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman as
having been allegedly helped by the accused testified against them. Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing can be inferred
from the evidence of the defense so far presented showing reason why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or fabricate or
manufacture such heinous crime as qualified piracy with triple murders and frustrated murder? The point which makes us doubt the
version of the defense is the role taken by the PC to whom the report was allegedly made by the accused immediately after the
commission of the offense. Instead of helping the accused, the PC law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the report
of the accused or believing in the version of the report made by the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently with the
latter's report and placed the accused under detention for investigation." (Expediente, pp. 127-128.)

3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de Guzman, and Primitiva de Castro, wife of the deceased
Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de Guzman informed them shortly after the incident that their husbands were killed by the
companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of the appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were the
killers and not the former. But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among the accused for as Judge Rasul has
stated:

It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is sufficiently proved in this case. In fact the following facts
appear to have been established to show clearly conspiracy: A) On July 14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-
witness Tony de Guzman noticed that near the window of a dilapidated house, both accused were talking to two (2)
armed strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the pumpboat was chased and overtaken, the survivor-
witness Tony de Guzman recognized their captors to be the same two (2) armed strangers to whom the two accused
talked in Baluk- Baluk Island near the dilapidated house; C) The two accused, without order from the two armed
strangers transferred the unsold goods to the captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman and companion peddlers
were divested of their jewelries and cash and undressed while the two accused remained unharmed or not molested.
These concerted actions on their part prove conspiracy and make them equally liable for the same crime (People vs.
Pedro, 16 SCRA 57; People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The convergence of the will of the conspirators in the scheming
and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation of all of them the act of any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25
SCRA, 759). (Id., pp. 128-129.)

4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen because his remains
were never recovered. There is no reason to suppose that Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a manner different from
his companions. The incident took place on July 14, 1979 and when the trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981 Anastacio de
Guzman was still missing. But the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified
piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by
death regardless of the number of victims.

5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by the victims; were they hacked wounds or gunshot
wounds? The cause of death stated for Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible gunshot
wounds." (Exhs. D and E.) The cause is consistent with the testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims were hacked; that the
appellants were armed with "barongs" while Indanan and Jamahali were armed with armalites.

WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the facts and the law, it is affirmed with the following
modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the penalty imposed shall be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants shall pay
in solidum to the heirs of each of the deceased indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Gutierrez, Jr., Dela Fuente, Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Aquino, C.J., took no part.

Teehankee, J., for affirmance of death sentence.

Separate Opinions

CUEVAS, J., dissenting:

considering the gravamen of the offense charged the manner by which it was committed, I vote to affirm the death penalty imposed by
the trial court.

Separate Opinions

CUEVAS, J., dissenting:

considering the gravamen of the offense charged the manner by which it was committed, I vote to affirm the death penalty imposed by
the trial court.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 153524-25 January 31, 2005

RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA, petitioners,


vs.
HON. ANIANO DESIERTO in his capacity as Head of the Office of the Ombudsman, HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO in his
capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Military, P/INS. JEFFREY T. GOROSPE, SPO2 ROLANDO G. REGACHO, SPO1 ALFREDO
B. ALVIAR, JR., PO3 JAIME D. LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B. CARDENAS, PO1 JOSEPH A. BENAZA, SPO1 FRANKLIN D.
CABAYA and SPO4 PEDRO PAREL, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of the Office of the Ombudsman in its finding of lack of probable cause
made during preliminary investigation. And, yet again, we reaffirm the time-honored practice of non-interference in the conduct of
preliminary investigations by our prosecutory bodies absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion on their part.

Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari,1 contend precisely that the public respondents herein – officers of the Office of the
Ombudsman – gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay
in the delivery of detained persons) against private respondents herein, members of the Philippine National Police stationed at the
Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur.

From the respective pleadings2 of the parties, the following facts appear to be indubitable:

1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day before the 14 May 2001 Elections 3 ), petitioners
were arrested without a warrant by respondents police officers for alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition;

2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal. revolver (a crime which carries with it the penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period) and for violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation
to the Commission on Election Resolution No. 3328 (which carries the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one [1] year
but not more than six [6] years);

3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22 cal. revolver with
ammunition;

4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos Sur, Police Station. It was at the Santa Police
Station that petitioner Bista was identified by one of the police officers to have a standing warrant of arrest for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;
5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election day), petitioners were brought to the residence of
Provincial Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a "Joint-Affidavit" against them was subscribed and
sworn to by the arresting officers. From there, the arresting officers brought the petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office
in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and there at about 6:00 p.m. the "Joint-Affidavit" was filed and docketed;

6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria was released upon the order of
Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite preliminary investigation, while petitioner Bista was brought back and continued to
be detained at the Santa Police Station. From the time of petitioner Soria’s detention up to the time of his release, twenty-two
(22) hours had already elapsed;

7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was brought before the MTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where
the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner Bista posted bail and an Order of Temporary Release
was issued thereafter;

8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with petitioner Bista’s arrest for alleged illegal possession
of firearms. At 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day (15 May 2001), an information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4413-S, was filed against petitioner Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00 in the afternoon, informations for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition and violation
of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, docketed as Criminal Cases
No. 2269-N and No. 2268-N, respectively, were filed in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan, Ilocos Sur;

9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and No. 4413-S. He
was detained for 26 days.

10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit for violation
of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents.

11. After considering the parties’ respective submissions, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered the first assailed Joint
Resolution dated 31 January 2002 dismissing the complaint for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code for lack of
merit; and

12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in the second
assailed Resolution dated 25 March 2002.

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The penalties provided in the next preceding
article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver
such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties,
or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six
(36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to
communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel.

It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Soria was arrested without warrant are punishable by correctional
penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours
of his arrest. Neither is it in dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Bista was arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only be detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints or information having been filed
with the proper judicial authorities.

The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the 12-18-36 periods. With respect specifically to the detention of
petitioner Soria which lasted for 22 hours, it is alleged that public respondents gravely erred in construing Article 125 4 as excluding
Sundays, holidays and election days in the computation of the periods prescribed within which public officers should deliver arrested
persons to the proper judicial authorities as the law never makes such exception. Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear
and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any attempts at interpretation.5 Public respondents, on the
other hand, relied on the cases of Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,6 and Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila7 and on commentaries8 of jurists to
bolster their position that Sundays, holidays and election days are excluded in the computation of the periods provided in Article
125,9 hence, the arresting officers delivered petitioners well within the allowable time.

In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect specifically to petitioner Bista, petitioners maintain that the filing of the
information in court against petitioner Bista did not justify his continuous detention. The information was filed at 4:30 p.m. of 15 May
2001 but the orders for his release were issued by the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only
on 08 June 2001. They argued that based on law and jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the prosecutor within the period fixed by
law, the arresting officer must release the detainee lest he be charged with violation of Article 125.10 Public respondents countered that
the duty of the arresting officers ended upon the filing of the informations with the proper judicial authorities following the rulings
in Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the Military ,11 and People v. Acosta.12

From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it is evident that public respondents did not abuse their discretion in
dismissing for lack of probable cause the complaint against private respondents.

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is
equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
1awphi 1.nét

positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 13
No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public respondents. Their disposition of petitioners’ complaint for
violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of thin air as it was properly backed up by
law and jurisprudence. Public respondents ratiocinated thus:

As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is concerned, based on applicable laws and
jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the
filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a "no-office day." (Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.) In
the instant case, while it appears that the complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1]
at 4:30 p.m., he had already been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as directed by
Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to
speak of.14

Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,15 that —

. . . The arresting officer’s duty under the law was either to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter
release him. The fact however is that he was not released. From the time of petitioner’s arrest at 12:00 o’clock p.m. on November 7 to
3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the information against him for murder actually was in court, over 75 hours have elapsed.

But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was declared an official holiday; and November 9
(election day) was also an official holiday. In these three no-office days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and
stenographer, draft the information and search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the courthouse,
docket the case and have the order of commitment prepared. And then, where to locate and the uncertainty of locating those officers
and employees could very well compound the fiscal’s difficulties. These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring
that Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the very first office day following arrest.

And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila16 --

. . . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and other circumstances, such as the time of
surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken
into consideration.

As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the information has already been filed in Court, public respondents
acted well within their discretion in ruling thus:

In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article 125, will not prosper because the
running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him from the time of his arrest was
tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15,
2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released
if he has no other pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention.

The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125, RPC and COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the
Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001 (Annexes "G" and "I", Complaint-Affidavit of
Edimar Bista) but he was released from detention only on June 8, 2001, on orders of the RTC and MTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur
(Annexes "J" and "K", Complaint-Affidavit). Was there a delay in the delivery of detained person to the proper judicial authorities under
the circumstances? The answer is in the negative. The complaints against him was (sic) seasonably filed in the court of justice within
the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law as discussed above. The duty of the detaining officers is deemed complied with upon
the filing of the complaints. Further action, like issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial authority (People v. Acosta
[CA] 54 O.G. 4739).17

The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the Military,18 wherein we ordained that –

. . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by
such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released
on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied for and was granted his release
upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC.
We agree with the position of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said
Article.

All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, we have no choice but to defer to the Office of the Ombudsman’s
determination that the facts on hand do not make out a case for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. l^vvphi1.net

As we have underscored in numerous decisions --

We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent any
compelling reason. This policy is based on constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. We are mindful that the Constitution
and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from
legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a
preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must
be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the
Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed
with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing
the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much
the same way, the courts will be swamped with cases if they will have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.19 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May 2002 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint Resolution
dated 31 January 2002 and the Order dated 25 March 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 3-22.

2Petitioners’ "PETITION FOR CERTIORARI (UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT)" dated 27 May 2002, Rollo, pp.
3-22; Public Respondents’ "COMMENT" dated 09 October 2002, Rollo, pp. 105-128; Petitioners’ reply (To: Respondents’
Comment dated 09 October 2002), Rollo, pp. 130-137; Petitioners’ "MEMORANDUM" dated 25 March 2003, Rollo, pp. 140-
164; Public Respondents’ "MEMORANDUM" dated 01 April 2003, Rollo, pp. 168-189.

3 Erroneously designated by the public respondents as "Presidential Elections."

4 Revised Penal Code.

5 Rollo, p. 131.

6 No. L-26723, 22 December 1966, 18 SCRA 1168, 1170.

7 No. L-2128, 12 May 1948, 80 Phil. 859.

8 (1) Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1997 ed., p. 74.

(2) Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, 2001 ed., p. 318 (Rollo, pp. 117 &179).

9 Revised Penal Code.

10 Id.

11
G.R. No. 134503, 02 July 1999, 309 SCRA 726 (Rollo, pp. 123-124).

12 C.A. 54 Official Gazette 4739 (Rollo, pp. 122-123).

Duero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131282 , 04 January 2002, 373 SCRA 11, 17; Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R.
13

No. 131445 , 27 May 2004.

14 Rollo, pp. 25-26

15 Supra, note 5.

16
Supra, note 6 at 870.

17 Rollo, p. 26.

18 Supra, note 10 at 739-740.

Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra, note 12, citing Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, G.R.
19

No. 140232 , 19 January 2001, 349 SCRA 767; and Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 136192 , 14 August 2001, 362 SCRA 730.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

A.M. No. 03-1462-MTJ April 19, 2007

JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LORINDA B. TOLEDO-MUPAS, Municipal Trial Court, Dasmariñas, Cavite, Respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Bizarre. The word would aptly describe this tale of the accuser turning out to be the culprit.

This case started with Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas (Judge Mupas) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite, filing
an administrative complaint (Administrative Matter No. OCA IPI No. 02-1515-RTJ) against Judge Dolores L. Español (Judge Español)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority,
Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. She imputed these offenses against Judge Español for
allegedly illegally usurping the functions of the Executive Judge of Dasmariñas, Cavite, and for ordering her (Mupas) on April 18, 2002,
in connection with Criminal Case No. 9292-01 (People v. Belinda Ventura Singello), "to desist from accepting, for ‘preliminary
investigation,' criminal cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, where suspects are apprehended
pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure."

Judge Español filed her Comment dated September 16, 2002 1 stating that since she was appointed to the single sala RTC of
Dasmariñas, Cavite, under Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 6 of 1975, she ipso facto became the Executive Judge exercising
supervision over the MTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite. She further stated that her Order dated April 18, 2002, directing the respondent to
desist from conducting preliminary investigation, did not deprive the latter of the authority to conduct preliminary investigation but
merely stopped her from conducting the same for being

violative of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 7438.

In the same Comment, Judge Español said that Judge Mupas operated the MTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite as a "One-Stop Shop" where
criminal suspects apprehended without a warrant are ordered detained in the municipal jail by virtue of an unsigned "Detention Pending
Investigation of the Case," in lieu of a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as prescribed by R.A. No. 7438
and by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, according to Judge Español, the apprehended persons
were detained for a long time until Judge Mupas set the case for preliminary investigation. If the detainee can post bail, Judge Mupas
would fix the amount of bail and require that the premium, usually equivalent to 20% or 30% thereof, be paid in cash. If the surety bond
was secured outside of the MTC, the bond would be rejected. Hence, the applicants for bail bonds would go to the RTC of Dasmariñas,
Cavite to complain and apply for the release of the detention prisoners.

This Court, acting on the Report dated July 4, 2003 of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), issued on August 6, 2003 a
Resolution,2 the dispositive portion of which reads:

"(T)he Court Resolved to ADOPT the following recommendations:

(a) to DISMISS the charges against Judge Dolores L. Español for lack of merit;

(b) to TREAT the comment dated September 16, 2002 of Judge Español as a SEPARATE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT
against Judge Lorinda Mupas of MTC, Dasmariñas, Cavite; and

(c) to REQUIRE Judge Toledo-Mupas to COMMENT on the allegations against her, contained in Judge Español’s comment."

Thus, a complaint against the respondent Judge Mupas was deemed filed, and docketed as OCA IPI No. 03-1462-MTJ.

On September 8, 2003, Judge Mupas filed a motion seeking reconsideration of this Court’s Resolution. On October 1, 2003, this Court
required the OCA to file its comment thereon within 15 days from notice. The OCA wrote a Memorandum dated April 15, 2004 3 to then
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. recommending the denial of the respondent’s motion being a mere reiteration of her arguments
already passed upon by the Court. This Court adopted the said recommendation of the OCA in its Resolution dated May 31, 2004. 4

Accordingly, Judge Mupas faced the following charges: (1) violation of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, and Republic Act No. 7438; and (2) violation of the rules on preliminary investigation (a) for the
delay in the resolution of preliminary investigation cases pending in [Judge Mupas’] court; (b) for failure to perform her ministerial duty
of transmitting the records of the case, including the resolution on the preliminary investigation, within 10 days from the issuance of the
said resolution to the provincial prosecutor of Cavite; and (c) for conducting preliminary investigation despite the fact that there were
many prosecutors in Cavite not indisposed to do the job.

On September 19, 2005, Judge Mupas filed her Reply5 (should be Comment) to Judge Español’s Comment which was treated as a
separate administrative complaint. She claimed that the August 6, 2003 Resolution of this Court failed to consider relevant laws, rules,
and pronouncements of the Court itself. She further said that under Rule 112, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
she is expressly authorized to conduct preliminary investigation. She questioned the authority of Judge Español in ordering her to desist
from conducting preliminary investigations in the guise of "supervising" or "reviewing" her actions, as the said authority was lodged in
the provincial prosecutors. She pointed out that, in the case of "People vs. Belinda Ventura Singello" (Criminal Case No. 9292-01),
subject of Judge Español’s Order dated April 18, 2002, the provincial prosecutor affirmed her (Mupas’) finding of probable cause
against the accused without any question on the manner in which the preliminary investigation was conducted.

She likewise claimed that, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 59-99 dated 1 June 1999, while in single-sala stations the presiding
judges are ex officio executive judges, for purposes of supervision in the interest of the service, their salas may be merged with multi-
sala stations. Therefore, the RTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite had long been merged with the multi-sala station of the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
In support of this claim, Judge Mupas noted that then Executive Judge Lucenito N. Tagle of the RTC of Imus, Cavite issued a
Memorandum to all judges within his supervision, including both Judge Español and Judge Mupas, to submit periodic reports on
detention prisoners.

She further argued that none of the detention prisoners had filed an administrative complaint against her. She said that it was her duty
to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints filed with her sala. In addition, Judge Mupas posited that Judge Español could not
entertain applications for bail in the RTC because the cases were pending before the MTC.
On January 30, 2006, the Court noted this Reply (should be Comment), and referred the same to the OCA for evaluation, report, and
recommendation.

In the Memorandum dated July 26, 20066 addressed to then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, the OCA found that the Reply of
Judge Mupas was merely a rehash of the arguments she raised in her Motion for Reconsideration; it did not refute the specific
allegations of Judge Español. The OCA said that the explanation given by the respondent was unsatisfactory and insufficient to absolve
her from administrative liability. However, the OCA recommended that this case be referred to an Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation. Eventually, this case was referred to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Myrna
Dimaranan-Vidal.

During the proceedings before Justice Vidal, Judge Español filed her Rejoinder [Re: Reply dated September 19, 2005] dated December
8, 20067 reiterating that: (1) her Order dated April 18, 2002 was lawful and within her authority to issue as the OCA declared that she
was merely performing her function as Executive Judge of Dasmariñas, Cavite; (2) Judge Mupas violated the rights of the accused
whose preliminary investigation is pending in her court, they being detained by virtue only of a "Detention Pending Investigation of the
Case" in place of a valid waiver signed in the presence of counsel for considerable lengths of time; (3) there was no basis for Judge
Mupas’ counter-charge that she could not grant bail while preliminary investigation was pending before the Mupas court, considering
the latter's absence upon the prisoners' applications for bail; and (4) Judge Mupas failed to adequately explain her failure to forward the
records and the resolution of the preliminary investigation of accused Belinda Singello in Criminal Case No. 9292-01.

Judge Mupas filed her Comment (Re: Rejoinder Dated December 8, 2006) dated December 21, 2006 8 and averred that: (1) acts made
in her judicial capacity and in good faith could not be subject to disciplinary action; (2) as judge, she enjoys the presumption of
regularity in the performance of her duties; (3) the preliminary investigation she conducted was within the scope of her authority; and (4)
the reason behind the seeming delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation was the heavy congestion of the dockets of the MTC of
Dasmariñas, Cavite.

Preliminary conferences were conducted by Justice Vidal on January 2, 2007 and January 9, 2007.9 However, both parties opted not to
present any testimonial evidence. In fact, Judge Español filed on January 5, 2007 an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to
Resolve,10 praying that, inasmuch as the proceedings were summary in nature, the case be decided based on the available records and
pleadings submitted.

On the same day, Judge Español filed her Reply [Re: Comment dated December 21, 2006], 11 arguing that: (1) Judge Mupas is guilty of
gross ignorance of the law even if she acted in good faith; and (2) the presumption of regularity in the performance of her judicial
function could not cure the incompetence of the respondent.

Both the complainant12 and the respondent13 filed their respective memoranda encompassing all the arguments they raised in their
respective pleadings. Judge Español also filed a Counter Memorandum (Re: Memorandum of the Respondent dated January 18, 2007)
dated January 29, 2007.14

In an undated Resolution filed with the OCA on February 9, 2007, Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal found, contrary to Judge Mupas’
claim, that the document entitled "Detention Pending Investigation of Cases" cannot validly be deemed to be an implied waiver of the
rights of the accused under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Justice Vidal submits the following findings:

"Extant from the records, is Respondent’s admission of her practice in the issuance of the document entitled ‘Detention Pending
Investigation of Cases’ claiming, however, that such document served as an implied waiver of the rights of the accused under Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code.

"The undersigned disagrees.

"Sec. 2 e) of RA 7438 is in point, thus:

xxx Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial
investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void
and of no effect. (Underscoring supplied)

"The afore cited law is clear and simple. Thus, construction is unnecessary. Clearly, what the said provision requires to protect the
rights of the accused is a written waiver signed by the accused with the assistance of a counsel. However, the procedure adopted by
the Respondent runs counter thereto. She resorted to the issuance of a commitment order dubbed as ‘Detention Pending Investigation
of the Case’ to legally prolong the detention of the accused pending the resolution of the preliminary investigation. Obviously, this is not
within the contemplation of the law. Thus, the practice is highly erroneous – a blatant manifestation of ignorance in the legal procedure.

"The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary15 provides:

Canon 6 – Competence and Diligence

xxx

Sec. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the
proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the training and other facilities which should be made
available, under judicial control, to judges.

xxx

"Otherwise put, Respondent is presumed to know the basic measures to protect the rights of the accused during preliminary
investigation. Sadly, Respondent failed in this regard. Instead, she maintained the practice of issuing this highly improper order, i.e.,
‘Detention Pending Investigation of the Case’, just to put a semblance of legality in the detention of the accused." 16
With respect to the other charges, Justice Vidal found the evidence insufficient to support the accusations that Judge Mupas: (1)
detained the accused for a long period of time while the preliminary investigation was pending in her court; (2) failed to transmit to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite the records of the case within 10 days after preliminary investigation; and (3) acted without authority to
conduct preliminary investigation because there were enough prosecutors in Cavite to conduct the same. 1a\^/phi 1.net

Justice Vidal then concludes:

"However, the undersigned finds that Respondent should still be held administratively liable. Respondent’s act of issuing orders dubbed
as ‘Detention Pending Investigation of Cases’ instead of requiring the accused to execute a written waiver, with the assistance of
counsel, pursuant to Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, fall [sic] short of the measure of responsibility expected from a judge.

"Respondent should be reminded that the actions of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from
the presiding judge to the clerk of lowest rank, should be circumscribed with a high degree of responsibility. The image of a court, as a
true temple of justice, is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat. Judicial personnel are
expected to be living examples of uprightness in the performance of official duties [and] preserve at all times the good name and
standing of the courts in the community."17

Thus, the dispositive portion of her Resolution reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, and it appearing that this is the first time the Respondent has committed the infraction, supra, the
undersigned respectfully recommends that she be REPRIMANDED for her practice of issuing the "Detention Pending Investigation of
the Case" orders with STERN WARNING that a repetition thereof or any similar act will be dealt with more severely".

We agree with the findings of Justice Vidal, but We find the recommended penalty too light, grossly disproportionate to the offense
committed, especially when viewed in the light of Judge Mupas’ record of incorrigible misconduct.

There is no gainsaying that Judge Mupas’ practice of issuing "Detention Pending Investigation of the Case" orders in lieu of a written
waiver signed by the accused with the assistance of counsel is, in the words of Justice Vidal, "a blatant manifestation of ignorance in
the legal procedure." It is gross ignorance of the law, pure and simple.

Under Rule 140, Section 8, of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10 SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is
classified as a serious charge, and Section 11 thereof provides the sanctions, as follows:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

While Justice Vidal considered the respondent's practice of issuing "Detention Pending Investigation of the Case" orders as a first-time
infraction, We note that this case is not the first time the respondent was charged and found guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

In Español v. Mupas,18 the respondent judge was fined the amount of P21,000.00 for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and for
gross ignorance of the law when she ordered the arrest of the accused in six criminal cases before the expiration of the 10-day period
she gave them to file their counter-affidavits, and without any finding of probable cause.

In Loss of Court Exhibits at MTC-Dasmariñas, Cavite,19 aside from being found guilty of grave misconduct for refusing to turn over to
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for ballistics examination a firearm that a court employee surreptitiously took from the court's
steel cabinet and used to commit suicide, Judge Mupas was held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for her failure to
submit to the provincial prosecutor her resolution and the records of the case within 10 days after preliminary investigation. The Court
imposed on the respondent the penalty of suspension for three (3) months without pay, with a stern warning that a similar infraction will
be dealt with more severely.

In Bitoon, et al. v. Toledo-Mupas,20 the respondent was also found administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for changing the
designation of the crime from a non-bailable offense to a bailable one, i.e., syndicated estafa to simple estafa, and granted bail without
hearing on the ground that the accused is entitled to it as a matter of right. The Court found her to have exceeded her authority in the
conduct of preliminary investigation and to have failed to observe the elementary rules on bail. She was meted the penalties of a fine in
the amount of P40,000.00, suspension for three (3) months without salaries and benefits, and a stern warning that a same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.

Upon motion for reconsideration, however, the penalty of fine of P40,000.00 was deleted on the ground that the acts of the respondent
in the Español v. Mupas and the Loss of Court Exhibits cases were done after the acts complained of in Bitoon. While the Court
maintained that the respondent's acts in Bitoon remain inexcusable, the respondent was not found to be an incorrigible third-time
offender deserving the penalty originally imposed. The Court also noted that the respondent was not motivated by malice, bad faith or
corrupt motives and that there was an absence of any serious damage to the complainants. However, the stern warning of the Court
should have been ample reminder that the penalty of dismissal would be imposed should the respondent commit the same or a similar
infraction.21

In the present case, while the documents denominated "Detention Pending Investigation of the Case" were issued during the same
period of time that the three (3) above-cited cases were decided, it is noteworthy that Judge Mupas continued with the practice even
after her attention had been called. Worse, she remained insistent that the document was an implied waiver of the rights of the accused
under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.22 Judge Mupas must be reminded that although judges have in their favor the
presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance of their official functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable
terms of the law obviates this presumption and renders them susceptible to administrative sanctions. 23 Being among the judicial front-
liners who have direct contact with the litigants, a wanton display of utter lack of familiarity with the rules by the judge inevitably erodes
the confidence of the public in the competence of our courts to render justice. 24 It subjects the judiciary to embarrassment. Worse, it
could raise the specter of corruption.

When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his
or her duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the exalted position and title he or she holds, or the oversight or
omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.25

All said, this Court finds the respondent, Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas, administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
Considering that this is her fourth offense, she deserves to be meted the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, with all the
accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.

WHEREFORE, Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas of the Municipal Trial Court of Dasmariñas, Cavite is found guilty of gross ignorance of
the law. This being her fourth offense, she is hereby ORDERED DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of all benefits due
her, excluding her accrued leave benefits, and with perpetual disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.

This Decision is final and immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 3-18.

2
Ibid., pp. 1-2.

3 Ibid., pp. 35-36.

4 Ibid., p. 39.

5 Ibid., pp. 40-50.

6 Ibid., pp. 54-58.

7 Ibid., pp. 70-88.

8 Ibid., pp. 93-96.


9 Ibid., pp. 98-98 and 222-223, respectively.

10 Ibid., pp. 100-103.

11 Ibid., pp. 122-136.

12 Dated January 12, 2007; Ibid., pp. 224-254.

13 Dated January 18, 2007; Ibid., pp. 255-274.

14 Rollo, pp. 277-295.

15
AM No. 03-05-01-SC; June 1, 2004.

16 Resolution of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal, pp. 10-12.

17 Resolution of Justice Vidal, pp. 14-15, citing Mataga v. Rosete, AM No. MTJ-03-1488, October 13, 2004.

18 A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348, November 11, 2004; 442 SCRA 13.

19 A.M. No. MTJ-03-1491, June 8, 2005; 459 SCRA 313.

20 A.M. No. MTJ-05-1598, August 9, 2005; 466 SCRA 17.

21 Bitoon, et al. vs. Toledo-Mupas, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1598, January 23, 2006; 479 SCRA 351.

22 Rollo, p. 262.

23
Caguioa v. Laviña, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1553, 345 SCRA 49 (2000).

24Enriquez vs. Caminade, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1966, March 21, 2006; 485 SCRA 98; Landayan v. Quilantang, A.M. No. MTJ-06-
1632, May 4, 2006; 489 SCRA 360.

25
De Guzman, Jr. v. Judge Sison, supra.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL
OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for
petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of
two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.

Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and
that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City
Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from using the
articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1

In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for
hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of
the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction
2

was rendered moot and academic.

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to this Court without having previously
sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants
before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. But this procedural flaw
3

notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to
mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized
in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its
rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, "it is always in the power
4

of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice
require it...".

Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said search
warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse
of a period of more than six [6] months.

Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
5

Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition thus:

Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition
was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been raided.

The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to bring their case to court,
it was because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years had taught them
that everything in this country, from release of public funds to release of detained persons from custody, has become
a matter of executive benevolence or largesse

Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano,
sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the printing
equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and
Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they were further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield
the desired results.

After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]

Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground to punish or chastise them for
an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they
had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.

Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some of the seized
documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow
the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them,
within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the
search warrants assailed in this petition.

Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in question.

1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his
witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . This objection,
6

however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983,
that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.

2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and
784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search W arrant
No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos,
Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based
on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:

Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime of subversion
penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City.

The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued because the
purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two
warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in
the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that
might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant
No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the
opening paragraph of the said warrant. Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant
7

No. 20-82 [b].


In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held
"that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true
where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the
warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in
the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8

3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a search warrant, to wit:

Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following
personal property:

[a] Property subject of the offense;

[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and

[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may
be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be
at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the
warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in
relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.

4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry
or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled
9

that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not
so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of
the owner.

In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This
being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a
search warrant.

5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of
the P.C. Metrocom. The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members
10

of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the
search warrants on December 7, 1982.

It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a
probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which
provides:

SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by
the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to
publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or
has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended
..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M.
Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned
and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and
to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6
Movement." 13

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant
or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted
averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of
general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing
of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to
the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the objectives and piurposes
of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6
Movement; and,

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and
propaganda, more particularly,

1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969

3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;

4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,

5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,
recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like
manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search
warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing
with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search
warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the era of disaccord between the
Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in
order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not
be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-
conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.

As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum
newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the
printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a
democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have been sequestered under Section
8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial,
engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules
and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be
effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.

Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than President Marcos himself denied the
request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:

The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and
its printing presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.

On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City and took a detailed
inventory of the equipment and all materials in the premises.

Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the disposal of the owners,
subject to the discretion of the court. 19

That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter
dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated
February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:

2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities to close the paper's
printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are
hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized
articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ.,
concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring

I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin At the same time I wish to state my own reasons for holding
that the search warrants which are the subject of the petition are utterly void.

The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of press freedom for the search warrants were issued in gross violation of
the Constitution.

The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV, stresses two points, namely: "(1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized." (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)

Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will result in wiping "out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)

The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be
alleged in the application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar nothing specifically subversive has been alleged; stated
only is the claim that certain objects were being used as instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion punishable
under P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the decree. I n the words of Chief Justice C
Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy of the highest order, to convict anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any
determinate provision thereof.

The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search warrants authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and take
possession, among other things, of the following:

Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to promote the objectives and purposes of
the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.

The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc. subversive? What did they contain to make them
subversive? There is nothing in the applications nor in the warrants which answers the questions. I must, therefore, conclude that the
warrants are general warrants which are obnoxious to the Constitution.

In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as there is nothing subversive which has been
published in MALAYA which has replaced the former and has the same content but against which no action has been taken.

Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the warrants should be returned to the owners and all of the
items are subject to the exclusionary rule of evidence.

Teehankee, J., concur.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring

I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin At the same time I wish to state my own reasons for holding
that the search warrants which are the subject of the petition are utterly void.

The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of press freedom for the search warrants were issued in gross violation of
the Constitution.

The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV, stresses two points, namely: "(1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized." (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)

Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will result in wiping "out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)
The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be
alleged in the application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar nothing specifically subversive has been alleged; stated
only is the claim that certain objects were being used as instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion punishable
under P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the decree. I n the words of Chief Justice C
Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy of the highest order, to convict anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any
determinate provision thereof.

The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search warrants authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and take
possession, among other things, of the following:

Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to promote the objectives and purposes of
the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.

The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc. subversive? What did they contain to make them
subversive? There is nothing in the applications nor in the warrants which answers the questions. I must, therefore, conclude that the
warrants are general warrants which are obnoxious to the Constitution.

In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as there is nothing subversive which has been
published in MALAYA which has replaced the former and has the same content but against which no action has been taken.

Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the warrants should be returned to the owners and all of the
items are subject to the exclusionary rule of evidence.

Teehankee, J., concur.

Footnotes

1 Petition, P. 44, Rollo.

2 Manifestation and Opposition, p. 75, Rollo.

3 Templo v. Dela Cruz, 60 SCRA 295.

4 463 Phil. 275.

5 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29.

6 Sec. 4, Rule 126, Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. Examination of the Applicant. — The municipal or city judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their deposition in
writing and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to them.

7 The opening paragraph of Search Warrant No. 20- 82 [b] reads:

"It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examination under oath of Maj. Alejandro M. Gutierrez and
Lt. Pedro U. Tango, that there are good and sufficient reason to believe that Jose Burgos, Jr. Publisher-Editor of "WE
FORUM" with office address at 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, has in his possession
and control at said address the following; ... :

8 68 Am. Jur. 2d., 729.

9 61 Phil. 709. Annex "C", Petition, pp. 51-52,

10 Rollo.

11 Annex "B", Petition, pp. 53-54, Rollo.

12 Annex "C", Petition, p. 51, Rollo.

13 Annex "D", Petition, p. 54, Rollo.

14 Sec. 3, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution.

15 64 Phil. 33.

18 Sec. 9. Art. IV of the Constitution

19 Annex "K", Consolidated Reply, p. 175, Rollo.

20 Annex "L", Consolidated Reply, p. 178, Rollo.

21 Annex "M", Consolidated Reply, p. 179, Rollo.


The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

APRIL 18, 2018

G.R. No. 216922

JAYLORD DIMAL and ALLAN CASTILLO, Petitioners


vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision dated August 27, 2014 and Resolution dated February 4, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No. 128355. The CA dismissed
1 2

the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 87, which denied
3

the Omnibus Motion (Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 10-11, to Declare the Seized Items as Inadmissible in Evidence) in Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-12-175369 to Q-12-175371.

The Facts

At around 6:00 p.m. of September 6, 2010, Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio were scheduled to visit the compound of
petitioner Jaylord A. Dimal in Echague, Isabela, to negotiate for the sale of palay. At around 7:30 p.m., Lucio's nephew, Edison Pua,
went to Dimal's compound, asking for information as to the whereabouts of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma. Dimal informed Edison that
they had left an hour ago. Unable to locate his relatives, Edison went to the police station in Alicia, Isabela, to report that they were
missing, then proceeded to seek assistance from the police station in Echague.

Thereafter, Edison was escorted by two policemen to Dimal's compound, where they allegedly stayed and observed the premises in the
absence ofDimal until September 7, 2010. On even date at around 5:30 a.m., Edison and the two policemen supposedly searched
without a warrant Dimal's compound, but found no evidence linking him to the disappearances.

On September 24, 2010, petitioner Allan Castillo was accosted by the Echague Police, and allegedly tortured to implicate Dimal in the
killing of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma. On September 25, 2010, a certain Eduardo Sapipi was arrested due to the supposed
statement made by Castillo. Sapipi purportedly made an uncounseled confession that Dimal shot the three victims, and ordered him,
Castillo and one Michael Miranda to cover up the crime by throwing the bodies in a river.

On September 26, 2010, Dimal was arrested by the Echague Police. On September 27, 2010, the Echague Police filed with the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela, a criminal complaint for Kidnapping for Ransom and Multiple Murder against Dimal,
Castillo, Sapipi, Miranda, Marvin Guiao and Robert Baccay.

On October 8, 2010, Police Inspector (P/lnsp.) Roy Michael S. Malixi, a commissioned officer of the Philippine National Police assigned
with the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response in Camp Crame Quezon City, filed an Application for the Issuance of a Search
Warrant before the R TC Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 17, in connection with the kidnapping and multiple murder of Lucio, Rosemarie and
4

Gemma.

In his application for search warrant, P/Insp. Malixi stated that "he was informed, and verily believed that JA YLORD ARIZABAL DIMAL
@ JAY, 28 years old, a resident of Felix Gumpal Compound, Ipil Junction, Isabela and CMJ Building Dubinan East, Santiago City, has
in control of the following items" in the said address, to wit:

a. Personal belongings such as:

1. Driver's License of Lucio Pua;

2. Alien Certificate of Registration Identification cards of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua;

3. ATM Cards such as BDO under Lucio Pua's accounts;

4. Deposit Slips in BDO accounts of Lucio Pua;

5. Receipts of the palay delivered;

6. Blood-stained clothes of the victims:

6.1 Rosemarie Pua's green inner garment with black blazer and brownish pedal pants;

6.2 Lucio Pua's black short and pink polo shirt;

6.3 Gemma Eugenio y Estrada's maong pants, faded pink long sleeves jacket, black striped t-shirt and a shoulder
bag;
6.4 Polo t-shirt and faded pink jacket seen beside the comfort room inside the compound of the warehouse of Jayson
Dimal.

7. Picture of Shaira Mae Eugenio's youngest sister (Queen Sean Eugenio) seen inside the shoulder bag of the victim, Gemma Eugenio.

b. 1,600 sacks of palay inside a warehouse found in the Felix Gumpal Compound, Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela;

c. Long bolo approximately 16 inches in length; and

d. Glock 9mm caliber pistol. 5

P/Insp. Malixi stressed that he has personally verified and ascertained the veracity of the information and found the same to be true and
correct, as narrated and sworn to by Ernesto Villador, a long-time employee of Dimal, Edison Uy Pua, the nephew of the victims Lucio
and Rosemarie Pua, and Shaira Mae Eugenio, daughter of the victim Gemma Eugenio. P/Insp. Malixi claimed that the application was
founded on his personal knowledge and that of his witnesses, acquired after conducting surveillance and investigation. P/Insp. Malixi
attached to the application as Annexes "A", "B", "C" and "D" the Vicinity/Location and Floor Map.

After the hearing of the application on October 8, 2010, Judge Bonifacio T. Ong of the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 17, issued a
Search Warrant, which reads:

The undersigned Presiding Judge personally examined in the form of questions and answers in writing and [under oath], the applicant
Police Senior Inspector Roy Michael S. Malixi and the witnesses, namely: Edison Pua, Shaira Mae Eugenio, and Ernesto Villador, who
all collaborated to the fact of death of Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio in Echague, Isabela. That witness Edison Pua
went to the house of Jaylord Dimal after the commission of the crime and was able to see the blood-stained clothes of the victims:

1) Lucio Pua's clothes; and

2) [Rosemarie] Pua's clothes;

On the part of Shaira Mae Eugenio, she testified that before her mother Gemma Eugenio left her house, she wore faded pink long
sleeves jacket and black T-shirt, and brought with her a shoulder bag and two (2) cellphones which probably are in the house of Jaylord
Dimal. In the case of Ernesto Villador, he testified that he saw Jay lord Dimal holding a 9mm caliber pistol and testified that he usually
keep said firearm under the computer table or drawers. He likewise testify (sic) that there were 1,600 sacks of palay sold by the victims
and brought to the Felix Gumpal Compound.

With the testimony of said witnesses and their Sinumpaang Salaysay and deposition of witness, it would readily show that there is
probable cause to believe that in the house, particularly the Felix Gumpal Compound of Jay lord Dimal located at Ipil Junction,
Echague, Isabela, said items, to wit: blood-stained clothes of the victims, 1,600 sacks of palay inside the warehouse in the Felix
Gumpal Compound and 9mm cal. pistol are found.

The said Application for Search Warrant was filed before this Court due to compelling reasons for security and confidentiality purposes,
considering that possibility of leakages of information once the application for search warrant is filed with the court within the area
having territorial jurisdiction over it.

In view thereof, you are hereby commanded to search at any time of the day or night the premises of Felix Gumpal Compound located
at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela, and forthwith seize and take possession of the following properties: blood-stained clothes of
Rosemarie Pua, Lucio Pua, and Gemma Eugenio, either to take the 1,600 sacks of palay or just to photograph the same, and the 9mm
caliber pistol, and to bring the said articles to the custody of the Provincial Director of Isabela at the Provincial Police Office of Isabela
under custodia legis, to be dealt with according to law. 6

In the Return on the Search Warrant, P/Insp. Gary Halay-ay Macadangdang, Deputy Chief of Police, Echague Police Station, Echague,
Isabela," manifested that (1) Search Warrant No. 10-11 was served at the premises of Dimal at Barangay Ipil, Echague, Isabela, on
October 9, 2010 at about 9:00 a.m., and (2) the search was conducted in an orderly manner and in the presence of owner/custodian
Carlos Dimal, Barangay Captain Florencio Miguel, Barangay Kagawads Rodolfo Vergara and Mariano Seriban, and BOMBO Radyo
reporter Romy Santos. P/Insp. Macadangdang enumerated the items recovered:

The following articles, subject of the warrant, were found by the said Office during the search:

a. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Mark as E-24 with JAM markings)

b. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Mark as E-25 with JAM markings)

c. One (1) Black T-Shirt with suspected blood stain (Mark as E-26 with JAM markings)

d. One (1) Black T-Shirt with red lining with suspected blood stain (Mark as E-15 with JAM markings)

e. One (1) Bra color brown (tiger) (Mark as E-14 with JAM markings)

f. One (1) cell phone spare part (mark as E-16 with JAM markings)

g. One (1) cell phone spare part (mark as E-17 with JAM markings)

h. Palay husk with suspected blood stain (mark as E-28 with JAM markings)

i. Suspected blood stain (mark as E-25-A with JAM markings)


The articles recovered/seized in plain view during the conduct of search are the following:

a. One (1) pc tom cloth (Mark as E-1 with JAM markings)

b. One (1) pc tom cloth (Mark as E-2 with JAM markings)

c. One (1) pc tom cloth (Mark as E-3 with JAM markings)

d. One (1) pc spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-4 with JAM markings)

e. One (1) bag pack color black (Mark as E-5 with JAM markings)

f. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-6 with JAM markings)

g. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-7 with JAM markings)

h. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-8 with JAM markings)

i. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-9 with JAM markings)

j. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-10 with JAM markings)

k. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-11 with JAM markings)

1. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-12 with JAM markings)

m. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-13 with JAM markings)

n. Two (2) Alien Certificate of Registration of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua, and One (1) BDO Passbook in the name
of Lucio Pua (mark as E-15 with JAM markings)

o. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-18 with JAM markings)

p. One (1) piece gold-plated earring (mark as E-19 with JAM markings)

q. Suspected human hair (mark as E-20 with JAM markings)

r. A piece of embroider[ed] cloth (mark as E-22 with JAM markings)

s. Three (3) burned Tire wires (mark as E-23 with JAM markings)

t. One (1) empty plastic bottle of Gleam muriatic acid (mark as E- 27 with JAM markings)

u. One (1) live ammo of caliber 22 (mark as E-29 with JAM markings)

v. One (1) color white t-shirt (mark as E-30 with JAM markings). 7

On February 20, 2012, petitioners Dimal and Castillo, together with Michael Miranda, filed an Omnibus Motion to quash Search
8

Warrant No. 10-11 and to declare the seized items as inadmissible in evidence. They argued that the search warrant is invalid because
it was issued in connection with, not just one single offense, but two crimes, i.e., kidnapping and multiple murder. They also contended
that except for witness Ernesto Villador, applicant P/Insp. Malixi and witnesses Edison and Shaira Mae have no personal knowledge
surrounding the two crimes committed; hence, their statements did not provide basis for a finding of probable cause, much less for the
issuance of a search warrant. With respect to Villador, petitioners assert that his sworn statement is incredible because he is just an
ordinary laborer, who is unfamiliar with the English language, and there is no showing that the contents of his statement were fully
explained to him by the Judge who issued the search warrant. Petitioners further posit that the search warrant was invalidly
implemented because the raiding team failed to comply with Section 8, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court on the requisite presence of two
witnesses during a search of premises, and with Section 10, Rule 126 on the issuance of a receipt of seized properties. Finally,
petitioners sought that the items seized which are not covered by the search warrant, should be declared inadmissible in evidence and
be ordered returned to the accused.

Meanwhile, on November 22, 2010, three (3) criminal Informations for Kidnapping for Ransom, as defined and penalized under Article
267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, were filed against petitioners before the RTC of Echague,
Isabela, Branch 24, and later re-raffled to the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 17. The accusatory portion of the Informations similarly
read, save for the names of the 3 victims, as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of September 2010, and for sometime thereafter, in the Municipality of Echague, Province of Isabela,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Jaylord Arizabal Dimas (sic) and Allan Castillo y Marquez,
being the principals therein, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, kidnap and detain one Lucio Uy Pua (Chinese name: Xinyi Pan) for the purpose of extorting ransom in the amount of
9

Fifty (50) million pesos, from him and from his relatives.

That during his[/her] detention, the said accused, in pursuance of conspiracy, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
assault, attack and shot with a caliber 9mm pistol the said Lucio Uy Pua which had directly caused his death and, thereafter, chopped
10
his body into several pieces and placed them into big plastic containers and ice box, and burned his head and placed the same into a
plastic bag, and threw the same on separate rivers located at Santiago City and at the Province of Quirino.

That the accused Michael Miranda Genova alias Mike Miranda being an accessory, took part in the subsequent commission of the
crime by providing the vehicle and a container drum used to dispose the chopped body of said Lucio Uy Pua and threw the same on
11

the river, in order to conceal the body of the crime, to prevent its discovery.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 12

Pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 12-1-18-RTC, the criminal cases were re-raffled to Judge Aurora A. Hernandez-Calledo of the
RTC of Quezon City, and re-docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-12-175369, Q-12- 175370 to Q-12-175371.

In an Order dated September 28, 2012, the RTC of Quezon City denied the Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 10-11 for lack of
13

merit. The RTC ruled that a perusal of the application for search warrant reveals that it was issued by the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela, after
conducting searching and probing questions upon the persons of the applicant P/Insp. Malixi, and his witnesses Edison, Shaira Mae
and more particularly Villador, and finding probable cause based on their personal knowledge. In rejecting the claim of
unreasonableness of the implementation of the search warrant, the R TC noted that the records show that the owner/custodian of the
property subject of the warrant by the name of Carlos Dimal, was present, together with the Barangay Captain, two Barangay
Kagawads, and a reporter from Bomba Radyo.

Considering that no complaint was filed regarding the implementation of the search warrant, and that a Certification of Orderly Search
was issued by the barangay officials, the RTC declared that the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duty was not
sufficiently contradicted. Anent the claim that the search warrant was not issued in connection with a single offense but with the crimes
of Kidnapping and Murder, the RTC said that the nature of the case and the circumstances at the time the search warrant was applied
for, justify the issuance of such warrant as the two offenses are allied or closely related to each other because it was reported to the
applicant that the victims were kidnapped for ransom and murdered. Finally, the RTC stressed that the claim that no return on the
search warrant was submitted must fail because such a return was issued by the executing officer, and was marked as Exhibit "4" for
the prosecution during the preliminary conference .

With the RTC's denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

In a Decision dated August 27, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the subject search warrant was validly issued, thus:
14

A perusal of the records show that Judge Ong, through searching and probing questions, personally examined the (sic) P/lnsp. Malixi
and the witnesses, Edison Uy, Ernesto Villador and Shaira Mae Eugenio, on 8 October 2010. The questions that Judge Ong
propounded were sufficiently probing, not at all superficial and perfunctory. The facts narrated by the witnesses while under oath, when
they were asked by the examining judge, were sufficient justification for the issuance of the subject search warrant.

Furthermore, the subject search warrant specifically designated or described Felix Gumpal Compound, located at lpil Junction,
Echague, Isabela as the place to be searched and enumerated the articles to be seized.

Petitioners['] contention that the subject search warrant which was issued in connection with two (2) separate offenses, Kidnapping and
Murder, as indicated therein, cannot stand. However, as aptly pointed out by the People through the Office of the Solicitor General, the
crimes of kidnapping and murder are interrelated and points to the commission of a single complex crime known as kidnapping with
murder. They cannot be treated as separate crimes. 15

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated February 4, 2015. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.

Issues

Petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred in failing to pass upon petitioners' allegations (1) that the search warrant is void and its
quashal impera1ive; and (2) that the items seized on the basis of the void search warrant are inadmissible in evidence. They contend
that the search warrant was null and void because it was issued in connection with two unrelated offenses, without a finding of probable
cause, and without specifying the place to be searched and the items to be seized.

Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious. Search Warrant No. 10-11 was validly issued, but most of the items seized pursuant thereto are
inadmissible in evidence, as they were neither particularly described in the warrant nor seized under the "plain view doctrine".

At the outset, there is no merit to petitioners' contention that the search warrant was applied for in connection with two unrelated
offenses, i.e., kidnapping and murder, in violation of Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which requires that such warrant must be
issued in relation to one offense.

Suffice it to state that where a person kidnapped is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, there is only one special complex
crime for which the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides the maximum penalty that shall be
imposed, i.e., death. In People v. Larranaga, the Court explained that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime:
16 17

This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of "special complex crime" of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It
effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely
sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought.
Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor
be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659.
xxxx

x x x Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex
crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3)
kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex
crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they
were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by
adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture
or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime." 18

There is no dispute that Search Warrant No. 10-11 was applied for and issued in connection with the crime of kidnapping with murder.
Asked by Judge Ong during the hearing as to what particular offense was committed, search warrant applicant P/Insp. Malixi testified
that Dimal "allegedly committed the crime of kidnapping and multiple murder of Lucio and Rosemarie Pua and one Gemma Eugenio on
September 6, 2010." It is not amiss to add that a search warrant that covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not
19

violate the one-specific-offense rule. 20

Neither can petitioners validly claim that the examining judge failed to ask searching questions, and to consider that the testimonies of
the applicant and his witnesses were based entirely on hearsay, as they have no personal knowledge of the circumstances relating to
the supposed disappearance or murder of the 3 victims.

The Court explained in Del Castillo v. People the concept of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant:
21

x x x Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than
evidence which would justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made
known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible totality of the circumstances standard. The existence
depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to
disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the
offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.

Corollarily, the Court said in Oebanda v. People that in an application for search warrant, the mandate of the judge is for him to
22

conduct a full and searching examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. "The searching questions propounded
to the applicant and the witnesses must depend on a large extent upon the discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast
rule as to how a judge may conduct his examination, it is axiomatic that the said examination must be probing and exhaustive and not
merely routinary, general, periphe.ial or perfunctory. He must make his own inquiry on the intent and factual and legal justifications for a
search warrant. The questions should not merely be repetitious of the averments stated in the affidavits/deposition of the applicant and
the witnesses."23

Having in mind the foregoing principles, the Court agrees with the RTC and the CA in both ruling that Judge Ong found probable cause
to issue a search warrant after a searching and probing personal examination of applicant P/Insp. Malixi and his witnesses, Edison,
Shaira Mae and Villador. Their testimonies jointly and collectively show a reasonable ground to believe that the 3 victims went to
Dimal's compound to sell palay, but were probably killed by Dimal, and that they may have left personal belongings within its premises.

During the hearing of his application for search warrant, Judge Ong was ab.le to elicit from P/Insp. Malixi the specific crime allegedly
committed by Dimal, the particular place to be searched and items to be seized:

[COURT:]

Q: And in your application for Search Warrant, what particular place are you going to search in this Search Warrant if ever it will
be granted?

[P/INSP. MALIXI:]

A: According to the Opponent we are applying to search the Palay Buying Station of Jaylord Dimal located at Felix Gumpal
Compound, lpil, Echague, Isabela, and also to search the back portion of a vacant lot within the Felix Gumpal Compound,
Your Honor.

Q: The particular place is Felix Gumpal Compound, in Echague, Isabela, no more?

A: No more, Your Honor.

Q: And what particular offense have this Jaylord Dimal committed, if any?

A: He allegedly committed the crime of kidnapping and multiple murder of Lucio and Rosemarie Pua and one Gemma Eugenio
on September 6, 2010, Your Honor.

Q: And what particular items are you going to search in that compound of Felix Gumpal?

A: Subject of the offense, the personal belongings of the victims when they went to the Felix Gumpal Compound, where they were
reportedly murdered, Your Honor. 1âwphi1
Q: What specific items are you going to search from that place?

A: Personal belongings such as Driver's License of Lucio Pua, Alien Certificate of Registration ID of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie
Pua, A TM Cards such as BDO under Lucio Pua's account, Deposit slips of BDO accounts of Lucio Pua, receipts of the palay
delivered, blood-stained clothes of the victims, such as Rosemarie Pua's green inner garment with black blazer and brownish
pedal pants, Lucio Pua's black short and pink polo shirt, Gemma Eugenio's maong pants, faded pink long sleeves jacket,
black stripe T-shirt and a shoulder bag of the victim Gemma Eugenio color white, the 1,600 sacks of palay inside the
Warehouse of Felix Gumpal Compound, long bolo [which] is approximately 16 inches long, and the 9mm caliber black pistol,
your Honor.

Q: Where did you get this information regarding the articles found in the Felix Gumpal Compound?

A: This information was given to me by the Opponents, Your Honor.

Q: And who are they?

A: They are Edison Uy Pua, Ernesto Villador y Yakapin and Shaira Eugenio y Estrada, Your Honor.

Q: How sure are you that these people were able to see these items in Felix Gumpal Compound? A: Edison Uy Pua and Shaira Mae
Eugenio are the relatives of the victims who personally saw the victim's clothes they were wearing right before they went to Jaylord's
compound and the victims were seen by Ernesto Villador sprawled lifeless on the floor in the palay buying station of Jaylord Dimal,
Your Honor.

Q: You said that there is a gun 9mm pistol, how did they come to know that there was a gun in that place?

A: It was reported to me by Ernesto Villador, Your Honor. 24

Judge Ong was also able to draw corroborative testimonies from P/lnsp. Malixi's witnesses. Edison testified on the circumstances prior
to the disappearance of his uncle Lucio and his aunties Rosemarie and Gemma, while Shaira Mae described the clothes and personal
belongings of her mother before the latter disappeared, thus:

[COURT]

Q: On September 6, 2010, where were you?

[EDISON]

A: I was at home, Your Honor.

Q: Where?

A: At Antonino, Alicia, Isabela, Your Honor?

Q: Where is Lucio and Rosemarie Pua on that day?

A: They went to Jaylord to collect the payment of the palay, Your Honor.

Q: And you were left in your house in Alicia when your Uncle Lucio and Auntie Rosemarie when they went to Jaylord to collect payment
of palay?

A: Yes, Your Honor, I was.

Q: And do you know what happened to your Uncle Lucio and Auntie Rosemarie when they went to Jaylord's place?

A: I know because when they went to collect payments they did not come back anymore, Your Honor.

Q: And what did you do when you learned that they did not come back anymore?

A: They were already dead and their bodies were chopped into pieces, your Honor.

Q: And what did you do when you learned that they did not come back anymore?

A: They were already dead and their bodies were chopped into pieces, your Honor.

Q: And what did you do when you learned that they were already dead and chopped into pieces?

A: We went to look for the pieces of the bodies because they said it was thrown to the river, Your Honor.

Q: And what did you do after that?

A: We went to the house of Jaylord, Your Honor.


Q: And what did you do in the house of Jaylord?

A: We saw the T-shirt of my Uncle Lucio Pua and Ate Gemma, Your Honor.

Q: Who is that Gemma?

A: My aunt, the one who canvass palay, your Honor.

Q: What did you see in the house of Jaylord?

A: Polo shirt and Jacket of Auntie Gemma, Your Honor.

Q: What else aside from the Polo shirt and jacket did you see?

A: No more your Honor, we went back to Alicia.

Q: Who were with you when you went to the house of Jaylord?

A: My cousin, Your Honor .

Q: What is the name of your cousin?

A: Harison, Your Honor.

Q: When was that when you went to the house of Dimal?

A: October 5, 2010, Your Honor. 25

xx xx

[COURT]

Q: On September 6, 2010, in the afternoon, at about 4:00 o'clock, do you know where was (sic) your mother then? [SHAIRA MAE]

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where?

A: She [Gemma] went to Jaylord Dimal, Your Honor.

Q: Do you remember what was (sic) the clothes of your mother and what did she brought (sic) with her when she went to
Jaylord Dimal?

A: Yes, Your Honor, the long sleeves is faded pink, the inner shirt is black, and bag is pink, inside it are two (2) cellphones,
the picture of my sister and her Driver's License. 26

While it may be noted that applicant P/Insp. Malixi and his witnesses Shaira Mae and Edison have no personal knowledge how the
crimes of kidnapping and multiple murder were committed, their testimonies corroborated that of Villador, who petitioners admitted to
have known about the incidents surrounding the commission of such crimes. 27

Significantly, Judge Ong's inquiry underscored that Villador has a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed at the
Felix Gumpal Compound on September 6, 2010. In reply to the queries of Judge Ong, Villador revealed that (1) when Dimal called him
inside the house to receive his payment as classifier of palay, he saw them [Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma] talking to each other; and
(2) later in the day, Dimal called him to ask for help, but he backed out upon seeing that Dimal was holding a black 0.9 mm pistol amidst
people lying bloody on the ground. Thus:

[COURT:]

Q: You said you are a classifier, what is the work of a classifier?

[VILLADOR]

A: We classify the kinds of palay, Your Honor.

Q: Where are you working as a classifier?

A: Jaylord Dimal, Your Honor.

Q: And where is the place of the business of Jaylord Dimal?


A: Junction Ipil at the former compound of Felix Gumpal, Your Honor.

Q: How long have you been a classifier of Jaylord Dimal?

A: It is already two (2) years that every cropping he calls for me to classify, Your Honor.

Q: On September 6, 2010, are (sic) you still a classifier in the business of Jaylord Dimal.

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Where were you on that date?

A: In the compound of Jaylord, Your Honor.

Q: In the afternoon of that date, do you know of any person who went to the place of businessman Dimal?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Who are they?

A: Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q: Do you know their purpose of going to the place of Jaylord Dimal?

A: They were supposed to collect payment of the palay that Jay lord asked me to gather, Your Honor?

Q: And where are those palay that Jaylord asked you to gather?

A: I was the one discarding the sacks of palay in the bodega of Jaylord, Your Honor.

Q: Who owns these palay that you are discarding?

A: Owned by Lucio and Rosemarie Pua, Your Honor.

Q: And why were they taken to the place of Jaylord Dimal?

A: They asked me to classify those palay and by agreement of Jaylord and the Pua's I discarded the palay in the bodega of Jaylord,
Your Honor.

Q: Do you know how many cavans?

xxxx

A: 1,600 sacks, Your Honor.

Q: And where are they now those sacks of palay?

A: They are in the bodega or warehouse, Your Honor.

Q: Are those sacks of palay still there up to now?

A: Yes, Your Honor, they are still there.

Q: What happened in the afternoon of September 6, 2010 when Lucio and Rosemarie and Gemma was (sic) there in the house
or place of Jaylord Dimal?

A: Jaylord Dimal went out from his house and he called for the three and went inside the house, Your Honor.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: Jaylord called me up but I was already in our house and I was busy giving wages to my laborers, when he summoned me
to go to his house, "Kuya punta ka sandali dito," meaning "Kuya, please come here for a while."

Q: And did you go to the place of Jaylord?

A: Yes, Your Honor, I rode my motorcycle and went to the place.


Q: And what happened next?

A: When I arrived at the gate he asked me to enter the compound with my motorcycle, Your Honor.

Q: What happened next?

A: I asked him, "Bakit Boss?" meaning, "Why, Boss?"

Q: What happened next?

A: He answered, "Kuya yung mga tao patay na baka pwedeng patulong." Meaning "Kuya the people are already dead please
help?

Q: What did you see from Jaylord [Dimal] when he told you the people were already dead? A: I saw him holding a black .9mm
pistol and when I saw the people lying bloody on the ground, I told him "Sir, hindi ko kaya", meaning "I cannot do it.

Q: How may times have you seen that gun which he was holding on that day September 6, 2010?

A: That night when he called for me, Your Honor.

Q: After the September 6, 2010 incident, have you went (sic) back to the place of Dimal.

A: No more, Your Honor.

Q: What are the things did you see (sic) when Dimal called for you and told you that these persons were already dead?

A: I saw these people lying on the ground bloody and they are already dead and I said, "hindi ko kaya", meaning "I cannot do
it" and he replied, "Sige sibat ka na," meaning "okay, just go."

Q: So, it is (sic) still possible that the gun held by Dimal is still in his house?

A: I think so that is still in his house because he keep (sic) it in one place, Your Honor.

Q: And you said he keep (sic) it in one place are you familiar where he is keeping it?

A: What I usually see, he placed it under the table where the laptop is and there drawers in it, Your Honor. 28

Records clearly show that Judge Ong personally examined under oath applicant P/Insp. Malixi and his witnesses, Edwin, Shaira Mae
and Villador, whose collective testimonies would prompt a reasonably discreet person to believe that the crime of kidnapping with
murder was committed at the Felix GumpaL Compound on September 6, 2010, and that specific personal properti'es sought in
connection with the crime could be found in the said place sought to be searched.

As to petitioners' claim that the judge did not ask anymore searching questions after statements were made by Villador, the Court
29

finds that searching and probing questions were indeed propounded by Judge Ong, and that there is no more necessity to ask Villador
to describe the position and state of the lifeless bodies, and the specific place in the compound where the bodies were lying. Villador
could not have been expected to take a closer look into the bloody bodies on the ground because Dimal was then holding a pistol, and
told him to leave if he cannot help. Petitioners would do well to bear in mind that, absent a showing to the contrary, it is presumed that a
judicial function has been regularly performed. The judge has the prerogative to give his own judgment on the application of the search
30

warrant by his own evaluation of the evidence presented before him. The Court cannot substitute its own judgment to that of the judge,
31

unless the latter disregarded facts before him/her or ignored the clear dictates of reason. 32

Petitioners submit that the search warrant is also void for failing to identify with particularity the place to be searched and the items to
be seized. They· assert that Felix Gumpal Compound consists of a very large area, consisting of two houses, one nipa hut, two external
bathrooms, one garage, one warehouse utilized as a palay depot, and one warehouse utilized to store a palay drying machinery. They
likewise claim that all the items actually seized were either not among those listed in the warrant or were seized in violation of the "plain
view doctrine". Insisting that the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, petitioners posit
that all the items seized in Dimal's compound are "fruits of the poisonous tree" and inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Contrary to petitioners' submission, the search warrant issued by Judge Ong identified with particularity the place to be searched,
namely; (1) the house of Jaylord Dimal and (2) the palay warehouse in the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound at Ipil Junction,
Echague, Isabela. This is evident from the Search Warrant issued by the judge, which reads:

The undersigned Presiding Judge personally examined in the form of questions and answers in writing and under oath, the applicant
Police Senior Inspector Roy Michael S. Malixi and the witnesses, namely: Edison Pua, Shaira Mae Eugenio, and Ernesto Villador, who
all collaborated to the fact of death of Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio in Echague, Isabela. That witness Edison Pua
went to the house of Jaylord Dimal after the commission of the crime and was able to see the blood-stained clothes of the victims:

1) Lucio Pua's clothes; and

2) [Rosemarie] Pua's clothes;

On the part of Shaira Mae Eugenio, she testified that before her mother Gemma Eugenio left her house, she wore faded pink long
sleeves jacket and black T-shirt, and brought with her a shoulder bag and two (2) cellphones which are probably in the house of
Jaylord Dimal. In the case of Ernesto Villador, he testified that he saw Jay lord Dimal holding a 9mm caliber pistol and testified that he
usually keep said firearm under the computer table or drawers. He likewise testify (sic) that there were 1600 sacks of palay sold by the
victims and brought to the Felix Gum pal Compound.

With the testimony of said witnesses and their Sinumpaang Salaysay and deposition of witness, it would readily show that there is
probable cause to believe that in the house, particularly the Felix Gumpal Compound of Jaylord Dimal located at Ipil Junction,
Echague, Isabela, said items, to wit: blood-stained clothes of the victims, 1600 sacks of palay inside the warehouse in the Felix
Gumpal Compound and 9mm cal. pistol are found.

The said Application for Search Warrant was filed before this Court due to compelling reasons for security and confidentiality purposes,
considering that possibility of leakages of information once the application for search warrant is filed with the court within the area
having territorial jurisdiction over it.

In view thereof, you are hereby commanded to search at any time of the day or night the premises of Felix Gum pal Compound
located at lpil Junction, Echague, Isabela, and forthwith seize and take possession of thefollowing properties: blood-stained clothes of
Rosemarie Pua, Lucio Pua, and Gemma Eugenio, either to take the 1,600 sacks of palay or just photograph the same, and the 9mm
caliber pistol, and to bring the said articles to the custody of the Provincial Director of Isabela at the Provincial Police Office of Isabela
under custodia legis, to be dealt with according to law. 33

A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable effort the
place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation that points out the place to be searched to the
34

exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of
definiteness. To the Court's view, the above-quoted search warrant sufficiently describes the place to be searched with manifest
35

intention that the search be confined strictly to the place described. At any rate, petitioners cannot be heard to decry irregularity in the
conduct of the search of the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound because, as aptly ruled by the RTC, a Certification of Orderly
Search was issued by the barangay officials, and the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duty was not sufficiently
contradicted by petitioners.

Moreover, the objection as to the particularity of the place to be searched was belatedly raised in petitioners' motion for reconsideration
of the Order denying their Omnibus Motion to quash. The Court has consistently ruled that the omnibus motion rule under Section 8,
Rule 15 is applicable to motion to quash search warrants. In Abuan v. People, it was held that "the motion to quash the search
36 37 38

warrant which the accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available,
existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress."
Accordingly, the trial court could only take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in a motion to quash if (1) said issue was not
available or existent when they filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or (2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Because petitioners' objection as to the particularity of the place to be searched was available when they filed their
39

omnibus motion to quash, and there being no jurisdictional issue raised, their objection is deemed waived.

Meanwhile, a search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized (1) when the description therein is as specific
as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or (2) when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law by which the warrant
officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; (3) and when the things to be described are limited to those which bear direct
relation to the offenses for which the warrant is being issued. The purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only
40

to those particularly described in the search warrant in order to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what items they
shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures will be committed. 41

In Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, the Court clarified that technical precision of description is not required. "It is only necessary that there
42

be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be
a mere roving commission. Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail
as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the
applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look for." 43

Under American jurisprudence which has persuasive effect in this jurisdiction, the degree of specificity required in a search warrant's
description of the items to be searched for and seized is flexible and will vary depending on the crime involved and the types of items
sought. A description is said to be valid if it is as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation will
44

permit. But if the circumstances make an exact description of the property to be seized a virtual impossibility, the searching officer can
only be expected to describe the generic class of the items sought. The practical guide to determine whether a specific search warrant
meets the particularity requirement is for the court to inquire if the officer reading the description in the warrant would reasonably know
what items to be seized. 45

In Search Warrant No. 10-11, only two things were particularly described and sought to be seized in connection with the special
complex crime of kidnapping with murder, namely: (1) blood-stained clothes of Gemma Eugenio consisting of a faded pink long sleeves
jacket and a black tshirt, and (2) a 0.9mm caliber pistol. Having no direct relation to the said crime, the 1,600 sacks of palay that were
supposedly sold by the victims to Dimal and found in his warehouse, cannot be a proper subject of a search warrant because they do
not fall under the personal properties stated under Section 3 of Rule 126, to wit: (a) subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled and
other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or (c) those used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense, can be the
proper subject of a search warrant.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in upholding the denial of the Omnibus Motion to quash because all the
Constitutional and procedural requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are still present, namely: (1) probable cause; (2) such
46 47

probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to
them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 48

Despite the fact that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 10-11 is valid, petitioners are correct that most items listed in the Return on
the Search Warrant are inadmissible in evidence. Since only 2 items were particularly described on the face of the search warrant,
namely: (1) the blood-stained clothes of Gemma Eugenio consisting of faded pink long sleeves jacket and black t-shirt; and (2) the 0.9
mm caliber pistol, the Court declares that only two articles under the Return on the Search Warrant are admissible in evidence as they
could be the blood-stained clothes of Gemma subject of the warrant:

c. One (1) Black T-Shirt with suspected blood stain (Mark as E-26 with JAM markings)
d. One (1) Black T-Shirt with red lining with suspected blood stain (Mark as E-15 with JAM markings)

It bears stressing that the application for search warrant particularly described the victims' blood-stained clothes as follows: (1)
Rosemarie Pua's green inner garment with black blazer and brownish pedal pants; (2) Lucio Pua's black shorts and pink polo shirt; and
(3) Gemma Eugenio's maong pants, faded pink long sleeves jacket, and black striped t-shirt. Considering that only Gemma's clothes
were described in Search Warrant No. 10-11 as specific as the circumstances will allow, the Court is constrained to hold as
inadequately described the blood-stained clothes of Lucio and Rosemarie. Without the aid of the applicant's witnesses who are familiar
with the victims' personal belongings, any other warrant officer, like P/Insp. Macadangdang who served the search warrant, will surely
be unable to identify the blood-stained clothes of Lucio and Rosemarie by sheer reliance on the face of such warrant.

The Court could have rendered a favorable ruling if the application for search warrant and supporting affidavits were incorporated by
reference in Search Warrant No. 10-11, so as to enable the warrant officer to identify the specific clothes sought to be searched. This is
because under American jurisprudence, an otherwise overbroad warrant will comply with the particularity requirement when the affidavit
filed in support of the warrant is physically attached to it, and the warrant expressly refers to the affidavit and incorporates it with
suitable words of reference. Conversely, a warrant which lacks any description of the items to be seized is defective and is not cured by
a description in the warrant application which is not referenced in the warrant and not provided to the subject of the search. 49

The Court further declares that the following items are inadmissible as they do not bear any direct relation to the 3 items particularly
described in Search Warrant No. 10-11:

a. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Mark as E-24 with JAM markings)

b. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Mark as E-25 with JAM markings)

xxxx

e. One (1) Bra color brown (tiger) (Mark as E-14 with JAM markings)

f. One (1) cell phone spare part (mark as E-16 with JAM markings)

g. One (1) cell phone spare part (mark as E-17 with JAM markings)

h. Palay husk with suspected blood stain (mark as E-28 with JAM markings)

i. Suspected blood stain (mark as E-25-A with JAM markings)

With respect to the items under Return on the Search Warrant indicated as "articles recovered/seized in plain view during the conduct
of the search," it is well settled that objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are
subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. 50

For the "plain view doctrine" to apply, it is required that the following requisites are present: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of
the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. As explained in People v. Salanguit:
51 52

What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the
course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification-whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to a lawful-arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused-and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.

The first requisite of the "plain view doctrine" is present in this case because the seizing officer, P/Insp. Macadangdang, has a prior
justification for an intrusion into the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound, for he had to conduct the search pursuant to a valid
warrant. However, the second and third requisites are absent, as there is nothing in the records to prove that the other items not
particularly described in the search warrant were open to eye and hand, and that their discovery was unintentional.

In fact, out of the 2 items particularly described in the search warrant, only the 2 black t-shirts with suspected blood stain possibly
belonging to Gemma were retrieved, but the 9mm caliber pistol was not found. It is also not clear in this case at what instance were the
items supposedly seized in plain view were confiscated in relation to the seizure of Gemma's bloodstained clothes - whether prior to,
contemporaneous with or subsequent to such seizure. Bearing in mind that once the valid portion of the search warrant has been
executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found, the Court rules
53

that the recovery of the items seized in plain view, which could have been made after the seizure of Gemma's clothes, are invalid.

It is also not immediately apparent to the officer that, except for the Alien Certificates of Registration of Lucio and Rosemarie, the BDO
Passbook in the name of Lucio, and the live ammo of caliber 22 (marked as E-29 with JAM markings), the following items may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure:

a. One (1) pc torn cloth (Mark as E-1 with JAM markings)

b. One (1) pc tom cloth (Mark as E-2 with JAM markings)

c. One (1) pc tom cloth (Mark as E-3 with JAM markings)

d. One (1) pc spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-4 with JAM markings)
e. One (1) bag pack color black (Mark as E-5 with JAM markings)

f. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-6 with JAM markings)

g. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-7 with JAM markings)

h. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-8 with JAM markings)

i. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-9 with JAM markings)

j. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-10 with JAM markings)

k. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-11 with JAM markings)

l. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-12 with JAM markings)

m. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-13 with JAM markings)

xxxx

o. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-18 with JAM markings)

p. One (1) piece gold-plated earring (mark as E-19 with JAM markings)

q. Suspected human hair (mark as E-20 with JAM markings)

r. A piece of embroider[ed] cloth (mark as E-22 with JAM markings)

s. Three (3) burned Tire wires (mark as E-23 with JAM markings)

t. One (1) empty plastic bottle of Gleam muriatic acid (mark as E-27 with JAM markings)

xxxx

v. One (1) color white t-shirt (mark as E-30 with JAM markings)

It bears emphasis that the "immediately apparent" test does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminating
character of the evidence, but only that the seizure be presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is a probable cause to associate
the property with a criminal activity. In view thereof, the 10 pieces of spent shell of calibre 0.22 ammo cannot be admitted in evidence
54

because they can hardly be used in a 9mm caliber pistol specified in the search warrant, and possession of such spent shells are not
illegal per se. Likewise, the following items supposedly seized under plain view cannot be admitted because possession thereof is not
inherently unlawful: (a) 3 tom cloths; (b) black bag pack; (c) a piece of goldplated earing; (d) a suspected human hair; (e) a piece of
embroidered cloth; (f) 3 burned tire wires; (g) empty plastic of muriatic acid; and (h) white t-shirt.

Notwithstanding the inadmissibility in evidence of the items listed above, the Court sustains the validity of Search Warrant No. 10-11
and the admissibility of the items seized which were particularly described in the warrant. This is in line with the principles under
American jurisprudence: (1) that the seizure of goods not described in the warrant does not render the whole seizure illegal, and the
seizure is illegal only as to those things which was unlawful to seize; and (2) the fact that the officers, after making a legal search and
seizure under the warrant, illegally made a search and seizure of other property not within the warrant does not invalidate the first
search and seizure. To be sure, a search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
55

expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. Objects taken which were not specified in the
56

search warrant should be restored to the person from whom they were unlawfully seized.
57

Although the Alien Certificates of Registration of Lucio and Rosemarie and the BDO Passbook in the name of Lucio are inadmissible in
evidence, for not having been seized in accordance with the "plain view doctrine," these personal belongings should be returned to the
heirs of the respective victims. Anent the live ammo of caliber 0.22 (marked as E-29 with JAM markings), which could not have been
used in a 0.9mm caliber pistol, the same shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of a criminal case that may be later filed
against petitioner Dimal. In Alih v. Castro, it was held that even if the search of petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution
58

and the firearms and ammunition taken therefrom are inadmissible in evidence, pending determination of the legality of said articles
they can be ordered to remain in custodia legis subject to appropriate disposition as the corresponding court may direct in the criminal
proceedings that have been or may thereafter be filed against petitioners.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
August 27, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 128355 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to declare that the following properties seized under
Search Warrant No. 10-11 are inadmissible in evidence for neither having been particularly described in the search warrant nor seized
under the "plain view doctrine":

1. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Marked as E-24 with JAM markings)

2. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Marked as E-25 with JAM markings)

3. One (1) Bra color brown (tiger) (Marked as E-14 with JAM markings)

4. One (1) cell phone spare part (marked as E-16 with JAM markings)
5. One (1) cell phone spare part (marked as E-17 with JAM markings)

6. Palay husk with suspected blood stain (marked as E-28 with JAM markings)

7. Suspected blood stain (marked as E-25-A with JAM markings)

8. One (1) pc tom cloth (Marked as E-1 with JAM markings)

9. One (1) pc tom cloth (Marked as E-2 with JAM markings)

10. One (1) pc tom cloth (Marked as E-3 with JAM markings)

11. One (1) pc spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-4 with JAM markings)

12. One (1) bag pack color black (Marked as E-5 with JAM markings)

13. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-6 with JAM markings)

14. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-7 with JAM markings)

15. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-8 with JAM markings)

16. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-9 with JAM markings)

17. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-10 with JAM markings)

18. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-11 with JAM markings)

19. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-12 with JAM markings)

20. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-13 with JAM markings)

21. Two (2) Alien Certificate of Registration of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua, and One (1) BDO Passbook in the name of Lucio Pua
(mark as E-15 with JAM markings)

22. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-18 with JAM markings)

23. One (1) piece gold-plated earring (marked as E-19 with JAM markings)

24. Suspected human hair (marked as E-20 with JAM markings)

25. A piece of embroider[ed] cloth (marked as E-22 with JAM markings)

26. Three (3) burned Tire wires (marked as E-23 with JAM markings)

27. One (1) empty plastic bottle of Gleam muriatic acid (marked as E-27 with JAM markings)

28. One (1) live ammo of caliber 22 (marked as E-29 with JAM markings)

29. One (1) color white t-shirt (marked as E-30 with JAM markings)

Moreover, the two (2) Alien Certificates of Registration of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua, and One (1) BDO Passbook in the name of
Lucio Pua are directed to be returned to the respective heirs of said victims, while the live ammo of caliber 0.22 (marked as E-29 with
JAM markings) shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal case that may be filed against petitioner Jaylord
Dimal.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
Chairperson

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA


Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANDRES B. REYES, JR.
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.
*

1
Penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting, with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Mario V. Lopez
concurring; rollo, pp. 44-50.

2
Id. at 52-53.

3
Presided by Judge Aurora A. Hernandez-Calledo; id. at 94-102.

4
Rollo, pp. 54-55.

5
Id.

6
Id. at 80-81.

7
Id. at 82-83, 136-138.

8
Id. at 84-93.

9
The names of the 2 victims in the other Informations are Rosemarie P. Pua (Chinese name: Juhua Pan) and Gemma
Eugenio y Estrada.

10
Id.

11
Id.

12
Rollo, pp. 126-129. (Emphasis ours)

13
Id. at 94-102.

14
Supra note 1.

15
Id at 49-50.

With the enactment of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which
16

prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, such penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

17
466 Phil. 324, 384-385 (2004), citing People v. Ramos, 357 Phil. 559 (1998), and People v. Mercado, 400 Phil. 37 (2000).

18
Id. at 385-387. (Italics in the original; emphasis added; citations omitted)

19
Rollo, p. 59.

20
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 875, 928 ( 1996).

21
680 Phil. 447, 457-458 (2012).

22
G.R. No. 208137, June 8, 2016, 792 SCRA 623.

23
Id. at 631-632.

24
Rollo, pp. 58-61. (Emphasis added)

25
Id. at 63-66. (Emphasis added)
26
Id. at 69. (Emphasis added)

27
Id. at 125. Motion for Reconsideration dated October 16, 2012, p. 17

28
Id. at 71-78. (Emphasis ours)

29
Rollo, p. 120. Motion for Reconsideration October 16, 2012, p. 18.

30
Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.

31
Oebanda v. People, supra note 22, at 642.

32
Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc. 481 Phil. 550, 563 (2004).

33
Rollo, pp. 80-81. (Emphasis and underscoring added on the particular place to be searched and things to seized,
respectively)

34
SPO4 Laud (Ret.) v. People, 747 Phil. 503, 522-523 (2014).

35
Del Castillo v. People, 680 Phil. 447, 458 (2012).

Section 8. Omnibus Motion.-Subject to the provisions of section I of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment or
36

proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.

37
Pilipinas Shell Corporation v. Romars International Gases Corporation, 753 Phil. 707, 716 (2015).

38
536 Phil. 672, 692 (2006).

39
Pilipinas Shell Corporation v. Romars International Gases Corporation, supra note 37.

40
SP04 Laud (Ret.) v. People, supra, at 525, citing Bache and Co. (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Ruiz, 147 Phil. 794, 811 (1971).

41
Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, inc., supra note 32, at 568-569.

42
471 Phil. 670 (2004).

43
Id. at 687.

44
68 Am Jur 2d, §222 (2000)

45
Id.

46
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no such
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

47
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall
not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

Del Castillo v. People, supra note 35, at 456; People v. Castillo, Sr., G.R. No. 204419, November 7, 2016, 807 SCRA 77, 87-
48

88.

49
68 Am Jur 2d §223 Searches and Seizures (2000).

50
Miclat, Jr. v. People, 672 Phil. 191, 206 (2011).

54
United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 500 Phil. 342, 363 (2005).

55
79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures §83.

56
People v. Nunez, 609 Phil. 176, 187 (2009).

57
ld..
58
235 Phil. 270, 278 (1987).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

APRIL 3, 2018

G.R. No. 215305

MARCELO G. SALUDAY, Petitioner


vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 26 June 2014 and the Resolution dated, 15
1

October 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01099. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Sentence dated
2

15 September 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City in Criminal CaseNo. 65, 734-09, finding petitioner
3

Marcelo G. Saluday (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition, and
explosive under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (PD 1866).
4

The Antecedent Facts

On 5 May 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint
near the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. SCAA Junbert M. Buco (Buco), a member of the Task Force, requested all male
passengers to disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female passengers to remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the
presence and intercept the entry of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals.

SCAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a small, gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of
the bus caught his attention. He lifted the bag and found it too heavy for its small size. SCAA Buco then looked at the male passengers
lined outside and noticed that a man in a white shirt (later identified as petitioner) kept peeping through the window towards the
direction of the bag. Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which the bus conductor answered that petitioner
and his brother were the ones seated at the back. SCAA Buco then requested petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner
obliged and the bag revealed the following contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber carbine bearing serial number 64702; (2) one
magazine with three live ammunitions; (3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked
petitioner to produce proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives. Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested
and informed of his rights by SCAA Buco.

Petitioner was then brought for inquest before the Office of the City Prosecutor for Davao City. In its Resolution dated 7 May 2009, the
5

latter found probable cause to charge him with illegal possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive under PD l 866.
The Information dated 8 May 2009 thus reads:

That on or about May 5, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, with intent to possess, had in his possession and under his custody an
improvised high powered firearm caliber .30 carbine bearing Serial No. 64702 (made in Spain) with one (1) magazine loaded with three
(3) live ammunitions and one (1) "'cacao" type hand grenade explosive, without first securing the necessary license to possess the
same.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

During the trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses namely, NUP Daniel Tabura (Tabura), a representative of the Firearms and
Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police, and SCAA Buco. NUP Tabura identified the Certification dated 5 November
2009 attesting that petitioner was "not a licensed/registered holder of any kind and caliber per verification from records." Meanwhile,
7

SCAA Buco identified petitioner and the items seized from the bag, and testified on the details of the routine inspection leading to the
immediate arrest of petitioner. On cross-examination, SCAA Buco further elaborated on the search conducted:

Atty. Mamburam

Q And that check point, which was conducted along llang [R)oad,

Davao City, was by virtue of a memorandum?

A Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx
Q Now, you said that at around 5:00 of said date, you were able to intercept a Metro Shuttle passenger bus and you requested all
passengers to alight?

A Yes.

Q passengers were left inside?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q And, after all passengers were able to alight, you checked all cargoes of the passengers in the bus?

A Yes.

xxxx

Q And, you testified that one of those things inside the bus was a black gray colored pack bag which was placed at the back portion of
the bus?

A Yes.

Q You said that the hag was heavy?

A Yes.

Q And you picked up or carried also the other belongings or cargo[e]s inside the bus and that was the only thing or item inside the bus
which was heavy. Is that correct?

A There were many bags and they were heavy. When l asked who is the owner of the bag because it was heavy but the bag was
small. when I asked, he said the content of the bag was a cellphone. But 1 noticed that it was heavy.

xxxx

Q And you said that somebody admitted ownership of the bag. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Who admitted ownership of the bag?

A (WITNESS POINTS TO THE ACCUSED)

Q Now, you said that while you are looking at the bag, you noticed that one male passenger you pointed as the accused kept looking
at you'?

A Yes.

Q And, aside from the accused, all the other male passengers were not looking at you?

A The other passengers were on the ground but he was in front of [the] window looking towards his bag.

xxxx

Q And the accused admitted that he owned the bag, you requested him to open the bag'?

A Not yet. I let him board the bus and asked him if he can open it.

Q And, when he opened it?

A I saw the handle of the firearm. (Emphasis supplied)


8

On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner as sole witness. On direct examination, petitioner denied ownership of the bag.
However, he also admitted to answering SCAA Buco when asked about its contents and allowing SCAA Buco to open it after the latter
sought for his permission:

ATTY. MAMBURAM

Q x xx After the conductor of the bus told the member of the task force that you and your brother were seated at the back of the bus.
can you please tell us what happened next'?

A The member of the task force asked who is the owner of the bag and what were the contents of the bag.
Q To whom did the member of the task force address that question?

A To me because I was pointed to by the conductor.

Q And what was your reply to the question of the member of the task force?

A I told him it was only a cellphone.

Q By the way, Mr. Witness, who owned that bag?

A My elder brother.

Q And why did you make a reply to the question of the member of the task force when, in fact, you were not the owner of the bag?

A Because I was pointed to by the conductor that it was me and my brother who were seated at the back.

xxxx

Q Now, after you told the member of the task force that probably the content of the bag was cellphone, what happened next?

A He asked if he can open it.

Q And what was your reply?

A I told him yes, just open it.

xx xx

Q Now, you said that the owner of the bag and the one who carried that bag was your brother, what is the name of your brother?

A Roger Saluday.

Q Where is your brother Roger now?

A Roger is already dead. He died in September 2009. (Emphasis supplied)


9

On cross-examination, petitioner clarified that only he was pointed at by the conductor when the latter was asked who owned the bag.
Petitioner also admitted that he never disclosed he was with his brother when he boarded the bus:

PROS. VELASCO

Q You said that you panicked because they pulled you but as a way of saving yourself considering you don't own the bag> did you not
volunteer to inform them that [the] bag was owned by your brother?

A I told them I have a companion but I did not tell them that it was my brother because I was also afraid of my brother.

Q So, in short, Mr. Witness, you did not actually inform them that you had a brother at that time when you were boarding that
bus, correct?

A No, sir, I did not.

xxxx

Q So, you were answering all questions by saying it is not your bag but you confirm now that it was the conductor of that bus who
pointed you as the owner of the bag, correct?

A Yes, sir, the conductor pointed at me as the one who [sic] seated at the back. 10
(Emphasis supplied)

The defense subsequently rested its case and the prosecution waived the right to present rebuttal evidence. Upon order from the trial
court, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.

The Decision of the Trial Court

Finding the denials of petitioner as self-serving and weak, the trial court declared him to be in actual or constructive possession of
firearm and explosive without authority or license. Consequently, in the dispositive portion of the Sentence dated 15 September 2011,
petitioner was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearm, ammunition, and explosive under PD 1866:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding Marcelo Gigbalen Saluday GUILTY of illegal
possession of high powered firearm, ammunition and explosive. For the offense of illegal possession of high powered firearm and
ammunition, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of prision mayor in its minimum period. He is likewise ordered to pay a
fine of ₱30,000.00. For the offense of illegal possession of explosive, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of ₱50,000.00.
xxxx

SO ORDERED. 11

On 12 October 2011, petitioner timely filed his Notice of Appeal. 12

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioner challenged his conviction raising as grounds the alleged misappreciation of evidence by the trial court and the
supposed illegality of the search. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the warrantless search was
13

valid being a consented search, and that the factual findings of the trial court can no longer be disturbed. 14

In its Decision dated 26 June 2014, the Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of petitioner and affirmed the ruling of the trial court
with modification:

WHEREFORE. the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Sentence dated September 15, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, 11 th Judicial
Region, Branch 11, Davao City, in Criminal Case No. 65, 734-09, finding Marcelo Gigbalen Saluday guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of high powered firearm, ammunition and explosive is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that:

(1) for the offense of illegal possession of high-powered firearm and ammunition, he is imposed an indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional maximum, as the minimum term, to seven (7) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor minimum, as the maximum term, in addition to the fine of Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00); and

(2) for the offense of illegal possession of explosive, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole.

SO ORDERED. 15

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to which the OSG filed its Comment. In its Resolution dated 15 October 2014,
16 17 18
the
Court of Appeals denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for being pro forma. Hence, petitioner filed this Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Issue

Petitioner assails the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to warrant his conviction for the offenses
charged.

The Ruling of this Court

We affirm.

Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As a result, the Court, on
19

appeal, is not duty-bound to weigh and sift through the evidence presented during trial. Further, factual findings of the trial court, when
20

affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded great respect, even finality. 21

Here, petitioner assails his conviction for illegal possession of high-powered firearm and ammunition under PD 1866, and illegal
possession of explosive under the same law. The elements of both offenses are as follows: (1) existence of the firearm, ammunition or
explosive; (2) ownership or possession of the firearm, ammunition or explosive; and (3) lack of license to own or possess. As regards
22

the second and third elements, the Corn1: of Appeals concurred with the trial court that petitioner was in actual or constructive
possession of a high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive without the requisite authority. The Decision dated 26 June 2014
reads in pertinent part:

In the present case, the prosecution proved the negative fact that appellant has no license or permit to own or possess the firearm,
ammunition and explosive by presenting NUP Daniel Tab[u]ra (Tab[u]ra), a representative of the Firearms and Explosives Division
(FED) of the PNP. He identified the Certification issued by the Chief. Records Section. FED of the PNP, stating that appellant "is not a
licensed/registered holder of any kind and caliber per verification from records of this office."

Appellant, however, questions the competence of Tab[u]ra to testify on the veracity or truthfulness of the Ce1tification. He claims that
the officer who issued it should have been the one presented so he would not be denied the right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him.

There is no merit to petitioner's claim. The following is pertinent:

xxxx

The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the second element of possession of illegal firearms. The prosecution more than complied when it presented both.

xxxx

Also, appellant denies having physical or constructive possession of the firearms, ammunition and explosive. However, his denial flies
in the face of the following testimonies which he himself made:

xxxx
Appellant gave information, albeit misleading, on the contents of the bag. He even allowed the police officer to open it. Based on his
actuations, there could be no doubt that he owned the bag containing the firearm, ammunition and explosive.

Shifting the blame to his dead brother is very easy for appellant to fabricate. Besides, the allegation that his brother owned the bag is
uncorroborated and self-serving. 23

As above-quoted, the presence of the second and third elements of illegal possession of firearm, ammunition, and explosive raises
questions of fact. Considering further that the Court of Appeals merely echoed the factual findings of the trial court, the Court finds no
reason to disturb them.

As regards the first element, petitioner corroborates the testimony of SCAA Buco on four important points: one, that petitioner was a
passenger of the bus flagged down on 5 May 2009 at a military checkpoint in Ilang, Davao City; two, that SCAA Buco boarded and
searched the bus; three, that the bus conductor pointed at petitioner as the owner of a small, gray-black pack bag on the back seat of
the bus; and four, that the same bag contained a .30-caliber firearm with one magazine loaded who three live ammunitions, and a hand
grenade. Notably, petitioner does not challenge the chain of custody over the seized items. Rather, he merely raises a pure question of
law and argues that they are inadmissible on the ground that the search conducted by Task Force Davao was illegal.

The Court disagrees.

Section 2, Article Ill of the Constitution, which was patterned after the Fourth Amendment to the United States (U.S.)
Constitution, reads:
24

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it operates against "unreasonable" searches and seizures
only.25

Conversely, when a search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article HI of the Constitution does not apply. As to what qualifies as a
reasonable search, the pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court, which are doctrinal in this jurisdiction, may shed light on the
26

matter.

In the seminal case of Katz v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the electronic surveillance of a phone conversation
27

without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, what the Fourth Amendment protects are
people, not places such that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his or her own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection in much the same way that what he or she seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected, thus:

Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have attached great significance to the characterization of
the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a
"constitutionally protected area." The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not. But this effo1i to decide whether or
not a given "area,'' viewed in the abstract, is "constitutionally protected" deflects attention from the problem presented by this case. For
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563.
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. See Rios
v. United States, 364 U.S. 253; £:y; parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733. (Emphasis supplied)
28

Further, Justice John Harlan laid down in his concurring opinion the two-part test that would trigger the application of the Fourth
Amendment. First, a person exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy. Second, the expectation is one that society is
29

prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). 30

The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a person's right to privacy. Hence, only when the State
intrudes into a person's expectation of privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is the Fourth Amendment triggered. Conversely,
where a person does not have an expectation of privacy or one's expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the alleged State
intrusion is not a "search" within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.

A survey of Philippine case law would reveal the same jurisprudential reasoning. To illustrate, in People v. Johnson, the Court
31

declared airport searches as outside the protection of the search and seizure clause due to the lack of an expectation of privacy that
society will regard as reasonable:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects. physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs. and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures
do not apply to routine airport procedures. (Citations omitted)
32

Similarly, in Dela Cruz v. People, the Court described seaport searches as reasonable searches on the ground that the safety of the
33

traveling public overrides a person's right to privacy:


Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per
se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the
safety of the traveling public.

xxxx

Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-related functions and deemed agents of government, Marti is
inapplicable in the present case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security
measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.

xxxx

Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when [they] used x-ray scanning machines for inspection of passengers'
bags. When the results of the x-ray scan revealed the existence of firearms in the bag, the port authorities had probable cause to
conduct u search of petitioner's bag. Notably, petitioner did not contest the results of the x-ray scan. 34

In People v. Breis, the Court also justified a bus search owing to the reduced expectation of privacy of the riding public:
35

Unlike the officer in Chan Fook, IO1 Mangili did not exceed his authority in the performance of his duty. Prior to Breis' resistance, IO1
Mangili laid nary a finger on Breis or Yurnol. Neither did his presence in the bus constitute an excess of authority. The bus is public
transportation, and is open to the public. The expectation of privacy in relation to the constitutional right against unreasonable searches
in a public bus is not the same as that in a person's dwelling. In fact, at that point in time, only the bus was being searched, not Yumol,
Breis, or their belongings, and the search of moving vehicles has been upheld. 36

Indeed, the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the
factual circumstances surrounding the case. Other factors such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity
37

may diminish this expectation. In Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, a common carrier was held civilly liable for the death of a
38 39

passenger due to the hostile acts of armed men who boarded and subsequently seized the bus. The Could held that "simple
precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably with
non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the
passenger's constitutional rights." In Costabella Corp. v. Court of Appeals, a compulsory right of way was found improper for the
40 41

failure of the owners of the dominant estate to allege that the passageway they sought to be re-opened was at a point least prejudicial
to the owner of the servient estate. The Court thus explained, ''[c]onsidering that the petitioner operates a hotel and beach resort in its
property, it must undeniably maintain a strict standard of security within its premises. Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and safety of
its clients and patrons would be compromised." Similarly, shopping malls install metal detectors and body scanners, and require bag
42

inspection as a requisite for entry. Needless to say, any security lapse on the part of the mall owner can compromise public safety.

Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private property whose owners have every right to exclude
anyone from entering. At the same time, however, because these private premises are accessible to the public, the State, much like the
owner, can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those going in. The only difference in the imposition of security measures
by an owner and the State is, the former emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of the Civil Code, while the latter
stems from the exercise of police power for the promotion of public safety. Necessad1y, a person's expectation of privacy is diminished
whenever he or she enters private premises that arc accessible to the public.

In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search.
Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy.
Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and minimally intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray
and physical inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals where passengers may further be required to open their bags and
luggages. Considering the reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application, thereby
precluding the necessity for a warrant.

As regards the warrantless inspection of petitioner's bag, the OSG argues that petitioner consented to the search) thereby making the
seized items admissible in evidence. Petitioner contends otherwise and insists that his failure to object cannot be construed as an
43

implied waiver.

Petitioner is wrong.

Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right, which may be
waived. However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
44

uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Relevant to this determination of voluntariness are the following characteristics of the
45

person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (a) the age of the consenting party; (b) whether he or she was in
a public or secluded location; (c) whether he or she objected to the search or passively looked on; (d) his or her education and
46

intelligence; (e) the presence of coercive police procedures; (f) the belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (g) the nature of
47

the police questioning; (h) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (i) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the
person consenting. 48

In Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, the apprehending officers sought the permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the latter
49

agreed. According to the Court, petitioner himself freely gave his consent to the search. In People v. Montilla, the Court found the
50

accused to have spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so,
which acts amounted to a clear waiver of his right. In People v. Omaweng, the police officers asked the accused if they could see the
51

contents of his bag, to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings." The policemen then asked if
they could open and see it, and the accused answered "you can see it." The Court held there was a valid consented search.

Similarly in this case, petitioner consented to the baggage inspection done by SCAA Buco. When SCAA Buco asked if he could open
petitioner's bag, petitioner answered ''yes, just open if' based on petitioner's own testimony. This is clear consent by petitioner to the
search of the contents of his bag. In its Decision dated 26 June 2014, the Court of Appeals aptly held:
A waiver was found in People v. Omaweng. There, the police officers asked the accused if they could see the contents of his bag and
he answered "you can see the contents but those are only clothings.'' When asked if they could open and see it, he said "you can see
it." In the present case, accused-appellant told the member of the task force that "it was only a cellphone" when asked who owns the
bag and what are its contents. When asked by the member of the task force if he could open it, accused-appellant told him "yes, just
open it." Hence, as in Omaweng, there was a waiver of accused-appellants right against warrantless search. 52

To emphasize, a reasonable search, on the one hand, and a warrantless search, on the other, are mutually exclusive. While both State
intrusions are valid even without a warrant, the underlying reasons for the absence of a warrant are different. A reasonable search
arises from a reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application. Examples
include searches done at airports, seaports, bus terminals, malls, and similar public ·places. In contrast, a warrantless search is
presumably an "unreasonable search," but for reasons of practicality, a search warrant can be dispensed with. Examples include
search incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain view, consented search, and extensive search of a private moving
vehicle.

Further, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court Jays down the following guidelines. Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and
1âwphi1

luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and seaport security protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray
scanning machines can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be
required instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection, which inspection must be made in the passenger's presence. Should
the passenger object, he or she can validly be refused entry into the terminal.

While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel of the bus owner in the following three
instances. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is
aboard can be stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person and his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane that
is forced to land upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger onboard. Second, whenever
a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same
routine inspection by government agents or private security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is
because unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it possible for these passengers to evade
the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints where State
agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and their bags or luggages.

In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus terminal and the search of the bus while in
transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be
the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any
cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as
insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with
disabilities, children and other similar groups should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to
ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary
measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.

The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at risk. Given the present circumstances, the
Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their terminals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.

Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers at the terminal and along its route is likewise
covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant with these guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle
itself while in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes unreasonable, thereby triggering the
constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private
or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be
flagged down by any other person unti1 the passengers on board alight from the vehicle.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 26 June 2014 and the Resolution dated 15 October 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01099 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

(on leave)
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO *

Chief Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN


Associate Justice Associate Justice

(on wellness leave)


MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE *

Associate Justice
Associate Justice
(no part)
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA *

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA SAMUEL R. MARTIRES


Associate Justice Associate Justice

(on wellness leave)


NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM
ANDRES B. REYES, JR. *

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

On leave.
*

**
Acting Chief Justice.

***
On wellness leave.

****
No part.

*****
On wellness leave,

1
Rollo, pp. 25-34, Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren. with Associate Justices Edward B. Contreras and Rafael
Antonio M. Santos concurring.

2
Id. at 41-42,

3
CA rollo, pp. 22-25. Penned by Judge Virginia Hofileña Europa.

4
Entitled "Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in. Acquisition or Disposition, of Firearms,
Ammunition or Explosives or Instruments Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives, and Imposing
Stiffer Penalties for Certain Violations Thereof and for Relevant Purposes." Effective 29 June 1983.

5
Records, pp. 2-3.

6
Id. at 1.

7
Exhihit "F,'' Folder of Exhibits. p. 2.

8
TSN, 11 November 1009. pp. 14-16.

9
TSN, 22 March 2010. pp. 5-6, 8.

10
TSN, 22 March 2010. p. 10.

11
CA rollo. pp. 24-25.

12
Id. at 8.

13
Id. at 15-19.

14
Id. at 46-60.

15
Rollo, pp. 33-34.
16
Id. at 35-39.

17
CA rollo, pp. 87-90.

18
Rollo, pp. 41-42.

19
Section I, Rule 45, Rules of Court.

20
Jose v. People, 479 Phil. 969, 978 (2004).

21
De la Cruz v. Court Appeals, 333 Phil. 126, 135 (1996). See also Castillo v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 150, 158-159
(1996); Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, 304 Phil. 343, 354 (1994); People v. Cabalhin, 301 Phil. 494, 504 (1994).

22
People v Dela Cru:::, 400 Phil. 872. 879-880 (2000), citing People i'. Bergmue. 350 Phil. 275, 291 (1998).

23
Rollo, pp. 28-3 l.

24
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures. shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis
supplied)

25
People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 878 (1998).

26
People v. Marti, 271 Phil. 51, 57 ( 1991).

27
389 U.S. 347 (1967).

28
Id. at 351.

29
Id. at 361.

30
Id.

31
401 Phil. 734 (2000).

32
Id. at 743.

33
776 Phil. 653 (2016).

34
Id. at 661, 681, 683-684 .

35
766 Phil. 785 (2015).

36
Id. at 812 .

37
Sps. Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., 712 Phil. 337, 350 (2013).

38
Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948. 981 (1998).

39
364 Phil. 480 (1999).

40
Id. at 490.

41
271 Phil. 350 (1991).

42
Id. at 359.

43
Rollo, pp. 108-110.

44
Caba11es v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263, 286 (2002).

45
Id., citing 68 Am Jur 2d Searches and Seizures, § 135.

46
Id., citing United States v. Barahona, 990 F. 2d 412.

47
Id., citing United States v. Lopez, 911 F. 2d 1006.

48
Id., citing United States v. Nafzger. 965 F. 2d 213.
49
362 Phil. l 18, 127 ( 1999).

50
349 Phil. 640, 661 (1998).

51
288 Phil. 350, 358-359 ( 1992).

52
Rollo. p. 32.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-46000 May 25, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,


vs.
JOSE M. BAES, appellant.

Crispin Oben for appellant.


Guillermo B. Guevarra for defendants-appellees.
No appearance for plaintiff-appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This appeal was given due course by the Court of First Instance of Laguna by virtue of a writ of mandamus issued by this court in G.R.
No. 45780. The facts are the following: In the justice of the peace court of the municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, a complaint
was filed of the following tenor:

The undersigned Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church in the parish and municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna,
upon being duly sworn, charges Enrique Villaroca, Alejandro Lacbay and Bernardo del Rosario with an offense against religion
committed as follows:

That on April 14, 1937, at about 9 o'clock a.m., in this municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this court, the aforesaid accused, while holding the funeral of one who in life was called
Antonio Macabigtas, in accordance with the rites of religious sect known as the "Church of Christ", willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally caused the funeral to pass, as it in fact passed, through the chruchyard fronting the Roman
Catholic Church, which churchyard belongs to the said Church, which churchyard belongs to the said Church and is
devoted to the religious worship thereof, against the opposition of the undersigned complainant who, through force
and threats of physical violence by the accused, was compelled to allow the funeral to pass through the said
churchyard. An act committed in grave profanation of the place, in open disregard of the religious feelings of the
Catholics of this municipality, and in violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.

(Sgd.) JOSE M.A. BAES


Parish Priest
Complainant

(Here follow the affidavit and the list of witnesses.)

The accused pleaded not guilty and waived the preliminary investigation. Before the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, the complainant filed a sworn statement regarding other points so that the provincial fiscal may have full knowledge of the
facts and of the witnesses who could testify thereon. Upon the remand of the case to the court, the fiscal, instead of filing the
corresponding information, put in the following motion for dismissal:

The complainant is the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna. The said priest charges the accused
with having caused, through force, intimidation and threats, the funeral of one belonging to the Church of Christ to pass
through the churchyard of the Church. Apparently, the offense consists in that the corpse was that of one who belonged to the
Church of Christ.

The undersigned is of the opinion that the fact act imputed to the accused does not constitute the offense complained of
considering the spirit of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code. At most they might be chargeable with having threatened the
parish priest, or with having passed through a private property without the consent of the owner. Justice Albert, commenting
on the article, has this to say: "An act is said to be notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the faithful when a person
ridicules or makes light of anything constituting a religious dogma; works or scoffs at anything devoted to religious ceremonies;
plays with or damages or destroys any object of veneration by the faithful." The mere act of causing the passage through the
churchyard belonging to the Church, of the funeral of one who in life belonged to the Church of Christ, neither offends nor
ridicules the religious feelings of those who belong to the Roman Catholic Church.

Sustaining the foregoing motion, the court by an order of August 31, 1937, dismissed the case, reserving, however, to the fiscal the
right to file another information for the crime found to have been committed by the accused.

From this order, the plaintiff appealed, which appeal was denied but thereafter given due course by the court by virtue of an order of
this court.
The appealed order is based upon the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal. This officer questions the sufficiency of the fac ts alleged in
the complaint, but omits an essential part thereof, to wit, that the churchyard belongs to the church, and is devoted to the religious
services of said church, and it is through this churchyard that the accused, over the objection of the parish priest and through force and
intimidation, caused to pass the funeral of one under the rites of the religious sect known as the Church of Christ. Had the fiscal not
omitted this essential part, he would not have come to the conclusion that the acts complained of do not constitute the crime defined
and penalized by article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.

Moreover, the fiscal, in his aforesaid motion, denies that the unlawful act committed by the accused had offended the religious feelings
of the Catholics of the municipality in which the act complained of took place. We believe that such ground of the motion is indefensible.
As the fiscal was discussing the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, he cannot deny any of them, but must admit them,
although hypothetically, as they are alleged. The motion raises a question of law, not one of fact. In the second place, whether or of the
act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged only according to the
feelings of the Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it is possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who
profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the feelings of those professing another faith. We, therefore, take the view
that the facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, and should
the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts and a trial be thereafter held at which the said facts should be conclusively
established, the court may find the accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass under article 281
of the Revised Penal Code, as may be proper, pursuant to section 29 of General Orders, No. 58.

The appealed order is reversed and the fiscal is ordered to comply with his duty under the law, without pronouncement as to the costs.
So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MORAN, J., concurring:

I concur in the dispositive part on the ground that the lower court, without determining if the churchyard of the Catholic Church is a
place devoted to religious worship or not, held that the passage through the said churchyard of a funeral conducted in accordance with
the rites of another religion is not offensive to the feelings of the Catholic. If that funeral with ceremonies of another religion had been
made to pass inside the church, it would without question be offensive top the feelings of the Catholics. The lower court, through the
provincial fiscal, is thus under a duty to determine: (1) If the churchyard is a place devoted to the religious worship of the Catholic
Church, and (2) if the funeral held under the rites of another religion was made to pass through the said churchyard.

If the churchyard of the Catholic Church is like some of those seen in Manila churches where anyone can pass and where goods are
even sold to the public, then it is not a place devoted to religious worship, and the fact that a funeral to pass through it, does not
constitute a violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, but, at most, the offense of threats if it is true that the parish priest was
threatened when he prohibited the passage of the funeral.

LAUREL, J., dissenting:

I dissent.

It is an accepted doctrine of construction that criminal statutes must be strictly interpreted. In fact, no person should be brought within
the terms of the penal law who is not clearly so within, and no acts should be pronounced criminal unless so defined and penalized by
law. The offense imputed to the defendants herein is defined in article 133 which is as follows:

ART. 133. Offending religious feelings. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any
religious ceremony, shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.

As defined, two essential elements must be present under this article, to wit: (1) That the facts complained of were performed in a place
devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony; and (2) that the said act or acts must be notoriously
offensive to the feelings of the faithful. It is admitted that the whole incident happened in the "atrio" or "patio" of the Catholic Church of
Lumban, Laguna. There was no celebration of any religious ceremony then. The "atrio" coming from the Latin "atrium" means, an open
space, generally closed, fronting a building or a church. In this case it is a churchyard. While occasional religious ceremonies may be
performed in the "atrio", nevertheless this does not make the "atrio" a place devoted to religious worship under article 133 of the
Revised Penal Code, any more than a public plaza, a street or any other place occasionally used for religious purposes. But assuming
that the churchyard in this case is "a place devoted to religious worship" — contrary to what we see and know (Justice Brown, in
Hunter vs. New York O. & W. Ry. Co., 23 N.E., 9, 10; 116 N.Y., 615) — is the act complained of "notoriously offensive to the feelings of
the faithful?" The imputed dereliction consist in that "los acusados arriba nombrados, estando dirigiendo el entierro segun el rito de una
secta religiosa llamada "Iglesia de Cristo", del cadaver de uno que en vida se llamada Antonio Macabigtas, voluntaria, ilegal y
criminalmente hicieron que dicho entierro pasase, como en efecto paso, por el a trio de la Iglesia Catholica Romana frente a dicha
Iglesia, el cual a trio es propiedad de dicha Iglesia y esta dedicado a los cultos religiosos de esta Iglesia y esta dedicado a los cultos
religiosos deesta Iglesia, contra la oposicion del infrascrito denunciantea quien los acusados mediante fuerza y amenazas de maltrato
obligaron a cederles el paso del entierro por dicho atrio." (Emphasis is mine.) As I see it the only act which is alleged to have offended
the religious "feelings of the faithful" here is that of passing by the defendants through the "atrio" of the church under the circumstances
mentioned. I make no reference to the alleged trespass committed by the defendants or the threats imputed to them because these
acts constitute different offenses (arts. 280, 281 and 282-285) and do not fall within the purview of article 133 of the Revised Penal
Code. I believe that an act, in order to be considered as notoriously offensive to the religious feelings, must be one directed against
religious practice or dogma or ritual for the purpose of ridicule; the offender, for instance, mocks, scoffs at or attempts to damage an
object of religious veneration; it must be abusive, insulting and obnoxious (Viada, Comentarios al Codigo Penal, 707, 708; vide
also Pacheco, Codigo Penal, p. 359).
Why, may I ask, should the mere act of passing of the corpse or funeral cortege in or through a private property be characterized as
notoriously offensive to the feelings of any religion or of its adherent or followers?

The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed by the name of the Lord. (Job. I. 21.)

In this case, the Lord has recalled the life of one of His creatures: and it must be His wish that the remains shall have the right
of way that they may be buried "somewhere, in desolate, wind-swept space, in twilight land, in no man's land but in
everybody's land.

Rather than too many religions that will make us hate one another because of religious prejudices and intolerance, may I express the
hope that we may grasp and imbibe the one fundamental of all religions that should make us love one another!

I must decline to accept the statement made in the majority opinion that "whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the
religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not
those of other faithful ones, for it is possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not
otherwise offensive to the feelings of those professing another faith." (Emphasis is mine.) I express the opinion that offense to religious
feelings should not be made to depend upon the more or less broad or narrow conception of any given particular religion, but should be
gauged having in view the nature of the acts committed and after scrutiny of all the facts and circumstance which should be viewed
through the mirror of an unbiased judicial criterion .Otherwise, the gravity or leniency of the offense would hinge on the subjective
characterization of the act from the point of view of a given religious denomination or sect, and in such a case, the application of the law
would be partial and arbitrary, withal, dangerous, especially in a country said to be "once the scene of religious intolerance and
persecution." (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 35 Off. Gaz., 2164.)

I think that the ruling of the lower court in ordering the dismissal of the case and in reserving to the provincial fiscal the presentation of
another complaint or complaints under other provisions of the Revised Penal Code, is correct and should be upheld.

IMPERIAL, J.:

I concur in the preceding dissenting opinion of Justice Laurel.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007

VICENTE P. LADLAD, NATHANAEL S. SANTIAGO, RANDALL B. ECHANIS, and REY CLARO C. CASAMBRE,Petitioners,
vs.
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR JOSELITA C. MENDOZA, SENIOR
STATE PROSECUTOR AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERREZ, STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN A. MARAYA, and STATE PROSECUTOR
MERBA A. WAGA, in their capacity as members of the Department of Justice panel of prosecutors investigating I.S. Nos.
2006-225, 2006-226 and 2006-234, JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO,
in his capacity as Chief, Philippine National Police, P/CSUPT. RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, JR., and P/SUPT. YOLANDA G.
TANIGUE, Respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 172074-76 June 1, 2007

LIZA L. MAZA, JOEL G. VIRADOR, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASIÑO, CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, and RAFAEL V.
MARIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, in his capacity as Chief
State Prosecutor, the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors composed of EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, JOSELITA C. MENDOZA,
AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERREZ, IRWIN A. MARAYA and MERBA A. WAGA (Panel), RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, in his capacity as
Acting Deputy Director, Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management (DIDM), YOLANDA G. TANIGUE, in her
capacity as Acting Executive Officer of DIDM, the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), and the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
(PNP), Respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 175013 June 1, 2007

CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of Justice and overall
superior of the Public Prosecutors, HONORABLE ENCARNACION JAJA G. MOYA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146, and HONORABLE ELMO M. ALAMEDA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150,Respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin petitioners’ prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside
the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation and
prosecution of petitioners’ cases.

The Facts

Petitioner in G.R. No. 175013, Crispin B. Beltran (Beltran), and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, Liza L. Maza (Maza), Joel G.
Virador (Virador), Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo), Teodoro A. Casiño (Casiño), and Rafael V. Mariano (Mariano),1 are members of the
House of Representatives representing various party-list groups.2Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 are private individuals. Petitioners
all face charges for Rebellion under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code in two criminal cases pending with
the RTC Makati.

G.R. No. 175013 (The Beltran Petition)

Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a
"State of National Emergency," police officers 3 arrested Beltran on 25 February 2006, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and
detained him in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of
the crime for which he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting
to Sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24
February 2006, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution. The inquest was based on the joint affidavit of Beltran’s
arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally. The inquest prosecutor4indicted Beltran and filed the corresponding
Information with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (MeTC). 5

The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where, on 27 February 2006, he was subjected to a second inquest, with 1 st Lt.
Lawrence San Juan (San Juan), this time for Rebellion. A panel of State prosecutors 6 from the DOJ conducted this second inquest. The
inquest was based on two letters, both dated 27 February 2006, of Yolanda Tanigue (Tanigue) and of Rodolfo Mendoza (Mendoza).
Tanigue is the Acting Executive Officer of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Philippine National Police (PNP),
while Mendoza is the Acting Deputy Director of the CIDG. The letters referred to the DOJ for appropriate action the results of the
CIDG’s investigation implicating Beltran, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, San Juan, and several others as "leaders and
promoters" of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. The plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by members of
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which have formed a "tactical alliance."

On 27 February 2006, the DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict Beltran and San Juan as
"leaders/promoters" of Rebellion. The panel then filed an Information with the RTC Makati. The Information alleged that Beltran, San
Juan, and other individuals "conspiring and confederating with each other, x x x, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
form a tactical alliance between the CPP/NPA, renamed as Partidong Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and its armed regular members as
Katipunan ng Anak ng Bayan (KAB) with the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP) and thereby rise publicly and take up arms against
the duly constituted government, x x x."7 The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-452, was raffled to Branch 137 under
Presiding Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino (Judge Delorino).

Beltran moved that Branch 137 make a judicial determination of probable cause against him. 8 Before the motion could be resolved,
Judge Delorino recused herself from the case which was re-raffled to Branch 146 under Judge Encarnacion Jaja-Moya (Judge Moya).

In its Order dated 31 May 2006, Branch 146 sustained the finding of probable cause against Beltran. 9 Beltran sought reconsideration
but Judge Moya also inhibited herself from the case without resolving Beltran’s motion. Judge Elmo M. Alameda of Branch 150, to
whom the case was re-raffled, issued an Order on 29 August 2006 denying Beltran’s motion.

Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 175013 to set aside the Orders dated 31 May 2006 and 29 August 2006 and to enjoin Beltran’s
prosecution.

In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims that Beltran’s inquest for Rebellion was valid and that the RTC Makati
correctly found probable cause to try Beltran for such felony.

G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76 (The Maza and Ladlad Petitions)

Based on Tanigue and Mendoza’s letters, the DOJ sent subpoenas to petitioners on 6 March 2006 requiring them to appear at the DOJ
Office on 13 March 2006 "to get copies of the complaint and its attachment." Prior to their receipt of the subpoenas, petitioners had
quartered themselves inside the House of Representatives building for fear of being subjected to warrantless arrest.

During the preliminary investigation on 13 March 2006, the counsel for the CIDG presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime
Fuentes (Fuentes), who claimed to be an eyewitness against petitioners. Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before respondent
prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco who then gave copies of the affidavit to media members present during the proceedings. The panel of
prosecutors10 gave petitioners 10 days within which to file their counter-affidavits. Petitioners were furnished the complete copies of
documents supporting the CIDG’s letters only on 17 March 2006.

Petitioners moved for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel for lack of impartiality and independence, considering the
political milieu under which petitioners were investigated, the statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice made to the
media regarding petitioners’ case,11 and the manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the preliminary investigation. The DOJ
panel of prosecutors denied petitioners’ motion on 22 March 2006. Petitioners sought reconsideration and additionally prayed for the
dismissal of the cases. However, the panel of prosecutors denied petitioners’ motions on 4 April 2006.

Petitioners now seek the nullification of the DOJ Orders of 22 March 2006 and 4 April 2006.
Acting on petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ, the Court issued a status quo order on 5 June 2006. Prior to this,
however, the panel of prosecutors, on 21 April 2006, issued a Resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioners and 46 others
with Rebellion. The prosecutors filed the corresponding Information with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati, docketed as Criminal Case No.
06-944 (later consolidated with Criminal Case No. 06-452 in Branch 146), charging petitioners and their co-accused as "principals,
masterminds, [or] heads" of a Rebellion.12Consequently, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 filed a supplemental petition to enjoin
the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.

In his separate Comment to the Maza petition, the Solicitor General submits that the preliminary investigation of petitioners was not
tainted with irregularities. The Solicitor General also claims that the filing of Criminal Case No. 06-944 has mooted the Maza petition.

The Issues

The petitions raise the following issues:

1. In G.R. No. 175013, (a) whether the inquest proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion was valid and (b) whether there is probable
cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion; and

2. In G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76, whether respondent prosecutors should be enjoined from continuing with the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 06-944.13

The Ruling of the Court

We find the petitions meritorious. On the Beltran Petition

The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void.

Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant. 14 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the instances when such warrantless arrest may be effected, thus:

Arrest without warrant; when lawful.— A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

xxxx

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers 15 states that the officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant,16 for Inciting to Sedition, and
not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and
no other. Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they
overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltran’s arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their
presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed
Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their
affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006. 17

Indeed, under DOJ Circular No. 61, dated 21 September 1993, the initial duty of the inquest officer is to determine if the arrest of the
detained person was made "in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113." 18 If the arrest was not
properly effected, the inquest officer should proceed under Section 9 of Circular No. 61 which provides:

Where Arrest Not Properly Effected.— Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was not made in accordance with the Rules, he
shall:

a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;

b) note down the disposition on the referral document;

c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and

d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.

Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by the City or Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on
hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary investigation, the order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of
said detainee and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary investigation, together
with the copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other
supporting evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

For the failure of Beltran’s panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with Section 7, Rule 112 in relation to Section 5, Rule 113 and DOJ
Circular No. 61, we declare Beltran’s inquest void. 19 Beltran would have been entitled to a preliminary investigation had he not asked
the trial court to make a judicial determination of probable cause, which effectively took the place of such proceeding.

There is No Probable Cause to Indict


Beltran for Rebellion.

Probable cause is the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." 20 To accord
respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the
prosecutor’s determination of probable cause for otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the prosecutor’s findings
in such investigations.21 However, in the few exceptional cases where the prosecutor abused his discretion by ignoring a clear
insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause, thus denying the accused his right to substantive and procedural due
process, we have not hesitated to intervene and exercise our review power under Rule 65 to overturn the prosecutor’s findings. 22 This
exception holds true here.

Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed –

[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its
laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving
the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.

The elements of the offense are:

1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and

2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either –

(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:

(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or

(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or

(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives. 23

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. 24

The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other
documents25 attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltran’s contention that the same are
insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion. The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some of which were
sworn before a notary public, executed by members of the military and some civilians. Except for two affidavits, executed by a certain
Ruel Escala (Escala), dated 20 Febuary 2006,26 and Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006, 27 none of the affidavits
mentions Beltran.28 In his affidavit, Escala recounted that in the afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran, Ocampo, Casiño, Maza,
Mariano, Virador, and other individuals on board a vehicle which entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and that
after the passengers alighted, they were met by another individual who looked like San Juan. For his part, Cachuela stated that he was
a former member of the CPP and that (1) he attended the CPP’s "10 thPlenum" in 1992 where he saw Beltran; (2) he took part in criminal
activities; and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used were purchased partly from contributions by Congressional members,
like Beltran, who represent party-list groups affiliated with the CPP.

The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public uprising against the
government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that
14 years earlier, he was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of
promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that
Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran’s alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of
a rebellion.

In fact, Cachuela’s affidavit stated that Beltran attended the 1992 CPP Plenum as "Chairman, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)." Assuming
that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not constitute
rebellion.29 As for the alleged funding of the CPP’s military equipment from Beltran’s congressional funds, Cachuela’s affidavit merely
contained a general conclusion without any specific act showing such funding. Cachuela merely alleged that "ang mga ibang mga
pondo namin ay galing sa mga party list na naihalal sa Kongreso tulad ng BAYAN MUNA – pimumunuan nila SATUR OCAMPO at
CRISPIN BELTRAN, x x x."30Such a general conclusion does not establish probable cause.

In his Comment to Beltran’s petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes’ affidavit, dated 25 February 2006, 31 as basis for the finding
of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided details in his statement regarding meetings Beltran and the other petitioners
attended in 2005 and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were allegedly discussed, among others.

The claim is untenable. Fuentes’ affidavit was not part of the attachments the CIDG referred to the DOJ on 27 February 2006. Thus, the
panel of inquest prosecutors did not have Fuentes’ affidavit in their possession when they conducted the Rebellion inquest against
Beltran on that day. Indeed, although this affidavit is dated 25 February 2006, the CIDG first presented it only during the preliminary
investigation of the other petitioners on 13 March 2006 during which Fuentes subscribed to his statement before respondent prosecutor
Velasco.

Respondent prosecutors later tried to remedy this fatal defect by motu proprio submitting to Branch 137 of the RTC Makati Fuentes’
affidavit as part of their Comment to Beltran’s motion for judicial determination of probable cause. Such belated submission, a tacit
admission of the dearth of evidence against Beltran during the inquest, does not improve the prosecution’s case. Assuming them to be
true, what the allegations in Fuentes’ affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of
the Revised Penal Code, not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring down a
government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion under Article 134. Even the prosecution acknowledged
this, since the felony charged in the Information against Beltran and San Juan in Criminal Case No. 06-452 is Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion and not Rebellion. The Information merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and others conspired to form a "tactical alliance" to
commit Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the
evidence before it.

The minutes32 of the 20 February 2006 alleged meeting in Batangas between members of MKP and CPP, including Beltran, also do not
detract from our finding. Nowhere in the minutes was Beltran implicated. While the minutes state that a certain "Cris" attended the
1a\^/phi 1.net

alleged meeting, there is no other evidence on record indicating that "Cris" is Beltran. San Juan, from whom the "flash drive" containing
the so-called minutes was allegedly taken, denies knowing Beltran.

To repeat, none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is promoting, maintaining, or heading a Rebellion. The Information in Criminal
Case No. 06-452 itself does not make such allegation. Thus, even assuming that the Information validly charges Beltran for taking part
in a Rebellion, he is entitled to bail as a matter of right since there is no allegation in the Information that he is a leader or promoter of
the Rebellion.33 However, the Information in fact merely charges Beltran for "conspiring and confederating" with others in forming a
"tactical alliance" to commit rebellion. As worded, the Information does not charge Beltran with Rebellion but with Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion, a bailable offense.34

On the Ladlad and Maza Petitions

The Preliminary Investigation was Tainted

With Irregularities.

As in the determination of probable cause, this Court is similarly loath to enjoin the prosecution of offenses, a practice rooted on public
interest as the speedy closure of criminal investigations fosters public safety. 35 However, such relief in equity may be granted if, among
others, the same is necessary (a) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner 36 or (b) to
afford adequate protection to constitutional rights. 37The case of the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76 falls under these
exceptions.

The procedure for preliminary investigation of offenses punishable by at least four years, two months and one day is outlined in Section
3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:

Procedure.—The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and
his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as
there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public,
each of whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to
continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting
affidavits and documents.

The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been
furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those
which he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for examination or copying by the
respondent at his expense.

Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination, copying, or photographing at
the expense of the requesting party.

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the
respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his
defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with
copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a
counter-affidavit.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day
period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.

(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness. The parties
can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the
investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.

The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits and other documents or from the
expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.

(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground
to hold the respondent for trial. (Emphasis supplied)

Instead of following this procedure scrupulously, as what this Court had mandated in an earlier ruling, "so that the constitutional right to
liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage," 38 respondent prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it.
Respondent prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint (which, with its attachment,
must be of such number as there are respondents) be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed
and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a
notary public. Respondent prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints 39 and
accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a
prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.

Further, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must determine if there are grounds to
continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall "issue a subpoena to the respondents."
Here, after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at
the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 "to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments." During the investigation, respondent
prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco.
Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes’ affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who
covered the proceedings. Respondent prosecutors then required petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits in 10 days. It was only
four days later, on 17 March 2006, that petitioners received the complete copy of the attachments to the CIDG letters. 1a\^/phi 1.net

These uncontroverted facts belie respondent prosecutors’ statement in the Order of 22 March 2006 that the preliminary investigation
"was done in accordance with the Revised Rules o[f] Criminal Procedure." 40 Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to
petitioners, tolerating the complainant’s antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness’ affidavit to members of the
media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only
trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to petitioners’ claim that the entire proceeding was a sham.

A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system which spells for an individual the difference between
months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the other hand. Thus,
we have characterized the right to a preliminary investigation as not "a mere formal or technical right" but a "substantive" one, forming
part of due process in criminal justice.41 This especially holds true here where the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua
and may be non-bailable for those accused as principals.

Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, respondent prosecutors’ filing of the Information against petitioners on 21 April 2006
with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati does not moot the petitions in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76. Our power to enjoin
prosecutions cannot be frustrated by the simple filing of the Information with the trial court. 1a\^/phi1.net

On Respondent Prosecutors’ Lack of Impartiality

We find merit in petitioners’ doubt on respondent prosecutors’ impartiality. Respondent Secretary of Justice, who exercises supervision
and control over the panel of prosecutors, stated in an interview on 13 March 2006, the day of the preliminary investigation, that, "We
[the DOJ] will just declare probable cause, then it’s up to the [C]ourt to decide x x x." 42 Petitioners raised this issue in their petition,43 but
respondents never disputed the veracity of this statement. This clearly shows pre-judgment, a determination to file the Information even
in the absence of probable cause.

A Final Word

The obvious involvement of political considerations in the actuations of respondent Secretary of Justice and respondent prosecutors
brings to mind an observation we made in another equally politically charged case. We reiterate what we stated then, if only to
emphasize the importance of maintaining the integrity of criminal prosecutions in general and preliminary investigations in particular,
thus:

[W]e cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is
being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends, or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and
fundamental objective of observing the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich
or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may be public’s perception of the
impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.44 1a\^/phi 1.net

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions. In G.R. No. 175013, we SET ASIDE the Order dated 31 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, Branch 146 and the Order dated 29 August 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150. In G.R. Nos.
172070-72 and 172074-76, we SET ASIDE the Orders dated 22 March 2006 and 4 April 2006 issued by respondent prosecutors. We
ORDER the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150 to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 06-452 and 06-944.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Beltran is also one of the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76.

2Beltran and Mariano represent Anakpawis; Virador, Casiño, and Ocampo represent Bayan Muna; and Maza represents
Gabriela.

3 Police Chief Inspector Rino V. Corpuz, Police Inspector Honesto Gaton, and SPO1 Arnold J. Casumpang.

4 Atty. Ben V. Dela Cruz.

5
During the inquest and in a motion filed with the MeTC, Beltran protested his detention, invoking his parliamentary immunity
from arrest under Section 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution since Inciting to Sedition is punishable with a maximum
penalty of less than six years. Finding merit in Beltran’s motion, the MeTC ordered Beltran’s release in its Order of 13 March
2006. This ruling was never implemented.

6Composed of Attys. Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Rosalina P. Aquino, Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez, Irwin A. Maraya, and Maria
Cristina P. Rilloraza.

7 Rollo (G.R. No. 175013), pp. 84-85; Annex "I." The Information reads in full:

That prior to February 24, 2006 and dates subsequent thereto, in Makati City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court (and other parts of the Philippines) the above named accused 1Lt. LAWRENCE SAN JUAN, being
then a member of the Philippine Army, CRISPIN BELTRAN y BERTIZ, duly elected member of the House of
Representatives, together with several other JOHN/JANE DOES whose present identities and whereabouts are
presently unknown, conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, form a tactical alliance between the CPP/NPA, renamed as Partidong Komunista and Pilipinas (PKP) and
its armed regular members as Katipunan ng Anak ng Bayan (KAB) with the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP)
and thereby rise publicly and take up arms against the duly constituted government, such as, but not limited to,
conducting bombing activities and liquidation of military and police personnel, for the purpose of removing allegiance
from the Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of
land, naval or armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers and prerogatives and ultimately to overthrow President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and the present duly
constituted Government.

8Pending resolution of Beltran’s motion, the DOJ sought leave from Branch 137 to file an Amended Information in Criminal
Case No. 06-452, impleading additional 46 defendants, including the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76 and 172070-72 and
encompassing crimes committed since the 1960s. On petitioners’ motion, Branch 137 expunged the Amended Information for
being an entirely new Information.

9Rollo (G.R. No. 175013), p. 59; Annex "A." The Order of 31 May 2006 pertinently reads: "After examining the record of this
case, the Court finds probable cause to believe that accused 1 st Lt. Lawrence San Juan, P.A. and Crispin Beltran y Bertiz
committed the crime charged. Let a commitment order be issued."

Composed of Attys. Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Joselita C. Mendoza, Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez, Irwin A. Maraya, and Merba A.
10

Waga.

11Rollo (G.R. Nos. 172074-76), pp. 99-102; Annexes "K" and "L." The President was quoted by a daily, thus: "They [petitioners
in the Maza petition] have committed a crime. They are committing a continuing crime. And we have laws to deal with that. x x
x." (The Philippine Star, 12 March 2006, p. 1). Respondent Gonzalez was also reported to have said: "We will just declare
probable cause, then it’s up to the Court to decide. x x x." (The Philippine Star, 14 March 2006, p. 6)

12 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 172070-72), pp. 540-541; Annex "11."

13 The Solicitor General claims that the petitioners in the Maza petition (except Beltran) are guilty of forum-shopping for having
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 93975) "demanding the
conduct of preliminary investigation." However, the records show that the petition in CA G.R. SP No. 93975 sought the
nullification of a DOJ Order, dated 1 March 2006, apparently relating to the warrantless arrest of Maza, Ocampo, Casiño,
Mariano, and Virador. Also, the Court of Appeals considered CA G.R. SP No. 93975 "closed and terminated" in its Resolution
of 28 June 2006.
14Section 7, Rule 112 provides: "When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.— When a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by
a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing Rules. In
the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer
directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance
with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in
the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five
(5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence
in his defense as provided in this Rule." (Emphasis supplied)

15Rollo (G.R. No. 175013), pp. 540-541; Annex "PP-1." Beltran’s arrest was later declared illegal by the MeTC for violating
Beltran’s parliamentary immunity from arrest under Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. It appears the prosecution did not
appeal from this ruling.

16Beltran also claims that on the night of his arrest, his jailors showed him a warrant of arrest, dated 7 October 1985, issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, in connection with Criminal Case No. Q-21905 for "inciting to rebellion"
which had been archived in October 1985.

17Even under the rulings in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (No. L-61388, 20 April 1983, 121 SCRA 472 also reported as Parong v.
Enrile, 206 Phil. 392) and Umil v. Ramos (G.R. No. 81567, 9 July 1990, 187 SCRA 811) where the Court characterized
Rebellion as a "continuing offense" thus allowing the warrantless arrest of its perpetrators, Beltran’s inquest for Rebellion
remains void as he was not arrested for committing such felony.

18"Section 8. Initial Duty of the Inquest Officer.— The Inquest Officer must first determine if the arrest of the detained person
was made in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, x x x."

Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 241 (1997); Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, 11 February 1992, 206
19

SCRA 138.

20
Cruz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 110436, 27 June 1994, 233 SCRA 439.

21 Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, G.R. No. 144692, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 232.

22See Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 192; Salonga v. Cruz-Paño, No. L-59524, 18 February
1985, 134 SCRA 438.

23 II L. B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code 84 (14th ed., 1998).

24 People v. Lovedioro, 320 Phil. 481 (1995).

25
Including official receipts, publications, articles, inventories, and photocopies of ID pictures.

26 Rollo (G.R. No. 175013), pp. 690-693; Annex "PP-27."

27 Id., pp. 605-615; Annex "PP-14."

The affidavits mainly concern the organization and recruitment of members of MKP, the aborted participation of MKP
28

members in a rally on 24 February 2006, and the criminal activities of CPP members.

29 See Buscayno v. Military Commissions Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, 196 Phil. 41 (1981); People v. Hernandez, 120 Phil. 191 (1964).

30
Rollo (G.R. No. 175013), p. 613.

31 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 172070-72), pp. 59-67; Annex "D."

32 Rollo (G.R. No. 175013), pp. 657-674; Annex "PP-18."

33 Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:

"Any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in rebellion, insurrection or coup d’etat shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal."

Under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion is punishable by prision correccional in its
34

maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000).
35 Hernandez v. Albano, 125 Phil. 513 (1967).

36
Dimayuga v. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304 (1922).

37 Hernandez v. Albano, supra.

38 Webb v. De Leon, 317 Phil. 758 (1995).

39Defined under Section 3, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as "sworn written statement charging a
person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated." (Emphasis supplied)

40
Rollo (G.R. Nos. 172074-76), pp. 61-62; Annex "A."

41 Go v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19.

42 Rollo (G.R. No. 172074-76), p. 102.

43 Id., pp. 16-17.

44 Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, No. L-72335-39, 21 March 1988, 159 SCRA 70, 81.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006

LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG)
JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND
PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL SANGGALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M.
SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge Advocate General of the Judge Advocate General’s Office
(JAGO), Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary restraining order) filed by the above-named members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein petitioners, against the AFP Chief of Staff and the Judge Advocate General,
respondents.

The facts are:

On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some members of the AFP, with high-powered
weapons, had abandoned their designated places of assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the government. The President then
directed the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.

On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP – mostly from the elite
units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and the Navy’s Special Warfare Group – entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building.

Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with the emblem of the "Magdalo" faction of
the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through broadcast media, announced their grievances against the administration of President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo, such as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of the
State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military assistance from the US government. They declared their
withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. They also called for
the resignation of her cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP.

About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of rebellion, followed by General
Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary measures to suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City. She
then called the soldiers to surrender their weapons at five o’clock in the afternoon of that same day.

In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. The aim was to persuade them
to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay
down their arms and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their
barracks.

A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities.


The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the military personnel involved be charged
with coup d’etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them.

Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of
Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own
separate investigation.

On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information for coup d’etat 2against those soldiers,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and eventually raffled off to Branch 61, presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza. 3 Subsequently,
this case was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678, involving the other accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC,
Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.

On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.

On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine
the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of the Articles of War under Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 as
amended, against the same military personnel. Specifically, the charges are: (a) violation of Article 63 for disrespect toward the
President, the Secretary of National Defense, etc., (b) violation of Article 64 for disrespect toward a superior officer, (c) violation of
Article 67 for mutiny or sedition, (d) violation of Article 96 for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and (e) violation of Article
97 for conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.

Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an
Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055. 5

On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) a motion praying for the suspension of its
proceedings until after the RTC shall have resolved their motion to assume jurisdiction.

On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to the AFP Chief of Staff recommending that the
military personnel involved in the Oakwood incident be charged before a general court martial with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96,
and 97 of the Articles of War.

Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found probable cause against only 31 (petitioners
included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784. Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended Information. 6

In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and dropped the charge of coup d’etat against the
290 accused.

Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report 7 to the
JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d’etatbefore the RTCshould not be charged
before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.

For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order 8 stating that "all charges before the court martial against the
accused…are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat." The
trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners’ applications for bail.

In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial
Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted
before a general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War.

On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magno’s recommendation was approved by the AFP top brass. The AFP Judge Advocate General then
directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for
Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation
to the Oakwood incident. 9

Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004 that the offense for violation of
Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime
of coup d’etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No. 7055 specifies which offenses covered by the Articles of
War areservice-connected. These are violations of Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. The law provides that violations of these
Articles are properly cognizable by the court martial. As the charge against petitioners is violation of Article 96 which, under R.A. No.
7055 is a service-connected offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction of the court martial.

Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition raising the additional issue that the offense charged before the
General Court Martial has prescribed. Petitioners alleged therein that during the pendency of their original petition, respondents
proceeded with the Pre-Trial Investigation for purposes of charging them with violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and
a gentleman) of the Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel then referred the case to the General Court Martial; that
"almost two years since the Oakwood incident on July 27, 2003, only petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes was arraigned, and this was
done under questionable circumstances;" 10 that in the hearing of July 26, 2005, herein petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case
on the ground that they were not arraigned within the prescribed period of two (2) years from the date of the commission of the alleged
offense, in violation of Article 38 of the Articles of War; 11 that "the offense charged prescribed on July 25, 2005;" 12 that the General
Court Martial ruled, however, that "the prescriptive period shall end only at 12:00 midnight of July 26, 2005;" 13 that "(a)s midnight of July
26, 2005 was approaching and it was becoming apparent that the accused could not be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly changed
its position and asserted that 23 of the accused have already been arraigned;" 14 and that petitioners moved for a reconsideration but it
was denied by the general court martial in its Order dated September 14, 2005. 15
In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental Petition be denied for lack of merit. He alleges that "contrary to
petitioners’ pretensions, all the accused were duly arraigned on July 13 and 18, 2005." 16 The "(r)ecords show that in the hearing on
July 13, 2005, all the 29 accused were present" and, "(o)n that day, Military Prosecutor Captain Karen Ong Jags read the Charges and
Specifications from the Charge Sheet in open court (pp. 64, TSN, July 13, 2005)." 17

The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are entitled to the writ of prohibition.

There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law. Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of Commonwealth Act
No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War, the term "officer" is "construed to refer to a commissioned officer."
Article 2 provides:

Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. – The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the
term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military law," whenever used in these articles:

(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary, all
members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military
instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the said service, from the dates
they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same.

Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:

SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws,
or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties, which may be
natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the
civil court, is service-connected, in which case, the offense shall be tried by court-martial, Provided, That the President of the
Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the
proper civil courts.

As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and
Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.

In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the
Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the general rule that members of the AFP and
other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or
offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup d’etat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the
proper civil court. Next, it provides the exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the
offense to be service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the
exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or
offenses be tried by the proper civil court.

The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the "service-connected crimes or offenses" as "limited to those defined
in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97" of the Articles of War. Violations of these specified Articles are triable by
court martial. This delineates the jurisdiction between the civil courts and the court martial over crimes or offenses committed by
military personnel.

Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of military justice system over military
personnel charged with service-connected offenses. The military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest
form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. 18 Military law is established not merely to enforce discipline
in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the
public peace and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military body. 19 The administration of military justice has been universally
practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries of the world look upon the power of military law and its
administration as the most effective means of enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become invariably an
indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline both in peace and in war. 20

Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War before
the court martial, thus:

All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City, Metro Manila, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities and
abused their constitutional duty to protect the people and the State by, among others, attempting to oust the incumbent duly-
elected and legitimate President by force and violence, seriously disturbing the peace and tranquility of the people and the nation they
are sworn to protect, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to the military profession, conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman, in violation of AW 96 of the Articles of War.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)

Article 96 of the Articles of War 21 provides:

ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. – Any officer, member of the Nurse Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or
probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the
service. (Underscoring ours)

We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1
(second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their
solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities.Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and
disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military
officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same – dismissal from the
service – imposable only by the military court.Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the
military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.

Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners’ argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial for violation of Article
96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected,
but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making
such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes
or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction
on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. 22 And it is only through a
constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to
apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be." 23 Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.

In Navales v. Abaya., 24 this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held:

We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148) in the dispositive portion of its Order
dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court-martial against the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in
furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat, cannot be given effect. x x x, such declaration was made without or in excess of jurisdiction;
hence, a nullity.

The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055) explicitly specifies what are considered "service-
connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:

Articles 54 to 70:

Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.

Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.

Art. 56. False Muster.

Art. 57. False Returns.

Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.

Art. 59. Desertion.

Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.

Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.

Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.

Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,

Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National

Defense.

Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.

Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.

Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.

Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.

Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.

Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.

Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.

Articles 72 to 92:

Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.

Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.

Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.


Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.

Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.

Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.

Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.

Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.

Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.

Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.

Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.

Art. 83. Spies.

Art. 84. Military Property.–Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage

or wrongful Disposition.

Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property

Issued to Soldiers.

Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.

Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.

Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.

Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.

Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.

Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.

Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.

Art. 92. Dueling.

Articles 95 to 97:

Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.

Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.

Art. 97. General Article.

Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. x x x.

It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of
Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected crimes or
offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial.

Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during the deliberation of this case is worth quoting, thus:

The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman is ‘absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d’etat.’ Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar
to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, 25unlike here where different statutes are involved.
Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts
of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is
not applicable to this case.

Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to military personnel because the military
constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from that of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83
[1953]). Military personnel carry high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the
nature of a military organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a separate disciplinary system not applicable to
unarmed civilians or unarmed government personnel.
A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question his reassignment by asking a temporary
restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However, a soldier cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his
military commander reassigns him to another area of military operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will collapse.

xxx

This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to
effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrop’s Military
Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinary system that ensures the President’s
control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this disciplinary system is the President who exercises review
powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted).

xxx

While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar proceedings, it did so sparingly and only to release a military
personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 401 [1948] or to correct objectionable procedures (Yamashita v. Styer,
75 Phil. 563 [1945]). The Court has never suppressed court-martial proceedings on the ground that the offense charged ‘is absorbed
and in furtherance of’ another criminal charge pending with the civil courts. The Court may now do so only if the offense charged is not
one of the service-connected offenses specified in Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is not the situation in the present case.

With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their Supplemental Petition, suffice it to say that we cannot entertain the
same. The contending parties are at loggerheads as to (a) who among the petitioners were actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of their
arraignment. These are matters involving questions of fact, not within our power of review, as we are not a trier of facts. In a petition for
prohibition, such as the one at bar, only legal issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved
on the basis of the undisputed facts. 26

Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of
authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there
being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 27 Stated differently, prohibition is the
remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they
have not been vested by law. 28

In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court martial and in charging petitioners with violation
of Article 96 of the Articles of War.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ENATO C. CORONA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 A group which spearheaded the Revolution of 1896 against Spain.

2
As defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

3 Now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

4Entitled "An Act for Making Further and More Effectual Provision for the National Defense by Establishing a System of
Military Justice for Persons Subject to Military Law."

5Entitled "An Act Strengthening Civilian Supremacy Over The Military By Returning To The Civil Courts The Jurisdiction Over
Certain Offenses Involving Members Of The Armed Forces Of The Philippines, Other Persons Subject To Military Law, And
The Members Of The Philippine National Police, Repealing For The Purpose Certain Presidential Decrees."

6 Rollo, pp. 176-179.

7 Id., pp. 370-380.

8 Id., pp. 207-209.

9
Id., pp. 14-15.

10 Par. 4, Supplemental Petition, p. 4.

11 Article 38 of the Articles of War partly provides:

"Article 38. As to Time. – Except for desertion or murder committed in time of war, or for mutiny, no person subject to military
law shall be liable to be tried or punished by a court-martial for any crime or offense committed more than two years before the
arraignment of such person: x x x."

12 Pars. 8, 18, Supplemental Petition, pp. 5, 10.

13
Par. 9, id.

14Par. 10, id. Petitioners stated, under this footnote, that the "(r)ulings before the General Court Martial were done orally;
unavailability of the TSN for the July 26, 2005 hearing."

15 Par. 14, id.

16
Comment, p. 10.

17 Id., p. 18.

18 Gloria, PHILIPPINE MILITARY LAW Annotated, revised edition, p. 3.

19
Id.

20 Id., pp. 4-5.

21 Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended by Republic Act No. 242 (approved on June 12, 1948).

22
Arnado v.Buban, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1543, May 31, 2004, 430 SCRA 382, 386; Republic v. Estipular, G.R. No. 136588, July
20, 2000, 336 SCRA 333, 340.

23 Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General, G.R. No. 17888, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 754.

24 G.R. Nos. 162318 and 162341, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 393, 409-421.

25 E.g., Murder (Article 248) and Robbery (Articles 294-295) absorbed by Rebellion (Article 134) of the Revised Penal Code
(People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 [1956]; Illegal Possession of Marijuana (Section 8, Republic Act No. 6425) absorbed by
Illegal Sale of Marijuana (Section 4, Republic Act No. 6425) (People v. De Jesus, 229 Phil. 518 [1986]).

26
Mafinco Trading Corp. v. Ople, No. L-37790, March 25, 1976, 70 SCRA 139, 160-161.

Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; Vergara v. Rugue, No. L-32984, August 26, 1977, 78
27

SCRA 312.
28 Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98310, October 24, 1996, 263 SCRA 490.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Agenda of August 8, 2006

Item No. 67

G.R. No. 164007 – (LT. [SG] EUGENE GONZALES, LT. [SG] ANDY TORRATO, LT. [SG] ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY
ALEJANO, LT. [SG] JAMES LAYUG, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT. [SG] MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT.
[JG] ARTURO PASCUA, ET AL. v. GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as the Chief-of-Staff of the ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and BRIG. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge Advocate General of the Judge
Advocate General Office [JAGO])

Promulgated:

August 10, 2006

CONCURRING OPINION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

I concur with the encompassing ponencia of Madame Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez ordering the dismissal of the petition.
However, I find it necessary to elucidate on my opinion relative to the submission of petitioners that the punitive act for conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman defined in Article 96 of the Articles of War is absorbed by coup d’etat, a political felony,
especially in light of the opinion of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel that the punitive act as well as these service-connected punitive
acts defined in Articles 63, 64, 96 and 97 of the Articles of War, are indeed absorbed by coup d’etat.

The charge against petitioners reads:

Violation of Article 96

All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City, Makati, Metro Manila, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities
and abuse their constitutional duty to protect the people and the State by, among others, attempting to oust the incumbent duly-elected
and legitimate president by force and violence, seriously disturbing the peace and tranquility of the people and the nation they are
sworn to protect, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to the military profession, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in
violation of AW 96 of the Articles of War.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Article 96 of the Articles of War defines the punitive act of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman as follows:

Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. – Any officer, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is
convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service.

Case law has it that common crimes committed in furtherance of a political crime, such as rebellion, are therein absorbed. A political
crime is one directly aimed against the political order as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political
purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. Coup d’etat is a political crime because the purpose of the plotters is to seize or
diminish State power. If a crime usually regarded as common, like murder, is perpetrated to achieve a political purpose, then said
common crime is stripped of its common complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires
the political character of the latter. 1 Such common offenses assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere
ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same to justify the
imposition of the graver penalty. 2

In Ponce Enrile v. Amin, 3 the court ruled that the principle of absorption of common crimes by the political crime applies to crimes
defined and penalized by special laws, such as Presidential Decree No. 1829, otherwise known as Obstruction of Justice. However, in
Baylosis v. Chavez,
Jr., 4 the Court ruled that the rulings of this Court in People v. Hernandez, 5 Ponce Enrile v. Amin 6 and Enrile v. Salazar, 7 do not apply
to crimes which, by statutory fiat, are sui generis.

Indeed, the service-connected punitive acts defined and penalized under the Articles of War are sui generis offenses not absorbed by
rebellion perpetrated, inter alia, by the officers and enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) or coup d’etat. This
is so because such acts or omissions are merely violations of military discipline, designed to secure a higher efficiency in the military
service; in other words, they are purely disciplinary in their nature, and have exclusive regard to the special character and relation of the
AFP officers and enlisted personnel. Laws providing for the discipline as well as the organization of the AFP are essential to the
efficiency for the military service in case their services should ever be required. "Deprive the executive branch of the government of the
power to enforce proper military regulations by fine and imprisonment, and that, too, by its own courts-martial, which from time
immemorial have exercised this right, and we at once paralyze all efforts to secure proper discipline in the military service, and have
little left but a voluntary organization, without cohesive force." 8
It bears stressing that for determining how best the AFP shall attend to the business of fighting or preparing to fight rests with Congress
and with the President. Both Congress and this Court have found that the special character of the military requires civilian authorities to
accord military commanders some flexibility in dealing with matters that affect internal discipline and morale. In construing a statute that
touches on such matters, therefore, courts must be careful not to circumscribe the authority of military commanders to an extent never
intended by Congress. Under these and many similar cases reviewing legislative and executive control of the military, the sentencing
scheme at issue in this case, and the manner in which it was created, are constitutionally unassailable. 9

Officers and enlisted personnel committing punitive acts under the Articles of War may be prosecuted and convicted if found guilty of
such acts independently of, and separately from, any charges filed in the civilian courts for the same or similar acts which are penalized
under the Revised Penal Code, under special penal laws or ordinances; and prescinding from the outcome thereof.

At this point, it is well to have a basic understanding of the Articles of War under Commonwealth Act No. 408, which was essentially
copied from that of the United States, which, in turn, had been superseded by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Our Articles of War
has since been amended by Republic Act Nos. 242 and 516.

The Articles of War is the organic law of the AFP and, in keeping with the history of military law, its primary function is to enforce "the
highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency." The following commentary is enlightening:

History points out the fact that nations have always engaged in wars. For that purpose, bodies of men have been organized into armed
forces under a commander-in-chief who, through his subordinate commanders, enforces the highest form of discipline in order to
ensure the highest degree of military efficiency.

Victory in battle is the ultimate aim of every military commander, and he knows that victory cannot be attained, no matter how superior
his forces may be, in men and materials, if discipline among the rank-and-file is found wanting. For, "if an Army is to be anything but an
uncontrolled mob, discipline is required and must be enforced." For this reason, in order to set an effective means of enforcing
discipline, all organized armies of the world have promulgated sets of rules and regulations and later, laws as embodied in the articles
of war, which define the duties of military personnel and distinguish infractions of military law and impose appropriate punishment for
violation thereof. 10

Every officer, before he enters in the duties of his office, subscribes to these articles and places himself within the powers of courts-
martial to pass on any offense which he may have committed in contravention thereof. 11

It is said that conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman is a uniquely military offense. 12 In order to constitute the said offense, the
misconduct must offend so seriously against the law, justice, morality or decorum as to expose to disgrace, socially or as a man, the
offender, and at the same time must be of such a nature or committed under such circumstances as to bring dishonor or disrepute upon
the military profession which he represents. 13 The article proscribing conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman has been held to
be wholly independent of other definitions of offenses, and the same course of conduct may constitute an offense elsewhere provided
for and may also warrant a conviction under this provision; it is not subject to preemption by other punitive articles. 14

The administration of military justice under the Articles of War has been exclusively vested in courts-martial whether as General Courts-
Martial, Special Courts-Martial or Summary Courts-Martial. 15 Courts-martial pertain to the executive department and are, in fact, simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly
commanding the army and navy, and enforcing discipline therein. 16

As enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, "the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society. It
has, again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own during its long history. The differences between the military and
civilian communities result from the fact that it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or ready to fight wars should the
occasion arise." 17 Further, the US Supreme Court quite succinctly stated that "the military constitutes a specialized community
governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian." 18

I wish to emphasize, however, a caveat: not all service-connected punitive acts under the Articles of War may be prosecuted before the
courts-martial independently of a crime defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code against the same accused based on the
same set of delictual acts. Congress may criminalize a service-connected punitive offense under the Articles of War.

A review of the deliberations in the Senate or the Report of the Conference Committee of Senate Bill 1500 will readily show that coup
d’etat was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code in Article 134-A precisely to criminalize "mutiny" under Article 67 of the Articles of
War and to penalize the punitive act of mutiny, under the Articles of War as coup d’etat. Article 67 of the Articles of War reads:

Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition. – Any person subject to military law who attempts to create or who begins, excites, causes, or joins in any
mutiny or sedition in any company, party, post, camp, detachment, guard, or other command shall suffer death or such other
punishment as a court-martial may direct.

Without Article 134-A in the Revised Penal Code, the mutineers would be charged for mutiny under Article 67 of the Articles of War:

Senator Lina. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Enrile. Then we added Article 134-A which deals with the new crime of coup d’etat.

Senator Enrile. – and we defined how this newly characterized and defined crime would be committed in Article 134-A?

Senator Lina. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Enrile. And, in fact, we made a distinction between the penalty of the crimes defined under Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code and the crime defined under Article 134-A, is this correct, Mr. President?

Senator Lina. Yes, Mr. President.


Senator Enrile. In fact, we distinguished between the conspiracy and proposal to commit the crime of rebellion from the conspiracy and
proposal to commit coup d’ etat?

Senator Lina. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Enrile. So that, for all intents and purposes, therefore, we are defining a new crime under this proposed measure—

Senator Lina. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Enrile.—which is coup d’etat. We are, in effect, bringing into the Revised Penal Code, a crime that was penalized under the
Articles of War as far as military participants are concerned and call it with its name "coup d’etat"?

Senator Lina. Yes, Mr. President. That is the . . .

Senator Enrile. Because without this criminalization of coup d’etat under the Revised Penal Code, people in the active service would be
charged with mutiny?

Senator Lina. Yes, Mr. President. Especially when they are inside the camp, when the rank-and-file go up to arms or insubordination or
against the orders of their superiors, they would be charged under the Articles of War.

Senator Enrile. In fact, one of the distinguishing features of a coup d’etat as defined here is, apart from the overt acts of taking a swift
attack with violence, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth against the duly-constituted authorities or an installation, et cetera, the
primary ingredient of this would be the seizure or diminution of state power.

Senator Lina. Yes, that is the objective, Mr. President.

Senator Enrile. On the other hand, in the case of rebellion as defined under Article 134, it does not necessarily mean a seizure of State
power or diminution of State power, but all that is needed would be to deprive the Chief Executive or the legislature of any of its powers.

Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Enrile. So that, there is a basis to consider a clear and definable distinction between the crime of coup d’etat and the crime of
rebellion as defined under Article 135?

Senator Lina. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Enrile. I just want to put that into the Record.

Thus, officers and enlisted personnel of the AFP charged of coup d’etat can no longer be charged with mutiny under Article 67 of the
Articles of War before courts-martial for the same delictual or punitive act.

I vote to DISMISS the petition.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515, 536 (1956).

2 Id. at 541.

3
G.R. No. 93335, September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 573, 580-581.

4
G.R. No. 95136, October 3, 1991, 202 SCRA 405, 416.

5 Supra note 1.

6 Supra note 3.

7 G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990, 186 SCRA 217.

8 Michigan v. Wagner, 77 N.W. 422.

9 Loving v. U.S., 517 U.S. 748, 778, 116 S.Ct. 1737 (1966).

10 Gloria, Philippine Military Law Annotated, p. 3.


11 Carter v. Roberto, 177 U.S. 497 (1900).

12
U.S. v. Weldon, 7 M.J. 938 (1979).

13 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).

14 U.S. v. Taylor, 23 M.J. 341 (1987).

15
Article 3, Articles of War.

16 Supra note 14, p.17, citing Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2nd ed.), 49.

17
U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).

18 Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953)

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. 164007 – LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, CAPT. GARY
ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL COBOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT.
(JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONHNEL SANGGALANG, Petitioners, versus GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and B/GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge Advocate
General of the Judge Advocate General Office (JAGO), Respondents.

Promulgated:

August 10, 2006

SEPARATE OPINION

(Concurring and Dissenting)

Tinga, J.:

My concurrence to the dismissal of the petition is limited to a much narrower ground than that offered by the majority opinion, which,
with due respect, I am unable to fully join and thus impelled to mostly dissent from. The broad propositions adopted by the majority
render inutile Republic Act No. 7055, (RA 7055) that generally restored civil jurisdiction over offenses involving members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). This law stands as a key implement in the restoration of civilian supremacy over the military, a precept
that was reinvigorated with the restoration of civil democracy in 1986. The rationale that sustains the majority position stands athwart to
that important constitutional principle as effectuated through RA 7055.

Instead, my position hinges on the peculiar nature of Article 96 of the Articles of War, the violation of which petitioners stand accused of
before the court-martial. Not only does Article 96 embody a rule uniquely military in nature, it also prescribes a penalty wholly
administrative in character which the civilian courts are incapable of rendering. For that reason alone, I agree that petitioners may
stand civilian trial for coup d’etat and court-martial for violation of Article 96.

Still, I acknowledge that I would have voted to grant the petition had petitioners faced other charges, instead of the sole Article 96
charge, before the court-martial in connection with the Oakwood mutiny. I submit that RA 7055 precisely authorizes the civil court to
independently determine whether the offense subject of the information before it is actually service-connected. If the trial court does
determine, before arraignment, that the offense is service-connected, it follows that, as a rule, the military court will not have jurisdiction
over the acts constituting the offense.

Restatement of Relevant Facts

The following facts I consider relevant.

On 5 August 2003, just a little over a week after the so-called Oakwood mutiny, the Department of Justice filed an Information with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati against 321 military personnel, including petitioners, for violation of Article 134-A of the Revised
Penal Code which is the crime of coup d’etat. After the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784, the RTC directed the DOJ to
conduct a reinvestigation of the said case. On the same day that the order for re-investigation was issued, the AFP Chief of Staff
created a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel against the same persons to determine the propriety of filing charges with a military tribunal
against petitioners, along with 300 or so other soldiers, for violation of the Articles of War, again in connection with the Oakwood
mutiny. Thus, 243 of the accused before the RTC, including petitioners, filed a motion with the trial court praying that the court assume
jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal, following RA 7055. 1

After re-investigation, the DOJ found probable cause for the crime of coup d’etat against only 31 of the original 321 accused. The DOJ
then filed a motion for dismissal of the charge of coup d’etat against the 290 others, which motion was granted by the RTC in an Order
dated 14 November 2003. Petitioners were among the 31 who still faced the charge of coup d’etat before the RTC.
Notwithstanding the dismissal of the charge of coup d’etat against the 290 soldiers, they were still charged before the General Court
Martial for violation of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96 and 97 of the Articles of War. 2 Among the charges faced by these soldiers was for
"mutiny," punishable under Article 63. Only those soldiers the charge of coup d’etat against whom was dismissed were
subjected to the charge of Articles of War violations before the court-martial. Some of these 290 soldiers challenged the
jurisdiction of the court-martial in a petition for prohibition before this Court, which was denied in Navales v. Abaya 3 in 2004.

On the other hand, on 9 December 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel recommended that the 31 officers facing the charge of coup
d’etat before the trial court be excluded from the court-martial proceedings. The rationale that the Panel offered was the assumption of
civilian jurisdiction by the RTC based on RA 7055 and its belief that the charges against the 31 it was investigating were absorbed by
the crime of coup d’etat, which was already within the jurisdiction of the RTC to try and decide.

It was on 11 February 2004 that the RTC issued an Order (RTC Order) stating that "all charges before the court-martial against the
accused.. are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat." Note
that as of then, only 31 officers remained within the jurisdiction of the RTC. If there are any relevant subjects of the RTC Order, it is
these 31, including petitioners, and not the 290 others the case for coup d’etat against whom had already been dismissed.

Thus, as things stood as of 11 February 2004, only 31 officers, including petitioners, were still within the jurisdiction of the RTC, as they
remained charged with coup d’etat. None of the 31 were facing any charge before the court-martial, the investigation against them by
the AFP Pre-Trial Investigation Panel had already been concluded by then. On the other hand, the 290 other soldiers, including
the Navales petitioners, were no longer facing any criminal cases before the RTC, but were instead facing court-martial charges. This
symmetry is deliberate, cognizant as the DOJ and the AFP were of the general principle, embodied in RA 7055, that jurisdiction over
acts by soldiers which constitute both a crime under the penal laws and a triable offense under the Articles of War is exercised
exclusively by either the civilian court or the court-martial, depending on the circumstances as dictated under Section 1 of RA 7055.

It was in June of 2004 that this symmetry was shattered. It appears that at that point, the AFP reconsidered its earlier decision not to try
the 31 officers before the court-martial. There appears per record, a letter dated 17 June 2004, captioned "Disposition Form," signed by
a certain De Los Reyes, and recommending that the 31 be charged as well before the court-martial for violation of Article 96 of the
Articles of War and that pre-trial investigation be reconducted for that purpose. 4 This recommendation was approved by then AFP
Chief of Staff Narciso Abaya. It was this decision to reinitiate court-martial proceedings against the 31 that impelled the present petition
for prohibition.

As stated earlier, I believe that ultimately, petitioners may still be charged with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War,
notwithstanding the pending case for coup d’etat before the RTC against them. My reason for such view lies in the wholly administrative
nature of Article 96 and the sole penalty prescribed therein, dismissal from service, which is beyond the jurisdiction of civilian courts to
impose. Yet I arrive at such view without any denigration of the RTC Order, which proceeds from fundamentally correct premises and
which, to my mind, bears the effect of precluding any further charges before the court-martial against petitioners in relation to the
Oakwood mutiny. Unfortunately, the majority gives undue short shrift to the RTC Order and the predicament confronting the present
petitioners, who are now facing not only trial before the civilian court for the crime of coup d’etat, but also court-martial proceedings for
acts which if not identical to those charged in the criminal case are at least integrally related. I respectfully submit that RA 7055 was
precisely designed to generally prevent such anomaly, but that the majority fails to give fruition to such legislative intent.

Instead, the majority has laid down a general rule that if members of the military are charged before military tribunals with
violation of Articles of War 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97, then the court-martial proceedings would progress
unhampered even if the acts which constitute the violation of the Articles of War also constitute offenses under the Revised
Penal Code. The court-martial proceedings would also ensue even if the said personnel are also charged for the same acts
with a criminal case before the civilian court, and even if the civilian court determines that the acts are not service-connected.
Most critically, this view would allow the defendant to be tried and convicted by both the military and civilian courts for the
same acts, despite the consistent jurisprudential rule that double jeopardy applies even as between court-martial and criminal
trials. I cannot agree to these general propositions, excepting when the defendants happen to be charged before the court-
martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.

There are three fundamental questions that are consequently raised. First, can Congress by law limit the jurisdiction of military
tribunals and court-martials? Second, does RA 7055 effectively deprive military courts jurisdiction over violations of Articles
of War 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97 if the civilian court determines that the offenses charged do not constitute service-
connected offenses? And third, does it constitute double jeopardy if the same military actor is tried and convicted before both
civilian and military courts for the same acts? I respectfully submit that all these questions should generally be answered in
the affirmative.

Jurisdictions of Courts-Martial In

the Philippines Fundamentally Statutory

I begin with the constitutional and statutory parameters of courts-martial in the Philippines.

It is settled, in cases such as Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 5 that court-martial proceedings are executive in character, deriving as they do from
the authority of the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. 6 Indeed, the authority of the President to discipline
members of the armed forces stands as one of the hallmarks of the commander-in-chief powers. Obedience to the President and the
chain-of-command are integral to a professional and effective military, and the proper juridical philosophy is to accede as much
deference as possible to this prerogative of the President.

However, in Marcos v. Chief of Staff, 7 decided five (5) years after Ruffy, the Court ruled that the word "court" as used in the
Constitution included the General Court-Martial, citing Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents, which noted that "courts-martial are [in]
the strictest sense courts of justice". 8 Indeed, it would be foolhardy to ignore, with semantics as expedient, the adjudicative
characteristics of courts-martial and their ability to inflict punishment constituting deprivation of liberty, or even life. A court-martial is still
a court of law and justice, 9 although it is not a part of the judicial system and judicial processes, but remains to be a specialized part of
the over-all mechanism by which military discipline is preserved. 10
Regardless of the accurate legal character of courts-martial, it should go without saying that the authority of the President to discipline
military personnel through that process is still subject to a level of circumscription. Without such concession, the President could very
well impose such draconian measures of military punishment, such as death by firing squad for overweight soldiers. The Court has
indeed, on occasion, recognized limitations and regulations over courts-martial. In Olaguer v. Military Commission, 11 the Court
reasserted that military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for as long as the civil courts are open and
functioning. 12 The authority of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the court-martial was affirmed in Ognir v. Director of
Prisons,13 and should be recognized in light of the judicial power of the Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, which extends to
determining grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. And finally, there are the series of rulings on the subject of double jeopardy, which I shall soon discuss further.

Most strikingly, the "Articles of War" presently in use emanates not from executive fiat, but from a law passed by the National Assembly
known as Commonwealth Act No. 408. As such, the determination of what acts or offenses are punishable by court-martial was in
actuality made not by the President, but by the legislature. As such, the Articles of War are utterly susceptible to legislative amendment,
augmentation, or even revocation.

I do not doubt that without an enabling law, the President would have the power to impose court-martial proceedings under the aegis of
the Commander-in-Chief clause. Yet if there is an enabling law passed, such as Commonwealth Act No. 408, then the President is
bound to exercise the power to prescribe court-martial proceedings only within the limits imposed by the law. These precepts should not
preclude the President from mandating other forms of military discipline, but if the choice is to subject the soldier concerned to court-
martial, then such proceedings should ensue within the boundaries determined by the legislature under Commonwealth Act No. 408.

American jurisprudence is actually quite emphatic that the jurisdiction of a court-martial is established by statute, and a court-martial
has no jurisdiction beyond what is given by statute. "[A] court-martial [is] a special statutory tribunal, with limited powers." 14 To quote
from Corpus Juris Secundum:

The jurisdiction of a court-martial is premised on an authorized convening authority, court membership in accordance with
the law, and power derived from congressional act to try the person and the offense charged. [ 15 Thus, in order for a court-
martial to have jurisdiction, it must be convened and constituted in accordance with law[ 16; and a court-martial has no jurisdiction
beyond what is given it by statute.[ 17 General court-martial jurisdiction is not restricted territorially to the limits of a particular state or
district.

The long continued practice of military authorities in exercising court-martial jurisdiction may aid in the interpretation of statutes
conferring such jurisdiction; but the authority of a Secretary of an armed forces department to issue regulations does not permit
extension of the jurisdictions of courts-martial of the armed force controlled by that department beyond the limits fixed by
Congress[ 19

The language of statutes granting jurisdiction to courts-martial to try persons for offenses must be construed to conform as near as may
be to the constitutional guarantees that protect the rights of citizens in general, it being assumed that Congress intended to guard
jealously against dilution of the liberties of citizens by the enlargement of jurisdiction of military tribunals at the expense of the
jurisdiction of the civil courts. 20

Clearly then, while court-martial under military law may be sui generis, it is not supra legem. The power to try by court-martial is
established, defined and limited by statute, even if it arises as a consequence of the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief.

What are the implications of these doctrines to the case at bar? To my mind, they sufficiently establish that Congress does have the
power to exclude certain acts from the jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial. The same legislature that enacted Commonwealth Act
No. 408 is very well empowered to amend that law, as it has done on occasion. 21 And I submit that Congress has done so with the
enactment of RA 7055.

Republic Act No. 7055

The title of RA 7055 reads "An Act Strengthening Civilian Supremacy Over the Military By Returning to the Civil Courts the
Jurisdiction Over Certain Offenses Involving Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Other Persons Subject to Military
Law, and the Members of the Philippine National Police, Repealing for the Purpose Certain Presidential Decrees." 22 In the Philippines,
the conferment of civil jurisdiction over members of the military charged with non-service connected offenses is predicated on the
constitutional principle of civilian supremacy over the military. 23 As Senator Wigberto Tañada remarked in his sponsorship remarks over
Senate Bill No. 1468, eventually enacted as RA 7055, "[A]s long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly
functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over military men for criminal offenses committed by them and which
are properly cognizable by the civil courts. To have it otherwise would be a violation of the aforementioned constitutional provisions on
the supremacy of civilian authority over the military and the integrity and independence of the judiciary, as well as the due process and
equal-protection clauses of the Constitution." 24

The title of the law alone is already indicative of the law’s general intent to exclude from the jurisdiction of the General Court-
martial "certain offenses" which would now be tried by the civil courts. Section 1 operationalizes such intent, asserting as a
general rule that members of the AFP "who commits crimes penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local
government ordinances xxx shall be tried by the proper civil court xxx." Notably, the majority does concede the general rule.

The exception of course, are offenses which are service-connected. They are excluded from the jurisdiction of the civilian courts. It is
worth mentioning at this juncture that the concept of "service-connected" offenses as a determinant of court-martial jurisdiction arose
from American jurisprudence. In O’Callahan v. Parker, 25 decided in 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed previous doctrines and
announced a new constitutional principle ── that a military tribunal ordinarily may not try a serviceman charged with a crime that has
no service connection. 26

RA 7055 Reposes on the Trial Court

The Specific Role of Determining Whether

The Offense is Service-Connected


Obviously, the ascertainment of whether or not a crime is service-connected is of controversial character, necessitating the exercise of
judgment. Appropriately, that function is assigned by Section 1 not to the courts-martial, but to the civil courts. Indeed, Section
1 requires that before the offense shall be tried by court-martial, there must be first a determination before arraignment by the civil
court that the offense is indeed service-connected. Section 1 states:

Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law xxx who commit crimes or offenses penalized
under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-
accused, victims or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when
the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried
by court-martial xxx

As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72
to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)

There are two possible scenarios that may arise after a soldier commits a crime which is punishable under both the Revised Penal
Code and under Commonwealth Act No. 408.

In one, the soldier is charged only with violation of the Articles of War and tried by the court-martial. In this situation wherein no criminal
case is filed against the soldier, the court-martial continues unimpeded.

In the other, the soldier is charged with both violation of the Articles of War (triable by court-martial) and a criminal offense involving the
same act (triable by the civilian court). Here, a different set of rules operates. RA 7055 comes into application in such a case. Section 1
of RA 7055 clearly reposes on the trial court, and not the court-martial, the duty to determine whether the charges in the information are
service-connected. If the civilian court makes a determination that the acts involved are not service-connected, then the court-
martial will generally have no jurisdiction.

In this particular role, the trial court is merely guided in its determination by Articles of War 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97, the
specific articles to which the determination of service-connected offenses according to RA 7055 is limited. The importance of
the trial court’s function of determination cannot be dismissed lightly. Since the law mandates that the trial court make such a
determination, it necessarily follows that the court has to ascertain on its own whether the offenses charged do fall within the Articles of
War. It would not bind the civilian court that the defendants are charged with the same acts before the court-martial under
Articles of War 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. The civilian court is required to still make a determination, independent of that
of the court-martial, that the acts charged constitute a service-connected offense.

However, the majority is satisfied that since petitioners are charged before the military tribunal with violation of one of the Articles of
War so mentioned in Section 1 of RA 7055, this offense is within the jurisdiction of the court-martial. The majority is thus of the position
that regardless of whatever transpires in the civilian court trial, court-martial proceedings may ensue unimpeded so long as the
defendants therein are charged with Articles of War 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. Such jurisdiction of the court-martial subsists even
if the civilian courts had determined that the acts which constitute the offense triable under court-martial are not service-
connected. This position renders utterly worthless the function of the civilian courts to determine whether the offense is
indeed service-connected, as such determination would no longer have any bearing on the jurisdiction of the courts-martial
to try the same acts.

Justice Carpio, in particular, asserts in his Concurring Opinion that the civilian court is limited to "only a facial examination of the charge
sheet in determining whether the offense charged is service connected." 28 This proposition negates the entire purpose of RA 7055, as
it would ultimately render the military as the sole judge whether a civilian court can acquire jurisdiction over criminal acts by military
personnel, even if such soldier has committed a crime under the Revised Penal Code. Under this position, all the military has to do is to
charge the actor with violation of Articles of War 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97, and the civilian court would be effectively deprived of
jurisdiction to try the offense, even if the act is clearly punishable under civil penal laws. With all due respect, such "facial examination",
which would be undertaken by a learned judge of a civilian court, can be accomplished with ease by a non-lawyer, by a fifteen-year old,
or anybody with rudimentary skills in the English language. After all, the only necessary act for such purpose would be to look at the
charge sheet and the Articles of War. As long as the civilian court sees that charge sheet states that the defendants have been charged
with any of the aforementioned Articles of War, the determinative function would already be accomplished.

Under the standard of "facial examination," the trial court can very well make its determination even without the benefit of charge sheet
if there is no such charge sheet yet. In reality though, the trial courts primary source of information and basis for determination is the
information in the criminal case before it, as well as the affidavits and documents which the prosecution may make available to it.
Assuming that there is a court-martial charge sheet, the same on its face may be incapable of capturing the particulars of the criminal
acts committed, as there is no prescribed demand for such particularity. As such, a "facial examination" could not suffice in affording the
civilian court any significant appreciation of the relevant factors in determining whether the offense was indeed service-connected.

Worse, by advocating "facial examination" as a limit, this view would actually allow malfeasors in the military to evade justice, if they are
fortunate enough to have sympathizers within the military brass willing to charge them with a violation of the aforementioned articles of
war in order that they escape the possibly harsher scrutiny of the civilian courts. For example, Article 69 of the Articles of War punishes
persons subject to military law who commit frauds against the government, which include, among others, stealing, embezzling,
knowingly and willfully misappropriating, applying to his own use or benefit or wrongfully or knowingly selling or disposing of "any
ordinance, arms, equipment, ammunition, clothing, subsistence stores, money or other property of the Government furnished or
intended for the military service." 29 The offense, which according to the majority is strictly a service-connected offense, is punishable by
"fine or imprisonment, or by such other punishment as a court-martial may adjudge, or by any or all of said penalties." 30 A military
comptroller who embezzles the pension funds of soldiers could be made liable under Article 95, and thus could be appropriately
charged before the court-martial. Also pursuant to Article 95, the court-martial has the discretion to impose as final punishment a fine
of P1,000.00, even if the comptroller embezzled millions of pesos. If the said comptroller has friends within the military top brass, the
prospect of such a disproportionate penalty is actually feasible.

Now, if Justice Carpio’s position were to be pursued, no civilian court, whether the RTC or the Sandiganbayan, could acquire
jurisdiction over the comptroller for the offense of embezzlement, which is punishable under the Revised Penal Code and the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, the moment the comptroller faces the charge of violating Article 95 before the court-martial. Why? Because
these civilian courts would be limited to "only a facial examination of the charge sheet in determining whether the offense is service-
connected." Justice Carpio adds, "[i]f the offense, as alleged in the charge sheet, falls under the enumeration of service-connected
offenses in Section 1 of RA No. 7055, then the military court has jurisdiction over the offense."

Applying Justice Carpio’s analysis to this theoretical example, the offense is "as alleged in the charge sheet" is a violation of Article 95
of the Articles of War. Article 95 "falls under the enumeration of service-connected offenses in Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055." Then,
according to Justice Carpio, "the military court has jurisdiction over the offense." Yet Section 1 also

states that as a general rule that it is the civilian courts which have jurisdiction to try the offense, "except when the offense, as
determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-
martial." The ineluctable conclusion, applying Justice Carpio’s view to our theoretical example, is that the civilian court does
not have jurisdiction to try the offense constituting embezzlement since it was forced to determine, following the limited facial
examination of the charge sheet, that the act of embezzlement punishable under Article 95 of the Articles of War is a service-
connected offense.

If "facial examination" ill-suffices as the appropriate standard of determination, what then should be the proper level of determination?

Full significance should be accorded the legislative tasking of the civil court, not the military court, to determine whether the offense
before it is service-connected or not. Indeed, determination clearly implies a function of adjudication on the part of the trial court, and
not a mechanical application of a standard pre-determined by some other body. The word "determination" implies deliberation 31 and is,
in normal legal contemplation, equivalent to "the decision of a court of justice." 32 The Court in EPZA v. Dulay 33 declared as
unconstitutional a presidential decree that deprived the courts the function of determining the value of just compensation in eminent
domain cases. In doing so, the Court declared, "the determination of ‘just compensation’ in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function." 34

The majority shows little respect for the plain language of the law. As earlier noted, they believe that the determination reposed in the
civilian court is limited to a facial examination of the military charge sheet to ascertain whether the defendants have been charged
before the court-martial with the violation of Articles of War 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. Their position could have been sustained
had Section 1 read, "As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses are those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to
92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended," discarding the phrase "shall be limited to" immediately
preceding the words "those defined." Such phraseology makes it clear that "service-connected crimes or offenses" are equivalent to
"Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97." Yet Section 1 is hardly styled in that fashion. Instead, it precisely reads, "xxx
service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70 xxx."

What is the implication of the phrase "shall be limited to"? This has to be tied to the role of determination ascribed to the civilian court in
the previous paragraph under Section 1. Note again, "determination" signifies that the civilian court has to undertake an inquiry whether
or not the acts are service connected. As stated earlier, the Articles of War specified in Section 1 serve as guides for such
determination. "shall be limited to" assures that the civilian court cannot rely on a ground not rooted on those aforementioned articles in
ruling that an offense is service-connected. For example, the civilian court cannot declare that an offense is service-connected because
the offender is a three-star general. Being a three-star general is in no way connected to Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles
95 to 97.

At the same time, Section 1 concedes that if the act or offense for which the defendant is prosecuted before the civilian court also falls
within those specified Articles of War, then the civilian court has to further determine whether the offense is service-connected. For
example, a soldier who knowingly harbors or protects an enemy of the state may be liable under Article 82 of the Articles of War, which
generally punishes military persons who aid the enemy, or under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, which classifies giving aid or
comfort to the enemy as an act of treason. If the soldier is charged with treason, the civilian court may be called upon to determine
whether the acts of assistance are service-connected, and it should be able to take into account the particular circumstances
surrounding such acts. If the trial court determines that the offense is indeed service-connected, finding for example that the defendant
had used his/her rank to assist the enemy, then it may rely on Article 82 in its conclusion that the act is service-connected. If however,
the actor’s being also a soldier proved merely incidental and inconsequential to the assistance rendered to the enemy, the civilian court
could very well declare that the offense is not service-connected and thus subject to trial for treason before it.

The function devolved by the law on the trial court involves the determination of which offenses are service-connected and which
offenses are not. The power of determination, however, is circumscribed by the law itself. By employing the phrase "shall be limited to"
and tying it with specifically enumerated Articles, the law precludes the trial court from characterizing acts which fall under the Articles
not so enumerated as service-connected. Since Article 93 defining rape and Article 94 defining "various crimes" are not included in the
enumeration in RA 7055 it follows that the trial court is devoid of authority to declare rape and "various crimes" as service-connected.

Again, the general purpose of RA 7055 is to deprive the court-martial of jurisdiction to try cases which are properly cognizable
before the civilian courts. Hence, if a soldier is charged with violation of any of the articles other than those referred to in Section 1, the
court-martial is deprived of jurisdiction under RA 7055 if such violation also constitutes a crime or offense under our penal laws. Section
1, by citing those aforementioned articles, carves an exception to the general rule, yet at the same time, qualifies this exception as
subject to the determination of the trial court. Hence, if the trial court so determines that the "service-connected" exception does not
apply, the general rule depriving the court-martial jurisdiction over the offense should continue to operate.

It is worth mentioning that prior to RA 7055, Commonwealth Act No. 408 recognized an exception to the rule that military persons are
always subjected to court-martial in lieu of civil trial. Article 94 stipulated that a person subject to military law who committed a felony,
crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinance recognized as an offense of a penal nature was punishable by court-martial,
provided that such act was committed "inside a reservation of the [AFP]," or outside such reservation when the offended party is a
person subject to military law. 35The implication, therefore, was that if such act described were committed outside a military reservation,
the civilian courts would have jurisdiction to try such offense. As the official Manual for Courts-Martial of the AFP states, "[w]henever
persons subject to military law commit any of the offenses above stated outside Philippine Army reservations, they fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts." 36

RA 7055 clearly expands this exception, by now mandating that even crimes committed within military reservations fall within the
jurisdiction of civil courts, the only exception remaining is if it is determined by the civilian court that the offense is actually service-
connected. Significantly, Section 1 of RA 7055 did not include Article 94 as among the Articles of War which define service-connected
offenses. 37 Evidently the situs of the offense is not material as to whether the acts committed are service-connected offenses.
Admittedly, RA 7055 effectively curtails the ability of the military leadership to discipline the soldiers under their command through the
court-martial process. This is accomplished though not by shielding errant soldiers from the criminal processes, but instead through the
opposite route, by entrusting to the civilian courts the authority and sufficient discretion to impose substantive justice on such soldiers,
conformably with the constitutional principle of civilian supremacy over the military. It must be noted that the acquisition of exclusive
jurisdiction by the court-martial to try soldiers for acts punishable under penal laws is a double-edged sword of mischief. It can be
utilized by a military leadership with an unquenchable thirst to punish its soldiers, a procedure which is facilitated due to the relatively
lighter evidentiary requirements under military justice. It can also be utilized by a military leadership greatly sympathetic to one of their
"mistahs" under fire, since the ability to inflict the lightest and most disproportionate of punishments falls within the wide range of
discretion in the punishment accorded by law to courts-martial. Either premise is undesirable, and precisely RA 7055 was enacted to
ensure that the civilian courts have all the opportunity to acquire jurisdiction over military persons who commit crimes, and to assure the
trial courts all the discretion necessary to determine whether it should assume jurisdiction if the exception provided under Section 1 of
the law is invoked.

RA 7055 Generally Prevents Military Personnel

From Facing Simultaneous Criminal Trials and Courts-Martial

Over the Same Acts or Offenses

It is thus not enough that petitioners have been charged with violating an Article of War referred to in Section 1 to authorize their court-
martial to proceed, since the same act that constitutes the violation of an Article of War is also alleged in the complaint for coup
d’etat now pending in the civilian courts. In order that the court-martial proceedings against petitioners could ensue, it is indisputably
necessary that the RTC Order determining that the charges before the court-martial are not service-connected is directly nullified or
reconsidered with the needed effect of terminating the criminal case for coup d’etat against them. If the act constituting the offense
triable before the civilian courts and the court-martial are the same, then the defendants may be tried only either before the civilian
courts or the court-martial, and not in both tribunals.

This is precisely why the exceptions under Section 1 of RA 7055 were provided for – to prevent the anomaly of the defendants
being subjected to two different trials of equally punitive value for the same act. It is well worth noting that the Senate
deliberations on RA 7055 indicate a strong concern on the part of the legislators over the situation wherein violations of the Articles of
War also stand as violations of the Revised Penal Code. The following exchange between the late Senate President Neptali Gonzales
and Senator Wigberto Tañada is worth noting:

Senator Gonzales. Again, in line 16, it says: The offenses defined in Articles 54 to 93 and 95 to 97 of the Articles of War, established
by Commonwealth Act Numbered Four Hundred Eight, as amended, the same shall be triable by court-martial.

But there are many offenses which are also violations of the Articles of War. For example, murder. It may not necessarily be a
murder of a fellow member of the Armed Forces. That is also a violation of the Articles of War; but, at the same time, it is also
a crime punishable under the Penal Code. What do we do in such a situation?

Senator Tañada. In such an example, that would be tried by the civil courts. We had accepted the amendment proposed by
Senator Ziga to exclude Article 93 under the Articles of War which would refer to murder or rape committed in times of war. Now, we
have excluded that, because we believe that the murder or rape, whether committed in times of war, should not be tried by the civil
courts.

Senator Gonzales. Do we have the distinguished Gentleman’s assurance that after deleting Article 93, also with respect to Articles 54
to 92, 95 to 97, there is absolutely no situation wherein the same act constitutes a violation of the Revised Penal Code and at the same
time a violation of the Articles of War?

Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. We excluded also Article 94 of the Articles of War, because this refers to various crimes that may
be committed by persons subject to military law, which crimes can be considered as felonies, breach of law, or violation of municipal
ordinance, which is recognized as an offense of a penal nature, and is punishable under the penal laws of the Philippines or under
municipal ordinances.

Senator Gonzales. We have the assurance of the distinguished Gentleman, and we rely on that assurance. xxx 38

The passage deserves to be cited as it affirms the deliberate intent, already evident in the text of the law itself, to avoid the scenario of
the civilian courts and the courts-martial exercising concurrent jurisdiction over the same acts. Hence, for as long as the act committed
by the soldier does not fall within those Articles of War referred to in Section 1, the civilian courts alone exercises jurisdiction over the
trial of the acts. If it is asserted by the courts-martial, or otherwise argued, that the act complained of falls within those Articles of War
referred to in Section 1, then the civilian court must make a determination that the acts committed are "service-connected," with the
cited Articles as reference, before it can exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of the courts-martial. If the trial court declares that the
acts are service-connected, it then is obliged to decline jurisdiction in favor of the courts-martial.

The cited passage does express the opinion of Senator Tañada that there is absolutely no situation wherein the same act constitutes a
violation of the Revised Penal Code and at the same time a violation of the Articles of War. Such opinion might be cited to refute the
declaration in the RTC Order that the acts charged before the court-martial were absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat. Yet caution
should be had before this opinion of Senator Tañada is cited for that purpose. The quoted remarks were made on 21 May 1990, or five
(5) months before the crime of coup d’etatwas incorporated into the Revised Penal Code with the enactment of Republic Act No. 6968
on 24 October 1990. Certainly, when Senator Tañada made such opinion, he had no reason to believe that the cited Articles of War did
not constitute any violation of the Revised Penal Code, particularly the crime of coup d’etat, since no such crime existed then.

Double Jeopardy

There is another vital reason RA 7055 cannot be interpreted in such a way as to permit both civilian and military trials of military
personnel over the same act. Double jeopardy would arise as a consequence if such an interpretation were foisted.
It is very well settled that double jeopardy attaches if one is tried by both a military court and a civilian court over the same act,
notwithstanding the differing natures of both tribunals. The rule was pronounced by the Philippine Supreme Court as far back as 1903,
in U.S. v. Colley. 39 Therein, the defendant was sentenced to death by a court-martial after murdering a fellow soldier, but the sentence
could not be carried out after the reviewing authority of the Army concluded that the military authorities were without power to carry into
execution the sentence. He then was charged with the same offense before a civilian court. In ruling that the criminal case should be
dismissed, the Court ruled that the criminal trial was barred by double jeopardy. The Court pronounced: "So here there is but one
offense, that against the United States, and when the Government chooses the tribunal in which to try an offender, when the trial takes
place in that tribunal, and when the accused is convicted and sentenced, he can not again be put in jeopardy in another court of the
same sovereignty. xxx It follows that the defendant having been once in jeopardy can not be tried again for the offense of which he was
formerly convicted." 40 A similar situation obtained in U.S. v. Tubig, 41 decided some months later, and a similar judgment of acquittal
was mandated by the Court on the ground of double jeopardy.

The doctrine has survived past the American occupation. In 1954, the Court was again confronted with the issue whether a sentence
passed by a military court barred further prosecution of the same offense in a civilian court. The Court, in Crisologo v.
People, 42 squarely ruled that double jeopardy indeed barred such prosecution:

As we see it, the case hinges on whether the decision of the military court constitutes a bar to further prosecution for the same offense
in the civil courts.

The question is not of first impression in this jurisdiction. In the case of U. S. vs. Tubig, 3 Phil., 244, a soldier of the United States Army
in the Philippines was charged in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga with having assassinated one Antonio Alivia. Upon
arraignment, he pleaded double jeopardy in that he had already been previously convicted and sentenced by a court-martial for the
same offense and had already served his sentence. The trial court overruled the plea on the grounds that as the province where the
offense was committed was under civil jurisdiction, the military court had no jurisdiction to try the offense. But on appeal, this court held
that "one who has been tried and convicted by a court-martial under circumstances giving that tribunal jurisdiction of the defendant and
of the offense, has been once in jeopardy and cannot for the same offense be again prosecuted in another court of the same
sovereignty." In a later case, Grafton vs. U. S. 11 Phil., 776, a private in the United States Army in the Philippines was tried by a general
court-martial for homicide under the Articles of War. Having been acquitted in that court, he was prosecuted in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo for murder under the general laws of the Philippines. Invoking his previous acquittal in the military court, he pleaded it
in bar of proceedings against him in the civil court, but the latter court overruled the plea and after trial found him guilty of homicide and
sentenced him to prison. The sentence was affirmed by this Supreme Court, but on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States,
the sentence was reversed and defendant acquitted, that court holding that "defendant, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide
alleged to have been committed by him by a court-martial of competent jurisdiction proceeding under the authority of the United States,
cannot be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in the Philippines."

There is, for sure, a rule that where an act transgresses both civil and military law and subjects the offender to punishment by both civil
and military authority, a conviction or an acquittal in a civil court cannot be pleaded as a bar to a prosecution in the military court, and
vice versa. But the rule "is strictly limited to the case of a single act which infringes both the civil and the military law in such a manner
as to constitute two distinct offenses, one of which is within the cognizance of the military courts and the other a subject of civil
jurisdiction" (15 Am. Jur., 72), and it does not apply where both courts derive their powers from the same sovereignty. (22 C. J. S., 449.)
It therefore, has no application to the present case where the military court that convicted the petitioner and the civil court which
proposes to try him again derive their powers from one sovereignty and it is not disputed that the charges of treason tried in the court-
martial were punishable under the Articles of War, it being as a matter of fact impliedly admitted by the Solicitor General that the two
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the offense charged. 43

As noted earlier, Marcos, relying on Winthrop’s Military Law, pronounced that courts-martial are still courts in constitutional
contemplation. 44 At the same time, the Court in Marcos pursued the logic of this thinking insofar as double jeopardy was concerned:

Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and not an administrative case, and
therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another prosecution of the defendant for the same offense, because the latter
would place the accused in double jeopardy, is shown by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grafton
vs. United States, 206 U. S. 333; 51 Law. Ed., 1088, 1092, in which the following was held:

"If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be accorded the finality and conclusiveness as
to the issues involved which attend the judgments of a civil court in a case of which it may legally take cognizance; . . . and restricting
our decision to the above question of double jeopardy, we adjudge that, consistently with the above act of 1902, and for the reasons
stated, the plaintiff in error, a soldier in the Army, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide, alleged to have been committed by
him in the Philippines, by a military court of competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the authority of the United States, could not be
subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that territory."

I am aware that following the Court’s 1993 ruling in People v. Pineda, 45 double jeopardy will not attach unless either the RTC or the
court-martial passes sentence on the petitioners. Yet even applying the Pineda doctrine, it is inevitable that, once either tribunal renders
judgment on the merits, double jeopardy would bar the further prosecution by the court which was last in time to pronounce sentence,
regardless whether petitioners were convicted or acquitted. If both the RTC trial for coup d’etat and the court-martial of the petitioners
are allowed to proceed unhampered, the strong likelihood arises that either one will be eventually mooted, no matter the stage, should
the other pronounce sentence.

I submit that RA 7055 precisely sought to avoid such a scenario by prescribing, as a general rule, an exclusively civilian trial for military
personnel charged with offenses punishable under our penal laws, even if they are also punishable under the Articles of War. The only
general exception lies if the civilian court determines that the acts constituting the court-martial offenses are service-connected, as
defined under those Articles of War referred to in Section 1, in which case jurisdiction falls exclusively with the court-martial. If the
civilian court arrives at a contrary determination, the civilian court retains jurisdiction to the exclusion of the court-martial unless and
until such determination is reconsidered or set aside, or unless the criminal case is dismissed or dropped for reasons other than
acquittal on the merits. The only exception I am willing to concede is if the charge before the court-martial falls under Article 96, which I
will discuss further.

Notion of Absorption of Crimes

Irrelevant to Determination under RA 7055


I would like to dwell briefly on the suggestion that the RTC erred in pronouncing that the acts for which petitioners were charged before
the court-martial were "absorbed" in the crime of coup d’etat. Justice Callejo, Sr., in his Concurring Opinion, cites Baylosis v.
Chavez, 46 and the rule that the doctrines laid down on the absorption of common crimes by political crimes do not apply to crimes
which are sui generis offenses.

This aspect is no longer material to my own disposition of the petition, yet I think it is misplaced to apply the doctrine of absorption of
crimes to the determination of service-connected offenses made by the civilian court pursuant to Section 1 of RA 7055. The function of
such determination by the trial court under RA 7055 is wholly different from that utilized by the trial court in ascertaining whether crime
A is absorbed by crime B in the classic criminal law context. The latter is material to the trial court in reaching conclusions as to which
crimes may be considered against the accused and which penalties may apply as to them. However, the purpose of the determination
under RA 7055 is merely for establishing whether the acts for which the accused stand charged before the courts-martial are indeed
service-connected offenses cognizable exclusively before the military courts, or non-service connected offenses cognizable exclusively
before the civilian courts. The determining factor is whether the act is "service-connected," not whether one act is absorbed into the
other.

The RTC may have been too loose in language when it utilized the word "absorbed," yet the word should not be appreciated in the
context of absorption of crimes, as such consideration is wholly irrelevant for purposes of Section 1. Instead, I think that the pertinent
conclusion of the RTC in its Order was that the acts charged before the court-martial were not service-connected, as they were
committed in furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat. This, and not the notion of absorption of crimes, should be the foundational basis
for any attack of the RTC Order.

The Special Circumstance Surrounding Article of War 96

It is my general conclusion that if the civilian court makes a determination that the acts for which the accused stands charged of, for
violating those Articles of War referred to in Section 1 of RA 7055, are not service-connected, then such determination, once final,
deprives the court-martial jurisdiction to try the offense. However, I submit that Article of War 96 warrants special consideration, as it
differs in character from the other Articles of War referred to in Section 1 of RA 7055.

Article 96 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, reads:

Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman. — Any officer, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is
convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service.

Justice Callejo, Sr. points out in his Concurring Opinion that "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman is a uniquely military
offense," 47 and that "[t]he article proscribing conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman has been held to be wholly independent
of other definitions of offenses xxx [and] is not subject to preemption by other punitive articles." 48 It is difficult to dispute these
conclusions, which derive from American military case law. After all, "conduct unbecoming" pertains to the unique exigencies of military
life and discipline, whereby an officer is expected to conform to an idiosyncratic etiquette not required of civilians.

Yet more pertinent to my position is the penalty prescribed by Article 96 for "conduct unbecoming." The penalty is dismissal from
service, a penalty which is administrative in character, and beyond the jurisdiction of the civilian court to impose. Notably, of all the
Articles of War referred to in Section 1 of RA 7055, it is only Article 96 that provides for dismissal from service as the exclusive penalty.
All the other articles so mentioned allow for the penalty of death, imprisonment, or a punishment "as a court-martial may so direct"
which could very well constitute any deprivation of life or liberty. While these other articles prescribes a penalty which is penal in nature,
it is only Article 96 which provides for a penalty which is administrative in character.

As a result, I am prepared to conclude that courts-martial retain the jurisdiction to try violations of Article 96 of Commonwealth Act No.
408, or conduct unbecoming of an officer, even if the RTC determines that the acts constituting such violation are service-connected.
The intent of RA 7055 is to restore to civilian courts jurisdiction over offenses which are properly cognizable by them to the exclusion of
courts-martial. Such intent could obviously not extend to those offenses which the civilian courts do not have jurisdiction to try and
punish. Civilian courts are utterly incapable of penalizing military officers with the penalty of discharge from the service, since the
penalty is administrative in character 49 and imposable only by the military chain of command.

Petition Should Have Been Granted If Petitioners

Were Charged Under A Different Article of War

Still, if petitioners were facing the charge of mutiny under Article 63 of the Articles of War, or any other Article of War for that matter, in
connection with the Oakwood incident, the petition would have been fully meritorious. The RTC has made a determination that all acts
related to the Oakwood incident are not service-connected offenses. I am not fully prepared to subscribe to the position that the acts
relating to Oakwood were "absorbed" in the offense of coup d’etat. However, I do concede two important points. First, the RTC did
determine that the acts relating to Oakwood were not service-connected. Second, the determination of the RTC, as embodied in the 11
February 2004 Order, remains binding as the said Order has not been appealed. It has not been modified or set aside, even by the
present decision or by the ruling in Navales.

The majority is clearly in a quandary, all too willing to pronounce that the Order is wrong, or even a nullity, yet unable to directly nullify
the same. Respondents argue that the Order is already final and beyond challenge, and that contention should not be dismissed
offhand. The suggestion has been raised that the principle of res judicata should not be made to apply in this case, since the AFP was
not a party to the criminal case. This claim is off-tangent, assuming as it does that the AFP somehow has a distinct and segregate legal
personality from the government of the Philippines. The AFP is part of the government. It is indeed headed by the same person who
heads the executive branch of government. The AFP likewise answers to officers of the executive branch, such as the Secretary of
Defense. Certainly, the rendition of the Order would have presumably caused the same level and degree of grief on the AFP as it would
have on the Department of Justice.

But was the government truly offended by the RTC Order? If it were, it should have timely elevated the same for appellate review. The
fact that it did not gives further indication that the government recognized that Order as fundamentally correct, especially considering
that it contains the very same conclusions reached by the Pre-Trial Investigating Panel constituted by the AFP.
I think in the end, respondents fully understood and applied the correct implications of RA 7055 as it pertained to petitioners. Had
respondents been aligned in thinking with the majority, they would have been emboldened to charge petitioners with violations of other
Articles of War despite the RTC Order and the pendency of the coup d’etatcase. Petitioners could have very well been charged before
the court-martial with violation of Article 63, for mutiny, just as the 290 other participants in the "Oakwood mutiny." Respondents
however did not do so, respecting in fact the assumption of jurisdiction by the civilian court over the crime of coup d’etat. Instead,
respondents limited the court-martial charge against petitioners for violation of Article 96, a punitive article which is nonetheless wholly
administrative in character and in penalty.

The majority unfortunately shows no similar prudence. Instead, it has opted to take the path that leads to most resistance. With the
decision today, there now stands a very real danger tomorrow that persons standing criminal trial before the civil courts, including the
Sandiganbayan, who also happen to be facing charges before the court-martial for violation of Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92, 95 or 97, will
move for the dismissal of all their cases before the civilian courts. Assuming that there is integral relation between the acts now
cognizable under court-martial and the acts for which those defendants face criminal trial, the trial courts will feel but little choice to
dismiss those charge, in light of the present majority ruling. Military justice was once supreme over civilian justice. We should not go
down that way again. Too many ghosts haunt that road.

I vote to dismiss the petition, for the reason discussed above. Insofar as the majority ruling deviates from the views I stated herein, I
respectfully dissent.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 107-115.

2 See id. at 186-206.

3G.R. No. 162318 & 162341, 25 October 2004, 441 SCRA 393. The author of this opinion was a member of the Court that
unanimously decided Navales, which used a similar rationale in dismissing the petitions therein to that now employed by the
majority. Even at present, the author submits that Navales was correctly decided, considering the following declaration made
by the Court therein: " There was no factual and legal basis for the RTC (Branch 148) to rule that violations of Articles 63, 64,
67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup d'etat and, as such, absorbed by the latter crime. It
bears stressing that, after a reinvestigation, the Panel of Prosecutors found no probable cause for coup d'etat against
the petitioners and recommended the dismissal of the case against them. The trial court approved the
recommendation and dismissed the case as against the petitioners. There is, as yet, no evidence on record that the
petitioners committed the violations of Articles 63, 64, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War in furtherance of coup d'etat" Navales
v. Abaya, id., at 417. Nonetheless, the author acknowledges that several passages in Navales are not consistent with the
views expressed in this Opinion which now embodies the author’s present thinking, arrived at after considerable reevaluation
of the legal issues involved.

4 Rollo, pp. 266-267.

5 75 Phil. 875 (1946).

6 See also e.g., S/Sgt. Santiago v. Lt. Col. Alikpala, et al., 134 Phil. 309, 318 (1968).

7
89 Phil. 246 (1951).

8 Id. at 248-249.

9 Claro C. Gloria, Philippine Military Law, p. 18 (1956), citing Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents , 2nd Ed., p. 54.

"As a court of law, it is bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law, and in the absence of a special provision on
the subject in the military code, it observes in general the rules of evidence as adopted in the civil courts. As a court of justice,
it is required, by the terms of its statutory oath, to adjudicate between the Philippines and the accused "without partiality, favor,
or affection," and according, not only to the laws and customs of the service, but to its "conscience, i.e., its sense of substantial
right and justice unaffected by technicalities. In the strictest sense courts-martial are courts of justice."

10Magno v. de Villa, G.R. No. 92606, 26 July 1991, 199 SCRA 663, 673, citing Chief Justice Teehankee in Vargas v. RADM
Kilcline, et al.

11 GR. Nos. L-54558 & L-69882, 22 May 1987, 150 SCRA 144.

12 Id. at 165.

13 80 Phil. 401 (1948).

14 Collins v. McDonald, 258 US 416, 417.

15 NCMR - U.S. v. Moody, 10 M.J. 845.

16 ACMR – U.S. v. Wilson, 27 M.J. 555.

17 In re Wilson, D.C.Va., 33 F.2d 214.


18 U.S. ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, N.Y., 69 S.Ct. 530, 336 U.S. 210, 93 L.Ed. 621.

19
U.S. ex rel. Flannery v. Commanding General, Second Service Command, D.C.N.Y., 69 F.Supp. 661.

20 57 C.J.S. Military Justice § 156. Emphasis supplied.

21 Com. Act No. 408 has been amended by Rep. Act No. 242 (1948) and Rep. Act No. 516 (1950).

22
Emphasis supplied.

23 See Constitution, Art. II, Section 3.

24
Record of the Senate, 9 May 1990, p. 671.

25 395 U.S. 298 (1969).

26See also Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 672 (1973). O’Callahan in turn was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its
1987 ruling in Solorio v. U.S., 483 U.S. 435, which reiterated the previous doctrine that the proper exercise of court-martial
jurisdiction over an offense hinged on one factor: the military status of the accused. Solorio v. U.S., id. at 450-451. Still, it
would be foolhardy to apply any persuasive value to the Solorio ruling to the present petition. The Court in Solorio whole-
heartedly embraced the principle that it was the U.S. Congress that possessed "the authority to regulate the conduct of
persons who are actually members of the armed services", id., at 441. The U.S. Supreme Court also acknowledged that
"Congress has primary responsibility for the delicate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the
military. As [the U.S. Supreme Court] recently reiterated, ‘judicial deference… is at its apogee when legislative action under
the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged.’"
Id., at 447, citing Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986). There was no American statute that prescribed the
"service-connected" standard, even at the time O’Callahan was decided, the latter decision predicated instead on the Fifth and
Six Amendments in the Bill of Rights. In the Philippine setting, "service-connected" is a standard duly legislated and enacted
by Congress under Rep. Act No. 7055. My views in this Opinion are thus conformable even to the Solorio decision.

27
Section 1, Rep. Act No. 7055. Emphasis supplied.

28 Concurring Opinion, J. Carpio, infra.

29
See Article 95, Com. Act No. 408, as amended.

30 Id.

31"The words ‘a design, a determination, to kill, distinctly formed in the mind’ in an instruction, imply deliberation. ‘xxx The word
‘determination in this instruction is not used in any technical sense; in fact, it has no technical sense in which it means less
than it does in popular signification. Webster defines it to be a ‘decision of a question in the mind; firm resolution; settled
purpose.’ Can it be said that a question can be decided, a wavering resolution made firm, or a hesitating purpose settled
without deliberation?" 12 Words and Phrases (1954 ed.), p. 478-479; citing State v. Ah Mook, 12 Nev. 369, 390.

32
1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (8th ed., 1914), p. 858.

33 G.R. No. L-59603, 29 April 1987, 149 SCRA 305.

34Id. at 316. Justice Vicente Mendoza’s declaration in Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 893 (1996), is worth
mentioning. "Indeed, I cannot understand why, after ruling that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a
judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies, this Court should be willing to leave the valuation of that
priceless commodity — expression, whether by means of motion picture or television — to administrative agencies with only
occasional review by the courts. The trend may be toward greater delegation of judicial authority to administrative agencies in
matters requiring technical knowledge and as a means of relieving courts of cases which such agencies can very well attend
to. There is no justification, however, for such delegation in the area of our essential freedoms, particularly freedom of
expression, where "only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding [can] ensure the necessary sensitivity to freedom
of expression." Id. at 962, J. Mendoza, Separate Opinion.

35 This proviso was enacted as an amendment to Com. Act No. 408 by Rep. Act No. 242 in 1948.

36 A Manual for Courts-Martial: Armed Forces of the Philippines, p. 181.

37 See note 27.

38 Record of the Senate, 21 May 1990, p. 840.

39
3 Phil. 58 (1903).

40 Id. at 66.

41 3 Phil.244 (1904).

42
94 Phil. 477 (1954).
43 Id. at 479-480.

44
Supra note 9.

45 G.R. No. 44205, 16 February 1993, 219 SCRA 1.

46 G.R. 95136, 3 October 1991, 202 SCRA 405.

47 Concurring Opinion of Justice Callejo, Sr., infra; citing U.S. v. Weldon, 7 M.J. 938 (1979).

48 Id. citing U.S. v. Taylor, 23 M.J. 341 (1987).

49 "The provisions of both the Civil Code and the Rules of Court regarding the relationship between the criminal and civil
liabilities of an accused do not contemplate administrative actions against government officers and employees. While there
may be specific statutes making criminal guilt indispensable to the dismissal or any other form of administrative punishment for
certain public employees, and there have been instances when the court itself did order reinstatement as a consequence of
absolute acquittal, as a rule xxx the administrative determination as to an employee’s dismissal or punishment in any other
way is not predicated in any respect on the result of corresponding criminal proceedings." Rice and Corn Administration v.
Silao, G.R. No. L-25294, 21 August 1980, 99 SCRA 200, 207-208. "[T]he criminal action is separate and distinct from the
administrative case. And, if only for that reason, so is administrative liability separate and distinct from penal liability. Hence,
probation only affects the criminal aspect of the case, not its administrative dimension." Samalio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
140079, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 462, 475.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 173150 July 28, 2010

LYDIA C. GELIG, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

An examination of the entire records of a case may be explored for the purpose of arriving at a correct conclusion, as an appeal in
criminal cases throws the whole case open for review, it being the duty of the court to correct such error as may be found in the
judgment appealed from.1

Petitioner Lydia Gelig (Lydia) impugns the Decision 2 promulgated on January 10, 2006 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
27488 that vacated and set aside the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, Branch 23, in Criminal Case No. CU-
10314. The RTC Decision convicted Lydia for committing the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion but the CA
found her guilty only of the crime of slight physical injuries.

Factual Antecedents

On June 6, 1982, an Information4 was filed charging Lydia with Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion committed as follows:

That on the 17th day of July, 1981 at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, at Barangay Nailon, Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously assault, attack, employ force and seriously intimidate one Gemma B. Micarsos a public classroom teacher of Nailon
Elementary School while in the performance of official duties and functions as such which acts consequently caused the unintentional
abortion upon the person of the said Gemma S. Micarsos.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Lydia pleaded not guilty during her arraignment. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Prosecution’s Version

Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public school teachers at the Nailon Elementary School, in Nailon,
Bogo, Cebu. Lydia’s son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the time material to this case.

On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from Roseller that Gemma called him
a "sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a
result of Lydia’s violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her "maxillary area", as shown by a medical certificate 5 issued by a
doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However, Gemma continued to experience abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after
the incident. On August 28, 1981, she was admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have
suffered incomplete abortion. Accordingly, a medical certificate 6 was issued.

The Defense’s Version


Lydia claimed that she approached Gemma only to tell her to refrain from calling her son names, so that his classmates will not follow
suit. However, Gemma proceeded to attack her by holding her hands and kicking her. She was therefore forced to retaliate by pushing
Gemma against the wall.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 11, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional
abortion. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused LYDIA GELIG, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer an Indeterminate Penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR AS
MINIMUM TO FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL AS MAXIMUM. She is likewise ordered to pay
the offended party the amount of Ten Thousand (₱10,000.00) Pesos as actual damages and Fifteen Thousand (₱15,000.00) Pesos for
moral damages.

SO ORDERED.7

Thus, Lydia filed an appeal.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA vacated the trial court’s judgment. It ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for direct assault since Gemma descended from
being a person in authority to a private individual when, instead of pacifying Lydia or informing the principal of the matter, she engaged
in a fight with Lydia.8 Likewise, Lydia’s purpose was not to defy the authorities but to confront Gemma on the alleged name-calling of
her son.9

The appellate court also ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for unintentional abortion since there was no evidence that she was
aware of Gemma’s pregnancy at the time of the incident. 10 However, it declared that Lydia can be held guilty of slight physical injuries,
thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court-Branch 23 of Cebu City, dated October 11,
2002 is hereby VACATED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered CONVICTING the accused-appellant for slight physical injuries
pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of arresto menor minimum of ten (10)
days.

SO ORDERED.11

Issues

Still dissatisfied, Lydia filed this petition raising the following as errors:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner is liable for Slight Physical Injuries pursuant to Article 266
(1) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of arrestomenor minimum of ten days.

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner can be convicted of Slight Physical Injuries under the
information charging her for Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion. 12

Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

When an accused appeals from the judgment of his conviction, he waives his constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy and
throws the entire case open for appellate review. We are then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate in the
exercise of our concomitant authority to review and sift through the whole case to correct any error, even if unassigned. 13

The Information charged Lydia with committing the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion. Direct assault is defined
and penalized under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision reads as follows:

Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of
any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or
resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos,
when the assault is committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands
upon a person in authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a
fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed. 1avvphi1

It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against public order that may be committed in two ways: first, by
any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on occasion of such performance. 14

The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault. Its elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious
resistance.

2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.

3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of official duties,
or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties.

4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties.

4. That there is no public uprising.15

On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance of her official duties, that is, she was busy with
paperwork while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was
assigned. Lydia was already angry when she entered the classroom and accused Gemma of calling her son a "sissy". Lydia refused to
be pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the victim. Gemma then proceeded towards
the principal’s office but Lydia followed and resorted to the use of force by slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The violent
act resulted in Gemma’s fall to the floor.

Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. The pertinent portion of the provision reads as follows:

Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority – Who shall be deemed as such. –

xxxx

In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public
or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on
the occasion of such performance shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 873, approved June
12, 1985).16

Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of direct assault.
The appellate court must be consequently overruled in setting aside the trial court’s verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could not be
held guilty of direct assault since Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the time of the assault because she allegedly
descended to the level of a private person by fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at the moment Lydia initiated her tirades,
Gemma was busy attending to her official functions as a teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk
properly,17 but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal invectives. When Lydia continued with her abusive behavior,
Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a similarly situated person. Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and violently
pushing her against a wall divider while she was going to the principal’s office. No fault could therefore be attributed to Gemma.

The prosecution’s success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of direct assault does not necessarily mean that the same physical
force she employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime of unintentional abortion. There is no evidence on record to prove that the
slapping and pushing of Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause of the abortion. While the medical
certificate of Gemma’s attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was presented to the court to prove that she suffered an
abortion, there is no data in the document to prove that her medical condition was a direct consequence of the July 17, 1981
incident.18 It was therefore vital for the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was competent to establish a link, if any, between
Lydia’s assault and Gemma’s abortion. Without her testimony, there is no way to ascertain the exact effect of the assault on Gemma’s
abortion.

It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital for incomplete abortion on August 28, 1981, which was 42
days after the July 17, 1981 incident. This interval of time is too lengthy to prove that the discharge of the fetus from the womb of
Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault. Her bleeding and abdominal pain two days after the said incident were not substantiated
by proof other than her testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the abortion may have been the result of other factors.

The Proper Penalty

Having established the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of direct assault, she must suffer the penalty
imposed by law. The penalty for this crime is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding
₱1,000.00, when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority.19 Here, Lydia
is a public officer or employee since she is a teacher in a public school. By slapping and pushing Gemma, another teacher, she laid her
hands on a person in authority. 1avv phi1

The penalty should be fixed in its medium period in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. 20Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law,21 the petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate term, the minimum of which is within the range of
the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, and the
maximum of which is that properly imposable under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.

Thus, the proper and precise prison sentence that should be imposed must be within the indeterminate term of four (4) months and one
(1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months of arresto mayor, maximum to prision correccional minimum to three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods. A fine of not more than ₱1,000.00 must also be imposed on Lydia in accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight
physical injuries is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered finding Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of direct assault and is ordered to suffer an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to three (3) years, six
(6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional. She is also ordered to pay a fine of ₱1,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 People v. Pajarillo, 183 Phil. 392, 399 (1979).

2CA rollo, pp. 86-94; penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale and concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente L. Yap
and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.

3 Records, pp. 157- 161; penned by Judge Generosa G. Labra.

4 Id. at 40.

5
Exhibit "A," Folder of Exhibits.

6 Exhibit "B," id.

7 Records, p. 161.

8 CA rollo, p. 92.

9 Id. at 91.

10 Id. at 93.

11 Id. at 94.

12 Rollo, p. 8.

13
People v. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123, 143 (1999).

14
Rivera v. People, 501 Phil. 37, 44-45 (2005).

15 Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, Fifteenth Edition, Revised 2001, p. 122.

16 Id. at 147.

17 TSN, March 20, 1991, p. 6.

18 Exhibit "C," Folder of Exhibits.

19 Revised Penal Code, Article 148.

20 See Revised Penal Code, Article 64 (1).


21Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum of which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended
by Act No. 4225)

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
RODRIGO DASIG @ KA RUBIN DAKU @ ARMAND; EDWIN NUÑEZ Y TABANAS @ MABI; ALVIN DOE @ AL @ KA ALVIN; ROGER
DOE @ KA JAMES @ KA PEPE; TUDING ANDRINO @ KA ERMI @ KA ROEL @ KA GRINGO MONTAYRE; RUBEN DOE @ KA
RUBEN @ KA JOJI @ INO ECHAVEZ; ANASTACIO BANGKAL @ KA JUNIOR; AND CARLITO MAGASIN @ BOBBY, accused,
RODRIGO DASIG, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Kinaadman and Archival for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONFESSION, AS A RULE, ADMISSIBLE; EXCEPTION; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. —
The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a
result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency. Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial
confession was legally defective and hence, should not have been admitted and considered by the trial judge. This accusation is
whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now questions the integrity
of the police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood by him during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a
matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is likewise
a matter of record that before appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the services of
Atty. Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of force and intimidation has not been substantiated by
evidence other than his self-serving testimony. as has been pointed out, such allegation is another naive effort of appellant to back
track from his prior voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial confession was done with regularity and
legality.

2. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ABSORBS THE CRIME OF DIRECT ASSAULT WHEN DONE IN FURTHERANCE THEREOF. —
The crime of rebellion consists of may acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in
furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police
officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in
furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.

3. ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (R.A. 4203). — The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable
to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or
heads a rebellion.

DECISION

NOCON, J p:

Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversal of his conviction by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Mandaue City
finding him guilty of Murder with Direct Assault.

He was charged together with Edwin Nuñez and 6 others who are still at large, in an information which reads:

"That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city of Mandaue, of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, conspiring
and confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and
use of motor vehicle, all armed with unlicensed firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
one Redempto Manatad, a police officer on traffic duty, at his vital portion which caused his death soon thereafter, knowing beforehand
that the victim was a policeman who was then in the performance of his official duties."

Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nuñes entered a plea of "not guilty." However, after the prosecution had presented its first
witness, accused Nuñes changed his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a
judgment against said accused until the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing, Nuñez died on
March 10, 1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.
The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon of August 4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and Pfc. Rene
Catamora were tasked by their commanding officer to assist in canning the traffic at M.N. Briones and Bonifacio Streets in Mandaue
City. Pfc. Tizon controlled the traffic lighting facility; Pfc. Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamora acted as back-up and posted
himself at Norkis Trading building.

At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuñez, acting
suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed the two, but sensing
that they were being followed, they immediately proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc. Catamora to a gun battle. At that
instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a series of shots from the other group and thereafter saw Pfc. Manatad sprawled on the ground. Being
out-numbered and to save his own life, Pat. Catamora sought refuge at the nearby BIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons take
Pfc. Manatad's gun and again fired at him to make sure that he is dead while the rest of the group including Nuñes acted as back up.
Thereafter, the Nuñes group commandeered a vehicle and fled from the scene of the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora testified that he
can identify accused-appellant Nuñes because of a mole at the bridge of his nose near the left eye which he noticed when the accused
passed 2 or 3 meters in front of him together with his companions.

On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the
sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nuñes trying to
escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nuñes and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions,
while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left upper arm and
subsequently apprehended. A .38 caliber revolver with 17 live ammunitions were confiscated from him.

Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment, while Nuñes was turned over to the Metrodiscom for investigation.
Meanwhile, Dasig was interrogated by M/Sgt. Ariston Ira of the PC Criminal Investigation Service on August 19, 1987 at his hospital
bed at the Lapulapu Army Hospital in Cebu City. Assisting Dasig during the interrogation was Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law
Office, who was requested by the military to represent appellant who did not have a lawyer. Before the start of the interrogation, Atty.
Parawan asked appellant whether he was willing to avail of his services, to which appellant agreed. M/Sgt. Ira then appraised Dasig of
his constitutional rights. The interrogation was conducted in Cebuano upon appellant's request.

Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nuñes killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nuñes were members of
the sparrow unit and the their aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi," respectively. The extra-judicial confession of appellant marked as
Exhibit "J" 2 was signed by him on every page thereof with the first page containing a certification likewise signed by him, which states:
"I hereby certify that the herein statement is free and voluntary, and that I am assisted by my counsel in the course of this investigation"
followed by the signed conformity of Atty. Parawan. The extra-judicial confession was subscribed and sworn to before Cebu City Asst.
Fiscal Salvador Solima.

In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the procedure by which his extra-judicial confession was taken was legally defective, and
contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further contends that assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be
convicted at most of simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.

Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done while he was still very sick and consequently, he could not have fully
appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a serious offense. That even with the presence of counsel, his extra-judicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence as said counsel did not actively assist him and advise him of his rights. In effect, his presence was merely to
give a semblance of legality to the proceedings and not to protect appellant against possible abuses of the investigator. Dasig, likewise
questions the sincerity of Atty. Parawan in protecting his rights considering that the latter is a known anti-Communist advocate and that
the law firm to which he belongs has represented high ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador Solima in his certification, Exhibit "J-7-B," stated that he had personally examined the
affiant and that he is convinced that the latter's statement was free and voluntary and that the affiant signed the same in his presence
and swore under oath as to the veracity of everything therein. Atty. Fortunato L. Parawan also testified that he assisted the affiant from
the start of the investigation up to its termination. Atty. Parawan testified thus:

"Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?

A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the whereabout of Rodrigo Dasig and I introduced myself as a lawyer. So they informed
me the room of Rodrigo Dasig. At that time I introduced myself as a lawyer who came to assist the person of Rodrigo Dasig. Once we
had a confrontation with Rodrigo Dasig, I asked him whether he was willing to get me as his lawyer in that investigation. Then he told
me yes.

Q Did he tell you whether he as a counsel of his own choice?

A No.

xxx xxx xxx

Q In other words he accepted your services as counsel in connection with that investigation which was about to be made?

A Yes.

Q Who are the persons present at that time?

A There were guards outside and inside. There was a man from the CIS in the person of Sgt. Ira, myself and Dasig.

Q What happened after that?

A The CIS started the investigation.


Q You mean this Ariston Ira?

A Yes.

Q Before Ariston Ira conducted the investigation was Dasig informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and if he
chooses to testify or say something, that statement of his will be used against or in his favor in the court of justice?

A Yes. He was willing to get me as counsel in that investigation.

Q After he was informed of his constitutional rights what transpired next?

A The investigation started.

Q Were you present at the very start of that investigation?

A Yes. I was present from the start until it was finished.

Q Was that reduced to writing?

A Yes.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said you were present during the entire investigation. Were the answers of the accused, Rodrigo Dasig, to the questions
propounded by the investigator voluntary?

A Yes, they voluntary.

Q After the investigation was finished what transpired next?

A After the investigation, I think that was already past 3:00 or 4:00, we proceeded to the office of the City Fiscal at F. Ramos St., Cebu
City and then we proceeded to the Office of Fiscal Solema (sic) and then it was subscribed there before Fiscal Solema (sic).

Q Were you present during the proceeding?

A I was also present."

We do not find any reason to doubt the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court that the extra-judicial confession of the
appellant was voluntarily made. Said the trial court:

"The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that herein accused during his investigation was properly informed and appraised of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice but since at that
time he did not signify his intention to retain a lawyer of his own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the person of Atty.
Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office who was available at that time, to assist him during the custodial investigation conducted by
T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at his hospital bed at Camp Lapulapu Army Station Hospital, Cebu City where he was confined after being hit on
his upper left arm and in fact, Atty. Parawan only consented to assist herein accused after the latter has answered in the affirmative to
his question as to whether he would be amenable to be assisted by him as his counsel of his own choice.

"The prosecution's evidence further show that Atty. Fortunato Parawan after consenting to be his counsel was with him when his extra-
judicial confession or sworn statement was subscribed and sworn to by him before Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu
City Fiscal's Office who, before accused has actually affixed his signature on each and every pages of his extra-judicial confession, has
informed him (accused) of his constitutional rights and has explained the contents of his extra-judicial confession.

"Moreover, per certification made by Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, clearly shows that
accused in executing the same has done so voluntarily and after having understood the contents thereof which is in the visayan
language, a language known to him, found on the last page thereof now marked as Exhibit "J-7-B."

"Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused Dasig is collaborated by the sworn statement of his co-accused Edwin Nuñes dated
August 18, 1987 which is sworn and subscribed to before City Fiscal Jopelinito Pareja of the city Fiscal's Office of Cebu City."

The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a
result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency. 5 The case of People of the Philippines v. Parojinog is four
square to the case at bar. In Parojinog this court had this to say:

"Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section 12 (1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

'Sec. 12(1). — Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel
he must provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.'

"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person under investigation for the commission of an offense may choose his own
counsel but if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. While the initial choice of the lawyer in the latter
case is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him
and ask for another one. In the instant case, the records show that no objection was voiced by the accused throughout the entire
proceedings of the investigation and afterwards when he subscribed to its veracity before City Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he
apparently acquiesced to the choice of the investigators. He complained for the first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice only
during trial. Thus it was too late."

Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial confession was legally defective and hence, should not have been
admitted and considered by the trial judge. This accusation is whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In an
attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now questions the integrity of the police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood by
him during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan
who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter of record that before appellant made his extra-judicial
confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively. Finally,
the alleged use of fore and intimidation has not been substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. As has been
pointed out, such allegation is another naive effort of appellant to back track from his prior voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the
taking of his extra-judicial confession was done with regularity and legality.

Nevertheless, there is merit in appellant's argument that granting he is guilty, what he committed was a political crime of simple
rebellion, and hence he should not be convicted of murder with direct assault.

The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on this point as manifested in the People's brief, which We quote:

"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court erroneously convicted him of Murder with Assault Upon a Person in
Authority, instead of Rebellion.

"Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government, among other means. (Article 135, Revised Penal Code). In this
case, appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership with the sparrow unit but also his participation and that of his group in
the killing of Pfc. Manatad while manning the traffic in Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of judicial notice that the
sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is
therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends
of the NPA. Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon a person in authority."

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in
furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. 9 The act of killing a police
officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in
furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.

Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan 10 We held that where the accused who was charged with murder admitted his
membership with the NPA and the killing of a suspected PC informer, the crime committed is not murder but rebellion punishable under
Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A.
4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor
and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in the case at bar, there is
no evidence to prove that appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of fact he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc.
Catamora as the person giving instructions to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.

Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command of an unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the
heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.

Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial court that the extra-judicial confession was legally obtained. However,
appellant being a confessed member of the sparrow unit, the liquidation squad of the New People's Army whose objective is to
overthrow the duly constituted government, the crime committed is simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.

WHEREFORE, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla and Regalado, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, p. 5.

2. Pp. 11-18, Records.

3. TSN, pp. 5-8, March 8, 1990.

4. Decision, p. 12-13.

5. People v. Parojinog, G.R. No. 95850, 203 SCRA 673.

6. Id. at p. 680.

7. People v. Quijano, G.R. No. 84361, 197 SCRA 761.


8. Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief, p. 12; Rollo, p. 99.

9. Enrile v. Amin, G.R. No. 93335, 189 SCRA 573.

10. 160 SCRA 116.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 88189 July 9, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
TIBURCIO ABALOS, accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:p

In this appeal, accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos seeks absolution from the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of
Catbalogan, Samar which pronounced him guilty of the complex crime of direct assault with murder in Criminal Case No. 2302. His arguments in the present
appeal turn on the central question of unwarranted credence allegedly extended by the trial court to the version of the criminal incident narrated by the sole
prosecution witness. The totality of the evidence adduced, however, indubitably confirms appellant's guilt of the offense charged. Accordingly, we affirm.

An information filed in the trial court, dated April 21, 1983, imputed the crime of direct assault with murder to herein appellant Tiburcio
Abalos, alias "Ewet," with the allegations —

That on or about the 20th day of March, 1983, at nighttime, in the Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and knowing fully well that one Sofronio Labine was an agent of a
person in authority being a member of the Integrated National Police with station at Catbalogan, Samar, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike said Sofronio Labine with a piece of wood, which
said accused ha(d) conveniently provided himself for the purpose while said P/Pfc. Sofronio Labine, a duly appointed
and qualified member of the said INP, was engaged in the performance of his official duties or on the occasion of
such performance, that is, maintaining peace and order during the barangay fiesta of Canlapwas, of said municipality,
thereby inflicting upon him "Lacerated wound 2 inches parietal area right. Blood oozing from both ears and nose"
which wound directly caused his death.

That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity was present. 1

At his arraignment on June 7, 1983, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. The trial conducted2

thereafter culminated in the decision of the trial court on February 3, 1989 finding appellant guilty as charged and meting out to him the
3

penalty of "life imprisonment, with the accessories of the law." Appellant was likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
sum of P30,000.00; actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P2,633.00, with P15,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the
costs. 4

As recounted by prosecution witness Felipe Basal, a farmer residing in Barangay Pupua, Catbalogan, Samar, appellant assaulted the
victim, Pfc. Sofronio Labine, at around 8:00 P.M. of March 20, 1983, which was then the day of the barangay fiesta celebrations in
Barangay Canlapwas, Catbalogan, Samar. The incident transpired near the house of appellant at the said barangay. Felipe Basal was
then having a drinking session in front of the shanty of one Rodulfo Figueroa, Jr. which was situated just a few meters from the
residence of appellant.

According to Basal, at about that time he noticed the father of appellant, Police Major Cecilio Abalos, scolding his employees in his
transportation business for turning in only two hundred pesos in earnings for that day. While Major Abalos was thus berating his
employees, appellant arrived and asked his father not to scold them and to just let them take part in the barangay festivities. This
infuriated the elder Abalos and set off a heated argument between father and son. 5

While the two were thus quarreling, a woman shouted "Justicia, boligue kumi! Adi in mag-a-aringasa." meaning, "Police officer, help us!
Somebody's making trouble here." The victim, Pfc. Sofronio Labine, then appeared on the scene and asked Major Abalos, "What is it,
sir?" The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face him. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine, appellant
hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood, about two inches thick, three inches wide and three feet long, from a nearby Ford Fiera
vehicle.

He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind, hitting the policeman at the back of
the right side of his head. Labine collapsed unconscious in a heap, and he later expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained from
that blow. Felipe Basal and his wife took flight right after appellant struck the victim, fearful that they might be hit by possible stray
bullets should a gunfight ensue.
6

Appellant's testimony, on the other hand, is of a different tenor. He admits having struck Labine with a piece of wood during the incident
in question but claims that he did so in the erroneous belief that his father was being attacked by a member of the New People's Army
(NPA). According to appellant, he was then seated inside their family-owned Sarao jeepney parked beside the store of Rodulfo
Figueroa, Jr. near their home in Barangay Canlapwas when he noticed a man in fatigue uniform suddenly accost his father. At that
time, appellant's father had just arrived from a trip from Wright, Samar and had just alighted from his service vehicle, a Ford Fiera.

The man tried to disarm Major Abalos of his firearm but the latter resisted and while the two were grappling for possession of the gun,
appellant instinctively went to the rescue of his father. He got a piece of wood from Figueroa's store with which he then clubbed Labine
whom he did not recognize at that point. When Labine fell to the ground from the blow, appellant immediately fled to Barangay
Mercedes nearby, fearing that the man had companions who might retaliate. When he came to know of the identity of his victim the
following morning, he forthwith surrendered to the authorities. 7

As mentioned at the outset, the foregoing version of the factual antecedents as presented by appellant was roundly rejected by the
lower court which found the same unworthy of belief. Appellant ascribes reversible errors to the trial court (a) in not giving credence to
the evidence adduced by the defense; (b) in believing the evidence presented by the prosecution; (c) in relying on the prosecution's
evidence which falls short of the required quantum of evidence that would warrant a conviction; (d) in finding that treachery attended the
commission of the crime and failing to credit in appellant's favor his voluntary surrender; and (e) in finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. 8

In the main, appellant insists that the trial court should not have given credence to the story of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution.
He also contends that since the testimony of that witness bore clear traces of incredibility, particularly the fact that he could not have
had a clear view of the incident due to poor visibility, the prosecution should have presented as well the woman who had called for help
at the height of the incident if only to corroborate Basal's narration of the events. Appellant also assails as inherently incredible the fact
that it took quite a time for witness Felipe Basal to come forward and divulge what he knew to the authorities. All these, unfortunately,
are flawed arguments.

From the evidence in the case at bar, the prosecution has convincingly proved, through the clear and positive testimony of Basal, the
manner in which the victim was killed by herein appellant. The record is bereft of any showing that said prosecution witness was
actuated by any evil motivation or dubious intent in testifying against appellant. Moreover, a doctrine of long standing in this jurisdiction
is that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused. There was thus no need, as
9

appellant would want the prosecution to do, to present in court the woman who shouted for assistance since her testimony would only
be corroborative in nature.

The presentation of such species of evidence in court would only be warranted when there are compelling reasons to suspect that the
eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations were inaccurate. Besides, it is up to the People to determine who should be
10

presented as prosecution witness on the basis of its own assessment of the necessity for such testimony. Also, no unreasonable
11

delay could even be attributed to Felipe Basal considering that during the wake for Pfc. Labine, Basal came and intimated to the widow
of the victim that he was going to testify regarding her husband's slaying. 12

Appellant's contention that the deceased had attacked and attempted to divest his father of his firearm is rather preposterous
considering that no reason was advanced as to why the deceased patrolman would assault a police officer of superior rank.
Parenthetically, the condition of visibility at the time of the incident was conducive not only to the clear and positive identification of
appellant as the victim's assailant but likewise to an actual and unobstructed view of the events that led to the victim's violent death.

Basal was seated just a few meters away from the protagonists whom he all knew, he being also a long-time resident of that
municipality. There was a twelve-foot high fluorescent lamppost located along the road and which, by appellant's own reckoning, was
just seventeen meters away from them. Notwithstanding the fact that a couple of trees partly obstructed the post, the illumination cast
13

by the fluorescent lamp and the nearby houses provided sufficient brightness for the identification of the combatants.

Curiously enough, appellant's assertion that there was poor visibility is ironically contradicted by his testimony which is detailed on facts
that one could readily recall after witnessing an event in broad daylight. While appellant considers unbelievable Basal's identification of
him supposedly because of inadequate lighting, he himself, under the same conditions, could clearly see his father's assailant wearing
a fatigue uniform which was different from that worn by policemen. He even asserts that he saw his father clutching the carbine with his
hands holding the butt while his purported assailant held on tightly to the rifle. What these facts establish is that the lights in the area
14

at the time of the incident were enough to afford Basal an excellent view of the incident, contrary to appellant's pretense. Appellant's
testimony is thus negated by the rule that evidence, to be believed, must have been given not only by a credible witness, but that the
same must also be reasonably acceptable in itself.

Appellant's flight right after he had assaulted the victim is also corrosive of his testimony. For, if it were true that he had merely labored
under the wrong notion that his father was being attacked by a member of the NPA, and that it was an innocent case of error in
personae, he could have readily surrendered to his father right then and there. After all, Cecilio Abalos was a police major and was the
Station Commander of the Integrated National Police (INP) in Wright, Samar. Further, there was no necessity at all for him to flee from
the crime scene for fear of retaliation considering that he was in the company of his own father who, aside from his position, was then
armed with a carbine. Appellant's explanation is, therefore, absurd and should be considered as self-serving evidence with no weight in
law.

On the offense committed by appellant, the trial court correctly concluded that he should be held accountable for the complex crime of
direct assault with murder. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under Article 148 of the
Revised Penal Code. The first is not a true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, except that there is no public uprising.
On the other hand, the second mode is the more common way of committing assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon
employed in the attack, or the offender is a public officer, or the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. 15

Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious
intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the assault was made when the said person was performing his
duties or on the occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that
the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority.16

Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an agent of a person in authority
pursuant to Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. There is also no dispute that he was in the actual performance of his
duties when assaulted by appellant, that is, he was maintaining peace and order during the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas. Appellant
himself testified that he personally knew Labine to be a policeman 7 and, in fact, Labine was then wearing his uniform. These facts
1
should have sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him, and his defiant conduct clearly demonstrates that he really h ad the
criminal intent to assault and injure an agent of the law.

When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arises the complex crime of direct
assault with murder or homicide. The killing in the instant case constituted the felony of murder qualified by alevosia through
18

treacherous means deliberately adopted Pfc. Labine was struck from behind while he was being confronted at the same time by
appellant's father. The evidence shows that appellant deliberately went behind the victim whom he then hit with a piece of wood which
he deliberately got for that purpose.

Obviously, appellant resorted to such means to avoid any risk to himself, knowing fully well that his quarry was a policeman who could
readily mount a defense. The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and nocturnity, however, were not duly proven, as
correctly ruled by the court below. On the other hand, appellant's voluntary surrender even if duly taken into account by the trial court
would have been inconsequential.

The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. Considering
that the more serious crime of murder then carried the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, the imposable
penalty should have been death. The mitigating circumstance, in that context, would have been unavailing and inapplicable since the
penalty thus imposed by the law is indivisible. At all events, the punishment of death could not be imposed as it would have to be
19

reduced to reclusion perpetua due to the then existing proscription against the imposition of the death penalty. 20

However, the designation by the trial court of the imposable penalty as "life imprisonment" is erroneous, as the same should properly be
denominated as reclusion perpetua. Also, the death indemnity payable to the heirs of the victim, under the present jurisprudential
21

policy, is P50,000.00.

ACCORDINGLY, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos should be reclusion
perpetua, and that the death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00, the judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 2302 is
AFFIRMED in all other respects, with costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, 1-2.

2 Ibid., 4.

3 Per Judge Sinforiano A. Monsanto.

4 Rollo, 9.

5 TSN, November 6, 1984, 16-23.

6 Ibid., id., 23-29.

7 Ibid., November 14, 1988, 32-36.

8 Brief for the Accused-Appellant, 1; Rollo, 13.

9 People vs. Bondoc, G.R. No. 98400, May 23, 1994, 232 SCRA 478 People vs. Paglinawan, G.R. No. 107804, June 28,
1994, 233 SCRA 494.

10 People vs. Comia, G.R. No. 109761, September 1, 1994, 236 SCRA 185.

11 People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 108180, February 8, 1994, 229 SCRA 754.

12 TSN, April 8, 1985, 18.

13 Ibid., November 14, 1988, 41.

14 Ibid., id., 45-47.

15 Aquino, R.C., The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II, 1987 ed., 146.

16 U.S. vs. Alvear, et al., 35 Phil. 626 (1916); People vs. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038 (1947); People vs. Villaseñor, L-28574, October
24, 1970, 35 SCRA 460.

17 TSN, November 14, 1988, 45.

18 People vs. Cesar, L-26185, March 13, 1968, 22 SCRA 1024; People vs. Renegado, L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 275;
People vs. Gadiano, L-31818, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 559.
19 Article 48, in relation to Art. 63, Revised Penal Code.

20 Sec. 19(1), Art. III, 1987 Constitution; People vs. Muñoz, et al., L-3896970, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 107.

21 See Administrative Circular 6-92, dated October 8, 1992, re "Correct Application of the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua."

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5803 November 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
NARCISO UMALI, ET AL., defendants.
NARCISO UMALI, EPIFANIO PASUMBAL and ISIDRO CAPINO, defendants-appellants.

Jose P. Laurel, Cipriano Primicias, Alejo Mabanag, Manuel Concordia, P.M. Stuart Del Rosario, Tomas R. Umali, Eufemio E. De Mesa
and Edmundo T. Zepeda for appellants.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Narciso Umali, Epifanio Pasumbal, and Isidro Capino are appealing directly to this Tribunal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon province finding them guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and
robbery, and sentencing each of them to "life imprisonment, other accessories of the law, to indemnify jointly and severally Marcial
Punsalan in the amount of P24,023; Valentin Robles in the amount of P10,000; Yao Cabon in the amount of P700; Claro Robles in the
amount of P12,800; Pocho Guan in the amount of P600; the heirs of Domingo Pisigan in the amount of P6,000; the heirs of Locadio
Untalan in the amount of P6,000; Patrolman Pedro Lacorte in the amount of P500; Lazaro Ortega in the amount of P300; Hilarion Aselo
in the amount of P300; Calixto Rivano in the amount P50; Melecio Garcia in the amount of P60; and Juanito Lector in the amount of
P90, each to pay one fifteenth of the costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency due to the nature of the principal
penalty that is imposed upon them."

The complex crime of which appellants were found guilty was said to have been committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong,
Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. It is not denied that such a raid took place
resulting in the burning down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023;
the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians
Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians; that during and after the
burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stories; and that the raiders were
finally dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.

To understand the reason for and object of the raid we have to go into the political situation in Tiaong not only shortly before that raid
but one year or two years before it. Narciso Umali and Marcial Punzalan were old time friends and belonged to the same political
faction. In the general elections of 1947 Umali campaigned for Punzalan who later was elected Mayor of Tiaong. In the elections of
1949 Punzalan in his turn campaigned and worked for Narciso Umali resulting in the latter's election as Congressman. However, these
friendly relations between the two did not endure. In the words of Punzalan, Narciso Umali who as Congressman regarded himself as
the political head and leader in that region including Tiaong, became jealous because of his (Punzalan's) fast growing popularity among
the people of Tiaong who looked to him instead of Umali for political guidance, leadership, and favors. In time the strain in their relations
became such that they ceased to have any dealings with each other and they even filed mutual accusations. According to Punzalan, in
May 1950, Umali induced about twenty-six special policemen of his (Punzalan's) to flee to the mountains with their arms and join the
Huks, this is in order to discredit Punzalan's administration; that he was later able to contact two of his twenty-six policemen and tried to
persuade them to return to the town and to the service, but they told him that they and their companions would not surrender except
and with through the intervention of Congressman Umali, and so Punzalan had to seek Umali's intervention which resulted in the
surrender of the 26 men with their firearms; that thereafter Umali wanted to have their firearms, claiming that they all belonged to him
from his guerrilla days when he was a colonel, and that after liberation he had merely loaned them to the municipal authorities of Tiaong
to help keep peace and order; and that the refusal of Punzalan to grant Umali's request further strained their relations, and thereafter
Umali would not speak to him even when they happened to meet at parties.

On September 19, 1951, the Chief of Police of Punzalan disarmed four of Umali's men, including his bodyguard Isidro Capino who were
then charged with illegal possession of firearms. Umali interceded for his men and Col. Gelveson, Provincial Commander, sent a
telegram stating that the firearms taken away from the men were licensed. As a result the complaint was dismissed. This incident was
naturally resented by Umali and spurred him to have a showdown with Punzalan.

Then the elections of 1951 (November 13) approached and Punzalan ran for reelection. To oppose him, and to clip his political wings
and definitely blast his ambition for continued power and influence in Tiaong, Umali picked Epifanio Pasumbal, his trusted leader.

The pre-election campaign and fight waged by both factions — Punzalan and Pasumbal, was intense and bitter, even ruthless. The
election was to be a test of political strength and would determine who was who in Tiaong, — Umali or Punzalan. Umali spoke at
political meetings, extolling the virtues of Pasumbal and the benefits and advantages that would accrue to the town if he was elected, at
the same time bitterly attacking Punzalan, accusing him of dishonesty, corruption in office, abuse of power, etc. At one of those
meetings he told the audience not to vote for Punzalan because he would not be elected and that even if he won the election, he would
not sit for blood will flow, and that he (Umali) had already prepared a golden coffin for him (Punzalan). After denying the charges, in
retort, Punzalan would say that Umali as a Congressman was useless, and that he did not even attend the sessions and that his chair
in Congress had gathered dust, even cobwebs.

To help in the Umali-Pasumbal campaign, Amado Mendoza who later was to play the role of star witness for the prosecution, was
drafted. He was a compadre of Pasumbal and had some experience in political campaigns, and although he was not exactly a model
citizen, being sometimes given to drunkenness, still, he had the gift of speech and persuasion. In various political meetings he delivered
speeches for Pasumbal. He was ever at the back and call of Umali and Pasumbal, and naturally he frequented the latter's houses or
headquarters. The result of the elections plainly showed that Punzalan was the political master and leader in Tiaong. He beat Pasumbal
by an overwhelming majority of 2,221 votes. Naturally, Umali and Pasumbal were keenly disappointed, and according to the evidence,
adopted measures calculated to frustrate Punzalan's victory, even as prophesied by Umali himself in one of his pre-election speeches
about blood flowing and gold coffin.

Going back to the raid staged in Tiaong on November 14, 1951, it is well to make a short narration of the happenings shortly before it,
established by the evidence, so as to ascertain and be informed of the reason or purpose of said raid, the persons, behind it, and those
who took part in it. According to the testimony of Amado Mendoza, in the morning of November 12th, that is, on the eve of the election,
at the house of Pasumbal's father, then being used as his electoral headquarters, he heard Umali instruct Pasumbal to contact the
Huks through Commander Abeng so that Punzalan will be killed, Pasumbal complying with the order of his Chief (Umali) went to the
mountains which were quite near the town and held a conference with Commander Abeng. It would seem that Umali and Pasumbal had
a feeling that Punzalan was going to win in the elections the next day, and that his death was the surest way to eliminate him from the
electoral fight.

The conference between Pasumbal and Commander Abeng on November 12th was witnessed and testified to by Nazario Anonuevo, a
Huk who was under Commander Abeng, and who later took an active part in the raid. In the evening of the same day, Mendoza heard
Pasumbal report to Umali about his conference with Commander Abeng, saying that the latter was agreeable to the proposition and
had even outlined the manner of attack, that the Huks would enter the town (Tiaong) under Commander Lucio and Aladin, the latter to
lead the sector towards the East; but that Commander Abeng had suggested that the raid be postponed because Pasumbal may yet
win the election the following day, thereby rendering unnecessary the raid and the killing of Punzalan.

Continuing with the testimony of Amado Mendoza, he told the court that as per instructions of Umali he went to the house of the latter,
in the evening of November 14th, the day following the election, with the result of the election already known, namely, the decisive
victory of Punzalan over Pasumbal. He was told by Umali to come with him, and Pasumbal and the three boarded a jeep with Pasumbal
at the wheel. They drove toward the Tiaong Elementary School and once there he (Mendoza) was left at the school premises with
instructions by Umali to wait for Commander Abeng and the Huks and point to them the house of Punzalan. After waiting for sometime,
Abeng and his troops numbering about fifty, armed with garands and carbines, arrived and after explaining his identity and his mission
to Abeng, he had led the dissidents or part of the contingent in the direction of Punzalan's house and on arriving in front of the bodega
of Robles, he pointed out Punzalan's house and then walked toward his home, leaving the Huks who proceeded to lie flat in a canal.
Before reaching his house, he already heard shots, so, he evacuated his family to their dugout in his yard. While doing so he and his
wife Catalina Tinapunan saw armed men in the lanzones grove just across the street from their house, belonging to the father of Umali,
and among those men they saw Congressman Umali holding a revolver, in the company of Huk Commander Torio and about 20 armed
men. Afterwards they saw Umali and his companions leave in the direction of Taguan, by way of the railroad tracks.

It would appear from the evidence that the raid was well-planned. As a diversionary measure, part of the attacking force was deployed
toward the camp or station of the Army (part of 8th B.C.T.) in the suburbs and the camp was fired upon, not exactly to destroy or drive
out that Army unit but to keep it from going to the rescue and aid of the main objective of the raid. The rest of the raiding party went
toward Punzalan's house and attacked it with automatic weapons, hand grenades, and even with bottles filled with gasoline (popularly
known as Molotov's cocktail). It was evident that the purpose of the attack on Punzalan's house was to kill him. Fortunately, however,
and apparently unknown to the attackers and those who designed the raid, at six o'clock that morning of November 14th Punzalan and
his Chief of Police had left Tiaong to go to Lucena, the capital, to report the results of the election to the Governor.

The attack on the house of Punzalan was witnessed and described by several persons, including policemen who happened to be near
the house. Policeman Tomas Maguare who was in front of the house saw Epifanio Pasumbal, Isidro Umali (brother of Congressman
Umali) and Moises Escueta enter the gate of Punzalan's house and take part in the firing. Policeman Pedro Lacorte who was stationed
as guard at the gate of Mayor Punzalan's house recognized defendant Isidro Capino as one of those firing at the house. Lacorte said
that he was guarding the house of Punzalan when he suddenly heard shots coming from the sides of the house and going over to the
place to investigate, he saw armed men in fatigue and shouting "burn the house of Mayor Punzalan"; that he was hit on the left check
and later Isidro Capino threw at him a hand grenade and he was hit in the right forearm and in the right eye and became permanently
blind in said eye. Mateo Galit, laundryman who was sitting inside a jeep parked in front of the house of Punzalan recognized defendant
Pasumbal as one of the attackers who, once in the yard said ina loud voice as though addressing somebody in the house "Pare, come
down." Mrs. Punzalan who was then inside the house related to the court that at about eight in the evening while she was resting she
heard shots and rapid firing. As a precaution she took her children to the bathroom. Then she noticed that her house was being fired at
because the glass window panes were being shattered and she heard the explosion of a hand grenade inside the house, followed by
flares in the sala and burning of blankets and mosquito nets in the bedrooms and she noticed the smell of smoke of gasoline. Realizing
the great danger, she and the children ran out of the house and went to hide in the house of a neighbor.

Nazario Añonuevo declared in court that he was a farmer and was picked up and seized by Huk Commander Tommy sometime in
August 1951, and was taken to Mt. Banahaw in Laguna and mustered in the ranks of the Huks; that just before the elections of
November 13, 1951, he saw Pasumbal come to the mountains near Tiaong and talk to Commander Abeng; that on November 14th by
order of Commander Abeng he with other Huks left Mt. Banahaw for Tiaong; that when they crossed the Osiw River already near
Tiaong, they were met by Pasumbal and Capino; that when they were at the outskirts of the town, he and the party were told by
Commander Tommy to attack the 8th BCT camp in Tiaong to prevent the sending of army help to the town proper; that he took part in
firing on the camp which returned the fire in the course of which he was wounded; and that because of his wound he could not escape
with his companions to the mountains when the Army soldiers dispersed and drove them out of the town and so he was finally captured
by said soldiers.

As to defendants Pasumbal and Capino, their participation in and responsibility for the raid was duly established not only by the going
of Pasumbal on November 12th to the mountains following instructions of Umali, and conferring with Commander Abeng asking him to
raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan, but also by the fact that Pasumbal and Capino in the afternoon or evening of November 14th met the
Huks at the Osiw River as the dissidents were on their way to Tiaong and later Pasumbal and Capino were seen in the yard of
Punzalan firing at the house with automatic weapons and hand grenades.

What about Umali? His criminal responsibility was also established, tho indirectly. We have the testimony of Amado Mendoza who
heard him instructing Pasumbal to contact Commander Abeng and ask him to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan. The rest of the evidence is
more or less circumstantial, but nonetheless strong and convincing. No one saw him take part in the firing and attack on the house of
Punzalan; nor was he seen near or around said house. Because of his important position as Congressman, perchance he did not wish
to figure too prominently in the actual raid. Besides, he would seem to have already given out all the instructions necessary and he
could well stay in the background. However, during the raid, not very far from Punzalan's house he was seen in the lanzonesan of his
father, holding a revolver and in the company of about 20 armed men with Huk Commander Torio, evidently observing and waiting for
developments. Then he and his companions left in the direction of Taguan.

Umali and Pasumbal, however, claim that during the raid, they were in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, about seven kilometers away
from Tiaong where a consolation party was being held. There is ample evidence however to the effect that they arrived in Pasumbal's
home only around midnight. An Army soldier named Cabalona who happened to be in Pasumbal's home arriving there earlier in the
evening and who was invited to take some refreshments said that he did not see the two men until they arrived about midnight when
the Army reinforcements from Lucena passed by on their way to Tiaong. Thus, we have this chain of circumstances that does not
speak in favor of Umali, or Pasumbal for that matter. But this is not all. There is the rather strange and unexplained, at least not
satisfactorily, behaviour of Umali and Pasumbal that evening of November 14th. Assuming for a moment as they claim, that the two
were not in Tiaong at the commencement of the raid between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., and during the whole time the raid lasted, and that
they were all that time in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, still, according to their own evidence, they were informed by persons
coming or fleeing from Tiaong that there was a raid going on there, and that some houses were burning. As a matter of fact,
considering the promixity of Taguan to Tiaong, a distance of about seven kilometers and the stillness and darkness of the night, the fire
and the glow produced by the burning of three houses and the noise produced by the firing of automatic weapons and the explosion of
the hand grenades and bottles of gasoline, could and must have been seen and heard from Taguan. The natural and logical reaction on
the part of Umali and Pasumbal would have been to rush to Tiaong, see what had really happened and then render help and give
succor to the stricken residents, including their own relatives. It will be remembered that the houses of the fathers of Umali and
Pasumbal were in Tiaong and their parents and relatives were residing there. And yet, instead of following a natural impulse and urge
to go to Tiaong, they fled in the opposite direction towards Candelaria. And Umali instead of taking the road, purposely avoided the
same and preferred to hike through coconut groves so that upon arriving in Candelaria, he was wet, and spattered and very tired. Had
they wanted to render any help to Tiaong they could have asked the police authorities of Candelaria to send a rescue party to that town.
Or better still, when the army reinforcements from Lucena sent at the instance of Punzalan, who at about eight or nine that evening was
returning to Tiaong from Lucena, found at the barrio or sitio of Lusakan near Tiaong that there was fighting in the town, he immediately
returned to Lucena to get army reinforcements to relieve his town, was passing by Taguan, where they were, Umali and Pasumbal
could have joined said reinforcements and gone to Tiaong. Instead the two continued on their way to the capital (Lucena) where before
dawn, they went and contacted Provincial Fiscal Mayo, a first cousin of Umali, and Assistant Fiscal Reyes and later had these two
officials accompany them to the Army camp to see Col. Gelveson, not for the purpose of asking for the sending of aid or reinforcement
to Tiaong but presumably to show to the prosecution officials, specially the Army Commander that they (Umali and Pasumbal) had
nothing to do whatsoever with the raid. Umali said he was trying to avoid and keep clear of Tiaong because he might be suspected of
having had some connection with the raid and might be the object of reprisal. As a matter of fact, according to Umali himself, while still
in Taguan that evening and before he went to Candelaria, somebody had informed him that Col. Legaspi of the Army was looking for
him. Instead of seeking Col. Legaspi and find out what was wanted of him, he left in the opposite direction and fled to Candelaria and
later to Lucena, and the next day he took the train for Manila. This strange act and behaviour of the two men, particularly Umali, all
contrary to impulse and natural reaction, and what other people would ordinarily have done under the circumstances, prompted the trial
court in its decision to repeat the old saying "The guilty man flees even if no one pursues, but the innocent stands bold as a lion." We
might just as well reproduce that portion of the decision of the trial court, to wit:

. . . Considering the fact that Taguan is very near Tiaong so that even taking it for granted as true, for the sake of argument,
that the said accused were really at the party of Pasumbal on the night in question, that would not prevent them from being in
Tiaong between 8 and 9. Besides, why was it that night the hasag lamp was replaced with candles when the reinforcements
passed through Taguan about midnight of November 14, 1951. Why did Congressman Umali and company instead of going to
Tiaong which was the scene of the attack hurried towards Candelaria, after the reinforcement has passed and went to the
house of Felix Ona walking through a muddy path under the coconut groves? Why was Umali afraid to pass through the
provincial road and preferred a muddy road instead? Was he trying to conceal himself? Why did Pasumbal and company also
go to the house of Ona? Why did they go to the house of Felix Ona instead of going to the house of Manalo who could have
given them better protection? And again why did Congressman Umali and the other co-accused repaired and sought the
company of Fiscal Reyes in going at such an early hour to the Army authorities, did they fear any reprisal? From whom? Why
did Umali go to Manila from Lucena on November 16, 1951? "The guilty man flees even if no one pursues, but the innocent
stands bold as a lion."

At first blush it would appear rather unbelievable that Umali and Pasumbal, particularly the former should seek the aids of the Huks in
order to put down and eliminate their political enemy Punzalan. It would seem rather strange and anomalous that a member of
Congress should have friendly relations with this dissidents whom the Government had been fighting all these years. But if we study the
evidence, it will be found that the reason and the explanation are there. As already stated, during the Japanese occupation, to further
the resistance movement, guerillas were organized in different parts of the Philippines. One of these was the guerilla unit known as
President Quezon's Own Guerillas (PQOG) operating in the provinces of Tayabas (now Quezon) and Laguna. Umali, Pasumbal,
Commander Abeng and even Punzalan himself were officers in this guerilla unit, Umali attaining the rank of colonel, and Pasumbal and
Punzalan that of Lieutenant-colonel, Pasumbal then being known as "Panzer". After Liberation, Abeng joined the dissidents, and
became a Huk Commander. It was not unnatural that Umali and Pasumbal should continue their friendship and association with
Commander Abeng and seek his aid when convenient and necessary. Umali admitted that he knew Huk Commander Kasilag. Graciano
Ramos, one of the witnesses of the prosecution told the court that way back in May 1950, in a barrio of San Pablo City he saw Umali
confer with Commander Kasilag, which Commander after the conference told his soldiers including Ramos that Umali wanted the Huks
to raid Tiaong, burn the presidencia and kidnap Punzalan. Of course, the last part of the testimony may be regarded as hearsay, but the
fact is that Umali conferred with a Huk commander as early as 1950. Then we have the fact that on November 18 of the same year
Punzalan wrote to President Quirino denouncing the congressman Umali for fraternizing with the Huks and conducting a campaign
among them in preparation for the elections the following year. And we may also consider the fact that the town of Tiaong stands at the
foothills of Mt. Banahaw where the dissidents under Commander Abeng, Tommy, Lucio, Aladin, and others had their hideout, so that it
was not difficult for residents of Tiaong like Umali and Pasumbal to communicate and even associate with dissidents in that region.

After carefully considering all the evidence in the case, we are constrained to agree with the trial court that the three appellants are
guilty. Besides, the determination of this case, in great measure, hinges on the credibility of witnesses. The learned trial court which had
the opportunity of observing the demeanor of witnesses on the stand and gauging their sincerity and evaluating their testimony, decided
the Government witnesses, including Amado Mendoza, to be more credible and reliable. And we find nothing in the record to warrant
correction or reversal of the stand and finding of the trial court on the matter. We have not overlooked the rather belated retraction of
Amado Mendoza made on October 31, 1952, about a year and 9 months after he testified in court. Considering the circumstances
surrounding the making of this affidavit or retraction, the late date at which it was made, the reasons given by him for making it and the
fact that when he testified in court under the observation and scrutiny of the trial court bearing in mind that he was the star witness for
the prosecution and his testimony naturally extremely important, and the trial court after the opportunity given to it of observing his
demeanor while on the witness stand had regarded him as a witness, sincere, and his testimony truthful, and considering further the
case with which affidavits of retraction of this nature are obtained, we confess that we are not impressed with such retraction of
Mendoza.

The last point to be determined is the nature of the offense of offenses committed. Appellants were charged with and convicted of the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery. Is there such a complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, etc? While the Solicitor General in his brief claims that appellants are guilty of said complex crime and in support of his
stand "asks for leave to incorporate by reference" his previous arguments in opposing Umali's petition for bail, counsel for appellants
considered it unnecessary to discuss the existence or non-existence of such complex crime, saying that the nature of the crime
committed "is of no moment to herein appellants because they had absolutely no part in it whatsoever". For that present, and with
respect to this particular case, we deem it unnecessary to decide this important and controversial question, its consideration and
determination to another case or occasion more opportune, when it is more directly and squarely raised and both parties given an
opportunity to discuss and argue the question more adequately and exhaustively. Considering that, assuming for the moment that there
is no such complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., and that consequently appellants could not have been legally charged with,
much less convicted of said complex crime, and the information should therefore, be regarded as having charged more than one
offense, contrary to Rule 106, section 12 and Rule 113, section 2 (e), of the Rules of Court, but that appellants having interposed no
objection thereto, they were properly tried for and lawfully convicted if guilty of the several, separate crimes charged therein, we have
decided and we rule that the appellants may properly be convicted of said several and separate crimes, as hereinafter specified. We
feel particularly supported and justified in this stand that we take, by the result of the case, namely, that the prison sentence we impose
does not exceed, except perhaps in actual duration, that meted out by the Court below, which is life imprisonment.

We are convinced that the principal and main, tho not necessarily the most serious, crime committed here was not rebellion but rather
that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the
Government and for the purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal code under rebellion. The raiders did
not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local Government. Rather, the object was to attain by means of force, intimidation, etc. one
object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of
Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same Code this was sufficient to constitute sedition. As regards the crime of robbery with which
appellants were charged and of which they were convicted, we are also of the opinion that it was not one of the purposes of the raid,
which was mainly to kidnap or kill Punzalan and destroy his house. The robberies were actually committed by only some of the raiders,
presumably dissidents, as an afterthought, because of the opportunity offered by the confusion and disorder resulting from the shooting
and the burning of the three houses, the articles being intended presumably to replenish the supplies of the dissidents in the mountains.
For these robberies, only those who actually took part therein are responsible, and not the three appellants herein. With respect to the
crime of multiple frustrated murder, while the assault upon policeman Pedro Lacorte with a hand grenade causing him injuries resulting
in his blindness in one eye, may be regarded as frustrated murder; the wounding of Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector should
be considered as mere physical injuries. The crimes committed are, therefore, those of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated
murder and physical injuries. The murders may not be qualified by evident premeditation because the premedition was for the killing of
Punzalan. The result was the killing of three others intended by the raiders (People vs. Guillen, 47 Off). The killing may, however, be
qualified by treachery, the raiders using firearms against which the victims were defenseless, with the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. The three murders may be punished with the penalty of death. However, because of lack of the necessary
votes, the penalty should be life imprisonment.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised by the appellants in their brief.

In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. For the crime of
sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders,
each of the appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000; and for the
arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that
the raiders in setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more
persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the
decision of the lower court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the
duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their long duration, we find it
unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums
awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below will stand. With these modifications, the
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISON

G.R. No. 125796, Promulgated: December 27, 2000

OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, Petitioners,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ATICO ABORDO, JUDY CATUBIG, PETER MOLATO, and FLORENCIO CANDIA,Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

The issue in this case is whether, even before the start of trial, the prosecution can be ordered to change the information which it had
filed on the ground that the evidence presented at the preliminary investigation shows that the crime committed is not murder with
multiple frustrated murder, but rebellion. The trial court ruled that the power to determine what crime to charge on the basis of the
evidence gathered is the prerogative of the public prosecutor. The Court of Appeals, however, while agreeing with the trial court,
nevertheless found the prosecutor to have gravely abused his discretion in charging murder with frustrated murder on the ground that
the evidence adduced at the preliminary investigation shows that the crime committed was rebellion. Accordingly, it ordered the
prosecutor to substitute the information filed by him. Hence, this petition brought by the provincial prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte
for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are not in dispute. On August 3, 1993, the provincial prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte 1 filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, Dipolog City, an information (docketed as Criminal Case No, 6427) charging private respondents and 10 other individuals
with murder and multiple frustrated murder. The Information reads:

The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor, accuses ATICO OBODO alias "Dondoy," NACENCIANO PACA-LIUGA, JR., ELEAZAR
FLORENDO, NESTOR BASES alias ‘Beses/Belly,’ FLORENCIO CANDIA alias "Bimbo," JUDY CATUBIG alias ‘Elboy/Al," PETER
MOLATO alias, Joker,’ ALBERTO CATUBIG alias "Blacky", ALMARIO CATUBIG alias ‘Nixon,’ JIMMY BENGAL alias "Macoboy,"
ENRICO SIMBULAN alias ‘Monstop,’ JIMMY GARIG alias "Gino" and BERNIDO QUENCAS alias "Digoy’ of the crime of MURDER
WITH MULTIPLE FRUSTRATED MURDER, committed as follows:

That, in the morning, on or about the 1st day of May, 1988, in the Municipality of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with the high caliber firearms, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another and with intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and fire several shots to one Cpl. ALFREDO DELA CRUZ PA, which accused his
instantaneous death and causing injuries to the following victims namely: SGT. RODRIGO ALVIAR PA, SGT. RODRIGO BARADI,
SGT. LINOGAMAN PIATOS and SGT. BELLIZAR PA, which injuries would ordinarily cause their death; thus performing all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of MURDER, as a consequence, but which nevertheless did not produce it for reason
of causes independent of the will of the herein accused, that is the timely and able medical attendance rendered to the said victims
which prevented their death; that as a result of the commission of the said crime the heirs of Cpl. Alfredo de la Cruz and the herein
victims suffered the following damages, vis:

On victim CPL ALFREDO DELA CRUZ:

a. Indemnity for

Victim’s death ….. P50, 000.00

b. Loss of earning

Capacity ………… 30,000.00

P80, 000.00

SGT. RODRIGO ALVIAR:

a) Hospitalization …… P10, 000.00

c. Loss of earning

Capacity ………….. 10,000.00

P20, 000.00

SGT. LINOGAMAN PIATOS:

a) Hospitalization …… P10, 000.00

d. Loss of earning

Capacity ………….. 10,000.00

P20,000.00

SGT. RODRIGO BARADI;

a) Hospitalization …… P10,000.00

e. Loss of earning

Capacity ………….. 10,000.00

P20,000.00

SGT. BELLIZAR:

a) Hospitalization …… P10,000.00

f. Loss of earning

Capacity ………….. 10,000.00

P20,000.00
CONTR ARY TO LAW (Viol. Of Art. 248, in relation or Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code), with the aggravating circumstance of
superior strength and with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. 2

The foregoing information is based on a joint affidavit executed on June 1, 1993 by five individuals, who claim to be former members of
the New People’s Army (NPA), before the Municipal Trial Court of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. The affiants stated that on May 1,
1988, their group, which included private respondents, figured in an armed encounter with elements of the Philippine Army in Campo
Uno, Femagas, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, as a result of which one solider, Cpl. Alfredo de la Cruz, was killed while four others,
Sgts. Rodrigo Alviar, Linomagan Piatos, Rodrigo Baradi, and a certain Bellizar, were seriously wounded. Although private respondents
did not appear nor submit affidavits in the preliminary investigation, they appealed the resolution of the provincial prosecutor to the
Secretary of Justice on the ground that, in accusing them of murder and multiple frustrated murder, the provincial prosecutor
disregarded the political motivation which made the crime committed rebellion. When the case was filed in court, private respondents
reiterated their contention and prayed that the provincial prosecutor be ordered to change the charge from murder with multiple
frustrated murder to rebellion.

On September 29, 1995, the trial court issued an order denying private respondents’ motion for the correction or amendment of the
information. The trial court said.3

Be it recalled, that as pointed out by the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, the same moving counsel sometime on July 22, 1993 filed a notice
of appeal assailing the resolution of the provincial prosecutor dated July 16, 1993 finding probable cause against all the above-named
accused for the crime of Murder and Multiple frustrated Murder, to the Honorable Secretary of Justice, by raising the same issue that
"instead of recommending the filing of a political crime such as subversion or rebellion, the investigating prosecutor is recommending
the filing of the common crime of murder to cover-up the apparent political color of the alleged crime committed.’ Until the Secretary of
Justice therefore resolves the appeal by the movant, this court will have no basis to order the public prosecutor to amend or change the
crime charged in the information. Besides, this Court recognizes and respects the prerogative of the fiscal to determine whether or not a
prima facie case exists in a given case against the accused. This power vested in the fiscal cannot be interfered with even by the
courts.

But since the case has already been filed with this Court, jurisdiction therefor now lies with the court. It may not even be bound by the
ruling of the Secretary of Justice…

Private respondents twice moved for reconsideration and twice were rebuffed. They then filed a petition for certiorari with this Court to
set aside the orders dated September 29, October 24, and November 3, 1995 of the trial court. They impleaded the provincial
prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte as co-respondent of Judge Pacifico Garcia of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Dipolog City.

Without ruling on the petition, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals, which, in decision 4 dated July 24, 1996, the subject
of this review, found the provincial prosecutor guilty of grave abuse of discretion in charging private respondents with murder with
multiple frustrated murder. The Court of Appeals held:

The New People’s Army (NPA) is the armed component of the Communist Party in this country called the national
Democratic Front (NDF). The ultimate objective of the NPA/NDF is to overthrow the constitutional democratic plant it
with a government anchored on the communist ideology.

It is common practice of the military and police to charge captured or arrested members f the NPA with capital offenses like murder,
robbery with homicide, illegal possession of firearms used in the commission of homicide or murder, arson resulting in death rather than
on simple rebellion.

If an NPA fighter (terrorist, according to the military lexicon) commits homicide, murder, arson, robbery, illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition in furtherance or on the occasion of his revolutionary pursuit, the only crime he has committed is rebellion because all
those common crimes are absorbed in the latter one pursuant to the ruling in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 and several
subsequent cases.

The reason why instead of charging the NPA fighter with capital offenses mentioned supra and not the proper offense of rebellion is
obvious. Rebellion is a bailable offense and given the resources of the NPA, it is the easiest thing for it to bail out its members facing
rebellion charges in court. Once out, the NPA fighter goes back to his mountain lair and continues the fight against the government. If
he is accused of a capital offense where the granting of bail is a matter of discretion, his chances of securing provisional liberty during
the pendency of the trial are very much lessened.

Since, the military and the police carry the brunt of fighting the NPAs and in so doing they put their limbs and lives on the line, it is easy
for Us to understand why they usually charge the captured or arrested NPAs with capital offenses instead of the proper offense which is
rebellion. The police or military practice is of course wrong, but it is not much of a problem because it is at most recommendatory in
nature. It is the prosecutory service that ultimately decides the offense to be charged.

No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure that the public prosecutor has the discretion to determine the crime
to be charged in a criminal action. But like all discretion’s, his must be exercised soundly, meaning, reasonably, responsibly, and fairly.
As stated by the Supreme Court in Misola v. Panga cited in respondents’ Comment (p. 61, Rollo); "The question of instituting a criminal
charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The information must be supported by the facts brought
about by an inquiry made by him." (Underscoring supplied).

If then, a public prosecutor deliberately ignores or suppresses an evidence in his hands which palpably indicates the chargeable
offense and files an information charging a more serious one, he departs from the precinct of discretion and treads on the forbidden
field or arbitrary action.

This was what happened in the case at bench. The evidentiary bases of the criminal action against petitioners are the Joint Affidavit
and the recorded testimony earlier adverted to. It is not at all disputed that based upon these two documents, the proper offense to
charge petitioners with is rebellion. No amount of legalistic sophistry can make those documents support murder for these offenses in
the factual milieu in this case were all absorbed by rebellion.
We vehemently reject respondents’ contention that the petitioners do not suffer any prejudice because they can use their theory that the
chargeable offense is only rebellion as a defense in the trial on the merits and if the trial court finds that the evidence establishes only
rebellion, then, it can convict them under the Information for just that lesser crime. This argument is not only wrong but betrays
insensitivity to violation of human rights. If prosecutory discretion is twisted to charge a person of an unbailable offense and, therefore,
keeps him under detention when the truly chargeable offense is a bailable one, the prosecutor transgresses upon the human rights of
the accused.5

The appeals court was more kindly disposed toward the trial court. It said:

Respecting the respondent court, the situation is different…

The Joint Affidavit and the recorded testimony mentioned earlier are not part of the records. The trial has not yet been started and,
therefore, no evidence has yet been adduced. There is no basis then for the trial court even to call the attention of the prosecutor to a
mistake in the crime charged.

We hold that respondent court did not commit an error in issuing the assailed orders, much less gravely abused its discretion in issuing
them.6

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals ordered:

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing premises, We a) dismiss the petition as against respondent court for lack of merit; and b) order the
respondent office of Provincial Prosecutor to file a substitute Information in Criminal Case No. 6472 charging the petitioners with
rebellion only.7

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred

I. IN MAKING DISPARATE AND IRRECONCILABLE RULINGS CONCERNING THE CORRECTNESS OF THE


ACTION OF PETITIONER AND THE LOWER COURT.
II. IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CHARGING PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WITH MURDER AND MULTIPLE FRUSTRATED MURDER.8

We find the contentions to be well taken.

First. It was improper for the Court of Appeals to consider the record of the preliminary investigation as basis for finding petitioner
provincial prosecutor guilty of grave abuse of discretion when such record was not presented before the trial court and, therefore, was
not part of the record of the case. Rule 112, 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure provide;

SEC. 8. Record of preliminary investigation. – The record of the preliminary investigation whether conducted by a judge or a fiscal, shall
not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court. However, the said court, on its own initiative or that of any party, may
order the production of the record of any part thereof whenever the same shall be necessary in the resolution of the case or any
incident therein, or shall be introduced as evidence by the party requesting for its production.

The certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals was limited to the record of the trial court and indeed the Court of Appeals
recognized this by absolving the trial court of any liability for abuse of its discretion. It is petitioner provincial prosecutor, which it found
guilty of grave abuse of discretion in filing a case for murder with multiple frustrated murder against private respondents because, in its
view, the crime committed is rebellion. The Court of Appeals based its ruling on the joint affidavit of five prosecution witnesses and their
testimonies relating to such affidavit before the Municipal Trial Court of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, which had conducted the
preliminary investigation. But this could not be done because the petition before it was a petition for certiorari to set aside orders of the
Regional Trial Court denying private respondents’ motion to compel petitioner to change the charge against them from murder with
frustrated murder to rebellion.

To sustain the procedure followed by the Court of Appeals of considering evidence dehors the record of the trial court would be to set a
bad precedent whereby the accused in any case can demand, upon the filing of the information, a review of the evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation for the purpose of compelling the trial court to change the charge to a lesser offense. Such a ruling
would undermine the authority of the prosecutor and impose and intolerable burden on the trial court. As held in Depamaylo v.
Brotario.9

The Court in a number of cases has declared that a municipal judge has no legal authority to determine the character of the crime but
only to determine whether or not the evidence presented supported prima facie the allegation of facts contained in the complaint. He
has no legal authority to determine the character of the crime and his declaration upon that point can only be regarded as an
expression of opinion in no wise binding on the court (People vs. Gorospe, 53 Phil. 960; de Guzman vs. Escalona, 97 SCRA 619). This
power belongs to the fiscal Bais vs. Tugaoen, 89 SCRA 101).

It is to be noted that private respondents did not even attend the preliminary investigation during which they could have shown that the
crime committed was rebellion because the killing and wounding of the government troopers was made in furtherance of rebellion and
not for some private motive.

Second. Indeed, it is not at all clear that the crime as made out by the facts alleged in the Joint Affidavit of witnesses is rebellion and not
murder with multiple murder. The affidavit reads:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES


PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE) S.S

Municipality of Jose Dalman)

X----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

JOINT AFFIDAVIT

I..Teofilo D. Sarigan, 31 years old, Manuel A. Cuenca, 28 yrs. Old, Romulo A. Pacaldo, 25 years old, Carmelito
Carpe, 36 yrs. Old, all married and Pablo D. Maladia, 20 yrs. old and with postal address of Brgy. Lopero, Brgy.
Lumaping, of Jose Dalman, Brgy. Villahermosa, Roxas, all of ZDN, Brgy. Sigamok, Dumingag, ZDS and Brgy. Lipay.
Jose Dalman, ZDN after having been duly sworn to an oath in accordance to law do hereby depose and answer
questions propounded:

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

1. Q – Why are you here now in this office?

A – To render statement regarding the alleged incident wherein we were previously involved when we were still with
the underground movement of CPP/NPA that transpired on or about 011000H May 1988 at vicinity Campo Uno,
Femagas, Katipunan, ZDN against the government troops of 321B.

2. Q – Since when the five (5) of you entered the underground movement of CPP.NPA?

A – Since May 16, 1980, August 12, 1980, March 12, 1981, May 7, 1983 and August 27, 2987, sir.

3. Q – What is your previous position?

A – CO, FCOM (Front Command) and second deputy secretary of FC-1 "BBC, the Vice CO, FCOM, the CO, FCOM
after @ Bebeth surrender, a Unit Militia (YM) member, GYP element under squad Lion all of FC-1 "BBC" in which we
are operating within the Province of ZDN.

4. Q – Will you narrate to me what and how the incident you are referring to all about?

A – Actually sir, last 30 April 1988 our main force of FGU, FC-1 "BBC" had a meeting at vicinity basketball court of
vicinity Campo Uno, Femagas, Katipunan ZDN. While on that status our security group left at the high ground portion
of the place and engaged the advancing government troops of 321B after which we then decided to postpone the
meeting hence, the government troops presence. However, on the following day of 01 May 1988 at about 10:00
o’clock in the morning when we assembled again at the aforesaid place, firefight occurred between us and the
government troops of 321B which resulted to inflict casualties to the 321B troopers, KIA one (1) Cpl. Alfredo Dela
Cruz and wounding four (4) others, Sgt. Rodrigo Alviar, Sgt. Linogaman Piatos, Sgt. Rodrigo Baradi and Sgt. Bellizar
while on our side with one wounded @ TOY.

5. Q – Can you still recall the names of those other NPA’s that participated in that encounter against the government
troops?

A – Yes, sir. ATICO OBORDO @ DONDOY, NACENCIANO PACALIUGA JR., @ ALFIE/IGI, ELEAZAT
FLOREDO, NESTOR BASES @ BELOY/BELLY. FLORENCIO CANDIA @ BIMBO, JUDY CATUBIG @
ELBOY/AL, PETER MOLATO @ JOKER, BIENVENIDO CATUBIG @ RASTY, ALBERTO CATUBIG @
BLACKY/RENATO, ALMARIO CATUBIG @ NOEL, ROGER CATUBIG @ JAMSE, JOEL CATUBIG @
NIXON, JIMMY DINGAL @ MACBOY, ENRICO SIMBULAN @ NONSTOP, @ DANDY, @ WAWAY, @
ALBA/JONAS, JIMMY GARIG @ NONOY, NILO CATUNGAN @ GINO, BERNIDO QUENECAS @ DIGOY,
@ CRISTINE/LFA @ MARILOU @ ELNA, @ BENIGNO PAULINO CORPUZ @ JR/PAWA, BENJAMIN
SANTANDER @ JAKE, @NESTOR, @ JAY, @ ISAGANI, @ RONIE, ESMAEL OBORDO @ ANICIO, @
FREDO, @ RUEL, @ DODONG, JULITA ADJANAN @ GENIE, @ TONY, @ RJ, @ LANNIE @ DEMET, @
RENDON, @JESS, @ SAMSON AND many others, sir.

Q – Then what transpired next?

A – Right after the encounter, we withdraw our troops towards vicinity SVR, complex, Sergio
Osmeña, Sr., ZDN.

Q – Do you have something more to say?

A – Nothing more, sir.

Q – Are you willing to sign you statement without being forced, coerced or intimidated?

A – Yes, sir.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, WE hereunto affix our signature this 1st day of June 1993 at Katipunan, ZN Philippines.

(SGD.) TEOFILO D. SARIGAN

Affiant
(SGD,) MANUEL A. CUENCA

Affiant

(SGD,) ROMULO A. PACALDO

Affiant

(SGD.) CARMELITO L. CARPE

Affiant

(SGD.) PABLO G. MALADIA

Affiant

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 1st day of June 1993 at Katipunan, ZN, Philippines.

(SGD.) ADELA S. GANDOLA

Municipal Trial Judge

Nowhere is the political motivation for the commission of the crime indicated in foregoing affidavit. Merely because it is alleged that
private respondents were members of the CCP/NPA who engaged government troops in a firefight resulting in the death of a
government trooper and the wounding of four others does not necessarily mean that the killing and wounding of the victims was made
in furtherance of a rebellion. The political motivation for the crime must be shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be
rebellion. Otherwise, as in People v. Ompad,10although it was shown that the accused was an NPA commander, he was nonetheless
convicted of murder for the killing of a person suspected of being a government informer. At all events, as this Court said in Balosis v.
Chanvez:11

Certainly, the public prosecutors should have the option to ascertain which prosecutions should be initiated on the basis of the evidence
at hand. That a criminal act may have elements common to more than one offense does not rob the prosecutor of that option (or
discretion) and mandatory require him to charge the lesser offense although the evidence before him may warrant prosecution of the
more serious one.12

In Baylosis v. Chavez, the accused, who were NPA members, assailed the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1866 under which they were
charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on the ground that it gave prosecutors the discretion to charge an accused
either with rebellion or with other crimes committed in furtherance thereof. In rejecting their contention, this Court said:

The argument is not tenable. The fact is that the Revised Penal Code trets rebellion or insurrection as a crime distinct from murder,
homicide, arson, or other felonies that might conceivably be committed in the course of rebellion. It is the Code, therefore, in relation to
the evidence in the hands of the public prosecutor, and not the latter’s whim or caprice, which gives the choice. The Code allows, for
example, separate prosecutions for either murder or rebellion, although not for both where the indictment alleges that the former has
been committed in furtherance of or in connection with the latter. 13

The burden of proving that the motivation for the crime is political and not private is on the defense. This is the teaching of another
case.14 in which it was held;

In deciding if the crime is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in
furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.

In such cases the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a state of mind which the accused better
than any individual knows.

Its not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crime. With
either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist.

The proceedings in the case at bar is still in the pre-arraignment stage. The parties have yet to present their respective evidence. If
during the trial, private respondents are able to show proof which would support their present contention, then they can avail of the
remedy provided under the second paragraph of Rule 110, 14 15 which provides:

If it appears at any time before judgement that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11,
provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy…

Until then, however, petitioner provincial prosecutor is under no obligation to change against private respondents.

Third. The Court of Appeals says it is a common practice of the military and the police to charge captured members of the NPA with
capital offenses like murder, robbery with homicide, or illegal possession of firearms rather than rebellion. The alleged purpose is to
deny them bail only if it can be shown that the evidence against them is not strong, whereas if the charge is rebellion, private
respondents would have an absolute right to bail.
As already stated, however, given the Joint affidavit of the prosecution witnesses alone, it is not possible to determine at this stage of
the criminal proceeding that in engaging the government troops in a "firefight," private respondents were acting in pursuance of
rebellion. It could be that the "firefight" was more of an ambush staged by the NPA, as shown by the fact that while the government
troop suffered one dead and four wounded, the CPP/NPA suffered only one wounded.

The charge that it is "common practice’ for the military and the police to charge suspected rebels with murder in order to prevent them
from going on bail can be laid equally at the door of the accused. As noted in Enrile v. Salazar:16

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quintessentially quixotic quality that justifies the
relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust
for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sancity of human life, is allowed to stand in
the way of their ambitions. Nothing so c this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and
assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and
large attributable to, or even claimed by so called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.17

What the real crime is must await the presentation of evidence at the trial or at the hearing on the application for bail. Those accused of
common crimes can then show proof that the crime with which they were charged is really rebellion. They are thus not without any
remedy.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated July 24, 1996, is REVERSED insofar as it orders petitioner to file a
substitute information for rebellion in Criminal Case No. 6427. In other respects, it is AFFIRMED. 1âwph i1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnote:

1 Rodolfo T. Mata.

2
Rollo, pp. 44-46.

3 Id., pp. 50-51.

4
Per Justice Hilarion L. Aquino and concurred in by Justices Jainal D. Rasul and Hector Hofileña.

5 CA Decision, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 43-45.

6 Id., p. 6; id., p. 45.

7
Id., p. 7; id., p. 46.

8 Rollo, p. 19.

9
265 SCRA 151, 157 (1996).

10 233 SCRA 62 (1994)

11 202 SRA 405 (1991).

12 Supra at 419-420 (1991).

13 Id., at 415 (emphasis added).

14 People v. Lovedioro, 250 SCRA 389, 395 (1995) (emphasis added).

15 Now Rule 110, 14, par. 3 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000).

16 186 SCRA 217 (1990).

17 Supra at 233.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 202692 November 12, 2014

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 are the December 28, 2011 Decision and July 18, 2012
1

Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567. The assailed issuances affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
2 3

Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 12, in Criminal Case Nos. 09-270107-08 which, in turn, affirmed that of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) in Manila adjudging petitioner Edmund Sydeco (Sydeco) guilty of drunk driving and resisting arrest. 4

The factual backdrop:

On July 20, 2006, separate Informations, one for Violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136 and another, for Violation of
5

Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) were filed against petitioner Sydeco with the MeTC in Manila and eventually raffled to
6

Branch 14 of that court. The accusatory portions of the interrelated informations, docketed as Crim. Case No. 052527-CN for the first
offense and Crim. Case No. 052528-CN for the second, respectively read:

1. Crim. Case No. 052527-CN

That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then the driver and owner of a car, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully, drive, manage and operate the same along Roxas Blvd. cor. Quirino Avenue, Malate, in said city,
while under the influence of liquor, in violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act 4136.

Contrary to law.

2. Crim. Case No. 052528-CN

That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully and unlawfully resist
and disobey P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO2 Virgilio Paulino, SPO4 Efren Bodino and PO3 Benedict Cruz III, bonafide member of the
Philippine National Police, Malate Police Station-9, duly qualified and appointed, and while in the actual performance of their official
duties as such police officers, by then and there resisting, shoving and pushing, the hands of said officers while the latter was placing
him under arrest for violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.

Contrary to law.

By Order of September 19, 2006, the MeTC classified the cases as falling under, thus to be governed by, the Rule on Summary
Procedure.

When arraigned, petitioner, as accused, pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.

During the trial of the two consolidated cases, the prosecution presented in evidence the oral testimonies of SPO4 Efren Bodino
(Bodino), PO2 Emanuelle Parungao and Ms. Laura Delos Santos, plus the documents each identified while in the witness box, among
7 8 9

which was Exh. "A", with sub-markings, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by SPO2 Bodino and two other police officers. The
10

defense’s witnesses, on the other hand, consisted of Sydeco himself, his wife, Mildred, and Joenilo Pano.

The prosecution’s version of the incident, as summarized in and/or as may be deduced from, the CA decision now on appeal is as
follows:

On or about June 11, 2006, P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar (Aguilar), SPO4 Bodino, PO3 Benedict Cruz III and another officer were manning a
checkpoint established along Roxas Boulevard corner Quirino Ave., Malate, Manila when, from about twenty (20) meters away, they
spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick up with plate number XAE-988. Petitioner was behind the wheel. The team members, all
inuniform, flagged the vehicle down and asked the petitioner to alightfrom the vehicle so he could take a rest at the police station
situated nearby,before he resumes driving. Petitioner, who the policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied being drunk and
11

insisted he could manage to drive. Then in a raised voice, petitioner started talking rudely to the policemen and in fact yelled at P/Insp.
Aguilar blurting: "P…g ina mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli." Atthat remark, P/Insp. Aguilar, who earlier pointed out to petitioner that his team
had seen him swerving and driving under the influence of liquor, proceeded to arrestpetitioner who put up resistance. Despite
petitioner’s efforts to parry the hold on him, the police eventually succeeded in subduing him who was then brought to the Ospital ng
Maynila where he was examined and found to be positive of alcoholic breath per the Medical Certificate issuedby that hospital, marked
as Exh. "F". Petitioner was then turned over to the Malate Police Station for disposition. Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed tobe a
12

victim in the incident in question, adding in this regard that he has in fact filed criminal charges for physical injuries, robbery and
arbitrary detention against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. In his Counter-Affidavit and his Complaint-Affidavit appended thereto, petitioner
13 14

averred that, in the early morning of June 12, 2006, he together with Joenilo Pano and Josie Villanueva, cook and waitress,
respectively, in his restaurant located along Macapagal Ave., Pasay City, were on the way home from on board his pick-up when
signaled to stop by police officers at the area immediately referred to above. Their flashlights trained on the inside of the vehicle and its
occupants, the policemen then asked the petitioner to open the vehicle’s door and alight for a body and vehicle search, a directive he
refused to heed owing to a previous extortion experience. Instead, he opened the vehicle window, uttering, "plain view lang boss, plain
view lang." Obviously irked by this remark, one of the policemen, P/Insp. Aguilar, as it turnedout, then told the petitioner that he was
drunk, pointing to three cases of empty beer bottles in the trunk of the vehicle. Petitioner’s explanation about being sober and that the
empty bottles adverted to came from his restaurant was ignored as P/Insp. Aguilar suddenly boxed him (petitioner) on the mouth and
poked a gun at his head, at the same time blurting, "P…g ina mo gusto mo tapusin na kita dito marami ka pang sinasabi." The officers
then pulled the petitioner out of the driver’s seat and pushed him into the police mobile car, whereupon he, petitioner, asked his
companions to call up his wife. The policemen then brought petitioner to the Ospital ng Maynila where they succeeded in securing a
medical certificate under the signature of one Dr. Harvey Balucating depicting petitioner as positive of alcoholic breath, although he
refused to be examined and no alcohol breath examination was conducted. He was thereafter detained from 3:00 a.m.of June 12, 2006
and released in the afternoon of June 13, 2006. Before his release, however, he was allowed to undergo actual medical examination
where the resulting medical certificate indicated that he has sustained physical injuries but negative for alcohol breath. Ten days later,
petitioner filed his Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Balucating, P/Insp. Aguilar and the other police officers.
Petitioner also stated in his counter-affidavit that, under Sec. 29 of R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not to place the erring driver under arrest, but to confiscate his driver’s license.

On June 26, 2009, the MeTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, his
conviction of the offenses charges is hereby pronounced. Accordingly, he is sentenced to:

1. Pay a fine of two hundred fifty pesos (₱250.00) for Criminal Case No. 052527-CN; and

2. Suffer imprisonment of straight penalty of three (3) months and pay a fine of two hundred fifty pesos (₱250.00) for Criminal
Case No. 052528-CN.

For lack of basis, no civil liability is adjudged.

The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to certify to the Land Transportation Office the result of this case, stating further the data required
under Section 58 of Republic Act 4136.
15

Therefrom, petitioner appealed to the RTC on the main submissions that the MeTC erred in: 1) according credit to the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Balucating, although the records custodian of Ospital ng Maynila was presented to testify thereon instead of the
issuing physician, and 2) upholding the veracity of the joint affidavit of arrest of P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO4 Efren Bodino, and PO3
Benedict Cruz III, considering that only SPO4 Bodino appeared in court to testify.

By Decision dated February 22, 2010, the RTC affirmed the conviction of the petitioner, addressing the first issue thus raised in the
16

appeal in the following wise: Dr. Balucating’s failure to testify relative to petitioner’s alcoholic breath, as indicatedin the medical
certificate, is not fatal as such testimony would only serve to corroborate the testimony on the matter of SPO4 Bodino, noting thatunder
the Rules of Court, observations of the police officers regarding the petitioner’s behavior would suffice to support the conclusion of the
17

latter’s drunken state on the day he was apprehended. 18

Apropos the second issue, the RTC pointed out that the prosecution has the discretion as to how many witnesses it needs to present
before the trial court, the positive testimony of a single credible witness as to the guilt of the accused being reasonable enough to
warrant a conviction. The RTC cited established jurisprudence enunciating the rule that preponderance is not necessarily with the
19

greatest number as "[W]itnesses are to be weighed, not numbered." Following the denial by the RTC of his motion for reconsideration,
petitioner went to the CA on a petition for review, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 33567. By a Decision dated December 28,
2011, as would be reiterated in a Resolution of July 18, 2012, the appellatecourt affirmed that of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 22, 2010 of the RTC, Manila, Branch 12, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition on the following stated issues:

I. The CA erred in upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties by the police officers; and

II. The CA erred in giving weight to the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Harvey Balucating, in the absence of his testimony
before the Court.

The petition is meritorious.

Prefatory, the rule according great weight, even finality at times, to the trial court’s findings of fact does hold sway when, as here, it
appears in the record that facts and circumstancesof weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a
case under appeal. Corollary, it is basic that an appeal in criminal prosecutions throws the whole case wide open for review, inclusive
20

of the matter of credibility and appreciation of evidence. ` Peace officers and traffic enforcers,like other public officials and employees
21

are bound to discharge their duties with prudence, caution and attention, which careful men usually exercise in the management of their
own affairs.22

In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in the subject area and during the period material appearednot to have performed
their duties as required by law, or at least fell short of the norm expected of peace officers. They spotted the petitioner’s purported
swerving vehicle. They then signaled him to stop which he obeyed. But they did not demand the presentation of the driver’s license
orissue any ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation as required under the particular premises by Sec. 29 of RA 4136, which
specifically provides:

SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s License. – Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director
shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and
regulations x x x confiscate the license ofthe driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issuedby the Bureau therefor which
shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of
said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter.x x x (Emphasis added.)
Instead of requiring the vehicle’s occupants to answer one or two routinary questions out of respectto what the Court has, in Abenes v.
Court of Appeals, adverted to as the motorists’ right of "free passage without [intrusive] interruption," P/Insp. Aguilar, et al. engaged
23

petitioner in what appears to be an unnecessary conversation and when utterances were made doubtless not to their liking, they
ordered the latter to step out of the vehicle, concluding after seeing three (3) empty cases of beer at the trunk of the vehicle that
petitioner was driving under the influence of alcohol. Then petitioner went on with his "plain view search" line. The remark apparently
pissed the police officers off no end as one of them immediately lashed at petitioner and his companions as "mga lasing" (drunk) and to
get out of the vehicle, an incongruous response to an otherwise reasonable plea. Defense witness, Joenilo Pano, graphically described
this particular event in his sinumpaang salaysay, as follows:
x x x matapos kami huminto ay naglapitan sa amin ang mga pulis, nag flash light sa loob ng sasakyan at sa aming mga mukha.

x x x isang pulis ang nag-utos sa aminna kami ay magsi-baba at buksan ang pintuan ng nasabing sasakyan.

x x x dahil doon sinabi ni Kuya sa mga pulis, na hindi pwede iyon at pinigilan niya ako at ang aking kasama kong waitress na bumaba.

x x x iginiit ni Kuya sa mga pulisang salitang "PLAIN VIEW LANG BOSS, PLAIN VIEW LANG" pero iyon ayhindi nila pinansin. Sa halip
as isang pulis ang nagsabi na "MGA LASING KAYO HETO MAY CASE PA KAYO NG BEER".

x x x habang nagpapaliwanag si Kuya, isang pulis ang biglang kumuha ng susi ng sasakyan habang ang isang pulis ang biglang
sumuntok sa bibig ni Kuya, nagbunot ng baril at tinutukan sa ulo si Kuya.

x x x dahil doon ay nagmakaawa ako na wag barilin si Kuya subalit ako rin ay tinutukan ng baril. x x x na matapos suntukin si Kuya
aypinagtulungan siya ng mga pulis na ilabas sa sasakyan at nang mailabas siyaay pinagtulakan siya ng mga pulis sa gilid ng kalsada
habang hawak ang kanilang baril. 24

Pano’s above account ironicallyfinds in a way collaboration from the arresting officers themselves who admitted that they originally had
no intention to search the vehicle in question nor subject its occupants to a body search. The officers wrote in their aforementioned joint
affidavit:

xxxx

That we arrested the suspect, Edmund Sydeco y Siozon x x x for violation of RA 4136 (Driving under the influence of liquor), and
violation of Article 151 of the RPC (Resisting Arrest) x x x committed on or about 3:30A.M., June 11, 2006 along x x x Malate, Manila. x
x x He began to raise his voice and converse with us rudely without considering that we are in uniform, on duty and performing our job.
P/INSP Manuel Aguilar pointed out that we saw him swerving and driving under the influence of liquor that was why we are inviting him
to our police station in which our intention was to make him rest for a moment before he continue to drive. x x x (Emphasis added.)

In fine, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was signaled to stop, to be precise, petitioner has not committed any crime or
suspected of having committed one. "Swerving," as ordinarily understood,refers to a movement wherein a vehicle shifts from a lane to
another or to turn aside from a direct course of action or movement. The act may become punishable when there is a sign indicating
25

that swerving is prohibited or where swerving partakes the nature ofreckless driving, a concept defined under RA 4136, as:

SECTION 48. Reckless Driving. – Noperson shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway recklessly or without reasonable caution
considering the width, traffic, grades, crossing, curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the highway and the conditions of the
atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger the property or the safetyor rights of any person or so as to cause excessive or
unreasonable damage to the highway.

Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive of reckless driving. To constitute the offense of
reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful and
wantondisregard of the consequences is required. Nothing in the records indicate that the area was a "no swerving or overtaking
26

zone." Moreover, the swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred at around 3:00 a.m. when the streets are usually clear of moving
vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to life, limb and property to third persons is minimal. When the police officers stopped the
petitioner’s car, they did not issue any ticket for swerving as required under Section 29 of RA 4136. Instead, they inspected the vehicle,
ordered the petitioner and his companions to step down of their pick up and concluded that the petitioner was then drunk mainly
because of the cases of beer found at the trunk of the vehicle. On re-direct examination, SPO4 Bodino testified:

Q: On that particular date, time and place … what exactly prompted you to arrest the accused (sic) the charged in for Viol. of Section
56(f) of R.A. 4136?

A: Noong mag check-up kami, naamoynamin na amoy alak siya at yung sasakyan ay hindi maganda ang takbo.

Q: Now you stated in your affidavit of arrest Mr. Witness that you spotted the vehicle of the accused swerving, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q. Is that also the reason why you apprehended him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what happened after Mr. Witness, when you approached the vehicle of the accused?

A: The accused was in a loud voice. He was asking, "Bakit daw siya pinahihinto?"

xxxx

Q: How do you describe the resistance Mr. Witness?

A: He refused to ride with usgoing to the hospital, Your Honor.

xxxx 27

Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-off between the police team, on one hand, and
petitioner on the other, was the latter’s refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a
plain view search only. Petitioner’s twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful order. He may have sounded
28
boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make him a criminal. It remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when
flagged down, committed a crime or performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to
avoid the road block established. He came to a full stop when so required to stop. The two key elements of resistance and serious
disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of
official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent. 29

There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in authority or agents of a person in authority
manning a legal checkpoint. But surely petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against unreasonable searches to be conducted in the
30

middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the
RPC. As has often been said, albeit expressed differently and under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies not in the
rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the people to assert and use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed. Moreover,
31

there is, to stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning policemen to order petitioner and his companions to get
out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body search. And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of the occurrence of
a crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and frisk" action. As SPO4 Bodino no less testified, the only reason
why they asked petitioner to get out of the vehicle was not because he has committed a crime, but because of their intention toinvite
him to Station 9 so he could rest before he resumes driving. But instead of a tactful invitation, the apprehending officers, in an act
indicative of overstepping of their duties, dragged the petitioner out of the vehicle and, in the process of subduing him, pointed a gun
and punched him on the face. None of the police officers, to note, categorically denied the petitioner’s allegation aboutbeing physically
hurt before being brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be tested for intoxication. What the policemen claimed was that it took the three
(3) of them to subdue the fifty-five year old petitioner. Both actions were done in excess of their authority granted under RA 4136. They
relied on the medical certificate issued by Dr. Balucating attesting that petitioner showed no physical injuries. The medical certificate
was in fact challenged not only because the petitioner insisted at every turn that he was not examined, but also because Dr. Balucating
failed to testify as to its content. Ms. Delos Santos, the medical record custodian ofthe Ospital ng Maynila, testified, but only to attest
that the hospital has a record of the certificate. The trial court, in its decision, merely stated:

At the outset, the records of the case show that the same were not testified upon by the doctor who issued it. Instead, the Records
1âwphi1

Custodian of the Ospital ng Maynila was presented by the Prosecution to testify on the said documents.

However, although the doctor who examined the accused was unable to testify to affirm the contents of the Medical Certificate he
issued (re: that he was found to have an alcoholic breath), this court finds that the observation of herein private complainants as to the
accused’s behavior and condition after the incident was sufficient.

Under Section 50 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of evidence:

The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding x x x x

The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person Under Section 15 of the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, "at the trial, the affidavits submitted by the parties shall constitute the direct testimonies of the
witnesses who executed the same." 32

In sum, the MeTC, as echoed by RTC and CA later, did not rely on the medical certificate Dr. Balucating issued on June 12, 2006 as to
petitioner’s intoxicated state, as the former was not able to testify as to its contents, but on the testimony of SPO4Bodino, on the
assumption that he and his fellow police officers were acting in the regular performance of their duties. It cannot be emphasized enough
that smelling of liquor/alcohol and be under the influence of liquor are differing concepts. Corollarily, it is difficult to determine with
legally acceptable certainty whether a person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving under the
influence of alcohol. The legal situation has of course changed with the approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving
Act of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA), a term defined under its Sec. 3(e) as the
33

"act of operating a motor vehicle while the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after being subjected to a breath analyzer test
reached the level of intoxication as established jointly by the [DOH], the NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. And under Sec. 3(g) of the IRR
of RA 10586, a driver of a private motor vehicle with gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has BAC [blood alcohol
concentration] of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive proof that said driver isdriving under the influence of alcohol. Viewed from the
prism of RA 10586, petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol for this obvious reason: he had not
been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let alone conclusively, for reaching during the period material the threshold level of intoxication
set under the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or over. Under Art. 22 of the RPC, penal laws shall be given retroactive insofar asthey
34

are favorable to the accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136. Verily, even by force of Art. 22 ofthe
RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e) of RA 10586 alone, petitioner could very well be acquitted for the charge of driving under the influence of
alcohol, even if the supposed inculpatory act occurred in 2006.

Parenthetically, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, per its Resolution of November 21, 2006 found, on the strength of another
35

physical examination from the same Ospital ng Maynila conducted by Dr. Devega on the petitioner on the same day,June 12, but later
hour, probable cause for slight physical injuries against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. That finding to be sure tends to indicate that the police
indeed man handled the petitioner and belied, or at least cancelled out, the purported Dr. Balucating’s finding as to petitioner’s true
state.

The Court must underscore at this juncture that the petitioner, after the unfortunate incident, lost no time incommencing the appropriate
criminal charges against the police officers and Dr. Balucating, whomhe accused of issuing Exh. "F" even without examining him. The
element of immediacy in the filing lends credence to petitioner’s profession of innocence, particularly of the charge of disobeying lawful
order or resisting arrest. Certainly not to be overlooked is the fact that petitioner,in so filing his complaint, could not have possibly been
inspired by improper motive, the police officers being complete strangers to him and vice versa. Withal, unless he had a legitimate
grievance, it is difficult to accept the notion that petitioner would expose himself to harm’s way by filing a harassment criminal suit
against policemen.

Conviction must come only after it survives the test of reason. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring one’s innocence be
36

duly taken into account. Given the deviation of the police officers from the standard and usual procedure in dealing with traffic violation
37

by perceived drivers under the influence of alcoholand executing an arrest, the blind reliance and simplistic invocation by the trial court
and the CA on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is clearly misplaced. As stressed in People v. Ambrosio, the 38

presumption of regularity is merely just that, a presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence
cannot be regarded as binding truth. And to be sure, this presumption alone cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence
that prevails if not overcome by proof that obliterates all doubts as to the offender’s culpability. In the present case, the absence of
conclusive proof being under the influence of liquor while driving coupled with the forceful manner the police yanked petitioner out of his
vehicle argues against or at least cast doubt on the finding of guilt for drunken driving and resisting arrest.

In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor of innocence or at least infavor of the milderform of
criminal liability. This is as it should be. For, it is basic, almost elementary, that the burden of proving the guiltof an accused lies on the
prosecution which must rely on the strength of its evidence and noton the weakness of the defense.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASI:OE. Petitioner is hereby acquitted of the crimes charged in Criminal Case No. 052527-CN and
Criminal Case No. 052528-CN.

No pronouncement as to costs.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. BIENVENIDO L. REYES


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE**
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

* dditional Member per Raffle dated November 10, 2014.

** Acting Member per Special Order No. 1866 dated November 4, 2014.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid with the concurrence of Associate Justices Michael P. Elbinias and
Leoncia Real-Dimagiba, Annex "A" Petition, rollo, pp. 25-37.

2
Annex "E", Petition, id. at 51-52.

3
Annex "H", Petition, id. at 90-98.

4
Annex "K", Petition, id. at 105-120.

5
Land Transportation and Traffic Code:

SECTION 56. Penalty for Violation. – The following penalties shall be imposed for violations of this Act: x x x

(f) Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor x x x a fine of not less than one thousand pesos or
imprisonment of not less than three nor more than six months, or both, at the discretion of the court.

6
Art. 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person. — The penalty of arresto
mayorand a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who not being included in the provisions of the
preceding articles shall resist or seriously disobey any person in authority, or the agents of such person, while engaged in the
performance of official duties; When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious nature, the
penalty of arresto menor or a fine ranging from 10 to 100 pesos shall be imposed upon the offender.

7
One of the apprehending officers.

8
Investigating Officer.

9
Medical Records Custodian of Ospital ng Maynila.

10
Annex "P" of Petition, rollo, p. 126.

11
Id. at 108.

12
Annex "R", Petition, id. at 129.

13
Annex "T", Petition, id. at 134.

14
Annex "U" Petition, id. at 136-138.

15
SECTION 58. Duty of Clerks of Court. – It is hereby made the duty of clerks of the Court of First Instance, the City Court or
Municipal Court trying traffic violation cases to certify to the Commission the result of any case, whether criminal or civil,
involving violations of any provision of this Act or of other laws and ordinances relating to motor vehicles. Said certificate shall
specifically contain the name of the driver or owner of the vehicle involved, his address, the number of his license and/or of the
certificate or registration of his vehicle, and the date thereof, and the offense of which he was convicted or acquitted.

16
Rollo, p. 90-98, 98.

Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. — The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in
17

evidence regarding —

(a) The identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and

(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.

18
Rollo, p. 45.

19
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 175929, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 78, 90.

20
People v. Laxa, G.R. No. 138501, July 20, 2001, 361 SCRA 622.

Willy Tan y Chua v. People, G.R. No. 148194, April 12, 2002; Olimpio Pangonorom Metro Manila Transit Corporation v.
21

People, G.R. No. 143380. April 11, 2005.

22
Balais v. Abuda, A.M. No. R-565-P, November 27, 1986.

23
G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007.

24
Rollo, pp. 139-140.

25
Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, 10th Ed. 1997.

26
Caminos, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 147437, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 348, 357.

27
Records, p. 491.

28
Abenes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 690.

29
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 18th ed., 2008, p. 154 .

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article III , Section 2. "The right of the people to be secure in their
30

persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

31
Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659.

32
Rollo, pp. 110-111.
Sec. 5. Punishable Act.- It shall be unlawful for any person to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol,
33

dangerous drugs and/or similar substances.

34
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.- Penal laws shall have retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

35
Rollo, pp. 167-170.

36
People v. Castro, G.R. No. L-42478 October 4, 1989.

37
People v. Dramayo, G.R. No. L-21325, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59.

38
G.R. No. 135378, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 312.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-4164 December 12, 1952

In the matter of the petition of Antonio Infante for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. ANTONIO INFANTE, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondent-appellant.

Office of the Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon and Solicitor Meliton G. Soliman for appellant.
Amado B. Parreño for appellee.

TUASON, J.:

This was a petition of habeas corpus filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental by Antonio Infante, and the petition having
been granted, the Provincial Fiscal has appealed to this Court.

It appears that the petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to 17 years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal, which
he recommended to serve on June 21, 1927, and that on March 6, 1939, after serving 15 years, 7 months and 11 days he was granted
a conditional pardon and released from imprisonment, the condition being that "he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines".

On April 25, 1949, Infante was found guilty by the Municipal Court of Bacolod City of driving a jeep without license and sentence to pay
a fine of P10 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On July 13, 1950, "by virtue of the authority conferred upon His
Excellency, the President, by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code", the Executive Secretary ordered Infante re-arrested
and re-committed to the custody of the Director of Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, for breach of the condition of the aforesaid pardon. lawphil.net

It was the main contention of the petitioner that section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code upon which he was ordered re-
incarcerated, had been abrogated, and he was sustained by the court below.

Since this appeal was taken, this Court has handed down a decision (Sales vs. Director of Prisons * 48 Off. Gaz., 560) in which these
ruling were laid down:

The Revised Penal Code, which was approved on December 8, 1930, contains a repealing clause (article 367), which
expressly repeals among other acts sections 102, 2670, 2671, and 2672 of the Administrative Code. It does not repeal section
64 (i) above quoted. On the contrary, Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which is subsequent to the Revised
Penal Code, in its section 9 expressly preserves the authority conferred upon the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code.

The legislative intent is clear, therefore, to preserve the power of the President to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of
any person who violates the condition or conditions of his pardon notwithstanding the enactment of article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code. In this connection, we observed that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code and article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code are but a reiteration of 3?3 Acts Nos. 1524 and 1561, under which a violator of a conditional pardon was liable to
suffer and to serve the unexpired portion of the original sentence.

We are of the opinion that article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes violation of a conditional pardon as an
offense, and the power vested in the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to authorize the
recommitment to prison of a violator of a conditional pardon to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence, can stand
together and that the proceeding under one provision does not necessarily preclude action under the other. . . .

The second ground of the petition was that the remitted penalty for which the petitioner had been recommitted to jail — one year and 11
days — had prescribed. This contention was also sustained in the appealed decision. Said the Court:
Segun el articulo 92 del Codigo Penal Revisado, la pena de un (1) año y once (11) dias que corresponde a la pena de prision
correccional, prescribe a los diez (10) años.

Por manera que, habiendo transcurrido mas de diez (10) años la responsabilidad criminal del solicitante proviniente de la
infraccion de su indulto bajo condicion, ha prescrito con exceso.

The contention is not well taken. According to article 93 of the Revised Penal Code the period of prescription of penalties commences
to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. It is evident from this provision that evasion of the
sentence is an essential element of prescription. There had been no such evasion in this case. Even if there had been one and
prescription were to be applied, its basis would have to be the evasion of the unserved sentence, and the computation could not have
started earlier than the date of the order for the prisoner's rearrest.

We think, however, that the condition of the pardon which the prisoner was charged with having breached was no longer operative
when he committed a violation of the Motor Vehicle Law.

Pardon is an act of grace, and there is general agreement that limitations upon its operation should be strictly construed (46 C.J. 1202);
so that, where a conditional pardon is susceptible of more than one interpretation, it is to be construed most favorably to the grantee.
(39 Am. Jur., 564) Thus, in Huff vs. Dyer, 40 Ohio C.C. 595, 5. L R A, N S, Note 1064), it was held that the duration of the conditions
subsequent, annexed to a pardon, would be limited to the period of the prisoner's sentence unless an intention to extend it beyond that
time was manifest from the nature of the condition or the language in which it was imposed. In that case, the prisoner was discharged
on habeas corpus because the term of the pardon in question did not, in the opinion of the court, imply that it was contemplated to have
the condition operated beyond the term of his sentence. The herein petitioner's pardon, it will be noted, does not state the time within
which the conditions thereof were to be performed or observed. In adopting, which we hereby do, the rule of strict construction, we take
into account, besides the benevolent nature of the pardon, the fact that the general run out prisoners are unlettered or at least
unfamiliar with the intricacies and legal implications of conditions subsequent imposed in a pardon.

There are courts which have gone so far as to hold, not without plausible argument, that no conditions can be attached to a pardon that
are to extend after the expiration of the term for which the prisoner was sentence, although this view is not shared by the weight of
authority. (39 Am., Jur. 564, 567; 46 C.J. 1201.)

Unless the petitioner's pardon be construed as above suggested, the same, instead of an act of mercy, would become an act of
oppression and injustice. We can not believe that in exchange for the remission of a small fraction of the prisoner's penalty it was in the
Executive's mind to keep hanging over his (prisoner's) head during the rest of his life the threat of recommitment and/or prosecution for
any slight misdemeanor such as that which gave rise to the order under consideration. 1awphil.net

There is another angle which militates in favor of a strict construction in the case at bar. Although the penalty remitted has not, in strict
law, prescribed, reimprisonment of the petitioner for the remainder of his sentence, more than ten years after he was pardoned, would
be repugnant to the weight of reason and the spirit and genius of our penal laws. If a prisoner who has escaped and has given the
authorities trouble and caused the State additional expense in the process of recapturing him is granted immunity from punishment
after a period of hiding, there is at least as much justification for extending this liberality through strict construction of the pardon to one
who, for the same period, has lived and comported as a peaceful and law-abiding citizen.

Not improper to consider in this connection is the circumstance that the prisoner's general conduct during his long confinement had
been "excellent", which had merited his classification as a trustee or penal colonist, and that his release before the complete
extinguishment of his sentence could have been intended as a reward for his past exemplary behavior with little or no thought of
exacting any return from him in the form of restraint from law violations, for which, after all, there were independent and ample
punishments. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, without costs.

Pablo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, C.J., concurring:

I concur in the result.

In so far, however, as the decision in the case of Sales vs. Director of Prisons (48 Off. Gaz., 576) is relied upon I wish to make
reference to my dissent in said decision and to the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Feria in which I concurred. I may emphasize that
section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code and article 159 of the Revised Penal Code cannot stand and be enforced together, as
the limit of imprisonment under section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code and the penalty under Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code are not the same. Even if it be assumed that the enforcement of the two legal provisions may bring about the same result in
some cases, the effect would be to penalize twice a single offense, namely, the violation of a conditional pardon, and this is repulsive to
elementary rules of criminal law.

Feria, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur in the result.

MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:


Petitioner herein was sentenced to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal for murder. On March
6, 1939 after serving fifteen (15) years, seven (7) months and eleven (11) days of his sentence, he was granted a conditional pardon
and released from imprisonment. The period of the sentence remaining to be served was one (1) year and eleven (11) days. The
condition of his pardon was that "he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." On April 25, 1949, petitioner was
convicted of a violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law for driving a jeep without a license and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On July 13, 1950, the Executive Secretary ordered the re-arrest and recommitment
of petitioner for violation of the conditions of his pardon. He was arrested and he sued this writ of habeas corpus.

I fully concur in the majority opinion insofar as it reaffirms the doctrine laid down in the case of Sales vs. Director of Prisons, (48 Off.
Gaz., 576), which holds that section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is still in force, and that for any violation of a conditional
pardon, the President is authorized to order the arrest and re-commitment of said violator to serve the unexpired portion of his
sentence. I also agree, with the majority that the penalty herein has not prescribed for the reason that there has been no evasion of
sentence upon which the principle of prescription of penalty is based. However, I cannot agree with the majority insofar as they hold
that when petitioner committed a violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the condition of his pardon was no longer operative. It is
the theory and opinion of the majority that the duration or life of the conditions imposed in the pardon is limited to the period of the
prisoner's sentence, specially when the pardon does not designate the time for the observance of the condition. This is diametrically
opposed to the great weight of authority that the conditions of a conditional pardon are to last and endure during the lifetime of the
pardonee. When no limit is mentioned in the pardon it is to be presumed that it is indefinite and lasts until the prisoner pardoned dies.

Limitations as to Time of Performance. — A pardon may, as one of its restrictions and limitations, designate the time for the
observance of its conditions, but if it does not, it is generally held that the time of performance of conditions subsequent is
limited only by the life of the convict. (39 Am. Jur., Pardon, etc., Sec. 71, p. 564; emphasis mine.)

SEC. 74. Suspension of Running of Sentence. — A sentence of imprisonment for a criminal act is satisfied only by the death
or by some legal authority; if, from any cause, the time elapses without the imprisonment being endured, the sentence will still
be a valid, subsisting, unexecuted one. In accordance with this principles, it is well-settled that where a prisoner is conditionally
pardoned, upon breach of the condition the time he was at liberty under the pardon is not to be considered as time served on
the original sentence, and he may be compelled to serve out the term which remained unserved at the time the pardon was
granted and accepted. By breach or non-performance of the conditions the pardon becomes void and the status of the
prisoner is the same as it was before the pardon was granted; or, as is sometimes said, the position of the prisoner on a
violation of the conditions of his pardon is similar to that of an escaped convict. He cannot complain of the interruption of the
execution of the sentence during the time he enjoyed his liberty, for it was secured by him by his acceptance of the conditional
pardon.

A condition in a pardon that the convict shall be required to serve out the unserved portion of the term of his original sentence
if he violates the terms of the pardon does not terminate with the expiration of the original term of sentence. Accordingly, the
rule is laid down by many courts that a convict who has violated the conditions of a pardon may be compelled to serve out the
unexpected term of his original sentence, even though the breach occurred after the date upon which his sentence as fixed by
the court which sentenced him would have expired. (Ibid, pp. 566-567; Emphasis mine).

The principle enunciated in the above quotations has been cited with favor and followed by this court in the following cases:

In case of People vs. Sanares, 62 Phil. 825, the defendant therein, convicted of theft and sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment, began serving his sentence on July 9, 1924. He was conditionally pardoned and released on March 1, 1927. The period
of the penalty remitted was three (3) years, seven (7) months and eight (8) days. He committed estafa on February 5, 1935, that is to
say, several years after the expiration of the original sentence or the period of the sentence not served by reason of the pardon. This
court said that prosecution under article 159 of the Revised Penal code was in order. That means that he had violated the condition of
the pardon despite the expiration of the period of his sentence. In other words, the conditions of the pardon were still in effect despite
said expiration of the period.

The case of Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons, 68 Phil., 154, is also applicable. The petitioner therein was convicted of falsification of a
public document and sentenced to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days, which sentence was to expire on October
28, 1937. On November 14, 1935, he was paroled by the then Governor General. One of the conditions imposed was that he will not
commit any other crime. The petitioner contended that the alleged act of adultery imputed to him were committed and took place not
before but after the expiration of his original sentence and so he was no longer liable for violation of his pardon. This court held that
even if the adultery were committed after said expiration, still he had violated his pardon, meaning to say, that the conditions of his
pardon were still in effect and were operative even beyond and after the expiration of his original sentence.

The following are additional authorities:

On forfeiture of a pardon by breach of the conditions, a convict becomes liable to serve that part which he has already served
of the term of imprisonment for which he was sentenced, although the original term has long since expired. (State vs. Barnes,
6 L.R.A., 743; 10 S.E., 611; Emphasis mine.)

The expiration of the term for which a convict was sentenced does not make inoperative a provision in a conditional pardon,
that, if he is subsequently convicted of crime, he shall serve the unexpired term in addition to that imposed by the new
sentence; but he may be compelled to serve out such unexpired term, although his subsequent conviction does not occur
until after the expiration of the term of the original sentence." (Re Kelly, 20 L.R.A. [N.S.] 337; 155 Cal., 39; 99 Pac., 368;
Emphasis mine.)

When a prisoner who has been at large on a conditional pardon is recommitted to serve the remainder of his term, the time he
has been so at large is not to be treated as time served on his sentence. (Ex parteMcKenna, 79 Vt. 34; 64 Atl. 77.) It follows
that a defendant sentenced to two years imprisonment and pardoned, may six years later be recommended for the breach of
the condition of his pardon. (State vs. Barnes, 32 S.C., 14; 10; S.E., 611; 6 L.R.A. 743; Vol. I, Bishops Criminal Law, Sec. 915
[5], p. 660; Emphasis mine.)

But there is really no need for all this authorities above-cited and quoted because the majority opinion itself admits that its view is
opposed to the weight of authority. What is it then that impels the majority to brave and go against the current of the great weight of
authority, and maintain that the conditions imposed in a conditional pardon that the pardonee will not again violate any penal laws of the
Philippines, dies with the expiration of the period of the original sentence, or with the expiration of the period of his sentence which
remain unserved which in the present case, was one year and eleven days? The only reason and the whole argument brought forth to
sustain the opinion is that if we are to hold otherwise, the pardon "instead of an act of mercy, would then be an act of oppression and
injustice" because in exchange for the remission of a small fraction of the prisoner's penalty, the Chief Executive would "keep hanging
over his (prisoner's) head during the rest of his life the threat of recommitment and/or prosecution for any slight misdemeanor such as
that which gave rise to the order under consideration." I emphatically dissent from this view.

To me, the concern of the majority about the threat of recommitment being used by the Chief Executive as the sword of Damocles
hanging over petitioner's head for the rest of his life, is without foundation. The threat, if there be one, is not being utilized by a heartless
and vindictive Chief Executive to harass and annoy a pardonee and make his existence miserable, but it is rather an alternative,
undesirable and unpleasant and to be avoided, which tends to keep the pardoned convict on the straight and narrow path. The prospect
of avoiding serving his remitted sentence and his employment of continued liberty and freedom from person is rather an incentive that
serves to impel and lead a pardonee to live within the law like his fellowmen. But even if we regard recommitment to jail as a continuous
threat hanging over the pardonee's head, are we not all, for that matter living under the continuous threat of prosecution for violation of
law. To all of us from the age of criminal responsibility (9 to 15 years depending on discernment) down to the grave, the threat of
punishment or suffering for violation of the penal laws or the 3p3 law of Nature, is like the sword of Damocles, ever hanging over our
heads. Commit an offense whether deliberate or thru negligence, and the sword of prosecution descends upon you; disobey the laws of
nature such as that of gravitation and you may have a fall, bad or even fatal; defy the elements and you may perish in them. The threat
and prospect in every case is real and ever present, and yet we never think of regarding that threat as oppressive or unjust. We take it
as a matter of course, and as an inevitable part or element of human institutions and of the scheme of the universe.

When a convict accepts a pardon with conditions attached, he does so with his eyes open and he knows the consequences. As a rule,
the benefits far outweigh the disadvantages. That is the reason conditional pardons are almost invariably accepted. Afterwards when
the pardonee fails to live up to the conditions of the pardon, it ill becomes him to whimper and complain and say that the conditions
were unjust and oppressive, just because the portion of his sentence remaining to be served is relatively short, and the offense
committed by him in violation of his pardon is not serious.

I am afraid that the majority has allowed itself to be unduly impressed and influenced by what I regard a misplaced sympathy for the
herein offender. But we should not interpret the law in accordance with the status of the parties and the effect of the operation of the law
on them. Where the law makes no distinction we should not distinguish. I confess that I see no justice, much less, oppression in
construing the conditions of a pardon that the pardonee will not again violate any penal laws of the Philippines, as operative during his
lifetime. If he commits such a violation, he is not penalized and punished for it from the standpoint of pardoning power. He is merely
made to serve out the remaining period of his sentence and nothing more. In other words, having shown that contrary to his promise or
undertaking, he could not be law-abiding citizen, the law cancels and compels him to continue serving his sentence. It is not a penalty
but rather a withdrawal or cancellation of the grant of freedom to him. In this connection, the majority has apparently overlooked the
contractual phase of a conditional pardon.

It has often been held that a conditional pardon, is a form and substance, a contract between the executive power of the state
and the person to whom it is granted." (39 Am Jur. 559)

A conditional pardon delivered and accepted has been said to constitute a contract between the sovereign power or the
executive and the criminal that the former will release the latter upon compliance with the conditions. (46 C.J., 1202)

The convict is given the pardon and is released from confinement and his sentence is suspended in return for a promise and an
undertaking that he would behave properly and not commit any violation of law. If to him that condition is too burdensome, if he believes
that because of criminal tendencies and inclinations he cannot keep away from law violations, he need not accept the offer of pardon.
There is no power on earth that can compel him to accept the pardon against his will. As Chief Justice Marshall years ago said in the
case of United States vs. George Wilson 7 Peters, 150; 8 Law ed., 640, a "pardon may be rejected by the person to whom it is
tendered; and if it be rejected, we have discovered no power in a court to force it to him."

The fact that a condition in a pardon may be burdensome or objectionable does not vitiate the pardon. Speaking of the condition in a
pardon Chief Justice Marshall in the same case said that " a pardon may be conditional, and the condition may be more objectionable
than the punishment inflicted by the judgment." But as already stated, if the prospective pardonee feels that the condition is
objectionable or burdensome, he need not accept the pardon.

A condition that the pardonee will not violate any penal law of the Philippines during his lifetime is legal.

Other conditions—. . . It is a valid condition that the grantee shall not be convicted of a violation of any of the criminal laws of
the state, . . . . (39 Am. Jur., 563.)

Again, a pardon may be granted upon the condition that the convict . . .shall be and remain a law-abiding citizen. (46 C.J.,
1201.)

And as to being burdensome or oppressive, personally, I firmly believe that suvh a condition is not burdensome and, clearly, not
oppressive. By far, the great majority of citizens go through life without committing any penal offense. Thousands upon thousands, even
millions of our citizens, especially in the provinces and in rural communities, have never entered the portals of a court of justice to be
arraigned and tried, much less have been behind prison bars. For every citizen like petitioner herein who commits a violation of law and
is prosecuted therefor, there are thousands of his fellow citizens who are law-abiding and do not commit such violation.

The only legal limitation to the condition that may be imposed in a conditional pardon is that it should not be illegal, immoral or
impossible of performance. I do not beleive that there is any illegality, immorality or impossibility of performance in the condition that the
pardonee shall not violate any penal laws of the Philippines.

Nature of condition.—The condition may be of any nature so long as it is not illegal, immoral, or impossible of performance.
(46 C.J., 1200.)
Time during which condition is to be performed.— . . .; and by the weight of authority a pardon is not illegal or impossible of
performance because its conditions require observance for a period of time extendingbeyond that in which the sentence
should have been served. (Ibid., p. 1201; Emphasis mine.)

A condition of a parddon that requires reimprisonment for the remainder of the original sentence of imprisonment, after the
expiration of the particular period of time fixed by the court within which the sentence imposed should be executed, is valid. It
can not be said to be immoral, or impossible of performance during the life of the petitioner; nor can it be illegal, since the
particular period of time within which the sentence is to be suffered by the convict as specified in the sentence is not a part of
the legal sentence, except so far as it fixes the quantum of time that he must suffer such penalty, and the condition imposed is
not forbidden and does not increase the punishment imposed by the court in its sentence. (39 Am. Jur., 564; Emphasis mine.)

Furthermore, the Chief Executive in issuing a conditional pardon and in imposing the conditions in it does so in the exercise of his
constitutional powers. The ChiefExecutive is vested with his authority not only by law (Sec. 64 [i], Revised Administrative Code), but by
the very Constitution (Art. VII, Sec. 10 [6], granting him the power to attach such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to
impose. In interpreting this constitutional power of the Chief Executive we should not without good ground or valid reason brush aside
and hold invalid a condition imposed by the Chief Executive on a conditional pardon on the ground that it is oppressive and unjust,
specially if to do so, we defy and ignore the weight of legal jurisprudence.

It is argued in the majority opinion that although the penalty remitted has not prescribed, his reimprisonment more than ten years after
he was pardoned would be repugnant to and against the spirit and genius of our penal laws, and by a process which it terms "strict
construction", it finally accords to him the benefits of prescription. That, to me, is perplexing. The maajority in a solemn holding and
declaration says that prescription of the penalty does not apply in the present case; then in the next breath it declaares tha it should
apply and so actually applies it. Where do we or the majority stand? The law of prescription of penalties, either is applicable or is not
applicable. There is no middle ground. If it is not appliocable, we may not apply it. If the law of prescription of penalties should be
amended so as to cover cases like the present under consideration, such amendment falls within the exclusive domain of the
Legislature. We cannot and should not undetake to do it, otherwise we would be treading on the controversial and dubious ground of
judicial legislation.

The reason given in the majority opinion for extending the benefits of prescription of penalties to the petitioner although according to the
same majority prescription is inapplicable, is contained in the following quotation of its opinion:

If a prisoner who has escaped and has given the authorities trouble and caused the State additional expense in the process of
recapturing him is granted immunity from punishment after a period of hiding, there is at least as much justification for
extending this liberality through strict construction of the pardon to one who, for the same period, has lived and comported as a
peaceful and law-abiding citizen.

This point of view fails to appreciate the theory and the reason behind the law of prescription of penalties. If a convict under
confinement, at the risk of being killed succeeds in breaking jail and also succeeds in evading rearrest for a certain period of time which
by no means is short, despite the efforts of all the instrumentalities of the Government including sometimes the setting of a prize or
reward on his head, which thereby enlists the aid of the citizenry, the law calls off the search for him, and condones the penalty. But
during that period of prescription the escaped convict lives a life of a hunted animal, hiding mostly in the mountains and forests in
constant mortal fear of being caught. His life far from being happy, comfortable and peaceful, is reduced to a mere existence filled with
fear, discomfort, loneliness and misery. As the distinguished penal law commentator Viada said, the convict who evades sentence is
sometimes sufficiently punished by his voluntary and self-imposed banishment, and at times voluntary exile is more grievous than the
sentence he was trying to avoid. (Viada y Villasca, Codigo Penal, Vol. III, p. 41, 5th ed.) And all the time he has to utilize every
ingenuity and means to outwit the Government agencies bent on recapturing him. For all this, the government extends to him a sort of
condonation or amnesty.

But the case of a pardonee is widely different, he never risked life or limb to secure his freedom. He never escaped from prison. He was
given his freedom as it were on a silver platter, and thereafter like his fellow citizens lives in peace and comfort. He rejoins his family
and engage in business and enjoys all that life has to offer. The only condition that the Chief Executive requires of him, which condition
he has voluntarily accepted is that he conducts himself and behaves like his fellow citizens, live in peace and abide by the law. To me,
there is absolutely no parity or comparison between him and an escaped convict. Naturally, the reasons for extending the benefits of
prescription of the penalty to an escaped convict do not obtain in the case of petitioner.

Finally, to bolster the opinion of the majority it is claimed that while in jail, petitioner had observed good conduct and was classified as
trustee or penal colonist, and that his release before extinguishing his sentence could have been intended as a reward for his
exemplary conduct. I believe that it is hardly relevant to bring in a pardonee's good behavior while in jail in order to mitigate, even to
condone his violation of the condition of his pardon. For good conduct while in prison, a prisoner is duly and amply rewarded with time
allowance for good conduct, resulting in a substantial reduction of sentence, all according to law (Art. 97, Rev. Penal Code.)

If the conditional pardon issued to the petitioner were intended and meant only as a reward "with little or no thought of exacting any
return from him in the form of restraint from law violations," as claimed in the majority opinion, then the pardon should have been made
absolute and unconditional. But the fact is that it imposed a condition, which the Chief Executive expected to be complied with as
shown by the action of the Office of the Chief Executive in having him rearrested for violation of the pardon. Incidentally, our very Penal
Code (Art. 95) provides that "any person who has been granted a conditional pardon shall incur the obligation of complying strictly with
the conditions imposed, otherwise his non-compliance with any of the conditions specified shall result in the revocation of the pardon . .
. ." This idea of strict compliance with the obligation assumed by a pardonee, embodied in Article 95 is wholly at variance with the claim
of the majority that a conditional pardon is a mere reward with no thought on the part of the Government of exacting fulfillment of the
obligations imposed. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it affirms the decision appealed from.

Bengzon and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
* 87 Phil., 492.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1960 November 26, 1948

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
FLORENTINO ABILONG, defendant-appellant.

Carlos Perfecto for appellant.


Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Manuel Tomacruz for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with evasion of service of sentence under the following
information:

That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a convict
sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of destierro during which he should not enter
any place within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue of final judgment rendered by the municipal
court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No. B-4795 for attempted robbery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
evade the service of said sentence by going beyond the limits made against him and commit vagrancy.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, with
the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs. He is appealing from that decision with the following assignment of error:

1. The lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not
cover evasion of service of "destierro."

Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentence of destierro is not criminally liable under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the said Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons
who are imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of their liberty. He bases his contention on the word "imprisonment"
used in the English text of said article which in part reads as follows:

Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment.

The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text of the Revised Penal Code been in the English language, then the
theory of the appellant could be uphold. However, it is the Spanish text that is controlling in case of doubt. The Spanish text of article
157 in part reads thus:

ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. — Sera castigado con prision correccional en sus grados medio y maximo el
sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme; . .
..

We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the
Spanish text governs (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil., 665, 668). It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a
wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although
the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense
that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. This view
has been adopted in the case of People vs. Samonte, No. 36559 (July 26, 1932; 57 Phil., 968) wherein this Court held, as quoted in the
brief of the Solicitor General that "it is clear that a person under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty and escapes
from the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the prohibited area." Said ruling in that case was ratified by this Court, though,
indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de Jesus, (45 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 9, p. 370)1, where it was held that one evades the service
of his sentence of destierro when he enters the prohibited area specified in the judgment of conviction, and he cannot invoke the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides that its provisions do not apply to those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence.

In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code
(Spanish text), in that during the period of his sentence of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering
the City of Manila, he entered said City.

Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

The legal question raised in this case is whether or not appellant, for having violated his judgment of destierro rendered by the
Municipal Court of Manila, can be sentenced under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code which reads as follows:

Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment. However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows,
gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance
with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum period.

Appellant invokes in his favor the negative opinion of author Guillermo Guevara (Revised Penal Code, 1946, p. 322). This negative
position is supported by another author, Ambrosio Padilla (Revised Penal Code annotated, p. 474).

The prosecution invokes the decision of this Court in People vs. De Jesus, L-1411,2promulgated April 16, 1948, but said decision has
no application because in said case the legal question involved in the case at bar was not raised. The Supreme Court did not consider
the question of interpretation of the wording of article 157. Undoubtedly, there was occasion for considering the question, but the Court
nevertheless failed to do so. This failure to see the question, at the time, is only an evidence that the tribunal is composed of human
beings for whom infallibility is beyond reach.

The prosecution maintains that appellant's contention, supported by two authors who have considered the question, although tenable
under the English text of article 157, is not so under the Spanish text, which is the one controlling because the Revised Penal Code was
originally enacted by the Legislature in Spanish.

There is no quarrel, therefore, that under the above quoted English text, the appellant is entitled to acquittal. The question now is
whether or not the Spanish text conveys a thing different from that which can be read in the English text. The Spanish text reads as
follows:

ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. — Sera castigado con prision correccional en sus grados medio y maximo el
sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme;
pero si la evasion o fuga se hubiere llevado a efecto con escalamiento, fractura de puertas, ventanas, verjas, paredes, techos
o suelos, o empleado ganzuas, llaves falsas, disfraz, engano, violencia o intimidacion, o poniendose de acuerdo con otros
sentenciados o dependientes del establecimiento donde a hallare recluido la pena sera prision correccional en su grado
maximo.

The question boils down to the words "fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme," which are
translated into English "by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." The prosecution contends that
the words "privacion de libertad" in the Spanish text is not the same as the word "imprisonment" in the English text, and that while
"imprisonment" cannot include destierro, "privacion de libertad" may include it.

The reason is, however, the result of a partial point of view because it obliterates the grammatical, logical, ideological function of the
words "fugandose" and "by escaping" in the Spanish and English texts, respectively. There should not be any question that, whatever
meaning we may want to give to the words "privacion de libertad," it has to be conditioned by the verb "fugandose," (by escaping).
"Privacion de libertad" cannot be considered independently of "fugandose."

There seems to be no question that the Spanish "fugandose" is correctly translated into the English "by escaping." Now, is there any
sense in escaping from destierro or banishment, where there is no enclosure binding the hypothetical fugitive? "Fugandose" is one of
the forms of the Spanish verb "fugar," to escape. The specific idea of "evasion" or "escape" is reiterated by the use of said words after
the semi-colon in the Spanish text and after the first period in the English text. Either the verb "to escape" or the substantive noun
"escape" essentially pre-supposes some kind of imprisonment or confinement, except figuratively, and Article 157 does not talk in
metaphors or parables.

"To escape" means "to get away, as by flight or other conscious effort; to break away, get free, or get clear, from or out of detention,
danger, discomfort, or the like; as to escape from prison. To issue from confinement or enclosure of any sort; as gas escapes from the
mains." (Webster's New International Dictionary.)

"Escape" means "act of escaping, or fact or having escaped; evasion of or deliverance from injury or any evil; also the means of
escape. The unlawful departure of a prisoner from the limits of his custody. When the prisoner gets out of prison and unlawfully regains
his liberty, it is an actual escape." (Webster's New International Dictionary.)

"Evasion" means "escape." (Webster's New International Dictionary.) .

The "destierro" imposed on appellant banished him from Manila alone, and he was free to stay in all the remaining parts of the country,
and to go and stay in any part of the globe outside the country. With freedom to move all over the world, it is farfetched to allege that he
is in any confinement from which he could escape.

The words "privacion de libertad" have been correctly translated into the English "imprisonment," which gives the idea exactly conveyed
by "privacion de libertad" in the Spanish text. Undoubtedly, the drafters of the latter could have had used a more precise Spanish word,
but the literary error cannot be taken as a pretext to give to the less precise words a broader meaning than is usually given to them.

"Privacion de libertad," literally meaning "deprivation of liberty or freedom," has always been used by jurist using the Spanish language
to mean "imprisonment." They have never given them the unbounded philosophical scope that would lead to irretrievable absurdities.

Under that unlimited scope, no single individual in the more than two billion inhabitants of the world can be considered free, as the
freest citizen of the freest country is subject to many limitations or deprivations of liberty. Under the prosecution's theory, should an
accused, sentenced to pay a fine of one peso, evade the payment of it, because the fine deprives him of liberty to dispose of his one
peso, he will be liable to be punished under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code to imprisonment of from more that two years to six
years. The iniquity and cruelty of such situation are too glaring and violent to be entertained for a moment under our constitutional
framework.

There is no gainsaying the proposition that to allow the violation of a sentence of destierro without punishment is undesirable, but even
without applying article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, the act of the appellant cannot remain unpunished, because his violation of the
sentence of destierro may be punished as contempt of court, for which imprisonment up to six months is provided.

It is deplorable that article 157 should not provide for a situation presented in this case, but the gap cannot be filled by this Court without
encroaching upon the legislative powers of Congress.

Perhaps it is better that evasions of sentence be punished, as provided by the old Penal Code, by an increased in the evaded penalty.
This will be more reasonable that the penalties provided by article 157, which appear to be disproportionate and arbitrary, because they
place on equal footing the evader of a sentence of one day of imprisonment and a life-termer, one who commits an insignificant offense
and one who perpetrates the most heinous crime. At any rate, this is a problem for Congress to solve.

The appealed decision should be set aside.

BRIONES, J., concurring:

I concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion, because evidently the word "fugandose" in the Spanish text refers to imprisonment, not
to destierro.

Footnotes

1 80 Phil., 746.

2 80 Phil., 746.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation


THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 174730-37, February 09 : 2011]

ROSALIO S. GALEOS, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

[G.R. NOS. 174845-52]

PAULINO S. ONG, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

The consolidated petitions at bar seek to reverse and set aside the Decision [1] promulgated on August 18, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan convicting
petitioners Paulino S. Ong (Ong) of eight counts and Rosalio S. Galeos (Galeos) of four counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The facts are as follows:

Ong was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu on April 16, 1986. He was elected Mayor of the same municipality
in 1988 and served as such until 1998.[2]

On June 1, 1994, Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and Federico T. Rivera (Rivera) for the positions of Construction and Maintenance
Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Office of the Municipal Engineer. [3] Prior to their permanent appointment, Galeos and Rivera were casual
employees of the municipal government.

In their individual Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the year 1993, Galeos answered "No" to the question: "To the best of your
knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the government?" while Rivera indicated "n/a"
on the space for the list of the names of relatives referred to in the said query. [4] The boxes for "Yes" and "No" to the said query were left in blank by
Galeos in his 1994 and 1995 SALN.[5] Rivera in his 1995 SALN answered "No" to the question on relatives in government. [6] In their 1996 SALN, both
Galeos and Rivera also did not fill up the boxes indicating their answers to the same query. [7] Ong's signature appears in all the foregoing documents as
the person who administered the oath when Galeos and Rivera executed the foregoing documents.

In a letter-certification dated June 1, 1994 addressed to Ms. Benita O. Santos, Regional Director, Civil Service Commission (CSC), Regional Office 7,
Cebu City, it was attested that:

This is to certify that pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, all restrictions/requirements
relative to creation of positions, hiring and issuance of appointments, Section 325 on the limitations for personal services in the total/supplemental
appropriation of a local government unit; salary rates; abolition and creation of positions, etc.; Section 76, organizational structure and staffing
pattern; Section 79 on nepotism; Section 80, posting of vacancy and personnel selection board; Section 81 on compensation, etc. have been duly
complied with in the issuance of this appointment.

This is to certify further that the faithful observance of these restrictions/requirements was made in accordance with the requirements of
the Civil Service Commission before the appointment was submitted for review and action. [8] (Emphasis supplied.)

The above certification was signed by Ong and HR Officer-Designate Editha C. Garcia.

On October 1, 1998, the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naga, Cebu filed a letter-complaint[9]before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)-
Visayas against Ong (then incumbent Vice-Mayor of Naga), Galeos and Rivera for dishonesty, nepotism, violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime of falsification of public documents.

On August 11, 2000, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the recommendation of OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas that criminal charges be
filed against Ong, Galeos and Rivera for falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in connection with
the Certification dated June 1, 1994 issued by Ong and the false statements in the 1993, 1995 and 1996 SALN of Rivera and the 1993, 1994, 1995 and
1996 SALN of Galeos.[10]

On August 16, 2000, the following Informations[11] were filed against the petitioners:

Criminal Case No. 26181

That on or about the 14th day of February, 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests
and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1993,filed by accused Rosalio
S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related within
the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact,
accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth
degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos [being] the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26182

That on or about the 15th day of February 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the Office of
the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify
a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections
and Identification of Relatives In the Government Service as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and subscribed and
sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear therein that he has no relatives within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in
truth and in fact, as accused very well knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to accused Paulino S. Ong
within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera's wife being the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26183

That on or about the 1st day of February, 1996, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests
and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1995, filed by accused Rosalio
S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making false statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as
accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth
degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26184

That on or about the 1st day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the Office of
the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify
a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections
and Identification of Relatives In The Government Service, [a]s of December 31, 1995, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and subscribed
and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear therein that he has no relatives within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when
in truth and in fact, as accused very well knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is re lated to accused Paulino S.
Ong within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera's wife being the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26185

That on or about the 5th day of February 1997, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the Office of
the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify
a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections
and Identification of Relatives In The Government Service, [a]s of December 31, 1996, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and subscribed
and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear therein that he has no relatives within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when
in truth and in fact, as accused very well knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is re lated to accused Paulino S.
Ong within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera's wife being the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26186

That on or about the 3rd day of March, 1995, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests
and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Services, as of December 31, 1994, filed by accused Rosalio
S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related within
the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as
accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong, within the fourth
degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26187


That on or about the 11th day of March, 1997, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving and confederating, together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests
and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1996, filed by accused Rosalio S.
Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related within
the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as
accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth
degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26188

That on or about the 1st day of June, 1994, at the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused, a public officer, being the former Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in
relation to office, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting
of a Certification in the form of a letter addressed to Mrs. Benita O. Santos, then Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)-Region VII,
Cebu City dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval of an appointment, certifying therein that there was a faithful compliance of
the requirement/restriction provided under the Civil Service Laws and Rules in the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos, as Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Naga, Cebu, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth
and in fact as accused very well knew that the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos was nepotic being made in violation of the Civil Service
Rules and Laws on Nepotism, as Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused within the fourth degree of consanguinity, since the mother of Rosalio S.
Galeos is the sister of the mother of accused, which Certification caused the approval of the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos, to the detriment of
public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26189

That on or about the 1st day of June, 1994, at the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused, a public officer, being the former Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in
relation to office, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting
of a Certification in the form of a letter addressed to Mrs. Benita O. Santos, then Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Region VII,
Cebu City, dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval of an appointment, certifying therein that there was a faithful compliance of
the requirement/restriction provided under the Civil Service Laws and Rules in the appointment of Federico T. Rivera, a Plumber I of the
Office of the Municipal Engineer, Naga, Cebu, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact as accused
very well knew that the appointment of Federico T. Rivera was nepotic being made in violation of the Civil Service Rules and Laws on
Nepotism, as Federico T. Rivera is related to accused within the fourth degree of affinity, since the mother of Federico T. Rivera's wife is the
sister of the mother of accused, which certification caused the approval of the appointment of Federico T. Rivera, to the detriment of public
interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the Joint Stipulation of Facts submitted to the court a quo, the accused made the following admissions: (1) Ong was the Municipal Mayor of Cebu
at all times relevant to these cases; (2) Ong is related to Galeos, within the fourth degree of consanguinity as his mother is the sister of Galeos' mother,
and to Rivera within the fourth degree of affinity as his mother is the sister of the mother of Rivera's wife; and (3) Galeos and Rivera were employed as
Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Municipal Government of Naga, Cebu at all times relevant to these cases. Ong
likewise admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documentary exhibits presented by the prosecutor (copies of SALNs and Certification dated
June 1, 1994) except for Exhibit "H" (Certification dated June 1, 1994 offered by the prosecution as "allegedly supporting the appointment of Rosalio S.
Galeos"[12]).[13]

As lone witness for the prosecution, Esperidion R. Canoneo testified that he has been a resident of Pangdan, Naga, Cebu since 1930 and claimed to be
friends with Ong, Galeos and Rivera. He knows the mother of Galeos, Pining Suarez or Peñaranda Suarez. But when the prosecutor mentioned "Bining
Suarez," Canoneo stated that Bining Suarez is the mother of Galeos and that Bining Suarez is the same person as "Bernardita Suarez." Ong is related
to Galeos because Ong's mother, Conchita Suarez, and Galeos' mother, Bernardita Suarez, are sisters. As to Rivera, his wife Kensiana,[14] is the
daughter of Mercedes Suarez who is also a sister of Conchita Suarez. He knew the Suarez sisters because they were the neighbors of his grandmother
whom he frequently visited when he was still studying. [15]

Both Galeos and Rivera testified that they only provided the entries in their SALN but did not personally fill up the forms as these were already filled up
by "people in the municipal hall" when they signed them.

Galeos, when shown his 1993 SALN,[16] confirmed his signature thereon. When he was asked if he understood the question "To the best of your
knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity to anyone working in the government?" he answered in the negative.
He claimed that the "X" mark corresponding to the answer "No" to said question, as well as the other entries in his SALN, were already filled up when
he signed it. When shown his SALN for the years 1994, 1995 and 1996, Galeos reiterated that they were already filled up and he was only made to sign
them by an employee of the municipal hall whom he only remembers by face. He also admitted that he carefully read the documents and all the entries
therein were explained to him before he affixed his signature on the document. However, when asked whether he understands the term "fourth degree
of consanguinity or affinity" stated in the SALNs, he answered in the negative. [17]

Rivera testified that he was not aware that his wife was a close relative of the Municipal Mayor because when he asked her, the latter told him that Ong
was a distant relative of hers. Rivera added that it was not Ong who first appointed him as a casual employee but Ong's predecessor, Mayor Vicente
Mendiola.[18]

On the part of Ong, he testified that at the time he was serving as Municipal Mayor of Naga, he did not know that he and Galeos are relatives, as in fact
there are several persons with the surname "Galeos" in the municipality. He signed Galeos' 1993 SALN when it was presented to him by Galeos at his
office. There were many of them who brought such documents and he would administer their oaths on what were written on their SALN, among them
were Galeos and Rivera. He came to know of the defect in the employment of Galeos when the case was filed by his "political enemy" in the
Ombudsman just after he was elected Vice-Mayor in 1998. As to Rivera, Ong claimed that he knows him as a casual employee of the previous
administration. As successor of the former mayor, he had to re-appoint these casual employees and he delegated this matter to his subordinates. He
maintained that his family was not very close to their other relatives because when he was not yet Mayor, he was doing business in Cebu and Manila.
When queried by the court if he had known his relatives while he was campaigning considering that in the provinces even relatives within the 6th and
7th degree are still regarded as close relatives especially among politicians, Ong insisted that his style of campaigning was based only on his
performance of duties and that he did not go from house to house. Ong admitted that he had been a resident of Naga, Cebu since birth. He could no
longer recall those SALN of most of the employees whose oaths he had administered. He admitted that he was the one who appointed Galeos and
Rivera to their permanent positions and signed their official appointment (Civil Service Form No. 33) but he was not aware at that time that he was
related to them. It was only after the filing of the case that he came to know the wife of Rivera. As to the qualifications of these appointees, he no
longer inquired about it and their appointments were no longer submitted to the Selection Board. When the appointment forms for Galeos and Rivera
were brought to his office, the accompanying documents were attached thereto. Ong, however, admitted that before the permanent appointment is
approved by the CSC, he issues a certification to the effect that all requirements of law and the CSC have been complied with.[19]

On August 18, 2005, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision convicting Ong, Galeos and Rivera, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the following:

In Criminal Case No. 26181, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty
and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26182, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty
and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26183, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty
and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26184, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty
and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26185, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty
and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26186, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty
and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26187, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty
and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26188, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong NOT GUILTY for Violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and

In Criminal Case No. 26189, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Falsification of Public
Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium as the
minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.[20]

In its Resolution[21] dated August 28, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration of Ong and Galeos. However, in view of the
death of Rivera on August 22, 2003 before the promulgation of the decision, the cases (Criminal Case Nos. 26182, 26184 and 26185) against him were
dismissed.

In G.R. Nos. 174730-37, Galeos contends that the Sandiganbayan erred when:

1) . . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.

2) . . . IT DID NOT CONSIDER PETITIONER'S VALID DEFENSE OF GOOD FAITH AND LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT THE CRIMES IMPUTED.

3) . . . IT GAVE FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE SOLE WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION. [22]

In support of his assigned errors, Galeos argues that he did not make untruthful or false statements in his SALN since a "statement" requires a positive
averment and thus silence or non-disclosure cannot be considered one. And even if they are considered statements, Galeos contends that they were not
made in a "narration of facts" and the least they could be considered are "conclusions of law." He also argues that the prosecution failed to adduce any
evidence to support the finding that he was aware of their relationship at the time of the execution of the SALN. With the presence of good faith, Galeos
avers that the fourth element of the crime - the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person
- is missing. He also faults the Sandiganbayan for its heavy reliance on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution's sole witness despite the fact
that there are aspects in his testimony that do not inspire belief.

On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 174845-52, Ong argues that the Sandiganbayan erred when:

(a)

. . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.

(b)

IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 26181-26187, [IT HELD] THAT A PERSON MERELY ADMINISTERING THE OATH IN A DOCUMENT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
FALSIFICATION BY MAKING UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.

(c)

. . . IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26189, ... IT INFER[R]ED, DESPITE THE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF ANY RELEVANT AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE, THAT
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT "I" (OR PETITIONER'S EXHIBIT "8") REFERS TO OR SUPPORTS THE APPOINTMENT OF FEDERICO T. RIVERA.[23]

Ong similarly argues that the subject SALN do not contain any untruthful statements containing a narration of facts and that there was no wrongful
intent of injuring a third person at the time of the execution of the documents. He contends that he cannot be held liable for falsification for merely
administering the oath in a document since it is not among the legal obligations of an officer administering the oath to cert ify the truthfulness and/or
veracity of the contents of the document. Neither can he be made liable for falsification regarding the letter-certification he issued since there was no
evidence adduced that it was made to support Rivera's appointment.

In the Joint Memorandum filed by the Ombudsman through the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Sandiganbayan, it was pointed out that Galeos
categorically admitted during his testimony that before affixing his signature on the subject SALN, he carefully read its contents and the entries therein
have been explained to him. Moreover, the admission made by Ong during the pre-trial under the joint stipulation of facts indicated no qualification at
all that he became aware of his relationship with Galeos and Rivera only after the execution of the subject documents. The defense of lack of knowledge
of a particular fact in issue, being a state of mind and therefore self-serving, it can be legally assumed that the admission of that particular fact without
qualification reckons from the time the imputed act, to which the particular fact relates, was committed. As to mistaken reliance on the testimony of
prosecution witness, the analysis and findings in the assailed decision do not show that such testimony was even taken into consideration in arriving at
the conviction of petitioners.[24]
With respect to Ong's liability as conspirator in the execution of the SALN containing untruthful statements, the Special Prosecutor argues that as a
general rule, it is not the duty of the administering officer to ascertain the truth of the statements found in a document. The reason for this is that the
administering officer has no way of knowing if the facts stated therein are indeed truthful. However, when the facts laid out in the document directly
involves the administering officer, then he has an opportunity to know of their truth or falsity. When an administering officer nevertheless administers
the oath despite the false contents of the document, which are known to him to be false, he is liable, not because he violated his duty as an
administering officer, but because he participated in the falsification of a document. [25]

After a thorough review, we find the petitions unmeritorious.

Petitioners were charged with falsification of public document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which states:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. -- The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any
of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

x x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied.)

The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows:

(a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.[26]

In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making
the falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty
to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.[27]
Likewise, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person
because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed.[28]

Falsification of Public Document


by making untruthful statements
concerning relatives in the
government service

All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements have been established by the prosecution.

Petitioners argue that the statements "they are not related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity" and "that Section 79 of the Local
Government Code has been complied with in the issuance of the appointments" are not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law, as both require the
application of the rules on relationship under the law of succession. Thus, they cite People v. Tugbang[29] where it was held that "a statement
expressing an erroneous conclusion of law cannot be considered a falsification." Likewise, in People v. Yanza,[30] it was held that when defendant
certified that she was eligible for the position, she practically wrote a conclusion of law, which turned out to be incorrect or erroneous; hence, she may
not be declared guilty of falsification because the law violated pertains to narration of facts.

We disagree.

A conclusion of law is a determination by a judge or ruling authority regarding the law that applies in a particular case. It is opposed to a finding of fact,
which interprets the factual circumstances to which the law is to be applied. [31] A narration of facts is merely an account or description of the
particulars of an event or occurrence.[32] We have held that a certification by accused officials in the Statement of Time Elapsed and Work Accomplished
qualifies as a narration of facts as contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as it consisted not only of figures and numbers but
also words were used therein giving an account of the status of the flood control project. [33]

In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives "within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity" in the SALN involves merely
a description of such relationship; it does not call for an application of law in a particular set of facts. On the other hand, Articles 963 to 967 of the Civil
Code simply explain the concept of proximity of relationship and what constitute direct and collateral lines in relation to the rules on succession. The
question of whether or not persons are related to each other by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners'
assertion, statements concerning relationship may be proved as to its truth or falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of opinion. When a
government employee is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of facts
contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Further, it bears to stress that the untruthful statements on relationship
have no relevance to the employee's eligibility for the position but pertains rather to prohibition or restriction imposed by law on the appointing
power.

Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in his 1993 SALN if he has relatives in the government service within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the fourth degree
of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are sisters). As to his 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN, Galeos left in blank the boxes for
the answer to the similar query. In Dela Cruz v. Mudlong,[34] it was held that one is guilty of falsification in the accomplishment of his information and
personal data sheet if he withholds material facts which would have affected the approval of his appointment and/or promotion to a government
position. By withholding information on his relative/s in the government service as required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification considering
that the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted in the disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to
Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which
provides:

No person shall be appointed in the local government career service if he is related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the
appointing power or recommending authority.

Section 7 (e), Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V, Executive Order No. 292 otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, provides
that the CSC shall disapprove the appointment of a person who "has been issued such appointment in violation of existing Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations." Among the prohibited appointments enumerated in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, series of 1993 are appointments in the LGUs of
persons who are related to the appointing or recommending authority within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity. [35]

The Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998 dated December 14, 1998) contain
a similar prohibition under Rule XIII, Section 9:

SEC. 9. No appointment in the national, provincial, city or municipal governments or any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government
owned or controlled corporations with original charters shall be made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommendin g authority, or of the chief
of the bureau or office or of the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the word "relative" and the members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of
consanguinity or of affinity.

In the local government career service, the prohibition extends to the relatives of the appointing or recommending authority, within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.

xxxx

The nepotism rule covers all kinds of appointments whether original, promotional, transfer and reemployment regardless of status including casuals and
contractuals except consultants. (Emphasis supplied.)

The second element is likewise present. "Legal obligation" means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts
narrated.[36] Permanent employees employed by local government units are required to file the following: (a) sworn statement of assets, liabilities and
net worth (SALN); (b) lists of relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service; (c) financial and business
interests; and (d) personal data sheets as required by law. [37] A similar requirement is imposed by Section 8 (B) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, thus:

(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives[38]. - It shall be the duty of every public official or employee to identify and disclose to the best of his
knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in the form, manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.

Section 11 of the same law penalizes the violation of the above provision, either with imprisonment or fine, and, in the discretion of the court of
competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office. Such violation if proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall also be sufficient cause
for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

The evidence on record clearly showed that Galeos' negative answer reflected in his SALN is absolutely false. During the trial, both Ong and Galeos
admitted the fact that they are first cousins but denied having knowledge of such relationship at the time the subject documents were executed. The
Sandiganbayan correctly rejected their defense of being unaware that they are related within the fourth degree of consanguinity. Given the Filipino
cultural trait of valuing strong kinship and extended family ties, it was unlikely for Galeos who had been working for several years in the municipal
government, not to have known of his close blood relation to Ong who was a prominent public figure having ran and won in the local elections four
times (three terms as Mayor and as Vice-Mayor in the 1998 elections), after serving as OIC Mayor of the same municipality in 1986 until 1988.

The same thing can be said of Ong, whose unbelievable claim that he had no knowledge that a first cousin (Galeos) was working in the municipal
government and appointed by him to a permanent position during his incumbency, was correctly disregarded by the Sandiganbayan. It was simply
unthinkable that as a resident of Naga, Cebu since birth and a politician at that, he was all the time unaware that he himself appointed to permanent
positions the son of his mother's sister (Galeos) and the husband of his first cousin (Rivera). Indeed, the reality of local politics and Filipino culture
renders his defense of good faith (lack of knowledge of their relationship) unavailing. Despite his knowledge of the falsity of the statement in the
subject SALN, Ong still administered the oath to Galeos and Rivera who made the false statement under oath. The Sandiganbayan thus did not err in
finding that Ong connived with Galeos and Rivera in making it appear in their SALN that they have no relative within the fourth degree of
consanguinity/affinity in the government service.

Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to commit the crime,[39] as it can be inferred from the acts of the accused
which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime. [40] In this case, Ong administered the oaths to Galeos and
Rivera in the subject SALN not just once, but three times, a clear manifestation that he concurred with the making of the untruthful statement therein
concerning relatives in the government service.

Falsification by making
untruthful statements
in the Certification re:
compliance with the
prohibition on nepotism

As chief executive and the proper appointing authority, Ong is deemed to have issued the certification recommending to the CSC approval of Galeos'
appointment although he admitted only the authenticity and due execution of Exhibit "I". Since Ong was duty bound to observe the prohibition on
nepotistic appointments, his certification stating compliance with Section 79 [41] of R.A. No. 7160 constitutes a solemn affirmation of the fact that the
appointee is not related to him within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Having executed the certification despite his knowledge that
he and Rivera were related to each other within the fourth degree of affinity, as in fact Rivera was his cousin-in-law because the mother of Rivera's wife
is the sister of Ong's mother, Ong was guilty of falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in a narration of facts. He also took
advantage of his official position as the appointing authority who, under the Civil Service rules, is required to issue such certification.

The importance of the certification submitted to the CSC by the proper appointing authority in the local government unit, regarding compliance with the
prohibition against nepotism under R.A. No. 7160 cannot be overemphasized. Under Section 67, Book V, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code of
1987, a head of office or appointing official who issues an appointment or employs any person in violation of Civil Service Law and Rules or who
commits fraud, deceit or intentional misrepresentation of material facts concerning other civil service matters, or anyone who violates, refuses or
neglects to comply with any of such provisions or rules, may be held criminally liable. In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,[42] we held that mere
issuance of appointment in favor of a relative within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity is sufficient to constitute a violation of the law.
Although herein petitioners were prosecuted for the criminal offense of falsification of public document, it becomes obvious that the requirement of
disclosure of relationship to the appointing power in the local government units simply aims to ensure strict enforcement of the prohibition against
nepotism.

Relevant then is our pronouncement in Dacoycoy:

Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In Debulgado, we stressed that "[T]the basic purpose or
objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one." "The Court was
unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive." If not within the exceptions, it is a form of
corruption that must be nipped in the bud or abated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what we need now is
not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the `outstanding' civil servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to
insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the
law."[43] (Emphasis supplied.)

The prosecution having established with moral certainty the guilt of petitioners for falsification of public documents under Article 171 (4) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, we find no legal ground to reverse petitioners' conviction.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated August 18, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 26181-26187 and 26189
is AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio Morales, (Chairperson), Brion, Bersamin, and Mendoza,* JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

*
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 944-A dated February 9, 2011.

[1]
Rollo (G.R. Nos. 174730-35), pp. 51-73. Penned by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (now a Member of this Court) and concurred in by
Associate Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (also now a Member of this Court) and Efren N. Dela Cruz.

[2]
TSN, May 9, 2002, pp. 41-42, 62.

[3]
Exhibits "J" and "K", folder of exhibits.
[4]
Exhibits "A" and "B", id.

[5]
Exhibits "C" and "F", id.

[6]
Exhibit "D", id.

[7]
Exhibits "E" and "G", id.

[8]
Exhibit "I", id.

[9]
Records, Vol. I, pp. 13-16.

[10]
Id. at 5-12.

[11]
Separate folders.

[12]
Records, Vol. 1, p. 181.

[13]
Id. at 202-204.

[14]
"Quinciana" in some parts of the TSN.

[15]
TSN, May 3, 2001, pp. 11-18.

[16]
Exhibit "A," folder of exhibits.

[17]
TSN, May 9, 2002, pp. 22-32.

[18]
Id. at 12-19.

[19]
Id. at 33, 42-47, 50-59, 64-72.

[20]
Rollo (G.R. Nos. 174730-37), pp. 69-72.

[21]
Id. at 94-98.

[22]
Id. at 25.

[23]
Rollo (G.R. Nos. 174845-52), p. 18.

[24]
Rollo (G.R. Nos. 174730-37), pp. 192-193, 203-207.

[25]
Id. at 199-201.

[26]
Fullero v. People, G.R. No. 170583, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 97, 114, citing Santos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 71523-25, December 8,
2000, 347 SCRA 386, 424.

[27]
Id., citing Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law (14 th Edition, Revised 1998), BOOK TWO, ARTS. 114-367, p. 216, People v. Uy, 101
Phil. 159, 163 (1957) and United States v. Inosanto, 20 Phil. 376, 378 (1911); Adaza v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154886, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA
460, 478-479.

[28]
Regidor, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 166086-92, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 244, 263, citing Lastrilla v. Granda, G.R. No. 160257, January 31, 2006,
481 SCRA 324, 345, Lumancas v. Intas, G.R. No. 133472, December 5, 2000, 347 SCRA 22, 33-34, further citing People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913,
918 (1955).

[29]
G.R. No. 76212, April 26, 1991, 196 SCRA 341, 350.

[30]
107 Phil. 888, 890-891 (1960).

[31]
http://definitions.uslegal.com/c/conclusion-of-law/.

[32]
Bartolo v. Sandiganbayan, Second Division, G.R. No. 172123, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 387, 394.

[33]
Id.

[34]
Adm. Matter No. P-985, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 280.

[35]
VII (Prohibitions on Appointments), 2(b).

[36]
Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, (17 th Edition, Rev. 2008), p. 223.

[37]
Art. 175, Rule XXII, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991.

[38]
Sec. 3. x x x

xxxx

(k) "Relatives" refers to any and all persons related to a public official or employee within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity,
including bilas, inso and balae.

[39]
People v. Herida, G.R. No. 127158, March 5, 2001, 353 SCRA 650, 659.

[40]
People v. Lenantud, G.R. No. 128629, February 22, 2001, 352 SCRA 549, 563.

[41]
Sec. 79. Limitation on Appointments. - No person shall be appointed in the career service of the local government if he is related within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the appointing or recommending authority.

[42]
G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999, 306 SCRA 425, 435.

[43]
Id. at 438-439.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 186739-960 April 17, 2013

LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, Petitioner,


vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal seeking to nullify the December 19, 2008 Decision1 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos.
SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259, which convicted Leovegildo R. Ruzol (Ruzol), then Mayor of General Nakar, Quezon, of Usurpation of
Official Functions penalized under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative
Assembly composed of civil society groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in view of regulating and
monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest products within the vicinity of General Nakar. Among those present in the organizational
meeting were Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) Rogelio Delgado Sr. and Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen,
the OCD-DD of the Prelature of Infanta Emeritus of the Catholic Church and Chairperson of TIPAN, an environmental non-government
organization that operates in the municipalities of General Nakar, Infanta and Real in Quezon province. During the said assembly, the
participants agreed that to regulate the salvaged forests products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a permit to
transport after payment of the corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer. 2

Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport salvaged forest products were issued to various
recipients, of which forty-three (43) bore the signature of Ruzol while the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178) were signed by his
co-accused Guillermo T. Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar. 3

On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of
Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259.

Except for the date of commission, the description of forest product, person given the permit, and official receipt number, the said
Informations uniformly read:

That, on (date of commission) or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in General Nakar, Quezon, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol and Guillermo M. Sabiduria, both public officers, being then the
Municipal Mayor and Municipal Administrator, respectively, of General Nakar, Quezon, taking advantage of their official position and
committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring and confederating with each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, issue permit to transport (description of forest product) to (person given the permit) under O.R. No. (official receipt number)
under the pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, to the damage and prejudice of the of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The details for each Information are as follows:5

Criminal Date of Description of Forest Person Given the Official


Case No. Commission Product Permit Receipt No.

0039 20 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft malaruhat/ David Villareal Jr. 1623446
marang
0040 16 Jan. 2004 600 board ft lawaan Pepito Aumentado 1623463
0041 15 Jan. 2004 100 pcs. malaruhat Francisco Mendoza 1708352
(assorted sizes)
0042 15 Jan. 2004 300 cubic m or 3,000 board Edmundo dela Vega 1708353
ft good lumber
0043 15 Jan. 2004 600 board ft good lumber David Villareal, Jr. 1708321
0044 15 Jan. 2004 1,050 board ft good lumber Romeo Sabiduria 1708322
0045 12 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft malaruhat Nestor Astejada 1625521
0046 09 Jan. 2004 4,000 board ft good lumber Naty Orozco 1623421
(assorted sizes)
0047 08 Jan. 2004 700 board ft lauan Winnie Aceboque 1623415
0048 05 Jan. 2004 500 board ft lauan Edmundo dela Vega 1623041
0049 07 Jan. 2004 4 x 5 haligi Mercy Vargas 1623314
0050 06 Jan. 2004 good lumber Mario Pujeda 1623310
0051 21 Oct. 2002 1,000 board ft sliced Conchita Odi 0830825
lumber
0052 21 Oct. 2002 400 board ft sliced lumber Lita Crisostomo 0830826
0053 28 Oct. 2002 450 board ft marang Agosto Astoveza 0830829
lumber
0054 08 Jan. 2003 300 board ft sliced lumber Edna E. Moises 0943941
(assorted sizes)
0055 13 Jan. 2003 1,500 board ft sliced Dante Z. Medina 0943964
lumber (assorted sizes)
0056 16 Jan. 2003 400 board ft sliced lumber Johnny A. Astoveza 0943975
(assorted sizes)
0057 27 Jan. 2003 7 pcs sliced lumber & 1 Sonny Leynes 1181827
piece 18 roda
0058 14 Feb. 2003 2,000 pcs trophy (wood Flordeliza Espiritu 1182033
carvings)
0059 17 Feb. 2003 700 board ft sliced lumber Nestor Astejada 1181917
(assorted sizes)
0060 18 Feb. 2003 1,632 board ft hard wood, Arthur/ Lanie 1182207
kisame & sanipa Occeña
0061 20 Feb. 2004 126 pcs lumber Lamberto 1708810
Aumentado
0062 3 March 2003 450 board ft hard wood Nestor Astoveza 1182413
(assorted sizes)
0063 6 March 2003 160 pcs sliced lumber Remedios Orozco 1182366
(assorted sizes)
0064 10 March 2003 1,500 board ft malaruhat Nestor Astejada 1181996
(assorted sizes)
0065 11 March 2003 900 board ft sliced lumber Fernando Calzado 1182233
(assorted sizes)
0066 13 March 2003 1,408 board ft hard wood Nestor Astejada 1182553
(assorted sizes)
0067 20 March 2003 90 pcs. sliced lumber Remy Orozco 1182157
(assorted sizes)
0068 21 March 2003 90 pcs. sliced lumber Rene Francia 1182168
(assorted sizes)
0069 25 March 2003 500 board ft lumber Thelma Ramia 1182179
(assorted sizes)
0070 26 March 2003 1 pc. 60 x 75 bed (narra) Roy Justo 1182246
finished product
0071 14 April 2004 95 pcs. kalap (9 ft.); 6 pcs. Anita Solloza 3651059
post (10 ft.) & 500 pcs.
Anahaw
0072 08 April 2004 460 board ft lumber Remy Orozco 3651101
(assorted sizes)
0073 14 April 2004 69 pcs. sliced lumber Dindo America 3651101
(assorted sizes)
0074 23 April 2003 870 board ft hard lumber Amado Pradillada 3651268
(assorted sizes)
0075 24 April 2003 400 board ft lumber Romy Buendicho 3651237
(assorted sizes)
0076 24 April 2003 400 board ft rattan Emmanuel 3651324
Buendicho
0077 30 April 2004 1,000 board ft good lumber Mylene Moises 3651335-C
(assorted sizes)
0078 30 April 2004 500 board ft sliced lumber Carlito Vargas 3651336
(assorted sizes)
0079 08 May 2003 72 x 78 bed (narra); 3 pcs. Fely Justo 3651519
60 x 75 bed (ling manok)
& 1 pc. 48 x 75 ed (kuling
manok) finished product
0080 12 May 2003 294 board ft lumber Virgilio Cuerdo 3650927
0081 13 May 2003 43 pcs. sliced lumber Amando Lareza 3651783
(assorted sizes)
0082 14 May 2003 750 board ft good lumber Wilma Cuerdo 3651529
0083 15 May 2003 440 board ft lumber Marte Cuballes 3651532
0084 15 May 2003 214 pcs. 2x6x7 or 1,500 Anneliza Vargas 3651531
board ft finished product
0085 26 May 2003 57 pcs. sliced lumber Danny Sanchez 3651585
(assorted sizes)
0086 27 May 2003 400 board ft cut woods Emy Francia 3651394
0087 30 May 2003 300 board ft lumber Daisy Cuerdo 3650943
0088 30 May 2003 1,000 board ft lumber Lea Astoveza 3651161
(assorted sizes)
0089 05 June 2003 130 pcs. or 1,500 board ft Jose Noly Moises 3651809
lumber cut woods
0090 06 June 2003 300 board ft lumber Mercy Escaraga 3651169
0091 18 June 2003 800 board ft good lumber Dante Medena 3651749
0092 24 June 2003 28 pcs. good lumber Virgilio Cuerdo 1247102
(assorted sizes)
0093 25 June 2003 190 pcs. good lumber Dante Medina 1247205
(assorted sizes)
0094 02 July 2003 800 board ft. good lumber Dante Medina 1247221
0095 02 July 2003 105 pcs. fresh cut lumber Emmanuel Lusang 1247167
(assorted sizes)
0096 04 July 2003 Assorted sizes of good Alberto dela Cruz 1247172
Lumber
0097 07 July 2003 Bulukan woods Conchita Ligaya 1247175
0098 07 July 2003 6 pcs. Haligi Jane Bulagay 1247173
0099 11 July 2003 700 board ft. cut woods Dominador Aveno 1247452
0100 14 July 200 800 board ft. cut wood/ Dante Medina 1247180
lumber
0101 16 July 2003 600 board ft. cut lumber Rachelle Solana 1247182
0102 23 July 2003 1,200 board ft. hard lumber Necito Crisostomo 1247188
0103 23 July 2003 700 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1247129
0104 28 July 2003 959 board ft. cut lumber Necito Crisostomo 1247428
0105 29 July 2003 600 board ft. lumber Marilou Astejada 1247191
0106 01 Aug. 2003 1,000 board Malaruhat Ruel Ruzol 1247198
0107 05 Aug. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Virgilio Aumentado 1322853
0108 08 Aug. 2003 4.8 cubic ft. Amlang Rosa Turgo 1322862
woods
0109 12 Aug. 2003 788 Board ft. cut woods Maria Teresa 1322865
Adornado
0110 25 Aug. 2003 500 board ft. assorted Romy Buendicho 1322929
lumber
0111 28 Aug. 2003 2 sala sets Roy Justo 1322879
0112 29 Aug. 2003 456 pieces good lumber Marilou Astejada 1323056
(assorted sizes)
0113 03 Sept. 2003 5 cubic ft softwoods Rosa Turgo 1322834
(assorted sizes)
0114 05 Sept. 2003 1,000 board ft. good Agustin Vargas 1323064
lumber (assorted sizes)
0115 08 Sept. 2003 80 pcs. wood post Peter Banton 1323124
0116 09 Sept. 2003 1 forward load (soft wood) Efifania V. Astrega 1323023
0117 11 Sept. 2003 1 forward load (assorted Noling Multi 1323072
species) Purpose Corp.
0118 11 Sept. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Agustin Vargas 1323071
0119 12 Sept. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1323073
(assorted sizes)
0120 15 Sept. 2003 950 board ft. Malaruhat Edna Moises 1323128
0121 16 Sept. 2003 14 pcs. Panel door Roy Justo 1323041
0122 17 Sept. 2003 546 board ft. soft woods Mr. Marquez 1322951
0123 19 Sept. 2003 1,600 board ft. good Decembrano 1323085
lumber (assorted sizes) Sabiduria
0124 22 Sept. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber Jeffrey dela Vega 1323095
0125 22 Sept. 2003 1 Jeep load hard wood Federico Marquez 1323100
0126 25 Sept. 2003 750 board ft. Malaruhat/ Virgilio Villareal 1323252
Marang
0127 03 Oct. 2003 750 board ft. Malaruhat/ Virgilio Villareal 1323252
Marang
0128 02 Oct. 2003 60 pcs. good lumber Nestor Astorza 1482662
(assorted sizes)
0129 03 Oct. 2003 1,600 board ft. good Virgilio Villareal 1482666
lumber (assorted sizes)
0130 03 Oct. 2003 400 board ft. Malaruhat Amado Pradillada 1482815
(assorted sizes)
0131 03 Oct. 2003 1 full load (soft wood) Flordeliza Espiritu 1482867
0132 03 Oct. 2003 6,342 board ft sticks Joel Pacaiqui 1482716
0133 03 Oct. 2003 6,090 board ft sticks Joel Pacaiqui 1482717
0134 07 Oct. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber Mylene Moises 1482670
(assorted sizes)
0135 13 Oct. 2003 600 board ft. Lawaan Winnie Acebaque 1482734
(assorted sizes)
0136 13 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. Malaruhat Nestor Bautista 1482740
(assorted sizes)
0137 13 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. Lawaan Trinidad Guerero 1482774
(assorted sizes)
0138 16 Oct. 2003 700 board ft. Lawaan Federico Marquez 1482782
0139 17 Oct. 2003 4,602 board ft. good Nenita Juntreal 1482787
lumber (assorted sizes)
0140 20 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. Malaruhat Belen Ordinado 1482793
(assorted sizes)
0141 23 Oct. 2003 66 pcs. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1482847
(assorted sizes)
0142 25 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. good Dante Medina 1323277
lumber
0143 27 Oct. 2003 1,800 board ft. good Dante Medina 1482951
lumber (assorted sizes)
0144 28 Oct. 2003 1,254 board ft. good Jonathan Supremo 1323281
lumber (assorted sizes)
0145 28 Oct. 2003 2,500 board ft. lumber Ramir Sanchez 1483001
(assorted sizes)
0146 28 Oct. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Rolando Franela 1323280
(assorted sizes)
0147 03 Nov. 2003 850 finished products Naty Orozco 1483020
(cabinet component,
balusters, door jambs)
0148 03 Nov. 2003 400 board ft. good lumber Elizabeth Junio 1483022
(assorted sizes) & 6
bundles of sticks
0149 10 Nov. 2003 1,770 board ft. good Dante Medina 1483032
lumber (assorted sizes)
0150 10 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1483033
0151 12 Nov. 2003 900 board ft. lumber Federico Marquez 1483041
(assorted sizes)
0152 12 Nov. 2003 Mini dump truck good Rizalito Francia 1483042
lumber (assorted sizes)
0153 14 Nov. 2003 500 components, 100 pcs Annie Gonzales 1483070
balusters (assorted sizes of
stringers, tassels)
0154 14 Nov. 2003 700 board ft. good lumber Winnie Aceboque 1323287
0155 17 Nov. 2003 1,600 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1483072
lumber (assorted sizes)
0156 05 Nov. 2003 400 board ft. Tapil & 7 Belen Ordinado 1483023
pcs. 1x10x14
0157 05 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Leonardo Aveno 1623003
(assorted sizes)
0158 05 Nov. 2003 150 board ft. good lumber Francisco Mendoza 1483027
0159 07 Nov. 2003 433 bundles of semi-finished products Naty Orozco 1483031
0160 08 Nov. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Armando Pradillada 1483134
(assorted sizes)
0161 25 Nov. 2003 30 pcs. sliced lumber Ariel Molina 1632059
0162 19 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. good Dante Medina 1623053
lumber (assorted sizes)
0163 20 Nov. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Maria Teresa 1323288
(assorted sizes) Adornado
0164 20 Nov. 2003 1,500 board ft. good Romeo Sabiduria 1483080
lumber (assorted sizes)
0165 21 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. Malaruhat Dante Medina 1623057
lumber (assorted sizes)
0166 25 Oct. 2003 2,000 board ft. lumber Federico Marquez 1322982
(assorted sizes)
0167 25 Nov. 2003 500 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1483090
0168 25 Nov. 2003 70 bundles of Rattan Manuel Buendicho 1483095
(assorted sizes)
0169 28 Nov. 2003 6,542 board ft. finished Nenita Juntareal 1623019
products (cabinet and
components)
0170 01 Dec. 2003 400 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1623061
0171 01 Dec. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1483123
0172 01 Dec. 2003 1,500 board ft. lumber Belen Ordinado 1623063
(assorted sizes)
0173 03 Dec. 2003 500 board ft. Laniti Rosa Turgo 1483125
0174 04 Dec. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Dante Medina 1483127
0175 04 Dec. 2003 26 pcs. lumber (assorted Nenita Juntareal 1483128
sizes) & 2 bundles of sticks
0176 05 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1483131
0177 08 Dec. 2003 678 board ft. good lumber Elenor Rutaquio 1623082
(assorted sizes)
0178 08 Dec. 2003 200 board ft. lumber William Rutaquio 1623010
(assorted sizes)
0179 09 Dec. 2003 1,800 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1623090
0180 12 Dec. 2003 One jeep load of good Angelo Avellano 1623099
lumber (assorted sizes)
0181 12 Dec. 2003 One jeep load of good Angelo Avellano 1623099
lumber (assorted sizes)
0182 12 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1483147
0183 16 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. Malaruhat Jonathan Marcial 1623033
0184 16 Dec. 2003 650 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1482987
0185 16 Dec. 2003 1,000 board ft. Malaruhat Dante Medina 1482986
0186 18 Dec. 2003 100 board ft. lumber Aladin Aveno 1322992
0187 19 Dec. 2003 780 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1323000
0188 19 Dec. 2003 1,500 board ft. coco Felecita Marquez 1322998
lumber
0189 22 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. lumber Belen C. Ordinado 1623209
0190 29 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. Lawaan Winnie Aciboque 1623211
0191 29 Dec. 2003 300 board ft. lumber Yolanda Crisostomo 1623210
0192 30 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. Lawaan Pepito Aumentado 1623215
0193 20 Nov. 2003 150 board ft. good lumber Francisco Mendoza 1483086
(assorted sizes)
0194 30 June 2003 450 board ft. fresh cut Mylene Moises 1247126
lumber
0195 13 July 2001 1 L-300 load of finished Evangeline Moises 9894843-Q
and semi-finished products
0196 02 July 2001 96 pcs. good lumber Rollie L. Velasco 9894996-Q
(assorted sizes)
0197 07 May 2004 1,500 board ft. babayahin Nemia Molina 200647
lumber
0198 19 April 2004 107 pcs. sliced lumber Carlo Gudmalin 1868050
(assorted sizes)
0199 5 March 2004 10 pcs. Deadwood Elizabeth Junio 1708899
(Bulakan)
0200 2 March 2004 600 board ft. Amalang Roda Turgo 1867608
wood
0201 1 March 2004 149 sliced lumber (assorted Necito Crisostomo 1708891
sizes)
0202 1 March 2004 80 bundles of rattan Manuel Buendicho 1708890
0203 23 Feb. 2004 30 pcs. sliced lumber Leonardo Aveno 1708863
(assorted sizes)
0204 13 Feb. 2004 50 pcs. sliced sliced lumber Federico Marquez 1708698
(assorted sizes)
0205 12 Feb. 2004 69 pcs. sliced sliced lumber Florencio Borreo 1708694
(assorted sizes)
0206 17 Feb. 2004 50 pcs. sliced sliced lumber Ronnie Astejada 1708774
(assorted sizes)
0207 04 Feb. 2004 600 board ft. sliced lumber Pepito Aumentado 1708486
(assorted sizes)
0208 1 March 2004 21 pcs. Lawaan (assorted Atan Marquez 1708878
sizes)
0209 4 Feb. 2004 563 board ft. sliced lumber Decembrano 1708487
(assorted sizes) Sabiduria
0210 06 Feb. 2004 80 pcs. Buukan (Ugat) Maila S. Orozco 1708547
0211 30 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft. good Pepito Aumentado 1708534
lumber (assorted sizes)
0212 29 Jan. 2004 950 board ft. good lumber Leonardo Moises 1708528
(assorted sizes)
0213 28 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft. good Pepito Aumentado 1708518
lumber (assorted sizes)
0214 28 Jan. 2004 5, 000 board ft. good Carmelita Lorenzo 1708521
lumber (assorted sizes)
0215 28 Jan. 2004 350 board ft. good lumber Amando Pradillada 1708368
(assorted sizes)
0216 23 Jan. 2004 800 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1708517
(assorted sizes)
0217 21 Jan. 2004 1,050 board ft. good Romeo Sabiduria 1708508
lumber (assorted sizes)
0218 06 April 2004 800 board ft. sliced lumber Mylene Moises 1868025
(assorted sizes)
0219 11 March 2004 300 pieces or 1, 200 board Ernesto Aumentado 1708975
ft. sliced lumber (assorted
sizes)
0220 02 Feb. 2004 7,000 board ft. good Carmelita Lorenzo 1708376
lumber
0221 08 Jan. 2004 600 board ft. Malaruhat Nestor Astejada 1623451
0222 10 Dec. 2003 300 pieces good lumber Francisco Mendoza 1623096
0223 18 Nov. 2003 6,432 board ft. assorted Naty Orozco 1483048
species
0224 30 Oct. 2003 8,000 board ft. Malauban Ma. Teresa 1483019
Adornado
0225 21 Oct. 2003 1,770 board ft. good Dante Medina 1482796
lumber (assorted sizes)
0226 21 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. Malaruhat Leonardo S. Aveno 1323271
(assorted sizes)
0227 21 Oct. 2003 10,875 board ft. lumber Annie Gonzales 1323273
(assorted sizes)
0228 20 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. sliced lumber Bernardo Gonzalvo 1482835
0229 17 Oct. 2003 6,090 board ft. lumber Naty Orozco 1482834
0230 17 Oct. 2003 16 pcs. panel door Roy Justo 1482743
(finished product)
0231 01 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. good lumber Analiza Vargas 1482710
(assorted sizes)
0232 01 Oct. 2003 700 board ft. Malaruhat Engr. Mercado 1482760
(assorted sizes)
0233 30 Sept. 2003 500 board ft. sliced lumber Mylene Moises 1482810
(assorted sizes)
0234 29 Sept. 2003 800 board ft. good lumber Wennie Acebuque 1482703
(assorted sizes)
0235 15 Sept. 2003 1,500 board ft. malaruhat Decembrano 1323076
lumber (assorted sizes) Sabiduria
0236 10 Sept. 2003 200 board ft. good lumber Junier Franquia 1323027
(assorted sizes)
0237 29 Aug. 2003 600 board ft. good lumber Annaliza Vargas 1322830
0238 07 Aug. 2003 2,000 board ft. lumber Abilardo dela Cruz 1247200
(assorted sizes)
0239 06 Aug. 2003 1,000 board ft. hardwood Jennifer Nudalo 1322802
0240 25 June 2003 600 board ft. good lumber Roy Justo 1247024
0241 26 May 2003 800 board ft. lumber Adelino Lareza 3651096
0242 26 May 2003 Assorted sizes good lumber Rollie Velasco 3651587
0243 23 May 2003 342 sliced lumber (assorted Dolores S. Gloria 3651499
sizes)
0244 20 May 2003 500 board ft. lumber Marylyn de Loreto/ 3651574
Melita Masilang
0245 02 May 2003 123 pieces sliced lumber Armando Lariza 3651656
(assorted sizes)
0246 17 Feb. 2003 70 pieces sliced lumber Efren Tena/ Romeo 1182204
(assorted sizes) Serafines
0247 07 Feb. 2003 1 piece narra bed; 1 piece Roy D. Justo 1182060
narra panel door; 6 pcs.
Refrigerator stand & 1 pc.
Narra cabinet (finished
product)
0248 05 Dec. 2002 140 pcs. round poles Lamberto R. Ruzol 0943647
0249 20 Nov. 2002 500 board ft. lumber Luz Astoveza 0943618
(assorted sizes)
0250 30 Oct. 2002 1,200 board ft. sliced Arceli Fortunado 0830698
lumber (assorted sizes)
0251 04 Oct. 2002 500 board ft. Huling Roy Justo 0830646
Manok
0252 27 Sept. 2002 300 board ft. sliced lumber Roy Justo 0830625
(assorted sizes)
0253 24 Sept. 2002 1,000 board ft. sliced Inna L. Customerado 0830771
lumber (assorted sizes)
0254 23 Sept. 2002 1,000 board ft. sliced Normelita L. 0830610
lumber (assorted sizes) Curioso
0255 03 Sept. 2002 2,000 pcs. trophy (wood Floredeliza D. 686642
carvings) Espiritu
0256 7 March 2002 2,000 sets trophy (wood Floredeliza D. 090549
carvings) Espiritu
0257 03 Dec. 2001 10,000 sets trophy (wood Floredeliza D. 090769
carvings) Espiritu
0258 12 Sept. 2001 1,075 board ft of sticks & Lea A. Rivera 7786333
1,450 board ft. Bollilo
(assorted sizes)
0259 07 Oct. 2003 Assorted lumber Roy D. Justo 1482765

Considering that the facts are undisputed, the parties during Pre-Trial agreed to dispense with the presentation of testimonial evidence
and submit the case for decision based on the documentary evidence and joint stipulation of facts contained in the Pre-Trial Order.
Thereafter, the accused and the prosecution submitted their respective memoranda. 6

Ruzol's Defense

As summarized by the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol professes his innocence based on following arguments:

(1) As Chief Executive of the municipality of General Nakar, Quezon, he is authorized to issue permits to transport forest
products pursuant to RA 7160 which give the LGU not only express powers but also those powers that are necessarily implied
from the powers expressly granted as well as those that are necessary, appropriate or incidental to the LGU’s efficient and
effective governance. The LGU is likewise given powers that are essential to the promotion of the general welfare of the
inhabitants. The general welfare clause provided in Section 16, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I of R.A. 7160 is a massive grant of
authority that enables LGUs to perform or exercise just about any power that will benefit their local constituencies.

(2) In addition to the foregoing, R.A. 7160 has devolved certain functions and responsibilities of the DENR to the LGU. And the
permits to transport were issued pursuant to the devolved function to manage and control communal forests with an area not
exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers.

(3) The Permits to Transport were issued as an incident to the payment of Transport Fees levied by the municipality for the
use of local public roads for the transport of salvaged forest products. Under (a) Section 5, Article X of the Constitution, (b)
Section 129, Chapter I, Title One Book II of R.A. 7160, and (c) Section 186, Article Five, Chapter 5, Tile One, Book II of R.A.
7160, the municipality is granted the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy fees in accordance therewith.

(4) The only kind of document the DENR issues relating to log, timber or lumber is denominated "Certificate of Timber Origin"
or CTO for logs and "Certificate of Lumber Origin" or CLO for lumber; hence, even if accused issued the Transport Permits on
his side, a person wanting to transport the said forest products would have to apply and obtain a CTO or CLO from the DENR.
The Transport Permits issued by the accused were never taken as a substitute for the CTO or CLO, and this is the reason why
said permits contain the annotation "Subject to DENR rules, laws and regulations."

(5) There is no proof of conspiracy between the accused. The Transport Permits were issued by accused Sabiduria in his
capacity as Municipal Administrator and his mere issuance is not enough to impute upon the accused Ruzol any transgression
or wrongdoing that may have been committed in the issuance thereof following the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan (180
SCRA 309).

(6) The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly authorized the issuance of the 221 Transport permits through the Provincial
Environment and natural Resources officer Rogelio Delgado Sr., in a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly.

(7) The accused cannot be convicted of Usurpation of Authority since they did not act "under the pretense of official position,"
accused Ruzol having issued the permits in his capacity as Mayor and there was no pretense or misrepresentation on his part
that he was an officer of DENR.7

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

After due consideration, the Sandiganbayan rendered on December 19, 2008 a Decision, acquitting Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty
as charged, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves these cases as follows:

1. Against the accused LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, judgment is hereby rendered finding him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of Two Hundred Twenty One (221) counts of the offense of Usurpation of Official Functions as defined and penalized under
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer for each case a straight penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY.

However, in the service of his sentences, accused Ruzol shall be entitled to the benefit of the three-fold rule as provided in
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

2. On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused GUILLERMO M. SABIDURIA is ACQUITTED of all 221 charges. The cash
bond posted by him for his provisional liberty may now be withdrawn by said accused upon presentation of the original receipt
evidencing payment thereof subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. The hold departure procedure issued by
this Court dated 16 April 2008 is set aside and the Order issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 29 April 2008 including
the name of Sabiduria in the Hold Departure List is ordered recalled and cancelled.

SO ORDERED.8

The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the authority to issue transport permits with respect to salvaged forest
products lies with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and that such authority had not been devolved to the
local government of General Nakar.9 To the graft court, Ruzol’s issuance of the subject permits constitutes usurpation of the official
functions of the DENR.

The Issue

The critical issue having a determinative bearing on the guilt or innocence of Ruzol for usurpation revolves around the validity of the
subject permits to transport, which in turn resolves itself into the question of whether the authority to monitor and regulate the
transportation of salvaged forest product is solely with the DENR, and no one else.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

Subsidiary Issue:

Whether the Permits to Transport Issued by Ruzol Are Valid

In ruling that the DENR, and not the local government units (LGUs), has the authority to issue transportation permits of salvaged forest
products, the Sandiganbayan invoked Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705), otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines and in relation to Executive Order No. 192, Series of 1987 (EO 192), or the Reorganization Act of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.

Section 5 of PD 705 provides:

Section 5. Jurisdiction of Bureau. The Bureau of Forest Management shall have jurisdiction and authority over all forest land, grazing
lands, and all forest reservations including watershed reservations presently administered by other government agencies or
instrumentalities.

It shall be responsible for the protection, development, management, regeneration, and reforestation of forest lands; the regulation and
supervision of the operation of licensees, lessees and permittees for the taking or use of forest products therefrom or the occupancy or
use thereof; the implementation of multiple use and sustained yield management in forest lands; the protection, development and
preservation of national parks, marine parks, game refuges and wildlife; the implementation of measures and programs to prevent
kaingin and managed occupancy of forest and grazing lands; in collaboration with other bureaus, the effective, efficient and economic
classification of lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules, and
regulations.

The Bureau shall regulate the establishment and operation of sawmills, veneer and plywood mills and other wood processing plants
and conduct studies of domestic and world markets of forest products. (Emphasis Ours.)

On the other hand, the pertinent provisions of EO 192 state:

SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands of the public
domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as maybe provided for by law in order to ensure equitable
sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos.

xxxx

SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following functions:

xxxx

(d) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposal lands, and mineral resources and in the process
of exercising such control the Department shall impose appropriate payments, fees, charges, rentals and any such revenues
for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources.

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(j) Regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country’s forest, land and mineral resources;

(k) Assume responsibility for the assessment, development, protection, conservation, licensing and regulation as provided for
by law, where applicable, of all natural resources; the regulation and monitoring of service contractors, licensees, lessees, and
permittees for the extraction, exploration, development and utilization of natural resources products; the implementation of
programs and measures with the end in view of promoting close collaboration between the government and the private sector;
the effective and efficient classification and sub-classification of lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of natural
resources laws, rules and regulations;
(l) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of co-production, joint venture or production sharing
agreements, licenses, permits, concessions, leases and such other privileges and arrangement concerning the development,
exploration and utilization of the country’s natural resources and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our natural
resources; to cancel or cause to cancel such privileges and arrangement upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any
regulations, orders, and for all other causes which are furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of
the national interests;

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(n) Implement measures for the regulation and supervision of the processing of forest products, grading and inspection of
lumber and other forest products and monitoring of the movement of timber and other forest products. (Emphasis Ours.)

Invoked too is DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-78 (DAO 2000-78) which mandates that the permittee should secure the
necessary transport and other related documents before the retrieved wood materials are sold to the buyers/users and/or wood
processing plants.10 DAO 2000-78 obliges the entity or person concerned to secure a Wood Recovery Permit––a "permit issued by the
DENR to gather/retrieve and dispose abandoned logs, drifted logs, sunken logs, uprooted, and fire and typhoon damaged tress, tree
stumps, tops and branches."11 It prescribes that the permittee shall only be allowed to gather or recover logs or timber which had
already been marked and inventoried by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer. 12 To the Sandiganbayan, this
mandatory requirement for Wood Recovery Permit illustrates that DENR is the sole agency vested with the authority to regulate the
transportation of salvaged forest products. 1âwphi 1

The Sandiganbayan further reasoned that the "monitoring and regulating salvaged forest products" is not one of the DENR’s functions
which had been devolved upon LGUs. It cited Sec. 17 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) or the Local Government Code (LGC) of
1991 which provides:

Section 17. Basic Services and Facilities. -

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and
functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices
devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other
functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and
facilities enumerated herein.

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(2) For a Municipality:

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(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, implementation of community-based
forestry projects which include integrated social forestry programs and similar projects; management and control of communal forests
with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest development
projects. (Emphasis Ours.)

According to the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 17 of the LGC has limited the devolved functions of the DENR to the LGUs to the following: (1)
the implementation of community-based forestry products; (2) management and control of communal forests with an area not
exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; and (3) establishment of tree parks, greenbelts and similar forest development projects.13 It also
referred to DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992 (DAO 1992-30), which enumerates the forest management functions,
programs and projects of the DENR which had been devolved to the LGUs, as follows: 14

Section 3.1 Forest Management

a. Implementation of the following community-based forestry projects:

i. Integrated Social Forestry Projects, currently funded out of regular appropriations, except at least one project per
province that shall serve as research and training laboratory, as identified by the DENR, and those areas located in
protected areas and critical watersheds;

ii. Establishment of new regular reforestation projects, except those areas located in protected areas and critical
watersheds;

iii. Completed family and community-based contract reforestation projects, subject to policies and procedures
prescribed by the DENR;

iv. Forest Land Management Agreements in accordance with DENR Administrative Order No. 71, Series of 1990 and
other guidelines that the DENR may adopt; and

v. Community Forestry Projects, subject to concurrence of financing institution(s), if foreign assisted.

b. Management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers or five thousand
(5,000) hectares, as defined in Section 2, above. Provided, that the concerned LGUs shall endeavor to convert said areas into
community forestry projects;

c. Management, protection, rehabilitation and maintenance of small watershed areas which are sources of local water supply
as identified or to be identified by the DENR; and
d. Enforcement of forest laws in community-based forestry project areas, small watershed areas and communal forests, as
defined in Section 2 above, such as but not limited to:

i. Prevention of forest fire, illegal cutting and kaingin;

ii. Apprehension of violators of forest laws, rules and regulations;

iii. Confiscation of illegally extracted forest products on site;

iv. Imposition of appropriate penalties for illegal logging, smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered
species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming and other unlawful activities; and

v. Confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances, equipment and other implements used in the commission
of offenses penalized under P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987 and other forestry laws, rules and
regulations.

Provided, that the implementation of the foregoing activities outside the devolved areas above mentioned, shall remain with the DENR.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that since the authority relative to salvaged forest products was not included in the above enumeration of
devolved functions, the correlative authority to issue transport permits remains with the DENR 15and, thus, cannot be exercised by the
LGUs.

We disagree and refuse to subscribe to this postulate suggesting exclusivity. As shall be discussed shortly, the LGU also has, under the
LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products,
provided that the parameters set forth by law for their enactment have been faithfully complied with.

While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged with the mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for
the protection of the environment and conservation of natural resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with such
authority. While the law has designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect the environment, it was not the intention of the
law to arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive prerogative of exercising this function. Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance, the word
"primary" can never be taken to be synonymous with "sole" or "exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192
suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such authority to the exclusion of all other government instrumentalities,
i.e., LGUs.

On the contrary, the claim of DENR’s supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the principle of local autonomy enshrined in
the 1987 Constitution16 in relation to the general welfare clause under Sec. 16 of the LGC of 1991, which provides:

Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to
a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace
and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (Emphasis Ours.)

Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, municipal governments are clothed with authority to enact such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon them by law, and such as shall be
necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals,
promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, and ensure the protection of property in the
municipality.17

As held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,18 the right of the people "to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment." In ensuring that this duty is upheld and maintained, a local government unit may, if it deems
necessary, promulgate ordinances aimed at enhancing the right of the people to a balanced ecology and, accordingly, provide
adequate measures in the proper utility and conservation of natural resources within its territorial jurisdiction. As can be deduced from
Ruzol’s memoranda, as affirmed by the parties in their Joint Stipulation of Facts, it was in the pursuit of this objective that the subject
permits to transport were issued by Ruzol––to regulate the salvaged forest products found within the municipality of General Nakar and,
hence, prevent abuse and occurrence of any untoward illegal logging in the area. 19

In the same vein, there is a clear merit to the view that the monitoring and regulation of salvaged forest products through the issuance
of appropriate permits is a shared responsibility which may be done either by DENR or by the LGUs or by both. DAO 1992-30, in fact,
says as much, thus: the "LGUs shall share with the national government, particularly the DENR, the responsibility in the sustainable
management and development of the environment and natural resources within their territorial jurisdiction." 20 The significant role of the
LGUs in environment protection is further echoed in Joint Memorandum Circular No. 98-01(JMC 1998-01) or the Manual of Procedures
for DENR-DILG-LGU Partnership on Devolved and other Forest Management Functions, which was promulgated jointly by the DILG
and the DENR in 1998, and provides as follows:

Section 1. Basic Policies

Subject to the general policies on devolution as contained in RA 7160 and DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992, the
following basic policies shall govern the implementation of DENR-DILG-LGU partnership on devolved and other forest management
functions:

1.1. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shall be the primary government agency responsible for
the conservation, management, protection, proper use and sustainable development of the country’s environment and natural
resources.
1.2. The LGUs shall share with DENR the responsibility in the sustainable management and development of the forest
resources within their territorial jurisdiction. Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs shall endeavor to strengthen their
collaboration and partnership in forest management.

1.3. Comprehensive land use and forest land use plans are important tools in the holistic and efficient management of forest
resources. Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs together with other government agencies shall undertake forest land use
planning as an integral activity of comprehensive land use planning to determine the optimum and balanced use of natural
resources to support local, regional and national growth and development.

1.4. To fully prepare the LGUs to undertake their shared responsibilities in the sustainable management of forest land
resources, the DENR, in coordination with DILG, shall enhance the capacities of the LGUs in the various aspects of forest
management. Initially, the DENR shall coordinate, guide and train the LGUs in the management of the devolved functions. As
the LGUs’ capacity in forest management is enhanced, the primary tasks in the management of devolved functions shall be
performed by the LGUs and the role of the DENR becomes assistive and coordinative.

1.5. To further the ends of local autonomy, the DENR in consultation with the LGUs shall devolved [sic] additional functions
and responsibilities to the local government units, or enter into agreements with them for enlarged forest management and
other ENR-related functions.

1.6. To seek advocacy, popular support and ultimately help achieve community empowerment, DENR and DILG shall forge
the partnership and cooperation of the LGUs and other concerned sectors in seeking and strengthening the participation of
local communities for forest management including enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations. (Emphasis Ours.)

To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products is not a manifestation of usurpation of DENR’s authority
but rather an additional measure which was meant to complement DENR’s duty to regulate and monitor forest resources within the
LGU’s territorial jurisdiction.

This is consistent with the "canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive
confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve respect as the handiwork of
coordinate branches of the government." 21 Hence, if there appears to be an apparent conflict between promulgated statutes, rules or
regulations issued by different government instrumentalities, the proper action is not to immediately uphold one and annul the other, but
rather give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. 22 Accordingly, although the DENR requires a Wood Recovery Permit, an LGU
is not necessarily precluded from promulgating, pursuant to its power under the general welfare clause, complementary orders, rules or
ordinances to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest products.

Notwithstanding, We still find that the Permits to Transport issued by Ruzol are invalid for his failure to comply with the procedural
requirements set forth by law for its enforcement.

Then and now, Ruzol insists that the Permit to Transport partakes the nature of transport fees levied by the municipality for the use of
public roads.23 In this regard, he argues that he has been conferred by law the right to issue subject permits as an incident to the LGU’s
power to create its own sources of revenue pursuant to the following provisions of the LGC:

Section 153. Service Fees and Charges. – Local government units may impose and collect such reasonable fees and charges for
services rendered.

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Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local government units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or
charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust, excessive,
oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or
charges shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis Ours.)

Ruzol further argued that the permits to transport were issued under his power and authority as Municipal Mayor under Sec. 444 of the
same law:

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits
had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance;

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vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest, and other resources of the municipality; provide
efficient and effective property and supply management in the municipality; and protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties of
the municipality. (Emphasis Ours.)

Ruzol is correct to a point. Nevertheless, We find that an enabling ordinance is necessary to confer the subject permits with validity. As
correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or charges under the LGC is exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan through
the enactment of an appropriate ordinance wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed.24 Needless to say, one of
the fundamental principles of local fiscal administration is that "local revenue is generated only from sources expressly authorized by
law or ordinance."25

It is likewise expressly stated in Sec. 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC that the authority of the municipal mayor to issue licenses and permits
should be "pursuant to a law or ordinance." It is the Sangguniang Bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, which is mandated
by law to enact ordinances against acts which endanger the environment, i.e., illegal logging, and smuggling of logs and other natural
resources.26
In this case, an examination of the pertinent provisions of General Nakar’s Revised Municipal Revenue Code 27 and Municipal
Environment Code28 reveals that there is no provision unto which the issuance of the permits to transport may be grounded. Thus, in
the absence of an ordinance for the regulation and transportation of salvaged products, the permits to transport issued by Ruzol are
infirm.

Ruzol’s insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGU’s devolved function to "manage and control communal forests" under Sec.
17 of the LGC and DAO 1992-3029 is specious. Although We recognize the LGU’s authority in the management and control of
communal forests within its territorial jurisdiction, We reiterate that this authority should be exercised and enforced in accordance with
the procedural parameters established by law for its effective and efficient execution. As can be gleaned from the same Sec. 17 of the
LGC, the LGU’s authority to manage and control communal forests should be "pursuant to national policies and is subject to
supervision, control and review of DENR."

As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the term "communal forest" 30 has a well-defined and technical meaning.31Consequently, as an
entity endowed with specialized competence and knowledge on forest resources, the DENR cannot be discounted in the establishment
of communal forest. The DILG, on behalf of the LGUs, and the DENR promulgated JMC 1998-01 which outlined the following
procedure:

Section 8.4 Communal Forest

8.4.1 Existing Communal Forest

The devolution to and management of the communal forest by the city and municipal governments shall be governed by the following
general procedures:

(a) DENR, through its CENRO, and the concerned LGU shall undertake the actual identification and assessment of existing
communal forests. The assessment shall determine the suitability of the existing communal forests. If these are no longer
suitable, then these communal forests may be disestablished. The Approval for disestablishment shall be by the RED upon
recommendation of the DENR-LGU assessment Team through the PENRO and the RTD for Forestry;

(b) Existing communal forest which are found and recommended by the DENR-LGU Assessment Team as still suitable to
achieve their purpose shall be maintained as such. Thereafter, the Sangguniang Panglungsod or Sangguniang Bayan where
the communal forest is located shall pass resolution requesting the DENR Secretary for the turnover of said communal forest
to the city or municipality. Upon receipt of said resolution, the DENR Secretary shall issue an Administrative Order officially
transferring said communal forest to the concerned LGU. The DENR RED shall effect the official transfer to the concerned
LGU within fifteen (15) days from the issuance of the administrative order;

(c) Within twelve months from the issuance of the Administrative Order and turnover of said communal forest to the city or
municipality, the LGU to which the communal forest was transferred shall formulate and submit to the Provincial ENR Council
for approval a management plan governing the sustainable development of the communal forest.

For the purpose of formulating the communal forest management plan, DENR shall, in coordination with the concerned LGU, undertake
a forest resource inventory and determine the sustainable level of forest resource utilization and provide the LGU technical assistance
in all facets of forest management planning to ensure sustainable development. The management plan should include provision for
replanting by the communities and the LGUs of the communal forests to ensure sustainability.

8.4.2 Establishment of New Communal Forest

The establishment of new communal forests shall be governed by the following guidelines:

(a) DENR, through its CENRO, together with the concerned city/municipal LGU shall jointly identify potential communal forest
areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality.

(b) Communal forests to be established shall be identified through a forest land use planning to be undertaken jointly between
the DENR and the concerned LGU. The ensuing forest land use plan shall indicate, among others, the site and location of the
communal forests within the production forest categorized as such in the forest land use plan;

(c) Once the forest land use plan has been affirmed, the local chief executive shall initiate the passage by the LGU’s
sanggunian of a resolution requesting the DENR Secretary to issue an Administrative Order declaring the identified area as a
communal forest. The required administrative order shall be issued within sixty (60) days after receipt of the resolution;

(d) Upon acceptance of the responsibility for the communal forest, the city/municipal LGU shall formulate the management
plan and submit the same to its ENR Council. The management plan shall include provision for replanting by the communities
and the LGUs of the communal forests to ensure sustainability.

The communal forests of each municipality shall in no case exceed a total of 5,000 hectares. (Emphasis Ours.)

It is clear, therefore, that before an area may be considered a communal forest, the following requirements must be accomplished: (1)
an identification of potential communal forest areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality; (2) a forest land
use plan which shall indicate, among other things, the site and location of the communal forests; (3) a request to the DENR Secretary
through a resolution passed by the Sangguniang Bayan concerned; and (4) an administrative order issued by DENR Secretary
declaring the identified area as a communal forest.

In the present case, the records are bereft of any showing that these requirements were complied with. Thus, in the absence of an
established communal forest within the Municipality of General Nakar, there was no way that the subject permits to transport were
issued as an incident to the management and control of a communal forest.
This is not to say, however, that compliance with abovementioned statutory requirements for the issuance of permits to transport
foregoes the necessity of obtaining the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR. As earlier discussed, the permits to transport may be
issued to complement, and not substitute, the Wood Recovery Permit, and may be used only as an additional measure in the regulation
of salvaged forest products. To elucidate, a person seeking to transport salvaged forest products still has to acquire a Wood Recovery
Permit from the DENR as a prerequisite before obtaining the corresponding permit to transport issued by the LGU.

Main Issue:

Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions

The foregoing notwithstanding, Ruzol cannot be held guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions as defined and penalized under Art. 177
of the RPC, to wit:

Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an officer,
agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or who, under
pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or
any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in
its minimum and medium periods. (Emphasis Ours.)

As the aforementioned provision is formulated, there are two ways of committing this crime: first, by knowingly and falsely representing
himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign
government; or second, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of
the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so. 32 The former
constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority, while the latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions.33

In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions for issuing 221 permits to transport salvaged forest
products under the alleged "pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources." 34 The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the crime were attendant
in the present case because the authority to issue the subject permits belongs solely to the DENR. 35

We rule otherwise.

First, it is settled that an accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and that to overcome the
presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. 36As held by this Court in People v.
Sitco:37

The imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in our criminal justice system, the accused, during a criminal
prosecution, having a stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his freedom if convicted
and because of the certainty that his conviction will leave a permanent stain on his reputation and name. (Emphasis supplied.)

Citing Rabanal v. People,38 the Court further explained:

Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even property.
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the petitioner to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the
presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of
innocence requires courts to take "a more than casual consideration" of every circumstance of doubt proving the innocence of
petitioner. (Emphasis added.)

Verily, an accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his or her guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt and it is the primordial duty of the
prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with
moral certainty.39 As explained by this Court in People v. Berroya:40

The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt lies in the fact that "(i)n a criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the
subject; it enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited means of command; with counsel usually of
authority and capacity, who are regarded as public officers, and therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil
majesty often in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These
inequalities of position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt."

Indeed, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty; moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 41 However,
contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, We find that a careful scrutiny of the events surrounding this case failed to prove that Ruzol
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of usurpation of official functions of the DENR.

We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecution’s theory that the DENR is the only government
instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official
functions that properly belong to the DENR.

But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to
the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such
authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood
Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under his authority as municipal
mayor and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made
representations or false pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood
Recovery Permit from the DENR.

Second, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good faith.
It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano, 42 this Court enunciated that good faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for
usurpation of official functions.43 The term "good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention,
and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking
any unconscientious advantage of another, even though technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit
or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious." 44 Good faith is actually a question of intention and although something
internal, it can be ascertained by relying not on one’s self-serving protestations of good faith but on evidence of his conduct and
outward acts.45

In dismissing Ruzol’s claim of good faith, the Sandiganbayan reasoned as follows:

If it is really true that Ruzol believed himself to be authorized under R.A. 7160 to issue the subject permits, why did he have to secure
the approval of the various NGOs, People’s Organizations and religious organizations before issuing the said permits? He could very
well have issued subject permits even without the approval of these various organizations if he truly believed that he was legally
empowered to do so considering that the endorsement of these organizations is not required by law. That Ruzol had to arm himself with
their endorsement could only mean that he actually knew that he had no legal basis for issuing the said permits; thus he had to look
elsewhere for support and back-up.46 (Emphasis Ours.)

We, however, cannot subscribe to this posture as there is neither legal basis nor established doctrine to draw a conclusion that good
faith is negated when an accused sought another person’s approval. Neither is there any doctrine in law which provides that bad faith is
present when one seeks the opinion or affirmation of others.

Contrary to the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan, We find that the conduct of the public consultation was not a badge of bad
faith, but a sign supporting Ruzol’s good intentions to regulate and monitor the movement of salvaged forest products to prevent abuse
and occurrence of untoward illegal logging. In fact, the records will bear that the requirement of permits to transport was not Ruzol’s
decision alone; it was, as earlier narrated, a result of the collective decision of the participants during the Multi-Sectoral Consultative
Assembly. As attested to by Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, it was the participants who agreed that the subject permits be issued by the
Office of the Mayor of General Nakar, through Ruzol, in the exercise of the latter’s authority as local chief executive. 47

The Sandiganbayan also posits the view that Ruzol’s good faith is negated by the fact that if he truly believed he was authorized to
issue the subject permits, Ruzol did not have to request the presence and obtain the permission of PENRO Rogelio Delgado Sr. during
the Multi-Sectoral Assembly.48

The graft court’s above posture, however, does not commend itself for concurrence. If, indeed, Ruzol willfully and deliberately intended
to usurp the official functions of the DENR as averred by the prosecution, he would not have asked the presence of a DENR official who
has the authority and credibility to publicly object against Ruzol’s allegedly intended usurpation. Thus, the presence of PENRO Delgado
during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly does not negate, but strengthens Ruzol’s claim of good faith.

As a final note, We emphasize that the burden of protecting the environment is placed not on the shoulders of DENR alone––each and
every one of us, whether in an official or private capacity, has his or her significant role to play. Indeed, protecting the environment is
not only a responsibility but also a right for which a citizen could and should freely exercise. Considering the rampant forest denudation,
environmental degradation and plaguing scarcity of natural resources, each of us is now obligated to contribute and share in the
responsibility of protecting and conserving our treasured natural resources.

Ruzol chose to exercise this right and to share in this responsibility by exercising his authority as municipal mayor––an act which was
executed with the concurrence and cooperation of non-governmental organizations, industry stakeholders, and the concerned citizens
of General Nakar. Admittedly, We consider his acts as invalid but it does necessarily mean that such mistakes automatically demand
Us to rule a conviction. This is in consonance with the settled principle that "all reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not
crime should be indulged in for the benefit of the accused." 49

Under our criminal judicial system, "evil intent must unite with the unlawful act for a crime to exist," as "there can be no crime when the
criminal mind is wanting."50 Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Ruzol possessed that "criminal mind" when he
issued the subject permits. What is clear from the records is that Ruzol, as municipal mayor, intended to regulate and monitor salvaged
forest products within General Nakar in order to avert the occurrence of illegal logging in the area. We find that to hold him criminally
liable for these seemingly noble intentions would be a step backward and would run contrary to the standing advocacy of encouraging
people to take a pro-active stance in the protection of the environment and conservation of our natural resources.

Incidentally, considering the peculiar circumstances of the present case and considering further that this case demands only the
determination of Ruzol's guilt or innocence for usurpation of official functions under the RPC, for which the issue on the validity of the
subject Permits to Transport is only subsidiary, We hereby resolve this case only for this purpose and only in this instance, pro hac vice,
and, in the interest of justice, rule in favor of Ruzol' s acquittal.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the December 19, 2008 Decision of the Sandiganbayan First Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-
CRIM-0039 to 0259, finding Leovegildo R. Ruzol guilty of violating Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

Accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol is, thus, ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt of the crimes as charged.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN


Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Additional member per raffle dated September 16, 2009.

1Penned by Associate Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo and concurred in by Presiding Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (now a
member of this Court) and Associate Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada.

2 Rollo, pp. 341-342, 155.

3 Id. at 192.

4 Id. at 147-148.

5 Id. at 148-154.

6 Id. at 157.

7
Id. at 159-161.

8 Id. at 193-194.

9 Id. at 161.

DAO 2000-78, entitled Regulations in the Recovery and Disposition, Abandoned Logs, Drifted Logs, Sunken Logs,
10

Uprooted, and Fire/Typhoon Damaged Trees, Tree Stumps, Tops and Branches, Sec. 5.4.

11 Id., Sec. 2.8.

12 Id., Sec. 5.3.

13 Rollo, p. 166.

DAO 1992-30, entitled Guidelines for the Transfer and Implementation of DENR Functions Devolved to Local Government
14

Units.

15 Rollo, p. 166.

16 Art. X, Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

17 Binay v. Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991, 201 SCRA 508, 514.

18 G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 805.
19 Rollo, pp. 156, 187.

20
Sec. 1.2.

21 Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138810, September 29, 2004, 439 SCRA 326, 345.

22 Id.

23
Rollo, p. 159.

24 Id. at 188.

25
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Sec. 305.

26 Id., Sec. 447(a)(1)(u).

27 Rollo, pp. 461- 578.

28 Id. at 657-670.

29 Id. at 64-65.

30DAO 1992-30, Sec. 2.3. Communal Forest. –– Refers to a tract of forest land set aside by the Secretary of the DENR for the
use of the residents of a municipality from which said residents may cut, collect and remove forest products for their personal
use in accordance with existing laws and regulations.

31 Rollo, p. 171.

32 L.B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, BOOK TWO 241-242 (2006).

33 Gigantoni v. People, No. L-74727, June 16, 1988, 162 SCRA 158, 162-163.

34 Rollo, p. 18.

35 Id. at 191.

36 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 2.

37 G.R. No. 178202, May 14, 2010, 620 SCRA 561, 574.

38 G.R. No. 160858, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 601, 617.

39
Amanquiton v. People, G.R. No. 186080, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 366, 373.

40 347 Phil. 410, 423 (1997).

41
RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 2.

42 99 Phil. 655, 657 (1956).

43In Hilvano, the accused was initially prosecuted for and convicted of "usurpation of public authority" as defined in RA 10.
However, it was later found out that RA 10 was no longer applicable and that the applicable law is Art. 177 of the RPC, as
amended by RA 379. Apparently, the crime of "usurpation of public authority" as designated in RA 10 was redefined and is
presently what we refer to as "usurpation of official functions" defined and penalized under the second portion of Art. 177 of
the RPC. In effect, Hilvano was convicted not of usurpation of authority but of usurpation of official functions.

44 Civil Service Commission v. Maala, G.R. No. 165253, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 390, 399; citations omitted.

45 Id.; citing Gabriel v. Mabanta, G.R. No. 142403, March 26, 2003, 399 SCRA 573.

46 Rollo, p. 180.

47 Id. at 156.

48 Id. at 181.

49 L.B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, BOOK TWO 48 (2006).

50 Bahilidad v. People, G.R. No. 185195, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 597, 608.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No.
1

09-1038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners
Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the
information for perjury filed by Tomas.

The Antecedents

Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate
against Forum Shopping. The Information against her reads:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a
material matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No.
342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was false
thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood. 2

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the
spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the
RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March 15,
2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification
against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath
in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving
the same issue in another tribunal or agency.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court
3

(where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of perjury – the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood – was not alleged with
particularity without specifying what the other action or proceeding commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency;
(b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another court when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged
with perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged
4

Tomas with perjury. The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas’ motion for reconsideration.
5 6

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet and Ilusorio v.
7

Bildner which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.
8

The Assailed RTC Decision

In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:

[I]nsofar as the petitioner’s stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March
30, 2009) however, reaffirms what has been the long standing view on the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,]
the high court reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the
offense was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that since the subject document[,] the
execution of which was the subject of the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of the said territorial
jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]

xxxx

x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state that the city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to
try and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner
dwells solely on the act of subscribing to a false certification. On the other hand, the charge against the accused in the case of Ilusorio
v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of the questioned documents but rather the
introduction of the false evidence through the subject documents before the court of Makati City. (emphasis ours)
9
The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of discretion since the order denying the Motion to
Quash was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from
the facts of the present case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper since the petitioners can later
appeal the decision in the principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 10

The Petition

The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the Information for perjury against Tomas. The petitioners
contend that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the present facts than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim. They argued that
11

the facts in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the petitions in court containing the false statements was the essential ingredient that
consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a General Information Sheet (GIS) that was submitted
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners’ view. In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment
(which we hereby treat as the Comment to the petition), the Solicitor General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the
crime of perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is material. The Solicitor General
observed that the criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.

The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be – Makati City, where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury
case against the petitioners.

Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the criminal action is to be
instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of
trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its
territorial jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on
12

trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available. 13

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where
the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the
offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:

Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the
particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was
committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed
sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Information Charging Perjury

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the requirement for a Certificate against Forum
Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading
asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the
affiant is required to execute a statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent person authorized to
administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court
wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a
Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing
simultaneous remedies in different fora. 14

In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for making a false Certificate against Forum
Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:

(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.

(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. (emphasis ours)
15

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of improper venue, the allegations in the complaint
and information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this
basis, we find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas
within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.

The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information
to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to
be under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati City:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a
material matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.
16

We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati
City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the Information:

[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said
material statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood. (underscoring ours)
17

Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate
against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and
swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against
Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting
the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.

Referral to the En Banc

The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict between the division rulings of the Court in the
Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy Tiong case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.

The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases

The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained in verified petitions filed with the court for the
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copies of certificates of title. The verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed
and sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed was: which court (Pasig City, Makati
City and/or Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?

We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places where the verified petitions were filed. The
Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged
untruthful statement found relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v. Cañet which
18

ruled:

It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from the information that the defendant, by means
of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional
giving of false evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring deleted]

In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and sworn to in Manila. We ruled that the proper venue
for the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was consummated in
Manila where the false statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice that, 19

in turn, cited an American case entitled U.S. v. Norris. We ruled in Villanueva that –
20

Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate
material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime is complete when a witness' statement has once been
made.

The Crime of Perjury: A Background

To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical background of how the crime of perjury (specifically,
Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.

The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and against the defendant in a criminal case
(Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other
cases (Article 183, RPC). Based on the Information filed, the present case involves the making of an untruthful statement in an affidavit
on a material matter.

These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the parties in their respective arguments. The cited
Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back to the case of Cañet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the
present RPC took effect. Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United
21

States v. Norris, a 1937 American case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after the present
RPC took effect. 22
The perjurious act in Cañet consisted of an information charging perjury through the presentation in court of a motion accompanied by a
false sworn affidavit. At the time the Cañet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal
offenses were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No.
58 for the procedural aspect.
23

Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:

Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine
Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony,
declaration, disposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material
matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos
and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving
testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the judgment against him is reversed.

This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 5392 and 5393 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. Act No.
24 25 26

1697 was intended to make the mere execution of a false affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction. 27

In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be the court of the place where the crime was
committed.

As applied and interpreted by the Court in Cañet, perjury was committed by the act of representing a false document in a judicial
proceeding. The venue of action was held by the Court to be at the place where the false document was presented since the
28

presentation was the act that consummated the crime.

The annotation of Justices Aquino and Griño-Aquino in their textbook on the RPC interestingly explains the history of the perjury
29

provisions of the present RPC and traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these authors: 30

Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del Pan’s Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken
from art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pan’s Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art.
321 of the old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn was
expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of the
old Penal Code were deemed revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised
Penal Code repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.

It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false testimony, whereas, under the Revised Penal Code, false
testimony includes perjury. Our law on false testimony is of Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act
1697) is derived from American statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace perjury committed in court
or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a false affidavit. The provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on false testimony "are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697" on perjury. [italics ours]

With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides:

The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person,
who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under
oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the
law so requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases ours]

in fact refers to either of two punishable acts – (1) falsely testifying under oath in a proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2)
making a false affidavit before a person authorized to administer an oath on any material matter where the law requires an oath.

As above discussed, Sy Tiong – decided under Article 183 of the RPC – essentially involved perjured statements made in a GIS that
was subscribed and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an
affidavit, not an actual testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the
place where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense was committed. By implication, the proper venue would have been the
City of Mandaluyong – the site of the SEC – had the charge involved an actual testimony made before the SEC.

In contrast, Cañet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and accompanied by an affidavit that contained a falsity.
With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time
when Act No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no distinction between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same time
separately penalized the making of false statements under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals with false testimony in
criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also penalizing the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue
should be the place where the submission was made to the court or the situs of the court; it could not have been the place where the
affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the offense charged in the Information.

The case of Ilusorio cited the Cañet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn petitions filed in court for the issuance of
duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the cited sworn statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities
stated in the sworn petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the
courts of these cities "where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement
finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owner’s duplicate copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title]
and [Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue." To the Court, "whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were
31

subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false statement," citing
32

Cañet as authority for its statement.

The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue because of its very categorical tenor in pointing to the
considerations to be made in the determination of venue; it leaves the impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a
material consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC likewise
applies to false testimony in civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge been Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption
that the petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil case. The Cañet ruling would then have been completely applicable as the
sworn statement is used in a civil case, although no such distinction was made under Cañet because the applicable law at the time (Act
No. 1697) did not make any distinction.

If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling, then only that portion of the article, referring to
the making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as the other portion refers to false testimony in other proceedings which a
judicial petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of a Certificate of Condominium Title is not because it is a civil
proceeding in court. As a perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where the oath was taken
as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City.

Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes from the time General Order No. 58 was
replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on
venue of criminal actions and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the essential ingredients of the crime
took place. This change was followed by the passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the 1985 Rules of Criminal
1âwphi 1
33

Procedure, and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure’s expanded
34

venue of criminal actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense was committed, but also where
any of its essential ingredients took place.

In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two complaints for sum of money with prayer
for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-
affidavit against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the Information that followed, the criminal act charged was
for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined
on the basis of this article which penalizes one who "make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires." The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit;
thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a),
Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury
committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and
swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is
committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the
testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the
oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases,
determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On official leave.

** On leave.

1
Dated April 28, 2010; rollo, pp. 137-143.

2
Id. at 11.

3
Id. at 29-37.

4
Order dated March 26, 2009; rollo, pp. 55-56.

5
Id. at 56.

6
Order dated August 28, 2009, pp. 69-70.

7
30 Phil. 371 (1915).

8
G.R. Nos. 173935-38, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 272.

9
Rollo, pp. 142-143.

10
Order dated June 9, 2010; id. at 154.

11
G.R. Nos. 174168 and 179438, March 30, 2009, 582 SCRA 517.

12
United States v. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376 (1913).

13
Parulan v. Reyes, 78 Phil 855 (1947).

14
Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004, 433 SCRA 455.

15
Monfort III v. Salvatierra, G.R. No. 168301, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 447, 461.

16
Supra note 2.

17
Ibid.

18
Supra note 7, at 378.

19
G.R. No. 162187, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 495, 512.

300 U.S. 564 (1937). The perjury was based on a false testimony by the defendant at the hearing before the Senate
20

Committee in Nebraska.

21
The Penal Code for the Philippines which took effect from July 19, 1887 to December 31, 1931.

22
Took effect on January 1, 1932.

23
Entitled "The Law on Criminal Procedure" which took effect on April 23, 1900.

Every person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the
24

United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or
subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury.

25
The law refers to subornation of perjury.
26
United States v. Concepcion, 13 Phil. 424 (1909).

27
Id. at 428-429.

28
People v. Cruz, et al., 197 Phil. 815 (1982).

29
Ramon C. Aquino and Carolina Griño-Aquino, 2 The Revised Penal Code, 1997 ed.

30
Id. at 301-302.

31
Ilusorio v. Bildner, supra note 8, at 283.

32
Id. at 284.

33
Section 14, Rule 110. Place where action is to be instituted. -

(a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the Court of the municipality or province
wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

34
Section 15, Rule 110. Place where action is to be instituted. –

(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 163972-77 March 28, 2008

JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, Petitioner,


vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 24167-24170, 24195-24196,1questions the denial by
the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal.

The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 25, 2004, as follows:

Said accused,2 together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before this Court for three counts of malversation of public
funds involving the sums of ₱3,293.00, ₱1,869.00, and ₱13,528.00, respectively, which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying
the time book and payrolls for given period making it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall
building of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the
charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted before this Court for three counts of falsification of public document by a public
officer or employee.

In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the same with a plea of "guilty",
provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the
alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public
document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of "not
guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.

Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of the accused to plead "guilty" to the
lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private individual. The prosecution explained:

"With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of
falsification by a private individual defined and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal code will strengthen our cases against
the principal accused, Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts."

Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer of said accused to plead "guilty"
to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts because:

"x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of ₱18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the
provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the government has already been restituted x
x x.3
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution,4 dated March 25, 2004, denied petitioner’s Motion to Plea Bargain, despite
favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval. 5

The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated May 31, 2004.

This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea bargaining offer on the following
grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he merely affixed his signature on the payrolls on a "routinary basis," negating
any criminal intent; and that the amount involved is only ₱18,860.00, which he already restituted. 6

The petition is meritorious.

Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of
the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the
counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. 7

Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,
may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After
arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not
guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)

Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court,
require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference,8 viz:

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. – In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter
period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and

(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.

SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. – All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing
and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters
referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court. (Emphasis supplied)

But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case.
Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after
the prosecution already presented several witnesses.9

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be
with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, 10 and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. The rules however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of
discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. 11 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea
of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the
convenience of the accused.12

In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,13 the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court,14 viz:

x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their
discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules
allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In his
concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo
explained clearly and tersely the rationale or the law:

x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing the
appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less
than the evidence already in the record. The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a
plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less
bargaining.15 (Emphasis supplied)
However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise of its discretion should neither be
arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.16

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner and the prosecution failed to
demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the public. The Sandiganbayanbelieves that approving the proposal
would "only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public
office that the penalties they are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited or that the economic
benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught
the deterrent value of the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in government." 17 1avv phi 1

Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events and higher
interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise
of this Court's equity jurisdiction -

Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of
their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards
the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by
different courts.18

and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts, 19 in order to afford equal justice to petitioner.

In People of the Philippines v. Estrada,20 the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated March 14, 2007, approved the Plea Bargaining
Agreement entered into by the prosecution and one of the accused, Charlie "Atong" Ang. The agreement provided that the accused
undertakes to assist in the prosecution of the case and promises to return the amount of ₱25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea
Bargaining Agreement, the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining and whether the agreement
complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The Sandigabayan noted that the accused had already
withdrawn his earlier plea of "not guilty"; and that the prosecution consented to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the lesser
offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in relation to Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is
Plunder.21

The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not be applied to the present case.
Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by the Office of the Special Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea
bargain. Thus, in its Memorandum dated August 16, 2002, the Office of the Special Prosecutor rationalized:

In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of ₱18,860.00 as per
official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the government
has already been restituted by the accused.

There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases. Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead
guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind, merits consideration.

With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of
falsification by private individual defined and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code will strengthen our cases against
the principal accused, the Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts. After all, the
movants herein JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as draftsman detailed as foreman/timekeeper of the
Municipality of Bato, Leyte.22

Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer are
necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which
petitioner was originally charged.

Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of Falsification of Public Documents through an untruthful
narration of facts to be established, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in
a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third
person.23

On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code has the
following elements: (a) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position; (b) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code;
and (c) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document. 24

As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, with which
petitioner was also charged, the elements are as follows: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or control of funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable;
and (d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence permitted, the
taking by another person of such funds or property.25 Article 217 also provides that the failure of the public officer to have duly
forthcoming such public funds or property, upon demand by a duly authorized officer, "shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use." In this regard, it has been ruled that once such presumption is rebutted, then it is
completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed to have existed at all.26

Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer, the lesser offense
which petitioner seeks to plead guilty of, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) the offender must be
an accountable officer for public funds or property; (c) the offender is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to
a provincial auditor; and (d) the offender fails to render an account for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered.27

Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states when an offense includes or is included in the other, to wit:

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.

An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former as
alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in
another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. 28

In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. Thus,
in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private
Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and
payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, while the
Informations contain allegations which make out a case for Malversation against petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of
conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held liable for Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the
failure to render account was in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to render such an accounting within the prescribed
period.

Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then
petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.

Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in that the nature of his duty as foreman/timekeeper does
not permit or require possession or custody of local government funds,29 not to mention that petitioner has already restituted the amount
of ₱18,860.00 involved in this case. Unlike Estrada which involves a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, 30 and a whopping
₱25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case tremendously pales in comparison.

Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will result in a discriminatory dispensation of justice, the
Court will not hesitate to intervene in order to equalize the imbalance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and May 31, 2004 are SETASIDE.
The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED to
the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ


Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

DANTE O. TINGA*
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ


Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes

* In lieu of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, per Special Order No. 497 dated March 14, 2008.

1 Entitled, "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, v. Benedicto E. Kuizon, et al."

2 Herein petitioner and Rosalina T. Tulibas.

3 Rollo, pp. 15-18.

4Penned by Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong with the concurrence of Associate Justices Norberto Y. Geraldez and Efren N.
de la Cruz.

5 Rollo, p. 26.

6 Rollo, pp. 8-10.

7 People of the Philippines v. Villarama, Jr., G.R. No. 99287, June 23, 1992, 210 SCRA 246, 251-252.

8
Ladino v. Garcia, 333 Phil. 254, 258 (1996); see also A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC dated July 13, 2004 (RE: PROPOSED RULE ON
GUIDELINES TO BE OBSERVED BY TRIAL COURT JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT IN THE CONDUCT OF PRE-
TRIAL AND USE OF DEPOSITION-DISCOVERY MEASURES).

9 People of the Philippines v. Mamarion, 459 Phil. 51, 75 (2003).

10 People of the Philippines v. Dawaton, 437 Phil. 861, 871 (2002).

11 People of the Philippines v. Besonia, 466 Phil. 822, 833 (2004).

12
People of the Philippines v. Judge Kayanan, 172 Phil. 728, 739 (1978).

13 G.R. No. 99287, June 23, 1992, 210 SCRA 246.

14
Id. at 252.

15 Id. at 252-253.

16 People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159261, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 383, 398.

17 Rollo, pp. 20-21.

18
Poso v. Judge Mijares, 436 Phil. 295, 324 (2002).

19 Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 134-135.

20 Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 26558.

21 Id. at 10-13.

22 Rollo, pp. 42-43.

Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman, 464 Phil. 102, 114 (2004); Lumancas v. Intas, 400 Phil. 785, 798 (2000); Lecaroz v.
23

Sandiganbayan, 364 Phil. 890, 909 (1999).

Reyes,Luis B., The Revised Penal Code (1981); see also Adaza v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154886, July 28, 2005, 464
24

SCRA 460, 472.

25
Revised Penal Code, Article 217; see Rueda, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 400 Phil. 142, 153-154 (2000).

26 Agullo v. Sandiganbayan, 414 Phil. 86, 98 (2001).

Revised Penal Code, Article 218; see Campomanes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161950, December 19, 2006, 511
27

SCRA 285, 295.

28Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 111399, November 14, 1994, 238 SCRA 116, 136; Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, G.R. No.
103102, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 134, 141.

Local Government Code, Section 340; see Frias, Sr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 171437, October 4, 2007, 534
29

SCRA 654, 662.

Republic Act No. 7080 (1991), Sec. 2. (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by Republic Act
30

No. 7659 (1993).


The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 143591 November 23, 2007

TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON,
BENJAMIN DE LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALEZ, JR., and BEN YU LIM, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
MAGDALENO M. PEÑA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago
City, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666 dismissing the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr., Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo Dizon,
Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr., Eric Lee and Ben T. Lim, Jr.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages, and attorney’s
fees,2 against Urban Bank and the petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. The case was
raffled to Branch 62 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 754. Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of
agency3 allegedly entered into with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder
and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss4 arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the motion were the following documents:
1) a letter5 dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the
original owner of the subject property; 2) an unsigned letter 6 dated December 7, 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G.
Ong; 3) a letter7 dated December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and 4) a
Memorandum8 dated November 20, 1994 from Enrique Montilla III. Said documents were presented in an attempt to show that the
respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.

In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents, respondent Peña filed his Complaint-Affidavit9 with the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Bago City.10 He claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their
signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. 11 Worse, petitioners introduced said
documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were falsified.

In a Resolution12 dated September 23, 1998, the City Prosecutor concluded that the petitioners were probably guilty of four (4) counts of
the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The
City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the
principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were falsified considering that the signatories were mere
dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners as evidence in
support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their answer and later, in their Pre-Trial Brief.13 Subsequently, the corresponding
Informations14were filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants 15 for the arrest of the petitioners.

On October 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation. 16 Petitioners
insisted that they were denied due process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation
prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. They
then argued that since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely
relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules.
Petitioners further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable cause. Lastly, petitioners posited that the criminal case
should have been suspended on the ground that the issue being threshed out in the civil case is a prejudicial question.

In an Order17 dated November 13, 1998, the court denied the omnibus motion primarily on the ground that preliminary investigation was
not available in the instant case --- which fell within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of the warrant of
arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides, the court added, petitioners could no longer question the validity
of the warrant since they already posted bail. The court also believed that the issue involved in the civil case was not a prejudicial
question, and thus, denied the prayer for suspension of the criminal proceedings. Lastly, the court was convinced that the Informations
contained all the facts necessary to constitute an offense.

Petitioners subsequently instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
TRO, before the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in issuing
and not recalling the warrants of arrest, reiterating the arguments in their omnibus motion. 18 They, likewise, questioned the court’s
conclusion that by posting bail, petitioners already waived their right to assail the validity of the warrant of arrest.

On June 20, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition.19 Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners now raise before us the following issues:

A.

Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, is the finding of probable cause required for the filing of an Information in court?
If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable cause, should not the investigating prosecutor dismiss the
complaint, or at the very least, require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit?

B.

Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not within the personal knowledge of the complainant be sufficient basis for the
finding of probable cause?

C.

Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, and the record of the preliminary investigation does not show the existence of probable cause, should not the
judge refuse to issue a warrant of arrest and dismiss the criminal case, or at the very least, require the accused to submit his counter-
affidavit in order to aid the judge in determining the existence of probable cause?

D.

Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?

E.

Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable cause? 20

On August 2, 2000, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) 21 enjoining the judge of the MTCC from proceeding in any
manner with Criminal Cases Nos. 6683 to 6686, effective during the entire period that the case is pending before, or until further orders
of, this Court.

With the MTCC proceedings suspended, we now proceed to resolve the issues raised.

Respondents contend that the foregoing issues had become moot and academic when the petitioners posted bail and were arraigned.

We do not agree.

It appears that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment
being then the officers of Urban Bank. On the scheduled date for the arraignment, despite the petitioners’ refusal to enter a plea, the
court entered a plea of "Not Guilty."

The earlier ruling of this Court that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of the right to question the validity of the arrest has already been
superseded by Section 26,22 Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the principle that the accused is
precluded from questioning the legality of his arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during
trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto.23

Records reveal that petitioners filed the omnibus motion to quash the information and warrant of arrest, and for reinvestigation, on the
same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to
question the validity of their arrest.24 On the date of the arraignment, the petitioners refused to enter their plea, obviously because the
issue of the legality of the information and their arrest was yet to be settled by the Court. This notwithstanding, the court entered a plea
of "Not Guilty." From these circumstances, we cannot reasonably infer a valid waiver on the part of the petitioners, as to preclude them
from raising the issue of the validity of the arrest before the CA and eventually before this Court.

In their petition filed before this Court, petitioners prayed for a TRO to restrain the MTCC from proceeding with the criminal cases
(which the Court eventually issued on August 2, 2000). Thus, we confront the question of whether a criminal prosecution can be
restrained, to which we answer in the affirmative.

As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain criminal prosecution.
However, the following exceptions to the rule have been recognized: 1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection
to the constitutional rights of the accused; 2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; 3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; 4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess
of authority; 5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; 6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; 7)
where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; 8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; 9) where the charges
are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and 10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused
and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.25

Considering that the issues for resolution involve the validity of the information and warrant of arrest, and considering further that no
waiver of rights may be attributed to the petitioners as earlier discussed, we issued a TRO on August 2, 2000 to give the Court the
opportunity to resolve the case before the criminal prosecution is allowed to continue. The nature of the crime and the penalty involved
(which is less than 4 years of imprisonment), likewise, necessitate the suspension of the case below in order to prevent the controversy
from being mooted.

We now proceed with the main issues, viz.: 1) whether petitioners were deprived of their right to due process of law because of the
denial of their right to preliminary investigation and to submit their counter-affidavit; 2) whether the Informations charging the petitioners
were validly filed and the warrants for their arrest were properly issued; and 3) whether this Court can, itself, determine probable cause.

As will be discussed below, the petitioners could not validly claim the right to preliminary investigation. Still, petitioners insist that they
were denied due process because they were not afforded the right to submit counter-affidavits which would have aided the court in
determining the existence of probable cause. 26 Petitioners also claim that the respondent’s complaint-affidavit was not based on the
latter’s personal knowledge; hence, it should not have been used by the court as basis in its finding of probable cause. 27 Moreover,
petitioners aver that there was no sufficient evidence to prove the elements of the crime. Specifically, it was not established that the
documents in question were falsified; that petitioners were the ones who presented the documents as evidence; and that petitioners
knew that the documents were indeed falsified.28 Petitioners likewise assert that at the time of the filing of the complaint-affidavit, they
had not yet formally offered the documents as evidence; hence, they could not have "introduced" the same in court. 29 Considering the
foregoing, petitioners pray that this Court, itself, determine whether or not probable cause exists. 30

The pertinent provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, 31 namely, Sections 1, 3 (a) and 9(a) of Rule 112, are relevant to the
resolution of the aforesaid issues:

SECTION 1. Definition. – Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.32

SEC. 3. Procedure. – Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies of the official
file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in
their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. 33

SEC. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. –

(a) Where filed with the fiscal. – If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3 (a)
of this Rule shall be observed. The Fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents
submitted by the complainant.34

Petitioners were charged with the offense defined and penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 35 of the Revised Penal Code.
The penalty imposable is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one
(1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Clearly, the case is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and preliminary investigation is
not mandatory.36

Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the complaint-affidavit of the respondent and did not require the petitioners to submit
their counter-affidavits. The prosecutor should not be faulted for taking this course of action, because it is sanctioned by the Rules. To
reiterate, upon the filing of the complaint and affidavit with respect to cases cognizable by the MTCC, the prosecutor shall take the
appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. It means that the prosecutor
may either dismiss the complaint if he does not see sufficient reason to proceed with the case, or file the information if he finds probable
cause. The prosecutor is not mandated to require the submission of counter-affidavits. Probable cause may then be determined on the
basis alone of the affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant, without infringing on the constitutional rights of the
petitioners.

On the other hand, for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge must personally determine the existence of probable cause. Again,
the petitioners insist that the trial judge erred in issuing the warrant of arrest without affording them their right to submit their counter-
affidavits.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the
existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable
cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. 37

In determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest in the case at bench, we find nothing wrong with the procedure
adopted by the trial judge --- he relied on the resolution of the prosecutor, as well as the supporting documents submitted by the
respondent. There is no provision of law or procedural rule which makes the submission of counter-affidavits mandatory before the
judge can determine whether or not there exists probable cause to issue the warrant.

In light of the foregoing, it appears that the proper procedure was followed by the prosecutor in determining probable cause for the filing
of the informations, and by the trial court judge in determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest. To reiterate,
preliminary investigation was not mandatory, and the submission of counter-affidavit was not necessary. 1âwphi1

However, notwithstanding the proper observance of the procedure laid down by the Rules, a closer scrutiny of the records reveals that
the Informations should not have been filed and the warrants of arrest should not have been issued, because of lack of probable cause.

Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 38 It is the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. 39 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. 40
On the other hand, we have defined probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested.41

To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with
the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause. Otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the prosecutor’s
findings in such investigations.42 In the same way, the general rule is that this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial
court, which include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.43 It is only in exceptional cases when
this Court may set aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of probable cause, that is, when it is
necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. 44 The facts obtaining in
the present case warrant the application of the exception.

Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article 172 of the RPC or Introduction of Falsified Document in a Judicial Proceeding.
The elements of the offense are as follows:

1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person.

2. That the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any subdivisions No. 1 or 2 of Article 172.

3. That he introduced said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding.45

The falsity of the document and the defendant’s knowledge of its falsity are essential elements of the offense. 46

The Office of the City Prosecutor filed the Informations against the petitioners on the basis of the complaint-affidavit of the respondent,
together with the following attached documents: the motion to dismiss and answer filed by the petitioners in Civil Case No. 754;
petitioners’ pre-trial brief in said case; the alleged falsified documents; a copy of the minutes of the regular meeting of ISC during the
election of the board; and the list of stockholders of ISC.47 On the basis of these documents and on the strength of the affidavit
executed by the respondent, the prosecutor concluded that probable cause exists. These same affidavit and documents were used by
the trial court in issuing the warrant of arrest.

Contrary to the findings of the MTCC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we find the complaint-affidavit and attachments insufficient
to support the existence of probable cause. Specifically, the respondent failed to sufficiently establish prima facie that the alleged
documents were falsified. In support of his claim of falsity of the documents, the private respondent stated in his complaint-affidavit that
Herman Ponce, Julie Abad and Marilyn Ong, the alleged signatories of the questioned letters, did not actually affix their signatures; and
that they were not actually officers or stockholders of ISCI. 48 He further claimed that Enrique Montilla’s signature appearing in another
memorandum addressed to respondent was forged. 49 These are mere assertions, insufficient to warrant the filing of the complaint or the
issuance of the warrant of arrest.

It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the complainant, or any of his witnesses, shall allege facts within their (affiants) personal
knowledge. The allegation of the respondent that the signatures of Ponce, Abad, Ong and Montilla were falsified does not qualify as
personal knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did respondent state that he was present at the time of the execution of the documents.
Neither did he claim that he was familiar with the signatures of the signatories. He simply made a bare assertion that the signatories
were mere dummies of ISCI and they were not in fact officers, stockholders or representatives of the corporation. At the very least, the
affidavit was based on respondent’s "personal belief" and not "personal knowledge." 50 Considering the lack of personal knowledge on
the part of the respondent, he could have submitted the affidavit of other persons who are qualified to attest to the falsity of the
signatures appearing in the questioned documents. One cannot just claim that a certain document is falsified without further stating the
basis for such claim, i.e., that he was present at the time of the execution of the document or he is familiar with the signatures in
question. Otherwise, this could lead to abuse and malicious prosecution. This is actually the reason for the requirement that affidavits
must be based on the personal knowledge of the affiant. The requirement assumes added importance in the instant case where the
accused were not made to rebut the complainant’s allegation through counter-affidavits.

Neither can the respondent find support in the documents attached to his complaint-affidavit. The minutes of the regular meeting, as
well as the list of stockholders, could have possibly shown that the signatories were not officers or stockholders of the corporation.
However, they did not at all show that the questioned documents were falsified. In the letter allegedly signed by Ponce and Abad, there
was no representation that they were the president and corporate secretary of ISCI. Besides, the mere fact that they were not officers
or stockholders of ISCI does not necessarily mean that their signatures were falsified. They still could have affixed their signatures as
authorized representatives of the corporation.

True, a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond reasonable doubt. It
does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless, although the determination of probable cause requires less
than evidence which would justify conviction, it should at least be more than mere suspicion.51 While probable cause should be
determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential
accused’s constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of
unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.52 It is,
therefore, imperative for the prosecutor to relieve the accused from the pain and inconvenience of going through a trial once it is
ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. 53

Considering that the respondent failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support his claim that the documents were falsified, it follows
that the introduction of the questioned documents in Civil Case No. 754 is not an offense punished by any provision of the Revised
Penal Code or any other law. The petitioners should not be burdened with court proceedings, more particularly a criminal proceeding, if
in the first place, there is no evidence sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that an offense was committed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 20, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order dated August 2, 2000 is hereby made permanent. Accordingly, the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, City of Bago, is ORDERED to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 6683-86.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner, with Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and Andres B. Reyes,
Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 50-60.

2 Rollo, pp. 61-66.

3 The contract was allegedly confirmed in a letter addressed to the respondent, the pertinent portion of which reads:

xxxx

This is to confirm the engagement of your services as the authorized representative of Urban Bank, specifically to
hold and maintain possession of our above [-]captioned property and to protect the same from former tenants,
occupants or any other person who are threatening to return to the said property and/or interfere with your
possession of the said property for and in our behalf.

You are likewise authorized to represent Urban Bank in any court action that you may institute to carry out your
aforementioned duties, and to prevent any intruder, squatter or any other person not otherwise authorized in writing
by Urban Bank from entering or staying in the premises. (Id. at 69).

4
Rollo, pp. 72-87.

5 Id. at 96.

6 Id. at 97.

7 Id. at 98.

8 Id. at 99.

9 Id. at 106-109.

10 The case was docketed as I.S. Case No. 9248.

11 Rollo, p. 108.

12 The dispositive portion of which reads:


Wherefore, In view of all the foregoing, undersigned finds probable cause that the crime of Introducing Falsified
Documents in evidence under par. 2, Article 172, RPC (4 counts) had been committed and that respondents Teodoro
Borlongan, Delfin Gonzalez, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa, and
Arturo Manuel are probably guilty.

Let Informations be filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, City of Bago, Philippines.

SO RESOLVED. (Id. at 110-114).

13
Rollo, pp. 113-114.

14 Id. at 115-122.

15 Id. at 123-126.

16 Id. at 127-142.

17 The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
reinvestigation is hereby denied.

Set arraignment of the accused on December 1, 1998 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED. (Id. at 143-150).

18 Rollo, pp. 151-186.

19 Supra note 1.

20 Rollo, pp. 13-14.

21 Id. at 518-522.

22Sec. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. – An application for or
admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued
therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him,
provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later
than the start of the trial of the case.

23People v. Vallejo, 461 Phil. 672, 686 (2003); People v. Palijon, 397 Phil. 545, 556 (2000); Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
101837, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 138, 154.

24 CA rollo, pp. 902-903.

25Andres v. Cuevas, G.R. No. 150869, June 9, 2005, 460 SCRA 38, 51-52; Samson v. Secretary Guingona, Jr., 401 Phil. 167,
172 (2000).

26 Rollo, p. 651.

27
Id. at 696.

28 Id. at 700-702.

29 Id. at 714.

30 Id. at 725.

31
As amended, per Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988. The Rules were further revised and
approved on October 3, 2000, which took effect on December 1, 2000.

32 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 112, Sec. 1 reads:

SECTION 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. – Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding
to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

Except as provided in section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing of
a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day without regard to the fine.

33 Section 3(a) of the New Rules states:


SECTION 3. Procedure. The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in
such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be
subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants
and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

34
Rule 112, Sec. 9 is presently worded as follows:

Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. –

(a) If filed with the prosecutor. – If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor involving an offense punishable by
imprisonment of less than four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, the procedure outlined in section 3(a) of
this Rule shall be observed. The prosecutor shall act on the complaint based on the affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the complainant within ten (10) days from its filing.

35 Article 172.

xxxx

Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or who,
with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article or
in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.

36
Villanueva v. Judge Almazan, 384 Phil. 776, 784 (2000); Del Rosario, Jr. v. Judge Bartolome, 337 Phil. 330, 333 (1997).

37AAA v. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007; Ho v. People, 345 Phil. 597, 605-606 (1997); Soliven v. Makasiar, No. L-
82585, November 14, 1988, 167 SCRA 393, 398.

38 Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 154239-41, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 533, 550.

39
Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, June 1, 2007.

40
Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 38.

41
Id; Cuevas v. Muñoz, 401 Phil. 752, 773 (2000); Ho v. People, supra note 37, at 608.

42 Ladlad v. Velasco, supra note 39.

43 De Joya v. Marquez, G.R. No. 162416, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 376, 381.

44 Id.; Ladlad v. Velasco, supra note 39.

45 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 1998 ed., p. 246.

46 Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II, 1987 ed., p. 270.

47 Rollo, pp. 110-114.

48 Id. at 108-109.

49
Id. at 109.

50 See Nala v. Judge Barroso, Jr., 455 Phil. 999, 1011 (2003) in which the Court held that the affidavit and testimony of the
witnesses that the petitioner had no license to possess a firearm do not qualify as "personal knowledge" but only "personal
belief" because they did not verify nor secure a certification from an appropriate government agency that petitioner was not
licensed to possess a firearm.

51See AAA v. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007; and Hon. Drilon v. CA, 327 Phil. 916, 922 (1996), where the Court
found that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutor in finding probable as the evidence, taken
altogether constitute probable cause.

52Ching v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 164317, February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 609, 629-630; Preferred Home Specialties,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163593, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 387, 410.

53 R.R. Paredes v. Calilung, G.R. No. 156055, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 369, 395.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143591 May 5, 2010

TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON,
BENJAMIN DE LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALES, JR., and BEN YU LIM, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
MAGDALENO M. PEÑA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago
City, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals, in its Decision 1 dated 20 June 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666, is
correct when it dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr., Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel,
Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Eric L. Lee and Ben Yu Lim, Jr., and ruled that the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City, did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reinvestigation and recall of the
warrants of arrest in Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686.

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña (Atty. Peña) instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses,
damages, and attorney’s fees2 against Urban Bank and herein petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental,
Bago City. The case was raffled to Branch 62 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 754. Atty. Peña anchored his claim for
compensation on the Contract of Agency3 allegedly entered into with the petitioners, wherein the former undertook to perform such acts
necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property located along Roxas Boulevard,
Pasay City. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss 4 arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the
motion were the following documents: 1) a Letter 5 dated 19 December 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of
Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property; 2) an unsigned Letter 6 dated 7 December 1994
addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a Letter 7 dated 9 December 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan, Jr. and
signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and 4) a Memorandum 8 dated 20 November 1994 from Enrique Montilla III. Said documents were presented
in an attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.

In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents, Atty. Peña filed his Complaint-Affidavit9 with the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Bago City.10 He claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their
signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. 11 Worse, petitioners introduced said
documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were falsified.

In a Resolution12 dated 24 September 1998, the City Prosecutor found probable cause for the indictment of petitioners for four (4)
counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents, penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.
The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the
principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were falsified considering that the signatories were mere
dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners as evidence in
support of their motion to dismiss, and then adopted in their answer and in their Pre-Trial Brief.13 Subsequently, the corresponding
Informations14 were filed with the MTCC, Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686.
Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants 15 for the arrest of the petitioners.

On 1 October 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation. 16 Petitioners
insisted that they were denied due process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation
prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. Then
they argued that since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely
relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention with the
Rules of Court. Petitioners further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable cause. Moreover, one of the accused,
i.e., Ben Lim, Jr., is not even a director of Urban Bank, contrary to what complainant stated. Lastly, petitioners posited that the criminal
cases should have been suspended on the ground that the issue being threshed out in the civil case is a prejudicial question.

In an Order17 dated 13 November 1998, the MTCC denied the omnibus motion primarily on the ground that preliminary investigation
was not available in the instant case – which fell within the jurisdiction of the first-level court. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of
the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules of Court. Besides, the court added, petitioners could no
longer question the validity of the warrant since they already posted bail. The court also believed that the issue involved in the civil case
was not a prejudicial question, and, thus, denied the prayer for suspension of the criminal proceedings. Lastly, the court was convinced
that the Informations contained all the facts necessary to constitute an offense.

Petitioners immediately instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the Court of Appeals, ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in issuing and not recalling the warrants of arrest, reiterating the arguments in their omnibus
motion.18 They, likewise, questioned the court’s conclusion that by posting bail, petitioners already waived their right to assail the validity
of the warrants of arrest.

On 20 June 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. 19 Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following issues:

A.

Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, is the finding of probable cause required for the filing of an Information in court?

If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable cause, should not the investigating prosecutor dismiss the
complaint, or at the very least, require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit?
B.

Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not within the personal knowledge of the complainant be sufficient basis for the
finding of probable cause?

C.

Where there is offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, and the record of the preliminary investigation does not show the existence of probable cause, should not the
judge refuse to issue a warrant of arrest and dismiss the criminal case, or at the very least, require the accused to submit his counter-
affidavit in order to aid the judge in determining the existence of probable cause?

D.

Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?

E.

Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable cause? 20

On the other hand, respondent contends that the issues raised by the petitioners had already become moot and academic when the
latter posted bail and were already arraigned.

On 2 August 2000, this Court issued a TRO21 enjoining the judge of the MTCC from proceeding in any manner with Criminal Case Nos.
6683 to 6686, effective during the entire period that the case is pending before, or until further orders of, this Court.

We will first discuss the issue of mootness.

The issues raised by the petitioners have not been mooted by the fact that they had posted bail and were already arraigned.

It appears from the records that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid
embarrassment, being then the officers of Urban Bank. On the scheduled date for the arraignment, despite the petitioners’ refusal to
enter a plea, the court a quo entered a plea of "Not Guilty" for them.

The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is
precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during
trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto. 22

As held in Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez:23

It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous
rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to
assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court
in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural
rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application.
Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the
time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Before the appellate court rendered its
decision on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It behoved the appellate court to have
applied the same in resolving the petitioner’s petition for certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration. 1avvphi 1

Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to
question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be
clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause.
When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent
to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x.

Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation on the same day that they
posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of
their arrest.24 On the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality of their
arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of their
right to preclude them from raising the same with the Court of Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative
necessity to avert their incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest. The ruling to which we
have returned in People v. Red25 stated:

x x x The present defendants were arrested towards the end of January, 1929, on the Island and Province of Marinduque by order of
the judge of the Court of First Instance of Lucena, Tayabas, at a time when there were no court sessions being held in Marinduque. In
view of these circumstances and the number of the accused, it may properly be held that the furnishing of the bond was prompted by
the sheer necessity of not remaining in detention, and in no way implied their waiver of any right, such as the summary examination of
the case before their detention. That they had no intention of waiving this right is clear from their motion of January 23, 1929, the same
day on which they furnished a bond, and the fact that they renewed this petition on February 23, 1929, praying for the stay of their
arrest for lack of the summary examination; the first motion being denied by the court on January 24, 1929 (G.R. No. 33708, page 8),
and the second remaining undecided, but with an order to have it presented in Boac, Marinduque.

Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be said to have waived the right granted to them by section 13, General Order No. 58, as
amended by Act No. 3042.
The rest of the issues raised by the petitioners may be grouped into two, which are: (1) the procedural aspect, i.e., whether the
prosecution and the court a quo properly observed the required procedure in the instant case, and, (2) the substantive aspect, which is
whether there was probable cause to pursue the criminal cases to trial.

The procedural aspect:

Petitioners contend that they were denied due process as they were unable to submit their counter-affidavits and were not accorded the
right to a preliminary investigation. Considering that the complaint of Atty. Peña was filed in September 1998, the rule then applicable
was the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure relevant to the issue are Sections 1, 3(a) and 9(a) of Rule 112, to wit:

Section 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are
respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public,
who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits.

Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

(a) Where filed with the fiscal.— If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state prosecutor, the procedure
outlined in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits
and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. (underscoring supplied)

The crime to which petitioners were charged was defined and penalized under second paragraph of Article 172 in relation to Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code.

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than ₱5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or
official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document
commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to
cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions
of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.

Prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods translates to imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day. 26 The next lower in
degree to prision correccional is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period which translates to 4
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months 27 of imprisonment. Since the crime committed is not covered by the Rules of Summary
Procedure,28 the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts but applying the ordinary rules. In such instance,
preliminary investigation as defined in Section 1, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable since such section
covers only crimes cognizable by the RTC. That which is stated in Section 9(a) is the applicable rule.

Under this Rule, while probable cause should first be determined before an information may be filed in court, the prosecutor is not
mandated to require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavits to oppose the complaint. In the determination of probable cause,
the prosecutor may solely rely on the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. If he does not
find probable cause, the prosecutor may dismiss outright the complaint or if he finds probable cause or sufficient reason to proceed with
the case, he shall issue a resolution and file the corresponding information.

The complaint of respondent, verbatim, is as follows:

COMPLAINT – AFFIDAVIT

I, MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, Filipino, of legal age, with address at Brgy. Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, after having been sworn
in accordance with law hereby depose and state:

1. I am the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 754 pending with the Regional Trial Court of Bago City entitled "Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña v. Urban
Bank, et al" Impleaded therein as defendants of the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De
Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel.(underlining ours)

2. I filed the said case to collect my fees as agent of Urban Bank, Inc.(hereinafter referred to as the "bank") in ridding a certain parcel of
land in Pasay City of squatters and intruders. A certified true copy of the Complaint in the said case is hereto attached as Annex "A".
3. In the Motion to Dismiss dated 12 March 1996 (a certified true copy of which is attached as Annex "B"), Answer dated 28 October
1996 (Annex "C"), and Pre-Trial Brief dated 28 January 1997 (Annex "D") filed by the bank and the respondent members of the board,
the said respondents used as evidence the following documents:

a. Letter dated 19 December 1994 supposedly signed by a certain Herman Ponce and Julie Abad for Isabela Sugar Company (ISC) (a
copy of which is attached as Annex "E"), which states:

December 19, 1994


Urban Bank
Urban Avenue, Makati
Metro Manila

Gentlemen:

This has reference to your property located among Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City which you purchased from Isabela Sugar Company
under a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on December 1, 1994.

In line with our warranties as the Seller of the said property and our undertaking to deliver to you the full and actual possession and
control of said property, free from tenants, occupants or squatters and from any obstruction or impediment to the free use and
occupancy of the property and to prevent the former tenants or occupants from entering or returning to the premises. In view of the
transfer of ownership of the property to Urban Bank, it may be necessary for Urban Bank to appoint Atty. Peña likewise as its
authorized representative for purposes of holding/maintaining continued possession of the said property and to represent Urban Bank
in any court action that may be instituted for the abovementioned purposes.

It is understood that any attorney’s fees, cost of litigation and any other charges or expenses that may be incurred relative to the
exercise by Atty. Peña of his abovementioned duties shall be for the account of Isabela Sugar Company and any loss or damage that
may be incurred to third parties shall be answerable by Isabela Sugar Company.

Very truly yours,

Isabela Sugar Company

By:

HERMAN PONCE
JULIE ABAD

b. Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 supposedly executed by a certain Marilyn Ong on behalf of ISC, a copy of which is hereto
attached as annex "F", which states:

December 7, 1994

To: ATTY. CORA BEJASA

From: MARILYN G. ONG

RE: ISABELA SUGAR CO., INC.

Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña, who has been assigned by Isabela Sugar Company inc. to take charge of inspecting the tenants would like to
request an authority similar to this from the Bank to new owners. Can you please issue something like this today as he (unreadable)
this.

b. Letter dated 9 December 1994 supposedly executed by the same Marilyn Ong, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "G",
which states:

December 9, 1994

Atty. Ted Borlongan


URBAN BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
MAKATI, METRO MANILA

Attention: Mr. Ted Borlongan

Dear Mr. Borlongan

I would like to request for an authority from Urban Bank per attached immediately – as the tenants are questioning authority of the
people who are helping us to take possession of the property.

Marilyn Ong

c. Memorandum dated 20 November 1994, copy of which is attached as annex "H", which states:

MEMORANDUM
To: Atty. Magadaleno M. Peña
Director

From: Enrique C. Montilla III


President

Date: 20 November 1994

You are hereby directed to recover and take possession of the property of the corporation situated at Roxas Boulevard covered by TCT
No. 5382 of the Registry of Deeds for Pasay City, immediately upon the expiration of the contract of lease over the said property on 29
November 1994. For this purpose, you are authorized to engage the services of security guards to protect the property against
intruders. You may also engage the services of a lawyer in case there is a need to go to court to protect the said property of the
corporation. In addition, you may take whatever steps or measures are necessary to ensure our continued possession of the property.

ENRIQUE C. MONTILLA III


President

4. The respondent member of the board of the bank used and introduced the aforestated documents as evidence in the civil case
knowing that the same are falsified. They used thae said documents to justify their refusal to pay my agent’s fees, to my damage and
prejudice.

5. The 19 December 1994 letter (Annex ‘E") is a falsified document, in that the person who supposedly executed the letter on behalf of
ISC, a certain Herman Ponce and Julie Abad did not actually affix their signatures on the document. The execution of the letter was
merely simulated by making it appear that Ponce and Abad executed the letter on behalf of ISC when they did not in fact do so.

6. No persons by the name of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad were ever stockholders, officers, employees or representatives of ISC. In
the letter, Herman Ponce was represented to be the President of ISC and Julie Abad, the Corporate Secretary. However, as of 19
December 1994, the real President of plaintiff was Enrique Montilla, III and Cristina Montilla was the Corporate Secretary. A copy of the
Minutes of the Regular Meeting of ISC for the year 1994, during which Montilla, et al. Were elected is hereto attached as Annex "I". On
the otherhand, a list of the stockholders of ISC on or about the time of the transaction is attached as Annex "J".

7. The same holds true with respect to the Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 and athe letter dated 9 December 1994 allegedly
written by a ceratin Marilyn Ong. Nobody by the said name was ever a stockholder of ISC.

8. Lastly, with respect to the supposed Memorandum issued by Enrique Montilla, III his signature thereon was merely forged by
respondents. Enrique Montilla III, did not affix his signature on any such document.

9. I am executing this affidavit for the purpose of charging Teodoro C. Borlongan, Corazon M. Bejasa and Arturo E. Manuel, Delfin C.
Gonzales Jr., Benjamin L. De Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon and Eric Lee, with the crime of use of falsified documents under Artilce 172,
paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.(underlining ours)

10. I am likewise executing this affidavit for whatever legal purpose it may serve.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

Sgd. MAGDALENO M. PEÑA

It is evident that in the affidavit-complaint, specifically in paragraph 1, respondent merely introduced and identified "the board of the
bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Jr., Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon
Bejasa and Arturo Manuel, Sr." However, in the accusatory portion of the complaint which is paragraph number 9, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was
not included among those charged with the crime of use of falsified documents under Article 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code. The omission indicates that respondent did not intend to criminally implicate Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., even as he was acknowledged to
be a member of the board. And there was no explanation in the Resolution and Information by the City Prosecutor why Mr. Ben Lim, Jr.
was included. Moreover, as can be gleaned from the body of the complaint and the specific averments therein, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was
never mentioned.

The City Prosecutor should have cautiously reviewed the complaint to determine whether there were inconsistencies which ought to
have been brought to the attention of the respondent or, on his own, considered for due evaluation. It is a big mistake to bring a man to
trial for a crime he did not commit.

Prosecutors are endowed with ample powers in order that they may properly fulfill their assigned role in the administration of justice. It
should be realized, however, that when a man is hailed to court on a criminal charge, it brings in its wake problems not only for the
accused but for his family as well. Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to
determine the existence of a prima facie case before filing the information in court. Anything less would be a dereliction of duty.29

Atty. Peña, in his Second Manifestation30 dated 16 June 1999, averred that petitioners, including Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., were already
estopped from raising the fact that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not a member of the board of directors of Urban Bank, as the latter participated
and appeared through counsel in Civil Case No. 754 without raising any opposition. However, this does not detract from the fact that
the City Prosecutor, as previously discussed, did not carefully scrutinize the complaint of Atty. Peña, which did not charge Mr. Ben Lim,
Jr. of any crime.

What tainted the procedure further was that the Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioners, including, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr.
despite the filing of the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation raising among others the issue
that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., was not even a member of the board of directors. With the filing of the motion, the judge is put on alert that an
innocent person may have been included in the complaint. In the Order31 dated 13 November 1998, in denying the motion to quash,
Judge Primitivo Blanca ruled that:
Courts in resolving a motion to quash cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not appear on the
face of the information because said motion is hypothethical admission of the facts alleged in the information x x x. (citations omitted.)

We cannot accept as mere oversight the mistake of respondent judge since it was at the expense of liberty. This cannot be condoned.

In the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the mandate of the Constitution is for the judge to personally determine the existence of probable
cause:

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Corollary thereto, Section 9(b) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

(a) x x x.

(b) Where filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court. — If the complaint or information is filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court, the
procedure provided for in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall likewise be observed. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of arrest after personally
examining in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers.

Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that "[n]o x x x warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing x x x the persons x x x to be seized." 32 Interpreting the words "personal determination," we said in Soliven v.
Makasiar33 that it does not thereby mean that judges are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the complainant and his
witnesses themselves. To require thus would be to unduly laden them with preliminary examinations and investigations of criminal
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before them. Rather, what is emphasized merely is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this end, he may:
(a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. What he is never allowed
to do is to follow blindly the prosecutor's bare certification as to the existence of probable cause. Much more is required by the
constitutional provision. Judges have to go over the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes if any, and other
documents supporting the prosecutor's certification. Although the extent of the judge's personal examination depends on the
circumstances of each case, to be sure, he cannot just rely on the bare certification alone but must go beyond it. This is because the
warrant of arrest issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it. 34 He should
even call for the complainant and the witnesses to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances warrant. 35

An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be
intruded by the State.36

Measured against the constitutional mandate and established rulings, there was here a clear abdication of the judicial function and a
clear indication that the judge blindly followed the certification of a city prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest with respect to all of the petitioners. The careless inclusion of Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., in the warrant of arrest gives flesh
to the bone of contention of petitioners that the instant case is a matter of persecution rather than prosecution.37 On this ground, this
Court may enjoin the criminal cases against petitioners. As a general rule, criminal prosecutions cannot be enjoined. However, there
are recognized exceptions which, as summarized in Brocka v. Enrile,38 are:

a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;39

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; 40

c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;41

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;42

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; 43

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;44

g. Where the court had no jurisdiction over the offense;45

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; 46

i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; 47 and

j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.48

The substantive aspect:


Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code or Introduction of Falsified Document in a
judicial proceeding. The elements of the offense are as follows:

1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person.

2. That the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any subdivisions Nos. 1 or 2 of Article 172.

3. That he introduced said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding. 49

The falsity of the document and the defendants’ knowledge of its falsity are essential elements of the offense. The Office of the City
Prosecutor filed the Informations against the petitioners on the basis of the Complaint-Affidavit of respondent Atty. Peña, attached to
which were the documents contained in the Motion to Dismiss filed by the petitioners in Civil Case No. 754. Also included as
attachments to the complaint were the Answers, Pre-Trial Brief, the alleged falsified documents, copy of the regular meetings of ISCI
during the election of the Board of Directors and the list of ISCI Stockholders. 50 Based on these documents and the complaint-affidavit
of Atty. Peña, the City Prosecutor concluded that probable cause for the prosecution of the charges existed. On the strength of the
same documents, the trial court issued the warrants of arrest.

This Court, however, cannot find these documents sufficient to support the existence of probable cause.

Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense
charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without restoring to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of
which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than
suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify conviction. 51

As enunciated in Baltazar v. People,52 the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.

The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start
those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. 53

We do not see how it can be concluded that the documents mentioned by respondent in his complaint-affidavit were falsified. In his
complaint, Atty. Peña stated that Herman Ponce, Julie Abad and Marilyn Ong, the alleged signatories of the questioned letters, did not
actually affix their signatures therein; and that they were not actually officers or stockholders of ISCI. 54 He further claimed that Enrique
Montilla’s signature appearing in another memorandum addressed to respondent was forged.55 These averments are mere assertions
which are insufficient to warrant the filing of the complaint or worse the issuance of warrants of arrest. These averments cannot be
considered as proceeding from the personal knowledge of herein respondent who failed to, basically, allege that he was present at the
time of the execution of the documents. Neither was there any mention in the complaint-affidavit that herein respondent was familiar
with the signatures of the mentioned signatories to be able to conclude that they were forged. What Atty. Peña actually stated were but
sweeping assertions that the signatories are mere dummies of ISCI and that they are not in fact officers, stockholders or
representatives of the corporation. Again, there is no indication that the assertion was based on the personal knowledge of the affiant.

The reason for the requirement that affidavits must be based on personal knowledge is to guard against hearsay evidence. A witness,
therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony
is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.56 Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or
statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.57

The requirement of personal knowledge should have been strictly applied considering that herein petitioners were not given the
opportunity to rebut the complainant’s allegation through counter-affidavits.

Quite noticeable is the fact that in the letter dated 19 December 1994 of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad, neither of the two made the
representation that they were the president or secretary of ISCI. It was only Atty. Peña who asserted that the two made such
representation. He alleged that Marilyn Ong was never a stockholder of ISCI but he did not present the stock and transfer book of ISCI.
And, there was neither allegation nor proof that Marilyn Ong was not connected to ISCI in any other way. Moreover, even if Marilyn
lawphil

Ong was not a stockholder of ISCI, such would not prove that the documents she signed were falsified.

The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of the public prosecutor’s function without any showing of
grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in his findings. 58 Considering, however, that the prosecution and the court a quo committed
manifest errors in their findings of probable cause, this Court therefore annuls their findings.

Our pronouncement in Jimenez v. Jimenez59 as reiterated in Baltazar v. People is apropos:

It is x x x imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it
is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as
to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same
must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding
or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the
clear dictates of reasons. The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence
might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears
repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by visualizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should
continue to be so.

On the foregoing discussion, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the findings of the prosecutor as well as the court a
quo as to the existence of probable cause. The criminal complaint against the petitioners should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 June 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order dated 2 August 2000 is hereby made permanent. Accordingly, the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Negros Occidental, Bago City, is hereby DIRECTED to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685
and 6686.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*


Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**


Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Raffle dated 27 April 2010, Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., is designated an additional member in place of
Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad who inhibited himself due to close association with one of the parties.

** Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno was originally designated as an additional member per raffle dated 15 February 2010 in lieu
of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio who inhibited himself due to a related case. However, per Special Order No. 836 dated
12 April 2010, Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza is designated an additional member of the Second Division, whether
Regular or Special, relative to cases wherein Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno was designated as additional member in view of
the Chief Justice forthcoming retirement.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner with Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and Andres B. Reyes,
Jr. concurring; rollo, pp. 50-60.

2 Id. at 61-66.

3
The contract was allegedly confirmed in a letter addressed to the respondent, the pertinent portion of which reads:

xxxx

This is to confirm the engagement of your services as the authorized representative of Urban Bank, specifically to
hold and maintain possession of our above [-]captioned property and to protect the same from former tenants,
occupants or any other person who are threatening to return to the said property and/or interfere with your
possession of the said property for and in our behalf.

You are likewise authorized to represent Urban Bank in any court action that you may institute to carry out your
aforementioned duties, and to prevent any intruder, squatter or any other person not otherwise authorized in writing
by Urban Bank from entering or staying in the premises. Id. at 69.

4 Id. at 72-87.
5 Id. at 96.

6
Id. at 97.

7 Id. at 98.

8 Id. at 99. Also at CA rollo, p. 304.

9
Id. at 106-109.

10 The case was docketed as I.S. Case No. 9248.

11 Rollo, p. 108.

12 The dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, In view of all the foregoing, undersigned finds probable cause that the crime of Introducing Falsified
Documents in evidence under par. 2, Article 172, Revised Penal Code (4 counts) had been committed and that
respondents Teodoro Borlongan, Jr., Delfin Gonzalez, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr.,
Corazon Bejasa, and Arturo Manuel are probably guilty.

Let Information be filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, City of Bago, Philippines.

SO RESOLVED. (Id. at 110-114).

13
Id. at 113-114.

14 Id. at 115-122.

15 Id. at 123-126.

16 Id. at 127-142.

17
The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
reinvestigation is hereby denied.

Set arraignment of the accused on December 1, 1998 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED. (Id. at 143-150.)

18 Id. at 151-186.

19 Id. at 50-60.

20
Id. at 13-14.

21 Id. at 518-522.

22 People v. Vallejo, 461 Phil. 672, 686 (2003); People v. Palijon, 397 Phil. 545, 556 (2000).

23
473 Phil. 758, 776-777 (2004).

24 CA rollo, pp. 902-903.

25 55 Phil. 706, 711 (1931).

26Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Fourteenth Edition, Revised 1998, Appendix "A," Table No. 15, p.
1010.

27
Id. at 1008.

28 (1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2) Violations of the rental law;

(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not
exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other
imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine
does not exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).

This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiff’s cause of action is pleaded in the same complaint with
another cause of action subject to the ordinary procedure; nor to a criminal case where the offense charged is
necessarily related to another criminal case subject to the ordinary procedure.

29Sales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143802, 16 November 2001, 369 SCRA 293, 305 citing Bernardo v. Mendoza, G.R. No.
L-37876, 25 May 1979, 90 SCRA 214, 220; Vda. De Jacob v. Puno, G.R. Nos. L-61554-55, 31 July 1984, 131 SCRA 144, 149.

30 Rollo, pp. 368-372.

31
Id. at 148.

32 Article III, Section 2, Philippine Constitution.

33
G.R. No. 82585, 14 November 1988, 167 SCRA 393, 406.

34 Lim, Sr. v. Felix, G.R. Nos. 94054-57, 19 February 1991, 194 SCRA 292, 305.

35 Id. at 306.

36
Yee Sue Koy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141, 146-147 (1940).

37 Rollo, pp. 41-42.

38 G.R. Nos. 69863-65, 10 December 1990, 192 SCRA 183, 188.

39 Hernandez v. Albano, 125 Phil. 513 (1967).

40Dimayuga v. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304, 306-307 (1922); Hernandez v. Albano, id.; Fortun v. Labang, 192 Phil. 125, 133
(1981).

41
De Leon v. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202 (1940).

42 Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62, 75 (1939).

43
Young v. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556, 562 (1916); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389 (1925).

44
Sangalang v. People, 109 Phil. 1140, 1142 (1960).

45 Lopez v. City Judge, G.R. No. L-25795, 29 October 1966, 18 SCRA 616, 620-621.

46
Rustia v. Ocampo, CA G.R. No. 4760, 25 March 1960.

47Recto v. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Rano v. Alvenia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, 8 October 1962; Guingona, Jr. v. City
Fiscal of Manila, 213 Phil. 516, 524-525 (1984).

48 Salonga v. Cruz Paño, G.R. No. L-59524, 18 February 1985, 134 SCRA 438, 448-450.

49
JBL Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Criminal Book Two, Fourteenth Edition, Revised, 1998 ed., p. 246.

50 Rollo, pp. 110-114.

51 People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 880 (1998).

52 G.R. No. 174016, 28 July 2008, 560 SCRA 278, 293-294.

53 Baltazar v. People, supra note 52 at 294 citing Okabe v. Gutierrez, supra note 23 at 781.

54 Rollo, pp. 108-109.

55 Id. at 109.

56 Sec. 36, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence. See also D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 409 Phil. 275, 285 (2001).

57 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 194. See also Philippine Home Assurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 255, 267-268 (1996)
cited in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, id. at 285.

58
Ang v. Lucero, G.R. No. 143169, 21 January 2005, 449 SCRA 157, 168.

59 G.R. No. 158148, 30 June 2005, 462 SCRA 516, 528-529.


The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 142011 March 14, 2003

ALFONSO C. CHOA, petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LENI CHOA, respondents.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Alfonso Chan Choa, petitioner, is a Chinese national. On April 25, 1989, he filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41,
Bacolod City, a verified petition for naturalization,1 docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5395.

During the initial hearing of the case on August 27, 1990, petitioner testified on direct examination but he was not able to finish the
same. On August 29, 1990, he filed a motion to withdraw his petition for naturalization. 2 The trial court granted the motion in its
Resolution dated September 28, 1990,3 which partly reads:

"The petitioner, Alfonso Chan Choa, has not yet finished testifying on direct-examination. Although the petitioner has not
stated in his said ‘Motion To Withdraw Petition’ the reason why he is withdrawing his petition at this stage of the proceedings,
the petitioner can not be compelled to continue with his petition for naturalization.

"In view thereof, the petitioner, Alfonso Chan Choa, is allowed to withdraw his petition for naturalization.

"SO ORDERED."

Meanwhile, on August 5, 1992, State Prosecutor Pedro D. Delfin on detail at Bacolod City, acting upon the complaint of petitioner’s
wife, Leni, filed an Information4 with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3, Bacolod City, charging petitioner with perjury
under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322. The Information reads:

"That on or about 30th day of March, 1989, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the herein accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly made untruthful statements or
falsehoods upon material matters required by the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 473) in his verified ‘Petition for
Naturalization’ dated April 13, 1989 (sic),5 subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Felomino B. Tan, Jr., who is
authorized to administer oath, which petition bears Doc. No. 140, Page No. 29, Book No. XXIII, series of 1989, in the Notarial
Register of said Notary Public, by stating therein the following, to wit:

‘5.) I am married to a Filipino. My wife’s name is Leni Ong Choa and now resides at 46 Malaspina Street, Bacolod
City. I have two (2) children whose names, dates and places of birth, and residence are as follows:

Name Date of Birth Place of Birth Residence


ALBRYAN ONG July 19, 1981 Bacolod City 46 Malaspina St.,
CHOA Bacolod City
CHERYL May 5, 1983 Bacolod City 46 Malaspina St.,
LYNNE ONG Bacolod City
CHOA

xxx xxx xxx

‘10) I am of good moral character, I believe in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. I have conducted
myself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of my residence in the Philippines in my
relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in which I am living.’

xxx xxx xxx

when in truth and in fact, said accused knew that his wife Leni Ong Choa and their two (2) children were not then residing at
said address at # 46 Malaspina Street, Villamonte, Bacolod City, having left the aforesaid residence in 1984, or about five (5)
years earlier and were then residing at Hervias Subdivision, Bacolod City; that contrary to his aforesaid allegation in his
verified Petition for Naturalization, accused, while residing at 211 106 Street, Greenplains Subdivision, Bacolod City, has been
carrying on an immoral and illicit relationship with one Stella Flores Saludar, a woman not his wife since 1984, and begetting
two (2) children with her as a consequence, as he and his wife, the private offended party herein, have long been separated
from bed and board since 1984; which falsehoods and/or immoral and improper conduct are grounds for disqualification to
become a citizen of the Philippines.

"Act contrary to law."

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued thereafter.

After trial, the MTCC rendered a Decision6 dated February 21, 1995 finding petitioner guilty of perjury, as charged, thus:
"FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense which he is
presently charged, and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances that may be considered, the accused is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional and to pay the costs."

Petitioner filed a motion for a reconsideration,7 contending, among others, that there is no basis to convict him of perjury because
almost two years prior to the filing of the Information, his motion to withdraw the petition for naturalization containing the alleged false
statements was granted by the MTCC, hence, the alleged false statements were no longer existing or had become functus officio.

The MTCC, in its Order8 dated March 31, 1995, denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Bacolod City, in a Decision dated September 12, 1996, affirmed the MTCC
judgment.9

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 19968. In his comment, the Solicitor
General recommended the acquittal of petitioner, contending that the withdrawal of his petition for naturalization rendered the
same functus officio, thus making the questioned false statements inexistent.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated June 8, 1999, 10 affirmed the RTC Decision with modification, thus:

"WHEREFORE, finding the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court to be in accordance with law and evidence, we
AFFIRM the same with the modification that petitioner-accused-appellant Alfonso Choa is sentenced to suffer imprisonment,
after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, for a period of three (3)
months of arresto mayor, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional.

"SO ORDERED."

In convicting petitioner, the Appellate Court adopted as its own the RTC’s findings as follows:

"Evidence presented clearly proved that all the above-enumerated elements (of perjury) have been duly executed by the
accused. His allegations in his petition regarding his, his wife’s and children’s residences and his positive averment of the fact
that he is of good moral character and had conducted himself in an irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines
are material matters in connection with his petition for naturalization as they are essential facts required by Sec. 7 of C.A. No.
473 for one to fulfill for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship. They are the very facts which would be the subject of inquiry by
the court hearing the petition and the same would be the basis of the court’s ruling whether one is qualified and granted
Philippine citizenship.

"Paragraph 2 of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the statement or affidavit is to be made before a competent
officer, authorized to receive and administer oath. The information shows that the statement was duly subscribed and sworn to
before Notary Public Felomino B. Tan, Jr., a person competent and authorized by law to receive and administer oath and the
same was entered in his notary register as Doc. No. 140, Page No. 29, Book No. XXIII, Series of 1989.

"That the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood could be gleaned from the discrepancies in his given
addresses. In his petition for naturalization he gave No. 46 Malaspina Street, Villamonte, Bacolod City as his and his wife’s
residence, while in the birth certificates and the affidavit of admission of paternity of both Fonsella Kae Saludar and Steve
Albert Saludar, he gave No. 211, 106 Street, Greenplains Subdivision, Bacolod City as his address besides from the fact that
while may have been residing in the above-stated addresses, his wife and children have been staying at Hervias Subdivision,
Bacolod City since the latter part of 1984. Furthermore, cohabiting openly with another woman not his wife and siring (2)
children with the same, in open defiance with the norm of morality of the community where monogamy is the accepted
practice, is very inconsistent with his allegations of a moral life, proper and irreproachable, considering that the accused, by his
own admission is a graduate of the University of St. La Salle, a school known for its high academic and moral standards.
These assertions are not only willful and deliberate but a perversion of truth which the law is mandated to punish.

"Section 7 of C.A. 473 provides:

‘Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent Court, a petition in triplicate,
accompanied by two (2) photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his present and former
residence, his occupation; the place and date of his birth, whether single or married, the name, age, birthplace and
residence of the wife and each of the children…x x x.’ (underscoring supplied)

"The above-cited provisions are the pertinent law which specifically requires any person desiring to acquire Philippine
citizenship to accomplish, thus complying with the fourth element of the crime of perjury. (pp. 119-120, Original Records, Vol.
II)"11

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated February 22, 2000.12

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. 13

Both the petitioner and the Solicitor General in their respective pleadings contend that the challenged Decision of the Court of
Appeals should be reversed because: (a) not all the elements of the crime of perjury are present; and (b) the withdrawal of the petition
for naturalization which contains the alleged untruthful statements bars the prosecution of petitioner for perjury.

Thus, the issue here is whether petitioner may be convicted of perjury based on the alleged false statements he stated in his petition for
naturalization withdrawn almost two years prior to the filing of the Information for perjury.

The petition is unmeritorious.


Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code under which petitioner has been charged and convicted, provides:

"Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful
statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit,
upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.

"Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this
and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein."

The elements of perjury are:

1. The accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter;

2. The statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer authorized to receive and administer oath;

3. In that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and

4. The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. 14

All these elements are present in the instant case. Petitioner willfully and deliberately alleged false statements concerning his
"residence" and "moral character" in his petition for naturalization. This was sufficiently proven by the prosecution, as succinctly noted
by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision.

The petition for naturalization was duly subscribed and sworn to by petitioner before Notary Public Filomino B. Tan, Jr., a person
competent and authorized by law to receive and administer oath. Also, petitioner started testifying under oath on his false allegations
before the trial court.

The allegations in the petition regarding "residence" and "moral character" are material matters because they are among the very facts
in issue or the main facts which are the subject of inquiry15 and are the bases for the determination of petitioner's qualifications and
fitness as a naturalized Filipino citizen. Thus, C.A. No. 473 provides:

"SEC. 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following qualifications may become a
citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:

xxx xxx xxx

"Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must
have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in
his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living;

xxx xxx xxx

"SEC. 7. Petition for citizenship. – Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent court, a
petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his present and
former places of residence; his occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single or married and if the father of
children, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and of the children; x x x; a declaration that he has the
qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of
this Act; x x x." (italics supplied)

The necessity of declaring a truthful and specific information on the "residence" and "moral character" in the petition for naturalization
has been underscored by this Court in Chua Kian Lai vs. Republic,16 thus:

"One qualification for Philippine citizenship is that the petitioner ‘must be of good moral character.’ That circumstance should
be specifically alleged in the petition.

xxx xxx xxx

"The law explicitly requires that the applicant should indicate in his petition ‘his present and former places of residence’ (Sec.
7, Com. Act No. 473). That requirement is designed to facilitate the verification of petitioner’s activities which have a bearing
on his petition for naturalization, especially so as to his qualifications and moral character, either by private individuals or by
investigative agencies of the government, by pointing to them the localities or places wherein appropriate inquiries may be
made (Keng Giok vs. Republic, 112 Phil. 896). Moreover, the suppression of that information might constitute falsehood which
signifies that the applicant lacks good moral character and is not, therefore, qualified to be admitted as a citizen of the
Philippines." (italics supplied)

Fully cognizant of the truth surrounding his moral character and residence, petitioner instead declared falsely in his verified petition for
naturalization that "he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualification under C.A. No. 473." 17 Clearly, he willfully asserted
falsehood under oath on material matters required by law.

We cannot go along with the submission of the petitioner and the Solicitor General that petitioner could no longer be prosecuted for
perjury in view of the withdrawal of the petition for naturalization containing his false material statements. In this jurisdiction, it is not
necessary that the proceeding in which the perjury is alleged to have been committed be first terminated before a prosecution for the
said crime is commenced.18 At the time he filed his petition for naturalization, he had committed perjury. As discussed earlier, all the
elements of the crime were already present then. He knew all along that he wilfully stated material falsities in his verified petition.
Surprisingly, he withdrew his petition without even stating any reason therefor.19 But such withdrawal only terminated the proceedings
for naturalization. It did not extinguish his culpability for perjury he already committed. Indeed, the fact of withdrawal alone cannot bar
the State from prosecuting petitioner, an alien, who made a mockery not only of the Philippine naturalization law but the judicial
proceedings as well. And the petition for naturalization tainted with material falsities can be used as evidence of his unlawful act.

Petitioner then claims that since the petition for naturalization is a pleading, the allegations therein are absolutely privileged and cannot
be used for any criminal prosecution against him, citing Sison vs. David,20 People vs. Aquino21 and Flordelis vs. Himalaloan.22

The argument is unavailing. Sison and Aquino both involve libel cases. In Sison, this Court categorically stressed that the term
"absolute privilege" (or "qualified privilege") has an "established technical meaning, in connection withcivil actions for libel and slander."
The purpose of the privilege is to ensure that "members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak
their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery
of damages. It is granted in aid and for the advantage of the administration of justice."23 Certainly, in the present case, petitioner cannot
seek refuge under the absolutely privileged communication rule since the false statements he made in his petition for naturalization has
instead made a mockery of the administration of justice.

The Flordelis case is likewise not in point. There, Flordelis was charged with perjury for having alleged false statements in his verified
answer. This Court held that no perjury could be committed by Flordelis because "an answer to a complaint in an ordinary civil
action need not be under oath," thus, "it is at once apparent that one element of the crime of perjury is absent x x x, namely, that the
sworn statement complained of must be required by law."24

Anent the alleged violation of petitioner's constitutional right to equal protection, suffice it to state that such right cannot be invoked to
protect his criminal act.

In People vs. Cainglet,25 this Court emphatically stressed that "every interest of public policy demands that perjury be not shielded by
artificial refinements and narrow technicalities. For perjury strikes at the administration of the laws. It is the policy of the law that judicial
proceedings and judgments be fair and free from fraud, and that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be
punished if they do not."

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 473 (An Act to Provide for the Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Naturalization).

2 Records of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3, Bacolod City, in Criminal Case No. 50322, at 313.

3 Id. at 313-314.

4 Rollo at 43-44.

5 The Petition for Naturalization is actually dated March 30, 1989 but was filed on April 25, 1989.

6 Records of the MTCC at 347-358; Rollo at 45-57.

7 Id. at 359-368.

8 Id. at 403-405.

9
Rollo at 58-64.

Penned by Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, now a member of this Court, and concurred in by Justices Salvador J.
10

Valdez, Jr. and Renato C. Dacudao; id. at 140-150.

11 Id. at 145-146.

12
Id. at 174.

13 Filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

14
Saavedra, Jr. vs. Department of Justice, 226 SCRA 438, 445 (1993) citing Diaz vs. People, 191 SCRA 86, 93 (1990); see
also Burgos vs. Aquino, 249 SCRA 504 (1995).

15 United States vs. Estraña, 16 Phil. 520 (1910).

16 59 SCRA 40 (1974).
17 Exhibit "J-3," MTCC Records at 105.

18 United States vs. Estraña, supra.

19 Exhibit "9," supra.

20 1 SCRA 60 (1961).

21
18 SCRA 555 (1966).

22 84 SCRA 477 (1978).

23 People vs. Aquino, supra at 561.

24 Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, supra at 481.

25 123 Phil. 568 (1966).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 164368-69 April 2, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 to seek the reversal of the Sandiganbayan’s Joint
Resolution dated July 12, 2004, granting respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s (Estrada) demurrer to evidence in Crim. Case No.
26565.2

THE FACTS

On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558) was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent
Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was likewise filed
against Estrada. The Amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 reads:

That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having
been duly authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e.,
in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as THE President of the Republic of
the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN SEVERAL
TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal
name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for joint trial. Still another Information, this time for perjury and
docketed as Crim. Case No. 26905, was filed with the Sandiganbayan against Estrada. This was later consolidated, too, with Crim.
Cases No. 26558 and 26565.

Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued.

On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and decide the charges of
plunder and related cases (illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent Estrada. 3

At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the allegations of the Informations for plunder, illegal
use of alias, and perjury. The People’s evidence for the illegal alias charge, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, consisted of:

A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) officers Clarissa G. Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty.
Manuel Curato (Curato) who commonly declared that on February 4, 2000, Estrada opened a numbered trust account (Trust
Account C-163) with PCIB and signed as "Jose Velarde" in the account opening documents; both Ocampo and Curato also
testified that Aprodicio Lacquian and Fernando Chua were present on that occasion;

B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan, who declared that a certain Baby Ortaliza
(Ortaliza) transacted several times with her; that Ortaliza deposited several checks in PCIB Savings Account No. 0160-62502-
5 under the account name "Jose Velarde" on the following dates (as evidenced by deposit receipts duly marked in evidence):
a. 20 October 1999 (Exh. "MMMMM")

b. 8 November 1999 (Exh. "LLLLL")

c. 22 November 1999 (Exh. "NNNNN")

d. 24 November 1999 (Exh. "OOOOO")

e. 25 November 1999 (Exh. "PPPPP")

f. 20 December 1999 (Exh. "QQQQQ")

g. 21 December 1999 (Exh. "RRRRR")

h. 29 December 1999 (Exh. "SSSSS")

i. 4 January 2000 (Exh. "TTTTT")

j. 10 May 2000 (Exh. "UUUUU")

k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. "VVVVV")

l. 25 July 2000 (Exh. "WWWWW")

(2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena Ortaliza was employed in the Office of the Vice President
and, later on, in the Office of the President when Estrada occupied these positions and when deposits were made to the Jose
Velarde Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5.

The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated cases, which the Sandiganbayan admitted into evidence in a Resolution
dated October 13, 2003.4 The accused separately moved to reconsider the Sandiganbayan Resolution;5 the People, on the other hand,
filed its Consolidated Comment/Opposition to the motions. 6 The Sandiganbayan denied the motions in its Resolution dated November
17, 2003.7

After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to file a demurrer to evidence in these cases. 8 In its Joint
Resolution dated March 10, 2004,9 the Sandiganbayan only granted the defense leave to file demurrers in Crim. Case Nos. 26565
(illegal use of alias) and 26905 (perjury).

Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26905. 10 His demurrer to evidence for Crim. Case No.
26565 (illegal use of alias) was anchored on the following grounds11:

1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms. Clarissa Ocampo and Atty.
Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000), they saw movant use the name "Jose Velarde";

2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in late 2001 as can be gleaned from Bangko
Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October 2001;

3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered by the prosecution are banking documents
which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be revealed without following proper procedures; and

4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.

The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated Opposition that presented the following arguments: 12

1. That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction was not expressly prohibited until BSP No. 302 is of no moment
considering that as early as Commonwealth Act No. 142, the use of alias was already prohibited. Movant is being prosecuted
for violation of C.A. No. 142 and not BSP Circular No. 302;

2. Movant’s reliance on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]) is misplaced;

3. Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended, requires publication of the alias and the habitual use thereof, the
prosecution has presented more than sufficient evidence in this regard to convict movant for illegal use of alias; and

4. Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case of illegal use of alias is not absorbed in plunder.

Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through a Consolidated Reply Opposition.

THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYAN’S RULING

The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now assailed in this petition. The salient points of the assailed resolution
are:

First – the coverage of Estrada’s indictment. The Sandiganbayan found that the only relevant evidence for the indictment are those
relating to what is described in the Information – i.e., the testimonies and documents on the opening of Trust Account C-163 on
February 4, 2000. The Sandiganbayan reasoned out that the use of the disjunctive "or" between "on or about 04 February 2000" and
"sometime prior or subsequent thereto" means that the act/s allegedly committed on February 4, 2000 could have actually taken place
prior to or subsequent thereto; the use of the conjunctive was simply the prosecution’s procedural tool to guard against any variance
between the date stated in the Information and that proved during the trial in a situation in which time was not a material ingredient of
the offense; it does not mean and cannot be read as a roving commission that includes acts and/or events separate and distinct from
those that took place on the single date "on or about 04 February 2000 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto." The Sandiganbayan
ruled that the use of the disjunctive "or" prevented it from interpreting the Information any other way.

Second – the People’s failure to present evidence that proved Estrada’s commission of the offense. The Sandiganbayan found that the
People failed to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals. 13 It ruled that there is an
illegal use of alias within the context of CA 142 only if the use of the alias is public and habitual. In Estrada’s case, the Sandiganbayan
noted, the application of the principles was not as simple because of the complications resulting from the nature of the transaction
involved – the alias was used in connection with the opening of a numbered trust account made during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405,
as amended,14 and prior to the enactment of Republic R.A. No. 9160.15

Estrada did not publicly use the alias "Jose Velarde":

a. Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" in his dealings with Dichavez and Ortaliza after February 4, 2000 is not relevant in
light of the conclusion that the acts imputed to Estrada under the Information were the act/s committed on February 4, 2000
only. Additionally, the phrase, "Estrada did … represent himself as ‘Jose Velarde’ in several transactions," standing alone,
violates Estrada’s right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation, because it is very general and vague.
This phrase is qualified and explained by the succeeding phrase – "and use and employ the said alias ‘Jose Velarde’" – which
"is neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other
corporate entities." Thus, Estrada’s representations before persons other than those mentioned in the Information are
immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do not fall within the "Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities" specified in the
Information. Estrada’s representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez are not therefore covered by the indictment.

b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the principle in the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is
publicity; it reasoned out that that the definition of publicity is not limited to the way it is defined under the law on libel;
additionally, the application of the libel law definition is onerous to the accused and is precluded by the ruling in Ursua that CA
No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against the State and favorably for the accused. It ruled that the
definition under the law on libel, even if it applies, considers a communication to a third person covered by the privileged
communication rule to be non-actionable. Estrada’s use of the alias in front of Ocampo and Curato is one such privileged
communication under R.A. No. 1405, as amended. The Sandiganbayan said:

Movant’s act of signing "Jose Velarde" in bank documents being absolutely confidential, the witnessing thereof by bank
officers who were likewise sworn to secrecy by the same law cannot be considered as ‘public’ as to fall within the ambit of CA
142 as amended. On account of the absolute confidentiality of the transaction, it cannot be said that movant intended to be
known by this name in addition to his real name. Confidentiality and secrecy negate publicity. Ursua instructs:

Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or
indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the
prohibition in C.A. No. 142 as amended.

c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not to be publicly known by the name "Jose Velarde" is shown by the
nature of a numbered account – a perfectly valid banking transaction at the time Trust Account C-163 was opened. The
opening, too, of a numbered trust account, the Sandiganbayan further ruled, did not impose on Estrada the obligation to
disclose his real identity – the obligation R.A. No. 6713 imposes is to file under oath a statement of assets and
liabilities.16 Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and R.A. No. 6713 together, Estrada had the absolute obligation to disclose
his assets including the amount of his bank deposits, but he was under no obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of
the bank account (such as the name he used to open it).

Third – the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.17 The Sandiganbayan said that the absolute prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against
the use of anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious names, and all other similar accounts, is a legislative acknowledgment that a
gaping hole previously existed in our laws that allowed depositors to hide their true identities. The Sandiganbayan noted that the
prohibition was lifted from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251 dated July 7, 2000 – another confirmation that the
opening of a numbered trust account was perfectly legal when it was opened on February 4, 2000.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as interpreted in Ursua, must necessarily be harmonized with the
provisions of R.A. No.1405 and R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that every statute should be construed in a way that will harmonize it
with existing laws. A reasonable scrutiny, the Sandiganbayan said, of all these laws in relation to the present case, led it to conclude
that the use of an alias within the context of a bank transaction (specifically, the opening of a numbered account made before bank
officers) is protected by the secrecy provisions of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus outside the coverage of CA No. 142 until the passage into
law of R.A. No. 9160.

THE PETITION

The People filed this petition raising the following issues:

1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding that the
use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose Velarde" was not public despite the presence of Messrs. Aprodicio
Laquian and Fernando Chua on 4 February 2000;

2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding that the
use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose Velarde" was allowable under banking rules, despite the clear prohibition
under Commonwealth Act No. 142;
3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in applying R.A.
No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of alias punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142;

4. Whether the alleged harmonization and application made by the court a quo of R.A. No.1405 and Commonwealth Act No.
142 were proper;

5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information in
Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the alias "Jose Velarde" by respondent Joseph Estrada on February 4, 2000;

6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in departing from its earlier final finding on the non-
applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appeals and forcing its application to the instant case.

THE COURT’S RULING

The petition has no merit.

The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling

Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:

Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events
where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was
registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which
he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent
court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have
one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall
comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain
judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The
petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his
immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or
reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be
recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the
same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.

How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an alias – "a name or names used by a person or intended to be
used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or
baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority." There must be, in the words of Ursua, a "sign or
indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth … [for the use of
alias to] fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended." 18

Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led to the enactment of CA No. 142, as follows:

The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different
names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using
fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed
they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. 19

Following the doctrine of stare decisis,20 we are guided by the Ursua ruling on how the crime punished under CA No. 142 may be
committed. Close adherence to this ruling, in other words, is unavoidable in the application of and the determination of criminal liability
under CA No. 142.

Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application of the Ursua ruling proceeds from Estrada’s position in the
government; at the time of the commission of the offense, he was the President of the Republic who is required by law to disclose his
true name. We do not find this argument sufficient to justify a distinction between a man on the street, on one hand, and the President
of the Republic, on the other, for purposes of applying CA No. 142. In the first place, the law does not make any distinction, expressly or
impliedly, that would justify a differential treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to Estrada, in fact allows him to use his cinema or screen
name of Joseph Estrada, which name he has used even when he was already the President of the Philippines. Even the petitioner has
acquiesced to the use of the screen name of the accused, as shown by the title of the present petition. Additionally, any distinction we
make based on the People’s claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this is proscribed by the Ursua dictum that CA No. 142, as a penal
statute, should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.21 The mode of violating CA No. 142 is therefore the
same whoever the accused may be.

The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution dated February 6, 2002) denying Estrada’s motion to
quash the Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected the application of Ursua under the following tenor:

The use of the term "alias" in the Amended Information in itself serves to bring this case outside the ambit of the ruling in the case of
Ursua v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]), on which the accused heavily relies in his motion to quash. The term "alias" means
"otherwise known as" (Webster Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 53). The charge of using an "alias" logically implies that
another name has been used publicly and habitually. Otherwise, he will not be known by such name. In any case, the amended
information adverts to "several transactions" and signing of documents with the Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities
where the above-mentioned alias was allegedly employed by the accused.
The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts established in the Ursua case where another name was used by
the accused in a single instance without any sign or indication that that [sic] he intended to be known from that day by this name in
addition to his real name.22

The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in applying Ursua notwithstanding this earlier final ruling on its
non-applicability – a ruling that binds the parties in the present case. The People thus claims that the Sandiganbayan erred to the point
of gravely abusing its discretion when it resurrected the application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling.

We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order – a ruling
denying a motion to quash23 – that cannot be given the attributes of finality and immutability that are generally accorded to judgments or
orders that finally dispose of the whole, of or particular matters in, a case. 24 The Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order
because its effects would only be provisional in character, and would still require the issuing court to undertake substantial proceedings
in order to put the controversy to rest.25 It is basic remedial law that an interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and
may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. 26 Perez v. Court of Appeals,27 albeit a
civil case, instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res adjudicata effects. Says Perez:

The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an interlocutory matter, the principle of res judicata cannot be applied in this
case. There can be no res judicata where the previous order in question was not an order or judgment determinative of an issue of fact
pending before the court but was only an interlocutory order because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final adjudication.
In this case, the lifting of the restraining order paved the way for the possession of the fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or their
representatives pending the resolution of the main action for injunction. In other words, the main issue of whether or not private
respondent may be considered a sublessee or a transferee of the lease entitled to possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the
case had yet to be resolved when the restraining order was lifted. 28

Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the Information to determine the
sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any evidence aliunde. This is far different from the present demurrer to evidence
where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the prosecution’s case, and was faced with the issue of whether the prosecution’s
evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of the Information. Under these differing views, the Sandiganbayan may arrive at a
different conclusion on the application of Ursua, the leading case in the application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is not per se
indicative of grave abuse of discretion. That there is no error of law is strengthened by our consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling
on the application of Ursua.

In an exercise of caution given Ursua’s jurisprudential binding effect, the People also argues in its petition that Estrada’s case is
different from Ursua’s for the following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used and intended to continually use the alias "Jose Velarde" in
addition to the name "Joseph Estrada"; (2) Estrada’s use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a single transaction; and (3) the use
of the alias "Jose Velarde" was designed to cause and did cause "confusion and fraud in business transactions" which the anti-alias law
and its related statutes seek to prevent. The People also argues that the evidence it presented more than satisfied the requirements of
CA No. 142, as amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or established that Estrada’s use of the alias was public.

In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties’ expressed positions, we shall now examine within the Ursua framework the
assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence. The prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the
evidence it presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied the Ursua requirements, particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality in
the use of an alias.

What is the coverage of the indictment?

The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information
in Crim. Case No. 26565 to Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" on February 4, 2000. It posits that there was a main transaction –
one that took place on February 4, 2000 – but there were other transactions covered by the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto; the
Information specifically referred to "several transactions" … "with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities." To the People,
the restrictive finding – that the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto" is absorbed by the phrase "on or about 04 February 2000" –
drastically amends the succeeding main allegations on the constitutive criminal acts by removing the plurality of both the transactions
involved and the documents signed with various entities; there is the undeniable essential relationship between the allegations of the
multiplicity of transactions, on one hand, and the additional antecedent of "prior to or subsequent thereto," on the other. It argues that
the Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto" into a useless appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient
and totally unwarranted escape route.

The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least exacting in satisfying the constitutional requirement that the accused
has to be informed of the accusation against him. Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an allegation of the
approximate date of the commission of the offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the same Rule provides that it is not necessary to
state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the crime.
This liberality allegedly shaped the time-tested rule that when the "time" given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, the
time of the commission of the offense does not need to be proven as alleged, and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows
that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action
(citing People v. Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US v. Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]). Since allegations of date of the
commission of an offense are liberally interpreted, the People posits that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
disregarding the additional clause "prior to or subsequent thereto"; under the liberality principle, the allegations of the acts constitutive
of the offense finally determine the sufficiency of the allegations of time. The People thus claims that no surprise could have taken place
that would prevent Estrada from properly defending himself; the information fully notified him that he was being accused of using the
alias Jose Velarde in more than just one instance.

We see no merit in these arguments.

At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature – the right of Estrada to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Under the provisions of the Rules of Court implementing this constitutional right, a complaint or information is sufficient if it states
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense in the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.29 As to the cause of accusation, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute,
but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged and the qualifying and aggrava ting
circumstances, and for the court to pronounce judgment.30 The date of the commission of the offense need not be precisely stated in
the complaint or information except when the precise date is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have
been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. 31

The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that
bear on the culpability and liability of the accused so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense.32 In short, the
allegations in the complaint or information, as written, must fully inform or acquaint the accused – the primary reader of and the party
directly affected by the complaint or information – of the charge/s laid.

The heretofore cited Information states that "… on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [did] … willfully, unlawfully and
criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias "Jose
Velarde" which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or
other corporate entities."

We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayan’s reading of the Information, as this was how the accused might have similarly read
and understood the allegations in the Information and, on this basis, prepared his defense. Broken down into its component parts, the
allegation of time in the Information plainly states that (1) ON February 4, 2000; (2) OR before February 4, 2000; (3) OR sometime prior
or subsequent to February 4, 2000, in the City of Manila, Estrada represented himself as "Jose Velarde" in several transactions in
signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities
all had their reference to February 4, 2000; they were all made on or about or prior or subsequent to that date, thus plainly implying that
all these transactions took place only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To be
sure, the Information could have simply said "on or about February 4, 2000" to capture all the alternative approximate dates, so that the
phrase "sometime prior or subsequent thereto" would effectively be a surplusage that has no meaning separately from the "on or about"
already expressed. This consequent uselessness of the "prior or subsequent thereto" phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and
necessary consequence of the use of the "OR" between the two phrases and the "THERETO" that referred back to February 4, 2000 in
the second phrase. Of course, the reading would have been very different (and would have been clearly in accord with the People’s
present interpretation) had the Information simply used "AND" instead of "OR" to separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various
transactions occurring on various dates and occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed. Unfortunately for the
People, the imprecision in the use of "OR" is the reality the case has to live with. To act contrary to this reality would violate Estrada’s
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him; the multiple transactions on several separate days that the
People claims would result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has a right to rely on the single day
mentioned in the Information.

Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation of time in the Information, another issue that the allegation of time and our
above conclusion raise relates to what act or acts, constituting a violation of the offense charged, were actually alleged in the
Information.1avvphi1

The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the People’s case, as it deals a fatal blow on the People’s claim that Estrada
habitually used the Jose Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed "habitual,"
as it does not amount to a customary practice or use. This reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition under CA No. 142 and the
terms of Ursua.

The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and


the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,
and R.A. No. 9160.

We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.

The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and Curato are bank officers sworn to secrecy under the law, the
presence of two other persons who are not bank officers – Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua – when Estrada’s signed the bank
documents as "Jose Velarde" amounted to a "public" use of an alias that violates CA No. 142.

On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to premise the validity of Estrada’s prosecution for violation of CA No. 142
on a mere banking practice is gravely erroneous, improper, and constitutes grave abuse of discretion; no banking law provision allowing
the use of aliases in the opening of bank accounts existed; at most, it was allowed by mere convention or industry practice, but not by a
statute enacted by the legislature. Additionally, that Estrada’s prosecution was supposedly based on BSP Circular No. 302 dated
October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as Estrada stands charged with violation of CA No. 142, penalized since 1936, and not with
a violation of a mere BSP Circular. That the use of alias in bank transactions prior to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed is inconsequential
because as early as CA No. 142, the use of an alias (except for certain purposes which do not include banking) was already prohibited.
Nothing in CA No. 142 exempted the use of aliases in banking transactions, since the law did not distinguish or limit its application; it
was therefore grave error for the Sandiganbayan to have done so. Lastly on this point, bank regulations being mere issuances cannot
amend, modify or prevail over the effective, subsisting and enforceable provision of CA No. 142.

On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its relationship with CA No. 142, that since nothing in CA No. 142 excuses the
use of an alias, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that R.A. No. 1405 is an exception to CA No. 142’s
coverage. Harmonization of laws, the People posits, is allowed only if the laws intended to be harmonized refer to the same subject
matter, or are at least related with one another. The three laws which the Sandiganbayan tried to harmonize are not remotely related to
one another; they each deal with a different subject matter, prohibits a different act, governs a different conduct, and covers a different
class of persons,33 and there was no need to force their application to one another. Harmonization of laws, the People adds,
presupposes the existence of conflict or incongruence between or among the provisions of various laws, a situation not obtaining in the
present case.

The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust transactions, such as Trust Account No. C-163, as it applies only to
traditional deposits (simple loans). A trust account, according to the People, may not be considered a deposit because it does not
create the juridical relation of creditor and debtor; trust and deposit operations are treated separately and are different in legal
contemplation; trust operation is separate and distinct from banking and requires a grant of separate authority, and trust funds are not
covered by deposit insurance under the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591, as amended).

The People further argues that the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that the transaction or communication was privileged in nature was
erroneous – a congruent interpretation of CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 shows that a person who signs in a public or private
transaction a name or alias, other than his original name or the alias he is authorized to use, shall be held liable for violation of CA No.
142, while the bank employees are bound by the confidentiality of bank transactions except in the circumstances enumerated in R.A.
No. 1405. At most, the People argues, the prohibition in R.A. No. 1405 covers bank employees and officers only, and not Estrada; the
law does not prohibit Estrada from disclosing and making public his use of an alias to other people, including Ocampo and Curato, as
he did when he made a public exhibit and use of the alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua.

Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that the use of an alias before bank officers does not violate CA No. 142
effectively encourages the commission of wrongdoing and the concealment of ill-gotten wealth under pseudonyms; it sustains an
anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the law to silence bank officials and employees from reporting the commission of crimes.
The People contends that the law – R.A. No. 1405 – was not intended by the Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or camouflage for
the commission of crimes and cannot be so interpreted; the law can only be interpreted, understood and applied so that right and
justice would prevail.

We see no merit in these arguments.

We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of libel – that mere communication to a
third person is publicity – does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. Our close reading of Ursua – particularly, the requirement that
there be intention by the user to be culpable and the historical reasons we cited above – tells us that the required publicity in the use of
alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an
open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the
alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly
use the alias must be manifest.

To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not
necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not
part of the public who had no access to Estrada’s privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacañan where he sat as
President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a
lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada
could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua
were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming
the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estrada’s representations to these people were made in privacy and in
secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.

The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged
criminal act related to the opening of a trust account – a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.34 We
previously rejected, in Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, 35 the People’s nitpicking argument on the alleged dichotomy between bank deposits
and trust transactions, when we said:

The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term "deposits," as used in R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail
a creditor-debtor relationship between the trustor and the bank, does not lie. An examination of the law shows that the term "deposits"
used therein is to be understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship between the
depositor and the bank.

The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:

SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give encouragement to the people to deposit their money in
banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist
in the economic development of the country. (Underscoring supplied)

If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank for authorized loans to third persons, then such account, regardless of
whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law
precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic development of the country.

Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the
trust account covers "deposit, placement or investment of funds" by Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner. The money deposited
under Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold
that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by
bank in other ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law.

Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term "deposits" was intended to be understood broadly:

SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with bank or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued
by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of
duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) 1avvphi1

The phrase "of whatever nature" proscribes any restrictive interpretation of "deposits." Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted
provision that, generally, the law applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those which are invested. This further shows
that the law was not intended to apply only to "deposits" in the strict sense of the word. Otherwise, there would have been no need to
lawphil.net

add the phrase "or invested.


Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.36

We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or
recognized zones of privacy.37 Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of signing the documents as "Jose Velarde" related to the
opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed
the signing. We need not even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is
essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed
privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly.

The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant development only because it clearly manifests that prior to its
enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted banking transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by a
mere banking regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without
violating the constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws. 38

We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of these various laws is not an attempt to harmonize these laws. A
finding of commission of the offense punished under CA No. 142 must necessarily rest on the evidence of the requisites for culpability,
as amplified in Ursua. The application of R.A. No. 1405 is significant only because Estrada’s use of the alias was pursuant to a
transaction that the law considers private or, at the very least, where the law guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to the
parties to the transactions; it is at this point that R.A. No. 1405 tangentially interfaces with an indictment under CA 142. In this light,
there is no actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 that requires harmonization. Each operates within its own
sphere, but must necessarily be read together when these spheres interface with one another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of
recent vintage in relation to the indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing factor in his indictment.

In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the totality of the circumstances obtaining in Estrada’s use of the
alias "Jose Velarde" vis-à-vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide here whether Estrada’s use of an alias when he occupied the
highest executive position in the land was valid and legal; we simply determined, as the Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made
liable for the offense charged based on the evidence the People presented. As with any other accused, his guilt must be based on the
evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal liability requires. If the People fails to discharge this burden, as
they did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that we so declare. We do so now in this review and accordingly find no reversible error
of law in the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING ANTONIO T. CARPIO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA DANTE O. TINGA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ


Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2
People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada for the crime of illegal use of alias.

3
A.M. No. 02-1-07-SC, entitled Re: Request for the Creation of a Special Division to Try the Plunder Case, SB Crim. Case No.
26558, and related cases.

4 Rollo, pp. 1304-1316.

5
See Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated November 17, 2003, id., p. 1318.

6 Ibid, p. 1320.

7 Promulgated on November 18, 2003.

8 Rollo, pp. 1323-1335.

9 Id., pp. 1337-1348.

10 Dated March 29, 2004, id., pp. 1349-1377.

11 See Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated July 09, 2004 (promulgated on July 12, 2004), id., p. 84.

12 Id., pp. 1378-1408.

13
G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996, 256 SCRA 147.

14 Otherwise known as the "Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act."

15 Otherwise known as the "Anti-Money Laundering Act."

16 Otherwise known as then "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees."

17 Otherwise known as the "Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001."

18 Supra note 13, pp. 155-156.

19 Supra note 12, p. 154 .

20Stare decisis et non quieta movere which means "to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established."
Department of Transportation and Communication v. Cruz, G.R. No. 178256, July 23, 2008, explained the principle as
follows:

The doctrine of stare decisis simply means that when the Supreme Court has once laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are
substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same. The doctrine of stare decisis is
based on the legal principle or rule involved and not upon the judgment which results therefrom and in this particular
sense stare decisis differs from res judicatawhich is based upon the judgment. The doctrine of stare decisis is a
policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has
laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all
future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions
and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward
by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.

21 Supra note 13, p. 157.

22 Rollo, pp. 1421-1425.

23 See: Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 116259-60, 118896-97, February 20, 1996, 253 SCRA 773, 793.

24 See: Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court.

25 See: Monterey Foods Corp. v. Eserjose G.R. No. 153126, September 11, 2003, 410 SCRA 627, 634-635.

26 See: East Asia Traders, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 152947, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 716, 723.

27 G.R. No. 107737. October 1, 1999, 316 SCRA 43, 56-57.


28 Bold face supplied; citation omitted.

29
RULES OF COURT, Section 6, Rule 110.

30 Id., Section 9.

31 Id., Section 11.

32
People v. Almendral, G.R. No. 126025, July 6, 2004, 433 SCRA 440, 451.

33 According to the People, CA 142 regulates the use of aliases and provides the penalty for violation of its provisions; in
Estrada’s case, it pertains to and regulates only his acts in using in several instances his alias "Jose Velarde;" the crime of
illegal use of alias starts and stops with Estrada for he alone consummates the crime. The law deals with the use of alias
outside the permissible trades and the subsequent conduct of persons who become privy to Estrada’s use of the alias, or
whatever obligation is incumbent upon them, are immaterial to the elements of the crime penalized by CA 142. On the other
hand, the People further asserted, RA 1405 relates to the secrecy of bank deposits and governs the conduct and liability of
bank officers with respect to information to which they become privy; it does not regulate or govern the conduct of depositors
themselves when they open accounts. Finally, RA 9160 refers to the crime of money laundering and the imposable penalty for
its commission – the illegal use of alias violative of CA 142 is not indispensable in sustaining a violation of the anti-money
laundering law and illegal use of alias does not necessarily amount to, or necessarily constitute, money laundering.

34Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 164, provides the two-part test of a reasonable expectation
of privacy as follows: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether his
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. See also: People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No.167693, September 19,
2006, 502 SCRA 419, 424.

35 G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006, 509 SCRA 190, 210-211.

36 Underscoring in the original.

37Ople v. Torres, supra note 28, p. 158; see also Marquez v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001, 359 SCRA 772, 781,
and Ejercito, supra note 29.

38
Section 22, Article III of the Constitution provides that no ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. We
enumerated in Lacson v.Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 299, 322-323, the forms of ex
post facto law as any of the following –

(a) one which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed,
and punishes such action; or

(b) one which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that when it was committed; or

(c) one which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it
was committed,

(d) one which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.

(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
disadvantage.

(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a
right which when done was lawful;

(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 139857 September 15, 2006

LEONILA BATULANON, petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15221, affirming with modification the
April 15, 1993 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and
3627, convicting Leonila Batulanon of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and the July 29, 1999 Resolution3 denying
the motion for reconsideration.

Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to
December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.

During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered. 4

Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed against Batulanon, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 3625

That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit
Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the aff[a]irs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and
collections of, the same, and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely:
Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of Erlinda Omadlao by then and there making an entry therein that the
said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan of P4,160, Philippine Currency, and by signing on the appropriate line thereon the
signature of Erlinda Omadlao showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Erlinda Omadlao was
granted a loan and received the amount of P4,160 when in truth and in fact the said person was never granted a loan, never
received the same, and never signed the cash/check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and received the loan of
P4,160 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused
and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of P4,160,
Philippine Currency.5

Criminal Case No. 3626

That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok
Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and
collections of, the same, and paying out loans to members taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely:
Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in the name of Gonafreda Oracion by then and there making an entry therein that the
said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan of P4,000.00 and by signals on the appropriate line thereon the signature of
Gonafreda Oracion showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a
loan, received the loan of P4,000.00 when in truth and in fact said person was never granted a loan, never received the same,
and never signed the Cash/Check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design
to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and received the amount of P4,000.00 and
thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still
refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of P4,000, Philippine
Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Criminal Case No. 3453

That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok
Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and
collection of the same and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an
Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Ferlyn Arroyo with the PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate column
of the ledger the entry that the said Ferlyn Arroyo had a fixed deposit of P1,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in
the amount of P3,500.00, thus making it appear that the said person made a fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was
granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Ferlyn Arroyo never made such a deposit and was never granted loan
and after the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and there again falsify the Cash/Check
Voucher of the PCCI in the name of Ferlyn Arroyo by signing therein the signature of Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it appear that
the said Ferlyn Arroyo received the loan of P3,500, Philippine Currency, when in truth and in fact said Ferlyn Arroyo never
received the loan, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and
there release to herself the same, and received the amount of P3,500, and thereafter, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands,
refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of
P3,500, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Criminal Case No. 3627

That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok
Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI) entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and
collection of, the same and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an
Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Dennis Batulanon with the PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate
column of the ledger the entry that the said Dennis Batulanon had a fixed deposit of P2,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted
a loan in the amount of P5,000.00 thus making it appear that the said person made fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with,
and was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Dennis Batulanon never made such a deposit and was never
granted loan and offer the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and there again falsify the
Cash/Check Voucher No. 374 A of PCCI in the name of Dennis Batulanon by signing therein the signature of Dennis
Batulanon, thus making it appear that the said Dennis Batulanon received the loan of P5,000.00 when in truth and in fact said
Dennis Batulanon never received the loan and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said
accused did then and there release to herself the same and receive the loan of P5,000, and thereafter, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and
[despite] demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the
aforementioned amount of P5,000, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3453,
3625, 3626 and 3627.

Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto Gopio, Jr., and Bonifacio Jayoma as witnesses.

Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers 9 testified that on certain dates in
1982, Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers representing varying amounts to four different individuals as follows: On June 2, 1982,
Cash Voucher No. 30A10 for P4,160.00 was released to Erlinda Omadlao; on September 24, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 237A 11 for
P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda12 Oracion; P3, 500.00 thru Cash Voucher No. 276A13 was released to Ferlyn Arroyo on October
16, 1982 and on December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was released to Dennis Batulanon thru Cash Voucher No. 374A. 14

Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were not eligible to apply for loan because they were not bona fide
members of the cooperative.15 Ferlyn Arroyo on the other hand, was a member of the cooperative but there was no proof that she
applied for a loan with PCCI in 1982. She subsequently withdrew her membership in 1983.16 Medallo stated that pursuant to the
cooperative's by-laws, only bona fide members who must have a fixed deposit are eligible for loans. 17

Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of Oracion and Arroyo in their respective cash vouchers and made
it appear in the records that they were payees and recipients of the amount stated therein. 18 As to the signature of Omadlao in Cash
Voucher No. 30A, she declared that the same was actually the handwriting of appellant.19

Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its board of directors since 1979. He corroborated Medallo's testimony
that Omadlao, Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis Batulanon are not members of PCCI. He stated that Oracion is Batulanon's sister-in-law
while Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to
minors.20

Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in 1980 before becoming its Chairman in 1982 until 1983. He testified
that the loans made to Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon did not pass through the cooperative's Credit Committee and
PCCI's Board of Directors for screening purposes. He claimed that Oracion's signature on Cash Voucher No. 237A is Batulanon's
handwriting.21 Jayoma also testified that among the four loans taken, only that in Arroyo's name was settled. 22

The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa Medallo who was presented as a hostile witness and Batulanon.

Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense and was asked to bring with her the PCCI General Journal for the
year 1982. After certifying that the said document reflected all the financial transactions of the cooperative for that year, she was asked
to identify the entries in the Journal with respect to the vouchers in question. Medallo was able to identify only Cash Voucher No. 237A
in the name of Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to identify the other vouchers because the Journal had missing pages and she was not
the one who prepared the entries.23

Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she did not sign the vouchers in the names of Omadlao, Oracion and
Arroyo; that the same were signed by the loan applicants in her presence at the PCCI office after she personally released the money to
them;24 that the three were members of the cooperative as shown by their individual deposits and the ledger; that the board of directors
passed a resolution in August 1982 authorizing her to certify to the correctness of the entries in the vouchers; that it has become an
accepted practice in the cooperative for her to release loans and dispense with the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his absence;25 that
she signed the loan application and voucher of her son Dennis Batulanon because he was a minor but she clarified that she asked
Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on the documents to avoid suspicion of irregularity; 26 that contrary to the testimony of Gopio, Jr., minors
are eligible for membership in the cooperative provided they are children of regular members.

Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her son's name because she is no longer qualified for another loan as she still has to pay
off an existing loan; that she had started paying off her son's loan but the cooperative refused to accept her payments after the cases
were filed in court.27 She also declared that one automatically becomes a member when he deposits money with the
cooperative.28 When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI from 1980 to 1982, the cooperative did not have by-laws yet.29

On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-1982, because the cooperative had been registered since 1967.30

On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all the above-
entitled case, she is sentenced in each of the four cases to 4 months of ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year and 2 months of
PRISION CORRECTIONAL, to indemnify the PCCI in the total sum of P16,660.00 with legal interest from the institution of the
complaints until fully paid, plus costs.

SO ORDERED.31
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant LEONILA BATULANON is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code; and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayormaximum, AS MINIMUM, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos; and to
indemnify the Polomolok Cooperative Credit , Inc. the sum of thirteen thousand one hundred sixty (P13,160.00), plus legal
interests from the filing of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.

SO ORDERED.32

The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is the person whose signature was allegedly forged, thus the
prosecution should have presented Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda Oracion and Ferlyn Arroyo instead of relying on the testimony of an
unreliable and biased witness such as Medallo. 33 She avers that the crime of falsification of private document requires as an element
prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not been prejudiced by these loan transactions because these loans are accounts
receivable by the cooperative.34

The petition lacks merit.

Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of commercial document, appellant could be convicted of
falsification of private document under the well-settled rule that it is the allegations in the information that determines the nature of the
offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the information. In Andaya v. People,35 we held:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime
of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x That to which his attention should be
directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did
he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. x x x The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in
the manner alleged?" not, "Did you commit a crime named murder?" If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated,
the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. x x x If the accused performed the acts
alleged in the manner alleged, then he ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the
crime which those acts constitute.

The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 36 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification was committed in any private
document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause
such damage.37

In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanon's act 38 of falsification falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to
appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. This is because by signing the
name of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo in Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A, respectively, as payee of the amounts appearing
in the corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that they obtained a loan and received its proceeds when they did not in
fact secure said loan nor receive the amounts reflected in the cash vouchers.

The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of the Cash Vouchers in the name of Omadlao and Oracion
knowing that they are not PCCI members and not qualified for a loan from the cooperative. In the case of Arroyo, Batulanon was aware
that while the former is a member, she did not apply for a loan with the cooperative.

Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the signatures of Oracion and Arroyo in the vouchers and made it appear
that the amounts stated therein were actually received by these persons. As to the signature of Arroyo, Medallo's credible testimony
and her familiarity with the handwriting of Batulanon proved that it was indeed the latter who signed the name of Arroyo. Contrary to
Batulanon's contention, the prosecution is not duty-bound to present the persons whose signatures were forged as Medallo's
eyewitness account of the incident was sufficient. Moreover, under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a
person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or
has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person.

Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis. There is no evidence showing that Medallo was prompted by any ill
motive.

The claim that Batulanon's letter to the cooperative asking for a compromise was not an admission of guilt is untenable. Section 27,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or those
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt.

There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI has not been prejudiced because the loan transactions are reflected in its books as
accounts receivable. It has been established that PCCI only grants loans to its bona fide members with no subsisting loan. These
alleged borrowers are not members of PCCI and neither are they eligible for a loan. Of the four accounts, only that in Ferlyn Arroyo's
name was settled because her mother, Erlinda, agreed to settle the loan to avoid legal prosecution with the understanding however,
that she will be reimbursed once the money is collected from Batulanon. 39

The Court of Appeals40 correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents and not commercial documents because they
are not documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions 41 nor are they defined and
regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law. 42Rather, they are private documents, which have been defined as deeds
or instruments executed by a private person without the intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by which
some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth. 43
In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonab le doubt. It
has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or
for any other crime necessarily included therein. 44 The prosecution in this case was able to discharge its burden completely.

As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, 45 it is important to ascertain whether the offender is to
be charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to
commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a
document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus, in People v. Reyes,46 the accused made it appear in the time book of the
Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he had worked only
11 days, and then charged the offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer for 21 days. The accused
misappropriated the wages during which the laborer did not work for which he was convicted of falsification of private document.

In U.S. v. Infante,47 the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face of the pawn ticket and made it appear that
the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned the falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of
the true value of the article pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a private document. In U.S. v. Chan Tiao,48 the accused
presented a document of guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas Hermanos for the payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of
sugar, and by means of said falsified documents, succeeded in obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of falsification of a private
document.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of
Private Documents in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453.

Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document with the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods with a duration of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, which is three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one
(21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days. Taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulanon is
entitled to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which must be within the range of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.49 Thus, in Criminal Case
Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, which is within the range of the allowed imposable penalty.

Since Batulanon's conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of private documents, she shall suffer the aforementioned penalties for
each count of the offense charged. She is also ordered to indemnify PCCI the amount of P11,660.00 representing the aggregate
amount of the 3 loans without deducting the amount of P3,500.00 paid by Ferlyn Arroyo's mother as the same was settled with the
understanding that PCCI will reimburse the former once the money is recovered. The amount shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the filing of the complaints on November 28, 1994 until the finality of this judgment. From the time the decision becomes
final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum until its satisfaction.

However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is estafa and not falsification. Under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, the acts that may constitute falsification are the following:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists,
or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or;

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.

In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon for falsifying Dennis Batulanon's signature in the cash voucher
based on the Information charging her of signing the name of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, however, reveal that in Cash
Voucher No. 374A, petitioner Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: "by: lbatulanon" to indicate
that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of falsification under
Article 171 because there in nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter,
obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is
not attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which
will make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that petitioner Batulanon is
also guilty of falsification of private document with respect to Criminal Case No. 3627 involving the cash voucher of Dennis. 50

The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are:

(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;

(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such
receipt;
(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;

(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. (Note: The 4th element is not necessary when there is
evidence of misappropriation of the goods by the defendant) 51

Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,52 the Court convicted the appellant of estafa by misappropriation. The latter, a treasurer of the
Manila Rail Road Company, took the sum of P8,330.00 out of the funds of the company and used it for personal purposes. He replaced
said cash with his personal check of the same amount drawn on the Philippine National Bank (PNB), with instruction to his cashier not
to deposit the same in the current account of the Manila Rail Road Company until the end of the month. When an audit was conducted,
the check of appellant was discovered to have been carried in the accounts as part of the cash on hand. An inquiry with the PNB
disclosed that he had only P125.66 in his account, although in the afternoon of the same day, he deposited in his account with the PNB
sufficient sum to cover the check. In handing down a judgment of conviction, the Court explained that:

Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very evidently not a necessary element of the form of estafa here
discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or diversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent
and is in itself sufficient. The reason for this is obvious: Grave as the offense is, comparatively few men misappropriate trust
funds with the intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases the offender hopes to be able to restore the funds before the
defalcation is discovered. x x x

Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case, we find all of the necessary elements of estafa x x x. That the
money for which the appellant's checks were substituted was received by him for safe-keeping or administration, or both, can
hardly be disputed. He was the responsible financial officer of the corporation and as such had immediate control of the
current funds for the purposes of safe-keeping and was charged with the custody of the same. That he, in the exercise of such
control and custody, was aided by subordinates cannot alter the case nor can the fact that one of the subordinates, the
cashier, was a bonded employee who, if he had acted on his own responsibility, might also have misappropriated the same
funds and thus have become guilty of estafa.

Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his personal use, from the funds entrusted to him for safekeeping and
substituting his personal checks therefor with instructions that the checks were to be retained by the cashier for a certain
period, the appellant misappropriated and diverted the funds for that period. The checks did not constitute cash and as long as
they were retained by the appellant or remained under his personal control they were of no value to the corporation; he might
as well have kept them in his pocket as to deliver them to his subordinate with instructions to retain them.

xxxx

But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention of the accused to permanently misappropriate the funds to
himself. As we have already stated, such intention rarely exists in cases of this nature and, as we have seen, it is not a
necessary element of the crime. Though authorities have been cited who, at first sight, appear to hold that misappropriation of
trust funds for short periods does not always amount to estafa, we are not disposed to extend this interpretation of the law to
cases where officers of corporations convert corporate funds to their own use, especially where, as in this case, the
corporation is of a quasi-public character. The statute is clear and makes no distinction between permanent misappropriations
and temporary ones. We can see no reason in the present case why it should not be applied in its literal sense.

The third element of the crime with which the appellant is charged is injury to another. The appellant's counsel argues that the
only injury in this case is the loss of interest suffered by the Railroad Company during the period the funds were withheld by
the appellant. It is, however, well settled by former adjudications of this court that the disturbance in property rights caused by
the misappropriation, though only temporary, is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of paragraph 5, supra.
(U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S. vs. Malong, 36 Phil., 821.)53

In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money for administration and in trust for PCCI.
Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a loan, she fraudulently used the name of her son who is likewise disqualified to
secure a loan from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the amount she obtained from the loan is also not disputed as she even admitted
receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount received by Batulanon is reflected in the records as part of the receivables of
PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter because the sum misappropriated by her could have been loaned by PCCI to qualified
members, or used in other productive undertakings. At any rate, the disturbance in property rights caused by Batulaono's
misappropriation is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Article 315.

Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was P5,000.00, the applicable provision is paragraph (3) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, where the amount defrauded is over P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. There being no modifying circumstances, the
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. With the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulaon is entitled to an
indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as
maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of three counts of falsification of private
documents and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum, for each count, and to indemnify complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative
Incorporated the amount of P11,660.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this
judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction; and

(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of estafa and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum. She is
likewise ordered to indemnify Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the sum of P5,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from
finality of this judgment until its satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 25-40. Penned by Associate Justice Arturo B. Buena and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona
and Demetrio G. Demetria.

2 CA rollo, pp. 34-41. Penned by Judge Abednego O. Adre.

3 Rollo, p. 41.

4
TSN, August 1, 1990, pp. 96-97.

5 CA rollo, pp. 16-17.

6
Id. at 18-19.

7 Id. at 14-15.

8 Id. at 20-21.

9
TSN, August 13, 1983, pp. 3-5.

10 Records, p. 230.

11 Id. at 238.

12 Also referred to as Godofreda in the Records.

13 Records, p. 239.

14
Id. at 240; TSN, March 4, 1986, pp. 5, 7-8.

15 Id. at 234-237.

16 TSN, March 4, 1986, pp. 24-25.

17 Id. at 12-14.

18 TSN, August 1, 1990, pp. 101-106.

19 Id. at 10.

20 TSN, October 22, 1986, pp. 5-19.

21
TSN, June 10, 1987, pp. 14-15.

22 Id. at 19.

23 TSN, February 16, 1988, pp. 2-15.

24 TSN, November 14, 1988, pp. 5-6; 8-10 and 14-16.

25 Id. at 13.

26 Id. at 19-23.

27 TSN, March 29, 1988, p. 38.

28
Id. at 30-31.

29 Id. at 34.

30 TSN, March 28, 1990, p. 69.

31 CA rollo, pp. 40-41.


32 Rollo, p. 39.

33 Id. at 6.

34 Id. at 13.

35 G.R. No. 168486, June 27, 2006, citing U.S. v. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273 (1910).

36Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. – The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon: x x x

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document
commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

37 Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 144026, June 15, 2006.

38Although Batulanon signed the names of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo, her act of falsification will not fall under Paragraph
1 of Article 171, which requires that there must be an attempt or intent on the part of the accused to imitate the signature of
other persons. Such was not shown in this case because the genuine signature of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo were never
offered in evidence. See Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II (15th ed., 2001), pp. 205-206.

39 TSN, August 13, 1986, pp. 10-13.

40Citing People v. Francisco, C.A., No. 05130-41-CR, August 23, 1966, 64 O.G. 537, 541, cited in Luis B. Reyes, The Revised
Penal Code, Book II (14th ed., 1998), p. 234. In People v. Francisco, the Court of Appeals ruled that "the cash disbursement
vouchers here in question are not negotiable instruments nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce. They
are nothing more than receipts evidencing payment to borrowers of the loans extended to them and as such are private
documents only."

41Monteverde v. People, 435 Phil. 906, 921 (2002), citing Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II (14th ed., 1998), p.
236, citing People v. Lizares, C.A., 65 O.G. 7174.

42 Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II (14th ed., 1998), p. 235, citing People v. Co Beng, C.A., 40 O.G. 1913.

43 U.S. v. Orera, 11 Phil. 596, 597 (1907).

44 People v. Caingat, 426 Phil. 782, 792 (2002).

45
A. Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review (9th ed., 1997), p. 464, citing Cuello Calon, II, p. 261.

46
56 Phil. 286 (1931).

47 36 Phil. 146 (1917).

48 37 Phil. 78 (1917).

49 Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128213, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 427, 435.

While the Information alleged that petitioner Batulanon also falsified the "Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger" of Dennis
50

Batulanon, she cannot likewise be convicted of falsifying said document as it was not formally offered in evidence.

51 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II (15th ed., 2001), p. 736.

52
43 Phil. 186 (1922), cited in Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II (15th ed., 2001), p. 750.

53
Id. at 189-191.

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600** February 1, 2011

VIVIAN T. DABU, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Complainant,


vs.
EDUARDO RODEN E. KAPUNAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 51 and Acting Judge, Branch 52,* MA. THERESA CORTEZ, LEILA
O. GALO, Both Court Stenographers, SUZETTE O. TIONGCO, Legal Researcher, All of Regional Trial Court, Branch 51,
Guagua, Pampanga, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

A.M. No. 01-3-138-RTC


RE: EVALUATION OF THE REPORT AND INVENTORY SUBMITTED BY EXECUTIVE JUDGE ROGELIO C. GONZALES, RTC,
Guagua, Pampanga, ON ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE CASES IN BRANCHES 49, 50, 51, 52 and 53 OF THE GUAGUA
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to the powers vested in the Court under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, 1 the Court acts upon these two
consolidated administrative cases against [1] Judge Eduardo Roden E. Kapunan (Judge Kapunan), then presiding judge of Branch 51
and acting judge of Branch 52, Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga (RTC); [2] stenographer Ma. Theresa Cortez (Cortez); [3]
stenographer Leila O. Galo (Galo); and [4] Legal Researcher Suzette Tiongco (Tiongco), all of Branch 51, RTC, Guagua, Pampanga.

In A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600, complainant Vivian T. Dabu (Dabu) claimed that she was appointed 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor for
Pampanga sometime in June 1999. In October of the same year, from her station in San Fernando, Pampanga, she was transferred
and re-assigned to Guagua, Pampanga, to serve Branches 50, 51 and 52 of the RTC therein.

According to Dabu, just a few months into her assignment, she noticed that unlike in Branch 50, she was not being called upon to
intervene or investigate cases involving annulment of marriages in Branches 51 and 52, both presided by Judge Kapunan, despite the
fact that the cases for annulment of marriage were being raffled equally among the five (5) branches of the RTC, in Guagua,
Pampanga.

Curious on what appeared to her as an oddity, and having previously learned that cases for annulment of marriage were being "fixed" in
the said station, Dabu went to the Office of the Clerk of Court and got from its docket the list of annulment cases raffled to Branches 51
and 52 pertaining to the period from August 1, 1999 to March 2000. She then went to each branch and requested the records of the
cases in the list. She then found out that the records were being falsified and made to appear that a prosecutor appeared during the
supposed hearings of the annulment cases, when, in truth, the prosecutors who supposedly appeared were either on leave or had
already been re-assigned to another station.

The other case, A.M. No. 01-3-138, stemmed from an article written by Atty. Emil P. Jurado (Atty. Jurado) in the November 1, 2000
issue of the Manila Standard. It reported that an RTC branch in Guagua, Pampanga, had been improperly disposing cases for
annulment of marriage in "syndicated efforts involving court personnel and a public assistance office lawyer."

Determined to ascertain the truth of the allegations made in the article, then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. instructed Executive
Judge Rogelio C. Gonzales (Judge Gonzales) of RTC, Guagua, Pampanga to submit inventories of marriage annulment cases filed in
the five (5) branches of the RTC, Guagua, Pampanga, from January 1997 to November 2000.

In the evaluation2 of the report and inventory submitted by Judge Gonzales, then Deputy Court Administrator Jose P.
Perez3 recommended that the matter be joined with the proceedings in A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600 so that "a complete picture and history of
the anomalous treatment by Branches 51 and 52 of annulment of marriage cases" would be made.

In its Resolution4 dated March 13, 2001, the Court ordered the consolidation of A.M. No. 1-3-138-RTC and A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-1028-
RTJ.

During the hearing of these cases, only Judge Kapunan and Tiongco participated. Cortez manifested that she would not adduce
evidence in her behalf and would submit the case for disposition/recommendation on the basis of the records and evidence adduced
during the investigation. Respondent Galo, on the other hand, neither appeared nor filed any comment or pleading.

The result of the investigation revealed something not expected of a proper judicial office. As reported in detail by the Investigating
Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos5 (Investigating Justice) of the Court of Appeals:

On August 24, 2000, Complainant Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Vivian T. Dabu executed an Affidavit citing several incidents wherein
the court records of cases for annulment of marriage, lost titles and declaration of presumptive death were being falsified. The Affidavit
was treated as a Complaint for falsification of court records against Judge Eduardo Roden E. Kapunan and court stenographers Ma.
Theresa Cortez and Leila O. Galo. Respondent Suzette Tiongco was not included in the charge of falsification of court records as
complainant ha[d] no evidence linking her thereto but the Office of the Court Administrator included her with the charge of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Complainant alleged that during the period between November 1999 and August 2000, respondent Judge was the presiding judge of
Branch 51 and the acting judge of Branch 52, both of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, with three (3) of the personnel of
Branch 51, namely: Leila Galo, Ma. Theresa Cortez and Suzette Tiongco.

Respondent Judge and Galo were detailed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48, at the same time and were returned to
their original assignment at the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga also at the same time x x x.

Respondents Galo and Cortez were appointed to the position of court stenographers for Branch 51 x x x. However, respondent Galo,
during the said period, did not perform the duties of a stenographer but acted as a secretary for respondent Judge x x x. She received
all communications pertaining to respondent Judge or to cases pending before Branches 51 and 52 x x x. Respondent Judge gave
specific instruction on this matter to the Court’s personnel x x x.

The other staff of Branch 51 (sic) holds office at the 3rd floor of Goseco hall, which is located across the municipal hall of Guagua,
Pampanga. On the other hand, all of the staff of Branch 52 (sic) is holding office at the 2nd floor of Goseco Hall.

All the records of Branches 51 and 52 are being kept at the Goseco Hall except for the records of cases which have pending incidents
to be resolved, or an Order/Decision for signature, or to be heard, or is needed by respondent Judge which are in the office of the
respondents at the municipal hall x x x.
Prior to November 1999, the assigned prosecutor for Branch 51 is Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Domingo C. Pineda and for Branch 52 is
former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo. Beginning 10 November 1999 up to 31 August 2000, herein complainant was the
assigned prosecutor for Branches 51 and 52.

As evidence for the charge of falsification of court records, complainant presented the following cases:

1. Civil Case No. G-3655


Nonito Vitug vs. Gracita Sangan
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga

On 3 November 1999, there was allegedly a hearing which was held in the presence of former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D.
Manalo, wherein the plaintiff and the psychologist testified and, thereafter, the counsel of record, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo, offered his
evidence, and, without the objection of the public prosecutor, the case was deemed submitted for decision x x x. The minutes and
transcript of stenographic notes were prepared by respondent Cortez.

On 9 November 1999, a Decision was rendered, which states on paragraph 3, page 1, thereof that "Prosecutor Reyes Manalo on
November 3, 1999 submitted his Report that no collusion exists between the parties" but no such Report is attached to the records of
the case x x x.

Former Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo testified that as early as 25 October 1999, when he filed his Application for Leave for the month of
November, he was already on leave and, from then on, has never appeared before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua,
Pampanga until his retirement in June 2000 x x x. This was corroborated by the stenographer of said Court, Zenaida A.C. Caraan x x x.

In the criminal cases heard on 3 November 1999, respondent Judge issued Orders declaring the hearing on said date cancelled and
resetting the same to another date in view of the absence of the public prosecutor x x x.

Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo, on the other hand, testified that none of the parties is his client and that he never appeared in the said case x x
x.

2. Civil Case No. G-3675


Meriam Vitug vs. Edgar Faeldon
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

On 12 November 1999, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Domingo C. Pineda allegedly issued a Manifestation finding no collusion between
the parties x x x. He, however, testified that he did not issue any "Manifestation" in connection with this case x x x.

On 15 November 1999, a hearing was allegedly conducted in the presence of the said public prosecutor wherein the plaintiff testified
and the case was re-set on 29 December 1999 for the presentation of the psychologist x x x. The minutes and transcript of
stenographic notes were both prepared by respondent Cortez x x x.

However, the Orders in the criminal cases heard on the same date, 15 November 1999, which were also prepared by respondent
Cortez and signed by respondent judge, stated that the hearing was cancelled in view of the absence of the public prosecutor x x x.

Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Domingo C. Pineda testified that he was, as of 8 November 1999, assigned to Branches 54 and 55 of the
Regional [T]rial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, and from then on, never appeared before Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court of
Guagua, Pampanga x x x. This was corroborated by the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court of the said Court, Eduardo P. Carlos x x x.

Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo again testified that none of the parties is his client and he never appeared in such case x x x.

The Decision in this case was included in the cases reported as having been decided or disposed of for the month of March 2000 x x x.

3. Civil Case No. G-3659


Ricardo Layug vs. Zerlina Arteta
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga

On 3 November 1999, a Manifestation was allegedly issued by former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo x x x but he
testified that he did not issue the same x x x.

On 5 November 1999, a hearing was allegedly held in the presence of the said public prosecutor wherein the plaintiff and a
psychologist testified, the counsel on record, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo, offered his evidence and without the objection of the public
prosecutor, the case was submitted for resolution x x x.

Again former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo and Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo denied any participation in the case.

4. LRC Case No. G-73


In re: Petition for Issuance of
Owner’s Duplicate Copy of
TCT No. 217416-R,
Rev. Fr. Francisco R. Lansang,
Petitioner,
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga
5. LRC Case No. G-74
In re: Petition for Issuance of
Owner’s Duplicate Copy of
TCT Nos. 441074-R to 441089-R,
Beatriz Lansang, Petitioner.
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

On 25 November 1999, a hearing was allegedly held wherein the petitioners were presented, the counsel on record, Atty. Ponciano C.
Lobo offered his evidence, and, thereafter, these cases were deemed submitted for resolution x x x. The minutes of hearing and
transcript of stenographic notes were prepared by respondent Cortez x x x.

On December 6, 1999 separate Orders were issued granting the petitions favorably x x x. These cases were reported in June 2000 to
have been decided or disposed of x x x.

Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo proffered the same testimony x x x.

6. Civil Case No. G-2579


Benito Samia, Jr. vs. Josephine L. Lorenzo-Samia
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

On 21 February 2000, a Decision was rendered stating therein that a Psychological Evaluation Report was submitted but none appears
on the record x x x.

Likewise, between 13 December 1999 and 21 February 2000, no other hearing was conducted despite the fact that the Order dated 13
December 1999 indicated the next hearing on 17 January 2000 and the dorsal side of page 111 of the record states "Reset 2/21/00" x x
x. There was also no record that plaintiff offered his evidence, rested his case, or submitted the case for resolution x x x.

The said Decision was included in the monthly report of cases disposed of in June 2000 x x x.

7. Civil Case No. G-3717


Tomas Tamayo vs. Adoracion Sampang
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga

The plaintiff, Tomas Tamayo, testified that the case was filed by respondent Cortez before the Regional Trial Court of Guagua,
Pampanga, after the latter agreed to help him in the "processing" of the annulment of his marriage; that he never appeared before any
lawyer for the notarization of his Verified Petition; that he was initially told that there would be no hearing in his annulment case and it
will be granted within three (3) months; that he gave the amount of Php 15,000.00 in connection thereto which was returned to him after
he withdrew his case; that respondent Galo took from him Php4000.00 in payment of the "psychologist fee" which amount was not
returned to him; that he gave the amount to respondent Galo after she identified herself as a court employee and even presented an
identification card of respondent Judge x x x.

In his testimony, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo stated that the plaintiff is not his client x x x.

8. Civil Case No. G-3677


Joseph Voltaire Datu vs. Marissa S. Tamarez
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga

On 11 April 2000, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo denying his signature appearing on the said
Complaint and claiming it to be a forgery x x x.

On the witness stand, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo reiterated that none of the parties is his client and that the signature appearing in the
Complaint is not his x x x.

9. Sum. Proc. No. G-1205


In re: Petition for Summary Proceeding
For Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Absentee Felicitas Jabilona,
Joselito Flores, Petitioner.
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

On 27 July 2000, a hearing was allegedly held wherein the counsel on record, Atty. Romeo B. Torno offered his evidence x x x.

Atty. Romeo B. Torno, however, testified that he did not appear before the said Court on the said time and date as he was then
appearing before Branch 50; that after his ex parte presentation of evidence, the next hearing was scheduled on 27 July 2000 at 3:30
o’clock in the afternoon but the same was cancelled since he has no witness to present; and that, thereafter, there was no other hearing
held or conducted in this case x x x.

On August 7, 2000, an Order was issued granting the Petition x x x.

Atty. Torno suspected that respondent Cortez prepared the same and when he confronted her, she replied that "everything is okay" x x
x.
10. Civil Case No. G-3730
Ofelia Enal vs. Francisco Enal Jr.
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

On 30 June 2000, an Order was issued stating that a hearing was allegedly held wherein the plaintiff testified, the Psychological
Evaluation Report filed, and the case deemed submitted for resolution x x x. The records of the case, however, bear an Order dated 9
June 2000 with the same contents x x x.

On even date, 9 June 2000, a Decision was issued in favor of the plaintiff x x x.

Refuting the charges against him, respondent Judge averred in his Comment 6 that:

a) his signatures appearing in the records of "Ofelia Enal vs. Francisco Enal, Jr., docketed as Civil Case Nos. G-3730, and
"Meriam Vitug vs. Edgar Faeldon," docketed as Civil Case No. G-3675, were forgeries;

b) after the said cases were made known to him during the latter part of July 2000 and since he received complaints [from]
litigants about the "activities" of respondent Galo, he conducted a discreet investigation, but stopped the same upon the filing
of this complaint;

c) he is a victim of falsification and did not conspire or connive with the other respondents in the commission thereof.

On May 28, 2001, Judge Kapunan suffered from cardio-pulmonary arrest and died at the age of fifty-four. According to his heirs, the
evidence of the complainant was insufficient to support the charges against their late father and, thus, sought the dismissal of the
complaint.

From a mere examination of the signatures of Judge Kapunan on the questioned court records, it is clear that his signatures were not
forged. As correctly pointed out by the complainant and the Investigating Justice, except for the abovementioned cases of Enal and
Vitug, Judge Kapunan failed to specifically deny under oath his participation in the anomalous cases or to challenge the genuineness of
his signature appearing in the court records of the questioned cases enumerated by Dabu. Thus, following Section 8, Rule 8 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,7 this amounts to an admission by Judge Kapunan that he indeed signed the questioned orders,
decisions and court records.

Also, in all the questioned cases pointed out by Dabu, including the cases of Enal and Vitug, Judge Kapunan failed to offer any
evidence to support his defense that his signatures therein were forged. The rule is that he who disavows the authenticity of his
signature on a public document bears the responsibility of presenting evidence to that effect. 8 Mere disclaimer is not sufficient. Under
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,9 the genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the following manner: [1] by any witness
who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted on or been charged; [2] by a comparison, made by a witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. At the
very least, he should present corroborating witnesses to prove his assertion. At best, he should present an expert witness. 10 As a rule,
forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery.11 This, unfortunately, Judge Kapunan failed to do.

At any rate, contrary to the assertions of Judge Kapunan, in the case of Vitug, the records show that as early as May 31, 2000, he
already issued an order granting the appeal of the Solicitor General. He could not, therefore, claim that he was only made aware of the
anomalies in Vitug after it was decided.

Further, as noted by the Investigating Justice, Judge Kapunan himself confirmed in his June 2000 report of decided cases that the
cases of Lansang and Samia were among those he had decided. Thus, he could not claim that his signatures in the decisions of those
cases were forged.

The Court finds specious the allegation of Judge Kapunan that the "processing" of cases were committed by Galo all by herself, and
that he conducted a "discreet investigation" when he learned of her activities. Judge Kapunan offered no plausible reason why he failed
to finish his investigation other than the lame excuse that he stopped his investigation due to the filing of the complaint. The reason is
clear. There was no investigation conducted. As opined by the Investigating Justice,12 had there been an investigation, Judge Kapunan
should have completed it, found the culprit, filed the appropriate charges, and cleared his name.

With respect to Galo, she failed to appear in the proceedings below or file any comment, or any pleading. The proceedings below
established that she received payments from litigants as "psychologist fee." She even admitted to Dabu on at least two occasions that
she had "processed" certain cases involving annulment of marriage with the "go signal" of Judge Kapunan. In fact, she admitted to
Dabu that she was "processing" one case where one of the parties was a friend of Judge Kapunan, upon orders of the latter.

On the other hand, Cortez admitted preparing the questioned orders, decisions, minutes of hearings, and transcripts. She tried to justify
her actions by claiming that she only acted upon the instructions of Galo. Unfortunately, these circumstances do not justify her acts at
all.

Taking all these into consideration, it is undeniable that Judge Kapunan, Galo and Cortez acted together in issuing questionable orders
and decisions through falsification of public documents.

With regard to Tiongco, however, there is no evidence against her. The inclusion of Tiongco in this case was only upon the initiative of
the Office of the Court Administrator. As the record is bereft of any evidence to hold her liable, her exoneration is in order.

Court employees, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, being public servants in an office dispensing justice, should always act
with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but
must also be in accordance with the law and court regulations. No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from
its holder than an office in the judiciary. Court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty to maintain the
people's respect and faith in the judiciary. They should avoid any act or conduct that would diminish public trust and confidence in the
courts. Indeed, those connected with dispensing justice bear a heavy burden of responsibility.13

Falsification of an official document such as court records is considered a grave offense. It also amounts to dishonesty. Under Section
23, Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of 1987, dishonesty (par. a) and falsification (par. f) are considered grave offenses warranting
the penalty of dismissal from service upon commission of the first offense.

Furthermore, falsification of an official document is punishable as a criminal offense under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and
dishonesty is an impious act that has no place in the judiciary.

The penalty of dismissal, however, can no longer be imposed and carried out with respect to the late Judge Kapunan. The
administrative complaints against him have become moot and academic and the case should be deemed closed and terminated
following our ruling in Loyao, Jr. v. Caube14 and Apiag v. Cantero.15

WHEREFORE, finding respondents, Ma. Theresa Cortez and Leila O. Galo, GUILTY of falsification of official documents and
dishonesty, the Court hereby orders their DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges, except
accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations. 1avvphi1

The case against respondent Judge Eduardo Roden E. Kapunan is hereby dismissed for being moot and academic due to his untimely
demise.

Respondent Suzette O. Tiongco is EXONERATED of the charges.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES


Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No Part due to prior action in OCA)


ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.***
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION


Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD


Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No Part)
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ***
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes

* Passed away on May 28, 2001.

** Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1028-RTJ.

***No part.

1
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

2 Rollo (A.M. No. 01-3-138-RTC), pp. 1-19.

3 Now an Associate Justice of the Court.

4 Rollo (A.M. No. 01-3-138 RTC), p. 20.


5The investigation was first assigned to then Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals Romeo J. Callejo, Jr. who became a
member of the Court in 2003.

6 Rollo (RTJ 00-1600), pp. 275-284.

7 Sec. 8. How to contest such documents. - When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or
attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding Section, the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to
the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.

8 Libres v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 176358, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 642, 655.

9Sec. 22.How genuineness of handwriting proved. — The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge. (23a)

10
Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125283, February 10, 2006, 482 SCRA 164, 176.

11 Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 753, 763 (1998).

12 Report and Recommendation, Rollo (A.M. No. 01-3-138-RTC), p. 12.

13
Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan, 478 Phil. 823, 829 (2004), citing Albior v. Auguis, 452 Phil. 936 (2003) and Castelo
v. Florendo, 459 Phil. 581 (2003).

14 450 Phil. 38, 47 (2003).

15 335 Phil. 511, 526 (1997).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 194390 August 13, 2014

VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
1

Decision dated February 26, 2009 and the Resolution dated October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27925,
2 3

finding Venancio M. Sevilla (Sevilla) guilty of falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence punished under Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Antecedent Facts

Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the felony of falsification of public document, penalized under Article
171(4) of the RPC, in an Information, which reads:
4

That on or about 02 July 2001, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Malabon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Venancio M. Sevilla, a public officer, being then a memberof the
[S]angguniang [P]anlunsod of Malabon City, having been elected a [c]ouncilor thereof, taking advantage of his official position and
committing the offense in relation to duty, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously make a false statement in a narration of
facts, the truth of which he is legally bound to disclose, by stating in his C.S. Form 212, dated 02 July 2001 or Personal Data Sheet, an
official document, which he submitted to the Office of the Secretariat, Malabon City Council and, in answer to Question No. 25 therein,
he stated that no criminal case is pending against him, when in fact, as the accused fully well knew, he is an accused in Criminal Case
No. 6718-97, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Venancio Sevilla and Artemio Sevilla", for Assault Upon AnAgent Of A Person In
Authority, pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 55, thereby perverting the truth.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

Upon arraignment, Sevillaentered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

The prosecution alleged that on July 2, 2001, the first day of his term as councilor of the City of Malabon, Sevilla made a false narration
in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS). That in answer to the question of whether there is a pending criminalcase against him, Sevilla
6
marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer despite the pendency of a criminal case against him for assault upon an agent ofa
person in authority before the Metropolitan Trial Court ofMalabon City, Branch 55.

Based on the same set of facts, anadministrative complaint, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-01-1520, was likewise filed against Sevilla. In its
Decision dated March 26, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman found Sevilla administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of
official document and dismissed him from the service. In Sevilla v. Gervacio, the Court, in the Resolution dated June 23, 2003, affirmed
7

the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman as regards Sevilla’s administrative liability.

On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer vis-à-visthe question on whether
he has any pending criminal case. However, heaverred that he did not intend to falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza
(Mendoza), a member of his staff, who actually prepared his PDS.

According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001,since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed in his house. Ataround two o’clock in the
afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to accomplish his PDS and submit the same to the personnel office of the City
of Malabon before five o’clock that afternoon. He then instructedMendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he
filed with the personnel office. After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just signed the same
without checking the veracity of the entries therein. That he failed to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any
pending criminal case, Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the "no" answer.

The defense likewise presented the testimony of Edilberto G. Torres (Torres), a former City Councilor. Torres testified that Sevilla was
not yet given an office space in the Malabon City Hall on July 2, 2001; that when the members of Sevilla’s staff would then need to use
the typewriter, they would just use the typewriter inside Torres’ office. Torres further claimed that he saw Mendoza preparing the PDS
of Sevilla, the latter having used the typewriter in his office.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

On February 26, 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
8

WHEREFORE, accused VENANCIO M. SEVILLA is found GUILTY of Falsification of Public Documents Through Reckless Imprudence
and pursuant to Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code hereby imposes upon him in the absence ofany modifying circumstances the
penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayoras minimum to two (2) years ten (10) months and twenty one (21) days of prision
correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs.

There is no pronouncement as to civil liability as the facts from which it could arise do[es] not appear to be indubitable.

SO ORDERED. 9

The Sandiganbayan found that Sevilla made an untruthful statement in his PDS, which is a public document,and that, in so doing, he
took advantage of his official position since he would not have accomplished the PDS if not for his position as a City Councilor. That
being the signatory of the PDS, Sevilla had the responsibility to prepare, accomplish and submit the same. Further, the Sandiganbayan
pointed out that there was a legal obligation on the part of Sevilla to disclose in his PDS that there was a pending case against him.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the felony of falsification of public
documents.

Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the
10

RPC since he did not act with maliciousintent to falsify the aforementioned entry in his PDS. However, considering that Sevilla’s PDS
was haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of
public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC. Thus:
11

Moreover, the marking of the "no" box to the question on whether there was a pending criminal case against him was not the only
defect in his PDS. As found by the Office of the Honorable Ombudsman in its Resolution, in answer to question 29 inthe PDS, accused
answered that he had not been a candidate in any localelection (except barangay election), when in fact he ran and served ascouncilor
of Malabon from 1992 to 1998. Notwithstanding the negative answer in question 29, in the same PDS, in answer to question 21, he
revealed that he was a councilor from 1992 to 1998. Not to give premium to a negligent act, this nonetheless shows that the preparation
of the PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done.

Taking together these circumstances, this Court is persuaded that accused did not act with malicious intent to falsify the document in
question but merely failed to ascertain for himself the veracity of narrations in his PDS before affixing his signature thereon. The
reckless signing of the PDS without verifying the data therein makes him criminally liable for his act. Accused is a government officer,
who prior to his election as councilor in 2001, had already served as a councilor of the same city. Thus, he should have been more
mindful of the importance of the PDS and should have treated the said public document with due respect.

Consequently, accused is convictedof Falsification of Public Document through Reckless Imprudence, as defined and penalized in
Article 171, paragraph 4, in relation to Article 365, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. x x x. 12

Sevilla’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated October 22, 2010.
13

Hence, this appeal.

In the instant petition, Sevilla asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding him guilty of the felony of falsification of public documents
through reckless imprudence. He claims that the Information that was filed against him specifically charged him with the commission of
an intentional felony, i.e.falsification of public documents under Article 171(4) of the RPC. Thus, he could not be convicted of
falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC, which is a culpable felony, lest his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him be violated.

Issue
Essentially, the issue for the Court’s resolution is whether Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of falsification of public document
through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against him in the Information was for the intentional felony of falsification
of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.

At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan’s designation of the felony supposedly committed by Sevilla is inaccurate. The
Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence, punished under Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification of
a public document. However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as "falsification of public document through reckless
imprudence." The foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a modality of committing it.
Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separatecrimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime.

In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, the Court explained that:


14

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized
under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to
this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampangathe proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it x x x" on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional
crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that
by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, maliciousmischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a
mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what
isprincipally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible.x x x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be
absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should befixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed
for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the
negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum,
to prision correccional[medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could
range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence
bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.(Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasicrimes is to state that their commission results in damage, either to person
or property. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
15

Further, in Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People, the Court clarified that:
16

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from
willful offenses. It is not a question ofclassification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itselfis punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerousrecklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase as ‘homicide
through reckless imprudence’, and the like; when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, ‘reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide’; or ‘simple imprudence causing damages to property’."

There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed penaltyfor the guidance of bench and
bar in strict adherence to precedent. (Emphasis ours) Thus, the proper designation ofthe felony should be reckless imprudence
17

resulting to falsification of public documents and not falsification of public documentsthrough reckless imprudence.

Having threshed out the proper designation of the felony committed by Sevilla, the Court now weighs the merit of the instant appeal.
Sevilla’s appeal is anchored mainly on the variance between the offense charged in the Information that was filed against him and that
proved by the prosecution. The rules on variance between allegation and proof are laid down under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court, viz:

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which isincluded in
the offense proved.

Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.

Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convictedof the offense proved when the
offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved.

There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged against Sevilla and that proved by the prosecution – the
Information charged him with the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC while the
prosecution was able to prove reckless imprudence resulting to falsification ofpublic documents. Parenthetically, the question that has
to be resolved then is whether reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document is necessarily included in the intentional
felony of falsification ofpublic document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.

The Court, in Samson v. Court of Appeals, has answered the foregoing question in the affirmative. Thus:
18

It is however contended that appellant Samson cannot be convicted of the crime of estafathrough falsification by imprudence for the
reason that the information filed against him charges only a willful act of falsification and contains no reference to any act of imprudence
on his part. Nor can it be said, counsel argues, that the alleged imprudent act includes or is necessarily includedin the offense charged
in the information because a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of negligence.

xxxx

While a criminal negligent act is nota simple modality of a wilful crime, as we held in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, x x x,
but a distinct crime in itself, designated asa quasi offense, in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former
can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a wilful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the
lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the
evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found thatin effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of
checks inquestion, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of
the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful
falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the
allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this Tribunal. (Emphasis ours)
19

Thus, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated
when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information only
charged the intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable. To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification
of public documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the
greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that
the Information only charged the willful act of falsification of public documents.

In this regard, the Court’s disposition in Sarep v. Sandiganbayan is instructive. In Sarep, the petitioner therein falsified his
20
1âwphi 1

appointment paper which he filed with the CSC. An Information was then filed against him for falsification of public document.
Nevertheless, the Court convicted the accused of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document upon a finding that
the accused therein did not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person. The Court, quoting the
Sandiganbayan’s disposition, held that:

We are inclined, however, to credit the accused herein with the benefit of the circumstance that he did not maliciously pervert the truth
with the wrongful intent of injuring some person (People vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341). Since he sincerely believed that his CSC eligibility
based on his having passed the Regional CulturalCommunity Officer (Unassembled) Examination and educational attainment were
sufficient to qualify him for a permanent position, then he should only be held liable for falsification through reckless imprudence
(People vs. Leopando, 36 O.G. 2937; People vs. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468; People vs. Pacheco, 18 Phil. 399).

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes criminal negligence or quasi-offenses, furnishes the middle way between a
wrongful act committed with wrongful intent, which gives rise to a felony, and a wrongful act committed without any intent which may
entirely exempt the doer from criminal liability. It is the duty of everyone to execute his own acts with due care and diligence in order
that no prejudicial or injurious results may be suffered by others from acts that are otherwise offensive (Aquino, R.P.C. Vol. III, 1976,
Ed., p. 1884). What is penalized is the mental attitude orcondition behind the acts of dangerous recklessness and lack of care or
foresight although such mental attitude might have produced several effects or consequences (People vs. Cano, L 19660, May 24,
1966).21

Anent the imposable penalty, under Article 365 of the RPC, reckless imprudence resulting in falsification of public document is
punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. In this case, taking into account the
pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed upon Sevilla the penalty of four ( 4) months
of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years ten ( 10) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 26, 2009 and
the Resolution dated October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27925 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Acting Working Chairperson per Special Order No. 1741 dated July 31, 2014 vice Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro.

** Acting Member per Special Order No. 1738 dated July 31, 2014 vice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro.

1
Rollo, pp. 24-35.

2
Penned by Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval, with Associate Justices Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos and Samuel R. Martires,
concurring; id. at 7-17.

3
Id. at 19-21.

4
Id. at 52-53.

5
Id.

6
Id. at 56-57.

7
G.R. No. 157207.

8
Rollo, pp. 37-47.

9
Id. at 46.

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. – The penalty of prision mayorand a fine
10

not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

x x x x 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

xxxx

11
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence.– Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium periods shall be imposed; x x x.

12
Rollo, p. 45.

13
Id. at 49-51.

14
G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 191.

15
Id. at 203-205.

16
386 Phil. 41 (2000).

17
Id. at 61-62.

18
103 Phil. 277 (1958).

19
Id. at 284-285.

20
258 Phil. 229 (1989).

21
Id. at 238-239.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed by petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz, from the Decision dated 22 June 2011 issued by the
1

Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) and Resolution dated 2 February 2012 issued by the Former Twentieth Division of the
2

CA in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman -
Visayas, in an Information dated 14 February 2006, which reads:
3

That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer, having been duly appointed and qualified to such public position as
Police Officer 2 of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned in the Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police Office, after
having beenarrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation, was found positive for use of
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDEcommonly known as "Shabu", the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test conducted on
said accused.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. The records do not reveal whether De la
Cruz was likewise charged for extortion.

VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION

The evidence of the prosecution reveals that at 8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the agents and special investigators of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office (NBI-CEVRO) or simply NBI, received a Complaint from Corazon Absin
(Corazon) and Charito Escobido (Charito). The complainants claimed that at 1:00 a.m. of that same day, Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the live-
in partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly
selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and when the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to
proceed to the Gorordo Police Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police office, they met "James" who
demanded from them ₱100,000, later lowered to ₱40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants
proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to file a complaint and narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While at the NBI-
CEVRO, Charitoeven received calls supposedly from "James" instructing her to bring the money as soon as possible.

The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages received by the complainants. A team was immediately formed
1âwphi 1

to implement an entrapment operation, which took place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues,
Cebu City. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was
made part of the amount demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to the forensic laboratory of the
NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done by forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to submit his
urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test result
labeled as Toxicology (DangerousDrugs) Report No. 2006-TDD-2402 dated 16 February 2006.

VERSION OF THE DEFENSE

The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the charges and testified that while eating at the said Jollibee branch,
he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug
examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the
NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to no
avail.

THE RULING OF THE RTC

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision dated 6 June 2007, found the accused guilty beyond
4

reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of compulsory rehabilitation for
a period of not less than six (6) months at the Cebu Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents located at Salinas,
Lahug, Cebu City. 5

Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC’s validation of the result of the urine test despite its dubiousness having been
admitted in spite of the lack of legal basis for itsadmission. First, he alleges that the forensic laboratory examination was conducted
despite the fact that he was not assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional right. Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty
beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis to convict him.

THE RULING OF THE CA

The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration. He argued that the CA overlooked prevailing jurisprudence, which states that drug
testing conducted under circumstancessimilar to his would violate a person’s right to privacy. The appellate court nevertheless denied
the motion.

Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari. He assigns as errors the use of hearsay evidence as basis for his
conviction and the questionable circumstances surrounding his arrest and drug test.

Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment, saying that "petitioner’s arguments cannot be the subject of
6

a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45, as they involve questions of facts which may not be the subject thereof; after his
arraignment, he can no longer contest the validity of his arrest, less so at this stage of the proceedings; his guilt has been adequately
established by direct evidence; and the manner in which the laboratory examination was conducted was grounded on a valid and
existing law.

THE ISSUE

We deem it proper to give due course to this Petition by confronting head-on the issue of whether or not the drug test conducted upon
the petitioner is legal.

OUR RULING

We declare that the drug testconducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any existing law or jurisprudence.

We gloss over petitioner’s non-compliance with the Resolution ordering him to submit clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true
7

copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution. Petitioner was charged with use of dangerous drugs in violation of the law, the pertinent
provision of which reads:

Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. – A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug,
after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first
offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty
thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00): Provided,That this Section shall not be applicable where
the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this
Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply. 8

The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following elements of Section 15 were established: (1) the accused was
arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to drug test; and (3) the confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug.

Disregarding petitioner’s objection regarding the admissibility of the evidence, the lower court also reasoned that "a suspect cannot
invoke his right to counsel when he is required to extract urine because, while he is already in custody, he is not compelled to make a
statement or testimony against himself. Extracting urine from one’s body is merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept
of a custodial investigation."

We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent affirmation by the CA, erroneous on three counts.

The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of R.A. 9165.

First, "[a] person apprehended orarrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for any crime.The phrase must be
read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful
acts listed under Article II of the law.

Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, among others, the "importation," "sale, trading,
9

administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation", "manufacture" and "possession" of dangerous drugs and/or
10 11 12

controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession thereof "during parties, social gatherings or meetings" ; being "employees
13

and visitors of a den, dive or resort"; "maintenance of a den, dive or resort"; "illegal chemical diversion of controlled precursors and
14 15

essential chemicals" ; "manufacture or delivery" or "possession" of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for
16 17 18

dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs "during parties, social
gatherings or meetings" ; "unnecessary" or "unlawful" prescription thereof; "cultivation or culture of plantsclassified as dangerous
19 20 21

drugs or are sources thereof"; and "maintenance and keeping of original records of transactions on dangerous drugs and/orcontrolled
22

precursors and essential chemicals." To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed
23

under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note thataccused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of
extortion.

A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the intent of the law to rehabilitate persons apprehended or
arrested for the unlawful acts enumerated above instead of charging and convicting them of other crimes with heavier penalties. The
essence of the provision is more clearly illustrated in People v. Martinez as follows:
24

On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15 (Use of
Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, withregard to the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This Court notes the practice of law
enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only and solely in
the form of residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping withthe
intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use, provided thatthere is a
positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15.The minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession
of residue isimprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a
minimum of six months rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone would
frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused
were found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of
custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there
was no residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under
Sec. 12(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any
person who shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the
maximum penalty is imprisonment of four years and a fine of ₱50,000.00. In fact, under the same section, the possession of such
equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima facieevidence that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be
presumed to have violated Sec. 15.

In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in
dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous drugs isonly and solely in the
form of residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous drugs.In such cases, to afford the
accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs should only be done when
another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided for in
Sec. 15. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended
for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons
apprehended or arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of thisprovision would run counter to our pronouncement in
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, to wit: 25

x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons
thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that
be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on
the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still,
the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. (Emphasis supplied)

The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.

We find that petitioner never raisedthe alleged irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment and raises the issue only now before this
tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may have attended
his arrest. However, "a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during
26

an illegal warrantless arrest."


27

We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such proscription. Cases where non-
testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause
of the arrest.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are
not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand ofcounsel is not
required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The essence of the right against selfincrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is,
the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235
SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence,it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be
compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused
may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to
whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine
from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced todetermine its identity with bloody
footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be photographed or measured, or his
garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil.
244 [1950]) (Emphasis supplied)
28

In the instant case, we fail to see howa urine sample could be material to the charge of extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both
1âwphi 1

erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling
outside the concept of a custodial investigation."

We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In Gutang v. People, the petitioner therein and his companions
29

were arrested in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his residence. A PNP-NARCOM team found and confiscated
shabu materials and paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in that case were also asked to give urine samples, which
yielded positive results. Later, the petitioner therein was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs.
Gutang claimed that the latter’s urine sample was inadmissible in evidence, since it was derived in effect from an uncounselled
extrajudicial confession.

In the Gutang et al.case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material." The situation in Gutangwas
categorized as falling among the exemptions under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought tobe examined
came from the body of the accused. The Court said:

This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosedfacts but to ascertain
physical attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled
to give samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test.
Assuming arguendothat the urine samples taken from the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial court that the
record is replete with other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial evidence of the prosecution which point to the
culpability of the petitioner for the crimes charged.

We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutangare clearly different from the circumstances of petitioner in the instant case. First,1awp++i1

Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were other pieces of evidence
that point to his culpability for the crimes charged. In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted having
his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample was the only available evidencethat was used as basis for his conviction for the
use of illegal drugs.

The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine
test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for
drug testing under those circumstances.

The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:

Section 2. The right of the people to be securein their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense
for which the arrest is being made.

While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously track down offenders intheir laudable effort to curb
the pervasive and deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on our society, they must, however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable
limits of their authority, because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge society of its lawless elements, they may be knowingly
or unknowingly transgressing the protected rights of its citizens including even members of its own police force.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division, and the Resolution
dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670 are SET ASIDE.
Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO


Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 20-30; Penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo L.
delos Santos and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes.

2
Id. at 32.

3
Rollo, p. 41.

4
Rollo, pp. 33-40; Penned by former RTC Judge (now CA Justice) Gabriel T. Ingles.
5
Id. at 40.

6
Id. at 69-86.

7
Id. at 64.

8
R.A. 9165.

9
Section 4.

10
Section 5.

11
Section 8.

12
Section 11.

13
Section 13.

14
Section 7.

15
Section 6.

16
Section 9.

17
Section 10.

18
Section 12.

19
Section 14.

20
Section 18.

21
Section 19.

22
Section 16.

23
Section 17.

24
G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010, 637 SCRA 791.

25
591 Phil. 393 (2008).

26
People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, 3 August 2010, 626 SCRA 633.

27
People v. Lapitaje, 445 Phil. 731 (2003).

28
People v. Gallarde, 382 Phil. 718 (2000).

29
390 Phil. 805 (2000).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 170359 July 27, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
PHILIP DILAO y CASTRO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Under automatic review is the May 26, 2005 Decision 1 and September 16, 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
C.R.-H.C. No. 00920, affirming in toto the February 27, 2003 Joint Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch
127, in Criminal Case Nos. C-65963 and C-65964, finding appellant Philip Dilao y Castro guilty of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Case
On July 31, 2002, in the RTC of Caloocan City, two (2) separate Informations were filed against accused-appellant charging him, in the
first, with violation of Section 5, Article II, of R.A. No. 9165. Docketed in the same court as Criminal Case No. C-65963, the first
Information4 alleges, as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of July 2002, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without the authority of law, did then and there wilfully(sic), unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO1
ROLANDO DE OCAMPO who posed as buyer, METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) weighing 0.06 grams, a
dangerous drug, without the corresponding license or prescription therefor, knowing the same to be such.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The other Information,5 docketed as Criminal Case No. C-65964, charges accused-appellant with violation of Section 11, Article II, also
of R.A. No. 9165, allegedly committed in the following manner:

That on or about the 19th day of July 2002, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without the authority of law, did then and there willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control METHAMPHETAMINE (sic) HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) weighing 0.07 grams, knowing the same to be a
dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. C-65964 was originally raffled to Branch 120 of the court, while Criminal Case No. C-65963 to Branch 127 thereof.
On arraignment, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges. Thereafter, and on motion of appellant’s
counsel, the two (2) cases were consolidated and assigned to Branch 127, after which a joint trial ensued.

Presented by the prosecution as its evidence were the testimonies of four (4) police officers belonging to the Drug Enforcement Unit of
Caloocan City Police Station and that of the forensic chemist, plus the marked money and the plastic sachets of "shabu."

The Evidence

The People’s version of the incident is well laid out in the People’s Brief6 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:

On July 19, 2002, around nine o’clock in the evening, a police informer called up the [DEU] Unit, Caloocan City Police Station, and
…[spoke] to PO2 Rolando de Ocampo [who was told] … that an alias Philip was rampantly selling shabu along Pangako St., Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. The informer also identified the drug pusher as Philip Dilao y Castro, herein appellant.

PO2 de Ocampo relayed the said information to their Chief, Captain Jose Valencia, who told him to verify the information. PO2 de
Ocampo again spoke to the informer on the phone and asked how they could entrap appellant. xxx.

PO3 Rodrigo Antonio informed Capt. Valencia about the conversation between the informer and PO2 de Ocampo. Acting thereon,
Capt. Valencia instructed PO3 Antonio to form and head a team to conduct a surveillance and "buy-bust" operation. Aside from PO3
Antonio, the team was composed of PO2 Ferdinand Modina and PO1 Joel Rosales as back-up, and PO2 de Ocampo as poseur-buyer.
Capt. Valencia provided the P100 bill to be used as "buy-bust" money with serial number ZX 985203. PO2 de Ocampo marked the
money with his initials, RDO, and the date, 07/19/02. The team had their operation blottered. Then, they proceeded to the target area
…and arrived thereat around 10:15-10:20 p.m.

PO3 Antonio’s team was met by the informer at a burger machine near the target area. PO2 de Ocampo was then accompanied by
said informer to appellant. Meanwhile, the rest of the members of the team positioned themselves in strategic places nearby.

The informer pointed to appellant who was standing outside a billiard court along Pangako St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Then,
they approached appellant and PO2 de Ocampo was introduced to him as a buyer of shabu. PO2 de Ocampo then addressed
appellant, "Pare, pa-iskor ng piso," and handed him the marked money. Appellant seized him up … and then got a plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance ….

After the exchange, PO2 de Ocampo examined first the contents of the plastic sachet and then gave the pre-arranged signal … to show
that the "buy-bust" operation was completed. Thereafter, he introduced himself to appellant as a police officer and told him: "Pare, pong
ka na," meaning he was already caught, while the rest of the team closed in on them.

PO2 de Ocampo recovered the marked money and P200 more in different denominations from appellant while PO2 Modina recovered
another plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. PO2 de Ocampo asked appellant where he got the P200 but he was not
given a reply. He then informed appellant of his constitutional rights ….

Appellant was turned over to … PO3 Fernando Moran, together with the seized articles. In the presence of PO2 de Ocampo and PO2
Modina, PO3 Moran placed the initials "PCD" on the specimens.

On even date, Capt. Valencia requested for laboratory examination of the seized articles. Subsequently, PO2 de Ocampo and PO2
Modina executed a "Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay" about the incident.

P/Insp. Erickson Lualhati Calbocal, forensic chemist of the Philippine National Police, Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, conducted a
laboratory examination on said specimens and found the same positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride. His findings are
contained in Chemistry Report No. D-323-02. (Words in brackets added.)

For its part, the defense presented the following: appellant himself and Jose Bandico.

Denial and alleged frame-up were appellant’s main exculpating line. In his Brief, 7 appellant summarized the version of the defense as
follows:
xxx. At about 8:00 to 9:00 o’clock p.m. of July 19, 2002, he [appellant] was playing billiard opposite alias "Joker" at the billiard hall xxx
located along Pangako St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. He and his companions were surprised when … police officers led by PO3
Antonio suddenly appeared … [and] instructed all persons there numbering [8] including his friend companion Socrates Manalad alias
"Sote". They told them, "WALANG TATAKBO MAY TAWAG SA AMIN MAY NAGBEBENTA NG SHABU DITO", and … individually
frisked them. Nothing illegal were recovered from all of them. Thereafter, six (6) of them were allowed to leave, leaving behind himself
and Manalad who were handcuffed and made to board one of the two (2) owner-type vehicles, parked near the North Diversion Road.
While the jeep was running, he and Manalad asked the operatives: "WALA KAMING KASALANAN, ANO BANG KASALANAN
NAMIN?" to which PO3 Antonio retorted: "KUNG GUSTO NINYONG MAKAWALA KAYO MAGPALIT ULO KAYO". He initially protested
but upon being told by PO3 Antonio: "OKAY KAHIT WALA KAYONG KASALANAN MATUTULUYAN KAYO, NGAYON KUNG AYAW
NINYONG MATULUYAN PALIT ULO NA LANG KAYO". He was made to understand, that was an order for them to point to the police
other persons in exchange for their release ….. He pretended to have agreed to this proposal xxx. The police officers stopped the
owner-type vehicle at the corner of Evangelista St. and EDSA, Caloocan City, near the Toyota Motors and let him alight. His handcuff
was removed. PO3 Antonio and PO2 Modina then asked him the name of the drug pusher he was supposed to point. In response, he
mentioned a fictitious name, one alias "JETT" …. Then, the police officers remarked: "O SIGE PAGKATAPOS… PAG NATAPOS ANG
TRABAHO NA TO PUWEDE NA KAYONG UMUWI". They made him board again the vehicle and they proceeded to Katarungan
Street.

Upon arrival thereat, his handcuff was removed. As he planned, he immediately fled but the police officers pursued and cornered him
…. His captors got provoked and took turns in slapping and mauling him. He was brought first to the Ospital ng Kalookan where he was
supposedly physically examined [then] taken to the DEU, Caloocan City Police Station. xxx. At the DEU, the police informed him that he
could have been freed if not for the fact that he fooled them (DAHIL PINAGOD MO KAMI") hence, he was charged for Violation of
Sections 5 and 11 of the Dangerous Drugs Law. At around 11:00 o’clock in the evening of the same date, while he was inside the DEU
detention cell, he was investigated by the police investigator. The next day, July 20, 2002, Manalad, was released. At about 3:00
o’clock [p.m.] of that day, he was brought before the Inquest Prosecutor who conferred only with PO2 Modina and PO2 De Ocampo
without even bothering to examine him about the incident.

He denied the charges leveled against him …. He explained that he first saw PO2 Modina when he was allowed to alight the jeep at
Toyota Motors, EDSA and that he saw PO2 De Ocampo only during the inquest. He admitted that he had no previous quarrel or
misunderstanding with the arresting police officers … who he came to know only when he was arrested.

He was unable to file any complaint against the concerned police officers for the physical injuries inflicted on him and for filing
fabricated charges against him as he has been detained since January [July] 19, 2002. (Word in bracket supplied).

JOSE BANDICO alias "Joker" substantially corroborated the testimony of appellant on the ownership of the billiard hall, the fact of the
latter’s arrest on July 19, 2002 and that nothing illegal was taken from appellant when frisked by the police in the hall. Alias "Joker" also
testified about the accused playing rotation billiard with him since 2:00 p.m. and how the police officers, after the arrest, even got the
₱260.00 bet.

The Trial Court’s and the CA’s Ruling

In its joint decision8 dated February 27, 2003, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond moral certainty of doubt of the offenses
charged against him and accordingly sentenced him, thus:

THEREFORE, premises considered and the prosecution having established to a moral certainty the guilt of Accused PHILIP DILAO y
CASTRO of the crimes charged, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:

1. In Crim. Case No. 65963 for Violations of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 this Court, in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance, hereby sentences the aforenamed Accused to LIFE IMPRISONMENT; and to pay the fine of five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;

2. In Crim. Case No. 65964 for Violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of the same Act, this Court, in the absence of any modifying
circumstance, sentences the common Accused to a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months and to pay the fine of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00), without any subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.

Therefrom, appellant came directly to this Court considering the penalty imposed.

Per Resolution dated March 9, 2005,9 however, the Court, in line with its ruling in People v. Mateo,10 referred the cases to the CA for
intermediate review, whereat it was docketed C.A.–G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00920.

On May 26, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision11 affirming in toto that of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated February 27, 2003 of the trial court is affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, appellant sought reconsideration, which the CA denied in its Resolution of September 16, 2005. 12

The case is again with this Court pursuant to the Notice of Appeal filed by appellant with the appellate court which has forwarded the
entire records of the case to this Court.
In its Resolution of February 20, 2006, the Court accepted the appeal and required the parties to file their supplemental briefs, if they so
desire.

In his manifestation13 of March 21, 2006, appellant in effect waived the filing of any supplemental brief and declared that he is adopting
his brief dated May 20, 2004, heretofore submitted before the Court, wherein he raised the following matters:

1. The Court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the incredible and inconsistent testimony of the prosecution
witnesses, and

2. The Court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the fact that his guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses on the alleged buy-bust operation, particularly that of PO2 Rolando De
Ocampo, contending that there were discrepancies in the testimony of PO2 De Ocampo, the poseur-buyer, and the affidavits submitted
to the trial court. He maintains being a victim of a frame-up operation of police operatives who, in fact, recovered nothing illegal from
him. He urges the Court to take judicial notice of the reality that some law enforcers in drug-related cases, in their quest to secure
information from suspected drug dealers, resort to numerous anomalous practices, such as planting evidence, physical torture and
extortion.

Moving on, appellant insists that the presumption on regularity in the performance of an official duty, by itself, could not sustain a
conviction, let alone prevail over the presumption of innocence in his favor. On these broad premises, appellant thus maintains that the
prosecution failed to adduce adequate evidence to prove his guilt.

The Court’s Ruling

We AFFIRM.

Right off, the Court shall address appellant’s lament about the credibility of witness PO2 De Ocampo. According to appellant, PO2 De
Ocampo’s testimony should have altogether been discredited since he, as poseur-buyer, cannot even remember ("Hindi ko gaanong
matandaan")14 the marking he allegedly placed on the ₱100.00-bill marked money, albeit he did recall its serial number.

While indeed PO2 De Ocampo failed to remember early in his direct testimony the markings placed on the marked money, he readily
identified the said markings during the latter part of the direct examination. We quote from the transcripts of stenographic notes:

Q. I am showing to you a photo copy of a one hundred peso bill with serial number ZX-985203, will you please go over it and tell the
Court its relation to the one which you used as buy bust money against the accused?

A. this is it sir.

Q. Why did you say so?

A. This is what we entered in the blotter book sir.

Q. Will you please go over this photo copy and tell us if this is your initial appearing immediately after the serial number ZX-985203 in
the lower part corner of this money?

A. Yes sir. There is.

Q. Can you explain to us what does that initial RDO mean?

A. Refers to my initial Rolando de Ocampo sir.

Q. How did that initial indicated there?

A. Because every time we conducted buy bust operation we always put initial sir.

Q. If you recall where did you place that initial RDO in the original copy of that buy bust money?

A. In our office sir.

Q. When?

A. At 9:45 p.m. July 19, 2002 sir.

Q. Also there’s (sic) appear on the right side of this buy bust money a figures 07/19/02 what does that mean?

A. We put that when we conducted the buy bust operation sir.

Q. Who was the one who placed that?

A. Me sir.

Q. When?
A. On that very day sir.

Q. Before or after the operation?

A. Before the operation sir.15

Moreover, the failure of PO2 De Ocampo to recall immediately the markings on the buy-bust money only shows that he is an
uncoached witness. Such momentary lapse in memory does not detract from the credibility of his testimony as to the essential details of
the incident. As the trial court aptly found, PO2 De Ocampo was candid, forthright and categorical in his testimony:

xxx . In the first place, this Court has had the untrammeled opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of poseur-buyer PO2 DE
OCAMPO while testifying on the witness stand and definitely he was noted to testify in a candid, forthright and categorical manner
which are the earmarks of a truthful and credible witness.

The Court accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of the lower court as to appellant’s guilt of the offenses charged against
him, particularly where such findings are adequately supported by documentary as well as testimonial evidence. The same respect
holds too, as regards the lower courts’ evaluation on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It is a settled policy of this Court,
founded on reason and experience, to sustain the findings of fact of the trial court in criminal cases, on the rational assumption that it is
in a better position to assess the evidence before it, having had the opportunity to make an honest determination of the witnesses’
deportment during the trial.16

Furthermore, the well-entrenched rule is that the findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on
this Court, absent any evidence that both courts ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance
which, if considered, would warrant a modification or reversal of the outcome of the case.17 And in the instant case, after a careful
evaluation of the records, we find no oversight committed by the trial and appellate courts for us to disregard their factual findings as to
the fact of possession and selling by the appellant of "shabu."

As between appellant’s testimony and that of the arresting/entrapping police officers as to what occurred in the evening of July 19,
2002, this Court finds, as did the trial court, the accounts of the latter more credible. For, aside from the presumption that they – the
police operatives – regularly performed their duties, we note that these operatives, as prosecution witnesses, gave consistent and
straightforward narrations of what transpired on July 19, 2002. As things stand, the police officers uniformly testified of having
apprehended the appellant in a buy-bust operation and upon being frisked, was also found to be in possession of another sachet
containing a white crystalline substance later on found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as "shabu."

It cannot be over-emphasized that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law at that, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. It is often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers
in the execution of their nefarious activities.18 Credence of the buy-bust operators cannot be undermined by the mere fact that law
enforcers are perceived to resort to the practice of planting evidence to gain favor from their superiors. In the absence of proof of motive
to falsely impute a serious crime against an accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s often self-serving and uncorroborated claim of
having been a victim of a frame-up.

It must be remembered that appellant’s defense of frame-up and denial requires strong and convincing evidence to support them for the
incantation of such defense is nothing new to the Court.19 As it were, appellant only offered an unsubstantiated tale that the police
officers asked, in police jargon, a "palit-ulo"20 and that he was a victim of a frame-up. His allegations that the police officers likewise beat
him up in their attempt to extract information from him is belied by the absence of any proof to that effect. And without so much of an
explanation, appellant did not even present as witness his companion Socrates Manalad, alias "Sote," who was allegedly with him
when the apprehension was effected. If the police officers indeed tried to extort information from appellant by beating him up, appellant
could have filed the proper charges against the erring police officers. The fact that no administrative or criminal charges were filed lends
cogency to the conclusion that the alleged frame-up was merely concocted as a defense ploy.

Clearly, as against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that they red-handedly caught appellant in a buy-bust
operation selling "shabu," supported by other evidence, such as the two (2) sachets of the prohibited substance seized from him and
the marked money, appellant’s negative testimony must necessarily fail. An affirmative testimony coming from credible witnesses
without motive to perjure is far stronger than a negative testimony. 21 Records show that appellant and the police officers are strangers
to each other. Thus, there is no reason to suggest that the police officers were ill-motivated in apprehending appellant. Moreover, there
is nothing in the records which shows even an iota of evidence that the prosecution witnesses merely fabricated their testimonies to
wrongly impute such a serious crime against the accused-appellant.

All told, in Criminal Case No. C-65963, the Court is convinced that the prosecution’s evidence more than proved beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of "shabu," to wit: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the contraband to the
poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust operation between the entrapping police
officers and the appellant. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.

Likewise proven by the same quantum of evidence is the charge for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 (illegal possession
of shabu) in Criminal Case No. C-65964, appellant having knowingly carried with him the plastic sachet of "shabu" without legal
authority at the time he was caught during the buy-bust operation. 1avvphil

Anent the penalty thus imposed, the RTC, as did the CA, correctly applied the provisions of Sections 5 and 11 (3) of R.A. No. 9165,
which respectively provide:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The Penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell any
dangerous drugs, xxx.
xxx xxx xxx

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs –

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos
(₱300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of x x x,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" x x x. (Emphasis supplied).

Since the appellant was found guilty of selling "shabu" weighing 0.06 gram, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the trial
court correctly sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00 in Criminal Case No. C-65963. Since he was also found
guilty of possession of "shabu" weighing 0.07 gram, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance and in accordance with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he was correctly meted a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months and a fine of three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00) in Criminal Case No. C-65964.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 26, 2005 of the CA in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 00920, as reiterated in its resolution of
September 16, 2005, affirming in toto that of the trial court is AFFIRMED in all respects.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and
Josefina Guevara-Salonga; rollo, pp. 3-18.

2 Id. at 168.

3
Id. at 68-83.

4 CA Rollo, p. 7.

5 Id. at 8.

6 Id. at 96-120.

7 Id. at 52-83.

8 Supra note 3.

9 Rollo, p. 2 and CA Rollo, pp. 128-129.

10 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

11 Supra note 1.

12
Supra note 2.
13 Appellant’s Manifestation in Lieu of Supplemental Brief dated March 21, 2006; rollo, pp. 20-21.

14
TSN, October 1, 2002, p. 5.

15 Id. at 11-12.

16 People v. Chua, G.R. No. 133789, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 562.

Gaviola v. People, G.R. No. 163927, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 436 and People v. Cheng Ho Chua, G.R. No. 127542,
17

March 18, 1999, 305 SCRA 28.

18
People v. Uy, G.R. No. 128046, March 7, 2000, 327 SCRA 335, citing People v. Gaco, G.R. Nos. 94994-95, May 14, 1993,
222 SCRA 49 and People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 105805, August 16, 1994, 235 SCRA 371.

19 People v. Uy, G.R. No. 144506, April 11, 2002, 380 SCRA 700.

20Appellant alleged that the police wanted him to give them a name and point to them the whereabouts of another drug
peddler in exchange for his own freedom and the dropping of charges against him.

21
Id. citing People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 97920, January 20, 1997, 266 SCRA 335.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 175222 July 27, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
RAMON QUIAOIT, JR., Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 12 July 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00803 entitled, "People of the
Philippines v. Ramon Quiaoit, Jr. y De Castro," affirming the Decision2 dated 1 December 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac
City, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 13229, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article II, Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The information against appellant reads as follows:

That at around 3:45 o’clock in the morning of April 13, 2004, at Tarlac City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell, dispense and deliver 0.851 gram of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, to poseur buyer PO1 Mark Anthony Baquiran for P500.00, without being authorized
by law.3

Appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 5 May 2004.4

During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: P/Sr. Insp. Ma. Luisa G. David, a Forensic Chemical Officer of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory assigned at the Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory; PO2 Ronnie Dueña, a member
of the buy-bust operation team and the one who arrested appellant; and PO1 Mark Anthony Baquiran, a member of the PNP and the
designated poseur-buyer.

The prosecution’s version of the case is as follows:

At around 11:00 o’clock in the evening of 12 April 2004, the Tarlac PNP received a report from a confidential informant that someone
was selling shabu at the Golden Miles,5 a videoke bar located in Barangay San Roque, Tarlac City. Acting on said information, a team
was immediately organized by PNP Provincial Director Rudy Gamido Lacadin to conduct a surveillance in order to verify the information
and perform a buy-bust operation.

Shortly thereafter, the team went to Golden Miles where they initially observed the movements of appellant who was with the
confidential informant at that time. Later, the informant introduced PO1 Baquiran to appellant and the two negotiated the sale of shabu.
According to PO1 Baquiran’s testimony, appellant handed to him a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance in front of The
Golden Miles’ comfort room which was located at the back of said establishment.6 In return, he gave appellant a marked ₱500.00 bill.
As soon as the exchange between appellant and PO1 Baquiran took place, the latter gave his companions the pre-arranged signal by
scratching his head. PO2 Dueñas and PO1 Cabradilla moved in to arrest appellant. The plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance was later marked RID 1 by PO2 Dueñas.

On their way back to Camp Makabulos, the informant allegedly told the buy-bust team, through a text message, that appellant still had
in his possession illegal drugs other than that which he had sold to PO1 Baquiran. Thus, upon reaching the camp, they frisked appellant
and this yielded six more plastic sachets, the contents of which were similar to those earlier bought by PO1 Baquiran.
All seven pieces of the plastic sachets were then forwarded to the Provincial Crime Laboratory for examination. The test was conducted
by P/Sr. Insp. David, and her report7 contained the following pertinent information:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

Seven (7) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with markings "RID-1" through "RID-7" and marked as specimen "A" through "G,"
respectively, each containing white crystalline substance having a total weight of 0.851 gram. x x x.

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of dangerous drugs xxx

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE results to the tests for the presence of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. x x x.

CONCLUSION:

Specimen "A" through "G" contain Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. x x x.8

Expectedly, appellant presented a disparate narration of the incident:

Appellant claimed that at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning of 13 April 2004, he went to the Golden Miles in order to meet a friend of
his. While he was having drinks, PO1 Baquiran saw him and asked if he had company and he replied that he was by himself. He
alleged that he knew PO1 Baquiran as he used to be a police asset. PO1 Baquiran then inquired if he was familiar with a certain August
Medrano who was a drug pusher in their place. When he answered in the affirmative, PO1 Baquiran supposedly instructed him to buy
₱500.00 worth of shabu from Medrano. He was also allegedly ordered by PO1 Baquiran to bring Medrano with him to Golden Miles. He
initially declined to follow PO1 Baquiran’s instructions since he no longer worked with the police. PO1 Baquiran, however, represented
that he was the one who would buy shabu from Medrano and not appellant. Despite this, appellant alleged that he was "forced" 9 to buy
shabu himself after PO1 Baquiran told him that "(they) need August Medrano." 10

And so, from Golden Miles, appellant proceeded to Medrano’s house. He informed Medrano that someone was interested in buying
shabu but the prospective buyer wanted to talk to him in person. Medrano refused appellant’s invitation claiming that he had to go
somewhere else; instead, he gave the plastic sachet containing shabu to appellant and the latter gave him the ₱500.00 earlier given by
PO1 Baquiran. After this, appellant went back to Golden Miles to inform PO1 Baquiran of what had just transpired between him and
Medrano including the latter’s refusal to go with him. He also handed over to said police officer the plastic sachet containing shabu
which he bought from Medrano. All of a sudden, PO1 Baquiran placed his hand over appellant’s shoulder and the latter was then taken
to Camp Makabulos.

At the camp, PO2 Dueñas called for a certain PO4 Donato for whom appellant used to act as a police asset. PO4 Donato allegedly
asked appellant if it was possible for him to buy some more shabu from Medrano. Appellant purportedly replied in the negative claiming
that the personnel at Golden Miles already knew about his arrest. To this, PO4 Donato reportedly retorted, "How could we release you
when this August Medrano is not yet arrested." 11Appellant claimed that he was surprised by PO4 Donato’s statement since he was only
doing the police force a favor.

Appellant also denied having possessed the other six plastic sachets of shabu, insisting that he bought only one heat-sealed plastic
sachet from Medrano which he turned over to PO1 Baquiran.

After trial, the court a quo found appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:

Wherefore, the prosecution having established the guilt of the [appellant] beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 5,
Art. II of RA 9165, the accused RAMON QUIAOIT JR. y DE CASTRO is sentenced to undergo a prison term of life imprisonment, to pay
a fine of Php500,000.00 and to pay the cost.12

On 8 February 2005, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.13 The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 12 July 2006, affirmed the findings
and conclusion of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DENIED. The December 1, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 65, in
Criminal Case No. 13229, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.14

Aggrieved, appellant is now before us assailing the above-mentioned Decision of the Court of Appeals. In our Resolution of 21 January
2007, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desired. Appellant manifested that he was adopting
the Appellant’s Brief dated 7 September 2005 which he previously filed before the Court of Appeals in order to avoid the repetition of
substantially the same arguments.15 Similarly, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it was no longer filing a supplemental
brief.16

In his brief, appellant impugns the trial court’s decision on the following grounds:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE ABSOLUTORY CIRCUMSTANCE
OF INSTIGATION.

II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S
FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE CORPUS DELICTI.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 5,
ARTICLE II, OF REPUBLIC ACT 9165, WHEN THE LATTER’S GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.17

In essence, appellant contends that the trial court erred in not finding that the buy-bust team instigated him into buying shabu from
Medrano and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt by its failure to properly identify the sachet of shabu allegedly bought from him
by PO1 Baquiran.

In support of the first error, appellant argues that the facts obtaining in this case reveal that he was a victim of instigation perpetrated by
PO1 Baquiran. He emphasizes that despite his initial resistance to participate in the police operation that night, PO1 Baquiran,
nevertheless, insisted that he purchase shabu from Medrano with the specific instruction to bring the latter to Golden Miles. Appellant,
likewise, points out that the money he used in acquiring shabu was supplied by PO1 Baquiran himself, thus, proving that it was said
police officer who initiated the events which led to his eventual arrest.

Appellant further assails the existence of a valid buy-bust operation on the ground that the buy-bust team was composed of untrained
and incompetent police officers. He claims that it was "inconceivable"18 for such a team to be made up of police officers who had
insufficient knowledge of how to properly conduct a buy-bust operation as shown by their failure to frisk appellant at the scene of the
crime.

The demarcation line distinguishing "instigation" from "entrapment" is clearly drawn. In the case of People v. Quintana, 19 we explained
the distinction between the two, to wit –

There is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation, for while in the latter case the instigator practically induces the will be
accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal, in entrapment ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the law breaker in the execution of his criminal plan.

Instigation and inducement must be distinguished from entrapment. The general rule is that instigation and inducement to commit a
crime, for the purpose of filing criminal charges, is to be condemned as immoral, while entrapment, which is the employment of means
and ways for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breaker, is sanctioned and permissible. And the reason is obvious. Under
the first instance, no crime has been committed, and to induce one to commit it makes of the instigator a co-criminal. Under the last
instance, the crime has already been committed and all that is done is to entrap and capture the law breaker. 20

In the case at bar, we find appellant’s claim of instigation to be baseless. To recall appellant’s version of the story, PO1 Baquiran
approached him that night inquiring about Medrano, the alleged object of the buy-bust operation. PO1 Baquiran then gave him a
₱500.00 bill to be used for purchasing shabu from Medrano; but PO1 Baquiran had an additional instruction for appellant which was to
bring along Medrano to Golden Miles. While appellant was able to talk with Medrano, he was unable to convince the latter to
accompany him back to Golden Miles. Such being the case, we fail to see anymore reason for him to still buy shabu considering that he
knew fully well that he would be unable to fully abide by PO1 Baquiran’s instructions. Furthermore, we scrutinized the records of this
case and failed to discern any "force" that was exerted upon him by PO1 Baquiran. In fact, nowhere in appellant’s testimony did he aver
that PO1 Baquiran insisted that he buy shabu from Medrano. We note that after appellant had initially refused to take part in the buy-
bust operation that night, PO1 Baquiran merely told him that "(they) needed August Medrano" and nothing more.

THE COURT:

Q: What will you buy?

A: Shabu worth 5 hundred pesos, sir.

Q: Did he give you the money?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. ABELLERA:

Q: What again PO1 Baquiran says to buy and what else?

A: "Take him along with you".

Q: Where?

A: At GMA Golden Miles, sir.

Q: And how much money did he hand to you?

A: Five hundred, sir.


Q: And how many items will you buy?

A: One sachet, sir.

Q: And how much is one sachet?

A: Five Hundred, sir.

Q: Now, you said that he asked you to buy from this Medrano, did you comply?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: By the way, what did you tell PO1 Baquiran concerning the task that he is asking you to do?

A: I told him I was already passed on that matter, I am now working. Then he told me that he will be the one to buy but I was forced to
buy, sir.

Q: How did he force you, Mr. Witness?

A: He told me, "We need that August Medrano."

Q: And how did you find this August Medrano?

A: I went to his house in Suizo, sir.

Q: Who told you that he lives in Suizo at that time?

A: My friend, sir.

Q: What is the name of your friend?

A: Noel Mallari, sir.

Q: What did you use in going there?

A: Single motorcycle, sir.

Q: And were you able [to] purchase a sachet of shabu from Medrano?

A: Yes, sir.21

To our mind, such innocuous statement on the part of PO1 Baquiran is inadequate to lead to the conclusion that appellant was "forced"
by the police to procure shabu. Moreover, appellant himself admitted that he was all alone when he went to see Medrano at the latter’s
house, far from the prying eyes and the perceived influence of PO1 Baquiran. Clearly, at that point, he could have easily desisted from
buying shabu from Medrano and chosen instead to go back to Golden Miles empty handed for he already knew before he bought the
illegal drug that Medrano could not accompany him back to the said videoke bar. The fact that he persisted in buying shabu despite the
absence of PO1 Baquiran betrays his contention that said police officer "forced" him to purchase shabu.

In challenging the existence of a legitimate buy-bust operation, appellant casts questionable, if not improper, motive on the part of the
police officers. Unfortunately for appellant, jurisprudence instructs us that in cases involving the sale of illegal drugs, credence is given
to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless
there is evidence to the contrary.22 Where there is nothing to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution were moved by improper
motives, the presumption is that they were not so moved and their testimony, therefore, is entitled to full faith and credit. 23 In this case,
the records are bereft of any indication which even remotely suggests ill motive on the part of the police officers. The following
observation of the Court of Appeals is indeed appropriate, thus:

In this case, the policemen categorically identified Quiaoit as the one subject of the "buy-bust" operation who agreed to sell to PO1
Baquiran a sachet of "shabu" in front of the restroom of Golden Miles Beerhouse after he was being introduced by the informant. As
police officers, PO1 Baquiran and PO2 Dueñas had in their favor the presumption of regularity of performance of duty. Furthermore, the
defense failed to present any evidence to show that the police officers were improperly motivated to bear false witness against Quiaoit.
While Quiaoit claimed that he was a former asset of the police and he knew the police officers who arrested him, yet, he did not impute
any ill-motive as to why the police officers would implicate him to drug pushing. This fact bolsters the police officers’ claim that Quiaoit
was, indeed, arrested in a buy-bust operation.

Quiaoit’s claim that he was just being framed-up by the arresting officers does not inspire belief. Appellant failed to show any motive
why the policemen would implicate him in a crime for illegal possession of prohibited drugs. It is the settled rule that where there is
nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated by improper motives, his/her positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand
made under solemn oath, should be given full faith and credence. (People vs. Dela Torre, 373 SCRA 104).

Moreover, there is nothing in the record that the police officers were trying to extort money from Quiaoit during his apprehension up to
the time he was brought to the police station. If Quiaoit was really a victim of frame-up, then he should have filed an administrative or
criminal case against these policemen. But he did not. Hence, his defense of frame-up must fail.
Finally, Quiaoit’s defense of denial is a weak defense. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, it is self-serving and
undeserving of any weight in law (see People v. Hampton, 395 SCRA 156). It cannot prevail over the positive identification by PO1
Baquiran that it was Quiaoit who sold to him a sachet of "shabu" in the early morning of April 13, 2004 at Golden Miles Beerhouse.24

Neither can we give credence to appellant’s contention that the existence of a valid buy-bust operation was betrayed by the inadequate
training of the members of the team for, it must be stated here, there is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The
Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers. 25

Anent the second issue, appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt by its failure to
properly identify the sachet of shabu which he sold to PO1 Baquiran. Again, we disagree with appellant’s proposition.

In order to successfully prove the existence of the illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution must be able to establish
the following elements of the crime: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor.26

In the case of People v. Mala,27 we held that what is material is the proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the
presentation before the court of the corpus delicti. It bears emphasizing that neither the law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation
of any of the money used in a buy-bust operation, for the only elements necessary to consummate the crime is proof that the illicit
transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the illicit drug as evidence.28 In the present case, appellant insists that
the prosecution failed to properly identify the sachet of shabu sold by appellant to PO1 Baquiran because of the buy-bust team’s failure
to segregate the said sachet from those confiscated from him at Camp Makabulos.

The pertinent portions of the testimony of PO1 Baquiran belies appellant’s claim:

ATTY. ABELLERA:

Q Mr. Witness did Dueñas mark these RID before Quiaoit was frisked?

FISCAL

No basis.

ATTY. ABELLERA

Q Mr. Witness, you said that this RID 1, these RID 2 and series where they mark these (sic)?

A RID 2 and series were marked in Camp Makabulos.

Q Did he marked (sic) them simultaneously or one at a time?

A One at a time sir.

Q He was already marking after you handed this to him?

A The RID 1 was marked before Quiaoit was frisked.29

It is clear from PO1 Baquiran’s declaration that, contrary to appellant’s assertion, the packet of shabu sold to PO1 Baquiran by
appellant during the buy-bust operation was properly identified and marked as RID 1 by PO2 Dueñas even before the police frisked
appellant for more illegal drugs. With PO1 Baquiran’s testimony, there can no longer be any basis for vacillation with respect to the
identity of the object which he, acting as poseur buyer, obtained from appellant. And, as the laboratory examination would later confirm,
the contents of the sachet bearing the mark RID 1 was positive for shabu.

All told, as the illegal sale of drugs had been established beyond reasonable doubt, this Court is constrained to uphold appellant’s
conviction.

We shall now determine the proper imposable penalty.

The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. It reads:

SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

Under the law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its quantity and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a
fine of ₱500,000.00 to ₱10,000,000.00. The statute, in prescribing the range of penalties imposable, does not concern itself with the
amount of dangerous drug sold by an accused. With the effectivity, however, of Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been proscribed.
Consequently, the penalty to be meted to appellant shall only be life imprisonment and fine. In this regard, this Court likewise sustains
the penalty imposed by the court a quo and which was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00803 dated 12 July 2006 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No.
13229, finding appellant Ramon Quiaoit, Jr. y de Castro guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with Associate Justices Jose C. Mendoza and Arturo G. Tayag,
concurring; rollo, pp. 2-8.

2
Records, pp. 22-27.

3 Id. at 1.

4 Id. at 7.

5 Sometimes referred to in the records as "GM Golden Miles."

6 TSN, 3 August 2004, p. 4.

7 Exhibit "C" for the prosecution.

8 Id.

9 TSN, 30 September 2004, p. 5.

10 Id.

11 Id. at 8.

12 Records, p. 27.

13
Id. at 30.

14
Rollo, p. 8.

15
Id. at 25.

16 Id. at 10.
17 CA rollo, p. 29.

18
Id. at 36.

19 G.R. No. 83888, 30 June 1989, 174 SCRA 675.

20 Id. at 679.

21
TSN, 30 September 2004, pp. 4-6; emphasis supplied.

22 People v. Bongalon, 425 Phil. 96, 114 (2002).

23
People v. Pacis, 434 Phil. 148, 159 (2002).

24 CA rollo, p. 78.

25 People v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 170234, 8 February 2007.

26 Suson v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 152848, 12 July 2006, 494 SCRA 691, 699.

27 458 Phil. 180, 190 (2003).

28 People v. Astudillo, 440 Phil. 203, 224 (2002).

29 TSN, 3 August 2004, p. 12.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 171019 February 23, 2007

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,


vs.
RAFAEL STA. MARIA y INDON, Appellant.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Under consideration is this appeal by Rafael Sta. Maria y Indon from the Decision 1 dated November 22, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00802, denying his earlier appeal from and affirming the May 5, 2004 decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 20, which found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5, 3 Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The indicting Information,4 docketed in the RTC as Criminal Case No. 3364-M-2002, alleges:

That on or about the 29th day of November, 2002, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law and legal justification, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give away, dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting of one (1)
heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing methylampetamine hydrochloride weighing 0.041 gram.

Contrary to law.

Duly arraigned on January 23, 2003, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged. Trial ensued thereafter.

The prosecution’s version of events which led to appellant’s arrest and subsequent prosecution under the aforementioned Information
is as follows:

On November 27, 2002, at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, P/Chief Insp. Noli Pacheco, Chief of the Provincial Drug Enforcement
Group of the Bulacan Provincial Office based at Camp Alejo Santos, Malolos, Bulacan received an intelligence report about the illegal
drug activities in Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan of a certain "Fael," who later turned out to be appellant Rafael
Sta. Maria. P/Chief Insp. Pacheco formed a surveillance team to look for a police asset to negotiate a drug deal with appellant. In the
morning of November 29, 2002, the surveillance team reported to P/Chief Insp. Pacheco that a confidential asset found by the team
had already negotiated a drug deal for the purchase of ₱200 worth of shabu from appellant at the latter’s house at No. 123 Sitio Gulod,
Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan between 7:00 and 7:30 in the evening of November 29, 2002. The surveillance team then
prepared for a buy-bust operation, with PO3 Enrique Rullan as team leader, and PO1 Rhoel Ventura, who was provided with two (2)
marked ₱100-bills, as poseur-buyer. At the appointed time and place, PO1 Ventura and the confidential informant proceeded to
appellant’s house and knocked at the door. Appellant opened the door and the confidential informant introduced to him PO1 Ventura as
a prospective buyer. PO1 Ventura later handed the two (2) marked ₱100-bills to appellant who, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet of
shabu. Thereupon, PO1 Ventura sparked his cigarette lighter, which was the pre-arranged signal to the other members of the buy-bust
team that the sale was consummated. Appellant was arrested and the two marked ₱100-bills recovered from him. Also arrested on that
occasion was one Zedric dela Cruz who was allegedly sniffing shabu inside appellant’s house and from whom drug paraphernalia were
recovered. Upon laboratory examination of the item bought from appellant, the same yielded positive for methylampetamine
hydrochloride or shabu weighing 0.041 gram.

The defense gave an entirely different account of what allegedly transpired prior to and at the time of appellant’s arrest on that evening
of November 29, 2002. 1awphi1.net

Appellant testified that on November 29, 2002, he was at home with a certain Zedric dela Cruz who was allegedly offering him a
cellphone for sale and collecting payment on a loan of his wife. At that time, his wife was out of the house to pay their electric bill. While
waiting for his wife, he and Zedric watched television when they heard the barking of dogs. Immediately, three (3) men suddenly barged
into the house and announced that they were police officers while three other men stayed outside the house. The police officers frisked
him and Zedric and searched the house. He tried to complain about what they were doing but the police officers got mad and accused
him of selling shabu. He replied that he does not know anything about drugs. Afterwards, he and Zedric were brought out of the house
and handcuffed. While on board the police vehicle, the police officers warned them to cooperate. The police officers also asked him to
be their asset and when he said that he does not know anything about it, they told him that they could file a case against him. The
police officers also offered to buy drugs from him but he refused the offer because he knows that it is only a plan for them to arrest him.

In a decision5 dated May 5, 2004, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, and accordingly
sentenced him, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1). xxx

2). xxx

3). In Criminal Case No. 3264-M-2002, the Court finds accused RAFAEL STA. MARIA Y INDON guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and is ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).

The dangerous drug and drug paraphernalia submitted as evidence in these cases are hereby ordered to be transmitted to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

SO ORDERED.

From the aforesaid decision, appellant went directly to this Court. Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo, 6 which
modified the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to the
Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the Court transferred
the appeal to the CA for appropriate action and disposition, whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00802.

On November 22, 2005, the CA promulgated the herein assailed Decision 7 denying the appeal and affirming that of the trial
court, to wit:

xxx The Court sees no reason to disturb the finding of trial court. The evidence presented by the prosecution proves to a
moral certainty appellant’s guilt of the crime of selling illegal drugs. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

The case is again with this Court following its elevation from the CA, together with the case records.

In his Brief, appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him because his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. He maintains that instigation, not entrapment, preceded his arrest. He also faults the appellate court in not
finding that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No.
9165.

It is appellant’s submission that what transpired on that fateful evening of November 29, 2002 was instigation and not a valid
buy-bust operation. He would make much of the fact that the transaction between him and the police informant occurred on
November 27, 2002, while the buy-bust operation took place on November 29, 2002. To appellant, the informant, by pretending
that he was in need of shabu, instigated or induced him to violate the anti-dangerous drugs law. He adds that the prosecution
was not able to prove that at the time of the police surveillance, he was indeed looking for buyers of shabu, and that were it
not for the inducement of the informant that the latter would buy shabu, he would not have produced the same on November
29, 2002.

We are not persuaded.

In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. In
instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be-defendant into committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-
principal. In entrapment, the means originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime
come from him. In instigation, the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who
adopts the idea and carries it into execution. The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability.
Instigation does.8
Here, the mere fact that the agreement between appellant and the police informant for the purchase and sale of illegal drugs
was made on November 27, 2002, while the buy-bust operation was conducted on November 29, 2002, is of no moment.
Without more, it does not prove that said informant instigated appellant into committing the offense. If at all, the earlier
agreement and the subsequent actual sale suggest that appellant was habitually dealing in illegal drugs.

It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the
criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where
the offense is one habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. 9

As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence of a course
of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly
acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with appellant. There was no showing that the informant
induced appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.

It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. 10 In this case, apart from appellant’s self-
serving declaration that he was instigated into committing the offense, he did not present any other evidence to prove the
same.

A perusal of the records readily reveals that the police operatives who took part in the buy-bust operation, namely, PO1
Alexander Ancheta, PO1 Rhoel Ventura and PO3 Enrique Rullan, clearly and convincingly testified on the circumstances that
led to appellant’s arrest. In a credible manner, they narrated in open court the details of the buy-bust operation they
conducted on November 29, 2002 in Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan. We thus quote with approval the
trial court’s findings on this matter:

PO1 Ancheta, PO1 Ventura and PO2 Rullan testified on the aforementioned circumstances concerning the drug buy-bust
operation that led to the arrest of accused Sta. Maria, following the purchase from him of ₱200 worth of shabu by PO1 Ventura
posing as poseur-buyer. The testimonies of these officers, as summarized above, are essentially clear credible and
convincing. Notwithstanding minor inconsistencies, their declarations in Court dovetail and corroborated one another on
material points, and are generally consistent with the narrations contained in their "Joint Affidavit of Arrest" (Exh. "D")
executed on December 2, 2002. More significantly, there is no credible showing that the aforementioned police officers were
impelled by any improper motive or intention in effecting the arrest of accused Sta. Maria and in testifying against him in
Court.

The Court also takes judicial notice of the fact that accused Sta. Maria had other criminal cases before other branches of this
Court for involvement in drug activities. He was charged with and convicted by Branch 21 of this Court of Violation of Section
16, Article III of the Republic Act of 6425, as amended, also known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," following a
voluntary plea of guilty in Criminal Case No. 341-M-2001. He was likewise charged with Violation of Sections 15 and 16 of the
same law before Branch 81 under Criminal Cases Nos. 59-M-2000 and 60-M-2000, which were dismissed on mere technicality
because of non-appearance of the arresting officers.

The Court is not persuaded by the defense of denial interposed by accused Sta. Maria. According to him, the police officers
just barged into his house on November 29, 2002 while he was watching television together with co-accused Dela Cruz. He
said, he was frisked and his place searched, and he was arrested for no reason at all by the police officers.

The Court rules that the version bandied about by accused Sta. Maria is purely self-serving. It cannot prevail over the positive
declarations of the police officers regarding the drug buy-bust operation and purchase from him of shabu. To reiterate, there
is no showing that said police officers were actuated by any ill or improper motive or intention in effecting the arrest of the
accused Sta. Maria and in testifying against him in Court. (See People v. Dela Cruz, 229 SCRA 754; People v. Persiano, 233
SCRA 393). 11

Appellant would next argue that the evidence against him was obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No.
9165 because the buy-bust operation was made without any involvement of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
Prescinding therefrom, he concludes that the prosecution’s evidence, both testimonial and documentary, was inadmissible
having been procured in violation of his constitutional right against illegal arrest.

The argument is specious.

Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 reads:

SEC. 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory
Provisions. – The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the Narcotics Division of the NBI and the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit
are hereby abolished; however they shall continue with the performance of their task as detail service with the PDEA, subject
to screening, until such time that the organizational structure of the Agency is fully operational and the number of graduates
of the PDEA Academy is sufficient to do the task themselves: Provided, That such personnel who are affected shall have the
option of either being integrated into the PDEA or remain with their original mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be
immediately reassigned to other units therein by the head of such agencies. Such personnel who are transferred, absorbed
and integrated in the PDEA shall be extended appointments to positions similar in rank, salary, and other emoluments and
privileges granted to their respective positions in their original mother agencies.

The transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices and units provided for in this Section shall take effect within
eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That personnel absorbed and on detail service shall be given
until five (5) years to finally decide to join the PDEA.

Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and the PNP on all other crimes as provided
for in their respective organic laws: Provided, however, That when the investigation being conducted by the NBI, PNP or any
ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency.
The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately transfer the same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP
and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters.

Cursory read, the foregoing provision is silent as to the consequences of failure on the part of the law enforcers to transfer
drug-related cases to the PDEA, in the same way that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165
is also silent on the matter. But by no stretch of imagination could this silence be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an
arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal nor evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.

It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction,
or great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the
court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and
unequivocal words.12

As we see it, Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the "lead agency" in the investigations and
prosecutions of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still possess authority to perform similar
functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter. Additionally, the same
provision states that PDEA, serving as the implementing arm of the Dangerous Drugs Board, "shall be responsible for the
efficient and effective law enforcement of all the provisions on any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical as provided in the Act." We find much logic in the Solicitor General’s interpretation that it is only appropriate that
drugs cases being handled by other law enforcement authorities be transferred or referred to the PDEA as the "lead agency"
in the campaign against the menace of dangerous drugs. Section 86 is more of an administrative provision. By having a
centralized law enforcement body, i.e., the PDEA, the Dangerous Drugs Board can enhance the efficacy of the law against
dangerous drugs. To be sure, Section 86 (a) of the IRR emphasizes this point by providing:

(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies – The PDEA shall be the lead agency in the enforcement of
the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support
of the PDEA xxx. Provided, finally, that nothing in this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other law enforcement personnel
and the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful arrests and seizures in consonance with
the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

Appellant next argues that the prosecution failed to show compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 regarding the
custody and disposition of the evidence against him.

Appellant demands absolute compliance with Section 21 and insists that anything short of the adherence to its letter, renders
the evidence against him inadmissible. Pertinently, Section 21 of the law provides:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA
shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.

Regrettably, the pertinent implementing rules, Section 21 of the IRR, states:

Section 21. a. xxx Provided further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

It is beyond quibbling then that the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with Section 21 was not fatal. It did not
render appellant’s arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him inadmissible.

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police
officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because
appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers’ alleged
violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the
first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of
seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such
objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. 13

To recapitulate, the challenged buy-bust operation, albeit made without the participation of PDEA, did not violate appellant’s
constitutional right to be protected from illegal arrest. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 which even remotely indicate
the intention of the legislature to make an arrest made without the participation of the PDEA illegal and evidence obtained
pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Moreover, the law did not deprive the PNP of the power to make arrests.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the appealed decision of the CA, affirmatorary of that of the trial court, is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)


ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Jose C. Mendoza,
concurring; Rollo, pp. 3-18.

2 CA Rollo, pp. 16-33.

3 SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

4
CA Rollo, p. 8.

5 Supra note 2.

6 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

7 Supra note 1.

8 People v. Marcos, G.R. No. 83325, May 8, 1990, 185 SCRA 154, 164.

9 People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, 56 Phil. 44 (1931).

10 Jimenez v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116960, April 2, 1996, 256 SCRA 84.

11 RTC Decision, pp. 13-14.

12 Sesbreño v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 106588, 270 SCRA 360 (1997).

13 People v. Ramon Chua Uy, G.R. No. 128046, March 7, 2000, 327 SCRA 335.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 192235 July 6, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,


vs.
ROLANDO LAYLO y CEPRES, Appellant.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision 1 dated 28 January 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03631. The CA affirmed the Decision2 dated 16 September 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67, in
Criminal Case No. 06-017, convicting appellant Rolando Laylo y Cepres (Laylo) of violation of Section 26(b), Article II (Attempted Sale
of Dangerous Drugs)3 of Republic Act No. 91654 (RA 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

On 21 December 2005, two separate Informations against appellant Laylo and Melitona Ritwal (Ritwal) were filed with the RTC of
Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 06-017 and 06-018, respectively. The information against Laylo states:

Criminal Case No. 06-017

That on or about the 17th day of December, 2005, in the Municipality of Binangonan, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to sell any dangerous drug, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly attempt to sell, deliver, and give away shabu to PO1 Angelito G. Reyes, 0.04 gram of white
crystalline substance contained in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets which were found positive to the test for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a dangerous drug, thus commencing the commission of the crime of illegal
sale but did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce such crime by reason of some cause or accident other than the
accused’s own spontaneous desistance, that is, said PO1 Angelito G. Reyes introduced himself as policeman, arrested the accused
and confiscated the two (2) above-mentioned sachets from the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the merits ensued. However, during the trial, Ritwal jumped bail and
was tried in absentia. Thus, Ritwal was deemed to have waived the presentation of her evidence and the case was submitted for
decision without any evidence on her part.

The prosecution presented two witnesses: Police Officer 1 (PO1) Angelito G. Reyes (PO1 Reyes) and PO1 Gem A. Pastor (PO1
Pastor), the poseur-buyers in the attempted sale of illegal drugs.

The prosecution summed up its version of the facts: In the afternoon of 17 December 2005, PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, both wearing
civilian clothes, were conducting anti-drug surveillance operations at Lozana Street, Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal. While the police
officers were in front of a sari-sari store at around 5:40 p.m., appellant Laylo and his live-in partner, Ritwal, approached them and
asked, "Gusto mong umiskor ng shabu?" PO1 Reyes replied, "Bakit mayroon ka ba?" Laylo then brought out two plastic bags
containing shabu and told the police officers, "Dos (₱200.00) ang isa." Upon hearing this, the police officers introduced themselves as
cops. PO1 Reyes immediately arrested Laylo. Ritwal, on the other, tried to get away but PO1 Pastor caught up with her. PO1 Pastor
then frisked Ritwal and found another sachet of shabu in a SIM card case which Ritwal was carrying.

PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor marked the three plastic sachets of shabu recovered from Laylo and Ritwal and forwarded them to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for forensic testing. Forensic Chemist Police Inspector Yehla C. Manaog conducted the
laboratory examination on the specimens submitted and found the recovered items positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug.

The police officers charged Laylo for attempted sale of illegal drugs and used the two plastic sachets containing shabu as basis while
Ritwal was charged for possession of illegal drugs using as basis the third sachet containing 0.02 grams of shabu.

The defense, on the other hand, presented different versions of the facts. The witnesses presented were: appellant Laylo; Laylo’s three
neighbors namely Rodrigo Panaon, Jr., Marlon de Leon, and Teresita Marquez.

Laylo testified that while he and his common-law wife, Ritwal, were walking on the street, two men grabbed them. The two men, who
they later identified as PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, dragged them to their house. Once inside, the police officers placed two plastic
sachets in each of their pockets. Afterwards, they were brought to the police station where, despite protests and claims that the drugs
were planted on them, they were arrested and charged.

To corroborate Laylo’s testimony, the defense presented Laylo’s three neighbors. Marlon de Leon (de Leon), also a close friend of the
couple, testified that he was taking care of the Laylo and Ritwal’s child when he heard a commotion. He saw men, whom de Leon
identified as assets, holding the couple and claimed that he saw one of them put something, which he described as "plastic," in the left
side of Laylo’s jacket.

Rodrigo Panaon, Jr. (Panaon) narrated that on 17 December 2005, at around 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., he was on his way home when he saw
Laylo arguing with three men in an alley. He overheard Laylo uttering, "Bakit ba? Bakit ba?" Later, Panaon saw a commotion taking
place at Laylo’s backyard. The three men arrested Laylo while the latter shouted, "Mga kapitbahay, tulungan ninyo kami, kami’y
dinadampot." Then Panaon saw someone place something inside the jacket of Laylo as he heard Laylo say, "Wala kayong makukuha
dito."

Teresita Marquez (Marquez) testified that while she was fetching water from the well on 17 December 2005, at around 5:00 or 6:00
p.m., she heard Laylo’s son shouting, "Amang, Amang." Marquez then saw the child run to his father, who was with several male
companions. Then someone pulled Laylo’s collar and frisked him. Marquez overheard someone uttering, "Wala po, wala po." Marquez
went home after the incident. At around 9:00 in the evening, Ritwal’s daughter visited her and borrowed money for Laylo and Ritwal’s
release. Marquez then accompanied Ritwal’s daughter to the municipal hall, where a man demanded ₱40,000.00 for the couple’s
release.
In its Decision dated 16 September 2008, the RTC found Laylo and Ritwal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of RA 9165.
The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the police officers, who were presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner. The RTC stated that Reyes and Pastor were straightforward and candid in their testimonies and unshaken by cross-
examination. Their testimonies were unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in their material points. The RTC added that the
denial of appellant Laylo is weak and self-serving and his allegation of planting of evidence or frame-up can be easily concocted. Thus,
Laylo’s defense cannot be given credence over the positive and clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The dispositive portion
of the decision states:

We thus find accused Rolando Laylo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 26(b) of R.A. No. 9165 and sentence him to
suffer a penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00. We also find accused Melitona Ritwal GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 and illegally possessing a total of 0.02 grams of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu and accordingly sentence her to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12 years and one day as minimum to 13
years as maximum and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00.

Let the drug samples in this case be forwarded to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition. Furnish
PDEA with a copy of this Decision per OCA Circular No. 70-2007.

SO ORDERED.6

Laylo filed an appeal with the CA. Laylo imputed the following errors on the RTC:

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION WITNESS’ PATENTLY FABRICATED ACCOUNTS.

II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE APPREHENDING
OFFICERS’ FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE ALLEGED SEIZED SHABU.7

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Decision dated 28 January 2010, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The challenged decision of the court a quo is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.8

Hence, this appeal.

The Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.9

In the present case, PO1 Reyes narrated in court the circumstances of the illegal sale:

PROS. ARAGONES:

Q: What time did you proceed to that place of surveillance?

A: 5:40 p.m., Ma’am.

Q: And what happened when you and PO1 Gem Pastor went there?

A: When we were making standby at a nearby store there was a man talking with a woman, the man asked me if we want to have a
shot of shabu.

Q: What was your reply?

A: "Bakit, meron ka ba?"

Q: How did that other person react to that question, what did he tell you, if any?

A: "Gusto mong umiskor ng shabu?"

Q: What happened after that?

A: I replied, "Bakit meron ka ba?" then he showed me two small plastic bags containing shabu, Ma’am.
Q: How big is that bag, Mr. Witness?

A: Small, Ma’am.

Q: Can you tell us the size?

A: (Demonstrating) Almost one inch the size of a cigarette, Ma’am.

COURT: It was in a plastic not in foil?

A: Yes, your Honor.

PROS. ARAGONES:

Q: After showing you two plastic bags, what happened?

A: I introduced myself as a police officer then I caught this man and confiscated the two small plastic bag containing shabu.

Q: How about the lady?

A: My partner caught the woman because she was intending to run away and he got from her right hand Smart SIM card case
containing one small plastic.10

PO1 Pastor corroborated the testimony of PO1 Reyes:

PROS. ARAGONES:

Q: Mr. Witness, while you were conducting surveillance on December 17, 2005, what happened?

A: While we were conducting surveillance at Lozana Street, Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal, while we were at the store, two (2) persons
approached us, one male and one female, Ma’am.

Q: Who were those persons? Did you come to know the name of those persons?

A: At that time I don’t know the names but when they were brought to the police station I came to know their names, Ma’am.

Q: What are the names of these two persons?

A: Rolando Laylo and Melitona Ritwal, Ma’am.

Q: At that time they approached you during the time you were conducting surveillance at Lozana Street, what happened?

A: The male person approached PO1 Reyes and asked if "iiskor", Ma’am.

Q: What was the reply of PO1 Reyes?

A: He answered "Bakit meron ka ba?"

Q: When that answer was given by Reyes, what did that male person do?

A: He produced two (2) small plastic sachets containing allegedly shabu and he said "dos ang isa."

COURT: What do you mean by "dos ang isa"?

A: Php 200.00, Your Honor.

PROS. ARAGONES:

Q: Where were you when that male person produced two (2) small plastic sachets?

A: I was beside PO1 Reyes, Ma’am.

Q: After he showed the plastic sachets containing drugs, what happened next?

A: We introduced ourselves as policemen, Ma’am.

Q: After you introduced yourselves, what happened next?

A: PO1 Reyes arrested the male person while I arrested the female person, Ma’am.

Q: Why did you arrest the woman?


A: At that time, she was about to run I confiscated from her a SIM card case, Ma’am.

COURT: What was the contents of the SIM card case?

A: One (1) piece of alleged shabu, Your Honor.11

From the testimonies given, PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they were the poseur-buyers in the sale. Both positively identified
appellant as the seller of the substance contained in plastic sachets which were found to be positive for shabu. The same plastic
sachets were likewise identified by the prosecution witnesses when presented in court. Even the consideration of ₱200.00 for each
sachet had been made known by appellant to the police officers. However, the sale was interrupted when the police officers introduced
themselves as cops and immediately arrested appellant and his live-in partner Ritwal. Thus, the sale was not consummated but merely
attempted. Thus, appellant was charged with attempted sale of dangerous drugs. Section 26(b), Article II of RA 9165 provides:

Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. – Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the following unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same
penalty prescribed for the commission of the same as provided under this Act:

xxx

(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical;

xxx

Here, appellant intended to sell shabu and commenced by overt acts the commission of the intended crime by showing the substance
to PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor.12 The sale was aborted when the police officers identified themselves and placed appellant and Ritwal
under arrest. From the testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution was able to establish that there was an attempt to sell shabu. In
addition, the plastic sachets were presented in court as evidence of corpus delicti. Thus, the elements of the crime charged were
sufficiently established by evidence.

Appellant claims that he was a victim of a frame up. However, he failed to substantiate his claim. The witnesses presented by the
defense were not able to positively affirm that illegal drugs were planted on appellant by the police officers when they testified that "they
saw someone place something inside appellant’s jacket." In Quinicot v. People,13 we held that allegations of frame-up and extortion by
police officers are common and standard defenses in most dangerous drugs cases. They are viewed by the Court with disfavor, for
such defenses can easily be concocted and fabricated.

Appellant asserts that it is unbelievable that he would be so foolish and reckless to offer to sell shabu to strangers. In People v. de
Guzman,14 we have ruled that peddlers of illicit drugs have been known, with ever increasing casualness and recklessness, to offer and
sell their wares for the right price to anybody, be they strangers or not. What matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer
and the seller, or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement as well as the act constituting the sale and delivery of the
prohibited drugs.

Further, appellant did not attribute any ill-motive on the part of the police officers. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
the police officers’ official duties should prevail over the self-serving denial of appellant.15

In sum, we see no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and CA. Appellant was correctly found to be guilty beyond reasonable
1avv phi 1

doubt of violating Section 26(b), Article II of RA 9165.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 January 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03631.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*


Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1006 dated 10 June 2011.

1Rollo, pp. 2-13. Penned by Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Justices Arturo G. Tayag and Elihu A. Ybañez, concurring.

2
CA rollo, pp. 6-8. Penned by Presiding Judge Dennis Patrick Z. Perez.

3Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. – Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the following unlawful acts shall be penalized by
the same penalty prescribed for the commission of the same as provided under this Act:

xxx

(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical; x x x

4An Act Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Repealing Republic Act No. 6425, Otherwise Known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, As Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes. Approved on 23 January
2002 and took effect on 7 June 2002.

5
CA rollo, pp. 40-41.

6 CA rollo, p. 8.

7 Id. at 116-117.

8 Rollo, p. 12.

9People v. Llamado, G.R. No. 185278, 13 March 2009, 581 SCRA 544, citing People v. Ong, G.R. No. 175940, 6 February
2008, 544 SCRA 123.

10 CA rollo, pp. 82-83.

11
Id. at 83-85.

12 People v. Adam, 459 Phil. 676 (2003).

13 G.R. No. 179700, 22 June 2009, 590 SCRA 458.

14 G.R. No. 177569, 28 November 2007, 539 SCRA 306.

15
People v. Lazaro, Jr., G.R. No. 186418, 16 October 2009, 604 SCRA 250.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 170234 February 8, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
BERNARDO F. NICOLAS, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01191 dated 23 August 2005 which affirmed in toto
the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 164, in Criminal Case No. 11566-D, finding accused-appellant
Bernardo Felizardo Nicolas, a.k.a. Bernie, guilty of violation of Section 5,3Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In an Information dated 7 August 2002, accused-appellant Bernardo Felizardo Nicolas, a.k.a. Bernie, was charged with Violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the accusatory portion thereof reading:

On or about August 6, 2002, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, who is not being authorized
by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO2 Danilo S. Damasco, one (1) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.42 gram of white crystalline substance which was found positive to the test for
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law. 4

The case was raffled to Branch 164 of the RTC of Pasig City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 11566-D.

When arraigned on 30 September 2002, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not Gulity" to the charge. 5 The Pre-Trial
Conference of the case was terminated on the same day. Thereafter, the case was heard.

The prosecution presented two witnesses: PO2 Danilo S. Damasco 6 and SPO2 Dante Zipagan,7 both members of the Station Drug
Enforcement Unit of the Pasig Police Station. The testimony of Police Inspector Delfin A. Torregoza, Forensic Chemical Officer, Eastern
Police District Crime Laboratory Office, was, however, dispensed with after both prosecution and defense stipulated that the
specimen8 submitted in court is the same one mentioned in the Request for Laboratory Examination 9 and in Chemistry Report No. D-
1501-02E,10 and that same was regularly examined by said forensic chemical officer.

For the defense, appellant11 took the witness stand together with his common-law wife, Susan dela Cruz Villasoto,12 and brother, Jose
Nicolas.13

The diametrical versions of the People and the accused are narrated by the trial court as follows:

VERSION OF THE PEOPLE

On August 6, 2002, at about 9:30 o’clock in the evening, a confidential informant stepped inside the office of the Station Drug
Enforcement Unit of the Pasig Police Station, Pasig City and informed SPO4 Numeriano S. De Lara, Officer In-Charge of that unit, that
a certain alias Bernie was selling shabu at his place along Santiago Street, in Barangay Bagong Ilog, Pasig City. Immediately, SPO4
De Lara organized a team to conduct a surveillance operation and the entrapment of alias Bernie, if warranted by the situation. The
team was composed of PO2 Danilo S. Damasco, PO2 Montefalcon, PO2 Orig and SPO2 Zipagan who was the team leader. PO2
Damasco was designated to act as poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation while the other police officers would serve as his back-ups
to assist in the possible apprehension of alias Bernie. After a short briefing, the team of police operatives, including the confidential
informant, proceeded to the target place at Santiago Street, Bagong Ilog, Pasig City. SPO2 Dante Zipagan, the team leader, instructed
the confidential informant to first check and look for the whereabouts of alias Bernie. The informant, after five minutes, returned and
informed the team that he found alias Bernie in front of his house and the team decided to proceed with the planned entrapment of alias
Bernie. PO2 Damasco and the informant then walked towards the house of alias Bernie while the back-up police officers placed
themselves strategically in different positions where they could see PO2 Damasco and the informant in the act of negotiating with alias
Bernie. PO2 Damasco and the informant saw alias Bernie conversing with a male person in front of his house. After the informant
greeted alias Bernie, he introduced PO2 Damasco to alias Bernie whose real name is Bernardo Nicolas, the accused herein, as a user
of shabu and would like now to buy some Php500.00 worth of the substance from him. Alias Bernie, responded that he still had one
piece of that stuff and was willing to sell it to poseur-buyer Damasco. Accused asked for the money which was pre-marked by Damasco
with initials DSD (Exh. D-1) which stands for the name of Danilo S. Damasco. Damasco then handed the five hundred peso bill (Exh. D)
to accused who accepted it. Accused, in return, gave Damasco one plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which looked
like that of shabu. For a moment, PO2 Damasco examined the plastic sachet and its content and then announced to the accused he
was a police officer and arresting him for violation of the drugs law. Accused Bernardo Nicolas alias Bernie got shocked and surprised.
As Damasco was holding the accused, the back-up officers arrived and assisted him in handling the accused. Damasco recovered the
buy-bust money and the police team took him away to their station, where he was turned over to a police investigator together with the
small plastic sachet of suspected shabu that Damasco had purchased from the accused. SPO4 Numeriano S. De Lara sent the small
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which was then marked with EXH.-A BFN/080602 to the Eastern Police District
Crime Laboratory Office at St. Francis St., Mandaluyong City, as per his letter memorandum dated August 6, 2002 (Exhs. B and B-1).
The specimen was received at the EPD Crime Laboratory office by P/Insp. Delfin Torregoza, a Forensic Chemical Officer, who weighed
and examined the specimen which he found to contain 0.42 gram of white crystalline substance which was tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride as per his Chemistry Report No. D-1501-02E (Exhs. C and C-1). Accused Bernardo F. Nicolas was
consequently charged with Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.

VERSION OF DEFENSE

xxxx

[Appellant] testified that on August 6, 2002 at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, he was outside of his house conversing with his
brother, Jose Nicolas, and a friend named Arnold Mendez. He had just came (sic) out of his house in order to close the billiard salon
that he owned. As they were then huddled in animated conversation, two motor vehicles stopped in front of his billiard parlor, a car and
a van. The passengers of the van alighted and one of them pointed a gun at him. As accused was not familiar with the men, he could
not recognize them. He learned, later on, that the man who poked a gun at him was PO2 Danilo Damasco who was accompanied by
other persons numbering about four or five of them. Damasco warned him not to move, holding and waiving in his hand a plastic sachet
which Damasco said he bought from accused Bernardo Nicolas. The police officers then proceeded to put handcuffs on the hands of
the accused, in spite of his protest denying anything to do with the plastic sachet of alleged shabu being displayed by Damasco. The
police officers also handcuffed and arrested Arnold Mendez. Jose Nicolas did not allow himself to be arrested and handcuffed. When
he sensed that he would be handcuffed, he immediately fled and ran into his house, locking himself in. Luckily for him, the police
officers did not pursue him any longer. He just watched the incident by peeping through the window of his house. Accused Bernardo
Nicolas alias Bernie and Arnold Mendez, were then forced into the police vehicle and taken to the police station, although Nicolas
showed resistance which forced the police officers to physically carry him into their vehicle. Accused Bernard Nicolas was then charged
with Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165.

Appellant denies the charge. He insists that there was no buy-bust operation and that the shabu (methamphetamine hydrochloride)
allegedly sold by him to the poseur buyer was planted evidence. He claims that the trumped-up charge is a way of getting even with
him because he, together with his wife, had filed a case before the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) for grave misconduct
against several policemen (PO2 Joel Tapec, PO1 Christopher Semana and five John Does) assigned at the Station Drug Enforcement
Unit of the Pasig Police Station, for entering and robbing their house on 5 February 2002. He further claims that the policemen who
arrested him for allegedly selling shabu were the John Does mentioned in the complaint he and his wife filed with the NAPOLCOM.

In its decision dated 8 October 2003, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced
him to life imprisonment. The dispositve portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the court finds accused BERNARDO F. NICOLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of violation of Section
5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500.00),14 with the accessory penalties provided under Section 35 thereof. 15

From the decision, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal informing the court that he is appealing the same to the Court of
Appeals.16 Though the Notice of Appeal specified that the decision is being appealed to the Court of Appeals, the trial court nonetheless
forwarded the records of the case to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. 17

On 22 November 2004, appellant filed an appellant’s brief before the Supreme Court. On 31 March 2005, the Office of the Solicitor
General filed the People’s brief.18

Since the penalty imposed by the trial court was life imprisonment, the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action and disposition pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo. 19

On 23 August 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming in full the decision of the trial court. 20Appellant filed a Notice of
Appeal assailing the decision before the Supreme Court.21

With the elevation of the records of the case to the Supreme Court, the parties were required to submit their respective supplemental
briefs, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice. 22 The parties opted not to file supplemental briefs on the ground that they have fully
argued their positions in their respective briefs.23

Appellant assigns as errors the following:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE VERSION OF THE DEFENSE.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellant observed that (1) the policemen did not conduct surveillance first; (2) they did not have any agreement as regards the money
to be used in buying the shabu; and (3) they failed to talk about any signal to inform the back-up policemen that the transaction has
been consummated. He contends that the absence of these things is unusual and that it made even more doubtful that the buy-bust
operation really took place. 1avv phi 1.net

These observations will not purge him of the charge.

Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no
textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective
means to apprehend drug dealers.24 A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary especially where the police
operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment. 25 Flexibility is a trait of good police work.26 In the case at bar, the
buy-bust operation was conducted without need of any prior surveillance for the reason that the informant accompanied the policemen
to the person who is peddling the dangerous drugs.

Appellant faults the policemen because there was no agreement or discussion among themselves as regards the marked money and
the pre-arranged signal.

From the records, it is clear that it was PO2 Damasco who prepared the marked money 27 as shown by his initials on the top right corner
of the ₱500.00 bill that was used in purchasing the shabu from appellant. 28 The fact that the team leader and the other members of the
team did not discuss or talk about the marked money does not necessarily mean that there was no buy-bust operation. As explained by
SPO2 Zipagan, since PO2 Damasco was the designated poseur buyer it was the latter’s discretion as to how to prepare the marked
money. It is not required that all the members of the buy-bust team know how the marked money is to be produced and marked
inasmuch as they have their respective roles to perform in the operation. As this Court sees it, the other members of the team left the
matter of the marked money to one person – the poseur buyer – because it was he who was to deal directly with the drug pusher.

As to the absence of a pre-arranged signal, same is not fatal to the cause of the prosecution. The employment of a pre-arranged signal,
or the lack of it, is not indispensable in a buy-bust operation. What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs is proof
of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted
to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. 29 The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of
drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefore.30 What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. 31

In the case under consideration, all these elements have been established. The witnesses for the prosecution clearly showed that the
sale of the drugs actually happened and that the shabu subject of the sale was brought and identified in court. The poseur buyer (PO2
Damasco) categorically identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. His testimony was corroborated by SPO2 Zipagan. Per
Chemistry Report No. D-1501-02E of Police Inspector Delfin A. Torregoza, the substance, weighing 0.42 gram, which was bought by
PO2 Damasco from appellant in consideration of ₱500.00, was examined and found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).

We quote the material portions of the testimony of the poseur buyer that detailed the apprehension of appellant, as follows:

A: And we briefed and after a short briefing we proceeded to the alleged residence of Bernie and when we reached the place, I
particularly saw the subject person in front of the alleged house.

Q: You said we, whom are you referring to as those who went with you to the house of Bernie?

A: The confidential informant.

Q: After reaching the house of Bernie, what happened there?

A: I saw the subject person infront of his alleged house talking to another male person.

Q: What was the general condition of that place outside the house of Bernie when you saw him?

A: Dim light, sir.

Q: After you first saw Bernie talking with somebody else, what did you do?

A: The confidential informant greeted alias Bernie and after greeting said person the other male person he was talking to went farther
from us and they conversed.

Q: And after that conversation between your informant and Bernie, what happened?

A: The confidential informant introduced me as a shabu user and as a customer.

Q: How far were you from Bernie when you were introduced?

A: Only two (sic) away.

Q: Less than a meter?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was the response of Bernie as you were introduced as a shabu user?

A: He checked my personality first and he asked me if I will get the stuff, he asked me in tagalog, kukuha ka ba?

Q: And what did you tell him?

A: I answered him, kung mayroon kukuha ako.

Q: And what was his answer?

A: He answered me that, mayroon kaya tamang-tama kasi isa na lang itong natitira sa akin panggamit ko sana.

Q: At that very moment, after you were told by Bernie isa na lang ang natitira, what did you?

A: I asked him kung puwede pang bilhin and then he told me, isa na lang ito panggamit ko, magkano ba ang kukunin mo?

Q: What was your answer?

A: I told him, ₱500.00 worth.

Q: And what is [his] reply?

A: Okay, ibibigay ko na lang sa inyo.

Q: And what happened next?

A: He asked my payment first.

Q: And what did you do after he asked your payment?

A: I gave him the pre-marked money.

Q: What (sic) that bill made off?


A: ₱500.00 bill.

Q: Where did you put that marking in that bill?

A: I put the marking on the upper right portion of the bill inside the 500.

Q: What are the markings did you put there?

A: I put my initials DSD.

Q: Now after you gave him that ₱500.00 marked money, what else happened?

A: After he received the pre-marked money then he gave me one (1) plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance after
receiving said I examined the plastic sachet.

Q: After that examination of yours, what did you do?

A: After a brief examination immediately I introduced myself as a police officer and subsequently, arrested alias Bernie.

Q: After you introduced yourself as a police officer, what was the reaction of alias Bernie?

A: He was shocked, sir.

Q: Did he tell you anything?

A: None, sir.

Q: And what did you do after arresting him immediately?

A: After informing his constitutional right I recovered the pre-marked money.

Q: You mean, you frisked him, Mr. Witness?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What else did you recover from him aside from the mark money?

A: Nothing more.32

Appellant tries to discredit PO2 Damasco and SPO2 Zipagan by showing an inconsistency in their testimonies regarding the condition
of the scene of the incident. He points out that PO2 Damasco stressed that the place was dark while SPO2 Zipagan said that the area
was well-lighted.33

After going over the testimonies of the two police operatives, we find no inconsistency in their testimonies. When asked about the
general condition of the place outside the house of appellant, PO2 Damasco answered "dim light." 34 On the other hand, SPO2 Zipagan
said the place was "a lighted area."35 PO2 Damasco did not say that the place was dark nor did SPO2 Zipagan say that the place was
well-lighted. What is clear is that the place was lighted. Thus, since both witnesses said that the place was lighted, the inconsistency is
more apparent than real. Even assuming ad arguendo that this can be considered an inconsistency, same is trivial to adversely affect
their credibility.

We now go to appellant’s contention that the policemen who arrested him were impelled by improper motive. He argues that he was
merely talking to his brother and a friend when the policemen suddenly arrived and insisted that he had sold shabu to PO2 Damasco.
He claims that the charge against him was driven by the policemen’s desire to get even with him for filing a case for grave misconduct
against the said policemen with the NAPOLCOM. He added that the trial court should have considered the motive as to why he was
charged and that the possibility of vengeance is not remote.

We find appelant’s imputation of ill motive on the police officers to be unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. We agree in
the trial court’s ruling when it said:

The evidence does not show that Damasco and Zipagan were moved by ill-will in testifying against the accused. There was no ill feeling
or personal animosity existing between the police officers and the accused at the time of the latter’s arrest. It is true that accused
Bernardo F. Nicolas and his common-law wife Susan Dela Cruz Villasoto filed an administrative case against PO2 Joel Tapec and PO1
Christopher Semana, both of the Pasig City Police Station for grave misconduct before the National Police Commission which is
docketed as ADM CASE No. 2003-008 (NCR). But the filing of this case against Tapec and Semana is not enough reason for Damasco
and Zipagan to fabricate or plant evidence against the accused. There was absolutely no reason at all for them to risk their lives and
career to go and plant evidence against the accused which is in violation of Section 29 of R.A. 9165 that imposes upon any person
found guilty of planting any dangerous drug regardless of quantity and purity, the penalty of death. These police officers are presumed
to know this law and the court believes that these police officers do not wish to lose their lives by fabricating evidence against innocent
individuals. Accused Bernardo Nicolas, naturally, was expected to deny the accusation against him, for admission would automatically
result in conviction. The testimony of his common-law wife, Susan Dela Cruz Villasoto is not much of help to the accused’[s] defense.
Since she did not witness what transpired when accused went out of the house in the evening of August 6, 2002. All that she
substantially testified to was that she heard shouting outside of their house and saw three persons forcibly carrying her husband to the
other side of the road. (TSN, July 7, 2003, p. 4). Witness Jose F. Nicolas, to the mind of the court is not a credible witness. He claimed
he was present at the time accused was arrested. He said he fled in order to avoid being handcuffed and arrested by the police when
his brother alias Bernie was arrested. He did not even visit his brother in jail. He talked to him only on August 25, 2003 to discuss with
him his testimony in court. (TSN, September 15, 2003, p. 13). Being accused’s close relative, Jose Nicolas is expected to testify
favorably in behalf of the accused whose testimony, of course, is not sufficient to overthrow the strength and weight of the testimonies
of the police officers Damasco and Zipagan.36

We likewise find appellant’s declaration that the policemen who arrested him were the very same ones who robbed his house on 5
February 2002 to be a mere afterthought in order that he may justify his claim of improper motive on the part of the policemen. How
convenient, indeed, it is for him to make such a declaration. From the time of the alleged break-in in his house on 5 February 2002 until
the time he was arrested on 6 August 2002 for selling shabu, he never lifted a finger to try and find out the identities of the alleged five
John Does mentioned in his complaint with the NAPOLCOM. He could have easily gone to the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the
Pasig Police Station, but this he did not do. Only when he was arrested during an entrapment operation did he make such a claim. The
timing thereof renders such declaration very dubious and unreliable.

Appellant’s contention that he was framed-up is made even more suspect by the fact that the statement 37 of his common-law wife that
he had gone out of the house for only two minutes when the policemen arrived and took him away is belied by the statement 38 of his
brother that he had been outside the house for 30 minutes and was talking with his brother and Arnold Mendez when the policemen
arrived.

Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is
a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 39 For this claim to prosper, the
defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their
duties in a regular and proper manner.40 In the case at bar, the presumption remained uncontradicted because the defense failed to
present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an
improper motive.

Prosecutions involving illegal drugs largely depend on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.
Considering that this Court has access only to the cold and impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the
assessment of the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during trial.
Hence, factual findings of the trial courts are accorded respect absent any showing that certain facts of weights and substance bearing
on the elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. 41 We have no reason to deviate from this rule. We
affirm the factual findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The evidence presented by the prosecution proves to a
moral certainty petitioner’s guilt of the crime of selling dangerous drugs.

The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Said section reads:

SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

Under said law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its quantity and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a
fine of ₱500,000.00 to ₱10,000,000.00. For selling 0.42 gram of shabu to PO2 Damasco, the trial court, as sustained by the Court of
Appeals, imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00 in accordance with Article 63(2)42 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Section 98 of Republic Act No. 9165, however, provides for the limited application of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on said
law. This Section reads:

SEC. 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. – Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815), as amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in the case of minor
offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided herein shall be
reclusion perpetua to death. (Underscoring supplied.)

With the aforesaid section, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer apply to the provisions of the Drugs law except
when the offender is a minor. Thus, Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code shall not be used in the determination of the penalty to be
imposed on the accused. Since Section 98 of the Drugs Law contains the word "shall," the non-applicability of the Revised Penal Code
provisions is mandatory, subject only to the exception in case the offender is a minor.

In the imposition of the proper penalty, the courts, taking into account the circumstances attendant in the commission of the offense, are
given the discretion to impose either life imprisonment or death, and the fine as provided for by law. In light, however, of the effectivity
of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the imposition of the supreme
penalty of death has been prohibited. Consequently, the penalty to be meted on appellant shall only be life imprisonment and fine.
Hence, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00 were properly imposed on the accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01191 dated 23 August 2005 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 164, in Criminal Case
No. 11566-D, finding accused-appellant Bernardo Felizardo Nicolas, a.k.a. Bernie, guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Penned by Associate Justice (now Presiding Justice) Ruben T. Reyes with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga
and Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring. Rollo, pp. 100-118.

2
Records, pp. 89-94.

3Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transporation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals.

4 Records, p. 1.

5 Id. at 16.

6 TSN, 16 December 2002 and 3 February 2003.

7 TSN, 3 March 2003.

8 Exhibit E-1.

9 Exhibit B-1; Records, p. 52.

10
Exhibit C-1; Records, p. 54.

11 TSN, 26 May and 29 May 2003.

12 TSN, 7 July 2003.

13 TSN, 15 September 2003.

14 Should read ₱500,000.00.

15 Records, p. 93.

16 Id. at 96.

17 SEC. 3. How appeal taken. –

xxxx

(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion
or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph
(a) of this section.

18 Rollo, pp. 70-92.

19
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

20 Rollo, p. 118.

21 Id. at 125.

22 Id. at 22.

23 Id. at 23-24, 26-27.

24
People v. Li Yin Chu, G.R. No. 143793, 17 February 2004, 423 SCRA 158, 169.

25 People v. Gonzales, 430 Phil. 504, 514 (2002).

26
People v. Cadley, G.R. No. 150735, 15 March 2004, 425 SCRA 493, 500.

27 Exh. D; Records, pp. 55-56.

28 TSN, 16 December 2002, pp. 6-7.

29
People v. Corpuz, 442 Phil. 405, 414 (2002).

30 People v. Adam, 459 Phil. 676, 684 (2003).

31 People v. Padasin, 445 Phil. 448, 461 (2003).

32 TSN, 16 December 2002, pp. 5-7.

33 Appellant’s Brief, p. 10; rollo, p. 56.

34 TSN, 16 December 2002, p. 5.

35 TSN, 3 March 2003, p. 7.

36 Records, pp. 92-93.

37 TSN, 7 July 2003, pp. 13-14.

38 TSN, 15 September 2003, p. 3.

39 People v. Eugenio, 443 Phil. 411, 419 (2003).

40 People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 393 Phil. 68, 135 (2000).

41
People v. Ahmad, G.R. No. 148048, 15 January 2004, 419 SCRA 677, 685.

42 ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.

xxx

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be
observed in the application thereof:

xxx

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty
shall be applied.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008


SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner
vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 158633 November 3, 2008

ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner


vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 161658 November 3, 2008

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in
issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug
testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ,
among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations
as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas,
shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the
risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a
ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service
Law;

xxxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six
(6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section
15 of this Act.

G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the
said resolution read as follows:

WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x

xxxx

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;

WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of candidates they are electing and they
will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations
on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public office[:]

SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local
Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by
the Department of Health.

SEC. 3. x x x

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall
submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x.

SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of the campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two
separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list
shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate. - No person elected to any public office shall enter upon
the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test
certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May 10, 2004 elections,1filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for
being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution;
and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least
thirty - five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of
the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He
adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.

G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous


Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs
Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground
that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to
schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can
be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also
breached by said provisions.

G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous


Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d),
(f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure, and the right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

The Issue on Locus Standi

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents
DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate
petitions.2

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be
reviewed.3 But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional
question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.4 To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.5

The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non - traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.6 There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the
requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and
Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved
in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.

The Consolidated Issues

The principal issues before us are as follows:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can
Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates
for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down
in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the
Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law
or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which
all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. 8 In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.9

Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court
has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:

Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In
constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x
are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are
necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative
enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.10

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of
the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.11 The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights 12 and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement
Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate
for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process
of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. 13

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal -
drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted
upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any
public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for
membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of
no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non - compliance with the drug - testing requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state that non - compliance with the
drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test
requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug - testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting
that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with
candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the election and the
assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon
without meaning and effect whatsoever.

While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover
only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it
appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional
provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while
mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of [the]
citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose, per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can
be achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an
integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies, programs and projects."14 The primary legislative intent is
not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may
even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:

Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation. - A drug dependent or any person who
violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment
and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the
applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she
shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.

xxxx

Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. - A drug dependent under the voluntary submission
program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the
following conditions:

xxxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous
systems of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low
rate.15

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure16 under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the
validity of a state - decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this
jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first impression.

US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug testing among school children, we turn to the
teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et
al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court - decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.

In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their respective institutions following the discovery of
frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James
Acton, a high school student, was denied participation in the football program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith
sued, claiming that the school's drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of the US Constitution.

The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their
students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy
rights than non - athletes since the former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes
voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student's privacy
since a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs
on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under the Fourth 20 and 14th Amendments and declared the
random drug - testing policy constitutional.

In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high school students desiring to join extra -
curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the
drug - testing policy made to apply to non - athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo
physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non - athletes are entitled to more privacy.

The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among non - athletes on the basis of the school's custodial
responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction between a non - athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers
act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that the school could implement its
random drug - testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco
parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of
their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may
adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for
admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable requirements.

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well - being of the people,21 particularly the
youth and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random
drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student
population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our
Nation's schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the necessity for the
State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and
faculty.22 Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate
unsuspecting individual students.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and
employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than
saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to
privacy,"23 has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to
privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. 24 Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as
simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:

The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the
school and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's constitutional
right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.25

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.26 In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's
person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while there has been
general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable
searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal
Court.28 Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police
power.29

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion.30 And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government -
mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest.31 In the criminal context, reasonableness
requires showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for employees--and students for that
matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary procedures,"
the probable - cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged
administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within
the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy
expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine,
reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the
search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly
focused"?32

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain
provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience.
While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test,
nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be
tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in
the work place."

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity.
As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test,
doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be
conducted by trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results
tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.33 In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the
"need to know" basis;34 that the "drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the
confidentiality of the test results."35 Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or
evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore,
the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test
results, and is relatively minimal.

To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well - being of the citizens, especially the
youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely
pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test. 36 To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize
illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug
menace cuts across gender, age group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal
drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug
problem has hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with
respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and
deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that
the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be
met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by
the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.37 And if RA 9165 passes the
norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are
required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency. 38

Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for
concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and
officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the
testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees,
the testing shall take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be
subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the
confidentiality of the test results are established.

Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH, Department of the Interior and Local Government,
Department of Education, and Department of Labor and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then,
the participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that
schools and employers have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape. 39 In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the
government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power,
or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here.

Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],


[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of
crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from
the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6)
years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of
persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness
and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons'
right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from
implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g)of RA 9165. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES - SANTIAGO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA - MARTINEZ


Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO - NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO - DE CASTRO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Re-elected as senator in the 2004 elections.

2
Rollo (G.R. No. 158633), pp. 184-185.

3
Dumlao v. COMELEC, No. L-52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392, 401.

4
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary 939 (2003).

5
Gonzales v. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000, 337 SCRA 733, 740.

6
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, G.R. Nos. 124360 & 127867, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 330, 349; De Guia v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992, 208 SCRA 420, 422.

7
Palmer v. Board of Education, 276 NY 222 11 NE 2d 887.

8
Cruz, Constitutional Law 4 (2000).

9
Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, No. L-32717, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 228, 234.

10
50 Phil. 259, 309 (1927).

11
J. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary 604 (1996).

12
Id.
13
See concurring opinion in Go v. Commision on Elections, G.R. No. 147741, May 10, 2001, 357 SCRA 739, 753.

14
RA 9165, Sec. 2.

15
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), 661.

16
Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169; citing Morfe v. Mutuc, No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424,
444-445.

17
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.

18
536 U.S. 822 (2002); cited in 2 Bernas, Constitutional Rights and Social Demands 224-227 (2004).

19
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

20
The Fourth Amendment is almost similar to Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, except that the latter limited the determination of probable
cause to a judge after an examination under oath of the complainant and his witnesses. Hence, pronouncements of the US Federal Supreme
Court and State Appellate Court may be considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction, unless they are manifestly contrary to our Constitution. See
Herrera, Handbook on Arrest, Search and Seizure 8 (2003).

21
Tolentino v. Alconcel, No. L-63400, March 18, 1983, 121 SCRA 92, 95-96.

22
Rollo (G.R. No. 158633), p. 204, respondents' Consolidated Memorandum.

23
Rollo (G.R. No. 157870), p. 10.

24
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.

25
Rollo (G.R. No. 158633), p. 9.

26
Ople, supra note 16, at 153; citing Cooley on Torts, Sec. 135, Vol. 1, 4th ed., [1932].

27
62 Am. Jur. 2d, Privacy, Sec. 1.

28
387 U.S. 523; cited in 2 Bernas, supra note 18, at 232.

29
62 Am. Jur. 2d, Privacy, Sec. 17.

30
Vernonia & Board of Education, supra notes 15 & 18.

31
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); cited in Vernonia, supra.

32
Supra note 16, at 166 & 169.

33
Under Sec. 7 [3] of the DOH IRR Governing Licensing and Accreditation of Drug Laboratories, a laboratory is required to use documented
chain of custody procedures to maintain control and custody of specimens.

34
DOH IRR Governing Licensing and Accreditation of Drug Laboratories, Sec. 7 [10.3] provides that the original copy of the test results form
shall be given to the client/donor, copy furnished the DOH and the requesting agency.

35
Id., Sec. 7 [10.4].

36
Secs. 47 and 48 of RA 9165 charge the Department of Labor and Employment with the duty to develop and promote a national drug
prevention program and the necessary guidelines in the work place, which shall include a mandatory drafting and adoption of policies to
achieve a drug-free workplace.

37
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees, Sec. 2.

38
Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 1.

39
Tatad, supra note 6, at 351.

40
Leona Pasion Viuda de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 695 (1938); citing Cooley, Const. Lim. 630 (8th ed.).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation


SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 184181 November 26, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
JOSEPH ROBELO y TUNGALA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is another instance where we are called upon to resolve an issue concerning the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded
to an accused vis-à-vis the corresponding presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties of police officers involved in a
drug buy-bust operation.

Assailed in this appeal interposed by appellant Joseph Robelo y Tungala is February 27, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
1

CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02711, which affirmed the January 26, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of Manila,
2

Branch 2, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Possession and Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under
Sections 11(3) and (5) in relation to Section 26, Article II, respectively, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Factual Antecedents

At about 10:00 a.m. of March 26, 2004, the Station of Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAID), Police Station 2 in
Moriones, Tondo, Manila received information from a civilian informer that a certain alias "Kalbo" (appellant) is involved in the sale of
illegal drugs in Parola Compound. Forthwith, the Chief of SAID organized a team composed of eight police officers to conduct a "buy-
bust" operation to entrap appellant. PO2 Arnel Tubbali (PO2 Tubbali) was designated as the poseur-buyer and was thus handed a 100
peso bill which he marked with his initials. The rest of the team were to serve as back-ups.

The civilian asset led PO2 Tubbali to the target area while others positioned themselves in strategic places. Not long after, appellant
came out from Gate 16, Area 1-b with a companion who was later identified as Teddy Umali (Umali). Upon approaching the two, the
civilian informer introduced to them PO2 Tubbali as a friend and a prospective buyer of shabu. PO2 Tubbali then conveyed his desire to
buy P100.00 worth of shabu and handed Umali the marked P100.00 bill. After accepting the money, Umali ordered appellant to give
PO2 Tubbali one plastic sachet of shabu to which the latter readily complied. PO2 Tubbali then looked at the plastic sachet, placed it in
his pocket, and made the pre-arranged signal by scratching his butt. Whereupon, the rest of the team rushed to the scene and arrested
appellant and Umali. When frisked by PO2 Conrado Juano, one plastic sachet suspected to contain shabu was found inside appellant’s
pocket. He and Umali were afterwards brought to the precinct where the investigator marked the seized items with the initials "JRT-1"
and "JRT-2". The investigator then prepared the Laboratory Request, Booking Sheet, Arrest Report, Joint Affidavit of
3 4 5

Apprehension and a referral letter for inquest.


6 7

After qualitative examination, the forensic chemist found the items positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug.

Appellant was accordingly charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu in two separate Informations while Umali was
indicted in another Information raffled to a different branch of the RTC.

The Informations against appellant read as follows:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 04-225284

That on or about March 26, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, without being authorized by law to possess any
dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1)
transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT ZERO NINETEEN (0.019) gram of white crystalline substance known as shabu,
containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 8

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 04-225285

That on or about March 26, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one whose true
name, identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell,
trade, deliver or give away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale one
(1) transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT ZERO THIRTEEN (0.013) gram of white crystalline substance known as shabu,
containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 9

During arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel, pleaded "not guilty" in the two cases. After the termination of the pre-trial, trial
on the merits immediately ensued.

Appellant denied being a drug pusher and claimed complete ignorance as to why he was being implicated in the said crimes. He
averred that he was repairing the floor of his mother’s house when two police officers in civilian clothes went inside the house,
ransacked the closet and without any reason handcuffed and brought him to the precinct. At the precinct, the police officers demanded
from him P10,000.00 in exchange for his liberty.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After trial, the RTC rendered a verdict of conviction on January 26, 2007, viz:
10

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:

1. In Criminal Case No. 04-225284, finding accused, Joseph Robelo y Tungala @ "Kalbo", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day as minimum to 17 years and 4 months
as maximum; to pay a fine of P300,000,00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

2. In Criminal Case No. 04-225285, finding accused, Joseph Robelo y Tungala @ "Kalbo", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The specimens are forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court, accompanied by the Branch Sheriff, is directed
to turn over with dispatch and upon receipt the said specimen to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposal in
accordance with the law and rules.

SO ORDERED. 11

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA concurred with the RTC’s findings and conclusions and, consequently, affirmed the said lower court’s judgment in its
assailed Decision of February 27, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:
12

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated January 26, 2007 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 13

Still undeterred, appellant is now before us and by way of assignment of errors reiterates the grounds and arguments raised in his Brief
filed before the CA, to wit:

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASOANBLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE POLICE OFFICERS’ FAILURE TO REGULARLY PERFORM THEIR OFFICIAL
FUNCTIONS. 14

Our Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Appellant’s first assignment of error basically hinges on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, particularly in their conduct of the
buy-bust operation. He asserts that the alleged buy-bust operation is tainted with infirmity due to the absence of a prior surveillance or
investigation. Moreover, per the testimony of PO2 Tubbali, appellant did not say anything when the former was introduced to him as an
interested buyer of shabu. Appellant points out that it is contrary to human nature that the seller would say nothing to the buyer who is a
complete stranger to him.

We sustain the validity of the buy-bust operation.

A buy-bust operation has been proven to be an effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In this regard, police authorities are
given a wide latitude in employing their own ways of trapping or apprehending drug dealers in flagrante delicto. There is no prescribed
method on how the operation is to be conducted. As ruled in People v. Garcia, the absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy does not
15

affect the legality of the buy-bust operation as there is no text book method of conducting the same. As long as the constitutional rights
of the suspected drug dealer are not violated, the regularity of the operation will always be upheld. Thus, in People v. Salazar, we ruled
16

that "if carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards, buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction."

Neither impressive is appellant’s contention that it is contrary to human nature to sell the illegal stuff to a complete stranger. The law
does not prescribe as an element of the crime that the vendor and the vendee be familiar with each other. As aptly held by the CA,
peddlers of illicit drugs have been known with ever increasing casualness and recklessness to offer and sell their wares for the right
price to anybody, be they strangers or not.

While indeed there was little or no exchange between the poseur-buyer and the appellant as it was the former and Umali who
negotiated for the sale, he still cannot escape liability because of his passive complicity therein. Simply stated, there was conspiracy
between appellant and Umali as can be deduced from the testimony of PO2 Tubbali, to wit:

Q. So when Teddy Umali received this One Hundred Peso-bill (P100.00), what happened next, Mr. Witness?

A. Then he talked to Joseph Robelo alias "Kalbo" to give me a shabu, one


(1) plastic sachet, sir.

Q. Did Robelo comply?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How did, this Joseph…

A. And then Joseph handed me one (1) plastic sachet, sir. 17

Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime suggesting concerted
action and unity of purpose among them. In this case, the testimony of the poseur-buyer clearly shows a unity of mind between
appellant and Umali in selling the illegal drugs to him. Hence, applying the basic principle in conspiracy that the "act of one is the act of
all" appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator and regardless of his participation, is liable as co-principal. Appellant’s silence when the
poseur-buyer was introduced to him as an interested buyer of shabu is non-sequitur.

Appellant denies his complicity in the crime by invoking alibi and frame-up. He claims that in the morning of March 26, 2004, he was at
his mother’s house doing some repair job and was just suddenly arrested and brought to the precinct where the arresting officers
demanded P10,000.00 for his liberty.

We, however, find that the RTC correctly rejected this defense of the appellant.

Time and again, we have stressed virtually to the point of repletion that alibi is one of the weakest defenses that an accused can invoke
because it is easy to fabricate. In order to be given full faith and credit, an alibi must be clearly established and must not leave any
doubt as to its plausibility and veracity. Here, appellant’s claim that he was at his mother’s house at the time of the incident cannot
stand against the clear and positive identification of him by the prosecution witnesses. As aptly held by the RTC, "[t]he portrayal put
forward by appellant remained uncorroborated. The testimonies of the witnesses presented by the defense do not jibe with one another
and that of the claim of the appellant himself. x x x Lastly, the demand for money worth P10,000.00 remained unsubstantiated. x x x If
indeed appellant is innocent he or his family who were his witnesses should have filed a case of planting of evidence against the police
which is now punishable by life imprisonment." 18

In fine, no error was committed by the RTC and the CA in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The general
rule is that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, and are generally not disturbed, on appeal. We
find no reason to depart from such old-age rule as there are no compelling reasons which would warrant the reversal of the verdict.

In his second assignment of error, appellant draws attention to the failure of the apprehending officers to comply with Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 regarding the physical inventory and photocopy of the seized items. He asserts that this failure casts doubt on the validity of
his arrest and the identity of the suspected shabu allegedly bought and confiscated from him.

Appellant’s contention fails to convince us.

It should be noted that the alleged non-compliance with Section 21 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not raised before the trial court but
only for the first time on appeal. This cannot be done. In People v. Sta. Maria, People v. Hernandez, and People v. Lazaro, Jr., among
19 20 21

others, in which the very same issue was belatedly raised, we ruled:

x x x Indeed the police officers’ alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court
but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in
the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such
objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.

Moreover, "non-compliance with Section 21 does not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is essential is the ‘preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.’" The records reveal that at no instance did appellant hint a doubt
22

on the integrity of the seized items.

Undoubtedly, therefore, the suspected illegal drugs confiscated from appellant were the very same substance presented and identified
in court. This Court, thus, upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by the apprehending police officers.

The Penalty

Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, illegal sale of shabu carries with it the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million irrespective of the quantity and purity of the substance.

On the other hand, Section 11(3), Article II of the same law provides that illegal possession of less than five grams of shabu is
penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years plus a fine ranging from P300,000.00 to
P400,000.00.

Appellant was found guilty of selling 0.019 gram of shabu and of possessing another 0.013 gram. Hence, applying the above
provisions, we find the penalties imposed by the RTC as affirmed by the CA to be in order.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed February 27, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02711 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*


Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Special Order No. 1377 dated November 22, 2012.

CA rollo, pp. 100-121; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso and concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Q.
1

Enriquez and Marlene Gonzales-Sison.

2
Records, pp. 78-85; penned by Judge Alejandro G. Bijasa.

3
Exhibit "F", id. at 11.

4
Exhibit "E", id. at 4-5.

5
Id.

6
Exhibit "D", id. at 6-10.

7
Id. at 12.

8
Id. at 2.

9
Id. at 3.

10
Id. at 78-85.

11
Id. at 84-85.

12
CA rollo, pp. 100-121.

13
Id. at 121.

14
Id. at 33.

15
G.R. No. 172975, August 8, 2007, 529 SCRA 519, 533, 534.

16
334 Phil. 556, 570 (1997).
17
TSN, July 12, 2005, pp. 10-11.

18
Records, p. 83.

19
G.R. No. 171019, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 621, 633-634.

20
G.R. No. 184804, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 625, 645.

21
G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 250, 274.

22
People v. Guiara, G.R. No. 186497, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 310, 329.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 185163 January 17, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
CARLO MAGNO AURE y ARNALDO and MELCHOR AUSTRIACO y AGUILA, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the May 12, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 02600 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Carlo Magno Aure and Melchor Austriaco, which affirmed the September 1, 2006 Decision2 in Criminal Case Nos. 03-
3296, 03-3297, and 03-4210 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64 in Makati City. The RTC found accused Carlo Magno Aure
(Aure) and Melchor Austriaco (Austriaco) guilty of violating Sections 5, 11, and 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

The Information in Criminal Case No. 03-3296 charged Aure and Austriaco with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165. The Information
reads:

That on or about the 26th day of August, 2003, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating and both of them mutually helping and aiding with one
another, without the necessary license or prescription and without being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver, and give away P6,000.00 worth of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) weighing three point ninety-one
(3.91) grams, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

In Criminal Case No. 03-3297, the Information charged Aure with violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165, as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of August, 2003, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess and/or use regulated drugs and without any
license or proper prescription, did then and there willingly, unlawfully, feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) weighing eighty six point twenty-three (86.23) grams, which is a dangerous drug, in
violation of the aforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

And the Information in Criminal Case No. 03-4210 charged Austriaco with violation of Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165, as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of August, 2003, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to use any dangerous drug, and having been arrested and
found positive for the use of Methylamphetamine after a confirmatory test, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use
Methylamphetamine, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

When arraigned in Criminal Case Nos. 03-3296 and 03-3297 on September 9, 2003, Aure and Austriaco entered their negative pleas.6

Meanwhile, during the arraignment on February 19, 2004, Austriaco pleaded guilty in Criminal Case No. 03-4210. The promulgation of
the decision in this case was deferred pending submission by the defense counsel of a certification that he had not been convicted of
the same offense.7
Thereafter, a consolidated trial of Criminal Case Nos. 03-3296 and 03-3297 ensued.

During trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, to wit: (1) Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) operative Norman
Bilason (Bilason), the designated poseur-buyer; (2) Police Officer 3 Jay Lagasca (PO3 Lagasca), the buy-bust team leader; and (3)
MADAC operative Rogelio Flores (Flores), one of the back-up operatives. On the other hand, the defense presented Aure and
Austriaco as its witnesses.8

The Prosecution’s Version of Facts

At around 4:00 in the afternoon of August 26, 2003, an informant came to the Office of MADAC Cluster 2 and reported that a certain
Carlo, later identified as Carlo Magno Aure, was rampantly selling illegal drugs along F. Nazario Street, Barangay Singkamas, Makati
City.9 Aure was reportedly armed with a handgun and was using his car in his illegal transactions. 10

Upon being apprised of the ongoing drug peddling, the Chief of the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Makati City Police Station immediately
created a group of officers which would conduct a buy-bust operation.11 Composing this team was PO3 Lagasca, as the team leader,
with operatives from both the police station’s Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Force (AIDSOTF) and MADAC’s Clusters 2 and 3
as members.

When a briefing was conducted, MADAC operative Bilason was assigned as the poseur-buyer to be provided with 12 marked five
hundred peso (PhP 500) bills, amounting to six thousand pesos (PhP 6,000).

After marking the 12 PhP 500 bills, the team, with the informant, went to the place where Aure was reported to be conducting his trade.
When they reached a point along Primo Rivera Street, about 30 meters away from F. Nazario Street, they alighted from their vehicles.
MADAC operative Bilason and the informant walked towards F. Nazario Street, while the rest of the team members followed them.

Thereafter, when Bilason and the informant saw Aure and a certain "Buboy," who turned out to be Austriaco, seating inside a car
parked along F. Nazario Street, they approached the latter. In the meantime, the other team members strategically positioned
themselves within the area to monitor the transaction.

Bilason was introduced by the informant as a buyer of shabu. Aure initially expressed his apprehension that Bilason could be an
operative. Nevertheless, when the informant assured him that Bilason is his friend from the province, Aure asked Bilason how much he
needed. To this, Bilason replied "Isang bolto, pare," 12 which meant six thousand pesos (PhP 6,000) worth of shabu. When demanded
by Aure, Bilason handed the previously marked money to him. The latter then placed the marked money inside his right front pocket.

Afterwards, Aure secured from Austriaco a small brown bag and a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, suspected as
shabu, taken from the same bag. Aure then handed over the same plastic sachet with its contents to Bilason.

After ascertaining that what Aure gave him was shabu, Bilason lighted his cigarette to signal to his team members that the transaction
with Aure was already consummated. Immediately, PO3 Lagasca and MADAC operative Flores closed in. 13 After introducing
themselves as AIDSOTF and MADAC operatives, Bilason and his team members placed Aure and Austriaco under arrest, and ordered
them to get out of the car.14

Subsequently, Bilason seized the small brown bag from Aure. When inspected, said bag yielded another plastic sachet containing
substantial amount of suspected shabu wrapped in red wrapping paper, empty plastic sachets, and glass pipe tooter. Also seized was a
.45 caliber pistol with one magazine and five live bullets found inside the car near the place where Aure was seated. Flores also
recovered the marked money from Aure. The recovered items were marked by Bilason in the presence of Aure and Austriaco. PO3
Lagasca likewise explained to the two suspects the cause of their arrest and apprised them of their constitutional rights.

Eventually, Aure and Austriaco were brought to the AIDSOTF office. The examinations conducted by the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory on the plastic sachets of suspected shabu and the glass pipe tooter yielded positive results for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride.15 This was indicated in Chemistry Report No. D-1068-0316issued by Police Inspector Alejandro C. de Guzman.

Version of the Defense

Aure and Austriaco interposed the defense of denial.

Aure testified that on August 26, 2003, at around 8:00 in the evening, he fetched Austriaco in Pasay City. 17 The latter was referred to
him by his compadre18 to repair the cabinet in the house he intended to lease on F. Nazario Street, Barangay Singkamas, Makati City.
They proceeded to the said house in Makati City on board Aure’s Toyota Celica.

At around 8:30 in the evening, while Austriaco was estimating the cost of materials to be used for the repair of the cabinet, Aure heard
knocks on the door. When he opened the door, he saw 10 men in civilian clothes who immediately grabbed him and made him lie face
down for about three minutes.

This group of men allegedly began to search the house and seized the money amounting to PhP 200,000 which Aure intended to use
for purchasing a taxi cab, among other things. During this time, Austriaco was standing beside the cabinet near the lavatory when
someone ordered, "Kunin niyo na rin yung isa."19

Thereafter, Aure was handcuffed and was subsequently brought to the office of the Drug Enforcement Unit.20 After about five to 10
minutes, he saw Austriaco, who was also handcuffed, being brought inside the said office.21

Aure further testified that a plastic sachet of shabu was shown to him, and when he denied that the item came from him despite the
arresting men’s insistence that this was in his possession, he was punched by a police officer. He also averred that a certain Rogelio
Flores tried to extort money from him. His wallet and license were allegedly taken from him by the persons who arrested him.
For his part, Austriaco recounted that in the evening of August 26, 2003, he was fetched by a certain Benjamin Zaide from his house in
Pasay City to repair the cabinet of Aure. Together, they proceeded to the house of Benjamin Zaide, also in Pasay City, where Aure was
waiting. Thereafter, they proceeded to Aure’s house in Makati City.

Upon arriving at Aure’s house, Austriaco immediately attended to the cabinet he was supposed to repair. A few minutes later, he heard
some noise coming from the direction of the stairs of the house. Nonetheless, he went on with his work and just focused his attention
on the cabinet he was estimating.22

Austriaco further narrated that when Aure opened the door, he saw several men wearing civilian clothes enter the house and forcibly
grab Aure. The latter stumbled and fell to the floor with his face down. The group of men began to search the house. Eventually,
Austriaco saw Aure being brought outside of Aure’s house. After two to three minutes, he was also taken out of the house and was
brought to the Criminal Investigation Division.23

Ruling of the Trial Court

After trial, the RTC convicted Aure and Austriaco. The dispositive portion of its Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 03-3296, for Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the accused CARLO MAGNO
AURE y ARNALDO and MELCHOR AUSTRIACO y AGUILA are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged and both are sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and each one to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (PHP 500,000.00) PESOS.

2. In Criminal Case No. 03-3297 for Violation of Section 11, Article II Republic Act No. 9165, the accused CARLO MAGNO
AURE y ARNALDO is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and considering the quantity of shabu
recovered from his possession which is 86.23 grams, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand (Php 500,000.00) [Pesos].

3. In Criminal Case No. 03-4210, for Violation of Section 15 Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, the accused MELCHOR
AUSTRIACO y AGUILA having pleaded GUILTY to the charge is sentenced to undergo drug rehabilitation for at least six (6)
months in a government rehabilitation center under the auspices of the Bureau of Corrections subject to the provisions of
Article VIII of Republic Act No. 9165.

The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to transmit to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the two (2) plastic sachets of
shabu with a combined weight of 90.14 grams subject matter of Criminal Cases Nos. 03-3296 and 03-3297 for said agency’s
appropriate disposition.

SO ORDERED.24

On appeal to the CA, Aure and Austriaco questioned the trial court’s decision in convicting them despite their claim that the prosecution
failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 25

Ruling of the Appellate Court

On May 12, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC. It ruled that all the elements necessary to establish the fact of sale or
delivery of illegal drugs were aptly established by the prosecution, to wit:

In the present controversy, the elements of the crimes charged were amply proven not only by the categorical and materially consistent
declarations of the poseur-buyer and two other members of the buy-bust team, but also by laboratory examinations of the substance
seized, drug test of one of the accused-appellants, affidavits, marked bills, and other reports which were all submitted in court. Taken
collectively, these pieces of evidence bear out that the accused-appellants indeed sold a packet of white crystalline substance to
MADAC operative and poseur-buyer Norman Bilason in exchange for P6,000 and that the substance seized eventually tested positive
for shabu. In the prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, what is essential is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. 26 (Citations omitted.)

The CA held also that in the absence of proof to suggest that the arresting officers were moved by improper motives, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over
the self-serving claim of having been framed.27 Further, the appellate court ruled that the statutory burden of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt was ably discharged by the prosecution. After all, it ratiocinated that "proof beyond reasonable doubt" does not necessarily
contemplate "absolute certainty" but that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

The fallo of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing discussion, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the decision of the court
a quo dated 01 September 2006 is perforce affirmed in its entirety.

SO ORDERED.28

On June 3, 2008, accused-appellants filed their Notice of Appeal.29

In our Resolution dated January 14, 2009,30 We notified the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs if they so
desired. On March 19, 2009, the People of the Philippines manifested that it was no longer filing a supplemental brief, as it believed that
the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee dated November 6, 2007 had thoroughly refuted and discussed the lone issue raised by accused-
appellants in the instant case.31 Similarly, accused-appellants, on April 8, 2009, manifested that they were no longer filing a
supplemental brief, as they are adopting all the arguments contained in their Brief for the Accused-Appellants dated June 15, 2007.32
The Issues

Accused-appellants contend in their Brief for the Accused-Appellants dated June 15, 200733 that:

the court A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FAILURE OF the PROSECUTION TO PROVE their GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Our Ruling

We sustain accused-appellants’ conviction.

Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt adequately established by the prosecution

After a careful examination of the records of this case, We are satisfied that the prosecution’s evidence established the guilt of accused-
appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

In deciding this appeal, this Court is guided by the legal aphorism that factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, are
binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable
error.34 As this Court held in People v. Lusabio, Jr.:35

All in all, we find the evidence of the prosecution to be more credible than that adduced by accused-appellant. When it comes to
credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly
the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial
evidence properly. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

Here, accused-appellants failed to show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or oversight on the findings of fact of the trial and appellate
courts as to warrant a review of such findings. 1avv phi 1

In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165, the following elements must concur:
(1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. 36 What is
material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the
presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence. 37 In the instant case, all these were sufficiently established by the
prosecution.

MADAC operative Bilason, the poseur-buyer, testified on the first element, thus:

Q: On August 26, 2003 at around 9:05 in the evening, where were you Mr. Witness?

A: I’m at F. Nazario St., Brgy. Singkamas, Makati City, sir.

Q: What were you doing in the said place?

A: We were conducting buy bust operation against a certain Carlo, sir.

Q: What was your participation in that buy bust operation that you were then conducting?

A: I was the poseur buyer.

xxxx

Q: Could you tell us what happened to the buy bust operation that you conducted at F. Nazario St., Brgy. Singkamas, Makati
City?

A: We successfully apprehended Carlo together with his companion Melchor Austriaco.

Q: If this alias Carlo is present in court, will you be able to identify him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you please point him out to us?

A: (The witness pointed to a man who identified himself as Carlo Magno Aure y Arnaldo)

Q: How about Melchor Austriaco Mr. Witness, will you please point him out to us?

A: (The witness pointed to a man who identified himself as Melchor Austriaco y Aguila)

xxxx

Q: What happened Mr. Witness after the operation was coordinated with the PDEA?

A: PO3 Jay Lagasca prepared the buy bust money, sir.


Q: And how much were you supposed to buy in the buy bust operation?

A: Worth P6,000.00 pesos, sir.

Q: And what were you supposed to buy?

A: Shabu, sir.

Q: You said that PO3 Jay Lagasca prepared the buy bust money?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where were you when it was given to you?

A: I was present, sir, beside PO3 Jay Lagasca, sir.

Q: If the buy bust money that was given to you by PO3 Jay Lagasca will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the
same?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: By the way, how much was given to you by PO3 Jay Lagasca?

A: Worth P6,000.00 pesos, sir.

Q: And could you tell us in what denomination were those P6,000.00 pesos are?

A: Twelve (12) pieces of P500.00 peso bills, sir.

Q: If this [sic] twelve (12) pieces of P500.00 peso bills given to you by PO3 Jay Lagasca to be used in that operation will be
shown to you, will you be able to identify the same?

A: I am very sure, sir.

Q: I’m showing to you Mr. Witness twelve (12) pieces of P500.00 peso bills. Will you please go over the same and tell us what
relation does that have to the money that was given to you by PO3 Jay Lagasca?

A: This is the same buy bust money that we used in the buy bust operation.

Q: x x x Why are you certain Mr. Witness that these are the same buy bust money that were given to you by PO3 Jay
Lagasca?

A: Because of the marking above the serial number C2, sir.

Q: What does this marking C2 stands for?

A: Cluster 2, sir.

Q: Who placed these markings above the serial numbers of the P500.00 peso bills?

A: Our team leader, PO3 Jay Lagasca, sir.

Q: Where were you when these markings were placed?

A: I’m just in front of him, sir.

Q: x x x Mr. Witness, what did you do next after the P500.00 peso bills were given to you by PO3 Jay Lagasca?

A: After receiving the money, we proceeded to the area, sir.

Q: Who was with you when you proceeded to the area?

A: The confidential informant together with the buy bust team, sir.

xxxx

Q: You said that while you were walking at F. Nazario Street, you saw the [sic]?

A: The informant told me that that is the accused, sir.

Q: And what was the accused doing when you saw him?
A: He was seated inside the car and beside him on the driver side is a male person.

xxxx

Q: And what was the other male person doing at that time that you saw accused Carlo Magno Aure?

A: They were talking to each other, sir.

Q: Where was this other man at that time?

A: Beside him, sir, at the other side, sir.

Q: What happened after you saw the two men, Mr. Witness?

A: The confidential informant introduced me to the subject alias Carlo and told him that I am in need of shabu.

Q: So Mr. Witness, you said that you were introduced by the informant to accused Carlo Magno Aure?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How were you introduced by the informant?

A: That I was in need of shabu, sir.

Q: And what was the reply of accused Carlo Magno Aure?

A: Carlo Magno Aure said that pare "parang parak yata yan tol?"

Q: And when he said "parang parak yata yan tol?" to whom was he addressing this statement?

A: To the informant.

Q: And what happened after he uttered those words Mr. Witness?

A: Sumagot yung informant "barkada ko yan, taga probinsya." 38

The second element¾the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it¾was satisfied through the testimony of witness
Bilason:

Q: And what happened after that?

A: "Tinanong ako ni Carlo Magno Aure kung magkano ang kukunin ko, sabi ko sa kanya isang bolto pare."

Q: When you said "isang bolto" what exactly do you mean?

A: According to the informant worth P6,000.00 pesos "isang bolto."

Q: And what happened after you said "isang bolto?"

A: He got the money from me and put it inside his right front pocket, sir.

Q: And what happened after that?

A: He ordered his companion alias Buboy to get the brown bag and took out one plastic sachet, sir.

Q: And what did he do with this plastic sachet?

A: Alias Buboy handed to Carlo Magno Aure one plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, the suspected shabu
and the brown bag.

Q: After the plastic sachet and the brown bag were handed to accused Carlo Magno Aure what happened next?

A: Alias Carlo gave me the one piece of transparent plastic sachet containing crystalline substance, the suspected shabu.

Q: If the male companion of Carlo Magno is inside the courtroom, will you be able to identify him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you please point him out to us.

A: (The witness pointed to a man who identified himself as Melchor Austriaco y Aguila)
Q: So, you are referring to accused Melchor Austriaco y Aguila?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened next Mr. Witness after accused Carlo Magno Aure handed to you this plastic sachet?

A: When I got the plastic sachet and I was convinced that it was shabu then I gave the pre-arranged signal, sir.

Q: What convinced you that the sachet contained shabu?

A: Because of [sic] the appearance consist of white crystalline substance, sir.

Q: What was the pre-arranged signal that you gave?

A: By lighting my cigarette, sir.

Q: And what happened after the pre-arranged signal was given?

A: Our team leader and my back up Rogelio Flores approached us and helped me in arresting the suspect, sir.

Q: What happened Mr. Witness after you arrested the two accused?

A: I got hold of Carlo Magno and I introduced myself as MADAC operative and we asked him to go outside the vehicle, sir.

Q: And what happened after you ordered the two to get off the car?

A: Narecover ko po yung isang brown bag na naglalaman ng nakabot [sic] na kulay pulang birthday wrapping paper na shabu
at glass tooter at saka may lamang mga plastic po.

Q: Mr. Witness, if the item that you bought from the accused will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the same?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: I’m showing to you Mr. Witness several pieces of object evidence. Will you please go over these and identify the item that
you bought from the accused?

A: Sir, ito po mismo yung nabili ko kay Carlo Magno Aure worth P6,000.00 pesos.

Q: x x x Why are you certain that this is the same item that you bought?

A: Because of the marking CAA 8/26/03.

Q: Who placed the markings on the sachet?

A: I was the one, sir.

Q: Where were you when you placed this marking?

A: In front of the accused, in the area where we arrested the accused.

Q: What does the initial CAA stands for?

A: Carlo Magno Aure y Arnaldo, sir.

Q: How did you come to know that the initial of accused Carlo Magno Aure was CAA at the time that you made this marking?

A: After arresting them and after confiscating all the items PO3 Jay Lagasca asked his name.

xxxx

Q: By the way Mr. Witness, earlier you identified these pieces of evidence contained in this brown plastic bag. Why are you
certain Mr. Witness that these are the same evidence, which you recovered from the possession of accused Carlo Magno
Aure?

A: I was the one who marked that evidence that we recovered from Carlo Magno Aure, sir.

Q: What happened to the buy bust money, Mr. Witness?

A: MADAC Rogelio Flores recovered the buy bust money from the front pocket of his worn pants.

Q: From whom was it recovered?


A: From Carlo Magno Aure, sir.

Q: Where were you when MADAC Flores recovered the money?

A: I was beside him, sir.

Q: After you have arrested the two accused where did you go?

A: We [went] to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Makati Police Station.

Q: And what happened at the Drug Enforcement Unit?

A: To give the evidence to the duty investigator PO1 Alex Inopia and PO1 Alex Inopia made a request for laboratory
examination of the specimen recovered from Carlo Magno Aure and drug test as well.

Q: Who brought the two accused to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug testing and the shabu for laboratory examination?

A: I was the one together with my group, sir.

Q: Did you come to know the result of the drug test conducted from the two accused?

A: I’m not aware, sir. I have not seen the result.

Q: How about the drug that were subject of these cases?

A: It gave positive result for Methlyamphetamine [sic] Hydrochloride, sir. 39

As shown in Bilason’s testimony, a buy-bust operation took place. Being the poseur-buyer, he positively identified accused-appellants
as the sellers of a sachet containing a white crystalline substance for a sum of PhP 6,000. The sachet was confiscated and marked with
the initials "CAA" and was subsequently taken to the crime laboratory for examination, where a chemical analysis on its contents
confirmed that the substance is indeed Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. Moreover, the testimonies of the other members of
the buy-bust team, PO3 Lagasca and MADAC operative Flores, substantially corroborated Bilason’s testimony.

As regards the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 against accused-appellant Aure, We
also find that the elements of the offense have been established by the evidence of the prosecution.

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.40

In the instant case, a brown bag was found inside the car of accused-appellant Aure. It yielded a plastic sachet of shabu weighing 86.23
grams wrapped in red wrapping paper, small plastic sachets, and an improvised plastic tooter. Considering that during the sale to
Bilason, it was from the same bag that accused-appellant Austriaco took the sachet of shabu, per order of accused-appellant Aure, the
owner-possessor of said bag and its contents is no other than accused-appellant Aure, who has not shown any proof that he was duly
authorized by law to possess them or any evidence to rebut his animus possidendi of the shabu found in his car during the buy-bust
operation.

Defense of denial is inherently weak

The sachet containing the dangerous drug was positively identified by MADAC operative Bilason during the trial as the very sachet with
white crystalline substance sold and delivered to him by accused-appellants. Thus, accused-appellants’ denial is self-serving and has
little weight in law. A bare denial is an inherently weak defense,41 and has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can
be easily concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of RA
9165.42

Time and again, We have held that "denials unsubstantiated by convincing evidence are not enough to engender reasonable doubt
particularly where the prosecution presents sufficiently telling proof of guilt." 43

In the absence of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such crime against the accused-appellants, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty stands. 44 Especially here, where an astute analysis of MADAC operative Bilason’s
testimony does not indicate any inconsistency, contradiction, or fabrication.

Considering the foregoing disquisitions, We uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and find that the
prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 02600 finding accused-appellants Carlo Magno Aure and
Melchor Austriaco guilty of the crimes charged is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Rollo, pp. 2-12. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente Q. Roxas
and Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal.

2 CA rollo, pp. 19-41. Penned by Judge Delia H. Panganiban.

3 Records, p. 2.

4 Id. at 4.

5 Rollo, p. 6.

6 Records, p. 29.

7 Rollo, p. 7.

8 CA rollo, p. 23.

9 Id. at 23-24.

10
Rollo, p. 2.

11 Id. at 2-3.

12
TSN, November 23, 2004, p. 20.

13 Rollo, p. 3.

14 Id. at 3-4.

15 Id. at 4.

16 Records, p. 143.

17 CA rollo, p. 28.

18 A name called by men to each other, as when one is a godfather to the other’s child in baptism.

19 "Get the other one, too."

20 CA rollo, p. 29.

21
Id. at 29-30.

22
Id. at 30.

23 Rollo, p. 5.

24 CA rollo, pp. 39-41.


25 Id. at 57.

26
Rollo, p. 11.

27 Id. at 11-12.

28 Id. at 12.

29
Id. at 13-14.

30 Id. at 19-20.

31
Id. at 21-23.

32 Id. at 25-27.

33
CA rollo, pp. 55-70.

People v. Belo, G.R. No. 187075, July 5, 2010; citing Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109849, February 26, 1997, 268
34

SCRA 703, 705.

35 G.R. No. 186119, October 27, 2009, 604 SCRA 565, 590.

People v. Alberto, G.R. No. 179717, February 5, 2010, 611 SCRA 706, 713; citing People v. Dumlao, G.R. No. 181599,
36

August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 762, 770.

37 Id.

38 TSN, November 23, 2004, pp. 4-19.

39 Id. at 20-32.

40People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 177777, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 377, 390-391; citing People v. Pringas, G.R. No.
175928, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 828, 846.

41People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 150624, February 24, 2004, 423 SCRA 652, 662; citing People v. Arlee, G.R. No. 113518,
January 25, 2000, 323 SCRA 201, 214.

42 People v. Barita, G.R. No. 123541, February 8, 2000, 325 SCRA 22, 38.

People v. Eugenio, G.R. No. 146805, January 16, 2003, 395 SCRA 317, 326; citing People v. Del Mundo, G.R. No. 138929,
43

October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 471.

44 People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 185381, December 16, 2009, 608 SCRA 350, 368.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

August 15, 2017

G.R. No. 226679

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,


vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is the constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or
1

the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, " which provides:


2

SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not
be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining. 3

The facts are not in dispute.


Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:

That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding
license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and
custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline
substance, which when examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not
5

guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates:
(1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.

In its Comment or Opposition dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23
6

of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining.
Later, in a Comment or Opposition dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea
7

bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express
mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the
accused."

On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an
Order denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:

The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive
constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed,
plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only
the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to plea
bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.

Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the
operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal
cases.

The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused
of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However,
by case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous
drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the
relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that is,
to rehabilitate the offender.

Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165,
which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive
constitutional power of the Supreme Court.

While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is
not unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the
potential ramifications that such declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this judicial station. 8

Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order dated July 26, 2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as
9

follows:

I.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE
SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAW.

II.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF
THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.

III.

WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 10

We grant the petition.


PROCEDURAL MATTERS

The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that the petition should be dismissed outright
for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the Congress should have been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the
constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a petition
for declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to
satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no
actual case or controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the case.

On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct. Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must be
1âwphi1

underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full
and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged
procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to
determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. 11

Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial and transcendental importance
are present. We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and
12

"harrowing" proportions, and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the
13

hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens. At the same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent
14

as the campaign against the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of
the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers, may be unjustly
accused and convicted." Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that has beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes,
15

the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of
drug lords, pushers and users. 16

Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical matters should not deter Us from having to make
the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance. When public interest requires, the
17

Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional issue. 18

x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a necessary complement of its
power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale for this tenet, viz. :

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, x x x.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must
not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.19

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Rule-making power of the Supreme


Court under the 1987 Constitution

Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no longer shared with the
Executive and Legislative departments. In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S.
20 21

Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-making power and highlighted its evolution and development.

x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to
this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose
that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested
this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to
the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared
Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of
its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which
considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952
bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed
law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only
this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a
clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that
the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the
matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this
Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of
this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed,
altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

xxxx

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration
of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power
to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of
this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

xxxx

"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. "

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x. 22

Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) further elucidated:


23

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto
Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court.Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

xxxx

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987
Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus
solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and
more independent judiciary."

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's
rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly
may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the phrase
"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the
Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word
"[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a
compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the
phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court"
and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional
participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the
Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.x
x x.
24

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power
to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this
25

prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the
Court. Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative
26

power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken
27

to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rulesinstead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section
27 of R.A. No. 6770.

2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28


- The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot
replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.

3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose
29

Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of
30

Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. - Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and
31 32

NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.

4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) - The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts
33

except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish
new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence. 34

Plea bargaining in criminal cases

Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect.
Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:

SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser
offense than that charged which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the complaint or information.

When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was retained under Rule 118 (Pleas). Subsequently,
1âwphi1

with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was amended. Section 2,
Rule 116 provided:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the
trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable
by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)

As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:

SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of facts;

(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and

(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)

The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in
1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense
charged for purposes of double jeopardy."

When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted, Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2
35

of the law required that plea bargaining and other matters that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during pre-
36

trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.

Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules are quoted below:
37

RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may
be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment
but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)

RULE 118 (Pre-trial):

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter
period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and

(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive
rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter. "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines
38

and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for
their invasions." Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
39 40

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this
Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive
in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an
insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional
system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges,
or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the
rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. 41

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. For example, in People v.
Lacson, Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the
42

State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused. Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court
43

opined:

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal
cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may
appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the
time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases
with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to
due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the
period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or
insufficiency of the time-bar.

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to
enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the
deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly,
either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were
times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because
of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the
mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.

It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the
consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to
expire.

The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the
disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim
or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit
another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the
crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that
the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of
community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his
capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice
system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. 44

Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that an accused who
45

failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the judgment, does not take
away substantive rights but merely provides the manner through which an existing right may be implemented.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under
the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of
conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.

It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only
works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple
expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction. 46

By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all
courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea
47

bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of
justice. Some of its salutary effects include:
48

x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are
obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated.
For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain
the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases
in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of
proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])

Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of
the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the
public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the
time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately
imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])

The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his
case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and
prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses
who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The
49 50

essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly
51

administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit
the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. 52

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right.
53

Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and by the
apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted. In any case, whether it be to the offense
54

charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental
rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to
bail (except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. 55

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of
guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is
56

not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid
57

plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full
58

control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on
what the evidence on hand can sustain. 59

[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference are well known.
Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also
must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best
to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal
charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have
been "properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. " 60
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to
allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that
61

actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused. 62

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its
case. As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse
63

thereof. "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an
64

evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. 65

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules
allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only
66

basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more
and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion,
it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused
made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. The ruling on the motion must disclose
67

the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's
68

acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular. 69

On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.


9165 violates the equal protection
clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal
protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A.
No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it
proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional
for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE


Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate concurring opinion


FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

On wellness leave
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM ANDRES B. REYES, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
On wellness leave.

1
With Urgent Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

2
Approved on June 7, 2002.

3
This repealed Section 20-A of R.A. No. 6425 ("Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972"), as amended by R.A. No. 7659 ("Death
Penalty Law"), which was approved on December 13, 1993. It provided: SEC. 20-A. Plea-bargaining Provisions. - Any person
charged under any provision of this Act where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death shall not be allowed to
avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.

4
Rollo, p. 47.

5
Id. at 49-51.

6
Id. at 52.

7
Id. at 53.

8
Id. at 44-45.

9
Id. at 46, 54-55.

10
Id. at 3, 15-16.

11
See Garcia v. Judge Drilon, et al., 712 Phil. 44, 84(2013).

12
GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC, 742 Phil. 174, 209-210 (2014).

See People v. Castro, 340 Phil. 245, 246 (1997); People v. Camba, 302 Phil. 31 I, 323 (1994); People v. Tantiado, 288 Phil.
13

241, 258 (1992); Peopie v. Zapanta, 272-A Phil. 161, 166 (1991); People v. Taruc, 241 Phil. 177, 186 (1988); and People v.
Ale, 229 Phil. 81, 87 (1986).

14
People v. Tantiado, supra, as cited in People v. Camba, supra, and People v. Caco, 294 Phil. 54, 65 (1993).

15
People v.Quintana, 256 Phil, 430, 436 (1989).

See People v. Gatlabayan, 669 Phil. 240, 261 (2011); People v. Lagmay, 365 Phil. 606, 632 (1999); and People v.
16

Arcega. G.R. No. 96319, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 681, 688.

17
See GMA NETWORK, Inc. v COMELEC, supra note 12 at 210.

18
Matibag v. Benipayo, 429 Phil 554, 579 (2002)

19
Philippine Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Inc. v. Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd And 3rd Generation Heirs Foundation,
Inc., 731Phil.269, 292 (2014). (Citation omitted and italics supplied)

20
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361 Phil. 73, 88 (1999), as cited in RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
GSIS from Payment of Legal Fee, 626 Phil. 93, 106 (2010) and Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes, 627 Phil. 543, 549 (2010).

21
Supra.

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, supra note 20, at 85-88. (Citations omitted). See also RE: Petition for Recognition of the
22

Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fee, supra note 20, at 106- 108 and In Re: Exemption of the National Power
Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, 629 Phil. 1, 4-5 (2010).

23
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, 774 SCRA 431.

24
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra, at 505-508. (Citations omitted).

25
RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of legal Fee, supra note 20, at 108.

26
Id.
27
356 Phil. 787 (1998).

28
738 Phil. 37 (2014).

29
Supra note 20.

30
Supra note 20.

31
Supra note 22.

32
638 Phil. 353 (2010).

33
Supra note 23.

See Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra note 23, at 517-518, citing Baguio Market Vendors Multi-
34

Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes, supra note 20, at 550.

35
Approved on February 12, 1998.

Such as stipulation of facts, marking for identification of evidence of parties, and waiver of objections to admissibility of
36

evidence.

37
Effective December 1, 2001 (People v. Mamarion, 459 Phil. 51, 74 [2003]).

CONSTITUTION, A1t. VIII, Sec. 5(5). See also Ogayon v. People, 768 Phil. 272, 288 (2015) and San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. v.
38

CA, 352 Phil. 405, 415-416 (1998).

39
See Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra note 23, at 516-517.

40
Supra note 27.

41
Fabian v. Desierto, supra at 808-809. See also Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supranote 23, at
517; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Judge Laigo, et al., 768 Phil. 239, 269-270 (2015): Jaylo, et
al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 751 Phil. 123, 141-142 (2015); Land Bank of the Phils. v. De Leon, 447 Phil. 495, 503 (2003);
and Bernabe v. Alejo, 424 Phil. 933, 94 l (2002).

42
448 Phil. 317 (2003).

43
See Los Banos v. Pedro, 604 Phil. 215, 229 (2009).

44
People v. Lacson, supra note 42, at 387-389. (Citations omitted).

45
Supra note 41.

46
Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., id. at 142-143. (Citation omitted).

47
CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). See also Neypes v. Court of'Appea/s, 506 Phil. 613, 626 (2005) and San Ildefonso
lines, Inc. v. CA, supra note 38, at 415-416.

See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (l 977); and the Majority Opinion and Mr.
48

Justice Douglas' Concurring Opinion in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).

49
People v. Villarama, Jr., 285 Phil. 723, 730 (1992), citing Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p. 103 7. See also Gonzales
Ill v. Office of the President of the Philippines, et al, 694 Phil. 52, 106 (2012); Atty. Amante-Descallar v. Judge Ramas, 601
Phil. 21, 40 (2009); Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil. 368, 375 (2008); and People v. Mamarion, supra note 37, at 75.

50
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).

51
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990).

52
See Santobello v. New York, supra note 48 and Blackledge v. Allison, supra note 48.

53
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).

54
Id.

See Brady v. United States, supra, and Mr. Justice Douglas' Concurring Opinion in Santobello v. New York, supra note 48, at
55

264.

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). See also Mr. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion in Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S.
56

156 (2011).
57
The State is the offended party in crimes under R.A. No. 9165. In People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 732 the Court
ruled:

"x x x While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are made so by law because they
infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed by drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society is
malevolent and incessant (People v. Ale, G.R. No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50, 58). Such pernicious
effect is felt not only by the addicts themselves but also by their families. As a result, society's survival is endangered
because its basic unit, the family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offended party
in this case. As guardian of the rights of the people, the government files the criminal action in the name of the
People of the Philippines. The Fiscal who represents the government is duty bound to defend the public interests,
threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he were the person directly injured by the offense (see United
States v. Samia, 3 Phil. 691, 696). Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended party, i.e. the state, will have to be
secured from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the government."

58
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49.

59
Id.

60
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987).

Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 732. In Capati v. Dr. Ocampo (199 Phil. 230, 234 [1982], citing In Re: Hirsh's
61

Estate SA. 2d 160, 163; 334 Pa. 172; Words & Phrases, permanent edition, 26a.), the Court also held:

"It is well settled that the word 'may' is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under
ordinary circumstances, the term 'may be' connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. 'May' is an auxiliary verb
indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility."

62
Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 377 and People v. Vil/arama, Jr, supra note 49, at 730.

See Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, id. at 376; People v. Mamarion, supra note 37, at 75; Ladino v. Hon. Garcia, 333 Phil.
63

254, 258 (1996); and People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 731.

64
See Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 378.

65
Sofronio Albania v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 226792, June 6, 2017.

People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 252, as cited in Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines, et al.,
66

supra note 49, at 106 and People v. Mamarion, supra note 37, at 76.

67
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 731.

68
See People v. Villarama, supra.

69
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

March 22, 2017

G.R. No. 227398

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee


vs
ANASTACIO HEMENTIZA y DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the October 16, 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06847, which affirmed the
1

January 29, 2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Antipolo City (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 03-25726 and 03-25727,
2

finding Anastacio Hementiza y Dela Cruz (accused-appellant) guilty of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Antecedents

On May 27, 2003, accused-appellant was charged in two (2) separate Informations before the RTC. In Criminal Case No. 03-25726,
accused-appellant was charged with possession of shabu in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The Informations read:
That on or about the 25th day of May 2003, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without having been lawfully authorized by law, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession, custody and control two (2) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets containing 0.03 and 0.06 gram of white crystalline
substance or with total weight of 0.09 gram, which after the corresponding laboratory examination conducted thereon by the PNP Crime
Laboratory both gave positive results to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, in
violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

In Criminal Case No. 03-25727, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the sale
of shabu. The Information states:

That on or about the 25th day of May 2003, in the City of Anti polo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not having been authorized by law to sell or otherwise dispose of any dangerous drug, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to P02 Rache E. Palconit, who acted as a poseur-buyer, one (1) heat
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance, for and in consideration of the sum of P200.oo,
which after the corresponding laboratory examination conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory gave a positive result to the test for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

On July 22, 2003, accused-appellant was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued with the prosecution presenting
Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Sharon Lontoc Fabros (Fabros), P02 Rache E. Palconit (Palconit) and Barangay Captain, Dr. Rina Gabuna
Junia (Dr. Junio),as its witnesses.

Version of the Prosecution

On May 25, 2003, at around 1:15 o'clock in the morning, Palconit, SP02 Gerry Abalos (Abalos), P02 Manuel Bayeng (Bayeng), and
P03 Russel Medina (Medina), conducted a buy-bust operation at Sitio Lower Sto. Nifio, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City. A
confidential informant (CI) told them that a certain Anastacio was peddling drugs in the area. A buy-bust team was formed with Abalos
as the team leader and Palconit as the poseur-buyer. Abalos marked two (2) ₱100.00 bills for the operation. After briefing and
coordination with the local police, the team was dispatched to Barangay Sta. Cruz. Upon arrival, the CI pointed to their target person.
Palconit approached accused-appellant and asked if he could buy shabu. After receiving the marked money, accused-appellant handed
to Palconit one (1) small heat-sealed plastic sachet containing shabu. At that point, Palconit scratched his head to signal that the sale
was consummated, and the rest of the team rushed to the scene. Abalos introduced themselves as police officers and immediately
frisked accused-appellant. Abalos recovered the marked money and two (2) other plastic sachets containing shabu from the left pocket
of accused-appellant's pants. Thereafter, accused-appellant and the seized items were brought to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) Office in Barangay San Roque, Antipolo City. The seized items were turned over to the case investigator who prepared
the corresponding request for laboratory examination. Thereafter, Palconit brought the seized items to the crime laboratory. After
examination, Fabros issued a report confirming that the crystalline substance in the sachets were positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.

Version of the Defense

In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that on May 25, 2003 at around 1:15 o'clock in the morning, he was playing billiards at Sitio
Lower Sto. Niño when three (3) armed men suddenly arrived and pointed a gun at him. Without saying anything, the men frisked and
handcuffed him but found nothing illegal on him. He was arrested and brought to an office in Lores where he was detained,
interrogated, and forced to admit a wrongdoing. He was also asked to point to other persons so that he could be released.

The RTC Ruling

In its January 29, 2014 decision, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of violation of Sections
5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of ₱500,000.00 for violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165. It also sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period
of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00 for violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165.

The R TC held that the failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and
photograph of the evidence confiscated did not automatically render accused-appellant's arrest illegal or the items seized from him as
inadmissible for it was shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved by the apprehending officers. It
opined that the witnesses presented by the prosecution successfully established the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs. The
fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Anastacio Hementiza y Dela Cruz is hereby found guilty beyond any shadow of a doubt
of the offense charged in the Informations and is sentenced to the penalty of Life Imprisonment in Criminal Case No. 03-25727 with a
fine of Php 500,000.00 and in Criminal Case No. 03-25726, the same accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an Imprisonment of
Twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years with a fine of Php300,000.00 as provided for under Sec. 11 Par. (3) of RA 9165,
as amended.

Anastacio Hementiza y Dela Cruz is to be promptly committed to the National Bilibid Prisons for immediate service of his sentence.

The seized specimens subject of the instant cases are ordered destroyed in the manner provided by law.

SO ORDERED. 5

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling
In its October 16, 2015 decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant. It explained that the police witnesses had
adequately established the conduct of the buy-bust operation which resulted in the consummated sale of the illegal drugs and the
recovery of two (2) sachets and the marked money in his possession. The CA added that prior surveillance of the suspected offender
was not a prerequisite for the validity of a buy-bust operation and that failure to strictly comply with the provisions of Section 21 (1),
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, on the handling of confiscated illegal drugs, as well as its IRR, was not fatal and would not render accused-
appellant' s arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible. The CA disposed the appeal in this wise:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 29 January 2014 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 73, Antipolo City is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 6

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIMES CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

In a Resolution, dated December 7, 2016, the Court required the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so
7

desired. In his Manifestation in lieu of Supplemental Brief, dated February 28, 2017, accused-appellant manifested that he was
8

adopting his Appellant's Brief filed before the CA as his supplemental brief for the same had adequately discussed all the matters
pertinent to his defense. In its Manifestation, dated February 6, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated that all matters
9

and issues raised by accused-appellant had already been discussed in its Brief before the CA and asked that it be excused from filing
its supplemental brief.

The Court's Ruling

The Court grants the appeal.

The elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Similarly, it is essential that the transaction or sale
be proved to have actually taken place coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti which means the actual
commission by someone of the particular crime charged. 10

On the other hand, to successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be
established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. 11

The corpus delicti in cases involving dangerous drugs is the presentation of the dangerous drug itself. In People v. Alcuizar, the Court
12

held:

The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a conviction under
Republic Act No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This
requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drugs unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily
open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity
and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually
recovered from the accused-appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession under Republic Act No. 9165 fails. 13

Thus, the chain of custody over the dangerous drug must be shown to establish the corpus delicti.

Section 1 (b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165, defines chain of custody
14

as follows:

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources
of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/ confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in
the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

In Mallillin v. People, the Court explained the importance of the chain of custody:
15

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was, received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of
custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its
condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise
obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination, and even substitution and exchange. In other words,
the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not
dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has
physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. Graham v.
State positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance was later analyzed as heroin was handled by two police
officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in
their possession was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been
indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the
continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the posession of the police officers until it was tested in the
laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to
determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood or at least the possibility, that at
any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from
other cases by accident or otherwise in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory
testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily
identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to
render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. 16

In connection thereto, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 provides for the manner by which law enforcement officers should handle seized
items in dangerous drugs cases:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. -The PDEA shall take charge
and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/ or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/ or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:

1. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/ s from whom such items were confiscated and/ or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

2. Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/ or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA
Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

3. A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner,
shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing
within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous
drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed
forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours[.]

Strict compliance with the chain of custody requirement, however, is not always the case. Hence, the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides:

SECTION 21.(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/ s from whom such items
were confiscated and/ or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer /team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items. [Emphasis supplied]

In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to demonstrate substantial compliance by the apprehending officers with the safeguards
provided by R.A. No. 9165 as regards the rule on chain of custody. To begin with, the records are bereft of any showing that an
inventory of the seized items was made. Neither does it appear on record that the apprehending team photographed the contraband in
accordance with law.

Further, People v. Dahil restated the links that the prosecution must establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as
17

follows: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.

First Link: Marking of the Drugs


Recovered from the Accused by the
Apprehending Officer

Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they have been
seized from the accused. "Marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature
on the items seized. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be
immediately marked because the succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the
evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized
from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting or contamination
of evidence.18
Still, there are cases when the chain of custody rule is relaxed such as when the marking of the seized items is allowed to be
undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of the accused in illegal drugs
cases. 19

In this case, Palconit claimed that he had placed his initials on the seized items. Based on his testimony, it is clear that the marking was
not immediately done at the place of seizure; instead, the markings were only placed at the PDEA office, for which the prosecution did
not offer any justifiable reason. Even if the Court glosses over this lapse, still, it could not be said that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items were preserved. For one, neither in the direct examination nor in the cross-examination of Palconit was it mentioned
that the markings were made in the presence of accused-appellant or his representatives. He merely testified that he placed the
markings at the PDEA office, without any allusion to the identities of the persons who were present when he did the markings.

Moreover, in the Incident Report as well as in the Affidavit of Arrest, the specific markings made on the seized items were not
20 21

mentioned. The same documents merely specified that three (3) small heatsealed transparent plastic bags containing
suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride of undetermined quantity were found in accused-appellant's possession. Considering that
the apprehending officers did not mark the sachets of illegal drugs at the place of seizure, then, it logically follows that the marking
should have been their foremost priority and should have been made prior to writing the incident report and executing the affidavit of
arrest. It, therefore, behooves the Court how Palconit could have said that he placed the markings at the PDEA office, but no mention of
the same whatsoever was made in both the incident report and in the affidavit of arrest. If the sachets of illegal drugs were already
marked, then there would have been no reason for its non-inclusion in the aforecited documents. Thus, the Court can only guess the
time when the markings were made and whether they were placed before the preparation of the incident report and the affidavit of
arrest.

To make matters worse, from the place of seizure to the PDEA office, the seized items were not marked. It could not, therefore, be
determined how the unmarked drugs were transported and who took custody of them while in transit.

Unfortunately, the direct examination of Palconit left much to be desired for it offered no explanation and justification for these lapses.
At most, what can be gleaned is the prosecution's lack of zealousness and interest in ensuring the conviction of accused-appellant
despite the time and resources at its disposal, viz:

Prosecutor Sampayo: When the marked money was recovered and two other sachets were recovered, what did you do?

Palconit: The suspect was brought to the PDEA office.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do at the PDEA office?

Palconit: We turned over the confiscated evidence to the investigator and we informed our CO that the operation was positive.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What were the confiscated items which were turned over?

Palconit: Buy bust money, one sachet which I bought and two other sachets which were recovered from the suspect.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What was done with the confiscated sachets, the one that was bought and the two others which were recovered
from the target person?

Palconit: When we arrived at the office, we made a request for laboratory examination.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do with the items?

Palconit: We placed markings on the confiscated items.

Prosecutor Sampayo: Do you remember what marking was placed?

Palconit: Yes, ma'm, REP-1, REP-2, REP-3.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What are these markings about?

Palconit: Those are my initials, Rache E. Palconit.

Prosecutor Sampayo: Where did you put the markings?

Palconit: At the sachets.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What sachets are you talking about?

Palconit: The sachet that I bought and the sachets that were recovered.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What marking was placed on the specimen found on his possession?

Palconit: REP-2 and REP-3.

Prosecutor Sampayo: After putting the markings, what did you do?

Palconit: We brought it to the crime laboratory.


Prosecutor Sampayo: Who personally brought it?

Palconit: Me. 22

In People v. De La Cruz, where the marking of the seized items was made at the police station, and without any showing that the
23

same had been done in the presence of the accused or his representatives, the Court concluded that the apprehending team's
omission to observe the procedure outlined by R.A. No. 9165 in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs significantly impaired
the prosecution's case.

The prosecution's sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia will not secure a
conviction. While law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail
24

over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The presumption of regularity is merely just that - a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged
by evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. 25

Second Link: Turnover of


the Seized Drugs by the
Apprehending Officer to
the Investigating Officer

The second link in the chain of custody is the transfer of the seized drugs by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer.
Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising officer, who will then send it by courier to
the police crime laboratory for testing. This is a necessary step in the chain of custody because it will be the investigating officer who
shall conduct the proper investigation and prepare the necessary documents for the developing criminal case. Certainly, the
investigating officer must have possession of the illegal drugs to properly prepare the required documents. 26

Here, the identity of the investigating officer was unknown.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do at the PDEA office?

Palconit: We turned over the confiscated evidence to the investigator and we informed our CO that the operation was positive.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What were the confiscated items which were turned over?

Palconit: Buy bust money, one sachet which I bought and two other sachets which were recovered from the suspect. 27

It is unlikely that Palconit did not know the officer to whom he supposedly turned over the seized drugs. Surely, this investigating officer
worked with him in the same office. Indeed, the apprehending officer and investigating officer might be one and the same person. If that
was the case, however, then there would have been no need to say that Palconit turned over the seized items to the investigator. He
could have simply said that he was the one who conducted the investigation and prepared the necessary documents for the filing of a
criminal case against accused-appellant.

Similarly, in People v. Nandi, where the apprehending officer was unable to identify the investigating officer to whom he turned over
28

the seized items, the Court held that such circumstance, when taken in light of the several other lapses in the chain of custody that
attend the case, raises doubts as to whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs had been preserved.

Third Link: Turnover by the


Investigating Officer of the Illegal
Drugs to the Forensic Chemist

From the investigating officer, the illegal drug is delivered to the forensic chemist. Once the seized drugs arrive at the forensic
laboratory, it will be the laboratory technician who will test and verify the nature of the substance. In this case, it was uncertain who
29

received the seized items when it was brought to the forensic laboratory, to wit:

Prosecutor Sampayo: When the marked money was recovered and two other sachets were recovered, what did you do?

Palconit: The suspect was brought to the PDEA office.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do at the PDEA office?

Palconit: We turned over the confiscated evidence to the investigator and we informed our CO that the operation was positive.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What were the confiscated items which were turned over?

Palconit: Buy bust money, one sachet which I bought and two other sachets which were recovered from the suspect.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What was done with the confiscated sachets, the one that was bought and the two others which were recovered
from the target person?

Palconit: When we arrived at the office, we made a request for laboratory examination.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do with the items?

Palconit: We placed markings on the confiscated items. 30


xxx

Prosecutor Sampayo: After putting the markings, what did you do?

Palconit: We brought it to the crime laboratory.

Prosecutor Sampayo: Who personally brought it?

Palconit: Me.

Prosecutor Sampayo: Why did you bring it to the crime laboratory.

Palconit: or a oratory exammation. 31

There are several unexplained and doubtful points in this step.

First, Palconit testified that he placed the markings on the sachets upon arrival at the office. Then, he turned over the seized items to
the investigator. In the latter part of his testimony, however, he said that after placing the markings, he brought the illegal drugs to the
crime laboratory. The circumstances surrounding the custody of the illegal drugs, from the time they were brought to the PDEA office up
to their turnover to the forensic laboratory, are all muddled. Moreover, it is unclear whether another officer intervened in the handling of
the illegal drugs or it was only Palconit himself who placed the markings and delivered the illegal drugs to the forensic chemist.

Further, a perusal of the records shows that the request for laboratory examination was prepared and signed by a certain Police Chief
32

Inspector Raul Loy Bargamento (Bargamento), who had necessarily taken custody of the seized items at some point in order to execute
the request for laboratory examination. Yet, Palconit did not even bother to mention Bargamento in his testimony. The prosecution
would have the Court guess (1) whether Bargamento was the same person to whom Palconit turned over the seized items and (2)
whether Bargamento was the one who handed Palconit the seized items for delivery to the forensic laboratory. Hence, the identities of
the officers who had custody of the illegal drugs, even for momentary periods, are open to question.

Finally, Fabros testified that their office received the request for laboratory examination on May 25, 2003 at three (3) o'clock in the
afternoon. The request for laboratory examination indicated that the same was received by Fabros. It is worthy to note, however, that
33

she did not affix her signature thereon. Moreover, in their testimonies, neither Palconit nor Fabros identified each other as the person
who delivered and received the seized drugs respectively. Hence, for failure of Fabros to mention before the court that she indeed
received the seized drugs from Palconit, her name, appearing on the request for laboratory examination, remained to be hearsay.

In People v. Beran, the investigator of the case claimed that he personally took the drug to the laboratory for testing, but there was no
34

showing who was the laboratory technician who received the drug from him. The Court noted that there was serious doubt that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item had not been fatally compromised.

Fourth Link: Turnover of the Marked


Illegal Drug Seized by the Forensic
Chemist to the Court

The last link involves the submission of the seized drugs by the forensic chemist to the court when presented as evidence in the
criminal case. 35

In this case, the records are bereft of any evidence as to how the illegal drugs were brought to court. Fabros merely testified that she
made a report confirming that the substance contained in the sachets brought to her was positive for shabu.

The saving clause in Section 21, IRR of R.A. No. 9165 fails to remedy the lapses and save the prosecution's case. In People v.
Garcia, the Court stated that "the saving clause applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter
36

cited justifiable grounds." Failure to follow the procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR must be adequately explained. 37

In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity
of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of
1âwphi 1

possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered
in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. 38

In fine, the Court holds that the totality of the evidence presented does not support a finding of guilt with the certainty that criminal cases
require. The procedural lapses committed by the apprehending team show glaring gaps in the chain of custody, creating a reasonable
doubt on whether the shabu seized from accused-appellant was the same shabu that were brought to the crime laboratory for chemical
analysis, and eventually offered in court as evidence. Hence, the corpus delicti has not been adequately proven.

It could be that the accused was really involved in the sale of shabu, but considering the doubts engendered by the paucity of the
prosecution's evidence, the Court has no recourse but to give him the benefit thereof. Law enforcers should not only be mindful of the
procedures required in the seizure, handling and safekeeping of confiscated drugs, but the prosecution should also prove every
material detail in court. Observance of these is necessary to avoid wasting the efforts and the resources in the apprehension and
prosecution of violators of our drug laws.39

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The October 16, 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. H.C. No. 0684 7
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Anastacio Hementiza y Dela Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged
against him and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is confined for some other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to immediately implement this decision and to inform this Court of the date of
the actual release from confinement of the accused within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN


Associate Justice Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios with Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Associate Justice Maria Elisa
Sempio Diy, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-10.

2
Penned by Executive Judge Renaldo B. Martin; CA rollo, pp. 36-41.

3
CA rollo, p. 36.

4
Id. at 37.

5
Id. at 41.

6
Rollo, p. 10.

7
Id. at 16-17.

8
Id. at 23-24.

9
Id. at 18-19.

10
People v. Roble, 663 Phil. 147, 157 (2011).

11
People v. Alcuizar, 662 Phil. 794, 808 (2011).

12
Id.

13
People v. Alcuizar, 662 Phil. 794, 801 (2011).

Guidelines of the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals and
14

Laboratory Equipment.

15
576 Phil. 576 (2008).
16
Id. at 587-589.

17
745 SCRA 221 (2015).

18
Id. at 240-241.

19
People v. Resurrecion, 618 Phil 520 (2009).

20
Records, p. 6-7.

21
Id. at 8-9.

22
TSN, March 23, 2006, p. 8.

23
591 Phil. 259 (2008).

24
People v. Holgado, G.R. No. 207992, August 11, 2014, 732 SCRA 554, 570.

25
People v. Sabdula, 733 Phil. 85, 100-101 (2014).

26
Supra note 17 at 244.

27
TSN, March 23, 2006, p. 7.

28
639 Phil. 134 (2010).

29
Supra note 17 at 245.

30
TSN, March 23, 2006, p. 8.

31
Id. at 9.

32
Records, p. 22.

33
Id.

34
724 Phil. 788 (2014).

35
Supra note 17 at 24 7.

36
599 Phil. 416, 432-433 (2009).

37
People v. Lorenzo, 633 Phil. 393 (2010).

38
Id. at 403.

39
People v. Sabdula, 733 Phil. 85, 101 (2014).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

APRIL 23, 2018

G.R. No. 219953

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee


vs
ANGELITA REYES y GINOVE and JOSEPHINE SANTA MARIA y SANCHEZ, Accused-Appellants

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal of the Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision dated January 13, 2015 dismissing accused-appellants' appeal and affirming
1

the Decision dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 82, Quezon City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-06-143175
2

convicting accused-appellants of Violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.

The facts follow.


On September 22, 2006, around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, P/Insp. Alberto Gatus of the Galas Police Station-Anti-Illegal Drugs Unit
received a report from a confidential informant about the activities of an alias "Babang" at No. 13 Manungal Street, Barangay Tatalon,
Quezon City. On the following day, around 4:30 in the afternoon, the chief of police dispatched some policemen to confirm the veracity
of the information, conduct a surveillance and a buy-bust operation. P/Insp. Gatus gave PO2 Talosig two (2) ₱100 bills, which he
marked with his initials. When they arrived at the place, the confidential informant told PO2 Talosig that the person standing in front of
the house is alias "Babang," later identified as appellant Angelita Reyes. The informant introduced PO2 Talosig to appellant Reyes as a
buyer of shabu. When appellant Reyes asked him how much he will buy, he replied ₱200.00. Appellant Josephine Santa Maria, who
was standing beside appellant Reyes, asked for money. When PO2 Talosig gave appellant Santa Maria the marked money, she told
appellant Reyes, "bigyan mo na." Appellant Reyes then got a plastic sachet containing a crystalline substance from her right pocket.
PO2 Talosig removed his cap, the pre-arranged signal that the transaction was consummated, and PO1 Mirasol Lappay, SPO1 Mario
Abong, PO2 Jonathan Caranza, Insp. Alberto Gatus and another policeman swooped in. PO1 Lappay asked appellant Santa Maria to
empty her pockets and retrieved the marked money from the right pocket. PO1 Lappay then placed appellant Santa Maria under arrest,
while PO2 Talosig arrested appellant Reyes, keeping the seized plastic sachet in his possession. Appellants were informed of their
violation and their rights. Thereafter, appellants and the seized evidence were brought to the police station. At the police station, PO2
Talosig placed the seized evidence in another plastic sachet, sealed it and marked it "DT-AR-JS." An inventory of seized items and
request for laboratory examination were prepared by PO1 Erwin Bautista, while PO2 Talosig took the photo of appellants and the
seized evidence. Thereafter, PO2 Talosig brought the request for laboratory examination and the seized plastic sachet of
suspected shabu to the Quezon City Police District Crime Laboratory. He was furnished a copy of Chemistry Report No. D-381-2006.

Thus, an Information was filed against the appellants for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 that reads as follows:
3

That on or about the 23rd day of September 2006 in Quezon City, accused conspiring and confederating with and mutually helping each
other without lawful authority did then and there wilfully and unlawfully sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport, or act as broker in the said transaction, a dangerous drug, to wit:

Zero point zero two (0.02) grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Appellants denied the allegations against them. According to appellant Reyes, on September 23, 2006, around 10 o'clock in the
morning, she was sleeping with her husband and children in their house when someone knocked on their door. Her daughter woke her
up and as she rose, three (3) men asked her if she knew a certain "Bugoy," to which query she replied in the negative. The men
brought her out of the street, was made to board a jeep arid then brought to the Galas Police Station. At the police station, she was
again asked whether she knew a certain Bugoy and she insisted that she did not know this certain Bugoy. Thus, she was detained.
Meanwhile, on the same date, appellant Santa Maria claimed that she left her house to sell rugs when PO2 Talosig and two (2) other
policemen accosted her and asked if she knew a person running by. She answered "no." After about five minutes, she was brought to a
passenger jeep where PO1 Lappay and the driver were waiting. PO2 Talosig arrived with appellant Reyes. The policemen then asked
her if she knew a certain Ray, and when she replied in the negative, they were brought to the police station.

The RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them to the following:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused ANGELITA REYES y GINOVE and JOSEPHINE
SANTA MARIA y SANCHEZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II, of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002.

Accordingly, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to each pay a fine in the amount of Five
Hundred Thousand (₱500,000.00) PESOS.

The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to transmit to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency the dangerous drug subject hereof
for proper disposition and final disposal.

SO ORDERED. 4

The RTC ruled that appellants were validly arrested through a buybust operation and that appellants' denials are weak and
unsubstantiated.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated June 24, 2011, issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 82, Quezon
City in Criminal Case No. Q-06-143175 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 5

The CA ruled that the illegal sale of shabu has been established beyond reasonable doubt. It also ruled that the defense of denial
should be looked with disfavor for they are easily concocted but difficult to prove, especially the claim that one has been the victim of a
frame-up. The CA also ruled that appellants' arrest was valid and there was a necessity to conduct a buy-bust operation. Finally, it ruled
that there is no broken chain of custody of the recovered dangerous drugs.

Hence, the present appeal. Pending appeal, appellant Reyes passed away, hence, her appeal was dispensed with by this Court in its
Resolution dated February 15, 2016.
6

The errors presented in the appeal are the following:

I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED WHEN THEIR
GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE TO BE ADMISSIBLE DESPITE BEING THE
RESULT OF AN INVALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND ARREST.

According to appellant Santa Maria, her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in finding the
prosecution evidence to be admissible despite being the result of an invalid warrantless search and arrest.

There is merit in the appeal.

First of all, as to the argument of appellant Santa Maria that the arresting officers illegally arrested them because they did not have with
them any warrant of arrest nor a search warrant considering that the police officers had enough time to secure such, the same does not
deserve any merit. Buy-bust operations are legally sanctioned procedures for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. These
operations are often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious
activities. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not
7

necessary, especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment. Hence, the said buy-
8

bust operation is a legitimate, valid entrapment operation.

As to whether the prosecution was able to prove appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds that the prosecution failed
to do so.

Under Article II, Section 5 of R. A. No. 9165 or illegal sale of prohibited drugs, in order to be convicted of the said violation, the following
must concur:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. 9

In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the sale transaction actually happened and that "the [procured] object is properly
presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from the accused. 10

In illegal sale, the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused comprise the corpus delicti of the charges. In People v. Gatlabayan, the
11 12

Court held that it is of paramount importance that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt; and that
it must be proven with certitude that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is exactly the same substance offered in
evidence before the court. In. fine, the illegal drug must be produced before the court as exhibit and that which was exhibited must be
the very same substance recovered from the suspect. Thus, the chain of custody carries out this purpose "as it ensures that
13

unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed." 14

To ensure an unbroken chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies:
15

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21 (a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]

On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other modifications, it essentially incorporated the
saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory
·of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected · public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That
noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other modifications, it essentially incorporated the
saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory
·of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected · public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That
noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

In her Sponsorship Speech on Senate Bill No. 2273, which eventually became R.A. No. 10640, Senator Grace Poe admitted that "while
Section 21 was enshrined in the 'comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act to safeguard the integrity of the evidence acquired and prevent
planting of evidence, the application of said section resulted in the ineffectiveness of the government's campaign to stop increasing
drug addiction and also, in the conflicting decisions of the courts." Specifically, she cited that "compliance with the rule on witnesses
16

during the physical inventory is difficult. For one, media representatives are not always available in all corners of the Philippines,
especially in more remote areas. For another, there were instances where elected barangay officials themselves were involved in the
punishable acts apprehended." In addition, "[t]he requirement that inventory is required to be done in police station is also very
17

limiting. Most police stations appeared to be far from locations where accused persons were apprehended." 18

Similarly, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III manifested that in view of the substantial number of acquittals in drug-related cases due to the
varying interpretations of the prosecutors and the judges on Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, there is a need for "certain adjustments so
that we can plug the loopholes in our existing law" and "ensure [its] standard implementation." In his Co-sponsorship Speech, he
19

noted:

Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations of highly organized and powerful local and international syndicates. The
presence of such syndicates that have the resources and the capability to mount a counter-assault to apprehending law enforcers
makes the requirement of Section 21(a) impracticable for law enforcers to comply with. It makes the place of seizure extremely unsafe
for the proper inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs.

xxx

Section 21(a) of RA 9165 needs to be amended to address the foregoing situation. We did not realize this in 2002 where the safety of
the law enforcers and other persons required to be present in the inventory and photography of seized illegal drugs and the
preservation of the very existence of seized illegal drugs itself are threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of drug syndicates at
the place of seizure. The place where the seized drugs may be inventoried and photographed has to include a location where the
seized drugs as well as the persons who are required to be present during the inventory and photograph are safe and secure from
extreme danger.

It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of seized illegal drugs be allowed to be conducted either in the
place of seizure or at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending law enforcers. The proposal will provide effective
measures to ensure the integrity of seized illegal drugs since a safe location makes it more probable for an inventory and photograph of
seized illegal drugs to be properly conducted, thereby reducing the incidents of dismissal of drug cases due to technicalities.

Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the seizure or confiscation is invalid or illegal, as long
as the law enforcement officers could justify the same and could prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are not tainted. This is the effect of the inclusion in the proposal to amend the phrase "justifiable grounds." There are instances wherein
there are no 'media people or representatives from the DOJ available and the absence of these witnesses should not automatically
invalidate the drug operation conducted. Even the presence of a public local elected official also is sometimes impossible especially if
the elected official is afraid or scared. 20

The foregoing legislative intent has been taken cognizance of in a number of cases. Just recently, We opined in People v. Miranda: 21

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may
not always be possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law
1âwphi 1

with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA
9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized ··.items so long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. Tersely put, the failure of
the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR does not ipso facto render
the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. In People v.
Almorfe, the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. Also, in People v. De Guzman, it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these
grounds are or that they even exist. 22

Under the original provision of Section 21, after confiscation of the drugs, the apprehending team was immediately conduct a physical
inventory and to photograph seizure and required to the same in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and ( 4) any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. It is assumed that the
presence of these three persons will guarantee "against planting of evidence and frame up," i.e., they are "necessary to insulate the
apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity." Now, the amendatory law mandates that. the
23

conduct of physical inventory and photograph of the seized items must be in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official and (3) a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In the present case, the old provisions of Section 21 and its IRR shall apply since the alleged crime was committed before the
amendment.

The CA ruled that the chain of custody was aptly followed, thus:

In this case, the chain of custody was aptly described in the testimony of PO2 Talosig, in the joint affidavit he and PO1 Lappay
executed on September 24, 2006, and the stipulations and admissions made by the prosecution and the defense during pre-trial. These
pieces of evidence showed that the transaction in the buy-bust operation was completed, the seized evidence remained in the custody
of PO2 Talosig, the poseur-buyer, who placed the evidence in another plastic sachet, sealed it and marked it as "DT-AR-JS" at the
police station where appellants and the seized evidence were brought; that PO2 Talosig delivered the request for laboratory
examination together with the seized evidence to the crime laboratory; that Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Ma. Shirlee M. Ballete conducted
a qualitative examination on the specimen contained in a plastic sachet with marking "DT-AR-JS" and found the specimen positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride; that the said forensic .chemist reduced her findings in Chemistry Report No. D-381-2006,
incidentally marking the plastic sachet itself as "D-381" to correspond to the number of the Chemistry Report. Though there were
deviations in the making of the Inventory of Seized Items, in that it was signed by Kagawad Balignasan only, and the seized item
was marked and inventoried, and with appellants, photographed, without the presence of counsel; nonetheless, the prosecution proved
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence, was duly accounted for and preserved. The fact that the process of
marking, inventory and photographing was undertaken without the presence of counsel was explained by PO2 Talosig, i.e. because
appellants had no counsel at that time.

Time and again, jurisprudence is consistent in stating that substantial compliance with the procedural aspect of the chain of custody
rule does not necessarily render the seized drug item inadmissible.

Although the police officers did not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, their noncompliance
did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drug seized from appellant Reyes as the chain of custody of the evidence was shown to be
unbroken under the circumstances of the case. 24

Clearly, from the very findings of the CA, the requirements stated in Section 21 of R.A. 1965 have not been followed. There was no
representative from the media and the National Prosecution Service present during the inventory and no justifiable ground was
provided as to their absence. It must be emphasized that the prosecution must be able to prove a justifiable ground in omitting certain
requirements provided in Sec. 21 such as, but not limited to the following: (1) media representatives are not available at that time or that
the police operatives had no time to alert the media due to the immediacy of the operation they were about to undertake, especially if it
is done in more remote areas; (2) the police operatives, with the same reason, failed to find an available representative of the National
Prosecution Service; (3) the police officers, due to time constraints brought about by the urgency of the operation to be undertaken and
in order to comply with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code in the timely delivery of prisoners, were not able to
25

comply with all the requisites set forth in Section 21 of R.A. 9165.

Certainly, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to show valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that, during the proceedings
26

before the trial court, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of the law. Its
27

failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on
evidence. The rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground
in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized item. A stricter
28

adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule since it is highly susceptible to planting,
tampering, or alteration.29

If doubt surfaces on the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, regardless that it does only at the stage of an appeal, our courts of justice
should nonetheless rule in favor of the accused, lest it betray its duty to protect individual liberties within the bounds of law.
30

Absent therefore any justifiable reason in this case for the noncompliance of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, the identity of the seized item
has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. As such, this Court finds it apt to acquit the appellant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated January 13, 2015 dismissing appellants' appeal and affirming the Decision
dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 82, Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-06-143175 is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. Appellant Josephine Santa Maria y Sanchez is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. She is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless she is confined for any other lawful cause. Let an entry of
final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women, for immediate implementation.
Said Superintendent is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) working days from receipt of this Decision the action he/she
has taken.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.
*

1
Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes with the concurrence of Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon
and Jane Aurora C. Lantion; rollo, pp. 2-13.

2
Penned by Presiding Judge Severino B. De Castro, Jr.; CA rollo, pp. 16-22.

3
CA Rollo, p. 10

4
Id. at 22.

5
Rollo, p. 12.

6
In a Resolution dated February 15, 2016, this Court dispensed the appeal of appellant Angelita Reyes, her liability having
been extinguished by her death pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. The case therefore is considered CLOSED
and TERMINATED as to appellant Reyes.

7
People v. Rebotazo, 711 Phil. 150, 162(2013).

8
See People v. Manlangits, 654 Phil. 427, 437 (2011).

9
People v. Ismaely Radang, G.R. No. 208093, February 20, 2017.

10
Id.

11
Id.

12
699 Phil. 240. 252 (2011 ).

13
People v. Mirando, 711 Phil. 345, 357 (2015).

14
See People v. lsmaely Radang, G.R. No. 208093, February 20, 2017.

15
Took effect on July 4, 2002.

16
Senate Journal, Session No. 80, 161h Congress, 1st Regular Session, June 4, 2014, p. 348.

17
Id

18
Id.

19
Id at 349.

20
Id. at 349-350.

21
G.R. No. 229671, January 31, 2018.

22
See also People v. Paz, G.R. No. 229512, January 31, 2018; People v. Mamangon, G.R. No. 229102, January 29,
2018; People v. Jugo, G.R. No. 231792, January 29, 2018; People v. Calibod, G.R. No. 230230, November 20, 2017; People
v. Ching, G.R. No. 223556, October 9, 2017; People v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 225500, September 11, 2017; People v.
Ceralde, G.R. No. 228894, August 7, 2017 and People v. Macapundag, G.R. No. 225965, March 13, 2017.

23
People v. Sagana, G.R. No. 208471, August 2, 2017.

24
Rollo, pp. 11-12. (Emphasis ours; citations omitted)

25
Article 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The penalties provided in the next
preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and
shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of; twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen ( 18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional
penalties, or their equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or
their equivalent. In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed upon
his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel. (As amended by E.O. Nos. 59 and 272, Nov.
7, 1986 and July 25, I 987, respectively).
26
See People v. Macapundag, supra note 22.

See People v. Miranda, supra note 21; People v. Paz, supra note 22; People v. Mamangon, supra note 22; and People v.
27

Jugo, supra note 22.

28
People v. Saragena, G.R. No. 210677, August 23, 2017.

See People v. Abelarde, G.R. No. 215713, January 22, 2018; People v. Macud, G.R. No. 219175, December 14, 2017;
29

People v. Arposeple, G.R. No. 205787, November 22, 2017; Aparente v. People, G.R. No. 205695, September 27,
2017; People v. Cabellon, G.R. No. 207229, September 20, 2017; People v. Saragena, supra note 28; People v. Saunar, G.R.
No. 207396, August 9, 2017; People v. Sagana, supra note 23; People v. Segundo, G.R. No. 205614, July 26, 2017;
and People v. Jaafar, G.R. No. 219829, January 18, 2017.

30
People v. Miranda, supra note 21.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. 231989, September 04, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMY LIM Y MIRANDA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

On appeal is the February 23, 2017 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01280-MIN, which affirmed the September 24, 2013
Decision2 of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Case Nos. 2010-1073 and 2010-1074, finding accused-appellant
Romy Lim y Miranda (Lim) guilty of violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In an Information dated October 21, 2010, Lim was charged with illegal possession of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), committed as follows:

That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drugs, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, criminally and knowingly have in his possession, custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of 0.02 gram, accused well-knowing that the substance
recovered from his possession is a dangerous drug.

Contrary to, and in violation of, Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. 3
On even date, Lim, together with his stepson, Eldie Gorres y Nave (Gorres), was also indicted for illegal sale of shabu, committed as follows:
That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, without being authorized by law to
sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drugs, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly sell and/or offer for sale, and give away to a PDEA Agent acting as poseur-buyer One (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of 0.02 gram,
accused knowing the same to be a dangerous drug, in consideration of Five Hundred Pesos (Php500.00) consisting of one piece five hundred peso bill,
with Serial No. FZ386932, which was previously marked and recorded for the purpose of the buy-bust operation.

Contrary to Section 5, Paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. 4


In their arraignment, Lim and Gorres pleaded not guilty.5 They were detained in the city jail during the joint trial of the cases.6

The prosecution presented Intelligence Officer (IO) 1 Albert Orellan, IO1 Nestle Carin, IO2 Vincent Orcales, and Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Charity
Caceres. Aside from both accused, Rubenia Gorres testified for the defense.

Version of the Prosecution

Around 8:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, IO1 Orellan and his teammates were at Regional Office X of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA). Based on a report of a confidential informant (CI) that a certain "Romy" has been engaged in the sale of prohibited drugs in Zone 7,
Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City, they were directed by their Regional Director, Lt. Col. Edwin Layese, to gather for a buy-bust operation. During
the briefing, IO2 Orcales, IO1 Orellan, and IOl Carin were assigned as the team leader, the arresting officer/back-up/evidence custodian, and
the poseur-buyer, respectively. The team prepared a P500.00 bill as buy-bust money (with its serial number entered in the PDEA blotter), the
Coordination Form for the nearest police station, and other related documents.

Using their service vehicle, the team left the regional office about 15 minutes before 10:00 p.m. and arrived in the target area at 10:00 p.m., more or
less. IO1 Carin and the CI alighted from the vehicle near the comer leading to the house of "Romy," while IO1 Orellan and the other team members
disembarked a few meters after and positioned themselves in the area to observe. IO1 Carin and the CI turned at the comer and stopped in front of a
house. The CI knocked at the door and uttered, "ayo, nang Romy. " Gorres came out and invited them to enter. Inside, Lim was sitting on the sofa
while watching the television. When the CI introduced IO1 Carin as a shabu buyer, Lim nodded and told Gorres to get one inside the bedroom. Gorres
stood up and did as instructed. After he came out, he handed a small medicine box to Lim, who then took one piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic
of shabu and gave it to IO1 Carin. In turn, IO1 Carin paid him with the buy-bust money.

After examining the plastic sachet, IO1 Carin executed a missed call to IO1 Orellan, which was the pre-arranged signal. The latter, with the rest of the
team members, immediately rushed to Lim's house. When they arrived, IO1 Carin and the CI were standing near the door. They then entered the house
because the gate was opened. IO1 Orellan declared that they were PDEA agents and informed Lim and Gorres, who were visibly surprised, of their
arrest for selling dangerous drug. They were ordered to put their hands on their heads and to squat on the floor. IO1 Orellan recited the Miranda rights
to them. Thereafter, IO1 Orellan conducted a body search on both.

When he frisked Lim, no deadly weapon was found, but something was bulging in his pocket. IOl Orellan ordered him to pull it out. Inside the pocket
were the buy-bust money and a transparent rectangular plastic box about 3x4 inches in size. They could see that it contained a plastic sachet of a white
substance. As for Gorres, no weapon or illegal drug was seized.

IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white substance, and a disposable lighter. IOl Carin turned over
to him the plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. Despite exerting efforts to secure
the attendance of the representative from the media and barangay officials, nobody arrived to witness the inventory-taking.

The buy-bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1 Orellan in possession of the seized items. Upon arrival, they "booked"
the two accused and prepared the letters requesting for the laboratory examination on the drug evidence and for the drug test on the arrested suspects
as well as the documents for the filing of the case. Likewise, IO1 Orellan made the Inventory Receipt of the confiscated items. It was not signed by Lim
and Gorres. Also, there was no signature of an elected public official and the representatives of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media as
witnesses. Pictures of both accused and the evidence seized were taken.

The day after, IO1 Orellan and IO1 Carin delivered both accused and the drug specimens to Regional Crime Laboratory Office 10. IO1 Orellan was in
possession of the sachets of shabu from the regional office to the crime lab. PSI Caceres, who was a Forensic Chemist, and Police Officer
2 (PO2) Bajas7personally received the letter-requests and the two pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance. PSI Caceres got urine samples from Lim and Gorres and conducted screening and confirmatory tests on them. Based on her examination,
only Lim was found positive for the presence of shabu. The result was shown in Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM-196 and 197-2010. With respect to the
two sachets of white crystalline substance, both were found to be positive ofshabu after a chromatographic examination was conducted by PSI Caceres.
Her findings were reflected in Chemistry Report No. D-228-2010. PSI Caceres, likewise, put her own marking on the cellophane containing the two
sachets of shabu. After that, she gave them to the evidence custodian. As to the buy-bust money, the arresting team turned it over to the fiscal's office
during the inquest.

Version of the Defense

Around 10:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, Lim and Gorres were in their house in Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City. Lim was sleeping in the
bedroom, while Gorres was watching the television. When the latter heard that somebody jumped over their gate, he stood up to verify. Before he could
reach the door, however, it was already forced opened by the repeated pulling and kicking of men in civilian clothing. They entered the house, pointed
their firearms at him, instructed him to keep still, boxed his chest, slapped his ears, and handcuffed him. They inquired on where the shabu was, but he
invoked his innocence. When they asked the whereabouts of "Romy," he answered that he was sleeping inside the bedroom. So the men went there and
kicked the door open. Lim was then surprised as a gun was pointed at his head. He questioned them on what was it all about, but he was told to keep
quiet. The men let him and Gorres sit on a bench. Lim was apprised of his Miranda rights. Thereafter, the two were brought to the PDEA Regional Office
and the crime laboratory. During the inquest proceedings, Lim admitted, albeit without the assistance of a counsel, ownership of the two sachets
of shabu because he was afraid that the police would imprison him. Like Gorres, he was not involved in drugs at the time of his arrest. Unlike him,
however, he was previously arrested by the PDEA agents but was acquitted in the case. Both Lim and Gorres acknowledged that they did not have any
quarrel with the PDEA agents and that neither do they have grudges against them or vice-versa.

Rubenia, Lim's live-in partner and the mother of Gorres, was at her sister's house in Pita, Pasil, Kauswagan the night when the arrests were made. The
following day, she returned home and noticed that the door was opened and its lock was destroyed. She took pictures of the damage and offered the
same as exhibits for the defense, which the court admitted as part of her testimony.

RTC Ruling

After trial, the RTC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale of shabu and acquitted Gorres for lack of sufficient evidence linking him
as a conspirator. The fallo of the September 24, 2013 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that:

1. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1073, accused ROMY LIM y MIRANDA is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve [12] years and one [1] day to thirteen [13] years, and to pay Fine in the amount
of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos [P300,000.00] without subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of Fine;

2. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1074, accused ROMY LIM y MIRANDA is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay the Fine in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos [P500,000.00].

3. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1074, accused ELDIE GORRES y NAVE is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged for failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Warden of the BJMP having custody of ELDIE GORRES y Nave, is hereby directed to immediately release him
from detention unless he is being charged of other crimes which will justify his continued incarceration.8
With regard to the illegal possession of a sachet of shabu, the RTC held that the weight of evidence favors the positive testimony of IO1 Orellan over
the feeble and uncorroborated denial of Lim. As to the sale of shabu, it ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the identity of the buyer, the
seller, the money paid to the seller, and the delivery of the shabu. The testimony of IO1 Carin was viewed as simple, straightforward and without any
hesitation or prevarication as she detailed in a credible manner the buy-bust transaction that occurred. Between the two conflicting versions that are
poles apart, the RTC found the prosecution evidence worthy of credence and no reason to disbelieve in the absence of an iota of malice, ill-will, revenge
or resentment preceding and pervading the arrest of Lim. On the chain of custody of evidence, it was accepted with moral certainty that the PDEA
operatives were able to preserve the integrity and probative value of the seized items.

In so far as Gorres is concerned, the RTC opined that the evidence presented were not strong enough to support the claim that there was conspiracy
between him and Lim because it was insufficiently shown that he knew what the box contained. It also noted Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM 196 &
197-2010, which indicated that Gorres was "NEGATIVE" of the presence of any illicit drug based on his urine sample.

CA Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. It agreed with the finding of the trial court that the prosecution adequately established all the elements of
illegal sale of a dangerous drug as the collective evidence presented during the trial showed that a valid buy-bust operation was conducted. Likewise, all
the elements of illegal possession of a dangerous drug was proven. Lim resorted to denial and could not present any proof or justification that he was
fully authorized by law to possess the same. The CA was unconvinced with his contention that the prosecution failed to prove the identity and integrity
of the seized prohibited drugs. For the appellate court, it was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs were
not compromised. The witnesses for the prosecution were able to testify on every link in the chain of custody, establishing the crucial link in the chain
from the time the seized items were first discovered until they were brought for examination and offered in evidence in court. Anent Lim's defense of
denial and frame-up, the CA did not appreciate the same due to lack of clear and convincing evidence that the police officers were inspired by an
improper motive. Instead. the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was applied.

Before Us, both Lim and the People manifested that they would no longer file a Supplemental Brief, taking into account the thorough and substantial
discussions of the issues in their respective appeal briefs before the CA. 9 Essentially, Lim maintains that the case records are bereft of evidence showing
that the buy-bust team followed the procedure mandated in Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

Our Ruling

The judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside, and Lim should be acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

At the time of the commission of the crimes, the law applicable is R.A. No. 9165. 10 Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of
2002, which implements the law, defines chain of custody as-
the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of
the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.11
The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be authenticated prior to its admission into evidence.12 To establish
a chain of custody sufficient to make evidence admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational basis from which to conclude that the
evidence is what the party claims it to be.13 In other words, in a criminal case, the prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from which the trier of
fact could reasonably believe that an item still is what the government claims it to be. 14 Specifically in the prosecution of illegal drugs, the well-
established federal evidentiary rule in the United States is that when the evidence is not readily identifiable and is susceptible to alteration by tampering
or contamination, courts require a more stringent foundation entailing a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness to render it
improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.15 This was adopted in Mallillin v.
People,16 where this Court also discussed how, ideally, the chain of custody of seized items should be established:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.17
Thus, the links in the chain of custody that must be established are: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the seized illegal drug by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover
of the illegal drug by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and submission of the illegal drug
from the forensic chemist to the court.18

Seizure and marking of the illegal


drug as well as the turnover by the
apprehending officer to the
investigating officer

Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 states:


Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]19
Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations(IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable,
in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items.20
On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other modifications, it essentially incorporated the saving clause
contained in the IRR, thus:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a phyical inventory of the seized
items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable,
in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and inva lid such seizures and
custody over said items.
In her Sponsorship Speech on Senate Bill No. 2273, which eventually became R.A. No. 10640, Senator Grace Poe admitted that "while Section 21 was
enshrined in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act to safeguard the integrity of the evidence acquired and prevent planting of evidence, the
application of said section resulted in the ineffectiveness of the government's campaign to stop increasing drug addiction and also, in the conflicting
decisions of the courts."21 Specifically, she cited that "compliance with the rule on witnesses during the physical inventory is difficult. For one, media
representatives are not always available in all comers of the Philippines, especially in more remote areas. For another, there were instances where
elected barangay officials themselves were involved in the punishable acts apprehended. "22 In addition, "[t]he requirement that inventory is required to
be done in police station is also very limiting. Most police stations appeared to be far from locations where accused persons were apprehended."23

Similarly, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III manifested that in view of the substantial number of acquittals in drug-related cases due to the varying
interpretations of the prosecutors and the judges on Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, there is a need for "certain adjustments so that we can plug the
loopholes in our existing law" and "ensure [its] standard implementation." 24 In his Co-sponsorship Speech, he noted:
Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations of highly organized and powerful local and international syndicates. The presence of
such syndicates that have the resources and the capability to mount a counter-assault to apprehending law enforcers makes the requirement of Section
21(a) impracticable for law enforcers to comply with. It makes the place of seizure extremely unsafe for the proper inventory and photograph of seized
illegal drugs.

xxxx

Section 21(a) of RA 9165 needs to be amended to address the foregoing situation. We did not realize this in 2002 where the sa fety of the law enforcers
and other persons required to be present in the inventory and photography of seized illegal drugs and the preservation of the very existence of seized
illegal drugs itself are threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of drug syndicates at the place of seizure. The place where the seized drugs may
be inventoried and photographed has to include a location where the seized drugs as well as the persons who are required to be present during the
inventory and photograph are safe and secure from extreme danger.

It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of seized illegal drugs be allowed to be conducted either in the place of seizure or
at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending law enforcers. The proposal will provide effective measures to ensure the integrity of seized
illegal drugs since a safe location makes it more probable for an inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs to be properly conducted, thereby
reducing the incidents of dismissal of drug cases due to technicalities.

Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the seizure or confiscation is invalid or illegal, as long as the law
enforement officers could justify the same and could prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are not tainted. This is the
effect of the inclusion in the proposal to amend the phrase "justifiable grounds." There are instances wherein there are no media people or
representatives from the DOJ available and the absence of these witnesses should not automatically invalidate the drug operation conducted. Even the
presence of a public local elected official also is sometimes impossible especially if the elected official is afraid or scared.25
We have held that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of the confiscated items at the place of arrest may be excused in instances when
the safety and security of the apprehending officers and the witnesses required by law or of the items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme
danger such as retaliatory action of those who have the resources and capability to mount a counter-assault.26 The present case is not one of those.

Here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white substance, and a disposable lighter. IO1 Carin also
turned over to him the plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. IO1 Orellan testified
that he immediately conducted the marking and physical inventory of the two sachets of shabu.27 To ensure that they were not interchanged, he
separately marked the item sold by Lim to IO1 Carin and the one that he recovered from his possession upon body search as BB AEO 10-19-10 and
AEO-RI 10-19-10, respectively, with both bearing his initial/signature.28

Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and representatives of the DOJ and the media to witness the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized items.29 In fact, their signatures do not appear in the Inventory Receipt.

The Court stressed in People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro:30


The prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that during the trial proceedings, it must initiate in acknowledging
and justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of law. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained, and
must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. It should take note that the rules require that the apprehending officers do not
simply mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took to
preserve the integrity of the seized items. Strict adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs se ized is miniscule, since it is
highly susceptible to planting, tampering or alteration of evidence. 31
It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not
obtained due to reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph
of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her
behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure
the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention;
or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law
enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.32
Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven. People v. Ramos33requires:
It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason
for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be
adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives
enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious
attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." Verily, mere statements of
unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non- compliance. These
considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the
information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary
arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As such,
police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest
efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable.34
In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials arrived at the crime scene because it was late at night and it was
raining, making it unsafe for them to wait at Lim's house. 35 IO2 Orcales similarly declared that the inventory was made in the PDEA office considering
that it was late in the evening and there were no available media representative and barangay officials despite their effort to contact them.36 He
admitted that there are times when they do not inform the barangay officials prior to their operation as they. might leak the confidential
information.37 We are of the view that these justifications are unacceptable as there was no genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with the law.

The testimony of team-leader IO2 Orcales negates any effort on the part of the buy-bust team to secure the presence of a barangay official during the
operation:
ATTY. DEMECILLO:

xxxx
Q x x x Before going to the house of the accused, why did you not contact a barangay
official to witness the operation?
A There are reasons why we do not inform a barangay official before our operation,
Sir.
Q Why?
A We do not contact them because we do not trust them. They might leak our
information.38
The prosecution likewise failed to explain why they did not secure the presence of a representative from the Department the arresting officer, IO1
Orellan, stated in his Affidavit that they only tried to coordinate with the barangay officials and the media, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
failed to show that they tried to contact a DOJ representative.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses also failed to establish the details of an earnest effort to coordinate with and secure presence of the
required witnesses. They also failed to explain why the buy-bust team felt "unsafe" in waiting for the representatives in Lim's house, considering that
the team is composed of at least ten (10) members, and the two accused were the only persons in the house.

It bears emphasis that the rule that strict adherence to the mandatory requirements of Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR may be
excused as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated items are properly preserved applies not just on arrest and/or seizure by
reason of a legitimate buy-bust operation but also on those lawfully made in air or sea port, detention cell or national penitentiary, checkpoint, moving
vehicle, local or international package/parcel/mail, or those by virtue of a consented search, stop and frisk (Terry search), search incident to a lawful
arrest, or application of plain view doctrine where time is of the essence and the arrest and/or seizure is/are not planned, arranged or scheduled in
advance.

To conclude, judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to illegal drugs are typically made without a warrant; hence, subject to
inquest proceedings. Relative thereto, Sections 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody Implementing Rules and Regulations directs:
A.1.10. Any justification or explanation in cases of noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, shall be
clearly stated in the sworn statements/affidavits of the apprehending/seizing officers, as well as the steps taken to preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items. Certification or record of coordination for operating units other than the PDEA pursuant to Section 86
(a) and (b), Article IX of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 shall be presented. 39
While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it has not been practiced in most cases elevated before Us. Thus, in order to weed
out early on from the courts' already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related cases, the following should henceforth be
enforced as a mandatory policy:

1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of
R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.

2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must state the justification or explanation therefor as well as
the steps they have taken in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.

3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not
immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order to determine
the (non) existence of probable cause.

4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment
order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5, 40
Rule 112, Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01280-MIN, which affirmed the
September 24, 2013 Decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2010-1073 and 2010-1074, finding
accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda guilty of violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from
detention, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the Davao Prison and Penal Farm, B.E. Dujali, Davao del Norte, for immediate
implementation. The said Director is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice, as well as to the Head/Chief of the National Prosecution Service,
the Office of the Solicitor General, the Public Attorney's Office, the Philippine National Police, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the National
Bureau of Investigation, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. Likewise, the Office of the Court Administrator
is DIRECTED to DISSEMINATE copies of this Decision to all trial courts, including the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, C.J., Carpio, Bersamin, Perlas-Bernabe, Tijam, Reyes, A., Jr., Gesmundo, and Reyes, Jr. J., JJ., concur.
Del Castillo, J., On wellness leave
Leonen, and Caguioa, JJ., See separate concurring opinion.
Jardeleza, J., no part prior OSG action.

September 21, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on September 4, 2018 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the
original of which was received by this Office on September 26, 2018 at 4:05 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA


Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

*
On wellness leave.

**
No part.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Ronaldo B. Martin, with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Oscar V. Badelles, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-19;
CA rollo, pp. 86-102.

2
Records, pp. 117-125; CA rollo, pp. 32-40.

3
Records (Criminal Case No. 2010-1073), pp. 3-4.

4
Records (Criminal Case No. 2010-1074), pp. 3-4.

5
Records (Criminal Case No. 2010-1073), pp. 19-20; records (Criminal Case No. 2010-1074), pp. 20-22.

6
Id. at 2.

7
Spelled as "Bajar" in the Request for Laboratory Examination on Drug Evidence (See Records of Criminal Case No. 2010-1073 [pp. 9-10] and Criminal
Case No. 2010-1074 [p. 9A]).

8
Records (Criminal Case No. 2010-1073), pp. 124-125; CA rollo, pp. 39-40.

9
Rollo, pp. 26-35.

10
R.A. No. 9165 took effect on July 4, 2002 (See People v. De la Cruz, 591 Phil. 259, 272 [2008]).

11
See People v. Badilla, 794 Phil. 263, 278 (2016); People v. Arenas, 791 Phil. 601, 610 (2016); and Saraum v. People, 779 Phil. 122, 132 (2016).

12
United States v. Rawlins, 606 F.3d 73 (2010).

13
United States v. Rawlins, supra note 12, as cited in United States v. Mehmood, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19232 (2018); United States v. De Jesus-
Concepcion, 652 Fed. Appx. 134 (2016); United States v. Rodriguez, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35215 (2015); and United States v. Mark, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 95130 (2012).

14
See United States v. Rawlins, supra note 12, as cited in United States v. Mark, supranote 13.

15
See United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528 (1989), as cited in United States v. Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d 673 (2011); United States v. Solis, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 1182 (1999); United States v. Anderson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9193 (1994); United States v. Hogg,1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 13732
(1993); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563 (1993); United States v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 1360 (1992); and United States v. Clonts,966
F.2d 1366 (1992).

16
Mallillin v. People, 576 Phil.576 (2008).

17
Mallillin v. People, supra, at 587, as cited in People v. Tamano, G.R. No. 208643, December 5, 2016, 812 SCRA 203, 228-229; People v. Badilla,
supra note 11, at 280; Saraum v. People, supra note 11, at 132-133; People v. Dalawis, 772 Phil. 406, 417-418 (2015); and People v. Flores, 765 Phil.
535, 541-542 (2015). It appears that Mallillin was erroneously cited as "Lopez v. People" in People v. De la Cruz, 589 Phil. 259 (2008), People v.
Sanchez, 590 Phil. 214 (2008), People v. Garcia,599 Phil. 416 (2009), People v. Denoman, 612 Phil. 1165 (2009), and People v. Abelarde, G.R. No.
215713, January 22, 2018.

18
People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro, G.R. No. 224290, June 11, 2018; People v. Amaro,786 Phil. 139, 148 (2016); and People v. Enad, 780 Phil. 346,
358 (2016).

19
See People v. Sic-Open, 795 Phil. 859, 872 (2016); People v. Badilla, supra note 11, at 275 276; People v. De la Cruz, 783 Phil. 620, 632
(2016); People v. Asislo, 778 Phil. 509, 516 (2016); People v. Dalawis, supra note 17, at 416; and People v. Flores, supra note 17, at 540.

20
People v. Sic-Open, supra note 19, at 873; People v. Badilla, supra note 11, at 276;People v. De la Cruz, supra note 19, at 633; People v. Asislo,
supra note 19, at 516-517; People v. Dalawis, supra note 17, at 417; and People v. Flores, supra note 17, at 541.

21
Senate Journal. Session No. 80. 16th Congress, 1st Regular Session. June 4, 2014. p. 348.

22
Id

23
Id.

24
Id at 349.

25
Id. at 349-350.

26
See People v. Mola, G.R. No. 226481, April l8, 2018.

27
TSN, June 2, 2011, pp. 25-28.
28
Id. at 17-19.

29
Under the original provision of Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, after seizure and confiscation of the drugs, the apprehending team was required to
immediately conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the same in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. As amended by R.A. No. 10640, it is now mandated that the
conduct of physical inventory and photograph of the seized items must be in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official and (3) a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof (See People v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 232300,
August, 2018; People v. Allingag, G.R. No. 233477, July 30, 2018; People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro, supra note 18; People v. Reyes, G.R. No.
219953, Apri123, 2018; and People v. Mola, supra note 26).

30
Supra note 18.

31
See also People v. Reyes, supra note 29 and People v. Mota, supra note 26.

32
People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro, supra note 18. See also People v. Reyes, supra note 29. and People v. Mola, supra note 26.

33
G.R. No. 233744, February 28, 2018. (Citations omitted).

34
See also People v. Crespo, G.R. No. 230065, March 14, 2018 and People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 231383, March 7, 2018. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

35
TSN, June 2, 2011, p.l9.

36
TSN, August 5, 2011, p. 13.

37
Id. at 15.

38
Id. at 14-15.

39
See People v. Alvarado, G.R. No. 234048, April 23, 2018 and People v. Saragena, G.R. No. 210677, August 23,2017.

40
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. -(a) By the Regional Trial Court. -Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the
judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commit ment order if the accused has
already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was
filed pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of
information.

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

The failure of law enforcement officers to comply with the chain of custody requirements spelled out in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), as amended, coupled with a failure to show justifiable grounds for their non compliance
engenders reasonable doubt on the guilt of persons from whom illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia were supposedly seized. Acquittal must then
ensue. This is especially true in arrests and seizures occasioned by buy-bust operations, which, by definition, are preplanned, deliberately arranged or
calculated operations.

Asserting proper compliance with chain of custody requirements and the ensuing acquittal of an accused due to the law enforcement officers' unjustified
non-compliance-is not a matter of calibrating jurisprudence. It is merely a matter of applying the clear text of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.

I concur that the accused-appellant, Romy Lim, must be acquitted on account of reasonable doubt.

Conviction in criminal actions requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence spells out this requisite
quantum of proof:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.

Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is ultimately a matter of conscience. Though it does not demand absolutely impervious certainty, it still charges the
prosecution with the immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty. Much as it ensues from benevolence, it is not merely engendered by
abstruse ethics or esoteric values; it arises from a constitutional imperative:
This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on
the weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the Constitution,
but similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." "Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of
innocence that lays such burden upon the prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that an
accused must be acquitted. As explained in Basilio v. People of the Philippines:

We ruled in People v. Ganguso:


An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he
must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is
on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an
acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied
that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.

Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of
the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence.1

II

The requisites that must be satisfied to sustain convictions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act are settled.
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took
place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.2 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted )
On the second element of corpus delicti, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640, spells out
requirements for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia. Section 21 (1) to (3) stipulate
requirements concerning custody prior to the filing of a criminal case:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. -The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or tile media who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof
Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said
items.
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well
as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be
submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative
examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by
the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of
the subject iterm/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does
not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of
dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however,
That a final certification shall be issued immediately upon completion of the said
examination and certification[.] (Emphasis supplied )
People v. Nandi3 thus, summarized that four (4) links "should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court." 4

People v. Morales y Midarasa5 explained that "failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 implie[s] a concomitant failure on
the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of the corpus delicti[.]"6 It "produce[s] doubts as to the origins of the [seized paraphernalia]." 7

Compliance with Section 21's chain of custody requirements ensures the integrity of the seized items. Conversely, non-compliance with it tarnishes the
credibility of the corpus delicti around which prosecutions under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act revolve. Consequently, they also tarnish the
very claim that an offense against the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was committed.

Fidelity to chain of custody requirements is necessary because, by nature, narcotics may easily be mistaken for everyday objects. Chemical analysis and
detection through methods that exceed human sensory perception (such as, specially trained canine units and screening devices) are often needed to
ascertain the presence of dangerous drugs. The physical similarity of narcotics with everyday objects facilitates their adulteration and substitution. It
also makes conducive the planting of evidence. In Mallillin v. People8
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their
composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of
custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases by accident or otherwise - in which
similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more
stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of
custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been
contaminated or tampered with.9 (Emphasis supplied)
People v. Holgado, et al.,10 recognized that:
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement ... ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia
in four (4) respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the
relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to
the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting,
contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner. "11
When the identity of corpus delicti is jeopardized by non-compliance with Section 21, the second element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs remains wanting. It follows then, that this non-compliance justifies an accused's acquittal. In People v. Lorenzo:12
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the
drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are
present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. 13 (Emphasis supplied )
III

As against the objective requirements imposed by statute, guarantees coming from the prosecution concerning the identity and integrity of seized items
are naturally designed to advance the prosecution's own cause. These guarantees conveniently aim to knock two targets with one blow. First, they insist
on a showing of corpus delicti divorced from statutory impositions and based on standards entirely the prosecution's own. Second, they justify non-
compliance by summarily pleading their own assurance. These self-serving assertions cannot justify a conviction.
Even the customary presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties cannot suffice. People v. Kamad14 explained that the presumption of
regularity applies only when officers have shown compliance with "the standard conduct of official duty required by law[.] " 15 It is not a justification for
dispensing with such compliance:
Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a
presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is
made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance
thereof The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required
by law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise. In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were
obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

We rule, too, that the discrepancy in the prosecution evidence on the identity of the seized and examined shabu and that formally offered in court
cannot but lead to serious doubts regarding the origins of the shabu presented in court. This discrepancy and the gap in the chain of custody
immediately affect proof of the corpus delicti without which the accused must be acquitted.

From the constitutional law point of view, the prosecution's failure to establish with moral certainty all the elements of the crime and to identify the
accused as the perpetrator signify that it failed to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence that every accused enjoys in a criminal
prosecution. When this happens, as in this case, the courts need not even consider the case for the defense in deciding the case; a ruling for acquittal
must forthwith issue.16 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted )
Jurisprudence has thus been definite on the consequence of non compliance. This Court has categorically stated that whatever presumption there is
concerning the regularity of the manner by which officers gained and maintained custody of the seized items is "negate[d]": 17
In People v. Orteza, the Court did not hesitate to strike down the conviction of the therein accused for failure of the police officers to observe the
procedure laid down under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Law, thus:
First, there appears nothing in the records showing that police officers complied with the proper procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified
in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or confiscation,
have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with the requirement raises doubt whether what was
submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually recovered from appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have
been regularly performed by the police officers.

....
IN FINE, the unjustified failure of the police officers to show that the integrity of the object evidence-shabu was properly preserved negates the
presumption of regularity accorded to acts undertaken by police officers in the pursuit of their official duties.18 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act requires nothing less thari strict compliance. Otherwise, the raison d'etre of the chain of custody requirement
is compromised. Precisely, deviations from it leave open the door for tampering, substitution and planting of evidence.

Even the performance of acts which approximate compliance but do not strictly comply with the Section 21 has been considered insufficient. People v.
Magat,19 for example, emphasized the inadequacy of merely marking the items supposedly seized: "Marking of the seized drugs alone by the law
enforcers is not enough to comply with the clear and unequivocal procedures prescribed in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165": 20
A review of jurisprudence, even prior to the passage of the R.A. No. 9165, shows that this Court did not hesitate to strike down convictions for failure to
follow the proper procedure for the custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. Prior to R.A. No. 9165, the Court applied the procedure required by
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979 amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974.

In People v. Laxa, the policemen composing the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the alleged apprehension of
the appellant. One policeman even admitted that he marked the seized items only after seeing them for the first time in the police headquarters. The
Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produces doubts as to the origins of the marijuana and concluded
that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.

Similarly, in People v. Kimura, the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the alleged seized marijuana on the night the accused were arrested
and to observe the procedure in the seizure and custody of the drug as embodied in the aforementioned Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3,
Series of 1979. Consequently, we held that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.

In Zaragga v. People, involving a violation of R.A. No. 6425, the police failed to place markings on the alleged seized shabu immediately after the
accused were apprehended. The buy-bust team also failed to prepare an inventory of the seized drugs which accused had to sign, as required by the
same Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited
drug which constitutes the corpus delicti.

In all the foregoing cited cases, the Court acquitted the appellants due to the failure of law enforcers to observe the procedures prescribed in Dangerous
Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974, which are similar to the procedures under Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165. Marking of the seized drugs alone by the law enforcers is not enough to comply with the clear and unequivocal procedures prescribed
in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
In the present case, although PO1 Santos had written his initials on the two plastic sachets submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory Office for
examination, it was not indubitably shown by the prosecution that PO1 Santos immediately marked the seized drugs in the presence of appellant after
their alleged confiscation. There is doubt as to whether the substances seized from appellant were the same ones subjected to laboratory examination
and presented in court.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they have to be subjected to scientific analysis to
determine their composition and nature. Congress deemed it wise to incorporate the jurisprudential safeguards in the present law in an unequivocal
language to prevent any tampering, alteration or substitution, by accident or otherwise. The Court, in upholding the right of the accused to be
presumed innocent, can do no less than apply the present law which prescribes a more stringent standard in handling evidence than that applied to
criminal cases involving objects which are readily identifiable.

R.A. No. 9165 had placed upon file law enforcers the duty to establish the chain of custody of the seized drugs to ensure the integrity of the corpus
delicti. Thru proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, the identity of the seized drugs is insulated from doubt from their confiscation up
to their presentation in court .21 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

IV

The precision required in the custody of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia is affirmed by the amendments made to Section 21 by Republic Act No.
10640.

The differences between Section 21(1) as originally stated and as amended are shown below:

Republic Act No. 9165 Republic Act No . 10640

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals, and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. Laboratory Equipment. -
The PDEA shall take charge and have The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well precursors and essential chemicals, as well
as instruments/paraphernalia and/or as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized laboratory equipment so confiscated,
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition seized and/or surrendered, for proper
in the following manner: disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial (1) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs custody and control of the dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and
shall, immediately after seizure and essential chemicals,
confiscation, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment
physically inventory
shall, immediately after seizure and
and photograph the same confiscation,

in the presence of the accused or the conduct a physical inventory of the seized
person/s from whom such items were items
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, and photograph the same

a representative from the media and the in the presence of the accused or the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any person/s from whom such items were
elected public official confiscated and /or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel,
who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy with an elected public official and a
thereof; representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media

who shall be required to sign the copies of


the inventory and be given a copy
thereof;

Provided, That the physical inventory and


photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizure;

Provided, finally, That noncompliance of


these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over said
items.

Section 21(1) was simultaneously relaxed and made more specific by Republic Act No. 10640.

It was relaxed with respect to the persons required to be present during the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items. Originally under
Republic Act No. 9165, the use of the conjunctive 'and' indicated that Section 21 required the presence of all of the following, in addition to "the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel":
First, a representative from the media;

Second, representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and

Third, any elected public official.

As amended by Republic Act No. 10640, Section 21(1) uses the disjunctive 'or' (i.e., "with an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media"). Thus, a representative from the media and a representative from the National Prosecution Service are now
alternatives to each other.

Section 21(1), as amended, now includes a specification of locations where the physical inventory and taking of photographs must be conducted (n.b., it
uses the mandatory "shall"). It now includes the following proviso: 22
Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures. (Emphasis supplied )
Lescano v. People23 summarizes Section 21(1)'s requirements:
As regards the items seized and subjected to marking, Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, requires the
performance of two (2) actions: physical inventory and photographing. Section 21(1) is specific as to when and where these actions must be done. As
to when, it must be "immediately after seizure and confiscation." As to where, it depends on whether the seizure was supported by a search warrant. If
a search warrant was served, the physical inventory and photographing must be done at the exact same place that the search warrant is served. In
case of warrantless seizures, these actions must be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable."

Moreover, Section 21(1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present during the physical inventory and photographing. These persons are: first, the
accused or the person/s from whom the items were seized; second, an elected public official; and third, a representative of the National Prosecution
Service. There are, however, alternatives to the first and the third. As to the first (i.e., the accused or the person/s from whom items were seized),
there are two (2) alternatives: first, his or her representative; and second, his or her counsel. As to the representative of the National Prosecution
Service, a representative of the media may be present in his or her place. 24

Set against the strict requirements of Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165, 25 this case screams of glaring infringements.

"the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same"

The prosecution's witnesses gave contradicting testimonies on the place where the physical inventory was conducted. Intelligence Officer 1 Albert
Orellan (Officer Orellan), the arresting officer, testified that he marked the seized items in the house of Romy Lim:
Pros. Vicente: (continuing to the witness [Officer Orellan] )
Q How did you know that the one bought and the one searched were not
interchanged?
A I marked the item I recovered from Romy Lim, Sir.
Q Where did you mark it Mr. Witness, in what place?
A At their house, Sir.26 (Emphasis supplied )
Meanwhile, Intelligence Officer 1 Nestle N. Carin (Officer Carin), the poseur-buyer, and Intelligence Officer 2 Vincent Cecil Orcales (Officer Orcales), the
team leader of the buy-bust operation, both testified that the inventory and marking happened in their office.
Because I was present, sir.
ACP VICENTE, JR.: (continuing to the witness [Officer Carin] )
QYou said that Romy Lim handed the sachet of shabu to you, what happened to that
sachet of shabu, Ms. Witness?
A I turned over it (sic) to IOl Orellan during the inventory.
QWhere did he conduct the inventory?
A At our office.
QWhere?
A At the PDEA Office, sir.
Q... How did you know that?
A Because I was there sir, during the inventory.
QThen, what did he do with the sachet of shabu Ms. Witness?
A He put a marking.
QHow did you know?
A Because I was present, sir.[27 (Emphasis supplied)
ACP VICENTE, JR.: (To the witness [Officer Orcales] )
Q How did Agent Orellan handle the evidence? The drugs he recovered and the buy-
bust item? And what did he do with it?
A He made an inventory.
Q How about the marking?
A He made markings on it.
Q How did you know?
A I supervised them.
Q And where did Agent Orellan made the inventory?
A In the office.28 (Emphasis supplied)
Surprisingly, Officer Carin's testimony was corroborated by Officer Orellan in his Affidavit when he narrated that they "brought the arrested suspects in
[their] office and conducted inventory."29

The taking of pictures was likewise not made immediately after seizure and confiscation. In their separate testimonies, Officers Orellan and Carin
stated:
Pros. Vicente: (continuing to the witness (Officer Orellan])
Q What else did you do at the office, Mr. Witness, did you take pictures?
A We asked them of their real identity Sir the two of them, and then we took pictures
together with the evidence seized from them.
Court:
These pictures IO1 Orellan were taken at the office?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
No pictures at the house of the accused?
A None, Your Honor.30 (Emphasis supplied)
ACP VICENTE, JR.: (continuing to the witness [Officer Carin])
....
Q Aside from markings what else did you do at the office?
A I took pictures during the inventory .31 (Emphasis supplied)
Although Officer Orcales testified that he took pictures "[i]in the house and also in the office, " 32 the only pictures in the records of the case were those
taken in the PDEA office.33

During cross-examination, Officer Carin reiterated that the inventory and the taking of photographs were done in their office and not in Romy Lim's
house.34

"in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official

Moreover, not one of the third persons required by Section 21(1) prior to its amendment-"a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official"-was present during the physical inventory and taking of photographs. Instead, only accused-appellant
Romy Lim and accused Eldie Gorres were present.

"who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof'

Since not one of the three required personalities were present during the operation, the inventory was not signed. Even the two accused were not given
a chance to sign the shabu sachets that were allegedly found in their possession:
Atty. Demecillo: (continuing to the witness [Officer Orellan])
Q In this Inventory, no signature ofthe two accused?
A The accused did not sign, Sir.
Q Not also sign[ed] by a man from the DOJ?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Also from the media?
A None, Sir.
Q Also by an elected official?
A None, Sir.35
These infringements are fatal errors. The police operatives' conduct failed to dispel all reasonable doubt on the integrity of the shabu supposedly
obtained from accused-appellant. The buy-bust team failed to account for the handling and safeguarding of the shabu from the moment it was
purportedly taken from accused-appellant.

What is critical, however, is not the conduct of an inventory per se. Rather, it is the certainty that the items allegedly taken from the accused are the
exact same items ultimately adduced as evidence before courts. People v. Nandi36 requires the ensuring of four (4) links in the custody of seized items:
from the accused to the apprehending officers; from the apprehending officers to investigating officers; from investigating officers to forensic chemists;
and, from forensic chemists to courts. The endpoints in each link (e.g., the accused and the apprehending officer in the first link, the forensic chemist
and the court in the fourth link) are preordained. What is precarious is not each of these end points but the transitions or transfers of seized items from
one point to another.

Section 21(1)'s requirements are designed to make the first and second links foolproof. Conducting the inventory and photographing immediately after
seizure, exactly where the seizure was done (or at a location as practicably close to it) minimizes, if not eliminates, room for adulteration or the planting
of evidence. The presence of the accused (or a representative) and of third-party witnesses, coupled with their attestations on the written inventory,
ensures that the items delivered to the investigating officer are the items which have actually been inventoried.

The prosecution's case could have benefitted from the presence of the third-party witnesses required by Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act. Indeed, the requirement that the inventory and photographing be done "immediately after the seizure and confiscation" necessarily means
that the required witnesses must also be present during the seizure or confiscation. People v. Mendoza37 confirms this and characterized the presence of
these witnesses as an "insulating presence [against] the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination ":38
The consequences of the failure of the arresting lawmen to comply with the requirements of Section 21(1) ... were dire as far as the Prosecution was
concerned. Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the
seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts
conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of
the seizure and confiscation of the sachets of shabu that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of
the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the insulating presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.39
In blatant disregard of statutory requirements, not one of the three (3) insulating witnesses required by Section 21(1) was shown to be present during
the arrest, seizure, physical inventory and taking of pictures.

The Court should not lose sight of how accused-appellant's apprehension was supposedly occasioned by a buy-bust operation. This operation was
allegedly prompted by anterior information supplied by an unidentified confidential informant. 40 Acting on the information, Regional Director Lt. Col.
Edwin Layese supposedly organized a ten-person buy-bust team41 and briefed them on the operation. Thereafter, the team claims to have managed to
prepare the P500.00 bill buy-bust money, a Coordination Form, and other documents. 42 All these happened from the time they were informed by their
confidential informant at 8:00pm up to the time they were dispatched for the operation at around 9:45 pm. 43

While the team managed to secure preliminaries, it utterly failed at observing Section 21(1)'s requirements. Certainly, if the buy-bust team was so
fastidious at preparatory tasks, it should have been just as diligent with observing specific statutory demands that our legal system has long considered
to be critical in securing convictions. It could not have been bothered to even have one third-party witness present.

With the buy-bust team's almost two-hour briefing period and the preparation of the necessary documents, the prosecution appears to have been
diligently prepared. How the buy-bust team can be so lax in actually carrying out its calculated operation can only raise suspicions. That diligence is the
most consummate reason for not condoning the buy-bust team's inadequacies.

The prosecution likewise failed to account for the third link-from the investigating officers to the forensic chemists. Officer Orellan testified that he did
not know the person who received the seized items from him in the crime laboratory.
Atty. Demecillo: (continuing to the witness [Officer Orellan] )
Q Who was the person who received the drugs you delivered in the crime lab?
A I cannot exactly remember who was that officer who received that request Sir but I
am sure that he is one of the personnel of the crime laboratory, Sir.
Q You know Forensic Chemist Charity Peralta Caceres?
A I only heard her name to be one of the forensic chemists in the crime lab, Sir.
Q Usually you have not seen her?
A I saw her but we were not friends, Sir.
Q But that evening of October 20, she was not the very person who received the
sachet of shabu for examination?
A Only the receiving clerk, Sir.
Q Not personally Caceres?
A No, Sir.
Q After delivering these sachets of shabu, you went home?
A I went back to our office, Sir.
Q From there, you did not know anymore what happened to the sachet of shabu you
delivered for examination?
A I don't know, Sir.44
His statements were corroborated by the testimony of Officer Orcales who stated that he was with Officer Orellan when the latter gave the seized items
to the crime laboratory personnel. He confirmed that the person who received it was not Chemist Caceres and that he did not know who it was.45

This break in the chain of custody opens up the possibility of substitution, alteration, or tampering of the seized drugs dur ing the turn over to the
chemist, especially since the amount was as little as 0.02 grams. Thus, the illegal drugs tested by the chemist may not be the same items allegedly
seized by the buy-bust team from accused-appellant. The doubt that the break created should have been enough to acquit accused-appellant.

VI

Section 21(1), as amended, now also includes a proviso that leaves room for noncompliance under "justifiable grounds":
Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items. (Emphasis
supplied)
This proviso was taken from the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165:
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value ofthe seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
(Emphasis supplied)
To sanction non-compliance, two requisites must be satisfied. First, the prosecution must identify and prove "justifiable grounds." Second, it must show
that, despite non-compliance, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved. To satisfy the second requirement, the
prosecution must establish that positive steps were observed to ensure such preservation. The prosecution cannot rely on broa d justifications and
sweeping guarantees that the integrity and evidentiary value of seized items were preserved.

The prosecution presented the following reasons of the buy-bust team as "justifiable grounds" why they failed to have the required witnesses present
during their operation: First, the operation was conducted late at night; Second, it was raining during their operation; Third, it was unsafe for the team
"to wait at Lim's house "46; Fourth, they exerted effort to contact the barangay officials and a media representative to no avail.47 The Ponencia added
that "[t]he time constraints and the urgency of the police action understandably prevented the law enforcers from ensuring the attendance of the
required witnesses, who were not improbably at a more pressing engagement when their presence was requested. "48 According to the Ponencia, "there
was no genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with the law. " 49

I join Justice Diosdado Peralta m finding these explanations inadequate.

First, the testimony of team-leader Officer Orcales negates any allegation of effort that the buy-bust team made to secure the presence of a barangay
official in their operation:
ATTY. DEMECILLO: (To the witness [Officer Orcales])

....
Q Before going to the house of the accused, why did you not contact a barangay
official to witness the operation?
A There are reasons why we do not inform a barangay official before our operation,
Sir.
Q Why?
A We do not contact them because we do not trust them. They might leak our
information.50
Assuming that the buy-bust team has reason not to trust the barangay officials, they could have contacted any other elected official. The presence of
barangay officials is not particularly required. What Section 21(1) requires is the presence of any elected officiaL

Second, the prosecution failed to explain why they did not contact a representative of the Department of Justice. Officer Ore llan, in his Affidavit,
mentioned that they only tried to coordinate with the barangay officials and the media.51 The testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses were bereft of
any statement that could show that they tried to contact a representative of the Department of Justice-one of the three required witnesses.

Third, the buy-bust team did not specifically state the kind of effort they made in trying to contact the required witnesses. A general statement that
they exerted earnest effort to coordinate with them is not enough. They should narrate the steps they carried out in getting the presence of a
Department of Justice representative, a media representative, and an elected official. Otherwise, it will be easy to abuse non-compliance with Section
21(1) since a sweeping statement of "earnest effort" is enough justify non-compliance.

Fourth, the prosecution failed to state the basis why the buy-bust team felt "unsafe" in waiting for the representatives in Lim's house. To reiterate, they
were composed of at least ten members. They outnumber the two accused, who were the only persons in the house. They were able to control the
accused's movement when they ordered them "to put their hands on their heads and to squat on the floor." 52 Moreover, when frisked, the agents did
not find any concealed weapon in the body of the two accused. How the PDEA agents could have felt "unsafe" in this situation is questionable, at the
very least.

Finally, there was no urgency involved and, certainly, the team was not under any time limit in conducting the buy-bust operation and in apprehending
the accused-appellant. As pointed out by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in his Reflections, there could have been no urgency or time constraint
considering that the supposed sale of drugs happened at Lim's house. 53 The team knew exactly where the sale happens. They could have conducted
their operation in another day-not late at night or when it was raining-and with the presence of the required witnesses. This could have also allowed
them to conduct surveillance to confirm the information they received that accused-appellant was indeed selling illegal drugs.

As farcical as the buy-bust team's excuses are, it would be equally farcical for us to condone it.

VII

The prosecution offers nothing more than sweeping excuses and self serving assurances. It would have itself profit from the buy-bust team's own
inadequacies. We cannot be a party to this profligacy.

Rather than rely on the courts' licentious tolerance and bank on favorable accommodations, our police officers should be exemplary. They should adhere
to the highest standards, consistently deliver commendable results, and remain beyond reproach. Section 21's requirements are but a bare minimum.
Police officers should be more than adept at satisfying them.

At stake are some of the most sacrosanct pillars of our constitutional order and justice system: due process, the right to be presumed innocent, the
threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt and the duty of the prosecution to build its case upon its own merits. We cannot let these ideals fall by the
wayside, jettisoned in favor of considerations of convenience and to facilitate piecemeal convictions for ostensible wrongdoing.

Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt hearkens to our individual consciences. I cannot accept that the severe consequences arising from criminal
conviction will be meted upon persons whose guilt could have clearly been established by police officers' mere adherence to a bare minimum. Certainly,
it is not too much to ask that our law enforcement officers observe what the law mandates. The steps we now require outlined in the able ponencia of
my esteemed colleague Justice Diosdado Peralta is definitely a step forward.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote that the Decision dated February 23, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01280-MIN, be REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda must be ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Endnotes:

1
Macayan, Jr. v. People, 756 Phil. 202, 213-214 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division],citing CONST, I (1987), Art. III, Sec. 1; CONST, (1987), Art.
III, Sec. 14(2); People of the Philippines v. Solayao, 330 Phil. 811, 819 (1996) [Per J. Romero, Second Division]; andBasilio v. People of the
Philippines, 591 Phil. 508, 521-522 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].

2
People v. Morales y Midarasa, 630 Phil. 215 (2010) [Per. J Del Castillo, Second Division].

3
639 Phil. 134 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

4
Id. at 144-145, citing People v. Kamad, 624 Phil. 289,304 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

5
630 Phil. 215 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].

6
Id. at 229.

7
People v. Laxa, 414 Phil. 156, 170 (2001) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division], as cited in People v. Orteza, 555 Phil. 700, 708 (2007) [Per J. Tinga,
Second Division].

8
576 Phil.576 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

9
Id. at 588-589.

10
741 Phil. 8 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

11
Id. at 93.

12
633 Phil. 393 (2010) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].

13
Id. at 403.

14
624 Phil. 289 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

15
Id. at 311.

16
Id.

17
People v. Navarrete, 665 Phil. 738, 749 (2011) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division]. See also People v. Ulat, 674 Phil. 484, 500 (2011) [Per J.
Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].

18
People v. Navarrete, 665 Phil.738, 748-749 (2011) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].

19
588 Phil. 95 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

20
Id. at 405.

21
Id at 403-406.

22
This is not entirely novel. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 already I stated it. Nevertheless, even if it has been
previously stated elsewhere, it now takes on a greater significance . It is no longer expressed merely in an administrative rule, but in a statute.

23
778 Phil. 60 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

24
Id. at 475.

25
The buy-bust operation was conducted in 2010.

26
TSN dated June 2, 2011, pp. 17-18.

27
TSN dated July 22, 2011, pp. 10-12.

28
TSN dated August 5, 20ll, p.l3.

29
RTC records (Crim. Case No. 2010-1073), p. 5, Affidavit of Arresting Officer.

30
TSN dated June 2, 2011, pp. 21-30.

31
TSN dated July 22, 2011, pp. 10-l2.

32
TSN dated August 5, 2011, p. 13.
33
RTC records (Crim. Case No. 2010-1073), p. 18, and RTC records (Crim. Case No. 2010-1074), p. 16.

34
TSN dated August 5, 2011, p. 17.

35
TSN dated June 2, 2011, pp. 28-29.

36
639 Phil. 134, 144 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

37
People v. Mendoza, 736 Phil. 749 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

38
Id. at 764.

39
Id.

40
Ponencia, p. 3.

41
Id.; TSN dated June 2, 2011, p. 8. In Officer Orellan's testimony, he stated that aside from himself, the buy-bust team was composed of "Regional
Director Layese, Deputy Director Atila, ... IO1 Carin, IO2 Alfaro, IOl Genita , IO1 Avila, IO2 Orcales, IA2 Pica , IO1 Cardona[.]"

42
Id.

43
Id.

44
TSN dated June 2, 2011, pp. 36-37.

45
TSN dated August 5, 20ll, p.l6.

46
Ponencia, p. 14.

47
Id.

48
Id.

49
Id.

50
TSN dated August 5, 2011, pp. 14-15.

51
RTC records (Crim. Case No. 2010-1073), p. 5, Affidavit of Arresting Officer.

52
Ponencia, p. 3.

53
J. Caguioa's Reflections, p. 2.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

CAGUIOA, J.:

I concur.

I agree with the ponencia that accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda (Lim) should be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken
link in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs supposedly seized from him.

The facts are simple:

On October 19, 2010, at around 8:00 p.m., Intelligence Officer 1 Albert Orellan (IO1 Orellan) and his team were at the Regional Office of the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) when they received information from a confidential informant (CI) that Lim had engaged in the sale of prohibited
drugs in his house at Zone 7, Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City. The team immediately prepared to conduct a buy-bust operation and coordinated
with the nearest police station. They then left to conduct the buy-bust operation and reached the target area at around 10:00 p.m., or two hours after
they received the information from the CI.

Upon reaching the target area, the poseur-buyer and the CI knocked at the door of Lim's house. Eldie Gorres (Gorres), Lim's stepson, came out and
invited them to enter. Inside the house, Lim was sitting on the sofa while watching the television while the supposed sale of shabu happened between
Gorres and the poseur-buyer. After the supposed consummation of the sale, the police officers barged into the house and arrested Lim and Gorres. The
two were then prosecuted for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165.

At the outset, it is important to stress that jurisprudence is well-settled that in all prosecutions for violation ofR.A. 9165, the following elements must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) proof that the transaction took place; and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence. The existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, they being
the very corpus delicti of the crimes.1 What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti.2 Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the crime, and establishes the fact that a crime has been actually committed.3
In dangerous drugs cases, it is essential in establishing the corpus delicti that the procedure provided in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 is followed. The said
section provides:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a
qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued
within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic
laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next
twenty-four (24) hours[.]
Furthermore, Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165 (IRR) filled in the details as to where the physical
inventory and photographing of the seized items could be done: i.e., at the place of seizure, at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, thus:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 21 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same immediately after
seizure and confiscation in the presence of the accused, with (l) an elected public official, (2) a representative of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
(3) a representative of the media, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

In buy-bust situations, or warrantless arrests, the physical inventory and photographing are allowed to be done at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable. But even in these alternative places, such inventory and photographing are
still required to be done in the presence of the accused and the aforementioned witnesses.

I submit that the phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended
by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. And only if this is not practicable can the inventory and photographing then
be done as soon as the apprehending team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office. There can be no other meaning to the plain import
of this requirement. By the same token, however, this also means that the required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of
apprehension - a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a
planned activity. Simply put, the apprehending team has enough time and opportunity to bring with them said witnesses.

In other words, while the physical inventory and photographing are allowed to be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures," this does not dispense with the requirement of having all the
required witnesses to be physically present at the time or near the place of apprehension. The reason is simple, it is at the time of arrest - or at the
time of the drugs' "seizure and confiscation" - that the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure
and confiscation that would insulate against the police practice of planting evidence.

The presence of the witnesses at the place and time of arrest and seizure is required because " [w]hile buy-bust operations deserve judicial sanction if
carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, it is well to recall that x x x by the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need
for entrapment procedures x x x the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting
provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great." 4

In this connection, it is well to point out that recent jurisprudence is clear that the procedure enshrined in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 is a matter of
substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects.5For indeed, however noble the purpose or necessary the exigencies of our campaign against illegal drugs may be, it is still a governmental
action that must always be executed within the boundaries of law.

Using the language of the Court in People v. Mendoza,6 without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected
public official during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-
busts conducted under the regime of R.A. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility
of the seizure and confiscation of the subject sachets that were evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the
incrimination of the accused.7

Thus, it is compliance with this most fhndamental requirement - the presence of the "insulating" witnesses - that the pernicious practice of planting of
evidence is greatly minimized if not foreclosed altogether. Stated otherwise, this is the first and foremost requirement provided by Section 21 to ensure
the preservation of the "integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs" in a buy-bust situation whose nature, as already explained, is that it is a
planned operation.

To reiterate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of
the warrantless arrest; such that they are required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness
the inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation."

The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the representative of the DOJ, the media representative, and the elected
public official, when they could easily do so - and "calling them in" to the police station to witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only
after the buy-bust operation has already been finished - does not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against
the planting of drugs. I thuencourage the Court to send a strong message that faithful compliance with this most important requirement bringing them
to a place near the intended place of arrest - should be strictly complied with.

In this regard, showing how the drugs transferred hands from the accused to the poseur-buyer, from the poseur-buyer to the investigator and from the
investigator to the crime laboratory - much like in this case - without showing compliance with the inventory and photographing as witnessed by the
three required witnesses is not enough to ensure the integrity of the seized drugs. Indeed, without such witnessing, the drug s could already have been
planted - an d the marking, and the transfer from one to another (as usually testified to by the apprehending officers) only proves the chain of custody
of planted drugs.

I am not unaware that there is now a saving clause in Section 21, introduced by R.A. 10640, which is the portion that states: "noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items."

The requirements referred to that need not be complied with if there are justifiable grounds are only in respect of the conduct of the physical inventory
and the photographing in the presence of the accused, with an elected public official, and a representative of the DOJ, and the media who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Again, the plain language of this last proviso in Section 21 of R.A. 10640 simply means that the failure of the apprehending officer/team to physically
inventory and photograph the drugs at the place of arrest and/or to have the DOJ or media representative and elected public official witness the same
can be excused (i.e., these shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items) so long as there are justifiable grounds for not
complying with these requirements and "as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team."

Thus, it has been held that, as a general rule, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 is mandatory. 8 The Court may allow noncompliance
with the requirement only in exceptional cases,9 where the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure
from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserve d by the apprehending
team.10 If these two elements are present, the seizures and custody over the confiscated items shall not be rendered void and invalid.

It has also been emphasized that for the saving clause to be triggered, the prosecution must first recognize any lapses on the part of the police officers
and justify the same.11 Breaches of the procedure contained in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left unacknowledged and unexplained by the
State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had
been compromised.12

In cases involving procedural lapses of the police officers, proving the identity of the corpus delictidespite noncompliance with Section 21 requires the
saving clause to be successfully triggered.

For this purpose, the prosecution must satisfy its two-pronged requirement: first, credibly justify the noncompliance, and second, show
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were properly preserved. 13 This interpretation on when the saving clause is
triggered is not novel. In Valencia v. People,14 the Court held:
Although the Court has ruled that non-compliance with the directives of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the
prosecution's case, the prosecution must still prove that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items were properly preserved. Further, the non-compliance with the procedures must be justified by the State's agents themselves.
The arresting officers are under obligation, should they be unable to comply with the procedures laid down under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
to explain why the procedure was not followed and prove that the reason provided a justifiable ground. Otherwise, the requisites under the law would
merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not be disregarded by the arresting officers at their own convenience. 15 (Citations omitted)
In the case of People v. Barte,16 the Court pronounced that the State has the duty to credibly explain the noncompliance of the provisions of Section 21:
When there is failure to comply with the requirements for proving the chain of custody in the confiscation of contraband in a drug buy-bust operation,
the State has the obligation to credibly explain such noncompliance; otherwise, the proof of the corpus delicti is doubtful, and the accused should be
acquitted for failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 17
In People v. Ismael,18 the accused was acquitted because "the prosecution failed to: (1) overcome the presumption of innocence which appellant
enjoys; (2) prove the corpus delicti of the crime; (3) establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs; and (4) offer any explanation why the
provisions of Section 21, RA 9165 were not complied with."19

Likewise, in People v. Reyes20:


Under the last paragraph of Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, a saving mechanism has been provided to ensure that not every case
of noncompliance with the procedures for the preservation of the chain of custody will irretrievably prejudice the Prosecution's case against the
accused. To warrant the application of this saving mechanism, however, the Prosecution must recognize the lapse or lapses, and justify
or explain them. Such justification or explanation would be the basis for applying the saving mechanism. Yet, the Prosecution did not
concede such lapses, and did not even tender any token justification or explanation for them. The failure to justify or explain underscored the
doubt and suspicion about the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti. With the chain of custody having been compromised, the accused
deserves acquittal. x x x21 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Conformably with these disquisitions, I thus express my full support over the institution by the ponenciaof the following mandatory policies before a
case for violation of R.A. 9165, as amended by R.A. 10640, may be filed:

1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their compliance with the requirements of Section 21(1) of
R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.

2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must state the justification or explanation therefor as well as
the steps they have taken in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.

3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not
immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order to determine
the (non) existence of probable cause.

4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment
order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court.22

To my mind, the Court, through the said policies, actually achieves two laudable objectives, namely: (1) ensuring that the cases filed before the courts
are not poorly prepared, thus ultimately leading to the decongestion of court dockets, and (2) further protection of the citizens from fabricated suits.

In connection with the case at hand, I therefore fully concur with the ponencia as it acquits Lim of the crime charged. In particular, I wholly agree with
the ponencia as it holds that the explanations put forth by the apprehending team -that it was late at night, it was raining, and that there were simply
no available elected official and representatives from the media and DOJ despite their unsubstantiatedclaim that they exerted efforts to contact them
- are simply unacceptable.

As the ponencia itself pointed out, "[i]t must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph
of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:" 23
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized
drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official
themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative
and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting
officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints nd urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely
on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could
escape.24
Verily, none of the above reasons - or any such justifications similar to the aforementioned - wa s present in this case.

It is important to note that (1) the report of the CI came in around 8:00 p.m.; (2) the police officers immediately arranged a buy-bust operation; and
(3) they arrived at Lim's house at about 15 minutes before 10:00 p.m. While the vigor exerted by the police officers was commendable, it must be
pointed out that Lim was supposedly selling drugs at his house. In fact, Lim "was sitting on the sofa while watching the television" when the CI and the
poseur-buyer arrived. There was thus no issue with regard to urgency and time constraints, as Lim was not a flight risk nor was his supposed
commission of the crime bound to a limited period oftime. To reiterate, Lim was supposedly continuously committing the crime at his own
residence. The police officers could have, for instance, proceeded with the operation the following day when the presence of the three witnesses - as
required by law - could have been obtained.

At this point, it is imperative to discuss that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties by the police officers could not justify the police
officers' noncompliance with the requirements of law. Verily, the said presumption could not supply the acts which were not done by the police officers.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of duties is simply that - a presumption - which can be overturned if evidence is presented to prove
that the public officers were not properly performing their duty or they were inspired by improper motive. 25 It is not uncommon, therefore that cases
will rely on the presumption when there is no showing of improper motive on the part of the police.

To my mind, however, notwithstanding a lack of showing of improper motive, the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only
when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty.26 As applied to drugs cases, I believe that the
presumption shall only arise when there is a showing that the apprehending officer/team followed the requirements of Section 21, or when the saving
clause is successfully triggered.

Judicial reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty despite the lapses in the procedures undertaken by the agents of
the law is fundamentally unsound because the lapses themselves are affirmative proofs ofirregularity. 27 In People v. Enriquez,28 the Court held:
x x x [A]ny divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
contraband. Absent any of the said conditions, the non compliance is an irregularity, a red flag that casts reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus
delicti.29 (Emphasis supplied )
Thus, in case of noncompliance with Section 21, the Court cannot rely on the presumption of regularity to say that the guilt of the accused was
established beyond reasonable doubt. The discussion in People v. Sanchez30 is instructive:
The court apparently banked also on the presumption of regularity in the performance that a police officer like SPO2 Sevilla enjoys in the absence of
any taint of irregularity and of ill motive that would induce him to falsify his testimony. Admittedly, the defense did not adduce any evidence showing
that SPO2 Sevilla had any motive to falsify. The regularity of the performance of his duties, however, leaves much to be desired given the lapses in his
handling of the allegedly confiscated drugs as heretofore shown.

An effect of this lapse, as we held in Lopez v. People, is to negate the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police
officers. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable. There can be no ifs and buts regarding
this consequence considering the effect of the evidentiary presumption of regularity on the constitutional presumption of innocence.31 (Citation
omitted)
What further militates against according the police the presumption of regularity is the fact that even the pertinent interna l guidelines of the police
(some as early as 1999, predating R.A. 9165) require photographing and inventory during the conduct of a buy-bust operation.

Under the 1999 Philippine National Police Drug Enforcement Manual32 (PNPDEM), the conduct of buy-bust operations requires the following:

ANTI-DRUG OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

xxxx

V. SPECIFIC RULES

x x xx

B. Conduct of Operation: (As far as practicable, all operations must be officer led )

1. Buy-Bust Operation in the conduct ofbuy-bust operation, the following are the procedures to be observed:

a. Record time of jump-off in unit's logbook;

b. Alertness and security shall at all times be observed[;]

c. Actual and timely coordination with the nearest PNP territorial units must be made;

d. Area security and dragnet or pursuit operation must be provided[;]

e. Use of necessary and reasonable force only in case of suspect's resistance:

f. If buy-bust money is dusted with ultra violet powder make sure that suspect ge[t] hold of the same and his palm/s contaminated with the powder
before giving the pre-arranged signal and arresting the suspects;

g. In pre-positioning of the team members, the designated arresting elements must clearly and actually observe the negotiation/transaction between
suspect and the poseur-buyer;

h. Arrest suspect in a defensive manner anticipating possible resistance with the use of deadly weapons which maybe concealed in his body, vehicle or
in a place within arms['] reach;

i. After lawful arrest, search the body and vehicle, if any, of the suspect for other concealed evidence or deadly weapon;

j. Appraise suspect of his constitutional rights loudly and clearly after having been secured with handcuffs;

k. Take actual inventorv of the seized evidence by means of weighing and/or physical counting, as the case may be;

I. Prepare a detailed receipt of the confiscated evidencefor issuance to the possessor (suspect) thereof;

m. The seizing officer (normally the poseur-buyer) and the evidence custodian must mark the evidence with their initials and also indicate
the date, time and place the evidence was confiscated/seized;

n. Take photographs of the evidence while in the process of taking the inventory, especially during weighing, and if possible under
existing conditions, the registered weight of the evidence on the scale must be focused by the camera; and

o. Only the evidence custodian shall secure and preserve the evidence in an evidence bag or in appropriate container and thereafter deliver the same to
the PNP CLG for laboratory examination. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Chapter 4, Rule 37 of the 2013 Revised Philippine National Police (PNP) Operational Procedures 33applicable during the pre-amendment of Section 21
provides:

37.3 Handling, Custody and Disposition of Evidence

a. In the handling, custody and disposition of evidence, the provision of Section 21, RA 9165 and its IRR shall be strictly observed.

b. The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the personls from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

c. The physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or
at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

d. Photographs of the pieces of evidence must be taken upon discovery without moving or altering its position in the place where it was situated,
kept or hidden, including the process of recording the inventory and the weighing of dangerous drugs, and if possible under existing
conditions, with the registered weight of the evidence on the scale focused by the camera, in the presence of persons required, as provided
under Section 21, Art II, RA 9165. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Further, the Revised PNP Manual on Anti-Illegal Drugs Operation and Investigation 34 (2014 AIDSOTF Manual) similarly requires strict compliance with
the provisions:
Section 2-6 Handling, Custody and Disposition of Drug and Non-Drug Evidence

2.33 During handling, custody and disposition of evidence, provisions of Section 21, RA 9165 and its IRR as amended by RA 10640 shall
be strictly observed.

2.34 Photographs of pieces of evidence must be taken immediately upon discovery of such, without moving or altering its original position including the
process of recording the inventory and the weighing of illegal drugs in the presence of required witnesses, as stipulated in Section 21, Art II, RA 9165,
as amended by RA 10640. xxxx
a. Drug Evidence.

1) Upon seizure or confiscation of illegal drugs or CPECs, laboratory equipment,


apparatus and paraphernalia, the operating Unit's Seizing Officer/Inventory
Officer must conduct the physical inventory, markings and photograph the same
in the place of operation in the presence of:

(a) The suspect/s or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized or his/her representative or counsel;

(b) With an elected Public Official; and

(c) Any representatives from the Department of Justice or Media who shall affix
their signatures and who shall be given copies of the inventory.

2) For seized or recovered drugs covered by Search Warrants, the inventory must
be conducted in the place where the Search Warrant was served.

3) For warrantless seizures like buy-bust operations, inventory and taking of


photographs should be done at the nearest Police Station or Office of the
apprehending Officer or Team.

4) If procedures during the inventory were not properly observed, as


stipulated in Section 21, RA 9165 as amended by RA 10640, law
enforcers must make a justification in writing for non-observance of the
same to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are not tainted. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under Sections Section 3-1(3.1)(b)(6) and (3.1)(b)(7) of the 2014 AIDSOTF Manual, strict compliance is similarly demanded from police officers, thus:

6) During the actual physical inventory, the Seizing Officer must mark, and photograph
the seized/recovered pieces of evidence in accordance with the provision of Section
21 of RA 9165 as amended by RA 10640 in the presence of:
(a) The suspect or person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized
or his/her representative or counsel;
(b) With an elected Public Official; and
(c) Any representatives from the Department of Justice or Media who shall affix their
signatures and who shall be given copies of the inventory.

(Note: The presence of the above-mentioned witnesses shall only be required


during the physical inventory of the confiscated items. If in case, witnesses
mentioned above are absent, same should be recorded in the report.

7) In warrantless searches and seizures like buy-bust operations, the inventory and
taking of photographs shall be made at the nearest Police Station or Office of the
Apprehending Officer or Team whichever is practicable, however, concerned police
personnel must execute a written explanation to justify, non-compliance of the
prescribed rules on inventory under Section 21, RA 9165 as amended by RA 10640.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied )
The Court has ruled in People v. Zheng Bai Hui 35 that it will not presume to set an a priori basis of what detailed acts police authorities might credibly
undertake and carry out in their entrapment operations. However, given the police operational procedures, it strains credulity why the police officers
could not have (1) ensured the presence ofthe required witnesses, or at the very least (2) marked, photographed, and physically inventoried the seized
items pursuant to the provisions of their own operational procedures. 36

To my mind, therefore, while no a priori basis for the conduct of a valid buy-bust operation is set, the noncompliance of the police with their own
procedures implicates (1) the operation of the saving clause and (2) the appreciation of the presumption of regularity.

With this in mind, anything short of observance and compliance by the PDEA and police authorities with the positive requirements of the law, and even
with their own internal procedures, means that they have not performed their duties. If they did, then it would not be difficult for the prosecution to
acknowledge the lapses and justify the same - it needs merely to present the justification in writing required to be executed by the police under
Sections 2-6(2.33)(a)(4) and 3-1(3.1)(b)(7) of the 2014 AIDSOTF Manual. After which, the court can proceed to determine whether the prosecution
had credibly explained the noncompliance so as to comply with the first prong of the saving mechanism. I submit that without a justification being
offered, the finding that the integrity and probative weight of the seized items are preserved can only satisfy the second prong and will not trigger the
saving clause.
It then becomes error to fill the lacuna in the prosecution's evidence with the presumption of regularity, when there clearly is no established fact from
which the presumption may arise. As such, the evidence of the State has not overturned the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.37

Based on these premises, I vote to GRANT the instant appeal and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 23,
2017 finding accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

Endnotes:

1
People v. Magat, 588 Phil.395, 402 (2008).

2
People v. Dumangay, 581 Phil.730, 739 (2008).

3
Id.

4
People v. Santos, Jr., 562 Phil. 458, 471 (2007).

5
People v. Crispo, G.R. No. 230065, March 14, 2018, p. 11; People v. Ana, G.R. No. 230070, March 14, 2018, p. 7; People v. Lumaya, G.R. No.
231983, March 7, 2018, p. 12;People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 233744, February 28, 2018, p. 9; People v. Manansala, G.R. No. 229092, February 21, 2018,
p. 9; People v. Guieb, G.R. No. 233100, February 14,2018, p. 9; People v. Paz, G.R. No. 229512, January 31,2018, p. 11; People v. Miranda,G.R. No.
229671, January 31,2018, p. 11; People v. Jugo, G.R. No. 231792, January 29, 2018, p. 9; People v. Mamangon, G.R. No. 229102, January 29, 2018,
p. 9; People v. Calibod, G.R. No. 230230, November 20, 2017, p. 9; People v. Ching, G.R. No. 223556, October 9, 2017, p. 10; People v.
Geronimo, G.R. No. 225500, September 11,2017, p. 9;People v. Macapundag, G.R. No. 225965, March 13, 2017, 820 SCRA 204, 215; Gamboa v.
People, 799 Phil. 584, 597 (2016); see also People v. Dela Victoria, G.R. No. 233325, April 16, 2018, p. 10; People v. Bintaib, G.R. No. 217805, April 2,
2018; People v. Segundo,G.R. No. 205614, July 26, 2017, p. 17.

6
736 Phil. 749 (2014).

7
Id. at 764.

8
See People v. Cayas, 789 Phil. 70,79 (2016); People v. Havana, 776 Phil. 462,475 (2016).

9
See id. at 80.

10
R.A. 9165, Sec. 21(1), as amended by R.A. 10640.

11
See People v. Alagarme, 754 Phil. 449,461 (2015).

12
See People v. Sumili, 753 Phil. 343, 352 (2015).

13
See People v. Capuno, 655 Phil.226, 240-241 (2011); People v. Garcia, 599 Phil.416, 432-433 (2009); People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 199271, October
19, 2016, 806 SCRA 513, 536-537.

14
725 Phil.268 (2014 ),

15
Id. at 286.

16
G.R. No. 179749, March 1, 2017, 819 SCRA 10.

17
Id. at 13.

18
G.R. No. 208093, February 20, 2017, 818 SCRA 122.

19
Id. at 142; underscoring supplied.

20
Supra note 13.

21
Id. at 536.

22
Ponencia, pp. 15-16.

23
Id. at 13; emphasis omitted.

24
Id., citing People v. Sipin, G.R. No. 224290, June 11, 2018, p. 17.

25
RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m) provides: "That official duty has been regularly performed."

26
People v. Mendoza, supra note 6, at 770.

27
Id.

28
718 Phil. 352 (2013).

29
Id. at 366.

30
590 Phil.214 (2008).

31
Id. at 242 243.

32
PNPM-D-0-3-1-99 [NG], the precursor anti-illegal drug operations manual prior to the 2010 and 2014 AIDSOTF Manual.

33
PNP Handbook, PNPM-00-DS-3-2-13, December 2013.

34
PNP Manual, PNPM-D-0-2-14 (DO), September 20l4.

35
393 Phil. 68, 133 (2000).

36
Note also that the same PNPDEM lays down the guidelines for preparation in buy-bust operations, including the preparation of inventory and
photographing equipment, save only from the a priori basis consideration above.

37
See People v. Barte, supra note 16, at 22.

37
See People v. Barte, supra note 16, at 22.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 195419 October 12, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH, RONNIE ARINGOY y MASION, and NESTOR RELAMPAGOS (at large),Accused.
HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH and RONNIE ARINGOY Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a consolidated criminal case filed against the accused-appellants for the crimes of Illegal Recruitment (Criminal Case No.
21930) and Trafficking in Persons (Criminal Case No. 21908).

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, in its Decision dated 29 November 2005 (RTC Decision), 1 found accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate,
and sentenced each of the accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment plus payment of fines and damages. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals (CA) in Cagayan de Oro, in its Decision dated 26 February 2010 (CA Decision),2 affirmed in toto the RTC Decision. The
accused-appellants appealed to this Court by filing a Notice of Appeal3 in accordance with Section 3(c), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

The Facts

The findings of fact of the RTC, which were affirmed in toto by the CA, are as follows:

In the evening of June 3, 2005, while Lolita Sagadsad Plando, 23 years old, single, was in Tumaga, Zamboanga City on her way to the
house of her grandfather, she met Ronnie Masion Aringoy and Rachel Aringoy Cañete. Ronnie greeted Lolita, "Oy, it’s good you are
here" ("oy, maayo kay dia ka"). Rachel asked Lolita if she is interested to work in Malaysia. x x x Lolita was interested so she gave her
cellphone number to Ronnie. After their conversation, Lolita proceeded to her grandfather’s house.

xxx

On June 4, 2005, at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning, Lolita received a text message from Ronnie Aringoy inviting her to go to the
latter’s house. At 7:30 in the morning, they met at Tumaga on the road near the place where they had a conversation the night before.
Ronnie brought Lolita to the house of his sister in Tumaga. Lolita inquired what job is available in Malaysia. Ronnie told her that she will
work as a restaurant entertainer. All that is needed is a passport. She will be paid 500 Malaysian ringgits which is equivalent to
₱7,000.00 pesos in Philippine currency. Lolita told Ronnie that she does not have a passport. Ronnie said that they will look for a
passport so she could leave immediately. Lolita informed him that her younger sister, Marife Plando, has a passport. Ronnie chided her
for not telling him immediately. He told Lolita that she will leave for Malaysia on June 6, 2005 and they will go to Hadja Jarma Lalli who
will bring her to Malaysia. Ronnie sent a text message to Lalli but the latter replied that she was not in her house. She was at the city
proper.

On June 5, 2005, at about 6:00 o’clock in the evening, Ronnie Aringoy and Rachel Aringoy Cañete arrived on board a tricycle driven by
Ronnie at the house where Lolita was staying at Southcom Village. Ronnie asked if Lolita already had a passport. Lolita said that she
will borrow her sister’s passport. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita went to Buenavista where Lolita’s other sister, Gina Plando was staying.
Her sister Marife Plando was there at that time. Lolita asked Marife to let her use Marife’s passport. Marife refused but Lolita got the
passport. Marife cried. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita proceeded to Tumaga. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita went to the house of Hadja Jarma
Lalli just two hundred meters away from the house of Ronnie in Tumaga. Ronnie introduced Lolita to Hadja Jarma, saying "Ji, she is
also interested in going to Malaysia." Lolita handed a passport to Hadja Jarma telling her that it belongs to her sister Marife Plando.
Hadja Jarma told her it is not a problem because they have a connection with the DFA (Department of Foreign Affairs) and Marife’s
picture in the passport will be substituted with Lolita’s picture. Nestor Relampagos arrived driving an owner-type jeep. Hadja Jarma
introduced Nestor to Lolita as their financier who will accompany them to Malaysia. x x x Lolita noticed three other women in Hadja
Jarma’s house. They were Honey, about 20 years old; Michele, 19 years old, and another woman who is about 28 years old. The
women said that they are from Ipil, Sibugay Province. Ronnie told Lolita that she will have many companions going to Malaysia to work.
They will leave the next day, June 6, and will meet at the wharf at 2:30 in the afternoon.

On June 6, 2005, Lolita went to Zamboanga City wharf at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon bringing a bag containing her make-up and
powder. She met at the wharf Hadja Jarma Lalli, Ronnie Aringoy, Honey and Michele. Ronnie gave to Lolita her boat ticket for the
vessel M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan, Malaysia; a passport in the name of Marife Plando but with Lolita’s picture on it, and
₱1,000.00 in cash. Hadja Jarma, Lolita, Honey, Michele and two other women boarded the boat M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan.
Ronnie Aringoy did not go with them. He did not board the boat. x x x After the boat sailed, Hadja Jarma Lalli and Nestor Relampagos
approached Lolita and her companions. Nestor told them that they will have a good job in Malaysia as restaurant entertainers. They will
serve food to customers. They will not be harmed.

M/V Mary Joy arrived at the port of Sandakan, Malaysia at 10:00 o’clock in the morning of June 7, 2005. After passing through the
immigration office, Hadja Jarma Lalli, Nestor Relampagos, Lolita, Honey, Michele and two other women boarded a van for Kota
Kinabalu. x x x At the hotel, Nestor Relampagos introduced to Lolita and her companions a Chinese Malay called "Boss" as their
employer. After looking at the women, "Boss" brought Lolita, Honey, Diane and Lorraine to a restaurant near the hotel. Diane and
Lorraine were also on baord M/V Mary Joy when it left the port of Zamboanga for Sandakan on June 6, 2005. When they were already
at the restaurant, a Filipina woman working there said that the place is a prostitution den and the women there are used as prostitutes.
Lolita and her companions went back to the hotel. They told Hadja Jarma and Nestor that they do not like to work as prostitutes. x x x
After about five minutes, another person called "boss" arrived. x x x [T]hey were fetched by a van at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening
and brought to Pipen Club owned by "Boss Awa", a Malaysian. At the club, they were told that they owe the club 2,000 ringgits each as
payment for the amount given by the club to Hadja Jarma Lalli and Nestor Relampagos. They will pay for the said amount by
entertaining customers. The customers will pay 300 ringgits for short time services of which 50 ringgits will go to the entertainer, and
500 ringgits for over night service of which 100 ringgits will be given to the entertainer. Pipen Club is a big club in a two-storey building.
There were about 100 women working in the club, many of them were Filipina women.
Lolita Plando was forced to work as entertainer at Pipen Club. She started working at 8:30 in the evening of June 14, 2005. She was
given the number 60 which was pinned on her. That night, she had her first customer who selected her among the other women at the
club. He was a very big man, about 32 years old, a Chinese-Malay who looked like a wrestler. The man paid for short time service at
the counter. Lolita was given by the cashier a small pink paper. She was instructed to keep it. A small yellow paper is given to the
entertainer for overnight services. The customer brought Lolita to a hotel. She did not like to go with him but a "boss" at the club told her
that she could not do anything. At the hotel, the man poked a gun at Lolita and instructed her to undress. She refused. The man boxed
her on the side of her body. She could not bear the pain. The man undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. He had sexual
intercourse with her every fifteen minutes or four times in one hour. When the customer went inside the comfort room, Lolita put on her
clothes and left. The customer followed her and wanted to bring her back to the hotel but Lolita refused. At about 1:00 o’clock in the
morning of June 15, 2005, Lolita was chosen by another customer, a tall dark man, about 40 years old. The customer paid for an
overnight service at the counter and brought Lolita to Mariner Hotel which is far from Pipen Club. At the hotel, the man told Lolita to
undress. When she refused, the man brought her to the comfort room and bumped her head on the wall. Lolita felt dizzy. The man
opened the shower and said that both of them will take a bath. Lolita’s clothes got wet. She was crying. The man undressed her and
had sexual intercourse with her. They stayed at the hotel until 11:00 o’clock in the morning of June 15, 2005. The customer used Lolita
many times. He had sexual intercourse with her every hour.

Lolita worked at Pipen Club from June 14 to July 8, 2005. Every night, a customer used her. She had at least one customer or more a
night, and at most, she had around five customers a night. They all had sexual intercourse with her. On July 9, 2005, Lolita was able to
contact by cellphone at about 10:00 o’clock in the morning her sister Janet Plando who is staying at Sipangkot Felda x x x. Janet is
married to Said Abubakar, an Indonesian national who is working as a driver in the factory. x x x Lolita told Janet that she is in Labuan,
Malaysia and beg Janet to save her because she was sold as a prostitute. Janet told Lolita to wait because her husband will go to
Pipen Club to fetch Lolita at 9:00 o’clock that evening of that day. x x x She told Janet to instruct her husband to ask for No. 60 at Pipen
Club. x x x At 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Lolita was told by Daddy Richard, one of the bosses at the club, that a customer requested
for No. 60. The man was seated at one of the tables. Lolita approached the man and said, "good evening." The man asked her is she is
the sister of Janet Plando. Lolita replied that she is, and asked the man if he is the husband of her sister. He said, "yes." The man had
already paid at the counter. He stood up and left the place. Lolita got her wallet and followed him. x x x Lolita told her sister about her
ordeal. She stayed at her sister’s house until July 22, 2005. On July 21, 2005 at 7:00 o’clock in the evening, a policeman went to her
sisters house and asked if there is a woman staying in the house without a passport. Her sister told the policeman that she will send
Lolita home on July 22. At dawn on July 22, Lolita and her brother-in-law took a taxi from Sipangkot Felda to Mananamblas where Lolita
will board a speedboat to Sibuto, Tawi-Tawi. x x x

Upon arrival in Zamboanga City on July 24, 2005, Lolita went directly to the house of her eldest sister Alejandra Plando Maywila at Sta.
Catalina, Zamboanga City. She left her things at her sister’s house and immediately went to the sister of Ronnie Aringoy in Tumaga.
Ronnie was not there. She asked Russel, niece of Ronnie, to call for the latter. Ronnie arrived and said to her, "so you are here, you
arrived already." He said he is not involved in what happened to her. Lolita asked Ronnie to accompany her to the house of Nestor
Relampagos because she has something to get from him. Ronnie refused. He told Lolita not to let them know that she had already
arrived from Malaysia.

Lolita was advised to file a complaint with the police regarding her ordeal in Malaysia. On August 2, 2005, at past 9:00 o’clock in the
morning, Lolita Plando went to Zamboanga Police Office at Gov. Lim Avenue to file her complaint. x x x

In her Counter-Affidavit (Exh. "1"; "1-A"-Lalli), Hadja Jarma Lalli admitted that she met Lolita Plando on June 6, 2005 on board M/V
Mary Joy while the said vessel was at sea on its way to Sandakan, Malaysia. The meeting was purely coincidental. By coincidence
also, Hadja Jarma, Nestor Relampagos and Lolita Plando boarded the same van for Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. Upon arrival, they parted
ways. They did not see each other anymore at Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. She did not know what happened to them. She went to Kota
Kinabalu to visit his son-in-law. She denied having recruited Lolita Plando for employment abroad (Exh. "1"; "1-A"). x x x

In his Counter-Affidavit (Exh. "1"-Aringoy), Ronnie Aringoy affirmed that he personally knows Lolita Plando since she was a teenager
and he knows for a fact that her name is Cristine and not Marife "as she purports it to appear." Sometime in the first week of June 2005,
Lolita borrowed ₱1,000.00 from Ronnie because she wanted to go to Malaysia to work as a guest relation officer (GRO). Ronnie lent
her ₱1,000.00. He told her that he knows "a certain Hadja Jarma Lalli, distant neighbor, who frequents to Malaysia and with whom she
can ask pertinent information on job opportunities." The entries in Philippine Passport No. MM401136 issued to Hadja Jarma Lalli on
January 29, 2004 (Exh. "2"; "2-A" to "2-Q") showed that she traveled to Malaysia no less than nine (9) times within the period from
March 2004 to June 2005.

xxx

Nora Mae Adling, ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of the vessel M/V Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan,
Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane 3, testified that Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to Sandakan, not only
for herself but also for other women passengers.

xxx

Ronnie Aringoy submitted the Affidavit of his witness Rachel Cañete (Exh. "2") and the Joint Affidavits of witnesses Mercedita Salazar
and Estrella Galgan. Rachel Canete declared that Lolita Plando whom she knows as Cristine Plando worked as a GRO (guest relation
officer) and massage attendant at Magic 2 Videoke and Massage Parlor, that Lolita Plando has four children sired by different men; and
that she knows for a fact that Lolita Plando has been going to and from Malaysia to work in bars. When she testified in court, Rachel did
not present other evidence to substantiate her allegations. Mercedita Salazar and Estrella Galgan declared in their Joint Affidavit that
Lolita Plando who is known to them as Marife Plando was their co-worker as massage attendant and GRO (guest relation officer) at
Magic 2 Massage Parlor and Karaoke bar where she used the names Gina Plando and Cristine Plando. She worked in the said
establishment for nine months from February to October 2002. She has four children from four different men. No other evidence was
submitted in court to prove their assertions.4

The Decision of the Trial Court

The Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision on 29 November 2005, with its dispositive portion declaring:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH and RONNIE ARINGOY y MASION GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 21908 of the Crime of Trafficking in Persons defined in Section 3(a) and penalized under
Section 10(c) in relation to Sections 4(a) and 6(c) of Republic Act No. 9208 known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" and
in Criminal Case No. 21930 of the crime of Illegal Recruitment defined in Section 6 and penalized under Section 7(b) of Republic Act
No. 8042 known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995" and SENTENCES each of said accused:

1. In Criminal Case No. 21908, to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of ₱2,000,000.00 pesos;

2. In Criminal Case No. 21930, to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00 pesos;

3. To pay the offended party Lolita Plando y Sagadsad, jointly and severally, the sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

4. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.5

The trial court did not find credible the denials of the accused-appellants over the candid, positive and convincing testimony of
complainant Lolita Plando (Lolita). The accused, likewise, tried to prove that Lolita was a Guest Relations Officer (GRO) in the
Philippines with four children fathered by four different men. However, the trial court found these allegations irrelevant and immaterial to
the criminal prosecution. These circumstances, even if true, would not exempt or mitigate the criminal liability of the accused. The trial
court found that the accused, without a POEA license, conspired in recruiting Lolita and trafficking her as a prostitute, resulting in
crimes committed by a syndicate.6 The trial court did not pronounce the liability of accused-at-large Nestor Relampagos (Relampagos)
because jurisdiction was not acquired over his person.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On 26 February 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC Decision and found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming in toto the RTC Decision.

The Ruling of this Court

We dismiss the appeal for lack of merit.

We modify and increase the payment of damages in the crime of Trafficking in Persons from ₱50,000 to ₱500,000 for moral damages
and ₱50,000 to ₱100,000 for exemplary damages.

Grounds for Appeal

In his Appeal Brief,7 Ronnie Aringoy (Aringoy) admits that he referred Lolita to a certain Hadja Jarma Lalli (Lalli), Aringoy’s neighbor
who frequents Malaysia and from whom Lolita could ask pertinent information on job opportunities.8 Aringoy claims that he learned later
that Lolita left for Malaysia.9 He denies knowing Relampagos to whom Lolita paid ₱28,000 as placement fee for finding her work in
Malaysia.10

Aringoy presented three witnesses: his niece Rachel Aringoy Cañete (Rachel), Mercedita Salazar (Mercedita), and Estrella Galgan
(Estrella). In her testimony, Rachel declared that: (1) Lolita is a GRO and Massage Attendant at Magic 2 Videoke and Massage Parlor;
(2) Lolita has four children sired by different men; and (3) Lolita has been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. Mercedita and Estrella,
on the other hand, declared in their testimonies that Lolita was their co-worker as Massage Attendant and GRO in Magic 2 Massage
Parlor and Karaoke Bar from February to October 2002.11

Aringoy assailed the credibility of Lolita’s testimony because of inconsistencies with regard to: (1) Lolita’s grandfather’s status and
name; (2) the persons (Ronnie and Rachel) who approached Lolita to talk about the job opportunity in Malaysia; (3) certain statements
in Lolita’s testimony that were not alleged in her Sworn Statement; (4) payment of placement fee of ₱ 28,000; and (5) names of the
other female recruits who were with Lolita in the boat going to Sandakan and Kota Kinabalu. 12 Aringoy likewise claims that he was
never included in the initial complaint filed by Lolita, and Lolita’s statements about her meetings with him, Lalli and Relampagos on 3, 4,
5 and 6 June 2005 were not corroborated by any witness. 13

On the other hand, in her Appeal Brief,14 Lalli claims that she simply met Lolita on 6 June 2005 on board the ship M/V Mary Joy bound
for Sandakan, Malaysia.15 Lalli denies having met Lolita prior to their meeting on board M/V Mary Joy. 16 Lalli claims she was going to
Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-in-law who was a Malaysian national.17 Lalli further claims that she only spoke to Lolita aboard
the ship for idle conversation to pass away the time. 18 In this conversation, she learned that Lolita was with a party of girls accompanied
by Relampagos, and the latter was bringing them to Malaysia to work as sales ladies. 19 Lalli admits that Lolita, Relampagos and the
other girls rode in Lalli’s van in Sandakan, driven by a friend of Lalli’s son-in-law.20 They all rode together because Relampagos talked
to the van driver, requesting if he and his party of girls could board the van and pay their fare when they reach the city proper of Kota
Kinabalu.21 Lalli boarded the van with Lolita, Relampagos and their companions. 22 Upon reaching her destination, Lalli got off the van,
leaving Lolita, Relampagos and their other companions to continue their journey towards the city proper of Kota Kinabalu. 23 After
spending several days in Malaysia with her daughter and son-in-law, Lalli went to Brunei to visit a cousin on 12 June 2005, and headed
back to Malaysia on 14 June 2005.24

Lalli assails the credibility of Lolita due to inconsistencies in her testimony with regard to: (1) Lolita not being in Southcom Village on 5
June 2005 at 6:00 p.m., as she claimed, but in Buenavista Village; and (2) Lolita’s claim that Lalli and Relampagos on 12 June 2005
brought the girls to Labuan, when in fact, Lalli was already in Brunei on 12 June 2005, as evidenced by the stamp in her passport. 25

Credibility of Testimonies
Both Aringoy and Lalli, in their respective Appeal Briefs, assail the testimony of Lolita due to its alleged inconsistency on immaterial
facts, such as the status of Lolita’s grandfather, the name of the village she was in, the date she was brought to Labuan, Malaysia, and
the like. In a long line of cases, the Court has ruled that inconsistencies pointed out by the accused in the testimony of prosecution
witnesses relating to minor details do not destroy the credibility of witnesses. 26 On the contrary, they indicate that the witnesses were
telling the truth and not previously rehearsed. 27

The clear material inconsistency in this case, however, lies in the testimonies of accused Aringoy and Lalli. Aringoy admitted that he
referred Lolita to a certain Hadja Jarma Lalli, his neighbor who frequents Malaysia and with whom Lolita could ask pertinent information
on job opportunities.28 Lalli, on the other hand, denies having met Lolita prior to their meeting on board M/V Mary Joy on 6 June
2005,29 and claims that her meeting with Lolita was purely coincidental. 30 Lalli admits that, even if she met Relampagos, Lolita and their
companions only on that day on board M/V Mary Joy, she allowed these people to ride with her in Malaysia using the van driven by the
friend of Lalli’s son-in-law.31 Lastly, Lalli claims that she often goes to Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-in-law.32 However, this
does not explain why Lalli purchased boat tickets, not only for herself, but for the other women passengers going to Malaysia.33 From
March 2004 to June 2005, Lalli traveled to Malaysia no less than nine (9) times. 34 Nora Mae Adling, ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping
Lines, owner of the vessel M/V Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane 3, testified in
open court that "Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to Sandakan, not only for herself but also for other women
passengers."35 Clearly, it is not Lolita’s testimony that is materially inconsistent, but the testimonies of Lalli and Aringoy.

Aringoy presented his witnesses Rachel, Mercedita and Estrella to impeach the credibility of Lolita by alleging that Lolita was a
Massage Attendant and GRO in a massage parlor and videoke bar. His witness Rachel further declared that Lolita, at the young age of
23 years, already had four children sired by four different men, and had been previously travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. These
bare allegations were not supported by any other evidence. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Lolita previously worked in a
Karaoke Bar and Massage Parlor and that she had four children from different men, such facts cannot constitute exempting or
mitigating circumstances to relieve the accused from their criminal liabilities. It does not change the fact that the accused recruited
Lolita to work in Malaysia without the requisite POEA license, thus constituting the crime of illegal recruitment. Worse, the accused
deceived her by saying that her work in Malaysia would be as restaurant entertainer, when in fact, Lolita would be working as a
prostitute, thus, constituting the crime of trafficking.

The facts found by the trial court, as affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, are, as a general rule, conclusive upon this Court, in the
absence of any showing of grave abuse of discretion.36 The Court, however, may determine the factual milieu of cases or controversies
under specific circumstances, such as:

(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;

(4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts;

(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;

(9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
and

(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. 37

In this case, none of these exceptions to the general rule on conclusiveness of facts are applicable. The Court gives weight and respect
to the trial court’s findings in criminal prosecution because the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses in person and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 38 For this reason, the Court adopts the
findings of fact of the trial court, as affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, there being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
lower courts.

Criminal Case No. 21930 (Illegal Recruitment)

Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042) defines illegal recruitment, as follows:

[I]llegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referring, contact services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by
a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines.

xxx

Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.

xxx
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, defines "authority" as
follows:

"Authority" means a document issued by the Department of Labor authorizing a person or association to engage in recruitment and
placement activities as a private recruitment entity.

Section 7 of RA 8042 provides for the penalty of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate (which constitutes economic sabotage),
as follows:

(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) nor more than One million
pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined therein.

It is clear that a person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement activities without the requisite authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE), whether for profit or not, is engaged in illegal recruitment.39 The Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), an agency under DOLE created by Executive Order No. 797 to take over the duties of the Overseas
Employment Development Board, issues the authority to recruit under the Labor Code. The commission of illegal recruitment by three
or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another is deemed committed by a syndicate and constitutes economic
sabotage,40 for which the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than ₱ 500,000 but not more than ₱ 1,000,000 shall be
imposed.41

The penalties in Section 7 of RA 8042 have already been amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 10022, and have been increased
to a fine of not less than ₱ 2,000,000 but not more than ₱ 5,000,000. However, since the crime was committed in 2005, we shall apply
the penalties in the old law, RA 8042.

In People v. Gallo,42 the Court enumerated the elements of syndicated illegal recruitment, to wit:

1. the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13(b), or
any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code;

2. he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of
workers; and

3. the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.43

Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines defines recruitment and placement as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not, provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee,
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."

Clearly, given the broad definition of recruitment and placement, even the mere act of referring someone for placement abroad can be
considered recruitment. Such act of referral, in connivance with someone without the requisite authority or POEA license, constitutes
illegal recruitment. In its simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give
the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes. 44

In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, found Lalli, Aringoy and Relampagos to have conspired and confederated
with one another to recruit and place Lolita for work in Malaysia, without a POEA license. The three elements of syndicated illegal
recruitment are present in this case, in particular: (1) the accused have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the accused engaged in this activity of recruitment and placement by
actually recruiting, deploying and transporting Lolita to Malaysia; and (3) illegal recruitment was committed by three persons (Aringoy,
Lalli and Relampagos), conspiring and confederating with one another.

Aringoy claims and admits that he only referred Lolita to Lalli for job opportunities to Malaysia. Such act of referring, whether for profit or
not, in connivance with someone without a POEA license, is already considered illegal recruitment, given the broad definition of
recruitment and placement in the Labor Code.

Lalli, on the other hand, completely denies any involvement in the recruitment and placement of Lolita to Malaysia, and claims she only
met Lolita for the first time by coincidence on board the ship M/V Mary Joy. Lalli’s denial does not deserve credence because it
completely conflicts with the testimony of Aringoy who claims he referred Lolita to Lalli who had knowledge of the job opportunities in
Malaysia.

The conflicting testimonies of Lalli and Aringoy on material facts give doubt to the truth and veracity of their stories, and strengthens the
credibility of the testimony of Lolita, despite allegations of irrelevant inconsistencies.

No improper motive could be imputed to Lolita to show that she would falsely testify against the accused. The absence of evidence as
to an improper motive entitles Lolita’s testimony to full faith and credit. 45

Aringoy claims that no conspiracy existed in illegal recruitment, as he denies even knowing Relampagos, who is currently at-large. Lalli
denies any involvement in the illegal recruitment, and claims that she only met Relampagos through Lolita on board the ship M/V Mary
Joy on 6 June 2005, and learned that Relampagos was bringing Lolita and their other girl companions to Malaysia to work as sales
ladies.

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it."
In People v. Lago,46 the Court discussed conspiracy in this wise:

The elements of conspiracy are the following: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) the agreement concerned the
commission of a felony, and (3) the execution of the felony was decided upon. Proof of the conspiracy need not be based on direct
evidence, because it may be inferred from the parties’ conduct indicating a common understanding among themselves with respect to
the commission of the crime. Neither is it necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit
agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or objective to be carried out. The conspiracy may be deduced from the mode
or manner in which the crime was perpetrated; it may also be inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose
and design, concerted action and community of interest. 47

In this case, Lolita would not have been able to go to Malaysia if not for the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos. First, it
was Aringoy who knew Lolita, since Aringoy was a neighbor of Lolita’s grandfather. It was Aringoy who referred Lolita to Lalli, a fact
clearly admitted by Aringoy. Second, Lolita would not have been able to go to Malaysia if Lalli had not purchased Lolita’s boat ticket to
Malaysia. This fact can be deduced from the testimony of Nora Mae Adling (Nora), ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of
the vessel M/V Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane 3. Nora testified in open court
that "Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to Sandakan, not only for herself but also for other women passengers."
Lalli’s claim that she only goes to Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-in-law does not explain the fact why she bought the boat
tickets of the other women passengers going to Malaysia. In fact, it appears strange that Lalli visited Malaysia nine (9) times in a span
of one year and three months (March 2004 to June 2005) just to visit her daughter and son-in-law. In Malaysia, it was Relampagos who
introduced Lolita and her companions to a Chinese Malay called "Boss" as their first employer. When Lolita and her companions went
back to the hotel to tell Relampagos and Lalli that they did not want to work as prostitutes, Relampagos brought Lolita and the girls on
board a van to Sangawan China Labuan, where they stayed in a room for one night. The next day, they were picked up by a van and
brought to Pipen Club, where Lolita and her companions worked as prostitutes. To date, accused Relampagos is at large and has not
been brought under the jurisdiction of the courts for his crimes.

Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention or the
institution or continuance of criminal proceedings.48 The unexplained flight of an accused person may as a general rule be taken into
consideration as evidence having a tendency to establish his guilt.49 Clearly, in this case, the flight of accused Relampagos, who is still
at-large, shows an indication of guilt in the crimes he has been charged.

It is clear that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos, Lolita was recruited and deployed to Malaysia to work as
a prostitute. Such conspiracy among Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos could be deduced from the manner in which the crime was
perpetrated – each of the accused played a pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of illegal recruitment, and evinced a joint common
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.

For these reasons, this Court affirms the CA Decision, affirming the RTC Decision, declaring accused Ronnie Aringoy y Masion and
Hadja Jarma Lalli y Purih guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate in Criminal Case
No. 21930, with a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱ 500,000 imposed on each of the accused.

Criminal Case No. 21908 (Trafficking in Persons)

Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 (RA 9208), otherwise known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, defines Trafficking in
Persons, as follows:

Trafficking in Persons – refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving
of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which
includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Section 4 of RA 9208 enumerates the prohibited acts of Trafficking in Persons, one of which is:

(a) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those done under the pretext of
domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage.

The crime of Trafficking in Persons is qualified when committed by a syndicate, as provided in Section 6(c) of RA 9208:

(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.

Section 10(c) of RA 9208 provides for the penalty of qualified trafficking:

(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than
Two million pesos (₱2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (₱5,000,000.00).

The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act is a new law passed last 26 May 2003, designed to criminalize the act of trafficking in persons for
prostitution, sexual exploitation, foced labor and slavery, among others.

In this case, Aringoy claims that he cannot be convicted of the crime of Trafficking in Persons because he was not part of the group that
transported Lolita from the Philippines to Malaysia on board the ship M/V Mary Joy. In addition, he presented his niece, Rachel, as
witness to testify that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. On the other hand, Lalli denies any involvement in the
recruitment and trafficking of Lolita, claiming she only met Lolita for the first time on board M/V Mary Joy going to Malaysia.
The testimony of Aringoy’s niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars cannot be given credence. Lolita
did not even have a passport to go to Malaysia and had to use her sister’s passport when Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos first recruited
her. It is questionable how she could have been travelling to Malaysia previously without a passport, as Rachel claims. Moreover, even
if it is true that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the crime of Trafficking in Persons can exist even with the victim’s
consent or knowledge under Section 3(a) of RA 9208.

Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to transportation of victims, but also includes the act of
recruitment of victims for trafficking. In this case, since it has been sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt, as discussed in
Criminal Case No. 21930, that all the three accused (Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to
illegally recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate under RA 9208 because the crime of recruitment for prostitution also
constitutes trafficking.

When an act or acts violate two or more different laws and constitute two different offenses, a prosecution under one will not bar a
prosecution under the other.50 The constitutional right against double jeopardy only applies to risk of punishment twice for the same
offense, or for an act punished by a law and an ordinance.51 The prohibition on double jeopardy does not apply to an act or series of
acts constituting different offenses.

DAMAGES

Lolita claimed actual damages of ₱ 28,000, which she allegedly paid to the accused as placement fee for the work of restaurant
entertainer in Malaysia. The trial court did not award this amount to Lolita. We agree and affirm the trial court’s non-award due to
Lolita’s inconsistent statements on the payment of placement fee. In her sworn statement, Lolita alleged that she paid ₱ 28,000 as
placement fee to Lalli.52 On cross-examination, however, she admitted that she never paid ₱ 28,000 to the accused. 53

We, however, modify and increase the payment of damages in the crime of Trafficking in Persons from ₱ 50,000 to ₱ 500,000 as moral
damages and ₱ 50,000 to ₱ 100,000 as exemplary damages.

The Civil Code describes moral damages in Article 2217:

Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act for omission. 1avv phi 1

Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are awarded in addition to the payment of moral damages, by way of example or correction for
the public good, as stated in the Civil Code:

Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

The payment of ₱ 500,000 as moral damages and ₱ 100,000 as exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a
Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which states:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order
named.
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other
lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute without one’s consent and to be sexually violated four to five times a
day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when she was trafficked as a
prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of
exemplary damages is likewise justified.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 February 2010, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga City dated 29 November 2005, finding accused Lalli and Aringoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate, with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. In Criminal Case No. 21908, each of the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a
fine of ₱ 2,000,000;

2. In Criminal Case No. 21930, each of the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFEIMPRISONMENT and to pay a
fine of ₱ 500,000;

3. Each of the accused is ordered to pay the offended party Lolita Plando y Sagadsad, jointly and severally, the sum of ₱
500,000 as moral damages, and ₱ 100,000 as exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons; and to pay the
costs.

The Court cannot pronounce the liability of accused-at-large Nestor Relampagos as jurisdiction over his person has not been acquired.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1114 dated 3 October 2011.

1 CA rollo, pp. 40-58.

2 Id. at 209-222.

3 Id. at 224-225, 255-256.

4 Id. at 42-53.

5 Id. at 58.
6 Id. at 53-57.

7
Id. at 167-179.

8 Id. at 171.

9 Id. at 172.

10
Id.

11 Id.

12
Id. at 173-174.

13 Id. at 175.

14 Id. at 64-85.

15 Id. at 77.

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Id. at 78.

19 Id.

20
Id. at 79.

21 Id.

22
Id.

23
Id.

24 Id.

25 Id. at 80-83.

26 People v. Martinada, G.R. Nos. 66401-03, 13 February 1991, 194 SCRA 36, 44.

27
Id.

28
CA rollo, p. 171.

29 Id. at 77.

30 Id. at 78.

31 Id. at 79.

32 Id. at 77.

33 Id. at 52.

34
Id. at 51.

35 Id. at 52.

Cosmos Bottling Corporation v. Nagrama, Jr., G.R. No. 164403, 4 March 2008, 547 SCRA 571, 584, citing The
36

Philippine American Life and General Insurance Co. v. Gramaje, 484 Phil. 880 (2004).

37 Reyes v. Court of Appeals (Ninth Division), 328 Phil. 171, 180 (1996) citing Floro v. Llenado, 314 Phil. 715 (1995).

38 Supra note 26 at 41.

39 Section 6, Republic Act No. 8042.

40 Id.
41 Section 7, Republic Act No. 10022.

42
G.R. No. 187730, 29 June 2010, 622 SCRA 439.

43 Id. at 451, citing People v. Soliven, 418 Phil. 777 (2001) and People v. Buli-e, 452 Phil. 129 (2003).

44 People v. Lapis, 439 Phil. 729, 740 (2002).

45
People v. Bodozo, G.R. No. 96621, 21 October 1992, 215 SCRA 33, 37, citing Araneta, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
43527, 3 July 1990, 187 SCRA 123.

46 411 Phil. 52 (2001).

47 Id. at 59, citing People v. Fegidiro, 392 Phil. 36 (2000) and People v. Francisco, 388 Phil. 94 (2000).

48 United States v. Alegado, 25 Phil. 510, 511 (1913).

49 Id.

50 People v. Tac-an, 261 Phil. 728, 746 (1990).

51 Section 21, Article III, 1987 Philippine Constitution.

52 CA rollo, p. 174.

53
Id.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. 138298 November 29, 2000

RAOUL B. DEL MAR, petitioner,


vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, BELLE JAI-ALAI CORPORATION, FILIPINAS GAMING
ENTERTAINMENT TOTALIZATOR CORPORATION, respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 138982 November 29, 2000

FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II and MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, petitioners,


vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, respondent.
JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, intervenor.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

These two consolidated petitions concern the issue of whether the franchise granted to the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) includes the right to manage and operate jai-alai.

First, we scour the significant facts. The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation is a government-owned and controlled
corporation organized and existing under Presidential Decree No. 1869 which was enacted on July 11, 1983. Pursuant to Sections 1
and 10 of P.D. No. 1869, respondent PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as to whether or not it is
authorized by its Charter to operate and manage jai-alai frontons in the country. In its Opinion No. 67, Series of 1996 dated July 15,
1996, the Secretary of Justice opined that "the authority of PAGCOR to operate and maintain games of chance or gambling extends
to jai-alai which is a form of sport or game played for bets and that the Charter of PAGCOR amounts to a legislative franchise for the
purpose." Similar favorable opinions were received by PAGCOR from the Office of the Solicitor General per its letter dated June 3,
1

1996 and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel under its Opinion No. 150 dated June 14, 1996. Thus, PAGCOR started
2

the operation of jai-alai frontons.

On May 6, 1999, petitioner Raoul B. del Mar initially filed in G.R. No. 138298 a Petition for Prohibition to prevent respondent
PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or Basque pelota games, by itself or in agreement with Belle Corporation, on the
ground that the controverted act is patently illegal and devoid of any basis either from the Constitution or PAGCOR’s own Charter.

However, on June 17, 1999, respondent PAGCOR entered into an Agreement with private respondents Belle Jai Alai Corporation
(BELLE) and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation (FILGAME) wherein it was agreed that BELLE will make available
to PAGCOR the required infrastructure facilities including the main fronton, as well as provide the needed funding for jai-alai operations
with no financial outlay from PAGCOR, while PAGCOR handles the actual management and operation of jai-alai. 3
Thus, on August 10, 1999, petitioner Del Mar filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari questioning the validity of said Agreement
on the ground that PAGCOR is without jurisdiction, legislative franchise, authority or power to enter into such Agreement for the
opening, establishment, operation, control and management of jai-alai games.

A little earlier, or on July 1, 1999, petitioners Federico S. Sandoval II and Michael T. Defensor filed a Petition for Injunction, docketed
as G.R. No. 138982, which seeks to enjoin respondent PAGCOR from operating or otherwise managing the jai-alai or Basque pelota
games by itself or in joint venture with Belle Corporation, for being patently illegal, having no basis in the law or the Constitution, and in
usurpation of the authority that properly pertains to the legislative branch of the government. In this case, a Petition in
Intervention was filed by Juan Miguel Zubiri alleging that the operation by PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal because it is not included in the
scope of PAGCOR’s franchise which covers only games of chance.

Petitioners Raoul B. del Mar, Federico S. Sandoval II, Michael T. Defensor, and intervenor Juan Miguel Zubiri, are suing as taxpayers
and in their capacity as members of the House of Representatives representing the First District of Cebu City, the Lone
Congressional District of Malabon-Navotas, the Third Congressional District of Quezon City, and the Third Congressional District of
Bukidnon, respectively.

The bedrock issues spawned by the petitions at bar are:

G.R. No. 138298

Petitioner Del Mar raises the following issues:

I. The respondent PAGCOR has no jurisdiction or legislative franchise or acted with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, in arrogating unto itself the authority or power to open, pursue, conduct, operate, control and
manage jai-alai game operations in the country.

II. x x x Respondent PAGCOR has equally no jurisdiction or authority x x x in executing its agreement with co-respondents
Belle and Filgame for the conduct and management of jai-alai game operations, upon undue reliance on an opinion of the
Secretary of Justice.

III. x x x Respondent PAGCOR has equally no jurisdiction or authority x x x in entering into a partnership, joint venture or
business arrangement with its co-respondents Belle and Filgame, through their agreement x x x. The Agreement was entered
into through manifest partiality and evident bad faith (Sec. 3 (e), RA 3019), thus manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government [Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, RA 3019, Sec. 3 (g)].

IV. x x x Respondent PAGCOR has equally no jurisdiction or authority x x x to award to its co-respondents Belle and Filgame
the right to avail of the tax benefits which, by law, inures solely and exclusively to PAGCOR itself.

V. x x x Respondent PAGCOR has equally no jurisdiction or authority x x x to cause the disbursement of funds for the illegal
establishment, management and operation of jai-alai game operations.

VI. x x x Respondent PAGCOR has equally no jurisdiction or authority x x x to award or grant authority for the establishment,
management and operation of off-fronton betting stations or bookies.

VII. The respondent PAGCOR has no jurisdiction or authority x x x in awarding unto its co-respondents Belle and Filgame,
without public bidding, the subject agreement.

In defense, private respondents BELLE and FILGAME assert:

1. The petition states no cause of action and must be dismissed outright;

2. The petitioner has no cause of action against the respondents, he not being a real party in interest;

3. The instant petition cannot be maintained as a taxpayer suit, there being no illegal disbursement of public funds involved;

4. The instant petition is essentially an action for quo warranto and may only be commenced by the Solicitor General;

5. The operation of jai-alai is well within PAGCOR’s authority to operate and maintain. PAGCOR’s franchise is intended to be
wide in its coverage, the underlying considerations being, that: (1) the franchise must be used to integrate all gambling
operations in one corporate entity (i.e. PAGCOR); and (2) it must be used to generate funds for the government to support its
social impact projects;

6. The agreement executed by, between and among PAGCOR, BJAC and FILGAME is outside the coverage of existing laws
requiring public bidding.

Substantially the same defenses were raised by respondent PAGCOR in its Comment.

G.R. No. 138982

Petitioners contend that:

I. The operation of jai-alai games by PAGCOR is illegal in that:

1) the franchise of PAGCOR does not include the operation of jai-alai since jai-alai is a prohibited activity under the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by P.D. No. 1602 which is otherwise known as the Anti-Gambling Law;
2) jai-alai is not a game of chance and therefore cannot be the subject of a PAGCOR franchise.

II. A franchise is a special privilege that should be construed strictly against the grantee.

III. To allow PAGCOR to operate jai-alai under its charter is tantamount to a license to PAGCOR to legalize and operate any gambling
activity.

In its Comment, respondent PAGCOR avers that:

1. An action for injunction is not among the cases or proceedings originally cognizable by the Honorable Supreme Court,
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. Assuming, arguendo, the Honorable Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition, the petition should be dismissed for
failure of petitioners to observe the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.

3. x x x Petitioners have no legal standing to file a taxpayer’s suit based on their cause of action nor are they the real parties-
in-interest entitled to the avails of the suit.

4. Respondent’s franchise definitely includes the operation of jai-alai.

5. Petitioners have no right in esse to be entitled to a temporary restraining order and/or to be protected by a writ of preliminary
injunction.

The Solicitor General claims that the petition, which is actually an action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, against
an alleged usurpation by PAGCOR of a franchise to operate jai alai, should be dismissed outright because only the Solicitor General or
public prosecutor can file the same; that P.D. No. 1869, the Charter of PAGCOR, authorizes PAGCOR to regulate and operate games
of chance and skill which include jai-alai; and that P.D. No. 1602 did not outlaw jai-alai but merely provided for stiffer penalties to illegal
or unauthorized activities related to jai-alai and other forms of gambling.

We shall first rule on the important procedural issues raised by the respondents.

Respondents in G.R. No. 138982 contend that the Court has no jurisdiction to take original cognizance of a petition for injunction
because it is not one of those actions specifically mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover,
they urge that the petition should be dismissed for failure of petitioners to observe the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and hence, the jurisdiction of the court, are the allegations of the pleading
and the character of the relief sought. A cursory perusal of the petition filed in G.R. No. 138982 will show that it is actually one for
4

Prohibition under Section 2 of Rule 65 for it seeks to prevent PAGCOR from managing, maintaining and operating jai-alai games. Even
assuming, arguendo, that it is an action for injunction, this Court has the discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition at bar if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction. It cannot be
5

gainsaid that the issues raised in the present petitions have generated an oasis of concern, even days of disquiet in view of the public
interest at stake. In Tano, et al. vs. Socrates, et al., this Court did not hesitate to treat a petition for certiorari and injunction as a special
6

civil action for certiorari and prohibition to resolve an issue of far-reaching impact to our people. This is in consonance with our case law
now accorded near religious reverence that rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice such that
when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court has the duty to suspend their operation. 7

Respondents also assail the locus standi or the standing of petitioners to file the petitions at bar as taxpayers and as legislators. First,
they allege that petitioners have no legal standing to file a taxpayer’s suit because the operation of jai-alai does not involve the
disbursement of public funds.

Respondents' stance is not without oven ready legal support. A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. In essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a
8

claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or where petitioners
9 10

seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. 11

In the petitions at bar, the Agreement entered into between PAGCOR and private respondents BELLE and FILGAME will show that all
financial outlay or capital expenditure for the operation of jai-alai games shall be provided for by the latter. Thus, the Agreement
provides, among others, that: PAGCOR shall manage, operate and control the jai-alai operation at no cost or financial risk to it (Sec.
1[A][1]); BELLE shall provide funds, at no cost to PAGCOR, for all capital expenditures (Sec. 1[B][1]); BELLE shall make available to
PAGCOR, at no cost to PAGCOR, the use of the integrated nationwide network of on-line computerized systems (Sec. 1[B][2]);
FILGAME shall make available for use of PAGCOR on a rent-free basis the jai-alai fronton facilities (Sec. 1 [C][1]); BELLE & FILGAME
jointly undertake to provide funds, at no cost to PAGCOR, for pre-operating expenses and working capital (Sec. 1 [D][1]); and that
BELLE & FILGAME will provide PAGCOR with goodwill money in the amount of ₱ 200 million (Sec. 1 [D][2]). In fine, the record is
barren of evidence that the operation and management of jai-alai by the PAGCOR involves expenditure of public money.

Be that as it may, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching significance
to our society, we find and so hold that as members of the House of Representatives, petitioners have legal standing to file the
12

petitions at bar. In the instant cases, petitioners complain that the operation of jai-alai constitutes an infringement by PAGCOR of the
legislature’s exclusive power to grant franchise. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution, so petitioners contend. The
contention commands our concurrence for it is now settled that a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. As presciently stressed in the case
13

of Kilosbayan, Inc., viz:

"We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and
of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and
retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal
standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition x x x."

After hurdling the threshold procedural issues, we now come to the decisive substantive issue of whether PAGCOR's legislative
franchise includes the right to manage and operate jai-alai. The issue is of supreme significance for its incorrect resolution can
14

dangerously diminish the plenary legislative power of Congress, more especially its exercise of police power to protect the morality of
our people. After a circumspect consideration of the clashing positions of the parties, we hold that the charter of PAGCOR does not
give it any franchise to operate and manage jai-alai.

FIRST. A "franchise" is a special privilege conferred upon a corporation or individual by a government duly empowered legally to
grant it. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public
15

control and administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the
government may impose on them in the interest of the public. A franchise thus emanates from a sovereign power and the grant
16 17

is inherently a legislative power. It may, however, be derived indirectly from the state through an agency to which the power has
been clearly and validly delegated. In such cases, Congress prescribes the conditions on which the grant of a franchise may be
18

made. Thus, the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the business, the character
19

and quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are almost always
defined in clear and unequivocal language. In the absence of these defining terms, any claim to a legislative franchise to operate
a game played for bets and denounced as a menace to morality ought to be rejected.

SECOND. A historical study of the creation, growth and development of PAGCOR will readily show that it was never given a
legislative franchise to operate jai-alai.

(2.a) Before the creation of PAGCOR, a 25-year right to operate jai-alai in Manila was given by President Marcos to the Philippine
Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation then controlled by his in-laws, the Romualdez family. The franchise was granted on
October 16, 1975 thru P.D. No. 810 issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers. On that very date, the 25-
year franchise of the prior grantee expired and was not renewed. A few months before, President Marcos had issued P.D. No.
771 dated August 20, 1975, revoking the authority of local government units to issue jai-alai franchises. By these acts, the former
President exercised complete control of the sovereign power to grant franchises.

(2.b) Almost one year and a half after granting the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation a 25-year franchise to operate jai-
alai in Manila, President Marcos created PAGCOR on January 1, 1977 by issuing P.D. No. 1067-A. The decree is entitled
"Creating the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, Defining Its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds therefor and for
Other Purposes." Its Declaration of Policy trumpeted the intent that PAGCOR was created to implement "the policy of the State to
20

centralize and integrate all games of chancenot heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law x x x." One of
its whereas clauses referred to the need to prevent "the proliferation of illegal casinos or clubs conducting games of chance x x x." To 21

achieve this objective, PAGCOR was empowered "to establish and maintain clubs, casinos, branches, agencies or subsidiaries, or
other units anywhere in the Philippines x x x." 22

(2.c) On the same day after creating PAGCOR, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1067-B granting PAGCOR "x x x a Franchise to
Establish, Operate, and Maintain Gambling Casinos on Land or Water Within the Territorial Jurisdiction of the Republic of the
Philippines." Obviously, P.D. No. 1067-A which created the PAGCOR is not a grant of franchise to operate the game of jai-alai. On the
other hand, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1067-B provides the nature and term of PAGCOR’S franchise to maintain gambling casinos (not
a franchise to operate jai-alai), viz:

"SECTION 1. NATURE AND TERM OF FRANCHISE. – Subject to the terms and conditions established in this Decree, the Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation is hereby granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another 25 years, the
right, privilege, and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs and other recreation or amusement places, sports,
gaming pools, i.e., basketball, football, etc., whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines."

Section 2 of the same decree spells out the scope of the PAGCOR franchise to maintain gambling casinos (not a franchise to
operate jai-alai), viz:

"SEC. 2. SCOPE OF FRANCHISE. – In addition to the right and privileges granted it under Sec. 1, this Franchise shall entitle the
franchise holder to do and undertake the following:

(1) Enter into operator’s and/or management contracts with duly registered and accredited company possessing the
knowledge, skill, expertise and facilities to insure the efficient operation of gambling casinos; Provided, That the service fees
of such management and/or operator companies whose services may be retained by the franchise holder of this Franchise
shall not in the aggregate exceed ten (10%) percent of the gross income.

(2) Purchase foreign exchange that may be required for the importation of equipment, facilities and other gambling
paraphernalia indispensably needed or useful to insure the successful operation of gambling casinos.

(3) Acquire the right of way, access to or thru public lands, public waters or harbors, including the Manila Bay Area; such right
to include, but not limited to, the right to lease and/or purchase public lands, government reclaimed lands, as well as land of
private ownership or those leased from the government. This right shall carry with it the privilege of the franchise holder to
utilize piers, quays, boat landings, and such other pertinent and related facilities within these specified areas for use as
landing, anchoring, or berthing sites in connection with its authorized casino operations.

(4) Build or construct structures, buildings, coastways, piers, docks, as well as any other form of land and berthing facilities for
its floating casinos.

(5) To do and perform such other acts directly related to the efficient and successful operation and conduct of games of
chance in accordance with existing laws and decrees."

(2.d) Still on the day after creating PAGCOR, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1067-C amending P.D. Nos. 1067-A
and B. The amendment provides that PAGCOR’s franchise to maintain gambling casinos "x x x shall
become exclusive in character, subject only to the exception of existing franchises and games of chance
heretofore permitted by law, upon the generation by the franchise holder of gross revenues amounting to ₱1.2 billion
and its contribution therefrom of the amount of ₱720 million as the government’s share."

(2.e) On June 2, 1978, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1399 amending P.D. Nos. 1067-A and 1067-B. The
amendments did not change the nature and scope of the PAGCOR franchise to maintain gambling
casinos. Rather, they referred to the Composition of the Board of Directors, Special Condition of
23

Franchise, Exemptions, and Other Conditions.


24 25 26

(2.f) On August 13, 1979, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1632. Again, the amendments did not change a
comma on the nature and scope of PAGCOR’s franchise to maintain gambling casinos. They related to the
allocation of the 60% share of the government where the host area is a city or municipality other than Metro
Manila, and the manner of payment of franchise tax of PAGCOR.
27 28

(2.g) On July 11, 1983, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1869 entitled "Consolidating and Amending P.D. Nos.
1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399 and 1632 Relative to the Franchise and Power of the PAGCOR." As a consolidated
decree, it reiterated the nature and scope of PAGCOR’s existing franchise to maintain gambling casinos (not
a franchise to operate jai-alai), thus:

"SEC. 10. Nature and term of franchise. – Subject to the terms and conditions established in this Decree, the Corporation is hereby
granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years, the rights, privilege and authority to operate
and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e. basketball, football,
lotteries, etc., whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.

SEC. 11. Scope of Franchise. – In addition to the rights and privileges granted it under the preceding Section, this Franchise shall
entitle the corporation to do and undertake the following:

(1) Enter into operating and/or management contracts with any registered and accredited company possessing the knowledge,
skill, expertise and facilities to insure the efficient operation of gambling casinos; provided, that the service fees of such
management and/or operator companies whose services may be retained by the Corporation shall not in the aggregate
exceed ten (10%) percent of the gross income;

(2) Purchase foreign exchange that may be required for the importation of equipment, facilities and other gambling
paraphernalia indispensably needed or useful to insure the successful operation of gambling casinos;

(3) Acquire the right of way or access to or thru public land, public waters or harbors, including the Manila Bay Area; such right
shall include, but not be limited to, the right to lease and/or purchase public lands, government reclaimed lands, as well as
lands of private ownership or those leased from the Government. This right shall carry with it the privilege of the Corporation to
utilize piers, quays, boat landings, and such other pertinent and related facilities within these specified areas for use as
landing, anchoring or berthing sites in connection with its authorized casino operations;

(4) Build or construct structures, buildings, castways, piers, decks, as well as any other form of landing and boarding facilities
for its floating casinos; and

(5) To do and perform such other acts directly related to the efficient and successful operation and conduct of games of
chance in accordance with existing laws and decrees."

(2.h) Then came the 1986 EDSA revolution and the end of the Marcos regime. On May 8, 1987, President Corazon
Aquino issued Executive Order No. 169 repealing P.D. Nos. 810, 1124 and 1966 thus revoking the franchise of the Philippine Jai-
Alai and Amusement Corporation controlled by the Romualdezes to operate jai-alai in Manila. PAGCOR’s franchise to operate
gambling casinos was not revoked. Neither was it given a franchise to operate jai-alai.

THIRD. In light of its legal history, we hold that PAGCOR cannot maintain that section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 grants it a franchise to
operate jai-alai. Section 10 provides:

"SEC. 10 Nature and term of franchise. – Subject to the terms and conditions established in this Decree, the Corporation is hereby
granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years, the rights, privilege and authority to operate
and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e., basketball, football,
lotteries, etc., whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines."

(3.a) P.D. No. 1869 is a mere consolidation of previous decrees dealing with PAGCOR. PAGCOR cannot seek comfort in section 10
as it is not a new provision in P.D. No. 1869 and, from the beginning of its history, was never meant to confer it with a franchise to
operate jai-alai. It is a reiteration of section 1 of P.D. No. 1067-B which provides:

"SECTION 1. Nature and Term of Franchise. – Subject to the terms and conditions established in this Decree, the Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation is hereby granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another 25 years, the
right, privilege, and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs and other recreation or amusement places, sports
gaming pools, i.e., basketball, football, etc., whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines."

(3.b) Plainly, section 1 of P.D. No. 1067-B which was reenacted as section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 is not a grant of legislative franchise to
operate jai-alai. P.D. No. 1067-B is a franchise to maintain gambling casinos alone. The two franchises are as different as day and night
and no alchemy of logic will efface their difference.

(3.c) PAGCOR's stance becomes more sterile when we consider the law's intent. It cannot be the intent of President Marcos to
grant PAGCOR a franchise to operate jai-alai because a year and a half before it was chartered, he issued P.D. No. 810 granting
Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation a 25-year franchise to operate jai-alai in Manila. This corporation is controlled by his in-
laws, the Romualdezes. To assure that this Romualdez corporation would have no competition, President Marcos earlier revoked the
29
power of local governments to grant jai-alai franchises. Thus, PAGCOR’s stance that P.D. No. 1067-B is its franchise to operate jai-
alai, which would have competed with the Romualdezes’ franchise, extends credulity to the limit. Indeed, P.D. No. 1067-A which
created PAGCOR made it crystal clear that it was to implement "the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of
chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law," which included the Philippine Jai-Alai and
Amusement Corporation.

(3.d) There can be no sliver of doubt that under P.D. No. 1869, PAGCOR’s franchise is only to operate gambling casinos and not jai-
alai. This conclusion is compelled by a plain reading of its various provisions, viz:

"SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance
not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:

xxxxxx

(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports, gaming pools (basketball, football,
lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: x x x (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, the evils, malpractices and
corruptions that are normally prevalent in the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct
government involvement.

xxxxxx

TITLE IV – GRANT OF FRANCHISE

SEC. 10. Nature and term of franchise. – Subject to the terms and conditions established in this Decree, the Corporation is hereby
granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years, the rights, privileges and authority to
operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e. basketball,
football, lotteries, etc. whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.

SEC. 11. Scope of Franchise. – In addition to the rights and privileges granted it under the preceding Section, this Franchise shall
entitle the Corporation to do and undertake the following:

(1) Enter into operating and/or management contracts with any registered and accredited company possessing the knowledge, skill,
expertise and facilities to insure the efficient operation of gambling casinos; provided, that the service fees of such management
and/or operator companies whose services may be retained by the Corporation shall not in the aggregate exceed ten (10%) percent of
the gross income;

(2) Purchase foreign exchange that may be required for the importation of equipment, facilities and other gambling paraphernalia
indispensably needed or useful to insure the successful operation of gambling casinos;

(3) Acquire the right of way or access to or thru public land, public waters or harbors x x x. This right shall carry with it the privilege of
the Corporation to utilize x x x such other pertinent and related facilities within these specified areas x x x in connection with its
authorized casino operations;

(4) Build or construct structures, building castways, piers, decks, as well as any other form of landing and boarding facilities for its
floating casinos;

xxxxxx

SEC. 13. Exemptions. –

(1) Customs duties, taxes and other imposts on importations. – All importations of equipment, vehicles, automobiles, boats, ships,
barges, aircraft and such other gambling paraphernalia, including accessories or related facilities, for the sole and exclusive use of
the casinos, the proper and efficient management and administration thereof, and such other clubs. Recreation or amusement places
to be established under and by virtue of this Franchise shall be exempt from the payment of all kinds of customs duties, taxes and other
imposts, including all kinds of fees, levies, or charges of any kind or nature, whether National or Local.

Vessels and/or accessory ferry boats imported or to be imported by any corporation having existing contractual arrangements with the
Corporation, for the sole and exclusive use of the casino or to be used to service the operations and requirements of the
casino, shall likewise be totally exempt from the payment of all customs duties, x x x.

(2) Income and other taxes. – (a) x x x

(b) Others: The exemption herein granted for earnings derived from the operations conducted under the franchise x x x shall inure to
the benefit of and extend to corporation(s) x x x with whom the Corporation or operator has any contractual relationship in
connection with the operations of the casino(s) authorized to be conducted under this Franchise x x x.

(3) Dividend Income. – x x x The dividend income shall not in such case be considered as part of beneficiaries’ taxable income;
provided, however, that such dividend income shall be totally exempted from income or other forms of taxes if invested within six (6)
months from date the dividend income is received, in the following:

(a) operation of the casino(s) or investments in any affiliate activity that will ultimately redound to the benefit of the Corporation or any
other corporation with whom the Corporation has any existing arrangements in connection with or related to the operations of the
casino(s);

xxxxxx
(4) Utilization of Foreign Currencies. – The Corporation shall have the right and authority, solely and exclusively in connection with
the operations of the casino(s), to purchase, receive, exchange and disburse foreign exchange, subject to the following terms and
conditions:

(a) A specific area in the casino(s) or gaming pit shall be put up solely and exclusively for players and patrons utilizing foreign
currencies;

(b) The Corporation shall appoint and designate a duly accredited commercial bank agent of the Central Bank, to handle, administer
and manage the use of foreign currencies in the casino(s);

(c) The Corporation shall provide an office at casino(s) for the employees of the designated bank, agent of the Central Bank, where
the Corporation will maintain a dollar account which will be utilized exclusively for the above purpose and the casino dollar treasury
employees;

xxxxxx

(f) The disbursement, administration, management and recording of foreign exchange currencies used in the casino(s) shall be
carried out in accordance with existing foreign exchange regulations x x x.

SEC. 14. Other Conditions. –

(1) Place. – The Corporation shall conduct the gambling activities or games of chance on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Republic of the Philippines. When conducted on water, the Corporation shall have the right to dock the floating casino(s) in any
part of the Philippines where vessels/boats are authorized to dock under the Customs and Maritime Laws.

(2) Time. – Gambling activities may be held and conducted at anytime of the day or night; provided, however, that in places where
curfew hours are observed, all players and personnel of gambling casinos shall remain within the premises of the casinos.

(3) Persons allowed to play. – x x x

(4) Persons not allowed to play. -

xxxxxx

From these are excepted the personnel employed by the casinos, special guests, or those who at the discretion of the Management
may be allowed to stay in the premises.

TITLE VI – EXEMPTION FROM CIVIL SERVICE LAW

SEC. 16. Exemption. – All position in the Corporation, whether technical, administrative, professional or managerial are exempt from
the provisions of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and shall be governed only by the personnel management policies set by
the Board of Directors. All employees of the casinos and related services shall be classified as "Confidential" appointees.

TITLE VII – TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

SEC. 17. Transitory Provisions. – x x x

SEC. 18. Exemption from Labor Laws. – No union or any form of association shall be formed by all those working as employees of the
casino or related services whether directly or indirectly. For such purpose, all employees of the casinos or related services shall be
classified as "confidential" appointees and their employment thereof, whether by the franchise holder, or the operators, or the
managers, shall be exempt from the provisions of the Labor Code or any implementing rules and regulations thereof."

From its creation in 1977 and until 1999, PAGCOR never alleged that it has a franchise to operate jai-alai. Twenty-two years is
a long stretch of silence. It is inexplicable why it never claimed its alleged franchise for so long a time which could have
allowed it to earn billions of pesos as additional income.

(3.e) To be sure, we need not resort to intellectual jujitsu to determine whether PAGCOR has a franchise to operate jai-alai. It is easy
to tell whether there is a legislative grant or not. Known as the game of a thousand thrills, jai-alai is a different game, hence, the
terms and conditions imposed on a franchisee are spelled out in standard form. A review of some laws and executive orders
granting a franchise to operate jai-alai will demonstrate these standard terms and conditions, viz:

(3.e.1) Commonwealth Act No. 485 (An Act to Permit Bets in the Game of Basque Pelota) – June 18, 1939

"Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

SECTION 1. Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be permissible in the game of Basque pelota, a game
of skill (including the games of pala, raqueta, cestapunta, remonte and mano), in which professional players participate, to make either
direct bets or bets by means of a totalizer; Provided, That no operator or maintainer of a Basque pelota court shall collect as
commission a fee in excess of twelve per centum on such bets, or twelve per centum of the receipts of the totalizer, and of such per
centum three shall be paid to the Government of the Philippines, for distribution in equal shares between the General Hospital and the
Philippine Anti-tuberculosis Society.

SEC. 2. Any person, company or corporation, that shall build a court for Basque pelota games with bets within eighteen months from
the date of the approval of this Act, shall thereunder have the privilege to maintain and operate the said court for a term of twenty-five
years from the date in which the first game with bets shall have taken place. At the expiration of the said term of twenty-five years, the
buildings and the land on which the court and the stadium shall be established, shall become the property of the Government of the
Philippines, without payment.

SEC. 3. The location and design of the buildings that shall be used for the same games of Basque pelota, shall have prior approval of
the Bureau of Public Works and the operator shall pay a license fee of five hundred pesos a year to the city or municipality in which the
establishment shall be situated, in addition to the real-estate tax due on such real property.

SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

ENACTED, without Executive approval, June 18, 1939."

(3.e.2) Executive Order No. 135 (Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Frontons and Basque Pelota Games
[Jai Alai]) – May 4, 1948

"By virtue of the powers vested in me by Commonwealth Act No. 601, entitled An Act to regulate the establishment, maintenance and
operation of places of amusements in chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts, the following rules and regulations
governing frontons and basque pelota games are hereby promulgated:

SECTION 1. Definitions. – Whenever used in this Order and unless the context indicates a different meaning, the following terms shall
bear the meaning indicated herein:

(a) ‘Basque pelota game’ shall include the pelota game with the use of pala, raqueta, cesta punta, remonte and mano, in which
professional players participate.

(b) ‘Fronton’ comprises the court where basque pelota games are played, inlcuding the adjoining structures used in connection with
such games, such as the betting booths and galleries, totalizator equipment, and the grandstands where the public is admitted in
connection with such games.

(c) ‘Pelotari’ is a professional player engaged in playing basque pelota.

(d) ‘Professional player’ is one who plays for compensation.

SEC. 2. Supervision over the establishment and operation of frontons and basque pelota games. – Subject to the administrative control
and supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, city or municipal mayors shall exercise supervision over the establishment,
maintenance and operation of frontons and basque pelota games within their respective territorial jurisdiction, as well as over the
officials and employees of such frontons and shall see to it that all laws, orders and regulations relating to such establishments are duly
enforced. Subject to similar approval, they shall appoint such personnel as may be needed in the discharge of their duties and fix their
compensation which shall be paid out of the allotment of one-half per centum (1/2%) out of the total bets or wager funds set aside and
made available for the purpose in accordance with Section 19 hereof. The Secretary of the Interior shall have the power to prohibit or
allow the operation of such frontons on any day or days, or modify their hour of operation and to prescribe additional rules and
regulations governing the same.

SEC. 3. Particular duties of city or municipal mayors regarding operation of basque pelota games and frontons. – In connection with
their duty to enforce the laws, orders, rules and regulations relating to frontons and basque pelota games, the city or municipal mayor
shall require that such frontons shall be properly constructed and maintained in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 485; shall see that the proper sanitary accommodations are provided in the grandstands and other structures comprising such
frontons; and shall require that such frontons be provided with a properly equipped clinic for the treatment of injuries to the pelotaris.

SEC. 4. Permits. – In the absence of a legislative franchise, it shall be unlawful for any person or entity to establish and/or operate
frontons and conduct basque pelota games without a permit issued by the corresponding city or municipal mayor, with the approval of
the provincial governor in the latter case. Any permit issued hereunder shall be reported by the provincial governor or city mayor, as the
case may be, to the Secretary of the Interior.

SEC. 5. License fees. – The following license fees shall be paid:

(a) For each basque pelota fronton, five hundred pesos (P500) annually, or one hundred and twenty-five pesos (P125) quarterly.

(b) For pelotaris, judges or referees and superintendents (intendentes) of basque pelota games, eighteen pesos (P18) each annually.

The above license fees shall accrue to the funds of the city or municipality where the fronton is operated.

SEC. 6. Location. – Except in the case of any basque pelota fronton licensed as of December 8, 1941, no basque pelota fronton shall
be maintained or operated within a radius of 200 lineal meters from any city hall or municipal building, provincial capitol building,
national capitol building, public playa or park, public school, church, hospital, athletic stadium, or any institution of learning or charity.

SEC. 7. Buildings, sanitary and parking requirements. – No permit or license for the construction or operation of a basque pelota
fronton shall be issued without proper certificate of the provincial or city engineer and architect certifying to the suitability and safety of
the building and of the district or city health officer certifying to the sanitary condition of said building. The city or municipal mayor may,
in his discretion and as circumstances may warrant, require that the fronton be provided with sufficient space for parking so that the
public roads and highways be not used for such purposes.

SEC. 8. Protest and complaint. – Any person who believes that any basque pelota fronton is located or established in any place not
authorized herein or is being operated in violation of any provision of this order may file a protest or complaint with the city or municipal
mayor concerned, and after proper investigation of such complaint the city or municipal mayor may take such action as he may
consider necessary in accordance with the provisions of section 10 hereof. Any decision rendered on the matter by the city or municipal
mayor shall be appealable to the Secretary of the Interior.
SEC. 9. Persons prohibited admission. – Persons under 16 years of age, persons carrying firearms or deadly weapons of any
description, except government officials actually performing their official duties therein, intoxicated persons, and persons of disorderly
nature and conduct who are apt to disturb peace and order, shall not be admitted or allowed in any basque pelota fronton: Provided,
That persons under 16 years of age may, when accompanied by their parents or guardians, be admitted therein but in no case shall
such minors be allowed to bet.

SEC. 10. Gambling prohibited. – No card games or any of the prohibited games shall be permitted within the premises of any basque
pelota fronton; and upon satisfactory evidence that the operator or entity conducting the game has tolerated the existence of any
prohibited game within its premises, the city or municipal mayor may take the necessary action in accordance with the provisions of
section 11 hereof.

SEC. 11. Revocation or suspension of permits and licenses. – The city or municipal mayor, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior, may suspend or revoke any license granted under this Order to any basque pelota fronton or to any official or employee
thereof, for violation of any of the rules and regulations provided in this Order or those which said city or municipal mayor may
prescribe, or for any just cause. Such suspension or revocation shall operate to forfeit to the city or municipality concerned all sums
paid therefor.

SEC. 12. Appeals. – Any action taken by the city or municipal mayor under the provisions of this Order shall stand, unless modified or
revoked by the Secretary of the Interior.

SEC. 13. Books, records and accounts. – The city or municipal mayor, or his duly authorized representative, shall have the power to
inspect at all times the books, records, and accounts of any basque pelota fronton. He may, in his discretion and as the circumstances
may warrant, require that the books and financial or other statements of the person or entity operating the game be kept in such
manner as he may prescribe.

SEC. 14. Days and hours of operation. – Except as may otherwise be provided herein, basque pelota games with betting shall be
allowed every day, excepting Sundays, from 2 o’clock p.m. to not later than 11 o’clock p.m.

SEC. 15. Pelotaris, judges, referees, etc. shall be licensed. – No person or entity operating a basque pelota fronton, wherein games are
played with betting, shall employ any pelotari, judge or referee, superintendent of games (intendente), or any other official whose duties
are connected with the operation or supervision of the games, unless such person has been duly licensed by the city or municipal
mayor concerned. Such license shall be granted upon satisfactory proof that the applicant is in good health, know the rules and usages
of the game, and is a person of good moral character and of undoubted honesty. In the case of pelotaris, such license shall be granted
only upon the further condition that they are able to play the game with reasonable skill and with safety to themselves and to their
opponents. The city or municipal mayor may further require other reasonable qualifications for applicants to a license, not otherwise
provided herein. Such license shall be obtained yearly.

SEC. 16. Installation of automatic electric totalizator. – Any person or entity operating a fronton wherein betting in any form is allowed
shall install in its premises within the period of one year from the date this Order takes effect, an automatic electrically operated
indicator system and ticket selling machine, commonly known as totalizator, which shall clearly record each ticket purchased on every
player in any game, the total number of tickets sold on each event, as well as the dividends that correspond to holders of winning
numbers. This requirement shall, however, not apply to double events or forecast pools or to any betting made on the basis of a
combination or grouping of players until a totalizator that can register such bets has been invented and placed on the market.

SEC. 17. Supervision over sale of betting tickets and payment of dividends. – For the purpose of verifying the accuracy of reports in
connection with the sale of betting tickets and the computation of dividends awarded to winners on each event, as well as other
statements with reference to the betting in the games played, the city or municipal mayor shall assign such number of auditing officers
and checkers as may be necessary for the purpose. These auditing officers and checkers shall be placed in the ticket selling booths,
dividend computation booths and such other parts of the fronton, where betting tickets are sold and dividends computed. It shall be their
duty to check up and correct any irregularity or any erroneous report or computation that may be made by officials of the fronton, in
connection with the sale of tickets and the payment of dividends.

SEC. 18. Wager tickets and dividends. – The face value of the wager tickets for any event shall not exceed ₱5 whether for "win" or
"place", or for any combination or grouping of winning numbers. The face value of said tickets, as the case may be, shall be the basis
for the computation of the dividends and such dividends shall be paid after eliminating fractions of ten centavos (₱0.10); for example: if
the resulting dividend is ₱10.43, the dividend that shall be paid will be only ₱10.40.

SEC. 19. Distribution of wager funds. – The total wager funds or gross receipts from the sale of the betting tickets shall be apportioned
as follows: a commission not exceeding ten and one-half per centum (10 ½%) on the total bets on each game or event shall be set
aside for the person or entity operating the fronton and four and one-half per centum (4 ½%) of such bets shall be covered into the
National Treasury for disposition as may be authorized by law or executive order; and the balance or eighty-five per centum (85%) of
the total bets shall be distributed in the form of dividends among holders of "win" or "place" numbers or holders of the winning
combination or grouping of numbers, as the case may be: Provided, however, That of the ten and one-half per centum (10 ½%)
representing the commission of the person or entity operating the fronton, an amount equivalent to one-half per centum (1/2%) of the
total bets or wager funds shall be set aside and made available to cover the expenses of the personnel assigned to supervise the
operation of basque pelota games and frontons, including payment of salaries of such personnel, purchase of necessary equipment
and other sundry expenses as may be authorized by competent authority.

SEC. 20. Supervision over the conduct of games; enforcement of rules and regulations. – The city or municipal mayor is authorized to
place within the premises of the fronton such number of inspectors and agents as may be deemed necessary to supervise the conduct
of the games to see that the rules of the games are strictly enforced, and to carry out the provisions of this Order as well as such other
regulations as may hereafter be prescribed.

SEC. 21. Rules governing the games and personnel of the fronton. – The rules and regulations that have been adopted by any fronton
to govern the operation of its games and the behavior, duties and performance of the officials and personnel connected therewith, such
as pelotaris, judges, referees or superintendents of games (intendentes) and others, shall be the recognized rules and regulations of
such fronton until the same are altered or repealed by the Secretary of the Interior; and any fronton may introduce any type or form of
games or events, provided they are not contrary to the provisions of this Order or any rule or regulation hereafter issued by the
Secretary of the Interior.
SEC. 22. Regulations governing pelotaris. – Any rule or regulation adopted by any established fronton governing the conduct or
performance of pelotaris to the contrary notwithstanding, the following regulations shall be observed:

(a) The pelotaris who are participating in the games shall not be allowed to communicate, talk or make signs with any one in the public
or with any official or employee of the fronton during the games, except with the judges or referees or the superintendent (intendente) in
charge of the games;

(b) The program of games or events, as well as the line-up or order of playing of the pelotaris in each event shall be determined by the
superintendent of the games (intendente), subject to the approval of the city or municipal mayor, or his authorized representatives;

(c) Pelotaris shall be in good physical condition before participating in any game and shall be laid off from playing at least two days in a
week. Every pelotari shall once a month secure a medical certificate from a government physician to be designated by the city or
municipal mayor concerned certifying to his physical fitness to engage in the games; and

(d) The amount of dividends computed for any event shall not be posted within the view of the pelotaris participating in the event until
after the termination of said event."

(3.e.3) Presidential Decree No. 810 (An Act Granting the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation a Franchise to Operate,
Construct and Maintain a Fronton for Basque Pelota and Similar Games of Skill in the Greater Manila Area) – October 16, 1975

"WHEREAS, by virtue of the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered 485 the franchise to operate and maintain a fronton for the
Basque pelota and similar games of skill in the City of Manila, shall expire on October, 1975 whereupon the ownership of the land,
buildings and improvements used in the said game will be transferred without payment to the government by operation of law;

WHEREAS, there is a pressing need not only to further develop the game as a sport and amusement for the general public but also to
exploit its full potential in support of the government’s objectives and development programs;

WHEREAS, Basque pelota is a game of international renown, the maintenance and promotion of which will surely assist the tourism
industry of the country;

WHEREAS, the tourism appeal of the game will be enhanced only with the government’s support and inducement in developing the
sport to a level at par with international standards;

WHEREAS, once such tourism appeal is developed, the same will serve as a stable and expanding base for revenue generation for the
government’s development projects.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, hereby decree as follows:

SECTION 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, there is hereby granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement
Corporation, a corporation duly organized and registered under the laws of the Philippines, hereinafter called the grantee or its
successors, for a period of twenty-five years from the approval of this Act, extendable for another twenty-five years without the
necessity of another franchise, the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and maintain a court for Basque Pelota (including
the games of pala, raqueta, cestapunta, remonte and mano) within the Greater Manila Area, establish branches thereof for booking
purposes and hold or conduct Basque pelota games therein with bettings either directly or by means of electric and/or computerized
totalizator.

The games to be conducted by the grantee shall be under the supervision of the Games and Amusements Board, hereinafter referred
to as the Board, which shall enforce the laws, rules and regulations governing Basque pelota as provided in Commonwealth Act
numbered four hundred and eighty-five, as amended, and all the officials of the game and pelotaris therein shall be duly licensed as
such by the Board.

SEC. 2. The grantee or its duly authorized agent may offer, take or arrange bets within or outside the place, enclosure or court where
the Basque pelota games are held: Provided, That bets offered, taken or arranged outside the place, enclosure or court where the
games are held, shall be offered, taken or arranged only in places duly licensed by the corporation; Provided, however, That the same
shall be subject to the supervision of the Board. No person other than the grantee or its duly authorized agents shall take or arrange
bets on any pelotari or on the game, or maintain or use a totalizator or other device, method or system to bet on any pelotari or on the
game within or without the place, enclosure or court where the games are held by the grantee. Any violation of this section shall be
punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos or by imprisonment of not more than six months, or both in the discretion of the
Court. If the offender is a partnership, corporation, or association, the criminal liability shall devolve upon its president, directors or any
other officials responsible for the violation.

SEC. 3. The grantee shall provide mechanical and/or computerized devices, namely: a) electric totalizator; b) machine directly
connected to a computer in a display board, for the sale of tickets, including, those sold from the off-court stations; c) modern sound
system and loud speakers; d) facilities that bring safety, security, comfort and convenience to the public; e) modern intercommunication
devices; and f) such other facilities, devices and instruments for clean, honest and orderly Basque pelota games, within three years
from the approval of this Act.

The Board shall assign its auditors and/or inspectors to supervise and regulate the placing of bets, proper computation of dividends and
the distribution of wager funds.

SEC. 4. The total wager fund or gross receipts from the sale of betting tickets will be apportioned as follows: eighty-five per centum
(85%) shall be distributed in the form of dividends among the holders of "win" or "place" numbers or holders of the winning combination
or grouping of numbers as the case may be. The remaining balance of fifteen per centum (15%) shall be distributed as follows: eleven
and one-half per centum (11 ½%) shall be set aside as the commission fee of the grantee, and three and one-half per centum (3 ½%)
thereof shall be set aside and alloted to any special health, educational, civic, cultural, charitable, social welfare, sports, and other
similar projects as may be directed by the President. The receipts from betting corresponding to the fraction of ten centavos eliminated
from the dividends paid to the winning tickets, commonly known as breakage, shall also be set aside for the above-named special
projects.

SEC. 5. The provision of any existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, the grantee is hereby authorized to hold Basque pelota
games (including the games of pala, raqueta, cestapunta, remonte and mano) on all days of the week except Sundays and official
holidays.

SEC. 6. The provisions of Commonwealth Act numbered four hundred and eighty-five as amended, shall be deemed incorporated
herein, provided that the provisions of this Act shall take precedence over the provisions thereof and all other laws, executive orders
and regulations which are inconsistent herewith.

SEC. 7. The grantee shall not lease, transfer, grant the usufruct of, sell or assign this franchise permit, or the rights or privileges
acquired thereunder to any person, firm, company, corporation or other commercial or legal entity, nor merge with any other person,
company or corporation organized for the same purpose, without the previous approval of the President of the Philippines.

SEC. 8. For purposes of this franchise, the grantee is herein authorized to make use of the existing fronton, stadium and facilities
located along Taft Avenue, City of Manila, belonging to the government by virtue of the provisions of Commonwealth Act numbered four
hundred and eighty-five."

It is abundantly clear from the aforequoted laws, executive orders and decrees that the legislative practice is that a franchise
to operate jai-alai is granted solely for that purpose and the terms and conditions of the grant are unequivocably defined by
the grantor. Such express grant and its conditionalities protective of the public interest are evidently wanting in P.D. No. 1869,
the present Charter of PAGCOR. Thus, while E.O. 135 and P.D. No. 810 provided for the apportionment of the wager funds or gross
receipts from the sale of betting tickets, as well as the distribution of dividends among holders of "win" or "place" numbers or holders of
the winning combination or grouping of numbers, no such provisions can be found in P.D. No. 1869. Likewise, while P.D. No. 810
describes where and how the games are to be conducted and bettings to be made, and imposes a penalty in case of a violation thereof,
such provisions are absent in P.D. No. 1869.

In fine, P.D. No. 1869 does not have the standard marks of a law granting a franchise to operate jai-alai as those found under
P.D. No. 810 or E.O. 135. We cannot blink away from the stubborn reality that P.D. No. 1869 deals with details pertinent alone to
the operation of gambling casinos. It prescribes the rules and regulations concerning the operation of gambling casinos such as the
place, time, persons who are and are not entitled to play, tax exemptions, use of foreign exchange, and the exemption of casino
employees from the coverage of the Civil Service Law and the Labor Code. The short point is that P.D. No. 1869 does not have the
usual provisions with regards to jai-alai. The logical inference is that PAGCOR was not given a franchise to operate jai-alai frontons.
There is no reason to resist the beguiling rule that acts of incorporation, and statutes granting other franchises or special benefits or
privileges to corporations, are to be construed strictly against the corporations; and whatever is not given in unequivocal terms is
understood to be withheld. 30

FOURTH. The tax treatment between jai-alai operations and gambling casinos are distinct from each other. Letters of Instruction No.
1439 issued on November 2, 1984 directed the suspension of the imposition of the increased tax on winnings in horse races and jai-alai
under the old revenue code, to wit:

"WHEREAS, the increased tax on winnings on horse races and jai-alai under Presidential Decree 1959 has already affected the holding
of horse races and jai-alai games, resulting in government revenue loss and affecting the livelihood of those dependent thereon;

WHEREAS, the manner of taxation applicable thereto is unique and its effects and incidence are in no way similar to the taxes on
casino operation or to any shiftable tax;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order and instruct the Minister of Finance, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the
Chairman, Games & Amusements Board, to suspend the implementation of the increased rate of tax winnings in horse races and jai-
alai games and collect instead the rate applicable prior to the effectivity of PD 1959."

Similarly, under Republic Act No. 8424, or the Tax Reform Act of 1997, there is an amusement tax imposed on operators of jai-alai
(Section 125) and a stamp tax on jai-alai tickets (Section 190). There is no corresponding imposition on gambling casinos. Well to note,
section 13 of P.D. No. 1869 grants to the franchise holder and casino operators tax exemptions from the payment of customs duties
and income tax, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent which shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of
any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial, or national government authority. No similar
exemptions have been extended to operators of jai-alai frontons.

FIFTH. P.D. No. 1869, the present Charter of PAGCOR, is a consolidation of P.D. Nos. 1067-A, 1067-B and 1067-C all issued on
January 1, 1977. P.D. No. 1067-A created the PAGCOR and defined its powers and functions; P.D. No. 1067-B granted to PAGCOR
a franchise to establish, operate, and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of
the Philippines; and P.D. No. 1067-C granted PAGCOR theexclusive right, privilege and authority to operate and maintain gambling
casinos, subject only to the exception of existing franchises and games of chance permitted by law.

Beyond debate, P.D. No. 1869 adopted substantially the provisions of said prior decrees, with some additions which, however,
have no bearing on the franchise granted to PAGCOR to operate gambling casinos alone, such as the Affiliation Provisions under
Title III and the Transitory Provisions under Title VII. It also added the term "lotteries" under Section 1 (b) on Declaration of Policy and
Section 10 on the Nature and Term of Franchise. It ought to follow that P.D. No. 1869 carries with it the same legislative intent that
infused P.D. Nos. 1067-A, 1067-B and 1067-C. To be sure, both P.D. No. 1067-A and P.D. No. 1869 seek to enforce the same avowed
policy of the State to "minimize, if not totally eradicate, the evils, malpractices and corruptions that normally are found prevalent in the
conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement." It did not address the moral
malevolence of jai-alai games and the need to contain it thru PAGCOR. We cannot deface this legislative intent by holding that the
grant to PAGCOR under P.D. Nos. 1067-A and 1067-B to establish, operate, and maintain gambling casinos, has been enlarged,
broadened or expanded by P.D. No. 1869 so as to include a grant to operate jai-alai frontons. Then and now, the intention was merely
to grant PAGCOR a franchise to operate gambling casinos, no more, no less.
SIXTH. Lest the idea gets lost in the shoals of our subconsciousness, let us not forget that PAGCOR is engaged in business affected
with public interest. The phrase "affected with public interest" means that an industry is subject to control for the public good; it has
31

been considered as the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power." Perforce, a legislative franchise to operate jai-
32

alai is imbued with public interest and involves an exercise of police power. The familiar rule is that laws which grant the right
to exercise a part of the police power of the state are to be construed strictly and any doubt must be resolved against the
grant. The legislature is regarded as the guardian of society, and therefore is not presumed to disable itself or abandon the
33

discharge of its duty. Thus, courts do not assume that the legislature intended to part away with its power to regulate public
morals. The presumption is influenced by constitutional considerations. Constitutions are widely understood to withhold from
34

legislatures any authority to bargain away their police power for the power to protect the public interest is beyond abnegation.
35

It is stressed that the case at bar does not involve a franchise to operate a public utility (such as water, transportation, communication
or electricity) – the operation of which undoubtedly redounds to the benefit of the general public. What is claimed is an alleged
legislative grant of a gambling franchise – a franchise to operate jai-alai. A statute which legalizes a gambling activity or business
should be strictly construed and every reasonable doubt must be resolved to limit the powers and rights claimed under its authority. 36

The dissent would like to make capital of the fact that the cases of Stone vs. Mississippi and Aicardi vs. Alabamaare not on all fours
to the cases at bar and, hence, the rulings therein do not apply. The perceived incongruity is more apparent than real.

Stone involves a contract entered into by the State of Mississippi with the plaintiffs which allowed the latter to sell and dispose of
37

certificates of subscription which would entitle the holders thereof to such prizes as may be awarded to them, by the casting of lots or
by lot, chance or otherwise. The contract was entered into by plaintiffs pursuant to their charter entitled "An Act Incorporating the
Mississippi Agricultural, Educational and Manufacturing Aid Society" which purportedly granted them the franchise to issue and sell
lottery tickets. However, the state constitution expressly prohibits the legislature from authorizing any lottery or allowing the sale of
lottery tickets. Mississippi law makes it unlawful to conduct a lottery.

The question raised in Stone concerned the authority of the plaintiffs to exercise the franchise or privilege of issuing and selling lottery
tickets. This is essentially the issue involved in the cases at bar, that is, whether PAGCOR’s charter includes the franchise to operate
jai-alai frontons. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the facts in the cases at bar are not identical, the principles of law laid down
in Stone are illuminating. For one, it was held in Stonethat:

"Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the wide-spread
pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to a few persons and places, but the latter infests the whole community; it enters every
dwelling; it reaches every class; it preys upon the hard earnings of the poor; and it plunders the ignorant and simple. x x x" 38

The verity that all species of gambling are pernicious prompted the Mississippi Court to rule that the legislature cannot bargain away
public health or public morals. We can take judicial notice of the fact that jai-alai frontons have mushroomed in every nook and corner of
the country. They are accessible to everyone and they specially mangle the morals of the marginalized sector of society. It cannot be
gainsaid that there is but a miniscule of a difference between jai-alai and lottery with respect to the evils sought to be prevented.

In the case of Aicardi vs. Alabama, Moses & Co. was granted a legislative franchise to carry on gaming in the form specified therein,
and its agent, Antonio Aicardi, was indicted for keeping a gaming table. In ascertaining whether the scope of the company’s franchise
included the right to keep a gaming table, the Court there held that "such an Act should be construed strictly. Every reasonable doubt
should be so resolved as to limit the powers and rights claimed under its authority. Implications and intendments should have no place
except as they are inevitable from the language or the context."

The view expressed in the dissent that the aforequoted ruling was taken out of context is perched on the premise that PAGCOR’s
franchise is couched in a language that is broad enough to cover the operations of jai-alai. This view begs the question for as shown in
our disquisition, PAGCOR's franchise is restricted only to the operation of gambling casinos. Aicardi supports the thesis that a
gambling franchise should be strictly construed due to its ill-effects on public order and morals.

SEVENTH. The dissent also insists that the legislative intent must be sought first of all in the language of the statute itself. In applying a
literal interpretation of the provision under Section 11 of P.D. 1869 that "x x x the Corporation is hereby granted x x x the rights,
privileges, and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming
pools, i.e., basketball, football, lotteries, etc. x x x," it contends that the extent and nature of PAGCOR’s franchise is so broad that
literally all kinds of sports and gaming pools, including jai-alai, are covered therein. It concluded that since under Section 11 of P.D. No.
1869, games of skill like basketball and football have been lumped together with the word "lotteries" just before the word "etc." and after
the words "gaming pools," it may be deduced from the wording of the law that when bets or stakes are made in connection with the
games of skill, they may be classified as games of chance under the coverage of PAGCOR’s franchise.

We reject this simplistic reading of the law considering the social, moral and public policy implications embedded in the cases at bar.
The plain meaning rule used in the dissent rests on the assumption that there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of the law.
The fact, however, that the statute admits of different interpretations is the best evidence that the statute is vague and ambiguous. It is
39

widely acknowledged that a statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either
of two or more senses. In the cases at bar, it is difficult to see how a literal reading of the statutory text would unerringly reveal the
40

legislative intent. To be sure, the term "jai-alai" was never used and is nowhere to be found in the law. The conclusion that it is included
in the franchise granted to PAGCOR cannot be based on a mere cursory perusal of and a blind reliance on the ordinary and plain
meaning of the statutory terms used such as "gaming pools" and "lotteries." Sutherland tells us that a statute is "ambiguous", and so
open to explanation by extrinsic aids, not only when its abstract meaning or the connotation of its terms is uncertain, but also when it is
uncertain in its application to, or effect upon, the fact-situation of the case at bar.
41

Similarly, the contention in the dissent that :

" x x x Even if the Court is fully persuaded that the legislature really meant and intended something different from what it enacted, and
that the failure to convey the real meaning was due to inadvertence or mistake in the use of the language, yet, if the words chosen by
the legislature are not obscure or ambiguous, but convey a precise and sensible meaning (excluding the case of obvious clerical errors
or elliptical forms of expression), then the Court must take the law as it finds it, and give it its literal interpretation, without being
influenced by the probable legislative meaning lying at the back of the words. In that event, the presumption that the legislature meant
what it said, though it be contrary to the fact, is conclusive."
cannot apply in the cases at bar considering that it has not been shown that the failure to convey the true intention of the legislature is
attributable to inadvertence or a mistake in the language used.

EIGHTH. Finally, there is another reason why PAGCOR's claim to a legislative grant of a franchise to operate jai-alai should be
subjected to stricter scrutiny. The so-called legislative grant to PAGCOR did not come from a real Congress. It came from
President Marcos who assumed legislative powers under martial law. The grant is not the result of deliberations of the duly elected
representatives of our people.

This is not to assail President Marcos’ legislative powers granted by Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, as the dissent would
put it. It is given that in the exercise of his legislative power, President Marcos legally granted PAGCOR's franchise to operate gambling
casinos. The validity of this franchise to operate gambling casinos is not, however, the issue in the cases at bar. The issue is whether
this franchise to operate gambling casinos includes the privilege to operate jai-alai. PAGCOR says it does. We hold that it does not.
PAGCOR's overarching claim should be given the strictest scrutiny because it was granted by one man who governed when the
country was under martial law and whose governance was repudiated by our people in EDSA 1986. The reason for this submission is
rooted in the truth that PAGCOR's franchise was not granted by a real Congress where the passage of a law requires a more rigorous
process in terms of floor deliberations and voting by members of both the House and the Senate. It is self-evident that there is a
need to be extra cautious in treating this alleged grant of a franchise as a grant by the legislature, as a grant by the
representatives of our people, for plainly it is not. We now have a real Congress and it is best to let Congress resolve this issue
considering its policy ramifications on public order and morals. 1âwphi1

In view of this ruling, we need not resolve the other issues raised by petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Respondents PAGCOR, Belle Jai Alai Corporation and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment
Totalizator Corporation are ENJOINED from managing, maintaining and operating jai-alai games, and from enforcing the agreement
entered into by them for that purpose.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Panganiban, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago JJ., concur.


Davide, Jr. , C.J., Vitug and De Leon Jr. , JJ., see separate opinion.
Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Quisumbing, JJ., join the opinion of J. De Leon.
Mendoza, J., join in the separate opinion of Vitug, J.

Footnotes

1
Annex D, Petition, G.R. No. 138298; Rollo, 171-174.

2
Annex A, id.; Ibid., 23.

3
Annex A, Supplemental Petition, G.R. No. 138298; Ibid., 162-168.

Times Broadcasting Network vs. CA, et al., 274 SCRA 366 (1997); Estate of the late Mercedes Jacob vs. CA, et al., 283
4

SCRA 474 (1997).

5
Fortich, et al. vs. Corona, et al., 289 SCRA 624 (1998).

6
278 SCRA 154 (1997).

7
Ramos vs. CA, et al., 269 SCRA 34 (1997).

8
Bugnay Construction & Dev. Corp. vs. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 (1989).

Pascual vs. Sec. of Public Works, 110 Phil 331 (1960); Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976); Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs.
9

Morato, et al., 250 SCRA 130 (1995).

10
Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980).

11
Philconsa vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966).

Philconsa vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965); Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991);
12

Guingona vs. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991); Osmeña vs. Comelec, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA
52 (1991); Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992).

13
Philconsa vs. Mathay, supra.

The game was introduced to the country during the Spanish colonial period. The first games were played at a fronton in
14

Numancia Street, Binondo, Manila. In 1917, the games were moved to a larger fronton at the corner of Taft Avenue and San
Luis Street in Ermita where it gained popularity. From a plain sport, jai-alai became a form of gambling when the Philippine
Legislature issued a franchise legalizing betting in June 1939. The fronton was then operated by the Madrigals, a family close
to Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon. Devastated by World War II, the fronton was rebuilt in 1948. During the term of
President Marcos, the jai-alai franchise was granted to the Romualdez family. After the EDSA revolution, the Aquino
administration closed down jai-alai. Then, in 1994, during the term of President Ramos, the Associated Development
Corporation (ADC) revived the games at a new location in Harrison Plaza, Manila. However, after only a few months of
operation, this Court ruled that a congressional franchise was required for the games.

15
City of Oakland vs. Hogan, 106 P.2d 987, 994, 41 Cal. App.2d 333.

Central Pac. R. Co. vs. People of State of California, 16 S.Ct. 766, 778, 162 U.S. 91, 40 L Ed. 903; Hamill vs. Hawks, C.C.A.
16

Okl., 58 F.2d 41, 44.

17
People ex rel. Foley vs. Begole, 56 P.2d 931, 933, 98 Colo. 354.

18
City of Helena vs. Helena Light and R. Co., 207 O. 337, 63 Mont. 108.

19
Beekman vs. Third Ave. R. Co., 47 N.E. 277, 153 N.Y. 144.

20
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1067-A.

21
See third whereas clause.

22
See section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1067-A.

23
See section 5 of P.D. No. 1067-A.

24
See section 3 of P.D. No. 1067-C.

25
See section 4 of P.D. No. 1067-B.

26
See section 5, par. 1 of P.D. No. 1067-B.

27
See section 1 of P.D. No. 1632.

28
See section 2 of P.D. No. 1632.

29
See Dissenting Opinion in Lim v. Pacquing, et al., 240 SCRA 649 (1995), pp. 720 and 729.

30
Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., pp. 504-506.

31
Nebbia v New York, 291 U.S. 502.

32
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 1053.

33
People v Chicago, 103 N.E. 609; Slaughter v O’Berry, 35 S.E. 241, 48 L.R.A. 442.

34
Stone v Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814.

35
Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, 5th ed., p. 244.

36
Aicardi v Alabama, 22 L.Ed. 215; West Indies, Inc. v First National Bank, 214 P.2d 144.

37
101 U.S. 1079.

38
Ibid. at p. 1080.

39
Marathon Le Tourneau Co., Marine Division v. National Labor Relations Board, 414 F. Supp 1074 (1976).

Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. Nagle-Hart, Inc., 234 NW2d 350 (1975); Allen v. Juneau County Forest Withdrawal Appeal
40

Review Committee, 295 NW2d 218 (1980); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 320 NW2d 5 (1982).

41
Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 2A, 5th ed., 1992 Revision, p. 713.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In my Separate Opinion in G.R. No. 115044 (Alfredo Lim vs. Hon. Felipe Pacquing) and G.R. No. 117263 (Teofisto Guingona vs. Hon.
Vetino Reyes), 240 SCRA 649, 685, I reiterated my prior view in a supplemental concurring opinion I submitted in the earlier case, G.R.
No. 115044 that jai alai is not a game of chance, but a sport based on skill. Betting on the results thereof can only be allowed by
Congress, and I am not aware of any new law authorizing such betting.

I said therein, thus:

It follows then that the Mayor’s Permit ordered by the trial court to be issued to the private respondent is not a license or authority to
allow betting or wagering on the results of the jai-alai games. Jai-alai is a sport based on skill. Under Article 197 of the Revised Penal
Code, before it was amended by P.D. No. 1602, betting upon the result of any boxing or other sports contests was penalized
with arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Article 2019 of the Civil Code provides that "[b]etting on the results of
sports, athletic competitions, or games of skill may be prohibited by local ordinances."

P.D. No. 483, enacted on 13 June 1974, penalizes betting, game fixing or point shaving and machinations in sports contests,
including jai-alai. Section 2 thereof expressly provides:

SECTION 2. Betting, game fixing, point shaving or game machinations unlawful.- Game fixing, point shaving, machination, as defined in
the preceding Section, in connection with the games of basketball, volleyball, softball, baseball, chess, boxing bouts, "jai-alai," "sipa,"
"pelota" and all other sports contests, games or races; as well as betting therein except as may be authorized by law, is hereby
declared unlawful.

The succeeding Section 3 provides for the penalties.

On 11 June 1978, P.D. No. 1602 (75 O.G. No. 15, 3270), Prescribing Stiffer Penalties on Illegal Gambling, was enacted to increase the
penalties provided in various "Philippine Gambling Laws such as Articles 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code (Forms of Gambling and
Betting), R.A. No. 3063 (Horse Racing Bookies), P.D. No. 449 (Cock-fighting), P.D. No. 483 (Game Fixing), P.D. No. 510 (Slot
Machines) in relation to Opinion Nos. 33 and 97 of the Ministry of Justice, P.D. No. 1306 (Jai-alai Bookies), and other City and
Municipal Ordinances on gambling all over the country," Section 1 thereof reads:

xxx

Both P.D. No. 483 and P.D. No. 1602 were promulgated in the exercise of the police power of the State.

Pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 483, which was not repealed by P.D. No. 1602 since the former is not inconsistent with the latter in
that respect, betting in jai-alai is illegal unless allowed by law. There was such a law, P.D. No. 810, which authorized the Philippine Jai-
Alai and Amusement Corporation as follows:

SECTION 2. The grantee or its duly authorized agent may offer, take or arrange bets within or outside the place, enclosure or court
where the Basque pelota games are held: Provided, That bets offered, taken or arranged outside the place, enclosure or court where
the games are held, shall be offered, taken or arranged only in places duly licensed by the corporation. Provided, however, That the
same shall be subject to the supervision of the Board. No person other than the grantee or its duly authorized agents shall take or
arrange bets on any pelotari or on the game, or maintain or use a totalizator or other device, method or system to bet on any pelotari or
on the game within or without the place, enclosure or court where the games are held by the grantee. Any violation of this section shall
be punished by a fine or not more than two thousand pesos or by imprisonment of not more than six months, or both in the discretion of
the Court. If the offender is a partnership, corporation or association, the criminal liability shall devolve upon its president, directors or
any officials responsible for the violation.

However, as stated in the ponencia, P.D. No. 810 was repealed by E.O. No. 169 issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino, I am not
aware of any other law which authorizes betting in jai-alai. It follows then that while the private respondent may operate the jai-
alai fronton and conduct jai-alai games, it can do so solely as a sports contest. Betting on the results thereof, whether within or off-
fronton, is illegal and the City of Manila cannot, under the present state of the law, license such betting. The dismissal of the petition in
this case sustaining the challenged orders of the trial court does not legalize betting, for this Court is not the legislature under our
systems of government.

My reading of the charter of the PAGCOR fails to disclose a grant of a congressional authority to allow betting on the results of jai alai.

Accordingly, all that the PAGCOR may do is operate and conduct the jai alai, but in no case can it allow betting on the results thereof
without obtaining a statutory authority for the purpose.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG, J.:

Gambling, universally regarded to be a threat to the moral fiber of any society, is aptly a prohibited activity in the Philippines. The
Revised Penal Code, as well as succeeding amendatory laws, makes "betting, game-fixing, point-shaving or game machination" on
games of chance or skill unlawful.1 The Civil Code additionally states that "betting on the result of sports, athletic competitions, or
games of skill may be prohibited by local ordinances." 2

An exception to the rule was introduced by the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he, in the exercise of his legislative powers
under the 1973 Constitution, created the Philippine Amusement Games Corp. ("PAGCOR") 3and granted it franchise to "operate and
maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, x x x." 4 PAGCOR was authorized
to implement, among other things, an objective "to establish and operate clubs and casinos for amusement and recreation, incl uding
games of chance, which (might) be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."5

The ponencia views the law to be broad enough to authorize PAGCOR to operate all kinds of sports and gaming pools, inclusive of jai
alai, in the country. Such does appear to be the case, and a statute which is sufficiently clear and free from serious ambiguity can only
be given its literal meaning and simply be applied. Quite a different matter, however, submits itself with regard to PAGCOR’s power to
enter into joint venture agreements in the operation and management of such games.

PAGCOR has entered into a joint venture agreement with Belle Jai Alai Corporation ("BELLE") and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment
Totalizator Corporation ("FILGAME") in the operation and management of jai alai games. The two firms, under the agreement, would
also furnish the jai alai fronton facilities. I see in the joint venture agreement a situation that places BELLE and FILGAME in active
endeavor with PAGCOR in conducting jai alai games. Without a congressional franchise of its own, neither BELLE nor FILGAME
can lawfully engage into the activity. Thus, in Lim vs. Pacquing, 6 this Court held that Associated Development Corporation,
having had no franchise from Congress to operate the jai alai, could not do so even if it had a license or permit from the city
mayor to operate that game in the City of Manila. While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into agreements in its
authorized operations, that power, upon the other hand, cannot be so construed as to permit it to likewise grant a veritable
franchise to any other person, individual or firm.

Indeed, the grant of a franchise is a purely legislative act that cannot be delegated to PAGCOR without violating the Constitution.7 The
thesis rests on the maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest. Any constitutionally delegated sovereign power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate, the legislature in this case, through the instrumentality of its own judgment. A further
delegation of such power to PAGCOR would constitute a negation of this duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated
to discharge it directly.8Parenthetically, under the 1987 Constitution, the only instances when the legislature may validly delegate its
assigned powers are those that involve the fixing of tariff rates to the President 9 and the inherent powers, i.e., police power, eminent
domain and taxation, that may be delegated but solely to local legislative units. 10

The broad authority then of PAGCOR under its charter to enter into agreements could not have been meant to empower PAGCOR to
pass on or to share its own franchise to others. Had its charter intended otherwise, PAGCOR would have been itself virtually capable
of extending franchise rights and thereby be a recipient of an unlawful delegation of legislative power.

For the foregoing considerations, I vote to grant the petitions in these cases insofar as they seek to enjoin respondent Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation ("PAGCOR") from operating jai alai or Basque Pelota games through respondents Belle Jai
alai Corporation ("BELLE") and/or Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation ("FILGAME") or through any other
agency, but I vote to deny the same insofar as they likewise seek to prohibit PAGCOR from itself managing or operating the game.

Footnotes

1 Sections 195-197, Revised Penal Code, Pres. Decree No. 483, Pres. Decree 1602.

2 Article 2019, New Civil Code.

3 P.D. No. 1067.

4
Sec. 10, P.D. No. 1869.

5Sec. 1(b), P.D. No. 1869; People vs. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191 (1996) citing Victoria vs. COMELEC, 299 SCRA 269 (1994)
and Libanan vs. Sandiganbayan, 233 SCRA 163 (1994)..

6 240 SCRA 649, 674.

7 Secs. 1 and 24, Art. VI, Constitution.

8 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 86 (1996).

9
Sec. 28 (2), Art. VI, Constitution.

10 Art. X, Constitution.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno granting the consolidated petitions in these two cases.

An exposition of these two cases would be helpful.


Here are two consolidated cases filed against respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
PAGCOR) to desist from managing and/or operating jai alai or Basque pelota games, by itself or with the "infrastructure facilities" of co-
respondents Belle Jai alai Corporation (hereinafter called BELLE) and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation
(hereinafter called FILGAME).

In G.R. No. 138298, Raoul B. del Mar, in his capacity as member of the House of Representatives representing the First District of
Cebu and as a taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order, against PAGCOR for conducting jai
alai or Basque pelota games. In the said petition filed with this Court on May 6, 1999, del Mar alleged that the operation of jai alai
games by PAGCOR is illegal since its franchise does not include the power to open, pursue, conduct, operate, control and manage jai
alai game operations in the country.

Under Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, PAGCOR’s nature and term of franchise which is therein contained, is as follows:

SEC. 10. Nature and term of franchise – Subject to the terms and conditions established in this Decree, the corporation is hereby
granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years, the rights, privilege and authority to
operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreations or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e.
basketball, football, lotteries, etc. whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.

PAGCOR, in conducting Basque pelota games otherwise known as jai alai, relied on the Opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July
16, 1996 that "the authority of PAGCOR under its charter to operate and maintain games of chance or gambling extends to jai alai
which is a form of sport or game played for bets and that the charter of PAGCOR (P.D. No. 1869) amounts to a legislative franchise for
the purpose."1

On June 17, 1999, PAGCOR entered into a joint venture agreement with BELLE and FILGAME relating to the opening, operation,
control and management of jai alai games operations in the country. Under the said agreement which is co-terminous with the franchise
of PAGCOR, BELLE and FILGAME will provide technical assistance to PAGCOR with respect to various aspects of jai alai operations
including the operation of computerized nationwide network of on-line betting systems. The jai alai fronton facilities will be provided by
BELLE and FILGAME, on a free-rent basis, to PAGCOR. PAGCOR, on the other hand, shall consult BELLE and FILGAME as regards
the formulation of the terms of appointment of their personnel.

On July 1, 1999, Federico S. Sandoval II and Michael T. Defensor, in their capacity as members of the House of Representatives
representing the lone district of Malabon-Navotas and the 3rd District of Quezon City respectively, and as taxpayers, filed a Petition for
Injunctive Relief with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, with this Court to compel PAGCOR to refrain from operating
and managing jai alai games. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 138982. Petitioners Sandoval and Defensor alleged that the
franchise of PAGCOR does not include the operation of jai alai, jai alai being one of the activities prohibited under the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by P.D. No. 1602 otherwise known as the Anti-Gambling Law. Petitioners further averred that jai alai is not a game
of chance and cannot be the subject of a PAGCOR franchise.

On August 17, 1999, petitioner del Mar filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental petition in G.R. No. 138298, impleading BELLE
and FILGAME as additional respondents. The said motion for leave was granted. In his supplemental petition denominated as "Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Writ" petitioner questioned the authority of
PAGCOR to enter into an agreement with BELLE and FILGAME for the opening, establishment, operation, control and management of
jai alai operations. Petitioner alleged that in entering into the said agreement with BELLE and FILGAME, PAGCOR has virtually
relinquished its control and management of the jai alai operations to the said corporations. Petitioner further alleged that assuming that
PAGCOR has the requisite franchise to operate jai alai, it is still under obligation to conduct an open and fair public bidding to determine
the capability of the parties concerned who may be interested to provide funds for capital expenditures, including an integrated
computer network system for fronton and off fronton betting stations and the infrastructure or facilities of the fronton at Manila. Petitioner
alleged that contracts that require competitive public bidding relate to infrastructure projects or public works and the procurement of
equipment, supplies and materials.

On September 24, 1999, Juan Miguel Zubiri, as a taxpayer and member of the House of Representatives representing the Third District
of Bukidnon, filed a petition for intervention in G.R. No. 138982. Zubiri alleged that the legislative power to grant franchises for the
operation of jai alai has not been delegated by Congress to anyone. By operating jai alai without the required legislative franchise,
PAGCOR has effectively usurped the authority of Congress to grant franchises in violation of the Constitution.

Considering that BELLE and FILGAME were impleaded as additional respondents in G.R. No. 138298, the Court required BELLE and
FILGAME on March 21, 2000 to file their respective comments.

On April 18, 2000, BELLE and FILGAME, thru counsel, filed their comment praying for the dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 138298
on the ground that it is essentially an action for quo warranto which may only be commenced by the Solicitor General.

On July 6, 2000, the Solicitor General filed a motion to consolidate G.R. No. 138982 with G.R. No. 138298 inasmuch as the issues
raised are identical. On August 8, 2000, we granted the said motion for consolidation.

In both G.R. Nos. 138982 and 138298, no temporary restraining order was issued by this Court.

PAGCOR’s comments, through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel and the Office of the Solicitor General, to these
consolidated petitions or cases may be essentially summarized as follows:

I. Petitioners have no legal standing to file a taxpayer’s suit based on their alleged cause of action nor are they a real party in interest
entitled to the avails of the suit

II. An action for injunction is not among the cases or proceedings originally cognizable by the Honorable Supreme Court

III. The franchise of PAGCOR includes its authority and power to open, pursue, conduct, operate, control and manage jai alai
operations in the country
In its comment in G.R. No. 138298, PAGCOR further alleged that :

IV. Per its charter, the corporate authority and power of PAGCOR to operate and conduct jai alai games include the express power to
enter into joint venture agreements

V. The joint venture Agreement dated June 17, 1999 entered into by and among PAGCOR, Belle Jai alai Corporation (BELLE) and
Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation (FILGAME) does not require any public bidding for its validity

Respondent PAGCOR maintains that petitioners have no standing to file a taxpayer’s suit since there is no showing that these cases
involve expenditure of public funds.

In Kilosbayan Incorporated vs. Morato2 we have categorically stated that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators, as such,
may bring suit only (1) in cases involving constitutional issues and (2) under certain conditions. Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for
example, where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or where a tax measure is assailed as unconstitutional.
Concerned citizens can bring suits if the constitutional question they raise is of transcendental importance which must be settled early.
While herein petitioners and intervenor claim illegal disbursement of public funds by PAGCOR in the resumption of the operations of jai
alai games, there is nothing on record to show involvement of any expenditure of public money on the part of PAGCOR. In fact, what is
essentially raised as an issue is whether PAGCOR has the requisite franchise to operate jai alai games and whether it is authorized
under its charter to enter into joint venture agreements with private corporations. More specifically, under the joint venture Agreement
dated June 17, 19993 it is private respondent corporations BELLE and FILGAME which will provide infrastructure facilities to PAGCOR
on a rent free basis. I cannot see how the Court could treat the subject petitions as taxpayers’ suits when there is nothing, apart from
petitioners’ bare allegations, to prove that the operations of jai alai would involve expenditure of public funds. Neither does the pivotal
issue raised relate to a constitutional question inasmuch as only the scope of PAGCOR’s franchise, and not its validity, is assailed.

This Court is faced, however, with the issue as to the standing of the petitioners who filed their petitions, in their capacity as taxpayers
and members of the House of Representatives, alleging infringement by PAGCOR on the legislature’s sole prerogative in the granting
of a jai alai franchise. Respondents PAGCOR, BELLE and FILGAME contend, however, that the pivotal issue raised by petitioners is
whether or not PAGCOR has violated any law or has committed acts beyond the scope of its franchise when it entered into the said
Agreement with BELLE and FILGAME for the resumption of jai alai operations. Respondents aver that petitioners, in consequence,
raised an issue which may be commenced and prosecuted only by the Solicitor General through a quo warranto action.

In support of their position, respondents cite Section 2, Rule 66 of the old Rules of Civil Procedure governing quo warranto proceedings
against legally incorporated entities which reads:

Sec. 2. Like actions against corporation. – A like action may be brought against a corporation:

A) When it has offended against a provision of an act for its creation.

xxx

D) When it has misused a right, privilege, or franchise conferred upon it by law, or when it has exercised a right, privilege or franchise,
or franchise in contravention of law.

Respondents maintain that although Section 2 of Rule 66 was not reproduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an action for quo
warranto may still be commenced by the Solicitor General before the Court based on the aforesaid section.

Quo warranto literally means: "By what authority." It is an extraordinary legal remedy whereby the State challenges a person or an
entity to show by what authority he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise. It is commenced by the Solicitor General in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines against a usurper or against a corporation, on the proposition that the State is the aggrieved
party. The Solicitor General institutes the action when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon a complaint or
otherwise, he has good reason to believe that any of the cases specified under the law exists to warrant the institution of a quo
warranto proceedings. Quo warranto proceedings against corporations are instituted to demand the forfeiture of their franchise or
charter.

It is clear that Section 2 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court governing quo warranto proceedings against legally incorporated entities, is
not reproduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Proceedings against legally incorporated entities, alleging misuse of its rights,
privileges and franchises granted by law, at the time the subject petitions before this Court were filed in May and July 1999,
respectively, up to the time the last pleading was filed on July 7, 2000, were governed by Section 5 (b) of P.D. 902-A which vested the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with full jurisdiction over the same. 4 However, P.D. 902-A was superseded by R.A.
8799,5 which took effect on August 8, 2000.

The difficulty of the issue posed by petitioners is that, in the cases at bar, the Solicitor General together with the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel is the counsel for respondent PAGCOR.

This is not to say, however, that this Court cannot take cognizance of the instant cases before us. While petitioners allege unlawful
operation of jai alai games by PAGCOR, what is ultimately and mainly at issue in these cases is the interpretation of PAGCOR’s
franchise which defines the scope of PAGCOR’s rights, privileges and authority. While the Executive branch of the government, through
the Secretary of Justice and Office of the Government Corporate Counsel have interpreted respondent PAGCOR’s franchise to include
the operation of jai alai, the petitioners, in their capacity as members of the House of Representatives, allege a different interpretation.
Whether or not PAGCOR has in fact committed acts beyond the scope of its franchise hinges upon the interpretation of PAGCOR’s
franchise. Considering that said pivotal issue involves the interpretation of the law defining the scope of PAGCOR’s rights, privileges
and authority, this Court may rightfully take, as in fact it has taken, jurisdiction over the subject petitions. It is well-settled that the duty
and power to interpret a statute belongs to the Judiciary. While the legislative and/or executive departments, by enacting and enforcing
a law, respectively, may construe or interpret the law, it is the Supreme Court that has the final word as to what the law means.6

Having ruled that this Court can take cognizance of the subject petitions, I come back to the question as to whether petitioners, in their
capacity as members of the House of Representatives, have the requisite standing to file these two related suits. Respondent PAGCOR
contends that petitioners who instituted these suits in their capacity as lawmakers cannot validly claim that they are suing in behalf of
Congress. Respondent PAGCOR contends that the issue as to whether or not it has the authority to operate and manage jai alai games
does not violate petitioners’ rights as members of Congress nor can it be deemed as impermissibly intruding into the domain of the
legislature.

The issue as to whether a member of Congress may bring suit in his capacity as a lawmaker, alleging impairment of any of the powers,
rights and privileges belonging to Congress, is not novel. Citing the American cases of Coleman vs. Miller 7 and Holtzman vs.
Schlesinger8 we declared in Philconsa vs. Enriquez9 that "to the extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of
each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution."

A more careful scrutiny is warranted, therefore, with regard to the issue as to whether the powers and rights of petitioners, as members
of Congress, are in any way impaired by respondent PAGCOR’s act of operating and maintaining jai alai games.

There is no dispute that the power to grant franchises rests within the legislative branch of government. In a legal or narrower sense,
the term "franchise" is more often used to designate a right or privilege conferred by law. The view taken in a number of cases is that to
be a franchise, the right possessed must be such as cannot be exercised without the express permission of a sovereign power, that is,
a privilege or immunity of a public nature which cannot be legally exercised without legislative grant. 10 Having the prerogative to grant
franchises, Congress also has the power to revoke or repeal or alter franchises. Considering that whatever judgment may be rendered
in the interpretation of the law defining the scope of PAGCOR’s franchise would have a bearing on petitioners’ prerogative, as members
of Congress, to consider whether to modify, amend, alter, or repeal, through legislation, PAGCOR’s franchise, I believe, that in limited
sense, that petitioners have the requisite standing to bring these suits at bar.

Respondent PAGCOR, nevertheless, insists that an action for injunction is not among the cases or proceedings originally cognizable by
the Supreme Court. In support of its contention, PAGCOR cites the cases of Diokno vs. Reyes11 and Garcia Gavires vs.
Robinson12 where it was held that an application for preliminary injunction will not be entertained by this Court unless the same is
prayed for in connection with some other remedy or in an action actually pending before Us.

Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a particular act. It may be an
action in itself brought specifically to restrain or command the performance of an act or it may be just a provisional remedy for and as
an incident in the main action which may be for other reliefs. The action for injunction should not be confused with the ancillary and
provisional remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as an incident of an independent action or proceeding. In a
main action for permanent injunction, a party may ask for preliminary injunction pending the final judgment.

Section 1, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 1. Original cases cognizable. – Only petitions for certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings
against members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers and consultants may be filed
originally in the Supreme Court.

It is clear that no mention was made in the above-cited rule as to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain original actions for injunction.
In the 1917 case of Madarang vs. Santamaria13, we have ruled that the Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction, in an action
brought for that purpose, to grant the remedy by injunction pursuant to Section 17 of Act No. 136 which provided that the Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus and quo warranto. As in Section
17 of Act 136, Section 1 of Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has likewise not made any provision for the granting of the writ
of injunction, as an original action, in the Supreme Court. Hence, the rule that this Court does not have jurisdiction over original actions
for injunction still holds. This Court may, however, issue preliminary writs of injunction in cases on appeal before Us or in original
actions commenced therein pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Notwithstanding procedural lapses as to the appropriateness of the remedies prayed for in the petitions filed before Us, however, this
Court can take primary jurisdiction over the said petitions in view of the importance of the issues raised. In some instances, this Court
has even suspended its own rules and excepted a case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so demanded.

It is helpful, in the discussion of the merits of these consolidated cases, to review the history of the law creating PAGCOR.

On January 1, 1977, the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the
1973 Constitution, issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1067-A creating the Philippine Amusement Games Corporation (PAGCOR).
PAGCOR was created and mandated to implement the following state policy:

Section 1. DECLARATION OF POLICY - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state to centralize and integrate all games of
chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law to obtain the following objectives:

1. To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one corporate entity to be
controlled, administered and supervised by the government;

2. To establish and operate clubs and casinos, sports gaming pools (basketball, football, etc.) and such other for amusement
and recreation, including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines
which will (1) generate source of additional revenue infrastructure and socio-economic projects, such as flood control,
Tulungan ng Bayan Centers/Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other essential public services; (2) create
recreation and integrate facilities which will expand and improve the country’s existing tourist attractions; (3) minimize, if not
totally eradicate the evils, malpractices and corruptions that normally are found prevalent in the conduct and operation of
gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement.

On the same day, PAGCOR was granted by the then President Marcos under P.D. No. 1067-B the "franchise to establish, operate and
maintain gambling casinos on land and water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines." PAGCOR’s franchise
was further amended under P.D. No. 1067-C for the purpose of specifying that "The franchise shall become exclusive in character,
subject only to the exception of existing franchises and games of chance heretofore permitted by law." P.D. No. 1067-A and P.D. No.
1067-B were again amended by P.D. Nos. 1399 and 1632 relative to the provisions on Board of Directors, exemptions and allocation of
fund, among others.
On July 11, 1983, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1869 for the purpose of consolidating and amending P.D. Nos. 1067-A, 1067-B,
1067-C, 1399 and 1632, relative to the franchise and powers of PAGCOR. Under P.D. No. 1869, PAGCOR is mandated to implement
the following state policy -

xxx

(b) to establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming pools (basketball, football,
lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance which may be allowed by law within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will (1) generate sources of additional revenue to infrastructure and socio-civic
projects, such as flood control programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan centers, Nutritional
Programs, population control and such other essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand
and improve the country’s existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, the evils, malpractices and corruptions
that are normally in the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement."

It is the petitioners’ contention that PAGCOR’S franchise is limited to the management and operation of games of chance. They point
out that P.D. No. 810 and Executive Order No. 169 have characterized jai alai as a game of skill and consequently, the operation and
management of jai alai or Basque pelota games cannot be said to have been included in PAGCOR’s franchise. Jai alai as defined in
Webster’s dictionary is a game of Basque origin resembling handball and played (as in Spain and Latin America) on a large walled
court by usually two or four (4) players who use a long curved wicker basket strapped to the right wrist to catch and hurl the ball against
the front wall to make it rebound in such a way that the opponent cannot return it before it has bounced more than once. 14

Respondent PAGCOR, on the other hand, citing the cases of Lim vs. Pacquing and Guingona vs. Reyes, et.al,15claims that while jai alai
in itself is not a game of chance, it may be characterized as a game of chance when bets are accepted as a form of gambling.

The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the legislature, to the
end that the same may be enforced. This meaning and intention must be sought first of all in the language of the statute itself.
For it must be presumed that the means employed by the legislature to express its will are adequate for the purpose and do express
that will correctly. If the language is plain and free from obscurity, it must be taken as meaning exactly what it says, whatever may be
the consequences.16

Section 11 of P.D. No. 1869 defining the extent and nature of PAGCOR’s franchise reads:

x x x the Corporation is hereby granted x x x the rights, privilege, and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and
other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e., basketball, football, lotteries, etc. x x x [underscoring supplied]

Contrary to the majority opinion that PAGCOR’s franchise is limited only to the management and operation of casinos, a cursory
reading of the abovequoted legal provision would readily show that the extent and nature of PAGCOR’s franchise is so broad that
literally all kinds of sports and gaming pools, including jai alai, are covered therein.

A sport is defined as "a game or contest especially when involving individual skill or prowess on which money is staked." 17 Gaming, on
the other hand, is defined as "the act or practice of playing games for stakes." 18 P.D. No. 1869 has made express mention of basketball
and football as example of gaming pools. Basketball and football, however, like jai alai are games of skills. In U.S. vs. Hilario 19, the
distinction between games of chance and games of skill was treated in this wise:

This distinction between games of chance and games of skill, making betting upon the former illegal is quite well treated in State vs.
Gupton (30 N.C. 271) where a game of tenpins was held not to be a game of chance, but a game depending chiefly upon the skill of
players, and betting thereon consequently not prohibited by a statute prohibiting bets or wagers upon games of chances.

Considering that under Section 11 of P.D. No. 1869, games of skill like basketball and football have been lumped together with the
word "lotteries" just before the word "etc." and after the words "gaming pools," it may be deduced from the wording of the law that when
bets or stakes are made in connection with games of skill, they may be classified as games of chance under the coverage of
PAGCOR’s franchise. The meaning of the phrase "et cetera" or its abbreviation "etc." depends largely on the context of the instrument,
description and enumeration of the matters preceding the term and subject matter to which it is applied, and when used in a statute, the
words should be given their usual and natural signification. 20 Consequently, jai alai, otherwise known as "game of Basque pelota", while
in itself is not per se a game of chance, may be categorized as a game of chance when bets are accepted as a form of gambling. It is a
cardinal rule of statutory construction that when words and phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Even if the Court is fully
persuaded that the legislature really meant and intended something different from what it enacted, and that the failure to convey the
real meaning was due to inadvertence or mistake in the use of language, yet, if the words chosen by the legislature are not obscure or
ambiguous, but convey a precise and sensible meaning (excluding the case of obvious clerical errors or elliptical forms of expression),
then the Court must take the law as it finds it, and give it its literal interpretation, without being influenced by the probable legislative
meaning lying at the back of the words. In that event, the presumption that the legislature meant what it said, though it be contrary to
the fact, is conclusive.21

Notably, even the literal application of the word "etc." does not run counter to the reason for the enactment of the statute and the
purpose to be gained by it. P.D. No. 1869, the law amending and consolidating P.D. Nos. 1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399 and 1632,
Relative to the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR, was issued by the then President Marcos, pursuant to the observation that
PAGCOR’s operation has enabled the government to identify potential sources of additional revenue for the government provided all
games of chance are managed and made subject to the close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control by the government. The
operation and management of jai alai can and will undoubtedly generate more funds for PAGCOR as a source of additional and much
needed revenue for the government.

It is alleged that there is no specific mention of jai alai among the games which PAGCOR can operate under its franchise. Hence,
pursuant to the principle that a franchise is a special privilege that should be construed strictly against the grantee, PAGCOR cannot
claim that it is authorized to conduct the operation of jai alai games.

While there is no specific mention of jai alai as among the games of chance which PAGCOR can operate under its franchise, the
language of the law defining the scope of PAGCOR’s franchise is broad enough to include the operations of jai alai as a game of
chance. Where the franchise contains no words either defining or limiting the powers which the holder may exercise, such holder has,
by implication, all such powers as are reasonably necessary to enable it to accomplish the purposes and object of its creation.22 It is
well recognized that the principle of strict construction does not preclude a fair and reasonable interpretation of such charter and
franchises, nor does it justify withholding that which satisfactorily appears to have been intended to be conveyed to the grantee.23

It is claimed that jai alai operations is beyond the scope of PAGCOR’s franchise inasmuch as jai alai is not allowed by law within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines; and that at the time of the passage of P.D. No. 1869, the operations of jai alai was already the
subject of a grant to the Philippine Jai Alai and Amusement Corporation (PJAC) by virtue of P.D. Nos. 810 and 1124; and that the
subsequent repeal of P.D. Nos. 810 and 1124 in 1986 allegedly reverted betting on the results of jai alai games to the status of a
criminal act under P.D. No. 1602.

The mere granting of a franchise does not amount to an implied contract on the part of the grantor that it will not grant a rival franchise
to a competing corporation or enter into a competition itself in reference to the subject of the franchise.24 Monopoly is not an essential
feature of a franchise and the strictly legal signification of the term franchise is not always confined to exclusive rights.25 An examination
of the provisions of P.D. No. 810 does not give us any indication that the franchise granted to PJAC to operate jai alai is exclusive in
character. Given the broad language of P.D. 1869 defining the scope of PAGCOR’s franchise, I find no reason why the operations of jai
alai cannot be deemed as included in its franchise. Besides, the subsequent repeal of P.D. Nos. 810 and 1124 in 1986 by E.O. No. 610
only meant that PJAC was no longer entitled to exercise its rights under its former franchise. E.O. No. 610, otherwise known as
Repealing Presidential Decree No. 810, entitled "An Act Granting the Philippine Jai alai and Amusement Corporation a Franchise to
Operate, Construct and Maintain a Fronton for Basque Pelota and Similar Games of Skill in the Greater Manila Area", as amended, and
Accordingly Revoking and Canceling the Right, Privilege and Authority granted therein in itself did not delimit the scope of the franchise
of PAGCOR especially since E.O. No. 610 was specific enough to identify the repeal of the law (P.D. No. 810) granting a certain
franchise, i.e. PJAC’s franchise. As regards P.D. No 1602, it should be stressed that it did not outlaw the operations of jai alai. It merely
provided for stiffer penalties for illegal or unauthorized activities related to jai alai and other forms of gambling.

The majority opinion makes much issue of the fact that the franchise of PAGCOR under P.D. No. 1869 came from President Marcos
who assumed legislative powers under martial law. He stresses that "the so-called legislative grant to PAGCOR did not come from a
real Congress." I would like to point out, however, the fact that the validity of PAGCOR’s franchise has already been upheld in the case
of Basco vs. PAGCOR.26 As earlier stated, the main issue before this Court is the scope of the aforesaid franchise of PAGCOR and not
its validity. The majority opinion does not dispute that PAGCOR under P.D. No. 1869 has the requisite franchise to operate gambling
casinos. In the same vein, however, it is argued that P.D. No. 1869 cannot be held as a valid legislative grant of franchise for the
operation of jai alai games. President Marcos had legislative power to grant PAGCOR a franchise to operate all other games of chance
including jai alai. President Marcos’ exercise of legislative power, under Amendment No. 6 during the martial law years, has been
upheld in a number of cases by this Court, notably that of Legaspi vs. Minister of Finance.27 Moreover, Section 3, Article XVIII of the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution clearly provides that: "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters
of instruction and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or
revoked." Hence, unless and until P.D. No. 1869 which is the charter and franchise of PAGCOR, is amended or repealed by Congress,
it remains valid and effective.

If courts believe that a particular statute is unwise, a recognition of their own limited sphere forbids them from amending or rewriting the
law in the guise of strict interpretation to suit their own predilections or prejudices. The case of Stone vs. Mississippi28 cited in the
majority opinion saying that courts do not assume that the legislature intended to part away with its power to regulate public morals, is
misplaced. In the said case, an Act was passed by the legislature of Mississippi on January 16, 1867 entitled, "An Act Incorporating the
Mississippi Agricultural, Educational and Manufacturing Aid Society" which conceded to the defendants the franchise of issuing and
vending lottery tickets. From 1822 to 1867, without any constitutional requirement, lotteries were prohibited by law in Mississippi and
those who conducted them were punished as a kind of gamblers. In 1868, the people of the State of Mississippi adopted a new
Constitution which contained a provision stating that "the Legislature shall never authorize any lottery; nor shall the sale of lottery tickets
be allowed; nor shall any lottery heretofore authorized be permitted to be drawn, or tickets therein to be sold." The defendants therein
insisted that they had complied with all the conditions imposed by the charter, and were conducting business in accordance with its
provisions; that the terms of the state Constitution and the Legislative Act, above set forth, interfered with their vested rights and violate
the Constitution of the United States, in attempting to impair the obligation of contracts. The question then posed was whether in the
view of the facts presented, the legislature of a state can, by the charter of a lottery company, defeat the will of the people
authoritatively expressed in relation to the further continuance of such business in their midst. The United States Supreme Court ruled
that no legislature can bargain away public health or public morals.

Clearly, the issue in the said case is materially different from the issue in the consolidated cases at bar where the main question
presented is the scope and not the validity of respondent PAGCOR’s franchise to operate jai alai as a legalized game of chance. It is
not amiss to note that PAGCOR in the light of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1869 was created, precisely, to "centralize and integrate all games
of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives" xxx "to
minimize the evils, malpractices and corruptions that normally are found prevalent in the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and
casinos without direct government involvement." PAGCOR’s right to operate jai alai games as legalized games of chance under its
franchise, is in fact a measure which flows from the legislature’s exercise of police power. In Basco vs. PAGCOR this Court have so
declared that "Public welfare lies at the bottom of the enactment of P.D. No. 1869." 29

Reliance in the majority opinion on the case of Aicardi vs. Alabama30 that a statute which legalizes a gambling activity or business
should be strictly construed and every reasonable doubt must be resolved to limit the powers and rights claimed under its authority is
likewise misplaced. The aforesaid statement was apparently taken out of context inasmuch as in the same case, the court
declared "Every reasonable doubt should be so resolved as to limit the powers and rights claimed under its authority. Implications and
intendments should have no place except as they are inevitable from the language or the context."31 As earlier stated, in the
case at bar the scope of PAGCOR’s franchise is couched in a language that is broad enough to cover the operations of jai alai.

As regards the issue that it could not have been the intent of then President Marcos to grant PAGCOR a franchise to operate jai alai
considering that he had already issued to another corporation which is controlled by his in-laws a franchise to operate jai alai, suffice it
to say that in the interpretation of statutes, it is not proper or permissible to inquire into the motives which influenced the legislative
body, except insofar as such motives are disclosed by the statute itself.32 It should be stressed that the magnitude of the consideration,
political or financial, which may operate upon the legislative mind as an inducement for grants and franchises conferred by statute, do
not change the character of the legislation, or vary the rule of construction by which the rights of the grantees must be measured.33

Considering that PAGCOR’s franchise is broad enough to cover the operation and management of jai alai games as well as supervised
betting activities in connection therewith, let us come to the question as to whether PAGCOR may enter into a joint venture agreement
with the private corporations, BELLE and FILGAME, to operate, manage and conduct jai alai games as well as supervised betting
activities both at the fronton site and selected off-fronton betting stations.

PAGCOR’s right to enter into management contracts is not limited to those relating to the efficient operation of gambling casinos under
Section 11 of P.D. No. 1869 which reads:

Sec. 11. Scope of Franchise. – In addition to the rights and privileges granted it under the preceding section, this Franchise shall entitle
the corporation to do and undertake the following:

(1) enter into operating and/or managing contracts with any registered and accredited company possessing the knowledge, skill and
expertise and facilities to insure the efficient operation of gambling casinos x x x

A joint venture is an association of persons or companies jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise - generally, all contribute
assets and share risks. It requires a community of interests in the performance of the subject matter, a right, and governs the policy
connected therewith, and duty, which may be altered by agreement to share in both profit and losses. 34 In this jurisdiction, a joint
venture is a form of partnership and is thus governed by the law on partnerships.

Section 3 of P.D. No. 1869 enumerates the following powers and functions of PAGCOR:

xxx

h) to enter into, make, perform, and carry out contracts of every kind and for any purpose pertaining to the business of the
corporation, or in any manner incident thereto, as principal, agent or otherwise, with any person, firm, association or
corporation;

xxx

l) to do anything and everything necessary, proper, desirable, convenient or suitable for the accomplishment of any of the purposes or
the attainment of any of the objects or the furtherance of any of the powers herein stated, either alone or in association with other
corporations, firms or individuals, and to do every other act or thing incidental, pertaining to, growing out of, or connected with, the
aforesaid purposes, objects or powers, or any part thereof.

Clearly, in Section 11 of P.D. No. 1869, the powers granted to PAGCOR is broad enough to include the power to enter into a joint
venture agreement with private corporations like BELLE and FILGAME relating to the operation, management and conduct not only of
gambling casinos but also of those relating to jai alai as legalized gambling.

Where the language of the statute is clear, it is the duty of the court to enforce it according to the plain meaning of the word.
There is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation,
and, when the words have a definite and precise meaning, to go elsewhere in search of conjecture in order to restrict or extend the
meaning. When an act is expressed in clear and concise terms, and the sense is manifest and leads to nothing absurd, there can be no
reason not to adopt the sense which it naturally presents. To go elsewhere in search of conjectures in order to find a different meaning
is not so much to interpret the law as to elude it. 35

Under the rule potestas delegata non delegari potest a delegated power cannot be delegated. This is based upon the ethical principle
that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own
judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. 36 However, the said rule is
inapplicable in the case at bar. The legislative grant of franchise to PAGCOR has not accorded unto the latter legislative powers nor
quasi-legislative powers. The joint venture Agreement was entered by PAGCOR with FILGAME and BELLE pursuant to the powers
granted under P.D. No. 1869 to PAGCOR to "enter into, make, perform, and carry out contracts of every kind and for any purpose
pertaining to the business of the corporation x x x with any person, firm or corporation." Under the joint venture Agreement, BELLE and
FILGAME will provide financial requirements and technical assistance to PAGCOR in connection with the use of their operational
facilities. PAGCOR however shall still manage, regulate and control all aspects of jai alai operations. The subject joint venture
Agreement is in consonance with the powers granted to PAGCOR that it may "do anything and everything necessary, proper, desirable,
convenient or suitable for the accomplishment of any of the purposes or attainment of any of the objects or the furtherance of any of the
powers herein stated, either alone or in association with other corporations, firms or individuals."

It should be noted that the joint venture Agreement entered into by and among PAGCOR, BELLE and FILGAME, does not involve any
infrastructure contract or project which is governed by P.D. No. 1594.37 Neither does it involve the sale and furnishing of supplies,
materials and equipment to the government under E.O. 301. In Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato 38, this Court ruled that Section 1 of
E.O. 301 denominated as "Decentralizing Actions on Government Negotiated Contracts, Lease Contracts and Records Disposal,"
applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment. In the joint venture Agreement in question, it is BELLE
and FILGAME which will, in fact, provide the financial requirements and technical assistance to PAGCOR in connection with the use of
their operational facilities. Hence, there is no necessity for PAGCOR to conduct a public bidding before entering into the said joint
venture Agreement with BELLE and FILGAME especially since there is nothing in the provisions of P.D. No. 1869 which would require
that contracts like the Joint Venture Agreement in question be submitted for public bidding.

Finally, while on one hand, jai alai, as a form of legalized gambling under the control and supervision of PAGCOR, does not
promote good morals, on the other hand it is expected to provide entertainment to the public and much needed revenues to
the government. In balancing those two apparently conflicting interests, it must be stressed that courts are not supposed to
pass upon and do not pass upon questions of wisdom or expediency of legislation, for it is not within their province to
supervise and keep legislation within the bounds of propriety. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.39 Any
shortcoming of a statute is for the legislature alone to correct by appropriate enactment. 40

In view of all the foregoing, I vote to dismiss the consolidated petitions in G.R. NO. 138298 and G.R. NO. 138982.
Footnotes

1 Opinion No. 67, S., 1996, G.R. No. 138298, Rollo, pp. 171-172.

2 250 SCRA 130, 140-141[1995].

3 Annex "A", Supplemental Petition in G.R. No. 138298, Rollo, pp. 162-170.

4Section 5 (b) of P.D. 902-A reads: Section 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and
Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted
under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:

xxx

(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between and among stockholders, members
or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are
stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the
state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as entity.

5 Sec. 5.2 of R.A. 8799, otherwise known as "The Securities Regulation Code" which took effect on August 8, 2000 reads: The
Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases under Section 5 of P.D. 902-A is hereby transferred to the courts of general
jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial court: Provided, that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may
designate the Regional trial court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The Commission shall retain
jurisdiction over cases pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved
within one (1) year from the enactment of this code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of
payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.

6
Endencia vs. David, 93 Phil 696, 700-702 (1953).

7 307 U.S. 433 [1939].

8 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973].

9
235 SCRA 506, 520 [1994].

10
36 Am Jur 26, Franchises §1.

11
7 Phil 385, 387 [1907].

12 8 Phil 332, 333 [1907].

13 37 Phil 304 [1917].

14 Websters Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged), 1993 Ed.

15 240 SCRA 649, 674-675 [1995].

16 H.C. Black, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 45 (2nd Ed, 1971).

17 See note 14, supra.

18
Ibid.

19
24 Phil 392, 399 [1913].

20 Wright vs. People, 181 P.2d 447,450. 116 Colo. 306.

21 H. Black, op. cit, note 16 at 53.

22 36 Am Jur 2d, Franchises §26 citing Russell vs. Kentucky Utilities Co., 231 Ky 820, 22 SW2d 289, 66 ALR 1238; Southern
Illinois and M. Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 Mo 1, 73 SW 453.

23 36 Am Jur 2d, Franchises §26 citing Russell vs. Sebastian, 233 US 195, 58 L ed 912, 34 S CT. 517.

24
36 Am Jur 2d, Franchises §29.

25
Ibid.

26
197 SCRA 52 [1991].

27 115 SCRA 418, 433 [1982] .


28 101 US 814, 25 L Ed. 1079 [1879].

29
197 SCRA 52, 62 [1991]

30 22 L. Ed. 215

31 Id. at 216

32
H. Black, op. cit., note 16 at 315 citing Home vs. Guy, L.R. 5 Ch Div. 901; Keyport & M.P. Streamboat Co. v. Farmer’s
Transp. Co. 18 N.J. Eq 13; Kountze v. Omaha, 5 Dill. 443, Fed. Cas. No. 7,928; City of Richmond v. Supervisors of Henrico
County , 83 Va. 204, 2 S.E. 26, People vs. Shepard, 36 N.Y. 285; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 3 L.Ed. 162; Williams v.
Nashville, 89 Tenn. 487, 15 S.W. 364; Pacific Coast S.S. Co. v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 36; City of Lebanon v. Creel, 109 Ky
363, 59 S. W. 16.

33 Ibid. at 116 citing Union Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 10 Ct. Cl 448.

34 Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110, 144 [1994].

35 H. Black, op. cit., note 16 at 49-50.

36
US vs. Barrias, 11 Phil 327,330 [1908].

37
Entitled "Prescribing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for Government Infrastructure Contracts."

38 See note 2, supra at 151.

39Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, 450 [1968]; Quintos vs. Lacson, 97 Phil 290, 293 [1955]; People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil 535,
548 [1947]; Angara vs. Electoral Commission , 63 Phil 139, 158 [1936].

40 Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil 456, 470 [1935]; Cornejo v. Naval, 54 Phil 809,814 [1930].

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. 180363 April 28, 2009

EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner,


vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The issue for resolution is whether the crime of which petitioner Edgar Y. Teves was convicted in Teves v. Sandiganbayan1 involved
moral turpitude.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007
elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify 2petitioner on the ground that in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC)
of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office
because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from
public office.4 The case was docketed as SPA No. 07-242 and assigned to the COMELEC’s First Division.

On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member of House of
Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. 5

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc which was denied in its assailed October 9, 2007 Resolution
for being moot, thus:

It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections for the position of member of the House of
Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 28 May 2007 filed by respondent Edgar Y. Teves
challenging the Resolution of this Commission (First Division) promulgated on 11 May 2007 is hereby DENIED for having been
rendered moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.6
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:

I.

THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN THE COMELEC EN BANC
DEMURRED IN RESOLVING THE MAIN ISSUE RAISED IN PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, WHETHER
PETITIONER IS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.

II.

THE MAIN ISSUE IS NOT RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC AS THE RESOLUTION THEREOF WILL DETERMINE
PETITIONER’S QUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR OTHER PUBLIC POSITIONS IN FUTURE ELECTIONS.

III.

THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN THE COMELEC EN BANC
IN EFFECT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST DIVISION WHICH RULED THAT PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(H) OF R.A. 3019 AND THE IMPOSITION OF FINE IS A CONVICTION FOR A CRIME INVOLVING
MORAL TURPITUDE.

A.

THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE SHOULD BE
RESOLVED TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FINDINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.

B.

THERE IS NOTHING IN THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST DIVISION
OF THE COMELEC, THAT BASED ON THE "TOTALITY OF FACTS" DOCTRINE, PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.7

The petition is impressed with merit.

The fact that petitioner lost in the congressional race in the May 14, 2007 elections did not effectively moot the issue of whether he was
disqualified from running for public office on the ground that the crime he was convicted of involved moral turpitude. It is still a justiciable
issue which the COMELEC should have resolved instead of merely declaring that the disqualification case has become moot in view of
petitioner’s defeat.

Further, there is no basis in the COMELEC’s findings that petitioner is eligible to run again in the 2010 elections because his
disqualification shall be deemed removed after the expiration of a period of five years from service of the sentence. Assuming that the
elections would be held on May 14, 2010, the records show that it was only on May 24, 2005 when petitioner paid the fine of
P10,000.00 he was sentenced to pay in Teves v. Sandignbayan. 8 Such being the reckoning point, thus, the five-year disqualification
period will end only on May 25, 2010. Therefore he would still be ineligible to run for public office during the May 14, 2010 elections.

Hence, it behooves the Court to resolve the issue of whether or not petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral
turpitude.1avvphi1

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. lawphil.net

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said
insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within
the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness
or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. 9

Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect
financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.10
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract,
or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is
prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law. 11

In Teves v. Sandiganbayan,12 petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit
which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Court held therein:

However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental,
owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn application for registration of cockpit filed on 26 September 1983 with the Philippine
Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal application dated 6 January 1989 he stated that he is the owner
and manager of the said cockpit. Absent any evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership thereof
is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature. His affidavit
dated 27 September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he "turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z.
Teves for the reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity due to other work pressure" is not
sufficient proof that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit was transferred to
Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.

Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest
thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as
such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all the property of the
conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in common by the husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and
is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:

Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly
or indirectly, to:

xxxx

(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit…. [Emphasis supplied].

The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited
interest.13

However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all
surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as
are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.

Thus, in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections,14 the Court clarified that:

Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the
Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se
involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit:

"It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely
mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral
turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being
positively prohibited."

This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution, for in "International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the
Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as
malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are
crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is
ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. (Emphasis
supplied)1awphi1

Applying the foregoing guidelines, we examined all the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s conviction and found that the same does
not involve moral turpitude.

First, there is neither merit nor factual basis in COMELEC’s finding that petitioner used his official capacity in connection with his
interest in the cockpit and that he hid the same by transferring the management to his wife, in violation of the trust reposed on him by
the people.

The COMELEC, in justifying its conclusion that petitioner’s conviction involved moral turpitude, misunderstood or misapplied our ruling
in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. According to the COMELEC:

In the present case, while the crime for which [petitioner] was convicted may per se not involve moral turpitude, still the totality of facts
evinces [his] moral turpitude. The prohibition was intended to avoid any conflict of interest or any instance wherein the public official
would favor his own interest at the expense of the public interest. The [petitioner] knew of the prohibition but he attempted to circumvent
the same by holding out that the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is to be owned by a certain Daniel Teves. Later on, he would
aver that he already divested himself of any interest of the cockpit in favor of his wife. But the Supreme Court saw through the ruse and
declared that what he divested was only the management of the cockpit but not the ownership. And even if the ownership is transferred
to his wife, the respondent would nevertheless have an interest thereon because it would still belong to the conjugal partnership of
gains, of which the [petitioner] is the other half.
[Petitioner] therefore maintained ownership of the cockpit by deceit. He has the duty to divest himself but he did not and instead
employed means to hide his interests. He knew that it was prohibited he nevertheless concealed his interest thereon. The facts that he
hid his interest denotes his malicious intent to favor self-interest at the expense of the public. Only a man with a malevolent, decadent,
corrupt and selfish motive would cling on and conceal his interest, the acquisition of which is prohibited. This plainly shows his moral
depravity and proclivity to put primacy on his self interest over that of his fellowmen. Being a public official, his act is also a betrayal of
the trust reposed on him by the people. Clearly, the totality of his acts is contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, honesty and
good morals. The crime, as committed by the [petitioner], plainly involves moral turpitude. 15

On the contrary, the Court’s ruling states:

The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of the business permit or license to operate
the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is "not well-founded." This it based, and rightly so, on the additional finding that only the
Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3) of the
LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan that has the authority to issue a license for the
establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the municipal mayor
was the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened or taken part in his official capacity in the issuance of a
cockpit license during the material time, as alleged in the information, because he was not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.16

Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to gain such pecuniary or financial interest in
the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife
considering that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC prohibiting possession of such interest.

As aptly observed in Teves v. Sandiganbayan:

As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of the Valencia Cockpit. Since then until 31 December 1991, possession by a
local official of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not yet prohibited. It was before the effectivity of the LGC of 1991, or on January
1990, that he transferred the management of the cockpit to his wife Teresita. In accordance therewith it was Teresita who thereafter
applied for the renewal of the cockpit registration. Thus, in her sworn applications for renewal of the registration of the cockpit in
question dated 28 January 1990 and 18 February 1991, she stated that she is the Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager of the said
cockpit. In her renewal application dated 6 January 1992, she referred to herself as the Owner/Licensee of the cockpit. Likewise in the
separate Lists of Duly Licensed Personnel for Calendar Years 1991 and 1992, which she submitted on 22 February 1991 and 17
February 1992, respectively, in compliance with the requirement of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission for the renewal of the cockpit
registration, she signed her name as Operator/Licensee. 17 (Emphasis supplied)

Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit is expressly prohibited
by the present LGC, however, its illegality does not mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such
possession of interest inherently immoral. Under the old LGC, mere possession by a public officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was
not among the prohibitions. Thus, in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that:

x x x under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions enumerated in Section 41
thereof. Such possession became unlawful or prohibited only upon the advent of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992.
Petitioner Edgar Teves stands charged with an offense in connection with his prohibited interest committed on or about 4 February
1992, shortly after the maiden appearance of the prohibition. Presumably, he was not yet very much aware of the prohibition. Although
ignorance thereof would not excuse him from criminal liability, such would justify the imposition of the lighter penalty of a fine of
P10,000 under Section 514 of the LGC of 1991.18 (Italics supplied)

The downgrading of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and twenty-one days as minimum to twelve years as
maximum to a lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000.00 is a recognition that petitioner’s violation was not intentionally done contrary to
justice, modesty, or good morals but due to his lack of awareness or ignorance of the prohibition.

Lastly, it may be argued that having an interest in a cockpit is detrimental to public morality as it tends to bring forth idlers and
gamblers, hence, violation of Section 89(2) of the LGC involves moral turpitude.

Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our culture and was prevalent
even during the Spanish occupation.19 While it is a form of gambling, the morality thereof or the wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable
issue. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., it was held that:

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests
of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it
at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit
gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may
consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such
choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said
that courts do no sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that
questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the
legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive.
Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge
their acts, and not to the courts of justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated May 11, 2007 and October
9, 2007 disqualifying petitioner Edgar Y. Teves from running for the position of Representative of the 3rd District of Negros Oriental, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring that the crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of
R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.

SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING ANTONIO T. CARPIO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
488 Phil. 311 (2004).

2 Rollo, pp. 130-134.

3 Supra, note 1.

4 Rollo, pp. 131, 133 & 134.

5
Id. at 45-46.

6 Id. at 49.

7 Id. at 12-13.

8 Rollo, p. 145.

9
Soriano v. Dizon, A.C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 1, 9.

10
Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149175, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 203, 215.

11 Id.

12 Supra note 4.

13 Id. at 329-330.

14 327 Phil. 1144, 1150-1151 (1996).


15 Rollo, pp. 44-45.

16
Teves v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 1 at 327-328.

17 Id. at 335.

18 Supra note 4 at 333-334.

19
Tan v. Pereña G.R. No. 149743, February 18, 2005, 452 SCRA 53, 69.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING OPINION

BRION, J.:

I fully concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago. I add these views to further explore the
term "moral turpitude" – a term that, while carrying far-reaching effects, embodies a concept that to date has not been given much
jurisprudential focus.

I. Historical Roots

The term "moral turpitude" first took root under the United States (U.S.) immigration laws.1 Its history can be traced back as far as the
17th century when the States of Virginia and Pennsylvania enacted the earliest immigration resolutions excluding criminals from
America, in response to the British government’s policy of sending convicts to the colonies. State legislators at that time strongly
suspected that Europe was deliberately exporting its human liabilities. 2 In the U.S., the term "moral turpitude" first appeared in the
Immigration Act of March 3, 1891, which directed the exclusion of persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime
or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude; this marked the first time the U.S. Congress used the term "moral turpitude" in immigration
laws.3 Since then, the presence of moral turpitude has been used as a test in a variety of situations, including legislation governing the
disbarment of attorneys and the revocation of medical licenses. Moral turpitude also has been judicially used as a criterion in
disqualifying and impeaching witnesses, in determining the measure of contribution between joint tortfeasors, and in deciding whether a
certain language is slanderous.4

In 1951, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the term "moral turpitude" in Jordan v. De George. 5The case presented
only one question: whether conspiracy to defraud the U.S. of taxes on distilled spirits is a crime involving moral turpitude within the
meaning of Section 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1919 (Immigration Act). Sam De George, an Italian immigrant was convicted twice
of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government of taxes on distilled spirits. Subsequently, the Board of Immigration Appeals ordered De
George’s deportation on the basis of the Immigration Act provision that allows the deportation of aliens who commit multiple crimes
involving moral turpitude. De George argued that he should not be deported because his tax evasion crimes did not involve moral
turpitude. The U.S. Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Vinzon, disagreed, finding that "under an unbroken course of judicial
decisions, the crime of conspiring to defraud the U.S. is a crime involving moral turpitude." 6 Notably, the Court determined that
fraudulent conduct involved moral turpitude without exception:

Whatever the phrase "involving moral turpitude" may mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which
fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude.xxx Fraud is the touchstone by which this case should
be judged.xxx We therefore decide that Congress sufficiently forewarned respondent that the statutory consequence of twice conspiring
to defraud the United States is deportation. 7

Significantly, the U.S. Congress has never exactly defined what amounts to a "crime involving moral turpitude." The legislative history of
statutes containing the moral turpitude standard indicates that Congress left the interpretation of the term to U.S. courts and
administrative agencies.8 In the absence of legislative history as interpretative aid, American courts have resorted to the dictionary
definition – "the last resort of the baffled judge."9 The most common definition of moral turpitude is similar to one found in the early
editions of Black’s Law Dictionary:

[An] act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. xxx Act or behavior that gravely violates moral
sentiment or accepted moral standards of community and is a morally culpable quality held to be present in some criminal offenses as
distinguished from others. xxx The quality of a crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community as
distinguished from statutory mala prohibita.10

In the Philippines, the term moral turpitude was first introduced in 1901 in Act No. 190, otherwise known as the Code of Civil Actions
and Special Proceedings.11 The Act provided that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer by the
Supreme Court upon conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. 12Subsequently, the term "moral turpitude" has been employed in
statutes governing disqualifications of notaries public, 13 priests and ministers in solemnizing marriages,14 registration to military
service,15 exclusion16 and naturalization of aliens,17 discharge of the accused to be a state witness,18 admission to the bar,19 suspension
and removal of elective local officials,20 and disqualification of persons from running for any elective local position. 21

In Re Basa,22 a 1920 case, provided the first instance for the Court to define the term moral turpitude in the context of Section 21 of the
Code of Civil Procedure on the disbarment of a lawyer for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Carlos S. Basa, a lawyer, was
convicted of the crime of abduction with consent. The sole question presented was whether the crime of abduction with consent, as
punished by Article 446 of the Penal Code of 1887, involved moral turpitude. The Court, finding no exact definition in the statutes,
turned to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary for guidance and held:
"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's
Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of
doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the
accepted rule of right conduct.

Thus, early on, the Philippines followed the American lead and adopted a general dictionary definition, opening the way for a case-to-
case approach in determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude.

II. Problems with the Definition of Moral Turpitude

Through the years, the Court has never significantly deviated from the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of moral turpitude as "an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals."23 This definition is more specific than that used in In re Vinzon 24 where the term moral turpitude was considered as
encompassing "everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals." 25

In the U.S., these same definitions have been highly criticized for their vagueness and ambiguity. 26 In Jordan, Justice Jackson noted
that "except for the Court’s [majority opinion], there appears to be a universal recognition that we have here an undefined and
undefinable standard."27 Thus, the phrase "crimes involving moral turpitude" has been described as "vague," "nebulous," "most
unfortunate," and even "bewildering." 28

Criticisms of moral turpitude as an inexactly defined concept are not unwarranted. First, the current definition of the term is broad. It can
be stretched to include most kinds of wrongs in society -- a result that the Legislature could not have intended. This Court itself
concluded in IRRI v. NLRC29 that moral turpitude "is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the
process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached" – once again confirming, as late as 1993 in IRRI, our case-by-case
approach in determining the crimes involving moral turpitude.

Second, the definition also assumes the existence of a universally recognized code for socially acceptable behavior -- the "private and
social duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general"; moral turpitude is an act violating these duties. The problem is
that the definition does not state what these duties are, or provide examples of acts which violate them. Instead, it provides terms such
as "baseness," "vileness," and "depravity," which better describe moral reactions to an act than the act itself. In essence, they are
"conclusory but non-descriptive."30 To be sure, the use of morality as a norm cannot be avoided, as the term "moral turpitude" contains
the word "moral" and its direct connotation of right and wrong. "Turpitude," on the other hand, directly means "depravity" which cannot
be appreciated without considering an act’s degree of being right or wrong. Thus, the law, in adopting the term "moral turpitude,"
necessarily adopted a concept involving notions of morality – standards that involve a good measure of subjective consideration and, in
terms of certainty and fixity, are far from the usual measures used in law. 31

Third, as a legal standard, moral turpitude fails to inform anyone of what it requires. 32 It has been said that the loose terminology of
moral turpitude hampers uniformity since … [i]t is hardly to be expected that a word which baffle judges will be more easily interpreted
by laymen.33 This led Justice Jackson to conclude in Jordan that "moral turpitude offered judges no clearer guideline than their own
consciences, inviting them to condemn all that we personally disapprove and for no better reason than that we disapprove it."34 This
trait, however, cannot be taken lightly, given that the consequences of committing a crime involving moral turpitude can be severe.

Crimes Categorized as Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude35

Since the early 1920 case of In re Basa,36 the Court has maintained its case-by-case categorization of crimes on the basis of moral
turpitude and has labeled specific crimes as necessarily involving moral turpitude. The following is a list, not necessarily complete, of
the crimes adjudged to involve moral turpitude:

1. Abduction with consent37

2. Bigamy38

3. Concubinage39

4. Smuggling40

5. Rape41

6. Estafa through falsification of a document42

7. Attempted Bribery43

8. Profiteering44

9. Robbery45

10. Murder, whether consummated or attempted46

11. Estafa47

12. Theft48

13. Illicit Sexual Relations with a Fellow Worker49


14. Violation of BP Bldg. 2250

15. Falsification of Document51

16. Intriguing against Honor52

17. Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law53

18. Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Drug-pushing)54

19. Perjury55

20. Forgery56

21. Direct Bribery57

22. Frustrated Homicide58

Zari v. Flores59 is one case that has provided jurisprudence its own list of crimes involving moral turpitude, namely: adultery,
concubinage, rape, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, bigamy, blackmail, bribery, criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium, dueling,
embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of loss on insurance contract, murder, mutilation of public records,
fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension laws, perjury, seduction under the promise of marriage, estafa, falsification of public
document, and estafa thru falsification of public document.60

Crimes Categorized as Crimes Not Involving Moral Turpitude61

The Court, on the other hand, has also had the occasion to categorically rule that certain crimes do not involve moral turpitude, namely:

1. Minor transgressions of the law (i.e., conviction for speeding) 62

2. Illegal recruitment63

3. Slight physical injuries and carrying of deadly weapon (Illegal possession of firearms) 64

4. Indirect Contempt65

III. Approaches and Standards.

Even a cursory examination of the above lists readily reveals that while the concept of "moral turpitude" does not have one specific
definition that lends itself to easy and ready application, the Court has been fairly consistent in its understanding and application of the
term and has not significantly deviated from what it laid down in In re Basa. The key element, directly derived from the word "turpitude,"
is the standard of depravity viewed from a scale of right and wrong.

The application of this depravity standard can be made from at least three perspectives or approaches, namely: from the objective
perspective of the act itself, irrespective of whether or not the act is a crime; from the perspective of the crime itself, as defined through
its elements; and from the subjective perspective that takes into account the perpetrator’s level of depravity when he committed the
crime.

The Court best expressed the first approach in Zari v. Flores66 where the Court saw the involvement of moral turpitude where an act is
intrinsically immoral, regardless of whether it is punishable by law or not. The Court emphasized that moral turpitude goes beyond
being merely mala prohibita; the act itself must be inherently immoral. Thus, this approach requires that the committed act itself be
examined, divorced from its characterization as a crime.

A ruling that exemplifies this approach is that made in the U.S. case In The Matter of G---67 where, in considering gambling, it was held
that:

Gambling has been in existence since time immemorial. Card playing for small stakes is a common accompaniment of social life; small
bets on horse racing and the "policy or numbers games" are diversions of the masses. That such enterprises exist surreptitiously is a
matter of common knowledge. Many countries permit it under a license system. In ancient times laws were enacted to discourage
people from gambling on the theory that the State had first claim upon their time and energy, and at later dates antigambling laws were
aimed especially at the activity as practiced by the working classes. Present-day movements to suppress gambling are also tinged with
other considerations. In urban communities in the past few decades the purely religious opposition to gambling has tended to become
less violent because certain activities, highly reputable according to prevailing social standards, have come more and more to resemble
it. Prohibition against gambling has had something of a police rather than a truly penal character. At all times an important fact in
arousing antagonism in gambling has been the association, almost inevitable, with sharp practice. In established societies more or less
serious attempts are everywhere made, however, to prohibit or to regulate gambling in its more notorious forms.

It would appear that statutes permitting gambling, such as those under discussion, rest primarily on the theory that they are in the
interest of public policy: that is to regulate and restrict any possible abuse, to obviate cheating and other corrupt practices that may
result if uncontrolled.

From this discussion, the Court went on to conclude that gambling is a malum prohibitum that is not intrinsically evil and, thus, is not a
crime involving moral turpitude.
With the same approach, but with a different result, is Office of the Court Administrator v. Librado, 68 a case involving drug possession.
Librado, a Deputy Sheriff in MTCC Iligan City was convicted of possession of "shabu," a prohibited drug. The Office of the Court
Administrator commenced an administrative case against him and he was subsequently suspended from office. In his subsequent plea
for reinstatement, the Court strongly denounced drug possession as an "especially vicious crime, one of the most pernicious evils that
has ever crept into our society… For those who become addicted to it not only slide into the ranks of the living dead, what is worse,
they become a grave menace to the safety of law abiding members of society." The Court, apparently drawing on what society deems
important, held that the use of drugs amounted to an act so inherently evil that no law was needed to deem it as such; it is an evil
without need for a law to call it evil69 - "an immoral act in itself regardless of whether it is punishable or not." 70

In People v. Yambot,71 the Court categorically ruled that the possession of a deadly weapon does not involve moral turpitude since the
act of carrying a weapon by itself is not inherently wrong in the absence of a law punishing it. Likewise, the Court acknowledged in
Court Administrator v. San Andres72 that illegal recruitment does not involve moral turpitude since it is not in itself an evil act – being
ordinarily an act in the ordinary course of business – in the absence of the a law prohibiting it.

The second approach is to look at the act committed through its elements as a crime. In Paras v. Vailoces, 73 the Court recognized that
as a "general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude." This is the same conclusion that
the U.S. Supreme Court made in Jordan, i.e., that crimes requiring fraud or intent to defraud always involve moral turpitude. 74

Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections75 is a case in point that uses the second approach and is one case where the Court even
dispensed with the review of facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime since Dela Torre did not assail his
conviction. Dela Torre was disqualified by the Comelec from running as Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna on the basis of his conviction for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law. Dela Torre appealed to this Court to overturn his
disqualification on the ground that the crime of fencing is not a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court ruled that moral turpitude is
deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of
malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of
moral turpitude.

To be sure, the elements of the crime can be a critical factor in determining moral turpitude if the second approach is used in the crimes
listed above as involving moral turpitude. In Villaber v. Commission on Elections, 76 the Court, by analyzing the elements alone of the
offense under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, held that the "presence of the second element manifest moral turpitude" in that "a drawer who
issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to
accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals." The same conclusion was reached by the Court in
Magno v. Commission on Elections,77 when it ruled that direct bribery involves moral turpitude, thus:

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately
commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of
the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes
advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the
accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
[Emphasis supplied]

The third approach, the subjective approach, essentially takes the offender and his acts into account in light of the attendant
circumstances of the crime: was he motivated by ill will indicating depravity? The Court apparently used this approach in Ao Lin v.
Republic,78 a 1964 case, when it held "that the use of a meter stick without the corresponding seal of the Internal Revenue Office by
one who has been engaged in business for a long time, involves moral turpitude because it involves a fraudulent use of a meter stick,
not necessarily because the Government is cheated of the revenue involved in the sealing of the meter stick, but because it manifests
an evil intent on the part of the petitioner to defraud customers purchasing from him in respect to the measurement of the goods
purchased."

In IRRI v. NLRC,79 the International Rice Research Institute terminated the employment contract of Nestor Micosa on the ground that he
has been convicted of the crime of homicide – a a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court refused to characterize the crime of
homicide as one of moral turpitude in light of the circumstances of its commission. The Court ruled:

These facts show that Micosa’s intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the
mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstances demonstrate
that Micosa’s character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust. [italics supllied].

The Court stressed, too, not only the subjective element, but the need for the appreciation of facts in considering whether moral
turpitude exists – an unavoidable step under the third approach. Thus, the Court explained:

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral
turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known
and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. [Emphasis supplied]

In contrast, while IRRI refused to characterize the crime of homicide as one of moral turpitude, the recent case of Soriano v.
Dizon80 held that based on the circumstances, the crime of frustrated homicide committed by the respondent involved moral turpitude.
In Soriano, complainant Soriano filed a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Manuel Dizon alleging that the crime of frustrated
homicide involves moral turpitude under the circumstances surrounding its commission, and was a sufficient ground for his disbarment
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The Court after noting the factual antecedents of IRRI held that –

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and
his unworthiness to practice law. Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least
expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by
complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer’s assault.

We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim
when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed
complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse,
respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention
to escape punishment for his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme
arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be
slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession.
His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the
tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the
obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge. 81 [Emphasis supplied]

Laguitan v. Tinio,82 expressed in terms of the protection of the sanctity of marriage, 83 also necessarily looked at the subjective element
because the offender’s concubinage involved an assault on the basic social institution of marriage. Another subjective element case, in
terms of looking at the damage wrought by the offender’s act, is People v. Jamero84 where the Court disregarded the appellants’
argument that the trial court erred in ordering the discharge of Inocencio Retirado from the Information in order to make him a state
witness, since he has been previously convicted of the crime of malicious mischief – a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court said:

In the absence of any evidence to show the gravity and the nature of the malicious mischief committed, We are not in a position to say
whether or not the previous conviction of malicious mischief proves that accused had displayed the baseness, the vileness and the
depravity which constitute moral turpitude. And considering that under paragraph 3 of Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, any
deliberate act (not constituting arson or other crimes involving destruction) causing damage in the property of another, may constitute
the crime of malicious mischief, We should not make haste in declaring that such crime involves moral turpitude without determining, at
least, the value of the property destroyed and/or the circumstances under which the act of destroying was committed. 85 [Emphasis
supplied]

Thus, again, the need for a factual determination was considered necessary.

In sum, a survey of jurisprudence from the earliest case of In Re Basa 86 to the recent case of Soriano v. Dizon 87shows that the Court
has used varying approaches, but used the same standard or measure – the degree of attendant depravity. The safest approach to
avoid being misled in one’s conclusion is to apply all three approaches, if possible, and to evaluate the results from each of the
approaches. A useful caveat in the evaluation is to resolve any doubt in favor of the perpetrator, as a conclusion of moral turpitude
invariably signifies a worse consequence for him or her.

IV. The Approaches Applied to TEVES

The Objective Approach

The crime for which petitioner Teves was convicted (possession of pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit) is, at its core, related to
gambling – an act that by contemporary community standards is not per se immoral. Other than the ruling heretofore cited on this
point,88 judicial notice can be taken of state-sponsored gambling activities in the country that, although not without controversy, is
generally regarded to be within acceptable moral limits. The ponencia correctly noted that prior to the enactment of the Local
Government Code of 1991, mere possession by a public officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not expressly prohibited. This bit
of history alone is an indicator that, objectively, no essential depravity is involved even from the standards of a holder of a public office.
This reasoning led the ponencia to conclude that "its illegality does not mean that violation thereof . . . makes such possession of
interest inherently immoral."89

From the Perspective of the Elements of the Crime

Under this approach, we determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude based solely on our analysis of the elements of the crime
alone.

The essential elements of the offense of possession of prohibited interest (Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law) for which the petitioner
was convicted are:

1. The accused is a public officer;

2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; and

3. He is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.

From the perspective of moral turpitude, the third element is the critical element. This element shows that the holding of interest that the
law covers is not a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals; it is illegal solely
because of the prohibition that exists in law or in the Constitution. Thus, no depravity immediately leaps up or suggests itself based on
the elements of the crime committed.

The Subjective Approach

This approach is largely the ponencia’s approach, as it expressly stated that "a determination of all surrounding circumstances of the
violation of the statute must be considered."90 In doing this, the ponencia firstly considered that the petitioner did not use his official
capacity in connection with the interest in the cockpit, not that he hid this interest by transferring it to his wife, as the transfer took effect
before the effectivity of the law prohibiting the possession of interest. The ponencia significantly noted, too, that the violation was not
intentionally committed in a manner contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals, but due simply to Teves’ lack of awareness or
ignorance of the prohibition. This, in my view, is the clinching argument that no moral turpitude can be involved as no depravity can be
gleaned where intent is clearly absent.

Conclusion
To recapitulate, all three approaches point to the conclusion that no moral turpitude was involved in the crime Teves committed, with
the predominant reasons being the first (or objective) and the third (or subjective) approaches. Analysis in this manner, with one
approach reinforcing another, results in clear and easily appreciated conclusions.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951).

2 Brian C. Harms, Redefining "Crimes of Moral Turpitude": A Proposal to Congress, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259, 261 (2001).

3 Id.

4 Supra note 1, p. 227.

5 Id.

6 Id., p. 229.

7 Id.. p. 232.

8Derrick Moore, "Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude": Why the Void-For-Vagueness Argument is Still Available and Meritorious,
41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 813, 816 (2008).

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Effective September 1, 1901.

12 Now RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 27.

13 ACT NO. 2711, Section 234, March 10, 1917.

14
ACT NO. 3613, Section 45, December 4, 1929.

15 COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 1, Section 57, December 21, 1935.

16 COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 473, Section 4, June 17, 1939.

17 COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 613, Section 29, August 26, 1940.

18
REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 119, Section 17.

19 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 2.

20 BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 337, Section 60, February 10, 1983; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, Section 60, January 1, 1992.

21 BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881, Section 12, December 3, 1985; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, Section 40, January 1, 1992.

22
41 Phil. 275, 276 (1920).

23Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 483, 487, citing Zari v. Flores, 94 SCRA
317, 323 (1979).

24 G.R. No. 561, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 815.

25Cited in Rafael Christopher Yap, Bouncing Doctrine: Re-Examining the Supreme Court’s Pronouncements of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 as a Crime of Moral Turpitude (2006), p. 13 (unpublished J.D. thesis, Ateneo de Manila University, on file
with the Professional Schools Library, Ateneo de Manila University).

26 Supra note 8, p. 816.

27 Supra note 1, p. 235.

28 Supra note 8, p. 814.


29 G.R. No. 97239, May 12, 1993, 221 SCRA 760.

30Nate Carter, Shocking The Conscience of Mankind: Using International Law To Define "Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude" In
Immigration Law, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 955, 959 (2006).

31A similar concept is "obscenity," whose standards have been in continuous development in U.S. Supreme Court rulings. See
Roth v. United States; Albert v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) and Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). Only a decade after Roth, Justice Harlan observed that "[t]he subject of obscenity has
produced a variety of views among the members of the Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudication." As
evidence, Justice Harlan noted that in the thirteen obscenity cases decided in the decade after Roth, there were "a total of 55
separate opinions among the Justices;" Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law, 1255, (1996 ed.) citing Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-705, 705 n.1 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

32
Supra note 30, p. 959.

33 Supra note 8, p. 813, citing Note, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, 43 HARV. L. REV. 117, 121 (1930).

34 Supra note 1, p. 242.

35 Supra note 25, pp. 20-21.

36 Supra note 22.

37 Id.

38 In Re Marcelino Lontok, 43 Phil. 293 (1922).

39In Re Juan C. Isada, 60 Phil 915 (1934); Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, A.C. No. 6148, February 27, 2004, 424 SCRA 42 citing
Laguitan v. Tinio, A.C. No. 3049, December 4, 1989, 179 SCRA 837.

40 In Re Atty. Tranquilino Rovero, 92 Phil. 128 (1952).

41 Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143 (1955).

42 In the Matter of Eduardo A. Abesamis, 102 Phil.1182 (1958).

43 In Re Dalmacio De Los Angeles, 106 Phil 1 (1959).

44 Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines, 106 Phil. 727 (1959).

45
Paras v. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, April 12, 1961, 1 SCRA 954.

46Can v. Galing, G.R. No. L-54258, November 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 663 citing In Re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. L-363, July 31,
1962, 5 SCRA 661.

47 In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon, Admin. Case No. 561, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 815.

48Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-63652 October 18,
1988, 166 SCRA 422.

49
Id.

People v. Tuanda, A.M. No. 3360, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 692; Paolo C. Villaber v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
50

No.148326, November 15, 2001, 369 SCRA 126; Selwyn F. Lao v. Atty. Robert W. Medel, A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003, 405
SCRA 227.

51 University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 89454, April 20, 1992, 208 SCRA 174.

52 Betguen v. Masangcay, A.M. No. P-93-822, December 1, 1994, 238 SCRA 475.

53 Supra note 23 at 483.

54
Office of the Court Administrator v. Librado, A.M. No. P-94-1089, August 22, 1996, 260 SCRA 624.

55
People v. Sorrel, G.R. No. 119332, August 29, 1997, 278 SCRA 368.

56
Campilan v. Campilan Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-96-1100, April 24, 2002, 381 SCRA 494.

57
Magno v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 147904, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 495.

58 Soriano v. Dizon, A.C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 1.
59 Adm. No. (2170-MC) P-1356, November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 317, 323.

60
Supra note 25 at 21.

61 Id.

62 Ng Teng Lin v. Republic, 103 Phil. 484 (1959).

63
Court Administrator v. San Andres, A.M. No. P-89-345, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 704.

64 People v. Yambot, G.R. No. 120350, October 13, 2000, 343 SCRA 20.

65
Garcia v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 27.

66 Supra note 59.

67 1 I. & N. Dec. 59, 1941 WL 7913 (BIA).

68 Supra note 54.

69 Supra note 25, p. 23.

70 Supra note 59, p. 323.

71 Supra note 64.

72 Supra note 63.

73
Supra note 45.

74 Supra note 1, p. 228.

75
Supra note 23.

76
Supra note 50, p. 134.

77 Supra note 57.

78 G.R. No. L-18506, January 30, 1964, 10 SCRA 27.

79 Supra note 29.

80
Supra note 58.

81 Supra note 58, pp. 10-11.

82 Supra note 39.

83 Supra note 25, p. 24.

84 G.R. No. L-19852, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 206.

85 Id., pp. 245-246.

86 Supra note 22.

87
Supra note 58.

88 Supra note 67.

89 Ponencia, p. 9.

90 Id., p. 7.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

March 22, 2017


G.R. No. 200396

MARTIN VILLAMOR y TAYSON, and VICTOR BONAOBRA y GIANAN, Petitioners


vs
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondents

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. A mere tip from an unnamed informant does not vest police officers
1

with the authority to barge into private homes without first securing a valid warrant of arrest or search warrant. While there are instances
where arrests and searches may be made without a warrant, the Court finds that the constitutionally-protected right against
unreasonable searches and seizures was violated in the case at bar.

This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the June 13, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals
2

(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30457 which affirmed the October 25, 2006 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43 of Virac,
3

Catanduanes in Criminal Case Nos. 3463 and 3464) convicting both petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1602 as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 9287, otherwise known as "An Act Increasing the Penalties for Illegal Numbers Games
Amending Certain Provisions of PD 1602 and for Other Purposes." Petitioner Martin T. Villamor (Villamor) was convicted as a collector
of bets in the illegal numbers game of "lotteng" under Section 3(c) of RA 9287, while petitioner Victor G. Bonaobra (Bonaobra) was
convicted as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d) of the said Jaw. The RTC sentenced Villamor to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum to nine (9) years as maximum, while Bonaobra was
sentenced to suffor the penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to eleven (11) years as maximum.

Factual Antecedents

Villamor was charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and soliciting bets for an illegal numbers game locally
known as "lotteng' and possessing a list of various numbers, a calculator, a cellphone, and cash. The charge stemmed from the
following lnformation: 4

That on or ahout the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of Virac, province of Catanduanes,
Philippines, \vi thin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused with intent [to] gain thru illegal means did then and there, [
willfully ], unlawfully and feloniously engage, collect [and] solicit x x x bets for illegal numbers game locally known as "Lotteng" by
having in his possession [a] calculator, cellphone, [list] of various numbers and money and lotteng paraphernalias.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Another Information was filed in the same court charging Bonaobra with violation of the same law, committed as follows:
5

That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of Virac, province of Catanduanes,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused with intent [to] gain thru illegal means did then and there,
[willfully], unlawfully and feloniously maintain and operate illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng" while in possession of
gambling paraphernalias, such as [a] calculator, cellphone, list of various numbers and cash in the amount of ₱1,500.00 representing
collection of bets.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioners filed t1eir respective Motions for Reinvestigation, which were both granted by the RTC. Subsequently, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor issued separate Resolutions both dated September 13, 2005 amending the Informations in both cases.

In the Amended Information, the phrase "acting as a collector" was included to charge Villamor as a collector in an illegal numbers
game. The Amended Information provides:
6

That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of Virac, province of Catanduanes,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused acting as a collector with intent [to] gain thru illegal means[,]
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and foloniously engage, collect and solicit bets for illegal numbers game locally known as
"Lotteng" by having in his possession [a] calculator, cellphone, [list] of various numbers and money and lotteng paraphernalias.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On the other hand, Bonaobra was charged as a manager or operator in the Amended Info1mation, the incriminatory paragraph of
7

which states:

That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of Virac, province of Catanduanes,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused acting as manager and operator with intent [to] gain thru
illegal means did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously maintain and operate illegal numbers game locally known as
"lotteng" while in possession of gambling paraphernalia, such as [a] calculator, cellphone, lists of variott5 numbers and cash in the
amount of ₱l,500,00 representing colleciion of bets.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When separately arraigned, Villamor, on October 4, 2005 and Bonaobra, on November 29, 2005, both pleaded not guilty to the
respective charges filed against them. After the pre-trial conference, a joint trial on the merits followed.
Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Domingo Tejerero (Tejerero), Provincial Director, Police Superintendent Francisco
Penaflor (PD Peñaflor), SP04 Severino Malasa, Jr., and POI David Adrian Saraspi (POI Saraspi). Culled from the records were the
following facts:

On June 17, 2005, at around 9:00 a.m., PD Peñaflor received a call from an infonnant regarding an ongoing illegal numbers game
at Barangay Francia, Virac, Catanduanes, specifically at the residence of Bonaobra. A team composed of PD Peñaflor, Saraspi, PO 1
Rolando Ami, a driver, and a civilian asset proceeded to Bonaobra's residence to confirm the report.

Upon arrival at the target area, the team parked their service vehicle outside the compound fenced by bamboo slats installed two
inches apart which allowed them to see the goings on inside. According to the police officers, they saw petitioners in the act of counting
bets, described by the Bicol term "revisar," which means collating and examining numbers placed in "papelitos," which are slips of
paper containing bet numbers, and counting money bets.

When they entered the gate of the compound, they introduced themselves as police officers and confiscated the items found on the
table consisting of cash amounting to ₱l,500.00 in different denominations, the "papelitos," a calculator, a cellular phone, and a pen.
Petitioners were then brought to Camp Francisco Camacho where they were investigated for illegal gambling. Subsequently, a case
was filed against the petitioners before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented six witnesses, namely Villamor, Bonaobra, Demetrio Bonaobra. the brother of Bonaobra, Florencio Bonaobra
(Florencio), the father of Bonaobra, Juan Vargas, and Jonah Bonaobra (Jonah), the wife of Bonaobra. Their testimonies are
summarized below.

On June 17, 2005, at around 8:30 a.m., Villamor went to Bonaobra's house to pay a debt he owed to the latter's wife, Jonah. At that
time, Bonaobra was having coffee with his father Florencio inside their house. Villamor gave Bonaobra ₱2,000.00 which the latter
placed on top of the table. Bonaobra then went outside the house to answer his cellphone. When Bonaobra was at the door, a man
later identified as PD Peñaflor kicked the fence of Bonaobra's house, grabbed Bonaobra's right arm, and said, "Caught in the act ka!"
Florencio went outside and asked PD Peñaflor if he had a search warrant. Two more men entered the house and took the money from
the table. Petitioners were then made to board the service vehicle and brought in for investigation at the police headquarters.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 25, 2006, the RTC of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 rendered its Judgment finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of committing illegal numbers game locally known as ''lotteng," a variant of the game Last Two, respectively as a collector or
8

agent under Section 3(c), and as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287.

The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the arresting officers and held that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto committing
an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng," a variant of Last Two. The RTC held that petitioners were seen by the arresting
officers in the act of counting bets before the arrest was made inside Bonaobra' s compound. 1he petitioners were also caught
holding "'papelitos," which contained the three rows of two-number combinations. Since the winning combination in "lotteng" is taken
from the first two numbers of the winning combinations in the daily draw of the lotto in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, the RTC
held that the number combinations shown in the ''papelitos" were meant to correspond to the lotto results.

The RTC further held that Villamor's participation in the illegal numbers game was that of a collector since he brought bet money to
Bonaobra while the latter was that of a coordinator, controller, or supervisor after it was shown that he received the money from
Villamor.

The dispositive part of the Judgment of the RTC reads:

WHEREFORE, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court hereby SENTENCES Martin Villamor to suffer a penalty of
imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum to nine (9) years as maximum, and Victor Bonaobra to suffer a penalty
of ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to eleven (11) years as maximum. Likewise, the money amounting to ₱l,500.00 and the
other personal properties used as gambling paraphernalia, like the calculator, ballpen and cellular phone are confiscated in favor of the
state.

SO ORDERED 9

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 13, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision. The CA brushed aside Bonaobra's argument that his right to due process was
violated when he was convicted of a crime different from that with which he was charged. The CA held that the classification of a
maintainer, manager, or operator includes a coordinator, controller, or supervisor. The CA ratiocinated that to hold a maintainer guilty of
10

the lesser offense of acting as a coordinator will not be violative of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation
since the graver offense of acting as a maintainer necessarily includes being a coordinator.

With respect to Villamor, the CA gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the arresting officer who were presumed to have
acted regularly in the performance of their official functions. The CA held that Villamor' s denials cannot prevail over the positive
assertions of the police officers who caught him in the act of revising and counting bets.

The CA disposed the case as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed.


SO ORDERED. 11

Hence, this Petition.

Issue

The main issue in this case is whether the petitioners' conviction for violation of RA 9287 as collector or agent under Section 3(c) for
Villamor, and as coordinator, controller, or supervisor m1der Section 3(d) for Bonaobra, should be upheld.

Our Ruling

We find the Petition meritorious.

In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire "case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision [based on] x x x grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors." 12

The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by the arresting officers when
they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid warrant of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule
requiring a warrant for a valid search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police
officers is inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation of the said right.

Section 2, Article Ill of the 1987 Constitution requires a judicial warrant based on the existence of probable cause before a search and
an arrest may be effected by law enforcement agents. Without the said warrant, a search or seizure becomes unreasonable within the
context of the Constitution and any evidence obtained on the occasion of such unreasonable search and seizure shall be inadmissible
in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. "Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search
13

and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree."14

In this case, the apprehending officers claim that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto, or caught in the act of committing an
offense. PD Peñaflor and his team of police officers claim that petitioners were committing the offense of illegal numbers game when
they were arrested without a warrant.

We are not persuaded.

Under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a lawful arrest may be effected even without a warrant of arrest in the following
instances:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely "(a) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer."
15

After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that there was no valid warrantless arrest on petitioners. It was not
1âw phi 1

properly established that petitioners had just committed, or were actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that said act
or acts were done in the presence of the arresting officers. Based on the testimonies of PO1 Saraspi and PD Peñaflor, they were
positioned some 15 to 20 meters away from petitioners. PO 1 Saraspi's testimony during cross examination reveals the following:

ATTY. SAMONTE:

Q While you were outside the compound of Bonaobra, what was your distance to accused Martin Villamor and Victor Bonaobra?

A More or less fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters.

Q Is it not that the compound of Bonaobra is surrounded with fence?

A Yes, sir.

Q Bamboo fence, right?

A Yes, sir, without a gate.


Q Are you sure it's without a gate?

A Probably it was open.

Q Can you determine the height of the fence?

A Between 5'7" to 5'9".

Q More than your height?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you tell us whether you can see what the person is doing inside the compound while you are outside?

A The fence is made up [sic] of bamboo and there were gaps as far as the fence is concerned that is why when we alighted from the
Frontier we saw what was inside the compound.

Q And the space of each bamboo, can you determine [sic]?

A One and half to two inches apart.

Q When you were already outside the compound what were the accused doing?

A They were sitting and they were revising.

Q Were they seated with [sic] a table?

A They were sitting and Victor Bonaobra was without a shirt.

Q What were they holding?

A 'Papelitos'.

Q What else?

A While they were holding 'papelitos' the monies were just on the table.

Q At the distance of 15 to 10 meters can you determine the contents of the 'papelitos'?

A No, sir.

Q So you are not sure whether those are gambling paraphernalia?

A No, sir.

Q Because you do not know the contents of that and you are not sure whether those are gambling paraphernalia you went inside, is
that right?

A After we introduced ourselves that we are [sic] police officers we entered the compound.

Q Meaning to say you were outside the compound and saying you are policemen?

A We entered first and we introduced ourselves.

Q Which is first, going inside or introducing yourselves?

A While entering we were also introducing ourselves simultaneously.

Q When you reached inside, what did you determine?

A We determined that there were lotteng paraphernalia on the table.

Q That is the only time that you determined that those were gambling paraphernalia?

A No, even on the [sic] outside we identified it already.

Q A while ago you said at a distance of 15 to 10 meters you can determine whether they were in possession of the illegal gambling
paraphernalia?

A What I am trying to say is that I cannot identify those that are written on the 'papelitos' at the distance and I saw the calculator, the
money bets.
Q So what you saw within a distance of 15 to 10 meters are calculators, money and cellphone?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you consider money gambling paraphernalia?

A Yes, sir.

Q So every time you see money you will consider that a gambling paraphernalia?

A In other situations.

Q How about calculator, do you consider calculator gambling paraphernalia?

A Yes, sir.

Q When you go to a department store there are calculators, do you consider those calculators gambling paraphernalia?

A If you are going to consolidate all these items in a table all of these are gambling paraphernalia

Q So when you consolidate these items and papers and calculators, if you see those items at Century Trading, will you consider those
as gambling paraphernalia? 16

Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the police officers and the petitioners, the Court finds it doubtful that
the police officers were able to determine that a c1iminal activity was ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante
delicto warrantless arrest and a search incidental to a warrantless arrest thereafter. The police officers even admitted that the
compound was surrounded by a bamboo fence 5'7" to 5'9" in height, which made it harder to see what was happening inside the
compound. It appears that the police officers acted based solely on the information received from PD Peñaflor's informant and not on
personal knowledge that a crime had just been c01m11itted, was actually being committed, or was about to be committed in their
presence. The Court finds it doubtful that the police officers witnessed any overt act before entering the private home of Bonaobra
immediately preceding the arrest. PO1 Saraspi even admitted that from his position outside the compound, he could not read the
contents of the so-called "papelitos;" yet, upon seeing the calculator, phone, papers and money on the table, he readily concluded the
same to be gambling paraphernalias.

On the part of PD Peñaflor, he likewise admitted that from his position outside the compound, he could not determine the activities of
the persons inside. It was only after he had illegally entered the compound, since he was not armed with a warrant, that he supposedly
saw the gambling paraphernalia. PD Peñaflor's testimony in this regard is as follows:

Q Can you tell the Honorable Court, Mr. Witness, the distance of the house of Victor Bonaobra to that place where you parked your
vehicle when you arrived in the vicinity?

A When I parked my vehicle in front of the compound because that is a street, the distance from the street to that place where there is
an on-going 'revisar' of 'lotteng', more or less 15 to 20 meters, I believe, from the gate.

Q So, you did not immediately go inside the compound of Victor Bonaobra?

A Yes, sir. I verified first if there is really [sic] persons in the compound.

Q So, at that distance of 15 to 20 meters, you were able to verify what they were doing on the particular 1ime, Mt. Witness?

A No, sir. 17

During his direct examination, Bonaobra testified that he was only answering his cellphone when PD Peñaflor barged into his
compound and arrested him. The relevant portions of his testimony reveals the following:

ATTY SAMONTE:

Q At around 9:00 a.m. of June 17, 2005, what were you doing if you still remember?

A I stood up and I went out and made [sic] three steps from the door to answer the cellphone and later on I was surprised when the
police whom I could not identify, kicked the door.

Q Mr. Witness, which door [are you] referring to [that] was kicked by the police?

A The gate outside of our fence.

xxxx

Q You said a while ago that the policeman kicked the door of your fence x

xx who was that policeman, if you know him?

A: Provincial Director Peñaflor.


Q: Who was with PD Peñaflor on [sic] that particular time, if any, Mr. Witness?

A Two (2) persons in civilian clothes.

xx xx

Q After PD Peñaflor kicked the door of your fence, what happened next, Mr. Witness?

A He held my hand and he seized my cellphone.

xxxx

Q After PD Peñaflor seized your cellphone, what else did he do?

A He said, "caught in the act."

Q Which comes first, Mr. Witness, the utterance made by PD Peñaflor that you were caught in the act or the utterance made by your
father whether they had a warrant?

A When my father asked them whether they have a warrant.

Q And what was the answer of PD Peñaflor when your father asked that question?

A He said, "caught in the act."

Q And what was the reply of your father?

A My father said that what you am doing is wrong, that is prohibited.

Q And what did PD Peñaflor answered [sic] to your father?

A He shouted at my father, "Di na kailangan yan" (That is not needed). 18

From the circumstances above, it is highly suspect that PD Peñaflor had witnessed any overt act indicating that the petitioners were
actually committing a crime. While PD Peñaflor claims that he caught the petitioners in the act of collecting bets and counting bet
money, this observation was highly improbable given the distance of the police from the petitioners and the fact that the compound was
surrounded by a bamboo fence.

For his part, Villamor claimed that he was at the Bonaobra compound to repay his loan to Jonah. The prosecution, through Prosecutor
Tañon, even admitted this fact during Jonah's direct examination. The following exchange between the prosecution and the defense
was quite revealing:

ATTY. SAMONTE:

Your Honor, please, [may] I respectfully offer the testimony of Jona[h] Bonaobra to show that she is the ·wife of Victor Bonaobra; that at
around 8:30 a.m. of June 17, 2005 she was inside their residence at Bonaobra's compound, Francia, Virac, Catanduances and on that
particular time and date, Martin Villamor arrived to pay his debt and she personally witnessed the unlawful act committed by the
policemen who entered their dwelling on that particular lime and date and such other matters relative thereto, Your Honor.

COURT:

Any comment from the prosecution?

PROS. TAÑON:

We will admit that she is the wife of Victor Bonaobra; that on Jw1e 17, 2005 at 8:30 in the morning she was inside the residence of
Bonaobra's compound; that accused Martin Villamor arrived to pay his debt. We are to contest on that she personally witnessed the
unlawful act.

A1TY. SAMONTE:

To clarify that, the prosecution is admitting the fact that Martin arrived to pay the loan on that particular day?

PROS. TAÑON:

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

Okay, so that we can proceed to the other matters. (Emphasis supplied)


19
From the exchange above, it is clear that the prosecution admitted that Villamor went to Bonaobra's house to pay his loan to Jonah.
Thus, at the exact moment of the arrest, neither Bonaobra, who was answering his cellphone, nor Villarr1or, who was paying his loan.
was performing any overt act constitutive of a crime.

Verily, the warrantless arrest conducted by PD Peñaflor and his team was unlawful as the same does not satisfy the requirements of
an in flagrante delicto arrest. Consequently, the search and seizure of the effects found inside the house of Bonaobra are likewise
illegal since there could be no valid search incident to an illegal warrantless arrest. Thus, evidence seized from Bonaobra's house is
inadmissible for being a fruit of the poisonous tree.

The Court is aware that any question regarding the legality of a warrantless arrest must be raised before arraignment. Failure to do so
constitutes a waiver of the right to question the legality of the arrest especially when the accused actively participated during trial as in
this case. However, we have clarified that such waiver is only confined to the defects of the arrest and not on the inadmissibility of the
evidence seized during an illegal arrest. In People v. Racho, the Court held that:
20

Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree', hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence
consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, 'any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding'.

Without the confiscated shabu, appellant's conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is
warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation
in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the prosecution failed to clearly establish the acts that constitute the offense of illegal gambling as a collector or an agent
under Section 3(c), and as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287. Under the said law, a collector or
agent is "any person who collects, solicits or produces bets in behalf of his/her principal for any illegal numbers game who is usually in
possession of gambling paraphernalia." On the other hand, a coordinator, controller, or supervisor is defined as, ''any person who
21

exercises control and supervision over the collector or agent." The prosecution merely relied on the alleged illegal gambling
22

paraphernalia found and confiscated inside the house of Bonaobra and not on the specific overt acts that constitute the offense.

All told, the evidence purportedly seized from the Bonaobra compound is inadmissible in evidence since it was obtained in violation of
Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, the Court acquits petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the June 13, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30457 which affirmed the Judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 in Criminal Case Nos. 3463 and 3464 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners Martin Villamor y Tayson and Victor Bonaobra y Gianan are ACQUITTED and are ordered to be immediately RELEASED
from detention, unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken
hereon within five days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO BIENVENIDO L. REYES *

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
Per Raffle dated March 20, 2017.
1
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 2.

2
CA rollo, pp. 162-170; penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III and concurred in by Associate Justices Apolinario D.
Bruselas, Jr. and Manuel M. Barrios.

3
Records (Crim. Case No. 3463), pp. 205-215; penned by Presiding Judge Lelu P. Contreras.

4
Id. at 1-2.

5
Records (Crim. Case No. 3464). pp. 1-2.

6
Records (Crim. Case No. 3463), p. 37.

7
Records (Crim. Case No. 3464), p. 28.

8
An illegal numbers game where the winning combination is derived from the last two (2) numbers of the first prize of the
winning Sweepstakes ticket which comes out during the weekly draw of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and its
variants.

9
Records (Crim. Case No. 3463), p. 215.

10
CA rollo, p. 168.

11
Id. at 169-170.

12
People v. Saludes, 451 Phil. 719, 728 (2003).

13
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 3(2) states:

Sec.3xxx

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

14
Ambre v. People, 692 Phil. 681, 693 (2012).

15
People v. Villareal, 706 Phil. 511, 517-518 (2013).

16
TSN, March 8, 2006, p. 27-31. Emphasis supplied.

17
TSN, March 6, 2006, pp. 11-12.

18
TSN, September 22, 2006, pp. 4-5.

19
TSN, September 29, 2006, pp. 12-l 3. Emphasis supplied.

20
640 Phil. 669, 681 (2010).

21
REPUBLIC Act No. 9287, Section 2(g).

22
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9287, Section 2(h).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-93-1062 August 25, 1994

ELIZA RATILLA DE LA CRUZ, assisted by Enriqueta R. de la Cruz, EDELINE CUISON, assisted by Estrella Cuison, ANA MARIA
CRUZ, assisted by Nieves Cruz and LOLITA SANTIAGO, assisted by Epifania del Rosario, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION, Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, respondent.

DECISION 1

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a case of a judge being made to account for his acquittal of an accused on reasonable doubt.

Respondent Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, is administratively indicted for
gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment for acquitting the accused who was charged before his court
with acts of lasciviousness. Parenthetically, respondent is not accused of rendering an erroneous judgment spawned in bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption; much less is immorality imputed to him.

Complainants Eliza Ratilla de la Cruz, 13, Edeline Cuison, 11, Ana Maria Cruz, 12, and Lolita Santiago, 12, alleged before the trial
2

court that they were summoned by their coach, accused Loreto Estrella, Jr., together with other volleyball players, to his classroom at
about five o'clock in the afternoon of 16 November 1988. He told them that he had to inspect their private parts for the presence of
public hair as required by MEC (now DECS) memorandum circulars. In three (3) groups, two (2) of threes and one (1) of two, their
coach told them to enter the "health corner room" where they removed their shorts and panties and showed their private parts to him
which he touched and stroked.

Eliza, Edeline, Ana Maria and Lolita, with the assistance of their guardians, charged their coach in four (4) separate criminal complaints
commonly alleging that he —

. . . . being a public school teacher and in relation to the discharge of his duties as the coach of the girls volleyball
team of Bustos Central School, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs, commit an
act of lasciviousness upon the person of (complainant) by then and there touching her private parts against the
latter's will and by means of force.

In the joint trial that ensued, the four (4) girls testified almost identically that upon instruction of the accused they reluctantly pulled down
their shorts and panties and when their private parts were already uncovered, the accused in kneeling or squatting position touched
their exposed private parts. They described on the witness stand the expression on the face of the accused while allegedly stroking
their private parts several times which lasted for about five minutes each as that of elation, "with his eyes wide open in wild excitement."

The accused on his part admitted having examined the pubic hair of the girls, particularly to be sure that as members of his volleyball
team not one of them was above 13 in strict compliance with specific school directives and guidelines. He however denied that he
touched their private parts and threatened them afterwards.

Upon hearing the prosecution and the defense, respondent Judge observed that the girls consented, without any force employed upon
them, to strip themselves from waist down although with understandable reluctance because of their desire to be in the team
considering that according to MEC Regional Memorandum No. 90, Series of 1981, in relation to MEC Order No. 66, Series of 1979,
failure to submit to physical examination would automatically disqualify a candidate from the volleyball team. Respondent Judge was
convicted that —

. . . what he (accused) did touch was only what is called the mons veneris or that part of the female sexual
organ where pubic hair could grow. No one of these complainants said that accused also touched the inner
part or genital orifice of their private parts. If he did, it is inconceivable that not one of them made any outcry
from that health corner room where they were inspected inside in groups of three or two, one group at a
time. The Court also refuses to believe that accused touched each one of them several times for about five
minutes. That is very unlikely and improbable, not to mention that they never said that before in the police
investigation, as well as what they now say the wild excitement on the face of accused while touching them.

To better understand and appreciate the rationale of respondent's decision in the light of the charges hurled against him, i.e., gross
ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it is imperative to quote from his decision which we find exhaustively
argued —

Understandably, the accused now denies touching the private parts of the four private complainants. That
touching is the very accusation of lascivious act imputed against him. He could have very well said that, no
matter how improper and humiliating for the girls it would seem to be, it was part of the necessary inspection
he was assigned to do as their coach by the guidelines provided by the then Ministry of Education and
Culture Order No. 66, Series of 1979 (Exh. "1"), and its implementing rules and guidelines (Exhs. "2" to "8"),
in determining the age eligibility and qualification of would-be young athletes to participate in the forthcoming
provincial sports event, taking into consideration, among other things, "breast enlargement" and "presence
of pubic hair." Growing pubic hair on young girls just above 13 years of age might still be hardly traceable
and accused could probably say that he had to feel it with his fingers to be sure that his very eyes were not
deceiving him, but he should have used his better sense of propriety and kind consideration to save the girls
from the anguish and humiliation of being touched on the most delicate parts of their bodies. There seemed
to be no urgency for that in the fulfillment of his duty as a coach and in obedience to the MEC directive, to
see to it that ineligible over-aged players are not allowed to play in the athletic meet then forthcoming, lest
he be found responsible and "be suspended from athletic meets throughout his life, without prejudice to the
filing of administrative charges against him even after the athletic meet is over" (Exh. "3-A").

To repeat, the Court is inclined to entertain doubt if the act of accused complained of was a manifestation of
his lewd designs and not just his repulsive way of following the silly MEC guideline of determining the age
qualification of prospective young athletes which did not even discriminate that female athletes should be
inspected for the presence of pubic hair or enlarged breasts by a female coach. First of all, if his real
motivation was just to satisfy his lust it was unnatural for him to do that by inspecting the girls eight in all of
their private parts one group of three at a time, the last of which was a group of two. In other words, he did
not inspect any of the girls alone in the secrecy of the health corner room inside his classroom, in which
situation he could have taken liberties with the girl(s) unwitnessed by a third person. Added to this, as
already noted, is the fact that he did not touch any of the girls on any other part of her body, like her chest
for example, to find out if she already had enlarged breasts. The act of the accused subject of the present
accusation seems to the Court not the product of a criminal mind, so much so that he deserves to be
exonerated from the charge in each of the four informations. However, for such act of indiscretion, though
not felonious but still wrongful, which directly resulted to the mental anguish and humiliation of each of the
four young complainants in these cases, the accused must answer for such moral damages they suffered.
A careful analysis of the decision of respondent Judge fails to persuade us that for rendering such well-reasoned verdict he is guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. In Revita v. Rimando we said —
3

. . . . ( i )t may be argued that the respondent committed an error of judgment in dismissing the complaint for
grave slander and thus causing (at least in complainant's opinion) a miscarriage of justice.

However, there is no proof that the error was attributable to a conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate
an injustice (In re Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, January 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107, 119). "As a matter of
public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous" (48 C.J.S. 974).

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties
must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. In the case before us, the administrative complaint does not even allege that the erroneous decision of respondent was thus
motivated.

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal and an administrative charge. As a crime, it is punished under Art. 204 of the
Revised Penal Code the elements of which are: (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for
decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; and, (d) the judge knows that his judgment is unjust. The gist of the offense therefore is that an
4

unjust judgment be rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, knowing it to be unjust. 5

An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, or both. The source of an unjust judgment may
be error or ill-will. There is no liability at all for a mere error. It is well settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his
judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for any error which he commits, provided he acts in good faith. Bad faith is therefore the
ground of liability. If in rendering judgment the judge fully knew that the same was unjust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted
maliciously and must have been actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy, revenge, greed, or some other similar motive. As 6

interpreted by Spanish courts, the term "knowingly" means sure knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice. Mere 7

error therefore in the interpretation or application of the law does not constitute the crime.

The nature of the administrative charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is the same as the criminal charge. Thus, in this
particular administrative charge, it must be established that respondent Judge rendered a judgment or decision not supported by law
and/or evidence and that he must be actuated by hatred, envy, revenge, greed, or some other similar motive. In the case at bench, the
motive of respondent Judge is not even alleged.

May it be asked: Of what law was respondent Judge grossly ignorant when he acquitted the accused? Corollarily, did he knowingly
render an unjust judgment when he extensively discussed and satisfactorily explained his decision?

If we hold respondent guilty as charged, then we might be telegraphing the wrong signals to our trial judges. For then, where
administrative sanctions are imposed on them for rendering judgments of acquittal based on reasonable doubt or on difficult questions
of law, they would be inclined, and not without practical reason, to hand down verdicts of conviction, in case of doubt. For that course
would be safer for them to pursue since, after all, erroneous convictions may still be corrected on appeal. But that would be
disregarding the true concept and judicial implication of "reasonable doubt" in criminal cases, under which judges are directed
according to the Rules of Court to render a judgment of acquittal. Reasonable doubt is —
8

. . . . that state of the case which, after full consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in
such a condition that they cannot say that they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of
the charge. Every person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. If, upon such proof, there is
reasonable doubt remaining, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of it by acquittal. It is not sufficient to
establish a probability, though a strong one, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than otherwise,
but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty, a certainty that
convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to
act conscientiously upon it, and, in order to find the defendant guilty, the evidence must be such as to
exclude every single reasonable hypothesis, except that of the guilt of the defendant. In other words, all of
the facts proved must be consistent with, and point to, the guilt of the defendant, not only, but the facts must
be inconsistent with her innocence. It matters not how clearly the circumstances point to guilt, still, if they are
reasonably explainable on a theory which excludes guilt, then it cannot be said that the facts in the case are
sufficient to satisfy the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the defendant, and in that event she
should be acquitted. If, after consideration of the whole case, any one of the jury should entertain a
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, it is the duty of such juror not to vote for a verdict of guilty,
and if after a consideration of the whole case, fully, carefully, and honestly made after comparison, still one
of the jury should entertain a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, it would then be the duty of such
juror not to vote for a verdict of guilty.
9

If for every error of a judge — although we do not find any in the case of respondent — he should be punished, then perhaps no judge,
however good, competent and dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judicial service without a tarnished image.
Somehow along the way he may commit mistakes, however honest. This does not exclude members of appellate courts who are not
always in agreement in their views. Any one belonging to the minority opinion may generally be considered in error, and yet, he is not
punished because each one is entitled to express himself. This privilege should extend to trial judges so long as the error is not
motivated by fraud, dishonesty, corruption, or any other evil motive.
10

Ordinarily, the act of a man in touching and stroking the private parts of a woman is, by itself, lewd for no hand of a man would wander
or venture near her manzanas prohibidas if not for a lascivious motivation. But even if the accused stroked and touched the girls on
their montes veneris, respondent nevertheless absolved the accused of criminal liability on the theory that the complained acts may
11

no longer be considered lascivious in view of the directives and implementing rules and guidelines of the then Ministry (now
Department) of Education, Culture and Sports which imposed on the coaches of boys' and girls' volleyball teams the responsibility of
excluding overaged players from their teams using as one of the criteria the presence of pubic hair. In other words, since the
complained acts may be considered lawful under MECS orders, rules and guidelines, respondent Judge may have had reason to
conclude that lewdness could no longer be merely presumed.
Although we are not supposed to pass upon the merits of the case, a cursory discussion thereon is deemed necessary for the purpose
of establishing that respondent, in rendering a judgment of acquittal, did not disregard, much less violate, any law or known
jurisprudence. In People v. Balbar we ruled that the presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts
12

themselves and the environmental circumstances. This supports our conviction that in the case at bench the accused did not have a
criminal mind at all, hence, his acquittal by the respondent. After all, in the face of two plausible self-sustaining theories, albeit
contradictory, one for conviction and the other for acquittal, the latter prevails under the constitutional presumption of innocence,
applying as our parameter the test spelled out in the preceding paragraphs.

We reiterate that "mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or
bad faith, or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision, are irrelevant and immaterial in an administrative proceeding against
him." In Ad Hoc Committee Report re Judge Silverio S. Tayao, RTC, Branch 143, Makati, and Morada v. Judge Tayao, this Court
13 14

through Mr. Justice Feliciano incisively and appropriately explained—

. . . . By its nature, judicial discretion involves the exercise of judgment on the part of the judge. The judge
must be allowed a reasonable latitude for the operation of his own individual view of the case, his
appreciation of the facts, and his understanding of the applicable law on the matter. Judicial discretion is, of
course, not unlimited; it must be guided and controlled by well-known rules and principles . . . .

If Judge Tayao committed any error at all, it was an error of judgment and it is important to recall the firmly
established principle that a judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of judgment, in the
absence of a showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose:

"A Judge cannot be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively, for an erroneous
decision rendered by him in good faith (In re: Petition for the Dismissal from Service and/or Disbarment of
Judge Baltazar R. Dizon, 173 SCRA 719 [1989]).

1. As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous (Revita vs.
Rimando, 98 SCRA 619 [1980]; Ubongon vs. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30 [1980]; Ramirez vs. Corpuz-Macandog,
144 SCRA 462 [1986]; Abad vs. Bleza, 145 SCRA 1 [1986]; Heirs of Julio Rosas vs. Reyes, 188 SCRA 236
[1990]; Pilipinas Bank vs. Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA 834 [1990]).

Mere errors in the appreciation of such evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce an inference of
ignorance or bad faith, or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision, are irrelevant and immaterial
in an administrative proceeding against him. No one, called upon to try facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice, can be infallible in his judgment. All that is expected of him is that he follow
the rules prescribed to ensure a fair and impartial hearing, assess the different factors that emerge
therefrom and bear on the issues presented, and on the basis of the conclusions he finds established, with
only his conscience and knowledge of the law to guide him, adjudicate the case accordingly (Vda. de Zabala
vs. Pamaran, 39 SCRA 430 [1971])."

Pertinently, it may be mentioned that on 26 February 1992, or almost a year before respondent Judge handed down his subject
decision on 8 January 1993, then Judge Narciso T. Atienza of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16, likewise
acquitted the same accused on a similar charge of acts of lasciviousness committed on one Sarah Jane Lapuz, an aspirant to the track
and field team coached by the accused. His decision was never questioned. Incidentally, Judge Atienza was later elevated to the
Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the administrative charges of gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment against
respondent JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12, are DISMISSED for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

ROMERO, J., dissenting:

I find it difficult to agree with the majority opinion that the charge against respondent judge be dismissed, thereby exonerating him from
any administrative liability. I am likewise unable to join the decision of my distinguished colleagues subscribing to the finding of
respondent judge that no acts of lasciviousness were committed by the accused Loreto Gaspar Estrella, Jr. alias "Boy Turko" in
Criminal Cases 614-M-89, 615-M-89, 616-M-89 and 617-M-89.

The Office of the Court Administrator itself, after some four (4) months of investigation and evaluation, noted in its Report that the
"respondent judge in his decision defied human logic because by complying with the supposed DECS order, there was no need to
touch and stroke the girls' private parts," especially as it is not disputed that the accused did so with pleasure in his eyes. Considering
the moral ascendancy amounting to intimidation which the accused had over the complainants, he may be said to have subdued the
free exercise of their will, such dominating compulsion directed against their chastity resulting in their mental anguish and humiliation.
The OCA recommended a P20,000.00 fine coupled with a stern warning that a repetition thereof would merit a harsher sanction.
The judge himself, in his decision dated January 8, 1993, admitted that "touching the girls' private parts was a repulsive way of following
the silly MEC guideline of determining the age qualification of prospective athletes" for the girls' volleyball team. Indeed, is there no
other, and certainly less "repulsive" way of gauging the fitness of an aspiring athlete than the tactile?

Moreover, the respondent judge, in his attempt to disprove any lewd designs on the part of the accused, stated: "Added to this, as
already noted, is the fact that he did not touch any of the girls on any other part of her body, like her chest for example, to find out if she
already had enlarged breasts." After having invaded the most private, nay, the most sacred part of a girls' body, any other molestation
pales into insignificance.

To my mind, any teacher who uses administrative guidelines of the Ministry of Education as an excuse to satisfy his lust and inflict his
lecherousness on innocent girls deserves strong condemnation from any judge worth the robe he dons and who is regarded in the
community as an upright, moral and just man.

That another case was brought against the accused on a similar charge of acts of lasciviousness on another female aspirant to the
track and field team, even if another misguided judge saw fit to deliver a judgment of acquittal, is strongly indicative of the propensity of
said accused to take advantage of chaste girls under his charge. Such morally perverse officials from whom the public would expect a
higher standard of morality inasmuch as they stand as guardians of young girls in loco parentis in the school premises should have
received more than just a figurative slap on the wrist (in this case moral damages), from respondent judge. The latter had the
opportunity to mete out a penalty cum a resounding reminder on the accused with respect to his moral responsibilities as a teacher.
Sad to say, he passed up this opportunity. Who is to say who is the worse transgressor, the offender himself or the one who by virtue of
his position of authority could have induced the former to henceforth tread the path of rectitude? We can only lament the fact that both
share the same lax moral standards to the detriment of the present and future crop of prospective virginal athletes. The judiciary would
undoubtedly be better off minus one judge of the questionable moral scruples of respondent.

# Separate Opinions

ROMERO, J., dissenting:

I find it difficult to agree with the majority opinion that the charge against respondent judge be dismissed, thereby exonerating him from
any administrative liability. I am likewise unable to join the decision of my distinguished colleagues subscribing to the finding of
respondent judge that no acts of lasciviousness were committed by the accused Loreto Gaspar Estrella, Jr. alias "Boy Turko" in
Criminal Cases 614-M-89, 615-M-89, 616-M-89 and 617-M-89.

The Office of the Court Administrator itself, after some four (4) months of investigation and evaluation, noted in its Report that the
"respondent judge in his decision defined human logic because by complying with the supposed DECS order, there was no need to
touch and stroke the girls' private parts," especially as it is not disputed that the accused did so with pleasure in his eyes. Considering
the moral ascendancy amounting to intimidation which the accused had over the complainants, he may be said to have subdued the
free exercise of their will, such dominating compulsion directed against their chastity resulting in their mental anguish and humiliation.
The OCA recommended a P20,000.00 fine coupled with a stern warning that a repetition thereof would merit a harsher sanction.

The judge himself, in his decision dated January 8, 1993, admitted that "touching the girls' private parts was a repulsive way of following
the silly MEC guideline of determining the age qualification of prospective athletes" for the girls' volleyball team. Indeed, is there no
other, and certainly less "repulsive" way of gauging the fitness of an aspiring athlete than the tactile?

Moreover, the respondent judge, in his attempt to disprove any lewd designs on the part of the accused, stated: "Added to this, as
already noted, is the fact that he did not touch any of the girls on any other part of her body, like her chest for example, to find out if she
already had enlarged breasts." After having invaded the most private, nay, the most sacred part of a girls' body, any other molestation
pales into insignificance.

To my mind, any teacher who uses administrative guidelines of the Ministry of Education as an excuse to satisfy his lust and inflict his
lecherousness on innocent girls deserves strong condemnation from any judge worth the robe he dons and who is regarded in the
community as an upright, moral and just man.

That another case was brought against the accused on a similar charge of acts of lasciviousness on another female aspirant to the
track and field team, even if another misguided judge saw fit to deliver a judgment of acquittal, is strongly indicative of the propensity of
said accused to take advantage of chaste girls under his charge. Such morally perverse officials from whom the public would expect a
higher standard of morality inasmuch as they stand as guardians of young girls in loco parentis in the school premises should have
received more than just a figurative slap on the wrist (in this case moral damages), from respondent judge. The latter had the
opportunity to mete out a penalty cum a resounding reminder on the accused with respect to his moral responsibilities as a teacher.
Sad to say, he passed up this opportunity. Who is to say who is the worse transgressor, the offender himself or the one who by virtue of
his position of authority could have induced the former to henceforth tread the path of rectitude? We can only lament the fact that both
share the same lax moral standards to the detriment of the present and future crop of prospective virginal athletes. The judiciary would
undoubtedly be better off minus one judge of the questionable moral scruples of respondent.

#Footnotes

1. Originally a dissenting opinion.

2. Crim. Case Nos. 614-M-89, 615-M-89, 616-M-89 and 617-M-89, respectively.

3. Adm. Matter No. 1439-M J, 22 July 1980, 98 SCRA 619, 624.

4. Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code (1977), Bk. II, p. 340.
5. Annotation: Malfeasance and Misfeasance of Judges (Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment), 55 SCRA 308, 313-
314.

6. IV Viada, Codigo Penal, 305.

7. Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, October 1884 and January 10, 1900, cited in Guevarra, Commentaries
on the Revised Penal Code, p. 418.

8. Sec. 2, Rule 133, The Revised Rules of Court.

9. Words and Phrases, v. 36, p. 536, citing Chadwick v. U.S. 141 F. 225, 228, 72 C.C.A. 343.

10. Same standard was used in Pilos v. Honrado, A.M. No. 1230-CFI, 23 November 1981, 109 SCRA 338; Abad v.
Bleza, A. M. Nos. R- 227-RTJ, R-561-RTJ and 5249-Ret, 13 October 1986, 145 SCRA 1; Libarios v. Dabalos, A.M.
No. RTJ-89-286, 11 July 1991, 199 SCRA 48; Lim v. Domagas, A.M. No. RTJ-92-899, 15 October 1993, 227 SCRA
258, 263; Chan v. Agcaoili, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1089, 27 June 1994.

11. Plural of mons veneris, that part of the female genitalia where pubic hair grows after the age of 13.

12. Nos. L-20216-17, 29 November 1967, 21 SCRA 1119, 1124.

13. Balayon, Jr. v. Ocampo, A.M. No. MTJ-91-619, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 13, 24-25, citing Vda. de Zabala v.
Pamaran, Adm. Case No. 200-J, 39 SCRA 430 (1971), which was also cited in Ramirez v. Corpus-Macandog, A.M.
No. R-351-RTJ, 144 SCRA 462 (1986); see also Ubungen v. Mayo, A.M. No. 1255-CTJ, 6 August 1980, 99 SCRA
30, 34, citing Vda. de Zabala v. Pamaran, supra; Louis Vuitton, S.A. v. Villanueva, A.M. No. MTJ-92-643, 27
November 1992, 216 SCRA 121, 131, citing Miranda v. Manalastas, A.M. No. MTJ-88-159, 21 December 1989;
Negado v. Autajay, A.M. No. R-710-RTJ, 21 May 1993, 22 SCRA 295, 298 citing Ramirez v. Corpus-
Macandog, supra.

14. A.M. Nos. 93-8-1204-RTC and RTJ-93-978, respectively, 7 February 1994, pp. 9, 15-16.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-58889 July 31, 1986

NATHANIEL S. MANIPON, JR., petitioner,


vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Second Division composed of HON. BERNARDO P. FERNANDEZ as Acting Presiding Justice and HON.
BUENAVENTURA J. GUERRERO and HON. MOISES C. KALLOS, as Associate Justices, respondents.

Guillermo B. Bandonill for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNAN, J.:

This is a case of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.

In its decision dated September 30, 1981, the Sandiganbayan found accused Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., 31, guilty of direct bribery,
sentenced him to four months and twenty days of arresto mayor with temporary special disqualification for eight years and one day and
a fine of P2,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

Manipon came to this Court on petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the judgment of conviction. The Court dismissed
the petition, "the question raised being factual and for lack of merit." However, upon motion for reconsideration, the Court reconsidered its resolution
1

and gave due course to the petition. 2

The facts of this case are as follows:

Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and Benguet, Branch IV, was assigned to
enforce an order of the Minister of Labor dated October 31, 1979 directing the Sheriff of Baguio City or his deputy to execute the
decision of the labor arbiter in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79 entitled "Longog Tabek, et al vs. Harry Dominguez et al" and to make a
return within thirty (30) days from said date. The labor arbiter's decision ordered Harry Dominguez, a building contractor and the then municipal mayor of
3

Tadian, to pay Longog Tabek and the other judgment creditors the amount of P2,720.00 with interest, as the balance of their work contract. 4

Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon on November 9, 1979 sent a notice to the Commercial Bank and Trust branch [Comtrust] in
Baguio City garnishing the bank accounts of Dominguez. The bank agreed to hold the accounts. For one reason or another, Manipon did not inform
5

the labor arbiter of the garnishment nor did he exert efforts to immediately satisfy the judgment under execution.
On November 12, 1979, Dominguez sought Manipon's help in the withdrawal of the garnished account. Manipon told Dominguez that
the money could not be withdrawn.

However, on December 27, 1979 when the two met again at the Office of the National Intelligence and Security Authority [NISA] in
Baguio City, Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy the withdrawal so they will have something for the New Year." Dominguez 6

interpreted this to mean that Manipon would withdraw the garnished amount for a consideration. Dominguez agreed and they arranged to meet at the bank later in
the afternoon. After Manipon left, Dominguez confided the offer to NISA Sub-Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They then hatched up a plan to entrap Manipon
by paying him with marked money the next day. Col. Sanchez and a Col. Aguana were able to put up P700.00 in fifty-peso bills which were then authenticated,
xeroxed and dusted with fluorescent powder. 7

Thus, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 28, 1979, Dominguez went to Comtrust as planned. Manipon showed up with
two companions, named Deputy Sheriff Crisanto Flora and Baltazar Pacis. Manipon delivered his letter to the bank lifting the
garnishment. Then Dominguez prepared a withdrawal slip for P2,500.00. As soon as Dominguez received the money from the teller, he took out P300.00
8 9

therefrom added it to the P 700.00 in marked bills and handed the total amount of P l,000.00 to Manipon. Then they all left the bank. Dominguez walked over to his
car and drove off. Manipon and his two companions walked down Session Road. Moments later, PC and NISA operatives accosted them, seized the P1,000.00
from the left breast pocket of Manipon and thereafter brought them to Camp Dangwa for questioning. Manipon was subjected to an ultraviolet light test and found
positive for fluorescent powder. However, after executing a certification relative to the money recovered, he refused to give any statement. 10 He filed his sheriff's
return unsatisfied on February 20, 1980 or after 114 days. 11

Originally, Manipon was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 46 for having demanded and received P l,000.00 from
Dominguez, a private individual, for a favor extended by him to the latter, i.e., by not enforcing the garnishment order issued to
Comtrust which was his official duty. However, in an amended information dated February 16, 1981, the charge was changed to direct
bribery under the Revised Penal Code. 12

Manipon was released on bail. When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty. 13

In his brief, Manipon contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him of direct bribery, in not giving credence to the defense
theory that there was novation of the money judgment and in admitting illegally-obtained evidence.

The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the following elements: (1) that the accused
is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or
promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing
something which it is his official duty to do, and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. The 14

promise of a public officer to perform an act or to refrain from doing it may be express or implied. 15

It is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the crime Manipon was the deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of
Benguet and Baguio assigned to implement the execution order issued in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79. It is also not disputed that
Manipon garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust and that he lifted the same on December 28, 1979 after which he
received P l,000.00 from Dominguez.

It is the theory of the defense that the P1,000.00 Manipon collected from Dominguez on December 28, 1979 was not a bribe but a
payment in partial satisfaction of the judgment under execution to which the judgment creditors headed by Longog Tabek had agreed.

Manipon narrates that during his meeting with Dominguez at the NISA office on December 27, 1979, Dominguez requested Manipon to
convey to the creditors that he was only willing to pay for the time being a partial amount of P1,000.00, the balance of P 1,720. 00 to be
paid after the New Year. So he visited Longog Tabek who was the "lead man." Tabek, an illiterate, consented to the lesser amount because he needed
16

money badly. 17 His arrangements with Tabek and Dominguez were all verbal. At that time he found no reason to have some written memorandum for his own
protection.

At Comtrust after Dominguez had given him the P1,000.00 Manipon made a move to hand him a temporary receipt but Dominguez
brushed it aside and said he was in a
hurry. 18

Manipon maintains that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge. He said that in 1978 he and Flora had levied execution
against several vehicles owned by Dominguez, an act which the latter had openly resented. 19

The defense theory is so incredible that it leaves no doubt whatsoever in the Court's mind that Manipon is guilty of the crime charged.

It is very strange indeed that for such an important agreement that would modify a final judgment, no one took the bother of putting it
down on paper. Of course Manipon would have us believe that there was no need for it because he trusted Dominguez and Tabek. And
yet did he not also claim that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge? And if there was really an agreement to alter the
judgment, why did he not inform the labor arbiter about it considering that it was the labor arbiter who had issued the order of
execution? Manipon could not give satisfactory explanations because there was no such agreement in the first place.

The temporary receipt adduced by Manipon, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, is a last-minute fabrication to provide proof of the alleged
20

agreement for the trial payment of the judgment debt. Contrary to Manipon's claim, it is hard to believe that Dominguez was not interested in getting said
temporary receipt because precisely that was the proof he needed to show that he had partially complied with his legal obligation.

The testimonies of Crisanto Flora and Longog Tabek are of no help either to the defense. Flora is Manipon's co-sheriff and is therefore
biased. On the other hand, Tabek, on several occasions on the witness stand, answered with obvious hesitation, betraying himself to
be a rehearsed witness. While he claimed that he was the supposed headman of the other creditors, he could not present any authority
that would allow him to speak for them, let alone agree to receive a lesser amount in their behalf. He even admitted that he did not
know their names. 21

Indeed, Manipon's behavior at the very outset, had been marked with irregularities. As early as November 9, 1979, he had already
garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust, but he did not notify the labor arbiter so that the corresponding order for the
payment by the bank of the garnished amount could be made and the sum withdrawn immediately to satisfy the judgment under
execution. His lame excuse was that he was very busy in the sheriff's office, attending to voluminous exhibits and court proceedings.
That was also the same excuse he gave for not informing the labor arbiter of the novation. In fact he candidly admitted that he never
communicated with the NLRC concerning the garnishment. He returned the writ unsatisfied only on February 20, 1980 although by its
express terms, it was returnable within thirty days from October 29, 1979. 22
Clearly, Manipon had planned to get Dominguez to acquiesce to a
consideration for lifting the garnishment order.

Manipon was also asked about the affidavit he executed during the preliminary investigation. That affidavit contained two annexes but the
23

temporary receipt which he allegedly prepared on December 28, 1979 was not included. He said he misplaced it in his office and found it only several weeks after
he had made the affidavit. 24 This leads us to strongly suspect there was actually no temporary receipt at all at the time of payment on December 28 and that it was
concocted by the defense as a last-ditch effort to make the authorities believe that what had transpired was not a payoff but a legitimate partial satisfaction of a
judgment debt.

In the final analysis, it all boils down to credibility. In this regard, the prosecution witnesses have acquitted themselves welt The
Sandiganbayan did not err in giving weight and credence to their version instead of Manipon's. Indeed, Manipon's guilt for the crime of
direct bribery has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Dwelling on one last point, Manipon has pointed out that the P1,000.00 was illegally seized because there was no valid March warrant
and therefore inadmissible.

The argument is untenable. The rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are
at least three exceptions to the rule recognized in this jurisdiction. These are: 1) search incidental to an arrest, 2) search of a moving
vehicle, and 3) seizure of evidence in plain view. 25

In the case at bar, the records show that at about 2:00 p.m. on December 28,1979, NISA Sub-Station Commander Colonel Luisito
Sanchez held a final briefing among his men and some operatives from the Benguet Philippine Constabulary concerning the planned
entrapment. He had earlier received word from Dominguez that the lifting of the garnishment would be effected that afternoon and he
informed them that Manipon was asking money from Dominguez. As Colonel Sanchez earlier testified, part of the money to be withdrawn after
26

lifting the garnishment was to be given to the accused 27


for agreeing to lift the order of garnishment. After the briefing which lasted from ten to fifteen minutes, they
an headed for the Comtrust bank.

NISA Agent Caesar Murla stationed himself near the door of the bank so that he could observe what transpired inside the bank. 28
He
testified that he saw Dominguez give the marked money to Manipon which the latter accepted and counted. Upon seeing Manipon take the money from
Dominguez, Agent Murla gave a signal to some of the agents positioned nearby by placing his right hand on his head to indicate that the money had changed
hands. Immediately thereafter, Dominguez left the bank, Manipon placed the money in his left breast pocket and followed suit. As Manipon walked past Murla on
his way out, the latter gave another signal by putting his hand on his left breast to indicate that Manipon had placed the money in his left breast pocket. 29

Upon noticing the second signal, the NISA agents and the PC operatives approached Manipon and his two companions. After
Identifying themselves as peace officers, they retrieved the P l,000.00 from Manipon. Through it all, Manipon remained amazingly silent
and voiced no protest. 30

The search and seizure of the P1,000.00 from Manipon would therefore fall within the first exception. The search was made as an
incident to a lawful arrest, in accordance with our pronouncement in Moreno v. Ago Chi 12 Phil. 439, reiterated in Alvero v. Dizon 76
Phil. 637, to wit:

An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which
was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the
means of committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case.

The evident purpose of this exception is both to protect the arresting officer against physical harm from the person being arrested who
might be armed with a concealed weapon and also to prevent the person arrested from destroying evidence within his
reach. 31

Since the other issues raised by Manipon are factual they need not be discuss here.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is denied for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner-accused Nathaniel
Manipon, Jr. The decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 30, 1981 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr. Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 p. 163, Rollo.

2 p. 195, Rollo.

3 Exhibits A, B and C.

4 Exhibit A.

5 Exhibit D.

6 tsn, p. 72, July 14,1981,

7 tsn, pp. 76-77, July 14, 1981; Exhs. J and I.

8 Exhibit F-1.
9 Exhibit N.

10 Exhibit G.

11 Exhibit 11.

12 p. 29, Records.

13 pp. 41, 45-46, Records.

14 Maniego vs. People, 88 Phil. 494.

15 US vs. Richards, 6 Phil. 545.

16 t.s.n., pp. 8-9, August 12, 1981.

17 tsn, pp. 8, 22, July 29, 1981.

18 tsn, pp. 35-36, August 12, 1981.

19 tsn, pp. 47-48, August 12,1981.

20 Exhibit 9.

21 tsn, p. 20, July 29, 1981.

22 tsn, 51-52, 82, August 12, 1981.

23 Exhibit O.

24 tsn, p. 76, August 12, 1981.

25 Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637; Papa v. Mago, L-27360, February 28, 1968,
22 SCRA 857; Haris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234.

26 tsn, p. 7, July 14, 1981.

27 tsn, p. 28, July 13, 1981.

28 tsn, p. 38, July 13, 1981.

29 tsn, pp. 12-15, 28, July 14, 1981.

30 tsn, pp. 15, 31-32, July 14, 1981.

31 Bernas, Constitutional Rights and Duties, Vol. I, 1974 Edition, p. 100.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. 75160 March 18, 1988

LEONOR FORMILLEZA, petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

K.V. Faylona & Associates for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a Petition for review of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan.

The records of the case disclose that petitioner Leonor Formilleza has been with the government service for around 20 years. She was
the personnel supervisor of the regional office of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) in Tacloban City, Leyte since October 1,
1982. Her duties include the processing of the appointment papers of employees.
On the other hand, a certain Mrs. Estrella Mutia was an employee of the NIA from February, 1978 up to March, 1985. Her appointment
was coterminous with a project of the NIA. On December 31, 1983, her appointment wag terminated. This notwithstanding, she
continued working for the NIA pursuant to the verbal instructions of the regional director of the Administration.

Mrs. Mutia testified that she took steps to obtain either a permanent or at the least a renewed appointment; that when she approached
the regional director about the matter she was advised to see the petitioner who was to determine the employees to be appointed or
promoted; and that the petitioner refused to attend to her appointment papers unless the latter were given some money.

On February 27, 1984, Mrs. Mutia reported her problem to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) authorities in the province. The PC officials
told her that steps were to be taken to entrap the petitioner. The entrapment equipment consisted of marked paper money bills worth
P100.00. The PC officials concerned were colleagues of the husband of Mrs. Mutia in the PC.

The first attempt to entrap the petitioner was on February 28, 1984. The plan did not materialize as the petitioner did not show up at the
designated rendezvous at the NIA building canteen.

The second attempt was on February 29,1984, this time with results. That morning, the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia met in their service
bus on their way to work. The two women supposedly agreed to meet at the canteen later that morning at 9:00 o'clock. Thereafter, Mrs.
Mutia notified the PC authorities who were to arrange the entrapment. The PC soldiers involved in the arrangement were Identified as
Sergeants Eddie Bonjoc, Efren Abanes and Ignacio Labong.

Everyone who was to participate in the entrapment was ready. Mrs. Mutia went to see the petitioner in her office after which the two of
them proceeded to the canteen. Some of their officemates — Mrs. Florida Sevilla and a certain Mrs. Dimaano — joined them in the
canteen. They occupied two squareshaped tables joined together. The petitioner sat at the head of the table with Mrs. Mutia seated at
her left, Mrs. Dimaano at her (the petitioner's) right and Mrs. Sevilla at the right of Mrs. Dimaano. Sergeants Bonjoc and Labong sat at
another table while Sergeant Abanes was alone in still another table. The latter brought along a camera in order to take photographs of
the entrapment. The marked money was folded altogether.

Mrs. Mutia maintains that after they had finished taking their snacks, she handed the marked money bills under the table with her right
hand to the petitioner who received the same with her left hand. At that moment, Sergeant Bonjoc approached the petitioner and held
her hand holding the money bills. Sergeant Abanes brought out his camera and took photo. graphs of the sequence of events. He was
able to take seven photographs. 1

The petitioner was arrested by the soldiers despite her objections to the entrapment. She was brought to the PC crime laboratory in the
locality where she was found positive for ultra-violet powder. In the presence of the corporate counsel of the NW the petitioner denied
accepting any bribe money from Mrs. Mutia.

The case was brought to the Sandiganbayan where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9634. Arraigned on January 1 0, 1985, the
petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and went to trial on May 13, 1985.

In the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution argued that the entrapment arranged by the PC operatives was n
because the petitioner was asking money from Mrs. Mutia in consideration for having the appointment papers of the latter facilitated. On
the other hand, the petitioner maintains her innocence — that there was no entrapment; the scenario was but a scheme set up by Mrs.
Mutia and her husband's colleagues in the PC. The petitioner denies having accepted the supposed bribe money.

The Sandiganbayan relying on the theory of the prosecution observed in a decision promulgated on July 14, 1986, as follows —
2

Upon consideration of the evidence. We find the p petitions version credible.

Two days before the entrapment, Mrs. Mutia complained to the PC authorities about the inaction of the on her
appointment papers due to her failure to give Mm money. She executed a sworn statement to that effect, ... It was the
PC who planned the entrapment and supplied the marked money. Sgt. Efren Abanes who dusted the money bills with
fluoresence powder and who was a member of the entrapment team, witnessed the delivery and receipt of the money
by the accused and the complainant and he saw how the folded money was handed by Mrs. Mutia with her right hand
underneath the table and received by the with her left hand. That was also how Mrs. Mutia described the manner she
delivered the money to the accused — the money bills were rolled winch she handed to with her right hand
underneath the table. Although Sgt. Abanes had a camera with him to photograph the entrapment, he could not
prematurely expose the camera to allow a shot of the actual giving of the money lest the notice his presence and
intention and thereby thwart the operation. But after the money had been delivered and received, he immediately took
out his camera and snapped pictures, one of them depicting the accused held by Sgt. Bonjoc and Labong on the left
hand ..., and another showing the accused also held on the left hand by one of the PC men, and the complainant,
Mrs. Mutia, drinking from a glass ...

The fact that Mrs. Mutia's husband is a PC -An himself does not detract from the credibility of Sgt. Abanes who took
part in the Sgt. Abanes entrapment, took pictures, and testified about the incident in court. Sets. Abanes Bonjoc and
Labong were not the only public authorities privy to the operation. Capt. Pedro Pates was the one to whom Mrs.
Mutia reported the accused demand for money; it was he who broached the Idea of entrapping the accused; and it
was Mador Fernando Pace who supplied the money and caused it to be marked with powder. It is inconceivable that
an these commissioned and non-commissioned officers had lent themselves to take part in an unholy cabal of falsely
incriminating a female government employee on the mere urging of one of their associates.

Just as unreasonable is the insinuation that Mrs. Mutia had inveigled the accused to the canteen and resorted to the
insidious machination of planting money in her hand in a simulated entrapment simply because she thought the
accused was not helping her in her application for appointment to a regular item.

Mrs. Florida Sevilla's presence on the same table with the complainant and the accused may be conceded. But her
testimony that she did not see anything that took place between the complainant and the accused before the PC
operative pounced upon the accused, and the latter angrily asked the complainant what she was trying to do to her,
does not improve the cause of the defense. As portrayed by the accused, she was at the head of the rectangular
table with the complainant at her left: Mrs. Dimaano at her right, and Mrs. Sevilla next to Mrs. Dimaano. Since the
money, according to the complainant and Sgt. Abanes was handed to and received by the accused underneath the
table, it is not surprising that Mrs. Sevilla who was two seats away from the accused did not see it. 3

The respondent court ruled that the crime committed by the petitioner was not Direct Bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code cited in the Information but Indirect Bribery as defined under Article 211 of the same code. Citing the case of People v.
Abesamis, the respondent court was of the opinion that she could be convicted for Indirect Bribery under the Information for Direct
4

Bribery to which she pleaded and entered into trial inasmuch as it is the allegation of facts rather than the denomination of the offense
by the provincial fiscal that determines the crime charged.

Thus, the respondent court found the petitioner guilty of Indirect Bribery and sentenced her to four months of arresto mayor, suspension
from public office, profession or calling, including the right of suffrage, and public censure.

On August 23, 1986, the petitioner elevated the case to this Court by way of the instant Petition for Review. The thrust of the Petition is
that the conclusions reached by the Sandiganbayan are not supported by the evidence. Moreover, the petitioner disputes the
applicability and/or correctness of the ruling of this Court in People v. Abesamis relied upon by the respondent court.

As instructed by this Court, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its Comment on the Petition. In opposing the Petition, the
Solicitor General maintains that only questions of law may be raised in the instant case and the respondent court did not commit any
error of law. The Solicitor General also stresses therein that the findings of fact made by the Sandiganbayan are supported by the
evidence on record and deserve full faith and credit. The Solicitor General adds that the question of credibility is addressed mainly to
the trier of facts, in this case, the Sandiganbayan.

The parties submitted subsequent pleadings in support of their stand. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

We find merit in the Petition.

Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, governs the procedure through which cases originating from the Sandiganbayan are
elevated to this Court. Under Section 7 thereof, the decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan are subject to review
5

on certiorari by the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court has ruled that only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45, subject to certain rare exceptions. Simply stated, one way through which a
6 7

decision or final order of the Sandiganbayan can be elevated to the Supreme Court is a Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and, as a
general rule, only questions of law may be raised therein. The Solicitor General cites the case of Peñaverde v. Sandiganbayan in 8

support of this view.

Going now to the question of law raised in the instant Petition, We believe that the ruling in People v. Abesamis, contrary to the
contention of the petitioner, is authority for the view that the allegation of facts, not the denomination of the offense by the prosecutor,
determines the crime charged. Anent the argument on the correctness of the ruling, the petitioner had not succeeded in showing any
cogent basis for reversing or modifying the same.

The remaining argument that the judgment of conviction is not supported by the evidence raises a question of fact inasmuch as the
resolution of the issue would require this Court to sort out and re-examine the evidence presented in the trial. Invoking the ruling of this
Court in Peñaverde v. Sandiganbayan, the Solicitor General moves for the denial of the Petition. The Solicitor General adds that the
credibility of witnesses is a matter better left to the appreciation of the trial court, in this case, the Sandiganbayan.

Indeed, the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition of this character. The general rule admits exceptions,
one of which is when the findings of fact made by the trial court overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered,
might affect the result of the case. This observation was made by this court in Peñaverde v. Sandiganbayan, cited by the Solicitor
General, to wit —

With respect to the allegation that there was error on the part of respondent Sandiganbayan in concluding that
petitioners conspired in the commission of the offense, suffice it to say that the basis of its finding was the credibility
of witnesses. Pursuant to Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, in relation to Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are entitled to great respect and only questions of laws (sic) may be
raised to the Supreme Court. Besides, well settled is the rule that the findings of (the) trial court on credibility of
witnesses will not be disturbed unless much findings overlook certain facts of substance and value which, if
considered might affect (the) results of (the) case. 9

We believe that the exception to the general rule calls for application in this case.

The fundamental axiom underlying a criminal prosecution is that before the accused may be convicted of any crime, his guilt must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, if there are substantial facts which were overlooked by the trial court but which could alter the
results of the case in favor of the accused, then such facts should be carefully taken into account by the reviewing tribunal.

In the case before Us, there are substantial facts and circumstances Which appear to be favorable to the accused but which were not
carefully considered by the Sandiganbayan. The failure to do so is most unfortunate considering that the Sandiganbayan is the first and
last recourse of the accused before her case reaches the Supreme Court where findings of fact are generally conclusive and binding.

The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned
10

must have accepted the gift or material consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so
offered and consider the same as his own property from then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same.
Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court
to conclude that the crime of indirect bribery has been committed. To hold otherwise will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame
up public officers by simply putting within their physical custody some gift, money or other property.

Did the petitioner accept the supposed bribe money?


The Sandiganbayan noted that the photographs of the entrapment show that the petitioner was accosted by the PC soldiers after she
accepted the marked money. Against the evidence of the pro petition that the money was handed to petitioner by Mrs. Mutia under the
table is the assertion of petitioner that it was when she stood up that Mrs. Mutia suddenly placed something in her hand which she did
not know to be money and when she saw that it was money she threw it away. An examination of the seven photographs that were
11

allegedly taken immediately after the passing of the money shows that the petitioner was standing up when the PC agents
apprehended her. This corroborates petitioner's story. There was no picture showing petitioner to be seated which should be her
position immediately after the money was handed to her under the table, which should be the case according to the version of the
prosecution. None of the photographs show the petitioner in the process of appropriating or keeping the money after it was handed to
12

her. Two of the seven photographs that were taken outside the canteen appear to be of no relevance to the operation.

As the petitioner was admittedly handed the money, this explains why she was positive for ultra-violet powder. It is possible that she
intended to keep the supposed bribe money or may have had no intention to accept the same. These possibilities exist but We are not
certain.

However, what is revealing is that Mrs. Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano were present around the table in the canteen with the petitioner and
Mrs. Mutia when the latter allegedly handed the money to the petitioner. There were other persons in the premises like the PC agents
whose Identities petitioner possibly did not know. Under the circumstances and in such a public place it is not probable that petitioner
would have the nerve to accept bribe money from Mrs. Mutia even under the table. If the petitioner knew and was prepared to accept
the money from Mrs. Mutia at the canteen, the petitioner would not have invited her officemate Mrs. Sevilla to join them. Mrs. Sevilla
stated she did not see the alleged passing of the money. She could not have seen the money as it was passed on under the table or
when, as petitioner said it was quickly placed in her hand when she stood up. What Mrs. Sevilla is sure of is that when they were about
to leave the canteen, two (2) men approached petitioner, one of whom took pictures, and the petitioner shouted at Mrs. Mutia, "What
are you trying to do to me?" The reaction of petitioner is far from one with a guilty conscience.
13

Moral certainty, not absolute certainty, is needed to support a judgment of conviction, Moral certainty is a certainty that convinces and
satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon a given matter. Without this standard of certainty, it may not be said
14

that the guilt of the accused in a criminal proceeding has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

With all these circumstances taken into account altogether, We are left at a loss as to the guilt of the accused. Overlooked by the
Sandiganbayan, these facts and circumstances make out a good case for the petitioner.

Accordingly, the Court holds that the guilt of the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 9634 has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
She is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 9634 is hereby SET ASIDE. The
petitioner Leonor Formilleza is hereby ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt. We make no pronouncement as to costs. This
Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Exhibits "M" and "M-1" up to "M-6", Original Record.

2 Pages 21 to 33, Rollo. The case was assigned to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan composed of Justices
Francis Garchitorena, Conrado Molina and Augusta Amores. Justice Molina prepared the Decision.

3 Pages 29 to 31, Rollo.

4 93 Phil. 712 (1953).

5 The Decree was signed into law on December 10, 1978. The validity of the Decree has been upheld in Nuñez v.
Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 (1982).

6 Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 67 (1987). See Section 2, Rule 45.

7 Another available remedy is the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 when only jurisdictional issues are
raised.

8 124 SCRA 345 (1983).

9 124 SCRA 345, at 351.

10 Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows – Art 211, Indirect bribery. – The penalties of arrests
mayor, suspension in its minimum and medium periods, and public censure shall be imposed upon any public officer
who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office.

11 TSN, February 12, 1985, pp. 6-7.


12 Exhibits M to M-6.

13 TSN, September 18, 1985, pp. 6-7.

14 People v. Lavarias, 23 SCRA 1301, at 1306 (1968).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 112761-65 February 3, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
PORFERIO M. PEPITO, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:

Accused-appellant PORFERIO PEPITO appeals from the Decision of the trial court convicting him of Malversation of Public Funds
through Falsification of Official Documents on five (5) counts.

Appellant, as Acting Postmaster of Iligan City, was charged with misappropriating government funds by manipulating his records and
making it appear that he paid a number of postal money orders although no such payments were made. Appellant was found short in
his cash accounts, as follows: (a) P23,643.73 for October 1975; (b) P11.07 for December 1975. (c) P7,283.59 for the month of
1 2

January 1976; (d) P30,052.25 for April 1976, and; (e) P42,302.97 for May 1976.
3 4 5

Except for the dates and amounts involved, appellant was similarly charged in five (5) separate Informations as follows:
6

That sometime during the month of __________, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Porferio Pepito, Acting Postmaster of Iligan City, with official station thereat, and
as such accountable officer, responsible for funds collected and received by him by reason of his position, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and fraudulently and with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, embezzle and
take away government funds in his possession in the amount __________ of accused employing deceit, false
manifestation and fraudulent misrepresentations, manipulated his records to make it appear that on the month
__________ of the Money Order Paid by him was __________ although his payments amounted only to __________
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts and that by virtue of such falsification in his record of payments,
the said accused successfully appropriated and converted to his own personal use and benefit the sum of
__________ to the damage and prejudice of the Bureau of Post, Manila, Philippines, in the aforementioned amount
of __________.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 217 and Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

First, the facts. In a letter, dated August 5, 1976, CESAR L. JUAN, Regional Director of the Bureau of Posts, Region X, Cagayan de
7

Oro City, requested the Office of the City Auditor, Iligan City, to audit the accounts of appellant PORFERIO PEPITO, Acting Postmaster
of Iligan City. Earlier, an audit team from the Office of Regional Director Juan uncovered certain anomalies regarding appellant's postal
money order transactions at the Iligan City Post Office. However, due to lack of time, the team failed to determine the exact figure
involved in the anomaly. Hence, their request for assistance from the City Auditor's Office. 8

Iligan City Auditor FRANCISCO APARECE immediately formed an audit team composed of Assistant City Auditor HONORIO N.
PABLICO and Auditor ROMULO ORBE. They started their audit on August 19, 1976 and concentrated on the postal money order
9

transactions of appellant. They examined the cash in appellant's possession and. verified the records of the postal money orders
(PMOs), the payment of these checks, and all depository funds of said post office in government banks and in the Bureau of Posts,
Manila, covering the period from July 1, 1975 to August 9, 1976. 10

Asst. Auditor Pablico outlined the procedure for payment of postal money orders, thus: The postmaster pays the postal money order
(PMO) upon presentation to him. The PMO paid cards, evidencing payment of the PMOs, are then kept by the postmaster as
custodian. The postmaster then prepares a list of the PMOs he paid for a period of fifteen (15) days. Hence, in a month, the postmaster
prepares two (2) lists or records of payment: one for the first fifteen days of the month, and another list for the next fifteen days. The
PMO paid cards and the lists are then sent to the central office of the Bureau of Posts in Manila for safekeeping. A copy of each list is
sent to the Regional Office of the Bureau of Posts, another copy is sent to the City Auditor's Office and the last copy is retained by the
Postmaster himself. 11

The audit team verified the total amount of PMO payments appearing on the lists or records prepared by appellant. They totalled the
daily PMO payments of appellant and cross-checked them with appellant's entry on the cash book. These reveal the total money order
payments of appellant for the month. After totalling the PMO payments of the postmaster per month, the audit team requested the
Central Office of the Bureau of Posts in Manila, through its regional office, to furnish them the PMO paid cards, evidencing payments of
the PMOs during the period covered by their audit. 12

Upon receipt of the PMO paid cards, the audit team cross-checked the paid cards with the record of the PMOs allegedly paid by
appellant. They discovered that some PMOs were listed as paid but were not supported by paid cards. The audit team uncovered these
discrepancies for the months of October and December, 1975 and for the months of January, April and May, all of 1976. Based on the
records, the total PMOs paid by appellant during the period covered by the audit was P494,720.85, but only P250,090.60 was
supported by PMO paid cards. The balance of two hundred forty-four thousand six hundred thirty pesos and twenty-five centavos
(P244,630.25) was disallowed in audit for lack of supporting documents. Hence, the cash shortage in appellant's account. Appellant
13

asked the auditors to double-check their findings but the audit team came out with the same result.

In a letter dated February 25, 1977, the audit team informed appellant of the shortage in his cash accounts. They demanded from
14

appellant the immediate restitution of the missing funds and an explanation why no criminal and administrative sanctions should be
taken against him. No action was taken by appellant to restore and explain his shortage of funds. Hence, five (5) criminal Informations
15

for malversation of public funds through falsification of official documents were filed against him.

After the prosecution formally offered its evidence and rested its case on December 18, 1978, the continuation of the hearing for the
presentation of the defense evidence was suspended due to the transfer of then Presiding Judge Leonardo I. Cruz to Angeles City.

It was only after two (2) years, or on August 13, 1982, that continuation of the trial resumed for the presentation of the defense
evidence. However, on the scheduled date of hearing, appellant, through counsel, filed a motion to suspend the trial on the ground
16

that he has applied for and was conditionally granted an amnesty under P.D. 1082 by the 11TH Amnesty Commission of Marawi City,
Lanao del Sur, for said cases. Appellant prayed that pursuant to Section 6 of P.D. 1082, further proceedings in his cases be held in
abeyance pending final approval of his conditional amnesty by the President of the Philippines.

The fiscal opposed the motion on the ground that the conditional amnesty of appellant was spurious for it was issued by a person not
17

duly authorized for the purpose.

Resolution of this motion was deferred for six (6) years with the subsequent reorganization of the judiciary and the re-raffling of
appellant's cases. Finally, in an Order, dated September 9, 1988, appellant's motion to suspend the trial of the cases was set for
18

hearing by the new presiding Judge Tago M. Bantuas. However, on the date set, appellant's counsel failed to appear. Judge Bantuas
continued with the hearing of appellant's motion and denied appellant's motion to suspend the trial. The continuation of the hearing of
the cases was set on January 10, 1989. Upon receipt of the Order and Notice of Hearing, appellant's counsel, Atty. Dimnatang T. Saro,
filed a motion to postpone the hearing due to conflict of schedule. Hearing was thus reset to February 7,
19

1989. 20

Again, a series of motions to defer the hearing was filed at appellant's instance and granted by the trial court. It was only on January 24,
1992 that the new presiding Judge Maximino Magno-Libre issued an Order admitting the evidence offered by the prosecution. On July 21

14, 1992, the defense commenced to adduce its evidence and presented appellant as its lone witness.

On the stand, appellant denied there was shortage in his cash accounts. After he was informed of the missing funds, he asked the audit
team to re-examine the records for his cash on hand has always tallied with his cashbook. His office had been subjected to various
regular audit examinations by different offices, namely: the Bureau of Treasury, the District Postal Inspector, the Postal Audit Examiners
and the Iligan City Auditor's Office. None of these offices found any irregularity in his accountabilities. He urged that there must have
been some error or inaccuracy in the conduct of the audit. He further charged that the malversation cases were filed against him for
political reasons for the late Governor Arsenio Quibranza had a grudge against his son-in-law. 22

Appellant admitted that when he was found short in his cash accounts, he applied for amnesty under P.D. 1082. When he was informed
by then Presiding Judge Dalisay and Prosecutor Lagcao that he would have to admit his guilt in his application for amnesty since
amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, he still proceeded with his application for his friends in Lanao del Sur assured him
that his amnesty would be immediately processed and approved. His conditional amnesty has been granted but it is still pending final
approval by the President for allegedly there is someone in Manila who is blocking the grant of his amnesty. 23

After trial, the court rendered judgment 24


on September 8, 1993 finding appellant guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive portion
reads:

WHEREFORE, in accordance with the provisions of Article(s) 217, 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, the Court finds accused guilty on all the five (5) counts he is charged (with) and is hereby sentenced, to wit:

1. As to Criminal Case No. 277, since the amount misappropriated is P23,643.73, accused should be penalized
according to the penalty provided in Paragraph No. 4 of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code which is reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. Since according to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be applied in its maximum period, accused is meted out a penalty of reclusion perpetua.

2. As to Criminal Case No. 278, considering that the amount misappropriated was P11.07, according to Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period, thus,
accused should be meted out the penalty prescribed in Article 171 and in applying the provisions of the indeterminate
sentence law, accused should be meted the indeterminate prison terms of six (6) years prision correctional to twelve
(12) years prision mayor.

3. As to Criminal Case No. 274, since the amount malversed was P7,283.79, accused should be penalized according
to Paragraph No. 3 of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code and should be meted out an indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal.

4. As to Criminal Case No. 275, considering that the amount misappropriated is P30,052.20, the penalty imposed
should be akin to the penalty prescribed in Criminal Case No. 277 mentioned in Paragraph 1 hereof, which
is reclusion perpetua; and

5. As to Criminal Case No. 276, considering that the amount subject of malversation is P37,558.30, then the
necessary penalty of reclusion perpetua should also be meted out against accused.

Finally, accused is also hereby ordered to pay the government the total sum of P98,549.99, which is the aggregate
government funds actually misappropriated, for restitution in accordance with Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.

Hence this appeal where appellant contends that:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUSPEND THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASES PENDING FINAL ACTION ON THE CONDITIONAL AMNESTY GRANTED TO
THE APPELLANT;

II THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES OF


MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THRU FALSIFICATION OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS; AND

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

First. Appellant charges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suspend the proceedings in these cases pursuant to Section 6
of P.D. 1082. Hence, the proceedings of the trial court are null and void and the judgment of conviction against him should be
25

vacated.

We do not subscribe to appellant's contention. On the date scheduled for hearing of his motion, appellant's counsel failed to appear and
substantiate the allegations in his motion. The trial court proceeded with the hearing of the motion, found no merit thereto and denied
the same. Appellant's counsel received a copy of the Order of denial and was notified of the continuation of the hearing of said cases.
Appellant did not challenge the correctness of this ruling by way of a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals. Instead, he proceeded to adduce evidence in his defense. After more than fifteen (15) years of trial of his cases, appellant
26

cannot now impugn the Order of the court denying his motion to suspend his prosecution. 27

Second. Appellant contends that there was no clear showing that he misappropriated the missing funds. Allegedly, his office has been
regularly audited by different agencies and none has found him short in his accountabilities. He insists on the inaccuracy of the audit
report of the City Auditor's Office which examined his cash and accounts.

We find no merit in the contention. It is settled that in cases of malversation of public funds, the mere failure of a public officer to have
duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, is prima
facie evidence that he has put such funds or property to personal use. An accountable officer may be convicted of malversation even
28

in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation so long as there is evidence of shortage in his accounts which he is unable to
explain. Indeed, to justify conviction for malversation of public funds, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused received
29

public funds or property and that he could not account for them or did not have them in his possession and could not give a reasonable
excuse for the disappearance of the same. 30

In the case at bar, all the elements of malversation of public funds are present, viz: (a) the offender is a public officer, (b) he had
custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office, (c) these funds or property were public funds or property
for which he was accountable, and (d) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or
negligence permitted another person to take them. Appellant, as Acting Postmaster of Iligan City has custody of the funds of his Office.
31

A portion of these funds was used in the payment of postal money orders (PMOs) presented to him. As evidence of these payments,
the Postmaster accomplishes the PMO paid cards and makes a list of the PMOs he paid for a given period. These lists and paid cards
are then sent to the Central Office of the Bureau of Post for safekeeping. An audit of the PMO transactions of appellant, however,
disclosed that some of his PMO payments were not supported by PMO paid cards.

Appellant's assertion that the audit made by the Office of Iligan City Auditor was inaccurate remains an unsubstantiated allegation.
Although appellant insisted on this alleged inaccuracy during the trial, he cannot point to the specific procedure where the auditors
erred in examining his accountabilities. Noticeably, appellant did not present any document to show that the audit of other government
32

agencies covered also the PMO transactions of the post office for the same period covered by the audit of the City Auditor.

Appellant also faults the trial court for considering as an admission of guilt his application for amnesty under P.D. 1082. Regardless of
this consideration, however, the totality of the prosecution evidence has proved the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The
testimonies of the auditors and the documentary evidence adduced clearly proved appellant's shortage of funds and his corresponding
liability therefor as an accountable officer. The testimonial and documentary evidence of the prosecution were not successfully rebutted
by the defense.

Finally, appellant contends that the trial court failed to consider in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Allegedly, he voluntarily surrendered to the court of justice and posted bail for his provisional liberty before a warrant for his arrest could
be issued.

The rule is clear that for the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be appreciated, it must be proven that the accused freely
placed himself at the disposal of law enforcing authorities. The records confirm that appellant was arrested and detained by the INP
Station of Marawi City for the crimes charged upon the issuance of the Order for his arrest on February 9, 1978. Appellant was only
33

released from custody upon the approval of his bailbond on March 27, 1978. Under the circumstances, appellant cannot be credited
34

with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting appellant PORFERIO M. PEPITO for five (5) counts of Malversation of
Public Funds Through Falsification of Official Documents is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Information, Crim. Case No. 277; Original Records, p. 434.


2 Information, Crim. Case No. 278; Original Records, p. 454.

3 Information, Crim. Case No. 274; Original Records, p. 1.

4 Information, Crim. Case No. 275; Original Records, p. 394.

5 Information, Crim. Case No. 276; Original Records, p. 414.

6 Original Records, p. 1.

7 Original Records, p. 147.

8 TSN, July 28, 1978, pp. 179-180.

9 Original Records, p. 109; TSN, July 28, 1978, pp. 6-8, 171-172.

10 TSN, July 28, 1978, pp. 9-11.

11 Id., pp. 21-25.

12 Id., pp. 28-33.

13 Id., pp. 35-70.

14 Exhibit "L", Original Records, p. 146.

15 Id., pp. 71-74.

16 Original Records, pp. 194-196.

17 Opposition, dated November 2, 1982; Original Records, p. 207.

18 Original Records, p. 223.

19 Id., p. 247.

20 See Order, dated January 10, 1989; Original Records, p. 254.

21 Original Records, p. 284.

22 TSN, June 14, 1992, pp. 6-36, 39-41.

23 Id., pp. 37-41.

24 Penned by Judge Maximino Magno-Libre, Regional Trial Court Lanao del Norte, 12th Judicial Region, Branch V,
Iligan City Rollo, pp. 90-100.

25 "Sec. 6. Pending Cases. — The investigation and trial of criminal cases against persons who apply for amnesty
pursuant to this Decree shall be held in abeyance until their applications for amnesty shall have been finally acted
upon in accordance hereof."

26 Fortich-Celdran, et al. v. Celdran, et al., 19 SCRA 502.

27 It is also well to note that as per the testimony of appellant himself, the conditional amnesty granted to him by the
Amnesty commission way back June 5, 1977 is still pending final approval by the President of the Philippines; TSN
June 1992, p. 39.

28 Article 217, last paragraph, Revised Penal Code; Agbanlog v. People, G.R. No. 105907, May 24, 1993, 222 SCRA
530.

29 Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 97214, July 18, 1994, 234 SCRA 175; Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
93885, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 94.

30 Felicilda v. Grospe, G.R. No. 102494, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 285.

31 Agbanlog v. People, 222 SCRA 530.

32 TSN, June 14, 1992, pp. 26 & 34.

33 Original Records, p. 55.

34 Order of Release, dated March 27, 1978, Original Records, p. 56.


The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005

NORMA A. ABDULLA, Petitioners,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal use of public funds defined and penalized under
1

Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now
before this Court on petition for review under Rule 45.

Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under an Information which pertinently reads:

That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being then the
President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties are accountable for
public funds under their administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with MAHMUD I.
DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school
teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Appellant’s co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the
Sandiganbayan in its decision dated August 25, 2000 (promulgated on September 27,2000), as follows:
2

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Mahmud Darkis and Nenita P. Aguil are hereby acquitted of the crime charged. The
cash bond posted by each of the said accused for their provisional liberty are hereby ordered returned to each of them subject to the
usual auditing and accounting procedures.

Accused Norma Abdulla is hereby convicted of the crime charged and is hereby meted a fine of three thousand pesos, pursuant to the
second paragraph of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. She is further imposed the penalty of temporary special disqualification for
a period of six (6) years. She shall also pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellant’s sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification
imposed upon her, thus:

Premises considered, the decision of this Court dated August 25, 2000, is hereby amended to the effect that the penalty of temporary
special disqualification for six (6) years is hereby cancelled and set aside. Hence, the last paragraph of said decision shall read as
follows:

Accused Abdulla is hereby convicted of the crime charged and is hereby meted a fine of three thousand pesos, pursuant to the second
paragraph of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. She shall also pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED. 3

Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.

The record shows that the prosecution dispensed with the presentation of testimonial evidence and instead opted to mark in evidence
the following exhibits:

EXHIBITS DESCRIPTION

"A" Audit Report which is denominated as Memorandum of Commission on


Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga City, from the Office of the Special Audit
Team, COA, dated May 8, 1992, consisting of nine (9) pages;

"B" Certified Xerox copy of a letter from the Department of Budget and
Management through Secretary Guillermo N. Carague to the President of
the Sulu State College dated October 30, 1989;

"C" Certified copy of the DBM Advice of Allotment for the Year 1989;

"C-1" The entry appearing in Exhibit "C" which reads: "Purpose – release partial
funding for the conversion of 34 Secondary School Teacher positions to
Instructor I items; Fund Source – lump-sum appropriation authorized on
page 370 of RA 6688 and the current savings under personal services;"

"D" Manifestation filed by accused Norma Abdulla herself dated November


24, 1997 consisting of two (2) pages appearing on pages 225 to 226 of
the record;

"E" Motion filed by the accused through Atty. Sandra Gopez dated February
9, 1998 found on pages 382-a and 382-b of the records of this case; and

"F" Prosecution’s Opposition to the motion marked as Exhibit "E" dated


February 11, 1998, consisting of three (3) pages, appearing in pages 383
to 385 of the record.4

Thereafter, the prosecution immediately made its Formal Offer of Evidence, and, with the admission thereof by the court, rested its
case.

The defense proceeded to adduce its evidence by presenting four (4) witnesses, namely, accused Mahmud Darkis, who was the
Administrative Officer of Sulu State College, Jolo, Sulu; accused Nenita Aguil, the Cashier of the same College; appellant Norma
Abdulla herself, who was the College President; and Gerardo Concepcion, Jr., Director IV and Head of the Department of Budget and
Management, Regional Office No. 9, Zamboanga City.

The undisputed facts, as found by the Sandiganbayan itself:

The evidence on record xxx show that the request for the conversion of thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers to Instructor I items
of the Sulu State College, through its former president, accused Abdulla, was approved by the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM); that consequent to the approval of the said request, was the allotment by the DBM of the partial funding for the purpose of
paying the salary differentials of the said thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers in the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00)
sourced from the "lump sum appropriation authorized on page 370 of R.A. 6688 [should be page 396 of RA 6688 (General
Appropriations Act January 1 – December 31, 1989)] and the current savings under personal services of said school (Exhibits `B,’ `C’
and `C-1;’ Exhibit `18,’ pp. 32-35; tsn, hearing of September 22, 1998, pp. 6 to 25 and 26); that out of the thirty-four (34) secondary
school teachers, only the six (6) teachers were entitled and paid salary differentials amounting to P8,370.00, as the twenty-eight (28)
teachers, who were occupying Teacher III positions, were no longer entitled to salary differentials as they were already receiving the
same salary rate as Instructor I (Exhibit `A,’ p. 4, par. 1; Exhibits `1’ to `6,’ inclusive; Exhibit `14-A;’ tsn, hearing of September 22, 1998,
pp. 6 to 8; tsn, hearing of September 23, 1998, pp. 10-11); and that the amount of P31,516.16, taken from the remaining balance of the
P40,000.00 allotment, was used to pay the terminal leave benefits of the six (6) casuals (Exhibits `D’ and `E;’ Exhibits `7’ to `12,’
inclusive; tsn, hearing of September 22, 1998, pp. 13 and 34; tsn, hearing of September 23, 1998, p. 13).

Accused Abdulla was able to sufficiently justify the payment of the salary differentials of only six (6), out of the thirty-four (34) teachers,
when she testified that out of the thirty-four (34) teachers, twenty-eight (28) were already holding the position of Secondary School
Teacher III receiving the salary of Instructor I; and that the remaining six (6) were still holding Secondary Teacher II positions and
therefore receiving a salary lower than that of Instructor I so they were paid salary differentials (tsn, hearing of September 23, 1998, pp.
8, 10 and 11). In fact, the notarized audit investigation report (Exhibit `A,’ p. 4, 1st par.) and the Joint Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman, Mindanao (Exhibit `14-a’), also point that said act of the accused is justified.

In this recourse, appellant questions the judgment of conviction rendered against her, claiming that the Sandiganbayan erred:

"I

XXX ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN INVOKING THE PRESUMPTION OF UNLAWFUL INTENT DESPITE EVIDENCE TO THE
CONTRARY.

II

XXX ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT PETITIONER COMMITTED
TECHNICAL MALVERSATION UNDER ARTICLE 220 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE".

The Court grants the appeal.

So precious to her is the constitutional right of presumption of innocence unless proven otherwise that appellant came all the way to this
Court despite the fact that the sentence imposed upon her by the Sandiganbayan was merely a fine of three thousand pesos, with no
imprisonment at all. And recognizing the primacy of the right, this Court, where doubt exists, has invariably resolved it in favor of an
accused.

In a judgment of acquittal in favor of two (2) accused charged of murder in People vs. Abujan, the Court wrote:
5

We are enraged by the shocking death suffered by the victim and we commiserate with her family. But with seeds of doubt planted in
our minds by unexplained circumstances in this case, we are unable to accept the lower court’s conclusion to convict appellants. We
cannot in conscience accept the prosecution’s evidence here as sufficient proof required to convict appellants of murder. Hence, here
we must reckon with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. Nowhere
is this rule more compelling than in a case involving the death penalty for a truly humanitarian Court would rather set ten guilty men free
than send one innocent man to the death row. Perforce, we must declare both appellants not guilty and set them free.

Similarly, the Court had to acquit an accused charged of rape in People vs. De Jesus on ground of reasonable doubt, to wit:
6
With seeds of doubt planted in our minds by the conduct of proceedings on record, we are unable to accept the lower court’s conclusion
to convict appellant. His conviction is founded on the sole testimony of Agnes, but though a credible witness despite her mental
retardation, she showed unnecessary dependence on her mother when identifying the father of her child. Maternal coaching taints her
testimony. That her mother had to be ordered by the judge to go outside the courtroom impresses us as significant. We are unable to
accept as sufficient the quantum of proof required to convict appellant of rape based on the alleged victim’s sole testimony. Hence, here
we must fall back on a truism of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated May 26, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Appellant RUBEN LUMIBAO is ACQUITTED of the charge of rape on reasonable doubt.

The Court’s faithful adherence to the constitutional directive imposes upon it the imperative of closely scrutinizing the prosecution’s
evidence to assure itself that no innocent person is condemned and that conviction flows only from a moral certainty that guilt has been
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the words of People vs. Pascua : 7

Our findings in the case at bar should not create the mistaken impression that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should
always be looked at with askance. What we are driving at is that every accused is presumed innocent at the onset of an indictment. But,
it has often happened that at the commencement of a trial, people’s minds, sometimes judges too, would have already passed
sentence against the accused. An allegation, or even any testimony, that an act was done should never be hastily accepted as proof
that it was really done. Proof must be closely examined under the lens of a judicial microscope and only proof beyond reasonable doubt
must be allowed to convict. Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied.

We shall now assay appellant’s guilt or innocence in the light of the foregoing crucibles.

In her first assigned error, appellant contends that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove criminal intent on her part. When
she raised this issue in her Motion for Reconsideration before the Sandiganbayan, that court, invoking Section 5 (b), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, ruled in a Resolution promulgated on September 17, 2001, as follows:
8

Anent the allegation of the movant/accused that good faith is a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation as it would negate
criminal intent on the part of the accused which the prosecution failed to prove, attention is invited to pertinent law and rulings of the
Supreme Court on the matter.

Sec. 5(b) of the Rule 131, Rules of Court, provides, `That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent.’ Hence, dolo may be
inferred from the unlawful act. In several cases (Tria, 17 Phil. 303; Ballesteros, 25 Phil. 634; Sia Tioan, 54 Phil. 52; Cueto, 38 Phil. 935;
Cubelo, 106 Phil. 496), the Supreme Court ruled that `When it has been proven that the appellants committed the unlawful acts alleged,
it is properly presumed that they were committed with full knowledge and with criminal intent, `and it is incumbent upon them to rebut
such presumption.’ Further, the same court also ruled that when the law plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by a person,
the law implies the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law which he had violated (State
vs. McBrayer, 98 NIC 619; Sing Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil. 577, 580; Hermenigildo Bautista, CA 40 O.G. 5th Supp. 139). If the
act is criminal, then criminal intent is presumed (Francisco y Martin, CA 53 O.G. 1450).

In the case at bar, inasmuch as the prosecution had proved that a criminal act was committed by the accused under Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code, criminal intent was presumed. The accused did not present any evidence to prove that no such criminal intent
was present when she committed the unlawful act of technical malversation. Hence, the presumption that the unlawful act of the
accused was done with criminal intent had been satisfactorily proven by the prosecution (Sec. 5[b], Rule 131).

The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance on Section 5 (b) of Rule 131 as basis for its imputation of
criminal intent upon appellant.

For sure, the procedural rule relied upon does not apply at all to this case. Indeed, clear it is from its very language that the disputable
presumption of the existence of unlawful or criminal intent presupposes the commission of an unlawful act. Thus, intent to kill is
presumed when the victim dies because the act of killing clearly constitutes an unlawful act. In People vs. Gemoya, the Court held:
9

The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death, unless the accused proves by convincing evidence that any of the
justifying circumstances in Article 11 or any of the exempting circumstances in Article 12, both of the Revised Penal Code, is present.

In fact, in a Resolution penned by Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. in People vs. Delim, the Court en banc categorically stated:
10

If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. (Emphasis supplied).

Similarly, intent to gain or animus lucrandi is presumed when one is found in possession of stolen goods precisely because the taking
of another’s property is an unlawful act. So it is that in People vs. Reyes, the Court held:
11

Accused-appellant’s contention that the animus lucrandi was not sufficiently established by the prosecution is devoid of merit. Animus
lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender. Although proof of motive for
the crime is essential when the evidence of the robbery is circumstantial, intent to gain or animus lucrandi may be presumed from the
furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator. The intent to gain may be presumed from the proven unlawful taking. In the case at bar, the act of taking the victim’s
wristwatch by one of the accused Cergontes while accused-appellant Reyes poked a knife behind him sufficiently gave rise to the
presumption.

The presumption of criminal intent will not, however, automatically apply to all charges of technical malversation because disbursement
of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when
she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to
under existing civil service laws. Thus, in a similar case, the Court reversed a conviction for technical malversation of one who paid out
12

the wages of laborers:


There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose – payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in
the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers’ wages enjoy as claims against the employers’ funds and
resources.

In the absence of any presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of proving by competent evidence that appellant’s act of paying the
terminal leave benefits of employees of the Sulu State College was done with criminal intent rests upon the prosecution.

The Court notes the odd procedure which the prosecution took in discharging its undertaking to prove the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. As it is, the prosecution did not present any single witness at all, not even for the purpose of identifying and proving
the authenticity of the documentary evidence on which it rested its case. The prosecution definitely failed to prove unlawful intent on the
part of appellant.

Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.
The weakness of the defense does not relieve it of this responsibility. And when the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of
establishing the guilt of an accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. A judgment of conviction must rest on
nothing less than moral certainty. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence must be duly taken into account.
The proof against him must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. There must
be moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind that it was accused-appellant who committed the crime. Absent this required quantum of
evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. 13

The Sandiganbayan’s improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day for the prosecution’s deficiency in proving the
existence of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence
of criminal intent, this Court has no basis to affirm appellant’s conviction.

x x x. This calls to mind the oft-repeated maxim `Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea,’ which expounds a basic principle in criminal
law that a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent. Thus, to constitute a crime,
the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent. It is true that a presumption of
criminal intent may arise from proof of the commission of a criminal act; and the general rule is that if it is proved that the accused
committed the criminal act charged, it will be presumed that the act was done with criminal intention and that it is for the accused to
rebut this presumption. But it must be borne in mind that the act from which such presumption springs must be a criminal act In the
case at bar, the act is not criminal. Neither can it be categorized as malum prohibitum, the mere commission of which makes the doer
criminally liable even if he acted without evil intent.
14

The second assigned error refers to the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence of all the essential elements of the crime of
technical malversation defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, which are:

"1. That the offender is a public officer;

"2. That there is public fund or property under his administration;

"3. That such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance;

"4. That he applies the same to a public use other than that for which such fund or property has been appropriated by law or
ordinance." 15

Appellant contends that the prosecution was unable to prove the second and third elements of the crime charged. She argued that the 16

public funds in question, having been established to form part of savings, had therefore ceased to be appropriated by law or ordinance
for any specific purpose.

The Court finds merit in appellant’s submission.

As found by the Sandiganbayan no less, the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) originally intended to cover the salary
differentials of thirty four (34) secondary school teachers whose employment status were converted to Instructor I, were sourced from
the "lump sum appropriation" authorized on page 370 (should be page 396) of R.A. 6688 and the current savings under personal
services of said school. 17

The pertinent portions of RA 6688 are reproduced hereunder:

"K.2 Sulu State College

For general administration, administration of personnel benefits, salary standardization, higher education and secondary education
services, including locally-funded project as indicated hereunder…………………………………………………..…P 17,994,000

New Appropriations, by Function/Project

Current Operating

Expenditures

-----------------------------------

Personal Maintenance Capital Total


Services and Other Outlays
Operating -------------------
-------------------- -------------------
Expenses

-------------------

A. Functions

1. General Administration P 1,605,000 P 1,196,000 P P 2,801,000


and Support Services

2. Administration of 608,000 608,000


Personnel Benefits

3. Salary Standardization 57,000 57,000

4. Higher Education 1,967,000 577,000 2,544,000


Services

5. Secondary Education 2,636,000 736,000 3,372,000


Services
------------------ ----------------- -----------------
Total, Functions 6,873,000 2,509,000 9,382,000
------------------ ----------------- -----------------

B. Locally-Funded Project

1. Acquisition and ------------------ ----------------- 8,612,000 8,612,000


Improvements of Lands,
Construction, ------------------ -----------------
Rehabilitation or
Renovation of Buildings
and Structures, and
Acquisition of Equipment
Total New Appropriations, P 6,873,000 P 2,509,000 P 8,612,000 P17,994.000
Sulu State College
========== ========== ========== ==========

xxxxxxxxx

New Appropriations, by Object of Expenditures

(In Thousand Pesos)


A. Functions/Locally-Funded Project
Current Operating Expenditures
Personal Services
Total Salaries of Permanent Personnel 4,148
Total Salaries and Wages of Contractual and Emergency Personnel 146
Total Salaries and Wages 4,294
Other Compensation
Honoraria and Commutable Allowances 185
Cost of Living Allowances 1,292
Employees Compensation Insurance Premiums 44
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 35
Medicare Premiums 18
Merit Increases 20
Salary Standardization 37
Bonuses and Incentives 511
Others 437

Total Other Compensation 2,579


O1 Total Personal Services 6,873

The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College
in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been
appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty
thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law
contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court has unequivocably ruled in Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan that in the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the public
18

fund allegedly technically malversed (in that case, the absence of any law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting
of Barangay Jalung Road), the use thereof for another public purpose (there, for the payment of wages of laborers working on projects
other than the Barangay Jalung Road) will not make the accused guilty of violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the
payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical
malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for payment of salary
differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this
case. Acquittal is thus in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed decision and resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 23261 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant ACQUITTED of the crime charged against her. The cash bond posted
by appellant for her provisional liberty, if any, is ordered returned to her subject to the usual auditing and accounting procedures.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice

Chairman, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Footnotes

Fifth Division, Ma. Cristina Cortez-Estrada (ponente), Minita V. Chico-Nazario (now a member of this Court), and Anacleto D.
1

Badoy, Jr., JJ.

2
Rollo, pp. 24-42

3
Resolution, p. 5, Rollo, p. 48.

4
Decision, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 26-27.

5
G.R. No. 140870, February 11, 2004.

6
G.R. No. 144080-81, January 26,2004

7
G.R. No. 82303, December 21,1989.

8
Rollo, pp. 44-48

9
G.R. No. 132633, October 4, 2000.
10
G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003

11
G.R. No. 135682, March 26, 2003

12
Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96025, May 15,1991.

13
People vs. Ortillas, G.R. No. 137666, May 20, 2004.

14
Manzanaris vs. People, G.R. No. L-64750, January 30, 1984.

15
L.B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 12th ed.

16
See Petition, p.12. This should have been third and fourth instead of second and third.

17
See Decision, p. 14, Rollo, p. 37.

18
See note 12, Supra.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-65952 July 31, 1984

LAURO G. SORIANO, JR., petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Dakila F. Castro for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

The principal issue in this petition to review a decision of the Sandiganbayan is whether or not the preliminary investigation of a criminal
complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a "contract or transaction" so as to bring it within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The factual background is as follows:

Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal of Quezon City. The case was docketed as I.S.
No. 82-2964 and assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the
petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the National Bureau of
Investigation which set up an entrapment. Because Tan was hard put to raise the required amount only P2,000.00 in bills were marked
by the NBI which had to supply one-half thereof. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 7393 which reads as follows:

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses LAURO G. SORIANO, for Violation of Section 3,
paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 21st day of March 1983, at Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then and still
is an Assistant City Fiscal of the Quezon City Fiscal's Office, detailed as the Investigating Fiscal in
the case of MARIANNE Z. LACAMBRA versus THOMAS N. TAN, docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964, for
Qualified Theft, taking advantage of his official position and with grave abuse of authority, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand and request from Thomas N. Tan the amount
of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) Philippine Currency, and actually received from said
Thomas N. Tan the amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) Philippine Currency, in
consideration for a favorable resolution by dismissing the abovementioned case, wherein said
accused has to intervene in his official capacity as such Investigating Fiscal.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Manila, Philippines, March 22, 1983.

(SGD.) EDGARDO C.
LABELLA
Special Prosecutor
After trial the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Lauro G. Soriano, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as Principal in the
Information, for Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as
maximum; to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; to suffer loss of all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law; and, to pay costs.

Of the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) used in the entrapment operations, and which was fully recovered
from the accused, One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) shall be returned to private complainant Thomas N. Tan, and
the other half, to the National Bureau of Investigation, National Capital Region.

A motion to reconsider the decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan; hence the instant petition.

The petitioner has raised several legal questions plus one factual question. The latter is to the effect that the Sandiganbayan convicted
him on the weakness of his defense and not on the strength of the prosecution's evidence. This claim is not meritorious not only
because it is not for Us to review the factual findings of the court a quo but also because a reading of its decision shows that it explicitly
stated the facts establishing the guilt of the petitioner and the competence of the witnesses who testified against him.

As stated above, the principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as a "contract or
transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. On this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit.

The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

(a) ...

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any
other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein
the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

The petitioner states:

Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner's guilt, the facts make out a case of Direct Bribery defined and penalized
under the provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of
Rep. Act 3019, as amended.

The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all the offense of Direct Bribery, which is not
the offense charged and is not likewise included in or is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for
violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the accused is
a public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited, P2,000.00 of which was allegedly
received, the petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal complaint pending preliminary investigation
before him, which may or may not constitute a crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending before
petitioner was related to the exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that the offense
proved, if at all is Direct Bribery. (Petition, p. 5.)

Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:

A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term 'transaction' as used thereof is not limited in its
scope or meaning to a commercial or business transaction but includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial,
civil or administrative in nature, pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would have so
stated in the "Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it did not, perforce leaving no other interpretation than that
the expressed purpose and object is to embrace all kinds of transaction between the government and other party
wherein the public officer would intervene under the law. (Comment, p. 8.)

It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transactionbecause this term must be
construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in
credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.

In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec.
3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.

The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of
as constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which
has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be
informed.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is modified in that the petitioner is deemed guilty of bribery
as defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay a fine of Two Thousand
(P2,000.00) Pesos. The rest of the judgment is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De
la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 147333 August 12, 2004

ROSALIA* M. DUGAYON, petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Petitioner Rosalia Dugayon seeks the review of the Decision dated November 24, 2000 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
1

20344, convicting her and her co-accused, Jessie Callangan, of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
2

Corrupt Practices Act.

The following facts, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, are undisputed: 3

Sometime in July 1989, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Region 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, embarked on
a P239,460 project involving the procurement of 19 typewriters. A Procurement Board was formed, composed of Assistant Regional
4

Director Rosalia Dugayon as Chairman, Supply Officer Rogelio Hipolito and Carlito Catabay as authorized canvasser.

The Board prepared the Requisition for Equipment and Supplies (RES) for the 19 typewriters indicating their specifications. The RES
was submitted to Regional Director Consolacion Arafiles for signature and approval. Upon approval of the RES, petitioner Dugayon
released letters of canvass (similar to an invitation to bid) addressed to dealers in Tuguegarao and Manila. From four proposals, San
Sebastian Marketing, represented by Jessie Callangan, won the bid. When State Auditor Judy Singson, resident auditor of DSWD,
Region 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, learned about the opening of the bids, she sent a letter dated July 21, 1989 to Regional Director
Consolacion Arafiles about the deficiencies in the bidding. In her letter, Auditor Singson observed that the Auditor's Office was not
informed of the opening of the bids, in violation of Section 391 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual; that the Auditor was
5

not furnished with copies of bid invitations at least two weeks ahead of the opening date; that bidder's bonds were not imposed; and
that the bidders were not required to submit or present their License/Accreditation before the opening of the bid proposals. She
recommended that the bidding be cancelled and another one be conducted.

In a letter dated July 25, 1989, Director Arafiles responded that the opening of the bids was done in good faith.

Auditor Singson sent another letter dated July 28, 1989 advising Director Arafiles to require the winning bidder to post a performance
6

bond instead, to ensure the delivery of the equipment since it was already late to impose a bidder's bond.

Thereafter, the Procurement Board prepared the Purchase Order specifying the brands and specifications of the 19 typewriters to be
delivered and addressed to San Sebastian Marketing c/o Jessie Callangan.

San Sebastian made three partial deliveries on August 14, 16 and 21, 1989. Upon delivery, the Inspection and Acceptance Committee
headed by Supply Officer Rogelio Hipolito, inspected and tested the typewriters and certified in the Reports of Inspection that the
7

deliveries were in accordance with the specifications in the Purchase Order.

Subsequently, Supply Officer Hipolito prepared the voucher for payment attaching therein the supporting documents including the
Reports of Inspection dated August 14, 16 and 21, 1989. San Sebastian Marketing was paid with three checks in the amounts
of P92,880, P88,560 and P58,050, as evidenced by three official receipts, all dated August 24, 1989.

Upon post-audit, acting on the Inspection Report dated November 15, 1989 by Agapito Malaki, Technical Audit Specialist of the COA,
Regional Office No. 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed the vouchers/checks. The Inspection Report
stated, among others, that all the 19 typewriters were not brand new, but merely rebuilt and reconditioned.

In notices dated November 29, 1989, the COA informed petitioner Dugayon, Director Arafiles, Supply Officer Hipolito and San
Sebastian Marketing of the report.

The petitioner, Arafiles, Hipolito and Callangan were indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
before the Sandiganbayan. Quoted below is the Amended Information dated June 17, 1994:
That for the period July 25 to August 24, 1989 or immediately prior and subsequent thereto, in Tuguegarao, Cagayan and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, CONSOLACION ARAFILES, ROSALIA DUGAYON, ROGELIO D.
HIPOLITO and JESSEE CALLANGAN, Regional Director, Asst. Regional Director, Supply Officer III, all of
DECS and Supplier, respectively, the said public officers in the discharge of their duties as such, conspiring and confederating
8

with one another and with JESSEE CALLANGAN as supplier, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, with evident bad faith,
purchase, pay and accept nineteen (19) second-hand rebuilt and reconditioned typewriters from Jessee Callangan of San
Sebastian Marketing, contrary to the intention to purchase brand new units of typewriters only, for a total cost of P239,490.00,
when in truth and in fact, the total and actual cost of the said nineteen (19) units of second-hand, rebuilt and reconditioned
typewriters at the time of purchase was only P141,800.00 or a difference of P97,690.00 to the damage and prejudice of the
government.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 9

On July 6, 1994, the Sandiganbayan ordered the immediate arrest of the accused. Except for Hipolito, who remains at-large, all of the
accused were arrested and later released on bail.

After the trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed Decision on November 24, 2000, convicting petitioner and Callangan,
acquitting Arafiles and ordering the archiving of the case against Hipolito. The decretal portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, under the premises, this Court finds accused ROSALIA M. DUGAYON and JESSEE G. CALLANGAN
"GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, and are hereby
sentenced to suffer each an indeterminate prison term of Six (6) years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Nine (9) years and
One (1) day, as maximum; to indemnify the government jointly and severally, in the amount of Ninety-Seven Thousand Six
Hundred and Ninety Pesos (P97,690.00), with costs; and accused Dugayon to further suffer perpetual disqualification from
public office.

On the other hand, in view of the above findings, accused CONSOLACION D. ARAFILES, is hereby ACQUITTED of the
charge. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court of the Fifth Division of this Court is ordered to release Original Receipt No. 4193001
dated July 18, 1994, in the amount of P15,000.00 covering her cash bond, upon proper receipt therefor, subject to the usual
auditing and accounting procedures.

As far as accused ROGELIO D. HIPOLITO is concerned, who is still at-large up to this time, the case against him is hereby
ordered archived until the Court shall have obtained jurisdiction over his person. Correspondingly, let an alias warrant of arrest
be issued against him.

SO ORDERED. 10

The Sandiganbayan denied the respective motions for reconsideration of the petitioner and Callangan in its Resolution dated11

February 26, 2001. Callangan's petition for review on certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court in a resolution dated August 8, 2001
for his failure to file the same within the reglementary period.

Here, before us, petitioner Dugayon assigns to the Sandiganbayan the following errors:

(1) THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION) GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING AND DECLARING ON THE
EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY AMONG PETITIONER-APPELLANT ROSALIA M. DUGAYON, ACCUSED (AT-LARGE)
ROGELIO D. HIPOLITO, AND JESSEE CALLANGAN.

(2) THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION) IN CONVICTING PETITIONER-APPELLANT ROSALIA M.


DUGAYON, FOR THE OFFENSE CHARGED FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY
THE PROSECUTION ARE NOT SUFFICIENT AND ADEQUATE TO ESTABLISH HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. 12

In our view, the following issues must be resolved: (1) Was there a conspiracy to defraud the government? and (2) Is the evidence
sufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt?

On the first issue, petitioner avers that conspiracy is not presumed and that the elements of conspiracy, like the physical acts
constituting the crime itself, must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. She notes that the Sandiganbayan could only point to her having
signed the certification portion of the disbursement vouchers that states,

3. CERTIFIED: Expenses necessary, lawful and incurred under my direct supervision. Additional in case of contracts, or
purchases of goods or services prices reasonable and not in excess of the current rates in the locality.

(Sgd.) ROSALIA M. DUGAYON


ARD FOR Admin. 13

While she admits being the Chairman of the Procurement Board, she denies being a member of the Inspection and Acceptance
Committee. She argues that, as Assistant Regional Director of the DSWD, she relies entirely on the recommendations of her
subordinates, on the recommendation of the accountant with respect to the Purchase Order, and on the signatures and
recommendations of four subordinates who process the documents with respect to the disbursement vouchers. She likewise denies
she conspired with her co-accused. Petitioner submits that the elements of conspiracy were not established beyond reasonable doubt
and she should be acquitted. 14

On the issue of conspiracy, petitioner relies on Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan, which cited Arias v. Sandiganbayan, as precedent to prove
15 16

the high improbability of her conspiring with her co-accused. She quotes,
" [the Court] would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems–dishonest or negligent
subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence–is suddenly swept into a conspiracy
conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and
investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority.
(Underscoring ours.)

...

All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids,
purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations."

...

When, however, that infraction consists in the reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of office on a subordinate
upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear case of conspiracy, the Arias doctrinemust be held to prevail.

Respondent, on the other hand, insists that petitioner was evidently part of the conspiracy considering that she certified the
disbursement vouchers when she very well knew that the typewriters were not brand new. Respondent offers as basis People v.
Geronimo which cited People v. Carbonel, and quotes,
17 18

when the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another part so
as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent were in fact
concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments, the
court will be justified in concluding that said defendants were engaged in a conspiracy. . . .

Respondent notes that the Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner certified the disbursement vouchers; she chaired the Procurement
Board, and she signed the report of the Inspection and Acceptance Committee. On the whole, she had an extensive and active
participation in this transaction for which she cannot disclaim responsibility and liability. She could not have been unaware that the 19
typewriters were secondhand, rebuilt and reconditioned.

In the recent case of Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, we said,


19

Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in
express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a
conspiracy may be, and from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that
two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that
their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiments, then a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to
concert means is proved. Thus, the proof of conspiracy, which is essentially hatched under cover and out of view of others
than those directly concerned, is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only.

It is not correct for the petitioner to say that the Sandiganbayan could only point to her having signed and certified the disbursement
vouchers for her involvement in the conspiracy. Other circumstances point to a finding of conspiracy. Among them, she was the
Chairman of the Procurement Board and member/signatory of the Inspection and Acceptance Committee. Moreover, despite patent
and glaring defects in the typewriters which could be determined by a reasonable inspection of the units, petitioner signed the Reports
of Inspection that mentioned only that the delivered typewriters met the quantity ordered. The report was silent on the quality of the
typewriters. Yet, she hastily signed it, conveniently overlooking the deficiencies in the transaction.

Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Magsuci and Arias when she relied on the recommendations of her subordinates.
Petitioner is an Assistant Regional Director, not the head of office or the final approving authority on whom the Arias doctrine is
applicable. That is the reason why the Sandiganbayan acquitted Regional Director Arafiles, who was the head of office.

Moreover, petitioner's denial of her membership in the Inspection and Acceptance Committee is belied by the records of this case. The
records show she signed the Reports of Inspection as a member/signatory of the Acceptance Committee. In her testimony, she also
admitted inspecting the three deliveries and supervising three subordinates.
20 21

On the sufficiency of the evidence to prove petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of graft and corruption, Section 3(e) of Rep.
Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) is pertinent. It provides,

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

...

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The essential elements of this crime are: (1) the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) said
public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public position; (3) they
caused undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; (4) such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. 22
Recall that at the time of purchase of the typewriters, the petitioner was then the Assistant Regional Director of DSWD Region 2,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. She was Chairman of the Procurement Board and member/signatory of the Inspection and Acceptance
Committee. She accepted the secondhand typewriters, contrary to the requirement to buy brand new units, and allowed payment for
them at the price of brand new units. She admitted that the specification for the typewriters should be brand new. The Sandiganbayan
23

found the typewriters that were paid for were secondhand, rebuilt and reconditioned. These findings of fact are binding on us. We find
24

no reason to reject these findings as these were based on the Inspection Report of the COA.

Without hesitation we find that this transaction defrauded and caused injury to the government. The Sandiganbayan reported that
based on the Prices Comparison of Agency Purchase Price Against Re-canvassed Prices on Re-conditioned Items, the government
paid P239,490 for the deliveries or P97,690 more than the actual cost of P141,800 of the rebuilt/reconditioned typewriters, giving
unwarranted benefits to San Sebastian Marketing and Jessie Callangan. The amount of P97,690 represents the actual damage
suffered by the government in this anomalous transaction.

In our view, petitioner not only failed in her duty as Chairman of the Procurement Board and member/signatory of the Inspection and
Acceptance Committee, she also clearly acted with evident bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It
imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious wrongdoing. It partakes the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state
of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive, self-interest or ill will, or for ulterior purposes. Verily, petitioner
25

must answer for her acts and omissions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated November 24, 2000 of the Sandiganbayan is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Also referred to as "Rosalinda" in other parts of the records.

1
Rollo, pp. 25-53.

2
Also spelled as Jesie or Jessee in other parts of the records.

3
Rollo, pp. 42-44.

4
As cited by the Sandiganbayan in its Decision. Based on Exhibit "F," the amount should be P239,490.

5
As cited in the letter (Exhibit C). Proper reference should have been to Section 436 which provides,

Sec. 436. Examination of bids.-A representative of the COA Chairman shall be present at the opening of all bids
and quotations in all cases of competitive public bidding conducted by the national, provincial, city or municipal
governments. His duties shall be confined strictly to: (a) secure and identify such papers and samples of the materials
submitted by the bidders to ensure the proper safeguard of the interests of the government; and (b) obtain an
authenticated copy of the abstract of bids and quotations (COA Cir. 78-87, Sept. 6, 1978).

Employees of the Commission on Audit shall not participate in any of the following functions:

a. Canvassing the market for quotations

b. Issuing invitations to bid

c. Examining bids before making the award

d. Awarding the contract

e. Any functions relating to the securing of bids or awarding of contracts, except only as provided in Sections
46 and 47 of Book V, Title I-B, of the 1987 Administrative Code.

However, the Commission on Audit shall examine an agency's files of bids and awards of contracts and orders, either
in full or on a selective basis, as circumstances require. These examinations shall be made to determine that the
agency's procedures are fundamentally sound, properly implemented, and the acquisition of supplies, materials,
equipment and services is at the most advantageous prices and in a regular and businesslike manner.

The agency head shall arrange for the conduct of reviews with similar objectives. A report shall be required for each
review made, and the original signed report shall be held available for inspection by the Commission on Audit on
demand (Gen. Cirs. 45 and 83, Memo Cirs. 322 & 324).

6
Referred to as "Pagulayan" in the decision of the Sandiganbayan but based on Exhibits D and D-1, Auditor Singson signed
this letter. For clarity, instead of referring to "Pagulayan" the same is changed to "Auditor Singson."
Also referred to as "Inspection Report" in some parts of the records. Rephrased "Reports of Inspection" (based on the titles of
7

Exhibits K, K-4, K-8) and to distinguish the same from the Inspection Report of the COA.

8
The Sandiganbayan observed that the amended information inadvertently alleged that the accused public officers were all
from "DECS"; that such allegation is inaccurate considering that all of them were from "DSWD" as contained in the original
information and from the testimonies of witnesses; and that such inaccuracy is clearly a typographical error. See Rollo, p. 51.

9
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 21-22.

10
Rollo, p. 52.

11
Id. at 54-55.

12
Id. at 14.

13
Exhibit "F," Folder of Exhibits for the Plaintiff.

14
Rollo, pp. 15-21.

15
G.R. No. 101545, 3 January 1995, 240 SCRA 13, 18-19.

16
G.R. No. 81563, 19 December 1989, 180 SCRA 309, 315-316.

17
No. L-35700, 15 October 1973, 53 SCRA 246, 254.

18
No. 24177, 15 March 1926, 48 Phil. 868, 876.

19
G.R. Nos. 98494-98692, 17 July 2003, 406 SCRA 311, 374-375.

20
TSN, 13 August 1998, p. 25.

21
Id. at 25-27; Rollo, p. 49.

22
Supra, note 19 at 343-344.

23
TSN, 13 August 1998, pp. 21-22.

24
Supra, note 19 at 353.

25
Id. at 344.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,


vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast
powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality
beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social
interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is
justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is
self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity
and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective
wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new
formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process,
the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein
irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous
attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against
State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses
1 2

that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to
subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness;
(b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par.
(d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary
benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public office concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees
and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall
declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks
derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).

On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim.
Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of
Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case
No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal
Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).

On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with
respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the
offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents
necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges
and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness
and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.

On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for
the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did
not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended
Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to
Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.

As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition
for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA
7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.

Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a
legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule
3

whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for
constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and
powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate
branch - the legislature.

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious
of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune
with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the
law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the
provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.

In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
4

constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the
presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the
law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive
commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.

Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must
demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be
no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to
sustain." And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of
5

constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to
determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or
forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;

2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or
criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits
from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any
of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural,
industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines; and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least
₱50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render
them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending
one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be
understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten
wealth of at least ₱50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.

In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements
of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:

"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,'
together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder,
defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR Aseries of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES
OR MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF
FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (₱545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE
FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (₱130,000,000.00),
more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (₱200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong'
Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES
& JANE DOES; (italic supplied).

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System
(SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (₱744,612,450.00),
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,847,578,057.50); AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN
THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱189,700,000.00)
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-
PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM
OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER
HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of
the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key
phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These
omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.

The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use.
6

Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute
will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered
from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. The
7 8

intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a
manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the
words "combination" and "series:"

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as
to obscure individual characters.

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the
legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR
CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are
two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of
the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.

REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -

REP. GARCIA: Two.

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.

REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?

REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.

REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same
act.

REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.

REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

REP. GARCIA: A series.

REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di
ba?

REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is
only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x

REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....

SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?"

REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.

REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....

REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.

REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

SEN. TANADA: Two different.

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...

REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...

DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989

SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result in such a big
amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy
COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.

SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....

SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.

SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts of plunder"
there should be, at least, two or more.

SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of
assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).

On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec.
1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would
have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.

As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec.
9

1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a
common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must
either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful
scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods
used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.
Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been
formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can
only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving
clause or by construction.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But 10

the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a
standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The
first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such
activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this
11

case.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning
as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the
12

"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit
in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the
details in advance as in all other statutes.

Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court
that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
13

unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." 14

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself
as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in
15

permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of
16 17

facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and,
again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to
be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
18

applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others." 19

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in
free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
20

Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that
21

this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not
before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of
22

the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S.
23

Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris 24

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute
is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the
impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line
analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly
and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which
25 26

are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. 27

In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at
length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the
statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed
in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched
presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is
all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon
by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal
implications and sound constitutional anchorage.

The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed
28

to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no
reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Actfor being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that
the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or
administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient
notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit:
(a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c)
giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three
(3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.

In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence"
merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of
all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.

The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third
International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice,
C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).

The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public
officer in:

x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as
amended).

It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified,
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case,
petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires
only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the
accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds
in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The use of the
29

"reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal
law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent
men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence
that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost
certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to
the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo
30

Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating -

DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990

MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work
against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than ₱100 million, but the totality of
the crime committed is ₱100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the
things taken by the robber in the information – three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable
doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond
earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.

MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I
feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only
₱50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate ₱1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as
required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?

MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that
element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is ₱100 million. Now, in
a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be ₱110 or ₱120 million, but there are
certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the
amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is ₱100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring
supplied).

It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of
plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute
the crime.

The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the
import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least ₱50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove
each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an
Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50)
raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at
least ₱50,000,000.00. 31

A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated
otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1,
par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense.
There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of

overt or criminal acts to stash ₱50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten
wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows
with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.

Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the
crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that
without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule
of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?

ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section
4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder
Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts
charged constituting plunder?

ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive
element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do
not have to go that far by applying Section 4?

ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be
avoided by the prosecution. 32

We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its
definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4
is clear and unequivocal:

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x

It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural
measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy.
It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had,
for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and
vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in
the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080
provides for a separability clause -

Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid,
the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
thereby.

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its
provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated
independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.

As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.
Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus
alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void,
petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:

SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual
criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder. 33

However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . . 34

Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and
every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however,
the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.

Indeed, §2 provides that -

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law
indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his
criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as
principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit,
but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 35

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the
decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes
are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray: 36

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously
taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as
a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of
the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses
involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted
on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive
arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme
of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the
population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and
syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or
misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of
the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery,
destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators
must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a
37

special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say
however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People
v. Echegaray to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands
38

as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very
foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative
to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is
the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread
like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living
testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other
venalities in public office.

These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of
interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a
virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by
responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of
ferment.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr. C.J., Melo, Quisumbing, JJ., join concurring opinion of J. Mendoza.
Puno, Vitug, JJ., concurred and joins J. Mendoza's concurring opinion.
Kapunan, Pardo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Ynares-Santiago, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., please see concurring opinion.
Panganiban J., please see separate concurring opinion.
Carpio, J., no part. Was one of the complainants before Ombudsman.

Footnotes
1
Approved 12 July 1991 and took effect 8 October 1991.

2
Approved 13 December 1993 and took effect 31 December 1993.

3
Lim v. Pacquing, et al., G.R. No. 115044, 27 January 1995, 240 SCRA 644.

4
G.R. No. 87001, 4 December 1989, 179 SCRA 828.

5
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 414 (1925).

6
82 C.J.S. 68, p. 113; People v. Ring, 70 P.2d 281, 26 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 768.

7
Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104988, 18 June 1996, 257 SCRA 430, 448.

8
PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., Inc., G.R. No. 943774, 27 August 1992, 213 SCRA 16, 26.

9
Resolution of 9 July 2001.

10
See People v. Nazario, No. L-44143, 31 August 1988, 165 SCRA 186, 195-196.

11
Ibid.

12
State v. Hill, 189 Kan 403, 369 P2d 365, 91 ALR2d 750.

Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L. Ed. 328 (1926) cited in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
13

Ass'n. v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849, 867 (1967).

14
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 12, 2 L. Ed 325, 338 (1958); Shelton v. Tucker 364 U.S. 479, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1960).

15
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408, 413 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 95 L. Ed 2d 697, 707 (1987); see also People v. De la Piedra, G.R. No. 121777,
16

24 January 2001.

17
413 U.S. 601, 612-613, 37 L. Ed 2d 830, 840-841 (1973).

18
United States v. Salerno, supra.

19
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 369 (1982).

United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524, 529 (1960). The paradigmatic case is Yazoo & Mississippi Valley
20

RR. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 57 L. Ed. 193 (1912).

21
G. Gunther & K. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 1299 (2001).

Id. at 1328. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As Applied and Facial Challenges, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321 (2000) arguing that, in
22

an important sense, as applied challenges are the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication and that determinations
that statutes are facially invalid properly occur only as logical outgrowths of ruling on whether statutes may be applied to
particular litigants on particular facts.

Constitution, Art. VIII, §1 and 5. Compare Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936); "[T]he power of judicial
23

review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to be constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities."

401 U.S. 37, 52-53, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669, 680 (1971). Accord, United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1960);
24

Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 106 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1989).

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 613, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 841; National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580
25

(1998).

FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 223, 107 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990); Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
26

Resources, G.R. No. 135385, 6 December 2000 (Mendoza, J., Separate Opinion).

27
United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 9 L. Ed. 2d 561, 565-6 (1963).

28
G.R. No. 57841, 30 July 1982, 115 SCRA 793.

29
People v. Ganguso, G.R. No. 115430, 23 November 1995, 250 SCRA 268, 274-275.

30
People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 94187, 4 November 1992, 215 SCRA 349, 360.
Then Senate President Jovito R. Salonga construed in brief the provision, thuswise: "If there are let’s say 150 crimes all in all,
31

criminal acts, whether bribery, misappropriation, malversation, extortion, you need not prove all those beyond reasonable
doubt. If you can prove by pattern, let’s say 10, but each must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, you do not have to prove
150 crimes. That’s the meaning of this (Deliberations of Committee on Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Laws, 15
November 1988, cited in the Sandiganbayan Resolution of 9 July 2001).

32
TSN, 18 September 2001, pp. 115-121.

33
4 Record of the Senate 1316, 5 June 1989.

34
Ibid.

35
Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339, 73 L.Ed. 722, 728 (1929).

36
267 SCRA 682, 721-2 (1997) (emphasis added).

37
Black's Law Dictionary 959 (1990); Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 324, 338 (1986).

38
G.R. No. 117472, 7 February 1997, 267 SCRA 682.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:

The primary duty of the Court is to render justice. The resolution of the issues brought before it must be grounded on law, justice and
the basic tenets of due process, unswayed by the passions of the day or the clamor of the multitudes, guided only by its members’
honest conscience, clean hearts and their unsullied conviction to do what is right under the law.

The issues posed by the instant petition are quite difficult. The task of the Court to resolve the same is made more daunting because
the case involves a former President of the Republic who, in the eyes of certain sectors of society, deserves to be punished. But the
mandate of the Court is to decide these issues solely on the basis of law and due process, and regardless of the personalities involved.
For indeed, the rule of law and the right to due process are immutable principles that should apply to all, even to those we hate. As Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a noted constitutionalist, aptly puts it--

x x x the greater disaster would be if the Supreme Court should heed the clamor for conviction and convict Estrada even under an
unconstitutional law but of the belief that Estrada deserves to be punished. That would be tantamount to a rule of men and not of law. 1

The Basic Facts

The petition before us questions the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7080 (R.A. No. 7080 or Plunder Law), as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659,2 entitled "An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder." 3 This original petition for certiorari and
prohibition against Respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan filed by petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada assails Respondent
court’s Resolution, dated July 9, 2001, denying his Motion to Quash the information against him in Criminal Case No. 26558 for
Plunder. Petitioner likewise prays that the Sandiganbayan be prohibited and enjoined from proceeding with his arraignment and trial in
Criminal Case No. 26558 due to the unconstitutionality of R. A. No. 7080.

On the heels of the finality of the joint decision of this Court in G.R. No. 146710 (Estrada vs. Desierto, et al.) and in G.R. No. 146738
(Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo), promulgated on April 3, 2001, upholding the constitutionality of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s
assumption of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines and declaring that the former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada no
longer enjoyed immunity from suit, the Ombudsman filed eight (8) Informations against Estrada. These cases were Criminal Case No.
26558 (for Plunder); Criminal Case No. 26559 (for Violation of Sec. 3[a] of Republic Act No. 3019); Criminal Case No. 26560 (for
Violation of Sec. 3[a] of R.A. No. 3019); Criminal Case No. 26561 (for Violation of Sec. 3[e] of R.A. 3019); Criminal Case No. 26562 (for
Violation of Sec. 3[e] of R.A. No. 3019); Criminal Case No. 26563 (for Violation of Sec. 7[d] of R.A. No. 6713); Criminal Case No. 26564
(for Perjury); and Criminal Case No. 26565 (for Illegal Use of Alias).

The aforementioned informations were raffled to the five divisions of the Sandiganbayan. Criminal Case No. 26558 was raffled to the
Third Division of said court. The amended information against petitioner charging violations of Section 2, in relation to Section (d) (1) (2)
of the statute reads:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, by himself and in conspiracy with his co-accused, business associates and persons heretofore named, by
taking advantage of his official position, authority, connection or influence as President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth, and unjustly enrich himself in the aggregate
amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, through a combination and series of overt and criminal acts, described as follows:
(a) by receiving, collecting, directly or indirectly, on many instances, so-called "jueteng money" from gambling operators in
connivance with co-accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and Edward Serapio, as witnessed by Gov. Luis
‘Chavit’ Singson, among other witnesses, in the aggregate amount of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000.000.00), more or less, in consideration of their protection from arrest or interference by law enforcers in their illegal
"jueteng" activities; and

(b) by misappropriating, converting and misusing for his gain and benefit public fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos
(P170,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, in conspiracy with
co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, as witnessed by Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, among other witnesses; and

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System
(SSS) to purchase and buy a combined total of 681,733,000 shares of stock of the Belle Corporation in the aggregate gross
value of One Billion Eight Hundred Forty-Seven Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Pesos and Fifty
Centavos(P1,847,578,057.50), for the purpose of collecting for his personal gain and benefit, as in fact he did collect and
receive the sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS
(P189,700,000.00) as commission for said stock purchase; and

(d) by unjustly enriching himself in the amount of THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(P3,233,104,173.17) comprising his unexplained wealth acquired, accumulated and amassed by him under his account name
"Jose Velarde" with Equitable PCI Bank:

to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

On April 16 and 17, 2001, the Ombudsman filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation to Withdraw Information in Criminal Case Nos. 26559,
26560, 26561, 26562 and 26563. Petitioner registered his objection to the Ombudsman’s motion to withdraw. The divisions of the
Sandiganbayan to which said cases were assigned granted the withdrawal of the informations, save for that in Criminal Case No.
26561. At present, the Order of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan denying the Ombudsman’s motion to withdraw in Criminal Case
No. 26561 is still under reconsideration.

In Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner filed on April 11, 2001 an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Office of the
Ombudsman for: (1) the conduct of a preliminary investigation as regards specification "d" of the accusations in the information in said
case; and (2) reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses in specifications "a," "b" and "c" to enable petitioner to file his counter-
affidavits as well as other necessary documents.

On April 25, 2001, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding that:

(p)robable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants of arrest of accused former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe
a.k.a Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramon Tan or Mr. Uy and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas.

Subsequently, on May 31, 2001, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s Omnibus Motion.

On June 15, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution but the same was denied in a Resolution of June 25,
2001.

Meanwhile, on June 14, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the information in Criminal Case No. 26558, invoking the following
grounds: (1) the facts charged do not constitute an indictable offense as R.A. No. 7080, the statute on which it is based, is
unconstitutional; and (2) the information charges more than one offense.

The People of the Philippines filed an Opposition thereto on June 21, 2001. Petitioner filed his Reply to the Opposition on June 28,
2001.

On July 9, 2001, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash.

Petitioner thus filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, claiming that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying his motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 26558. Petitioner argues that R.A. No. 7080 is
unconstitutional on the following grounds:

I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS

II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM

III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY
LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER

IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT THE REASONABLE DOUBT
STANDARD AND TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN MALA IN SECRIMES BY CONVERTING THESE
TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.5

The provisions of law involved


Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 provides:

Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives
by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at
least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and
all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the
deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. (As amended by Sec. 12, RA No. 7659.)

Section 1(d) of the same law defines "ill-gotten wealth" as "any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2)" hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates, and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit
from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer concerned;

3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.6

On the other hand, Section 4 states:

Rule of Evidence - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

Petitioner’s theory

Petitioner asserts that R.A. No. 7080 is vague and overbroad on its face, and suffers from structural deficiency and ambiguity.7 In sum,
he maintains that the law does not afford an ordinary person reasonable notice that his actuation will constitute a criminal offense. More
particularly, petitioner argues that the terms "combination" and "series" are not clearly defined, citing that in a number of cases, the
United States (U.S.) federal courts in deciding cases under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO law), after
which the Plunder Law was patterned, have given different interpretations to "series of acts or transactions." 8 In addition, he terms "raid
on the public treasury," "receiving or accepting a gift," "commission," "kickbacks," "illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of
assets," "monopolies or other combinations," "special interests," "taking undue advantage of official position," "unjustly enrich" all suffer
from overbreadth which is a form of vagueness.9

In arguing that the law on plunder is vague and impermissibly broad, petitioner points out that the terms "combination" and ‘series" used
in the phrase "any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes" are not defined under the statute. The use of these
terms in the law allegedly raises several questions as to their meaning and import.

Petitioner posits the following queries: "Does it (referring to the term "series") mean two, three, four, of the overt or criminal acts listed in
Section 1(d)? Would it mean two or more related enterprises falling under at least two of the means or ‘similar schemes’ listed in
the law, or just a joint criminal enterprise? Would it require substantial identity of facts and participants, or merely a common
pattern of action? Would it imply close connection between acts, or a direct relationship between the charges? Does the term mean
a factual relationship between acts or merely a common plan among conspirators?"10

The term "combination" is allegedly equally equivocal. According to petitioner, it is not clear from the law if said term covers time, place,
manner of commission, or the principal characters. Thus petitioner asks: "Does it (referring to the term "combination") include any two
or more acts, whether legal or illegal, or does the law require that the combination must include at least two of the ‘means or similar
schemes’ laid down in R.A. 7080? Does it cover transactions that have occurred in the same place or area, or in different places, no
matter how far apart? Does ‘combination’ include any two or more overt acts, no matter how far apart in time, or does it contemplate
acts committed within a short period of time? Does the ‘combination’ cover the modus operandi of the crimes, or merely the
evidence to be used at the trial?"11

It is also argued that the phrase "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy" adds to the vagueness
of the law because "pattern" is not defined therein and is not included in the definition of the crime of plunder even though it is an
essential element of said crime.12

Petitioner also maintains that the Plunder Law violates the due process clause and the constitutional presumption of innocence by
lowering the quantum of evidence necessary for proving the component elements of plunder because Section 4 does not require that
each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy be proved, "it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy." 13
Finally, petitioner alleges that it is beyond the power of Congress to delimit the reasonable doubt standard and to abolish the element
of mens rea in mala in se crimes by converting these to mala prohibita, thereby making it easier for the prosecution to prove
malversation, bribery, estafa and other crimes committed by public officers since criminal intent need not be established. 14

Considering the infringement to the constitutionally-guaranteed right to due process of an accused, petitioner contends that R.A. No.
7080 cannot be accorded any presumption of constitutional validity.

Respondents’ theory

On the other hand, Respondents argue that the "particular elements constituting the crime of plunder" are stated with "definiteness and
certainty," as follows:

(1) There is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;

(2) There is an amassing, accumulating or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth;

(3) The total amount of ill-gotten wealth so amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00);
and

(4) The ill-gotten wealth, which is defined as any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person
within the purview of Section Two (2) of R.A. No. 7080, was acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates, and/or business associates by any combination or series of the means or similar schemes enumerated
in Section 1(d).15

Moreover, Respondents maintain that assuming that there is some vagueness in the law, it need not be declared unconstitutional but
may be clarified by judicial construction.16 Respondents further add that the ordinary import of the terms combination" and "series"
should prevail, as can be gleaned from the deliberations of the Congress in the course of its passage of the law. According to
respondents, "series of overt criminal acts" simply mean a repetition of at least two of any of those enumerated acts found in Section
1(d) of R.A. 7080. And "combination" means a product of combining of at least one of any of those enumerated acts described in
Section 1(d) with at least one of any of the other acts so enumerated. Respondents score petitioner for arguing on the basis of federal
courts’ decisions on the RICO law, citing that the U.S. courts have consistently rejected the contention that said law is void for being
vague.17

Respondents deny that the Plunder Law dispenses with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. While there may be no
necessity to prove each and every other act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme to acquire ill-gotten wealth, it is still
necessary for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or
conspiracy, as well as all the other elements of the offense of plunder. 18 Respondents also point out that conspiracy itself is not
punishable under the Plunder Law, which deals with conspiracy as a means of incurring criminal liability. 19

Respondents likewise contend that it is within the inherent powers and wisdom of the legislature to determine which acts are mala
prohibita in the same way that it can declare punishable an act which is inherently not criminal in nature. 20

In conclusion, Respondents assert that petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080.

Petitioner’s Reply

Petitioner, in his Reply to Comment, draws attention to Section 4, arguing that the provision states the "most important element, which
is the common thread that ties the component acts together: "a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy21 and raises the following questions:

(a) Reference is made to a "pattern of overt or criminal acts." The disjunctive "or" is used. Will a pattern of acts, which
are overt but not criminal in themselves, be indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy?

(b) Under what specific facts or circumstances will a "pattern" be "indicative" of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy?

(c) Under what specific facts or circumstances will the required "pattern" or "scheme" even be said to be present or to exist?

(d) When is there an "unlawful scheme or conspiracy?"22

Issues raised in the oral arguments

Oral arguments were heard on September 18, 2001. At said hearing, the Court defined the issues for resolution as follows:

1.) WHETHER R.A. NO. 7080 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VAGUE;

2) WHETHER R.A. NO. 7080 REQUIRES LESS EVIDENCE FOR PROVING THE PREDICATE CRIMES OF PLUNDER AND
THEREFORE VIOLATES THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS; and

3) WHETHER PLUNDER AS DEFINED IN R.A. NO. 7080 IS A MALUM PROHIBITUM AND IF SO, WHETHER IT IS WITHIN
THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO SO CLASSIFY THE SAME.23

Thereafter, both parties filed their respective memoranda in which they discussed the points which they raised in their earlier pleadings
and during the hearing.
I believe that there is merit in the petition.

A penal statute which violates constitutional


guarantees of individual rights is void.

Every law enacted by Congress enjoys a presumption of constitutionality, 24 and the presumption prevails in the absence of contrary
evidence.25 A criminal statute is generally valid if it does not violate constitutional guarantees of individual rights. 26 Conversely, when a
constitutionally protected right of an individual is in danger of being trampled upon by a criminal statute, such law must be
struck down for being void.27

One of the fundamental requirements imposed by the Constitution upon criminal statutes is that pertaining to clarity and definiteness.
Statutes, particularly penal laws, that fall short of this requirement have been declared unconstitutional for being vague. This "void-for-
vagueness" doctrine is rooted in the basic concept of fairness as well as the due process clause of the Constitution.

The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process 28 as well as the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.29 A criminal statute should not be so vague and uncertain that "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. 30

There are three distinct considerations for the vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is designed to ensure that individuals are properly
warned ex ante of the criminal consequences of their conduct. This "fair notice" rationale was articulated in United States v. Harriss:31

The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed. 32

Second, and viewed as more important, the doctrine is intended to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement. 33 Vague
laws are invariably "standardless" and as such, they afford too great an opportunity for criminal enforcement to be left to the unfettered
discretion of police officers and prosecutors.34 Third, vague laws fail to provide sufficient guidance to judges who are charged with
interpreting statutes. Where a statute is too vague to provide sufficient guidance, the judiciary is arguably placed in the position of
usurping the proper function of the legislature by "making the law" rather than interpreting it.35

While the dictum that laws be clear and definite does not require Congress to spell out with mathematical certainty the standards to
which an individual must conform his conduct, 36 it is necessary that statutes provide reasonable standards to guide prospective
conduct.37 And where a statute imposes criminal sanctions, the standard of certainty is higher. 38 The penalty imposable on the
person found guilty of violating R.A. No. 7080 is reclusion perpetua to death.39 Given such penalty, the standard of clarity and
definiteness required of R.A. No. 7080 is unarguably higher than that of other laws.40

Void-for-vagueness doctrine
applies to criminal laws.

A view has been proffered that "vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are not applicable to penal laws." 41 These two concepts, while
related, are distinct from each other.42 On one hand, the doctrine of overbreadth applies generally to statutes that infringe upon freedom
of speech.43 On the other hand, the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine applies to criminal laws, not merely those that regulate speech or
other fundamental constitutional rights.44 The fact that a particular criminal statute does not infringe upon free speech does not mean
that a facial challenge to the statute on vagueness grounds cannot succeed. 45

As earlier intimated, the "vagueness doctrine" is anchored on the constitutionally-enshrined right to due process of law. Thus, as in this
case that the "life, liberty and property" of petitioner is involved, the Court should not hesitate to look into whether a criminal statute has
sufficiently complied with the elementary requirements of definiteness and clarity. It is an erroneous argument that the Court cannot
apply the vagueness doctrine to penal laws. Such stance is tantamount to saying that no criminal law can be challenged however
repugnant it is to the constitutional right to due process.

While admittedly, penal statutes are worded in reasonably general terms to accomplish the legislature’s objective of protecting the
public from socially harmful conduct, this should not prevent a vagueness challenge in cases where a penal statute is so indeterminate
as to cause the average person to guess at its meaning and application. For if a statute infringing upon freedom of speech may be
challenged for being vague because such right is considered as fundamental, with more reason should a vagueness challenge with
respect to a penal statute be allowed since the latter involve deprivation of liberty, and even of life which, inarguably, are rights as
important as, if not more than, free speech.

It has been incorrectly suggested46 that petitioner cannot mount a "facial challenge" to the Plunder Law, and that "facial" or "on its face"
challenges seek the total invalidation of a statute. 47 Citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma,48 it is also opined that "claims of facial overbreadth
have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and that "overbreadth
claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct." For this reason, it is argued further that "on its face invalidation of statutes has been described as ‘manifestly strong
medicine,’ to be employed ‘sparingly and only as a last resort.’" A reading of Broadrick, however, shows that the doctrine involved
therein was the doctrine of overbreadth. Its application to the present case is thus doubtful considering that the thrust at hand is to
determine whether the Plunder Law can survive the vagueness challenge mounted by petitioner. A noted authority on constitutional
law, Professor Lockhart, explained that "the Court will resolve them (vagueness challenges) in ways different from the approaches it
has fashioned in the law of overbreadth." 49 Thus, in at least two cases,50 the U.S. courts allowed the facial challenges to vague criminal
statutes even if these did not implicate free speech

In Kolender v. Lawson,51 petitioners assailed the constitutionality of a California criminal statute which required persons who loiter or
wander on the streets to provide a credible and reasonable identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace
officer under circumstances that would justify a valid stop. The U.S. Supreme Court held that said statute was unconstitutionally vague
on its face within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by
failing to clarify what is contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a "credible and reasonable identification." Springfield
vs. Oklahoma52 on the other hand involved a challenge to a Columbus city ordinance banning certain assault weapons. The court
therein stated that a criminal statute may be facially invalid even if it has some conceivable application. It went on to rule that the
assailed ordinance’s definition of "assault weapon" was unconstitutionally vague, because it was "fundamentally irrational and
impossible to apply consistently by the buying public, the sportsman, the law enforcement officer, the prosecutor or the judge."53

It is incorrect to state that petitioner has made "little effort to show the alleged invalidity of the statute as applied to him, as he allegedly
"attacks ‘on their face’ not only §§ 1(d)(1) and (2) of R.A. 7080 under which he is charged, but also its other provisions which deal with
plunder committed by illegal or fraudulent disposition of government assets (§1(d)(3)), acquisition of interest in business (§1(d)(4)), and
establishment of monopolies and combinations or implementation of decrees intended to benefit particular persons or special interests
(§ 1(d)(5))."54 Notably, much of petitioner’s arguments dealt with the vagueness of the key phrases "combination or series" and "pattern
of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" which go into the very nature of the crime for which he
is charged.

Taking into consideration that the Plunder Law is a penal statute that imposes the supreme penalty of death, and that petitioner in this
case clearly has standing to question its validity inasmuch as he has been charged thereunder and that he has been for sometime now
painfully deprived of his liberty, it behooves this Court to address the challenge on the validity of R.A. No. 7080.

Men steeped in law find


difficulty in understanding plunder.

The basic question that arises, therefore, is whether the clauses in Section 2--

combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof

and Section 1(d), which provides--

x x x by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

xxx

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves
at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

as qualified by Section 4 which also speaks of the "scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth" and of
"a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy," are clear enough that a person "of
common intelligence" need not guess at their meaning and differ as to their application.

The above raise several difficult questions of meaning which go to the very essence of the offense, such as:

a. How many acts would constitute a "combination or series?"

b. Must the acts alleged to constitute the "combination or series" be similar in nature? Note that Section 1(d) speaks of "similar
schemes" while Section 4 speaks of "the scheme" and of "a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy."

c. Must the "combination or series" of "overt or criminal acts" involving the aggregate amount of at least P50 million be
conceived as such a scheme or a "pattern of overt or criminal acts" from inception by the accused?

d. What would constitute a "pattern"? What linkage must there be between and among the acts to constitute a "pattern"? Need
there be a linkage as to the persons who conspire with one another, and a linkage as to all the acts between and among
them?

e. When Section 4 speaks of "indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy," would this mean that the "scheme" or
"conspiracy" should have been conceived or decided upon in its entirety, and by all of the participants?

f. When committed in connivance "with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons" or through "dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates", would
such fact be part of the "pattern of overt or criminal acts" and of the "overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" such that all of
those who are alleged to have participated in the crime of plunder must have participated in each and every act allegedly
constituting the crime of plunder? And as in conspiracy, conspired together from inception to commit the offense?

g. Within what time frame must the acts be committed so as to constitute a "combination or series"?

I respectfully disagree with the majority that "ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters" are provided in the law55 to resolve
these basic questions.

Even men steeped in the knowledge of the law are in a quandary as to what constitutes plunder. The Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, Justice Francis Garchitorena, admitted that the justices of said court "have been quarrelling with each other in
finding ways to determine what [they] understand by plunder."56 Senator Neptali Gonzales also noted during the deliberations of
Senate Bill No. 733 that the definition of plunder under the law is vague. He bluntly declared: "I am afraid that it might be faulted for
being violative of the due process clause and the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation of an accused.57 Fr.
Bernas, for his part, pointed to several problematical portions of the law that were left unclarified. He posed the question: "How can you
have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?"58
The meanings of "combination" and "series"
as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not clear.

Although the law has no statutory definition of "combination" or "series", the majority is of the view that resort can be had to the ordinary
meaning of these terms. Thus, Webster's Third New International Dictionary gives the meaning of "combination": "the result or product
or product of combining: a union or aggregate made of combining one thing with another." 59

In the context of R.A. No. 7080, "combination" as suggested by the Solicitor General means that at least two of the enumerated acts
found in Section 1(d), i.e., one of any of the enumerated acts, combined with another act falling under any other of the enumerated
means may constitute the crime of plunder. With respect to the term "series," the majority states that it has been understood as
pertaining to "two or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category" 60 as gleaned from the deliberations on the law in the
House of Representatives and the Senate.

Further, the import of "combination" or "series" can be ascertained, the majority insists, 61 from the following deliberations in the
Bicameral Conference Committee on May 7, 1991:

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say, THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR
CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are
two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of
the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yeah, because we say series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yeah, we include series.

REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.

THE CHAIRMAN: (REP. GARCIA): Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that-

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Two.

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.

THE CHAIRMAN: (REP. GARCIA): No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes. Combination is not twice—but combination, two acts.

REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean two different acts. It can not be a repetition of the same
act.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): That be referred to series. Yeah.

REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): A series.

REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. It’s a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, ‘di
ba?

THE CHAIRMAN: (REP. GARCIA): Yes, This distinguishes it, really, from the ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good
suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. So…

HON. ISIDRO: I know what you are talking about. For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public
funds who raids the public treasury, now, for example, misappropriation, if there are a series of misappropriations?

xxx

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Series. One after the other eh di…

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN TAÑADA): So that would fall under term "series"?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Series, oo.

REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is combination, ano, two misappropriations…

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): It’s not… two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When you say "combination", two different?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA): Two different.

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): For example, ha…

REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition…62

The following deliberations in the Senate are pointed to by the majority 63 to show that the words "combination" and "series" are given
their ordinary meaning:

Senator Maceda. In line of our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result in such a big amount,
on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or". To read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by
criminal acts such as". Remove the idea of necessitating "a series". Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.

Senator Tañada. That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.

The President. Probably, two or more would be….

Senator Maceda. Yes, because ‘a series’ implies several or many’ two or more.

Senator Tañada. Accepted, Mr. President.

xxx

The President. If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say ‘acts of plunder’ there
should be, at least, two or more.

Senator Romulo. In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President. 64

To my mind, resort to the dictionary meaning of the terms "combination" and "series" as well as recourse to the deliberations of the
lawmakers only serve to prove that R.A. No. 7080 failed to satisfy the strict requirements of the Constitution on clarity and definiteness.
Note that the key element to the crime of plunder is that the public officer, by himself or in conspiracy with others, amasses,
accumulates, or acquires "ill-gotten wealth" through a "combination or series of overt or criminal acts" as described in Section 1(d) of
the law. Senator Gonzales, during the deliberations in the Senate, already raised serious concern over the lack of a statutory definition
of what constitutes "combination" or "series", consequently, expressing his fears that Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 might be violative of
due process:

Senator Gonzales. To commit the offense of plunder, as defined in this Act and while constituting a single offense, it must consist of a
series of overt or criminal acts, such as bribery, extortion, malversation of public funds, swindling, illegal exaction, and graft or corrupt
practices act and like offenses. Now, Mr. President, I think, this provision, by itself will be vague. I am afraid that it might be faulted for
being violative of the due process clause and the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation of an accused. Because,
what is meant by "series of overt or criminal acts"? I mean, would 2, 3, 4 or 5 constitute a series? During the period of amendments,
can we establish a minimum of overt acts like, for example, robbery in band? The law defines what is robbery in band by the number of
participants therein. In this particular case probably, we can statutorily provide for the definition of "series" so that two, for example,
would that be already a series? Or, three, what would be the basis for such determination? 65(Emphasis supplied.)

The point raised by Senator Gonzales is crucial and well-taken. I share petitioner’s observation that when penal laws enacted by
Congress make reference to a term or concept requiring a quantitative definition, these laws are so crafted as to specifically state the
exact number or percentage necessary to constitute the elements of a crime. To cite a few:

"Band" – "Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed
to have been committed by a band." (Article 14[6], Revised Penal Code) 66

"Conspiracy" – "A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it." (Article 8, Revised Penal Code)67

"Illegal Recruitment by a Syndicate" – "Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme
x x x." (Section 38, Labor Code)

"Large-scale Illegal Recruitment" – "Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group." (Section 38, Labor Code)

"Organized/Syndicated Crime Group" – "[M]eans a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one
another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime." (Article 62 (1)(1a), Revised Penal Code) 68
"Swindling by a Syndicate" – "x x x if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with
the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme x x x ." (Section 1, P.D. No. 1689)69

The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee and of the Senate cited by the majority, consisting mostly of unfinished
sentences, offer very little help in clarifying the nebulous concept of plunder. All that they indicate is that Congress seemingly intended
to hold liable for plunder a person who: (1) commits at least two counts of any one of the acts mentioned in Section 1(d) of R.A. No.
7080, in which case, such person commits plunder by a series of overt criminal acts; or (2) commits at least one count of at least two of
the acts mentioned in Section 1(d), in which case, such person commits plunder by a combination of overt criminal acts. Said
discussions hardly provide a window as to the exact nature of this crime.

A closer look at the exchange between Representatives Garcia and Isidro and Senator Tañada would imply that initially, combination
was intended to mean "two or more means,"70 i.e., "number one and two or number one and something else x x x," 71 "two of the
enumerated means not twice of one enumeration," 72 "two different acts."73Series would refer to "a repetition of the same
act."74 However, the distinction was again lost as can be gleaned from the following:

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA) Yes. Combination is not twice – but combination, two acts.

REP. ISIDRO. So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It can not be a repetition of the same
act.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). That be referred to series. Yeah.

REP. ISIDRO. No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). A series.

REP. ISIDRO. That’s not series. It’s a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, ‘di
ba?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Yes. This distinguishes it really the ordinary --- That’s why I said, that’s a very good suggestion,
because if its’ only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime. But we have here a combination or series, of overt or criminal acts"
(Emphasis supplied).75

xxx

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Series. One after the other eh di…

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) So, that would fall under the term "series"?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P) Series, oo.

REP. ISIDRO. Now, if it is combination, ano, two misappropriations…

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA) It’s not… two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.

REP. ISIDRO. So, it is not a combination?

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Yes.

REP. ISIDRO. When we say "combination", two different?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Two different.

REP. ISIDRO. Two different acts.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) For example, ha…

REP. ISIDRO. Now a series, meaning, repetition…

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Yes.

REP. ISIDRO. With that…

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) So, it could be a series of any of the acts mentioned in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 of Section 2 (d), or… 1
(d) rather, or a combination of any of the acts mentioned in paragraph 1 alone, or paragraph 2 alone or paragraph 3 or paragraph 4.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) I think combination maybe…which one? Series?

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Series or combination.


REP. ISIDRO. Which one, combination or series or series or combination?

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Okay. Ngayon doon sa definition, ano, Section 2, definition, doon sa portion ng… Saan iyon? As
mentioned, as described…

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Described. I think that is…

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) … better than "mentioned". Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Okay?

REP. ISIDRO. Very good.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA) Oo, marami pong salamat.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Maraming salamat po.

The meeting was adjourned at 1:33 p.m."76 (Emphasis supplied.)

The aforequoted deliberations, especially the latter part thereof, would show a dearth of focus to render precise the definition of the
terms. Phrases were uttered but were left unfinished. The examples cited were not very definite. Unfortunately, the deliberations were
apparently adjourned without the Committee members themselves being clear on the concept of series and combination.

Moreover, if "combination" as used in the law simply refers to the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amounting
to at least P50 Million through at least two of the means enumerated in Section 1(d), and "series," to at least two counts of one of the
modes under said section, the accused could be meted out the death penalty for acts which, if taken separately, i.e., not considered as
part of the combination or series, would ordinarily result in the imposition of correctional penalties only. If such interpretation would be
adopted, the Plunder law would be so oppressive and arbitrary as to violate due process and the constitutional guarantees against cruel
or inhuman punishment.77 The penalty would be blatantly disproportionate to the offense. Petitioner’s examples illustrate this absurdity:

a. One act of indirect bribery (penalized under Art. 211 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods),

combined with -

one act of fraud against the public treasury (penalized under Art. 213 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its medium
period to prision mayor in its minimum period).

equals –

Plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death plus forfeiture of assets under R. A. 7080)

b. One act of prohibited transaction (penalized under Art. 215 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its minimum period
or a fine ranging from P200 to P1,000 or both).

combined with –

one act of establishing a commercial monopoly (penalized under Art. 186 of Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
minimum or a fine ranging from P200 to P6,00, or both.

equals –

Plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets under R.A. 7080).

c. One act of possession of prohibited interest by a public officer (penalized with prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine of
P200 to P1,000, or both under Art. 216 of the Revised Penal Code).

combined with –

one act of combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade (penalized under Art. 186 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional
in its minimum period, or a fine of P200 to P1,000, or both),

equals –

plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets). 78

The argument that higher penalties may be imposed where two or more distinct criminal acts are combined and are regarded as special
complex crimes, i.e., rape with homicide, does not justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death in case plunder is
committed. Taken singly, rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua;79and homicide, by reclusion temporal.80 Hence, the increase in the
penalty imposed when these two are considered together as a special complex crime is not too far from the penalties imposed for each
of the single offenses. In contrast, as shown by the examples above, there are instances where the component crimes of plunder, if
taken separately, would result in the imposition of correctional penalties only; but when considered as forming part of a series or
combination of acts constituting plunder, could be punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The disproportionate increase in the
penalty is certainly violative of substantive due process and constitute a cruel and inhuman punishment.
It may also be pointed out that the definition of "ill-gotten wealth" in Section 1(d) has reference to the acquisition of property (by the
accused himself or in connivance with others) "by any combination or series" of the "means" or "similar schemes" enumerated therein,
which include the following:

xxx

4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other forms of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment or any business enterprise or undertakings;

5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests;

xxx

The above-mentioned acts are not, by any stretch of the imagination, criminal or illegal acts. They involve the exercise of the right to
liberty and property guaranteed by Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." Receiving or accepting
any shares of stock is not per se objectionable. It is in pursuance of civil liberty, which includes "the right of the citizen to be free to use
his faculties in all lawful ways; x x x to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and/or that purpose, to enter
into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion.81 Nor is
there any impropriety, immorality or illegality in establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination
and/or implementation of decrees and orders even if they are intended to benefit particular persons or special interests. The phrases
"particular persons" and "special interests" may well refer to the poor, 82the indigenous cultural
communities,83 labor,84 farmers,85 fisherfolk,86 women,87 or those connected with education, science and technology, arts, culture and
sports.88

In contrast, the monopolies and combinations described in Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code are punishable because, as
specifically defined therein, they are "on restraint of trade or commerce or to prevent by artificial means of free competition in the
market, or the object is "to alter the price" of any merchandise "by spreading false rumors," or to manipulate market prices in restraint of
trade. There are no similar elements of monopolies or combinations as described in the Plunder Law to make the acts wrongful.

If, as interpreted by the Solicitor General, "series" means a "repetition" or pertains to "two or more" acts, and "combination as defined in
the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary is "the result or product of combining one thing with another," 89 then, the commission
of two or more acts falling under paragraphs (4) and (5) of Section 1(d) would make innocent acts protected by the Constitution as
criminal, and punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

R.A. No. 7080 does not define "pattern,"


an essential element of the crime of plunder.

Granting arguendo that, as asserted by the majority, "combination" and "series" simplistically mean the commission of two or more of
the acts enumerated in Section 1(d),90 still, this interpretation does not cure the vagueness of R.A. No. 7080. In construing the definition
of "plunder," Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 must not be read in isolation but rather, must be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of
said law. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that to ascertain the meaning of a law, the same must be read in its
entirety.91 Section 1 taken in relation to Section 4 suggests that there is something to plunder beyond simply the number of acts
involved and that a grand scheme to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth is contemplated by R.A. No. 7080. Sections 1 and
2 pertain only to the nature and quantitative means or acts by which a public officer, by himself or in connivance with other persons,
"amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth." Section 4, on the other hand, requires the presence of elements other than those
enumerated in Section 2 to establish that the crime of plunder has been committed because it speaks of the necessity to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy."

Clearly, it will not suffice that the "illegal wealth" amassed is at least Fifty Million Pesos and that this was acquired by any two or more of
the acts described in Section 1(d); it is necessary that these acts constitute a "combination or series" of acts done in furtherance of "the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth", and which constitute "a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy."

That pattern is an essential element of the crime of plunder is evident from a reading of the assailed law in its entirety. It is that which
would distinguish plunder from isolated criminal acts punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other laws, for without the
existence a "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy" to acquire ill-gotten wealth, a person
committing several or even all of the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) cannot be convicted for plunder, but may be convicted only for the
specific crimes committed under the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code or other laws.

For this reason, I do not agree that Section 4 is merely a rule of evidence or a rule of procedure. It does not become such simply
because its caption states that it is, although its wording indicates otherwise. On the contrary, it is of substantive character because it
spells out a distinctive element of the crime which has to be established, i.e., an overall unlawful "scheme or conspiracy" indicated by a
"pattern of overt or criminal acts" or means or similar schemes "to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth."

The meaning of the phrase "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy," however, escapes
me. As in "combination" and "series," R.A. No. 7080 does not provide a definition of "pattern" as well as "overall unlawful scheme."
Reference to the legislative history of R.A. No. 7080 for guidance as to the meanings of these concepts would be unavailing, since the
records of the deliberations in Congress are silent as to what the lawmakers mean by these terms.

Resort to the dictionary meanings of "pattern" and "scheme" is, in this case, wholly inadequate. These words are defined as:

pattern: an arrangement or order of things or activity. 92

scheme: design; project; plot.93


At most, what the use of these terms signifies is that while multiplicity of the acts (at least two or more) is necessary, this is not sufficient
to constitute plunder. As stated earlier, without the element of "pattern" indicative of an "overall unlawful scheme," the acts merely
constitute isolated or disconnected criminal offenses punishable by the Revised Penal Code or other special laws.

The commission of two or more of the acts falling under Section 1(d) is no guarantee that they fall into a "pattern" or "any arrangement
or order." It is not the number of acts but the relationship that they bear to each other or to some external organizing principle that
renders them "ordered" or "arranged":

A pattern is an arrangement or order of things, or activity, and the mere fact that there are a number of predicates is no guarantee that
they fall into an arrangement or order. It is not the number of predicates but the relationship that they bear to each other or to some
external organizing principle that renders them ‘ordered’ or ‘arranged.’ 94

In any event, it is hardly possible that two predicate acts can form a pattern:

The implication is that while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient. Indeed, in common parlance, two of anything will not
generally form a ‘pattern.’95

In H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. et al.96 (hereinafter referred to as Northwestern), the U.S. Court reiterated the foregoing
doctrine:

xxx Nor can we agree with those courts that have suggested that a pattern is established merely by proving two predicate acts.97

Respondents’ metaphorical illustration of "pattern" as a wheel with spokes (the overt or criminal acts of the accused) meeting at a
common center (the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth) and with a rim (the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy) of the wheel enclosing
the spokes, is off tangent. Their position that two spokes suffice to make a wheel, even without regard to the relationship the spokes
bear to each other clearly demonstrates the absurdity of their view, for how can a wheel with only two spokes which are disjointed
function properly?

That "pattern" is an amorphous concept even in U.S. jurisprudence where the term is reasonably defined is precisely the point of the
incisive concurring opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia in Northwestern where he invited a constitutional challenge to the RICO law on
"void-for-vagueness" ground.98 The RICO law is a federal statute in the United States that provides for both civil and criminal penalties
for violation therefor. It incorporates by reference twenty-four separate federal crimes and eight types of state felonies. 99 One of the key
elements of a RICO violation is that the offender is engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity." 100 The RICO law defines the phrase
"pattern of racketeering activity" as requiring "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of
18 USCS § 1961, and within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity."101 Incidentally, the Solicitor General claims that R.A. No. 7080 is an entirely different law from the RICO law. The deliberations
in Congress reveal otherwise. As observed by Rep. Pablo Garcia, Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
R.A. No. 7080 was patterned after the RICO law.102

In Northwestern, conceding that "[the U.S. Congress] has done nothing . . . further to illuminate RICO’s key requirement of a pattern of
racketeering," the U.S. Supreme Court, through Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., undertook the task of developing a meaningful concept
of "pattern" within the existing statutory framework.103Relying heavily on legislative history, the US Supreme Court in that case
construed "pattern" as requiring "continuity plus relationship."104 The US Supreme Court formulated the "relationship requirement" in this
wise: "Criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims,
or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." 105 Continuity is
clarified as "both a closed and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by
its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition." 106

In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Scalia rejected the majority’s formulation. The "talismanic phrase" of "continuity plus
relationship" is, as put by Justice Scalia, about as helpful as advising the courts that "life is a fountain." He writes:

x x x Thus, when §1961(5) says that a pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity" it is describing what is needful but not
sufficient. (If that were not the case, the concept of "pattern" would have been unnecessary, and the statute could simply have attached
liability to "multiple acts of racketeering activity"). But what that something more is, is beyond me. As I have suggested, it is also beyond
the Court. Today’s opinion has added nothing to improve our prior guidance, which has created a kaleidoscope of Circuit positions,
except to clarify that RICO may in addition be violated when there is a "threat of continuity." It seems to me this increases rather than
removes the vagueness. There is no reason to believe that the Court of Appeals will be any more unified in the future, than they have in
the past, regarding the content of this law.

That situation is bad enough with respect to any statute, but it is intolerable with respect to RICO. For it is not only true, as Justice
Marshall commented in Sedima, S.P.R.L. vs. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 x x x, that our interpretation of RICO has "quite simply
revolutionize[d] private litigation" and "validate[d] the federalization of broad areas of state common law of frauds," x x x so that clarity
and predictability in RICO’s civil applications are particularly important; but it is also true that RICO, since it has criminal applications as
well, must, even in its civil applications, possess the degree of certainty required for criminal laws x x x. No constitutional challenge to
this law has been raised in the present case, and so that issue is not before us. That the highest court in the land has been unable to
derive from this statute anything more than today’s meager guidance bodes ill for the day when that challenge is presented. 107

It bears noting that in Northwestern the constitutionality of the RICO law was not challenged.108 After Northwestern,the U.S.
Supreme Court has so far declined the opportunity to hear cases in which the void-for-vagueness challenge to the pattern requirement
was raised.109

Admittedly, at the district courts level, the state statutes (referred to as Little RICOS) 110 have so far successfully survived constitutional
challenge on void-for-vagueness ground. However, it must be underscored that, unlike R.A. No. 7080, these state anti-racketeering
laws have invariably provided for a reasonably clear, comprehensive and understandable definition of "pattern."111 For
instance, in one state, the pattern requirement specifies that the related predicate acts must have, among others, the same or similar
purpose, result, principal, victims or methods of commission and must be connected with "organized crime. 112 In four others, their
pattern requirement provides that two or more predicate acts should be related to the affairs of the enterprise, are not isolated, are not
closely related to each other and connected in point of time and place, and if they are too closely related, they will be treated as a single
act.113 In two other states, pattern requirements provide that if the acts are not related to a common scheme, plan or purpose, a pattern
may still exist if the participants have the mental capacity required for the predicate acts and are associated with the criminal
enterprise.114

All the foregoing state statutes require that the predicate acts be related and that the acts occur within a specified time frame.

Clearly, "pattern" has been statutorily defined and interpreted in countless ways by circuit courts in the United States. Their divergent
conclusions have functioned effectively to create variant criminal offenses.115 This confusion has come about notwithstanding that
almost all these state laws have respectively statutorily defined "pattern". In sharp contrast, R.A. No. 7080, as earlier pointed out,
lacks such crucial definition. As to what constitutes pattern within the meaning of R.A. No. 7080 is left to the ad hoc interpretation of
prosecutors and judges. Neither the text of R.A. No. 7080 nor legislative history afford any guidance as to what factors may be
considered in order to prove beyond reasonable doubt "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy."

Be that as it may, it is glaringly fallacious to argue that "series" simply means a "repetition" or "pertaining to two or more" and
"combination" is the "result or product or product of combining." Whether two or more or at least three acts are involved, the majority
would interpret the phrase "combinations' or "series" only in terms of number of acts committed. They
entirely overlook or ignore Section 4 which requires "a pattern of overt of criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy" to convict.

If the elements of the offense are as what the majority has suggested, the crime of plunder could have been defined in the following
manner:

Where a public official, by himself or in conspiracy with others, amasses or acquires money or property by committing two or more acts
in violation of Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019), or Articles 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216 and 217 of
the Revised Penal Code, he shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.

The above would be a straightforward and objective definition of the crime of plunder. However, this would render meaningless the core
phrases "a combination or series of" "overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy," or the phrase "any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes" or "a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy."

But that obviously is not the definition of the crime of plunder under R.A. 7080. There is something more. A careful reading of the law
would unavoidably compel a conclusion that there should be a connecting link among the "means or schemes" comprising a "series or
combination" for the purpose of acquiring or amassing "ill-gotten wealth." The bond or link is an "overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy
mentioned in Section 4. The law contemplates a combination or series of criminal acts in plunder done by the accused "in furtherance
of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth." It does not postulate acts committed randomly,
separately or independently or sporadically. Otherwise stated, if the legislature intended to define plunder as the acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth in the manner espoused by the majority, the use in R.A. 7080 of such words and phrases as "combination" and "series of
overt or criminal acts" xxx "in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy" is absolutely pointless and meaningless.

R.A. No. 7080 makes it possible for a person


conspiring with the accused in committing
one of the acts constituting the charge
of plunder to be convicted for the same crime.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 states that "[a]ny person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation
and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court." Both parties share the view that the law as it is worded makes it possible for a person who participates in the commission of only
one of the component crimes constituting plunder to be liable as co-conspirator for plunder, not merely the component crime in which
he participated.116 While petitioner concedes that it is easy to ascertain the penalty for an accomplice or accessory under R.A. No. 7080,
such is not the case with respect to a co-principal of the accused.117 In other words, a person who conspires with the accused in the
commission of only one of the component crimes may be prosecuted as co-principal for the component crime, or as co-principal for the
crime of plunder, depending on the interpretation of the prosecutor. The unfettered discretion effectively bestowed on law enforcers
by the aforequoted clause in determining the liability of the participants in the commission of one or more of the component crimes of a
charge for plunder undeniably poses the danger of arbitrary enforcement of the law. 118

R.A. No. 7080 does not clearly state


the prescriptive period of the crime of plunder.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 7080 provides that the crime punishable under said Act shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Considering that the
law was designed to cover a "combination or series of overt or criminal acts," or "a pattern of overt or criminal acts," from what time
shall the period of prescription be reckoned? From the first, second, third or last act of the series or pattern? What shall be the time gap
between two succeeding acts? If the last act of a series or combination was committed twenty or more years after the next preceding
one, would not the crime have prescribed, thereby resulting in the total extinction of criminal liability under Article 89(b) of the Revised
Penal Code? In antithesis, the RICO law affords more clarity and definiteness in describing "pattern of racketeering activity" as "at least
two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of
a prior act of racketeering activity."119119 119 The U.S. state statutes similarly provide specific time frames within which racketeering acts
are committed.

The Solicitor General enjoins the Court to rectify the deficiencies in the law by judicial construction. However, it certainly would not be
feasible for the Court to interpret each and every ambiguous provision without falling into the trap of judicial legislation. A statute
should be construed to avoid constitutional question only when an alternative interpretation is possible from its language. 120 Borrowing
from the opinion of the court121 in Northwestern,122 the law "may be a poorly drafted statute; but rewriting it is a job for Congress, if it
so inclined, and not for this Court." But where the law as the one in question is void on its face for its patent ambiguity in that it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, the
Court cannot breathe life to it through the guise of construction.
R.A. No. 7080 effectively eliminates mens rea
or criminal intent as an element of the crime of plunder.

Section 4 provides that for the purpose of establishing the crime of plunder, "it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal
act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy."

The majority would interpret this section to mean that the prosecution has the burden of "showing a combination or series resulting in
the crime of plunder." And, once the minimum requirements for a combination or a series of acts are met, there is no necessity for the
prosecution to prove each and every other act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate,
or acquire ill-gotten wealth.123

By its language, Section 4 eliminates proof of each and every component criminal act of plunder by the accused and limits itself to
establishing just the pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The law, in effect, penalizes the
accused on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy to commit plunder without the necessity of establishing beyond reasonable
doubt each and every criminal act done by the accused in the crime of plunder. To quote Fr. Bernas again: "How can you have a
‘series’ of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" 124

Moreover, by doing away with proof beyond reasonable doubt of each and every criminal act done by the accused in the furtherance of
the scheme or conspiracy to acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient just to prove a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy, the Plunder Law effectively eliminated the mens rea or criminal intent as an element of the
crime. Because of this, it is easier to convict for plunder and sentence the accused to death than to convict him for each of the
component crimes otherwise punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other laws which are bailable offenses. The resultant
absurdity strikes at the very heart if the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.

Plunder is a malum in se.

The acts enumerated in Section 1(d) are mostly defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, e.g. malversation, estafa, bribery
and other crimes committed by public officers. As such, they are by nature mala in secrimes. Since intent is an essential element of
these crimes, then, with more reason that criminal intent be established in plunder which, under R.A. No. 7659, is one of the heinous
crimes125 as pronounced in one of its whereas clauses.126

The fact that the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 were made criminal by special law does not necessarily make the
same mala prohibita where criminal intent is not essential, although the term refers generally to acts made criminal by special laws. For
there is a marked difference between the two. According to a well-known author on criminal law:

There is a distinction between crimes which are mala in se, or wrongful from their nature, such as theft, rape, homicide, etc., and those
that are mala prohibita, or wrong merely because prohibited by statute, such as illegal possession of firearms.

Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on society as to call for almost unanimous condemnation of its members; while
crimes mala prohibita are violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society.
(Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Rawle’s 3rd Revision)

(1) In acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in those mala prohibit the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? (People vs. Kibler,
106 N.Y., 321, cited in the case of U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 132)

Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy, as in illegal possession of firearms. (People
vs. Conosa, C.A., 45 O.G. 3953)

(2) The term mala in se refers generally to felonies defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code. When the acts are inherently
immoral, they are mala in se, even if punished by special laws. On the other hand, there are crimes in the Revised Penal Code which
were originally defined and penalized by special laws. Among them are possession and use of opium, malversation, brigandage, and
libel.127

The component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime, being inherently wrongful and immoral, are patently mala in se, even if
punished by a special law and accordingly, criminal intent must clearly be established together with the other elements of the crime;
otherwise, no crime is committed. By eliminating mens rea, R.A. 7080 does not require the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the component acts constituting plunder and imposes a lesser burden of proof on the prosecution, thus paving the way for the
imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on the accused, in plain violation of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. Evidently, the authority of the legislature to omit the element of scienter in the proof of a crime refers to
regulatory measures in the exercise of police power, where the emphasis of the law is to secure a more orderly regulations of the
offense of society, rather than the punishment of the crimes. So that in mala prohibita prosecutions, the element of criminal intent is a
requirement for conviction and must be provided in the special law penalizing what are traditionally mala in se crimes. As correctly
pointed out by petitioner,128 citing U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the Smith Act was ruled to require "intent" to advocate129 and held to
require knowledge of illegal advocacy.130 And in another case,131 and ordinance making illegal the possession of obscene books was
declared unconstitutional for lack of scienter requirement.

Mens rea is a substantive due process requirement under the Constitution, and this is a limitation on police power. Additionally, lack
of mens rea or a clarifying scienter requirement aggravates the vagueness of a statute.

In Morisette v. U.S.132 the U.S. Supreme Court underscored the stultifying effect of eliminating mens rea, thus:

The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to change the weights and balances in the scales of justice. The purpose
and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution’s party to conviction, to strip the
defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom heretofore
allowed juries. Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual should not be extended to common law crimes on judicial
initiative.
In the same breath, Justice Florenz Regalado expreses serious doubts as to the authority of the legislature to complex mala in
se crimes with mala prohibita, saying:

x x x although there has been a tendency to penalize crimes under special laws with penalties "borrowed" from the Code, there is still
the question of legislative authority to consolidate crimes punished under different statutes. Worse, where one is punished under the
Code and the other by the special law, both of these contingencies had not been contemplated when the concept of a delito
complejo was engrafted into the Code.133

Petitioner is not estopped from questioning


the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080.

The case at bar has been subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved herein. The fact that one of petitioner’s
counsels134 was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law135 and petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a Senator would not in
any put him in estoppel to question its constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law. 136 Moreover,
estoppel should be resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice.137 To hold that petitioner is estopped from questioning the
validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had earlier voted for its passage would result in injustice not only to him, but to all others who may
be held liable under this statute. In People vs. Vera,138 citing the U.S. case of Attorney General v. Perkins, the Court held:

x x x The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law enacted by their representatives; that to
an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation upon their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an
adequate statute relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is a statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more
saving effect to justify action under it it had never been enacted. the constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the
legislature, and the people must bow. x x x139

The Court should not sanction the use of an equitable remedy to defeat the ends of justice by permitting a person to be deprived of his
life and liberty under an invalid law.

Undoubtedly, the reason behind the enactment of R.A. 7080 is commendable. It was a response to the felt need at the time that
existing laws were inadequate to penalize the nature and magnitude of corruption that characterized a "previous regime." 140 However,
where the law, such as R.A. 7080, is so indefinite that the line between innocent and condemned conduct becomes a matter of
guesswork, the indefiniteness runs afoul of due process concepts which require that persons be given full notice of what to avoid, and
that the discretion of law enforcement officials, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, be limited by
explicit legislative standards.141 It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such an ambiguous law as R.A. No. 7080 would put on the
balance the life and liberty of the accused against whom all the resources of the State are arrayed. It could be used as a tool against
political enemies and a weapon of hate and revenge by whoever wields the levers of power.

I submit that the charge against petitioner in the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 does not constitute "plunder" under
R.A. No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. If at all, the acts charged may constitute offenses punishable under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) or the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the information charging petitioner with plunder must be
quashed. Such quashal, however, should be without prejudice to the filing of new informations for acts under R.A. No. 3019, of the
Revised Penal Code and other laws. Double jeopardy would not bar the filing of the same because the dismissal of the case is made
with the express consent of the petitioner-accused.142

In view of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition.

Footnotes

1 Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., Prejudging the Supreme Court, in his column "Sounding Board", Today, September 26, 2001, p. 6.

2An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, amending for that purpose the Revised Penal Code and
Other Special Penal Laws, namely: Dangerous Drugs Act, Crime of Plunder, and Anti-Carnapping Act (1993).

3
87 O.G. 38, pp. 5488-5490 (1991).

4 Annex "C" of Petition.

5 Amended Petition, p. 8.

6 Section 1(d).

7 Memorandum for Petitioner, p.11.

8
Amended Petition., pp. 13-17; Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 16-24.

According to petitioners:

a. While American federal courts in the First Circuit in the U.S. have defined "series of acts or transactions" for
purposes of Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to refer only to "joint criminal enterprise" [U.S. v.
Turkette (1980, CA 1 Mass. 632 F 2d 896)] under a common scheme [U.S. v. J. Tirocchi & Sons, Inc. (1960 DC RI)
187 F. Supp. 778], the courts in the Second Circuit insist that "series of acts and transactions" should mean that
there should be "connection between the offenses" [U.S. v. Charney (1962, SD BY) 211 F. Supp. 904] or "direct
relationship between counts" [U.S. v. Haim (1963 SD NY), 218 F. Supp. 922] or "substantial identity of facts and
participants" [U.S. v. Olin Corp. (1979, WD NY), 465 S. Supp. 1120].
b. Still on the U.S. Federal courts, the courts in the Third Circuit define "series of acts" following the "direct
relationship between acts" standard of the Second Circuit; for example, U.S. v. Stafford (1974, ED Pa.), 382 F.
Supp. 1401) using "factual relationship between acts"; U.S. v. Slawik (1975, DC Del.) 408 F. Supp. 190, using
"connection between charges"; U.S. v. Cohen (1978, ED Pa.) 444 F. Supp. 1314, using "direct relationship
between offenses"; and U.S. v. Serubo (1978, ED Pa.) 460 F. Supp. 689), using "direct relationship between
offenses", but the federal courts in the Fourth Circuit follow the "common scheme" standard, as in Rakes v. U.S.
(169 F2d 730).

c. The Sixth Circuit courts define "series" to mean "common scheme" (e.g. U.S. v. Russo (480 F2d 1228) and so
do the courts in the Seventh Circuit (e.g. U.S. v. Scott, (1969, CA 7 Ill.) (413 F2d 932), and Eighth Circuit
Courts (e.g. Haggard v. U.S. (1966, CA 8 Mo.) 369 F2d 968), but the courts in the Fifth Circuit follow the "close
connection between acts" standard, (e.g. U.S. v. Laca (1974 CA 5 Tex) 593 F2d 615) or "substantial identity of
facts and participants" (e.g. U.S. v. Levine (1977 CA 5 Fla.) 546 F2d 658; U.S. v. Marionneaux (1975 CA 5 La.) 514
F2d 1244) together with federal courts in the Ninth Circuit (e.g. U.S. v. Ford (1980 CA 9 Cal..) 632 F2d 1354) and
those in the District of Columbia Circuit (U.S. v. Jackson (1977) 562 F2d 789; U.S. v. Bachman, (1958 DC Dist.
Col.) 164 F. Suppl. 898). [Amended Petition, pp. 14-16; Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 20-22.]

9
Amended Petition, pp. 18-19; Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 34-45.

10 Id., at 13-14; Id., at 19.

11
Id., at 16-17; Id., at 23.

12 Id., at 25-34.

13 Id., at 27-31;Id., at. 66-76.

14
Id., at 27-35; Id.,. at 76-83.

15 Comment, pp. 11-13; Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 30-32.

16
Ibid.; Id., at 49-50.

17 Id., at 13-25; Id., at 58-59.

18
Id., at 28-33; Id.., at 70-77.

19 Id., at 33-34.

20 Comment, pp. 37-42; Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 82-84.

21 Reply to Comment, p. 12.

22 Id., at 14-15.

23 TSN, Hearing on oral arguments, September 18, 2001, pp. 2-3.

24 Tan vs. People, 290 SCRA 117 (1998); see also Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 402 (1997).

25 Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968).

26 State v. Vogel, 467 N.W.2d 86 (1991).

27
See Id.

28 ART. III, Sections 1, 12 and 14.

In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila (20 SCRA 849 [1967]), the
Court expounded on the concept of due process as follows:

x x x What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity
sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official
action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is
thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from
arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for justice' and
judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch 'in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that
reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought.' It is not a narrow or 'technical conception with fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' decisions based on such a clause requiring a 'close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly
or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases (at pp. 860-861).

29 ART. III, Section 14.


30 People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186 (1988).

31
347 U.S. 612 (1954).

32 Id., at 617.

33 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).

34 Ibid.

35 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).

36 Ibid.

37 Kolender, supra.

38
Ibid.

39 Section 2.

40 See FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 US 284 (1954).

41 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, pp. 10-12.

42
RELATIONS BETWEEN VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH – THE VOID FOR VAGUE DOCTRINE, American
Constitutional Law (2nd) (1998), p. 1033 citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). See also Springfield Armory, Inc.
v City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250, 1994 FED App 239P (6th Cir. 1994); Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 U.S.
385 (1926); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 1957); Kolender v. Lawson, supra.

43THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE, Treatise on Constitutional Law – Substance and Procedure, Vol. IV (1992), pp. 25-31;
36-37.

44 See Note 42.

45 Springfield Armory, Inc. v City of Columbus, supra.

46 See Concurring Opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, pp. 10-12.

47RELATIONS BETWEEN VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH – THE VOID FOR VAGUE DOCTRINE, American
Constitutional Law (2nd) [1998], p. 1033 citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 [1939]. See also Springfield Armory, Inc.
v City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250, 1994 FED App 239P [6th Cir. 1994]; Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 U.S.
385 [1926]; Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 [1957]; Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 [1953].

48
413 U.S. 601 [1973].

VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH, AN OVERVIEW, Lockhart et al. Constitutional Law, Cases-Comments-Questions [6th
49

Ed, 1986], p. 740.

50 Springfield v. Oklahoma, supra; Kolender v. Lawson, supra.

51 Supra.

52 Supra.

53 At p. 253.

54 See Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, p. 5.

55
See Decision, p. 7.

56 The transcript of Stenographic Notes of the Hearing in Criminal Case No. 26561 on June 13, 2001, p. 16 reads:

PJ Garchitorena:

xxx

But you see, I will provoke you. Forgive us for provoking you, but we ourselves have been quarrelling with each other
in finding ways to determine what we understand by plunder.

xxx

57
Infra.
58 In his column on the April 25, 2001 issue of Today, Fr. Bernas stated:

xxx

One question that has come up is whether a public official can commit more than one crime of plunder during his or
her incumbency. There are those who hold that the law describes only one crime and that it cannot be split into
several offenses. This would mean that the prosecution must weave a web of offenses out of the six ways of illegally
amassing wealth and show how the various acts reveal a combination or series of means or schemes which reveal a
pattern of criminality. My understanding is that under such a reading the six ways of amassing wealth should not be
seen as separate from each other but must be shown to be parts of one combination or scheme. The interrelationship
of the separate acts must be shown.

An alternate reading of the law, which is perhaps easier to prove but harsher on the accused, is that each one of the
six ways of amassing wealth can constitute plunder if the total take adds up to the required P75 million.

xxx

There is another provision in the law which I find intriguing. It says: "For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder,
it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt
a pattern of overt criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy." Is this an indication that there
is only one crime of plunder under the statute?

Fr. Bernas also discussed the vagueness of "combination" or "series" in the July 1, 2001 issue of Today:

Taken individually, the elements that are supposed to constitute the series can be well understood. But now the
Estrada lawyers are asking when precisely these elements constitute a "combination or series". The question is
important because of an intriguing provision in the plunder law: "For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it
shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt
a pattern of overt criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy." How can you have a "series
of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?

59 Decision, p. 12.

60 Id., at 14.

61 Decision, pp. 12-14.

RECORD OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE MEETING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND COMMITTEE ON


62

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS (S. No. 733 & H. No. 22752), May 7, 1991, pp. 39-40.

63 Decision, p. 14.

64 RECORDS OF THE SENATE, June 6, 1989, pp. 92-93.

65 RECORDS OF THE SENATE, June 5, 1989, pp. 34.

66
Reply to Comment, p. 33.

67 Ibid.

68 Id.

69 Id.

RECORD OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE MEETING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND COMMITTEE ON


70

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS (S. No. 733 & H. No. 22752), May 7, 1991, p. 40.

71 Ibid.

72 Id.

73 Id.

74 Id.

75 Id., at 40-41.

76 Id., at 42-43.

77
Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

xxx

Sec. 19(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. (Emphasis supplied.)

78 Reply to Comment, pp.16-18; Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 62-63.

79
Article 335, Revised Penal Code.

80 Article 249, Revised Penal Code.

81 Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660 (1919).

82 See Article XIII, Section 1 and 2, Constitution.

83
Id., at Section 6.

84 Id., at Section 3.

85 Id., at Section 5.

86
Id., at Section 7.

87 Id., at Section 14.

88 See Article XIV, Constitution..

89 Comment, p. 13.

90
Decision, pp. 14-15.

91
Alpha Investigation and Security Agency, 272 SCRA 653 (1997).

92 11 Oxford English Dictionary 357 (2d ed 1989).

93 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p. 2029 (1976).

94 H.J. Inc., et al. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., et al., 492 US 229 (1989)

95 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).

96 Supra.

97 Id., at 236.

98 Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy.

99Atkinson, Jeff. "RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS," § § 1961-68: Broadest of the Federal
Criminal Statutes, 69 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1978).

100 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970):

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal
within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which effect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of
securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in
the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities
of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern
or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to
one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, an do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect
one or more directors of the issuer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.

(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this
section.

101 Id., at § 1961(5).

102
See RECORDS JOINT CONFERENCE COMMITTEE MEETING, May 7, 1991, p. 12.

103 Northwestern, supra.

104
Id., at 239:

RICO’s legislative history reveals Congress’ intent that to prove a pattern of racketeering activity a plaintiff or
prosecutor must show that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of
continued criminal activity. Citing 116 Cong Rec 18940 (1970)

105 Id., at 240.

106 Id.,at 241.

107 Separate Concurring Opinion, pp. 255-256.

108
The issue involved in this case was whether Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., Inc. was liable under the RICO Law for
bribing the members of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission to approve rates for the company in excess of a fair and
reasonable amount. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the District Court of Minnesota and held that (1) to prove a "pattern of
racketeering activity" within the meaning of RICO, it must be shown that the predicate acts of racketeering activity are related
and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity; (2) it is not only by proof of multiple schemes that
continuity of criminal activity may be shown; (3) a pattern of racketeering activity may be shown regardless of whether the
racketeering activities are characteristic of "organized crime"; and (4) remand was necessary because, under the facts
alleged, it might be possible to prove that the defendants' actions satisfied the requirements of relatedness and continuity and
they thus constituted a "pattern of racketeering activity".

109See United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 11 S. Ct. 2019 (1991); United Statesv. Pungitore, 910
F.2d 1084 (3rd Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 11 S.Ct. 2009-11 (1991); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 130 (1990). All cases cited in Moran, Christopher, infra.

Bauerschmidt, Joseph E., Mother of Mercy – Is this the End of RICO? – Justice Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-for-
110

Vagueness Challenge to RICO "Pattern", 65 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1106 (1990).

Moran, Christopher. Is the "Darling" in Danger? "Void for Vagueness" – The Constitutionality of the RICO Pattern
111

Requirement, 36 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW 1697 (1991) citing:

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-17-103(3): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two acts of
racketeering activity which are related to the conduct of the enterprise, if at least one of such acts occurred in this
state after July 1, 1981, and if the last of such acts occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment)
after a prior act of racketeering activity.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-394(e) (West 1985): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two
incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims or methods of
commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, including a nexus to the same enterprise,
and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one of such incidents occurred after the effective date of this act and
that the last of such incidents occurred within five years after a prior incident of racketeering conduct.

GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-3(8) (Supp. 1991): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two
incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of
commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at
least one of such incidents occurred after July 1, 1980, and that the last of such incidents occurred within four years,
excluding any periods of imprisonment, after the commission of a prior incident of racketeering activity.

IDAHO CODE § 18-7803(d) (1987): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two (2) incidents of
racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission,
or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one (1)
of such incidents occurred after the effective date of this act and that the last of such incidents occurred within five (5)
years after a prior incident of racketeering conduct.

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (West 1986): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two (2)
incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intent, result, accomplice, victim, or method of
commission, or that are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics [sic] that are not isolated incidents.
However, the incidents are a pattern of racketeering activity only if at least one (1) of the incidents occurred after
August 31, 1980, and if the last of the incidents occurred within five (5) years after a prior incident of racketeering
activity.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1352 (C) (West Supp. 1992): "Pattern of drug racketeering activity" means engaging in at
least two incidents of drug racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results, principals, victims, or
methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents,
provided at least one of such occurs after a prior incident of drug racketeering activity.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-43-3(d) (Supp 1989): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two (2)
incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of
commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at
least one (1) of such incidents occurred after the effective date of this chapter and that the last of such incidents
occurred within five (5) years after a prior incident of racketeering conduct.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(b) (1990): "Pattern of racketeering activity means engaging in at least two incidents of
racketeering activity that have the same or similar purposes, results, accomplices, victims or methods of commission
or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated and unrelated incidents, provided at
least one of such incidents occurred after October 1, 1986, and that at least one other of such incidents occurred
within a four-year period of time of the other, excluding any periods of imprisonment, after the commission of a prior
incident of racketeering activity.

OR. REV. STAT. § 166.715(4) (1990): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two incidents of
racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, including a nexus to the same enterprise, and are not
isolated incidents, provided at least one of such incidents occurred after November 1, 1981, and that the last of such
incidents occurred within five years after a prior incident of racketeering activity.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-203(6) (1991): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two (2)
incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims or methods of
commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents; provided,
that at least one (1) of such incidents occurred after July 1, 1986, and that the last of such incidents occurred within
two (2) years after a prior incident of racketeering conduct.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.010(15) (1988): "Pattern of criminal profiteering activity" means engaging in at
least three acts of criminal profiteering, one of which occurred after July 1, 1985, and the last of which occurred within
five years, excluding any period of imprisonment, after the commission of the earliest act of criminal profiteering. In
order to constitute a pattern, the three acts must have the same or similar intent, results, accomplices, principals,
victims or methods of commission, or be otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics including a nexus to
the same enterprise, and must not be isolated events.

112 Id., citing:

CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2(b) (West 1988): "Pattern of criminal profiteering activity" means engaging in at least to
incidents of criminal profiteering, as defined by this act, which meet the following requirements: (1) Have the same or
similar purpose, result, principals, victims or methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics[;] (2) Are not isolated events[; and] (3) Were committed as criminal activity of organized crime.

113 Id., citing:

DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 11. § 1502(5) (1987): "Pattern of racketeering activity" shall mean 2 or more incidents of
conduct: a. That: 1. Constitute racketeering activity; 2. Are related to the affairs of the enterprise; 3. Are not so closely
related to each other and connected in point of time and place that they constitute a single event; and b. Where: 1. At
least 1 of the incidents of conduct occurred after July 9, 1986; 2. The last incident of conduct occurred within 10 years
after a prior occasion of conduct . . .

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2923.31(E) (Anderson Supp. 1991): "Pattern of corrupt activity" means two or more
incidents of corrupt activity, whether or not there has been a prior conviction, that are related to the affairs of the
same enterprise, are not isolated, and are not so closely related to each other and connected in time and place that
they constitute a single event. At least one of the incidents forming the pattern shall occur on or after January 1,
1986. Unless any incident was an aggravated murder or murder, the last incidents forming the pattern shall occur
within six years after the commission of any prior incident forming the pattern, excluding any period of imprisonment
served by any person engaging in the corrupt activity.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1402(5) (West Supp. 1992): Pattern of racketeering activity" means two or more
occasions of conduct: a. that include each of the following: (1) constitute racketeering activity, (2) are related to the
affairs of the enterprise, (3) are not isolated, (4) are not so closely related to each other and connected in point of
time and place that they constitute a single event, and b. where each of the following is present: (1) at least one of the
occasions of conduct occurred after November 1, 1988, (2) the last of the occasions of conduct occurred within three
(3) years, excluding any period of imprisonment served by the person engaging in the conduct, of a prior occasion of
conduct . . .

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.82(3) (West Supp. 1991): "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least 3
incidents of racketeering activity that the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims or methods of
commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, provided at least one of the incidents
occurred after April 27, 1982 and that the last of the incidents occurred within 7 years after the first incident of
racketeering activity. Acts occurring at the same time and place which may form the basis for crimes punishable
under more than one statutory provision may count for only one incident of racketeering activity.

114 Id., citing:


MINN. STAT. ANN. §609.902(6) (West Supp. 1992): "Pattern of criminal activity" means conduct consisting
constituting three or more criminal acts that: (1) were committed within ten years of the commencement of the
criminal proceedings; (2) are neither isolated incidents, nor so closely related and connected in point of time or
circumstance of commission as to constitute a single criminal offense; and (3) were either: (i) related to one another
through a common scheme or plan or shared criminal purpose or (ii) committed, solicited, requested, importuned, or
intentionally aided by persons acting with the mental culpability required for the commission of the criminal acts and
associated with or in an enterprise involved in these activities.

N.Y. PENAL LAW §460.10(4) (McKinney 1989): "Pattern of criminal activity" means conduct engaged in by persons
charged in an enterprise corruption count constituting three or more criminal acts that: (a) were committed within ten
years of the commencement of the criminal action; (b) are neither isolated incidents, nor so closely related and
connected in point in time or circumstance of commission as to constitute a criminal offense or criminal transaction . .
. ; and (c) are either: (i) related to one another through a common scheme or plan or (ii) were committed, solicited,
requested, importuned or intentionally aided by persons acting with the mental culpability required for the commission
thereof and associated with or in the criminal enterprise.

Luskin, Robert D. Behold, The Day of Judgment: Is the RICO Pattern Requirement Void for Vagueness? 64 ST. JOHN’S
115

LAW REVIEW 779 (1990).

116 Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 47; TSN, Oral Arguments, September 18, 2001, see pp. 224-233.

117 Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 47.

118 See Kolender v. Lawson, supra

119 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (5). .

120
See U.S. v. Batchelder, 442 US 114, 60 L Ed 2d 755, 99 S Ct 2198 (1979).

121 Through Justice Brennan.

122
Supra.

123 Decision, pp. 21-22.

124
Today, July 1, 2001 issue.

125In People vs. Echegaray (267 SCRA 682) the word "heinous" was traced to the early Spartans’ word "haineus" which
means hateful and abominable. In turn, the word came from the Greek prefix "haton" indicating acts so hateful or shockingly
evil. (at 715)

126WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and
which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous
to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.

127 Reyes, Luis B. The Revised Penal Code, Book One (13th ed.), p. 56.

128 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 81.

129 Dennis v. U.S., 314 U.S. 494 (1951).

130 Scales v. U.S., 203 (1961).

131 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).

132 342 U.S. 246 (1952).

133 Regalado, Florenz, Criminal Law Conspectus (2001 ed.), 161-162.

134 Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag.

135 Senate Bill No. 733.

136 Tañada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1093.

137 Commercial National Bank v. Rowe, 666 So. 2d 1312 (1996).

138 65 Phil. 56 (1937).

139
Id., at 90.

140 See Explanatory Note, Senate Bill No. 733, Records of the Senate, June 1, 1989, pp. 1-2.
141 See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).

142One of the reliefs sought in the Prayer contained in the Petition (at p. 37) and in Petitioner’s Memorandum (at p. 84) is for
the quashal of the Information in Criminal case No. 26558 for being null and void.

Double jeopardy attaches only when all of the following circumstances are present: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2)
before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the accused
was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused (Tecson vs. Sandiganbayan, 318 SCRA 80, 89 [1999]).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION

PARDO, J.:

With due respect, I vote to grant the petition on the second ground raised therein, that is, multiplicity of offenses charged in the
amended information.1 Consequently, the resolution of the Sandiganbayan must be set aside, and the case remanded to the
Ombudsman for the amendment of the information to charge only a single offense.

In my view, it is unnecessary to rule on the unconstitutionality of the entire law, 2 R. A. No. 7080, as amended by R. A. No. 7659,
although I share the opinion of the dissenting justices in the case of People v. Echagaray, 3 that the heinous crime law is
unconstitutional. Hence, the amendments to the plunder law prescribing the death penalty therefor are unconstitutional. I am of the view
that the plunder law penalizes acts that are mala in se, and consequently, the charges must be the specific acts alleged to be in
violation of the law, committed with malice and criminal intent. At any rate, I venture the view that Section 4, R. A. No. 7080, must be
interpreted as requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt of all the elements of plunder as prescribed in the law, including the elements of
the component crimes, otherwise, the section will be unconstitutional.

Footnotes

1 Petition, Annex "B", Motion to Quash, Ground II.

2‘The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed
of on some other ground." (Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797, 813 [1990], citing Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 312
U.S. 175 [1909]; Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]; Lalican v. Vergara, 342 Phil. 485, 498 [1997];
Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001.

3 335 Phil. 343 [1997].

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

SANDOVAL–GUTIERREZ, J.:

At times when speaking against popular views can subject a member of this Court to all sorts of unfair criticism and pressure from the
media, the lure not to wield the judicial pen is at its crest. Nevertheless, I cannot relent to such enticement. Silence under such
circumstances may mean not only weakness, but also insensibility to the legal consequence of a constitutional adjudication bound to
affect not only the litigants, but the citizenry as well. Indeed, the core issue in this case is highly significant, the resolution of which is
inevitably historical. Thus, today, I prefer to take a stand and, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion.

It is beyond dispute that Republic Act No. 7080 (R.A. No. 7080), 1 entitled "An Act Penalizing the Crime of Plunder," is controversial and
far-reaching. Nonetheless, it is my view that it is also vague and fuzzy, inexact and sweeping. This brings us to the query - may R.A.
No. 7080 be enforced as valid and its shortcomings supplied by judicial interpretation? My answer, to be explained later, is "NO."

As a basic premise, we have to accept that even a person accused of a crime possesses inviolable rights founded on the Constitution
which even the welfare of the society as a whole cannot override. The rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution are not subject to
political bargaining or to the calculus of social interest. Thus, no matter how socially-relevant the purpose of a law is, it must be nullified
if it tramples upon the basic rights of the accused.

Enshrined in our Constitution is the ultimate guaranty that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law."2 This provision in the Bill of Rights serves as a protection of the Filipino people against any form of arbitrariness on the part of the
government, whether committed by the legislature, the executive or the judiciary. Any government act that militates against the ordinary
norms of justice and fair play is considered an infraction of the due process; and this is true whether the denial involves violation merely
of the procedure prescribed by law or affects the very validity of the law itself. 3

The same Due Process Clause protects an accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The reason for this was enunciated in In Re Winship:4 "[t]he accused
during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty
(or life) upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction." In view thereof, any attempt on
the part of the legislature to diminish the requirement of proof in criminal cases should be discouraged.

R.A. No. 7080, as amended, is unconstitutional. Albeit the legislature did not directly lower the degree of proof required in the crime of
plunder from proof beyond reasonable doubt to mere preponderance of or substantial evidence, it nevertheless lessened the burden of
the prosecution by dispensing with proof of the essential elements of plunder. Let me quote the offending provision:

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. – For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.

In every criminal prosecution, the law recognizes certain elements as material or essential. Calling a particular fact an "essential
element" carries certain legal consequences. In this case, the consequence that matters is that the Sandiganbayan cannot convict the
accused unless it unanimously5 finds that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt each element of the crime of plunder.

What factual elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt to constitute the crime of plunder?

Ordinarily, the factual elements that make up a crime are specified in the law that defines it. Under R.A. No 7080, as amended, the
essential elements of the crime of plunder are: a) that the offender is a public officer; b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1 (d), to wit:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks, or any other form of pecuniary
benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer concerned;

3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivision, agencies or instrumentalities or government –owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly, or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees
and orders intended to benefit particular person or special interests; or

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection, or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

and c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). 6

Does the phrase "combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1 (d)" mean that the "criminal acts" merely
constitute the means to commit plunder? Or does it mean that those "criminal acts," are essential elements of plunder?

When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to prove each and every criminal act done
by the accused, the legislature, in effect, rendered the enumerated "criminal acts" under Section 1 (d) merely as means and not
as essential elements of plunder. This is constitutionally infirmed and repugnant to the basic idea of justice and fair play. 7 As a matter
of due process, the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which the defendant is charged. The State may not specify a lesser burden of proof for an element of a crime. 8 With more
reason, it should not be allowed to go around the principle by characterizing an essential element of plunder merely as a "means" of
committing the crime. For the result is the reduction of the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.

Let me elucidate on the vices that come with Section 4.

First, treating the specific "criminal acts" merely as means to commit the greater crime of plunder, in effect, allows the imposition of the
death penalty even if the Justices of the Sandiganbayan did not "unanimously" find that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of those "criminal acts." The three Justices need only agree that the accused committed at least two of the criminal acts,
even if not proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt. They do not have to agree unanimously on which two.

Let us consider the present case against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. The accusatory portion of the information in
Criminal Case No. 26558 charges Mr. Estrada and others of willfully, unlawfully and criminally amassing, accumulating and acquiring ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17 more or less, through a combination and series of overt and criminal
acts described as follows:

"a) by receiving, collecting, directly or indirectly, on many instances, so called "jueteng money" from gambling operators in
connivance with co-accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte and Edward Serapio, as witnessed by Gov. Luis
Chavit Singson, among other witnesses, in the aggregate amount of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION
PESOS (P545,000,000.00), more or less, in consideration of their protection from arrest or interference by law enforcers in
their illegal "jueteng" activities; and

b) by misappropriating, converting and misusing his gain and benefit public fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos
(P170,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, in conspiracy with
co-accused Charlie "Atong" Ang, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy., and Jane Doe a.k.a Delia
Rajas as witnesses by Gov. Luis "Chavit" Singson, among other witnesses; and

c) by directing, ordering and compelling the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System
(SSS) to purchase and buy a combined total of P681,733,000. shares of stock of Belle Corporation in the aggregate value of
One Billion Eight Hundred Forty Seven Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P1,847,578,057.50), for the purpose of collecting for his
personal gain and benefit, as in fact he did collect and receive the sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS(P189,700,000.00), as commission from said stock purchase; and

d) by unjustly enriching himself in the amount of THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) comprising his unexplained wealth, acquired, accumulated and amassed by him under his
account name "Jose Velarde" with Equitable PCI Bank."

Since it is not necessary to prove each criminal act, the inevitable conclusion is that Mr. Estrada may be convicted of the crime of
plunder without the Justices of the Sandiganbayan "unanimously" deciding which two of the four criminal acts have actually been
committed. In short, all that R.A. No. 7080 requires is that each Justice must be convinced of the existence of a "combination or series."
As to which criminal acts constitute a combination or series, the Justices need not be in full agreement. Surely, this would cover-up a
wide disagreement among them about just what the accused actually did or did not do. Stated differently, even if the Justices are not
unified in their determination on what criminal acts were actually committed by the accused, which need not be proved under the law,
still, they could convict him of plunder.

Considering that what R.A. No. 7080 punishes is the plurality of criminal acts indicative of the grand scheme or conspiracy to amass ill-
gotten wealth, it is imperative to focus upon the individual "criminal acts" in order to assure the guilt of the accused of plunder.

Second, R.A. No. 7080 lumps up into one new offense of plunder six (6) distinct crimes which by themselves are currently punishable
under separate statutes or provisions of law. The six (6) separate crimes become mere "means or similar schemes" to commit the
single offense of plunder. It bears emphasis that each of the separate offenses is a crime mala in se. The commission of any
offense mala in se is inherently accompanied by a guilty mind or a criminal intent. 9 Unfortunately, R.A. No. 7080 converted the six mala
in se offenses into one crime which is mala prohibita wherein the intent becomes insignificant. Upon the commission of the
proscribed act, without proof of intent, the law is considered violated.10 Consequently, even acts recklessly committed (i.e. without
intent) can be punished by death.

Third, Section 4 mandates that it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to prove each and every criminal act done by the
accused x x x it being sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts. By its own terminology,
Section 4 requires that the "pattern" be proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Initially, we must disassociate the specific
"criminal acts" from the "pattern of criminal acts." These two phrases do not refer to one and the same thing. Pattern, as defined in the
dictionary, means an established mode of behavior.11 In the crime of plunder, the existence of a "pattern" can only be inferred from the
specific "criminal acts" done by the accused. Several queries may be raised to determine the existence of a "pattern." Are these
criminal acts related or tied to one another? Is the subsequent criminal act a mere continuation of the prior criminal act? Do these
criminal acts complement one another as to bring about a single result? Inevitably, one must focus first on each criminal act to ascertain
the relationship or connection it bears with the other criminal acts, and from there determine whether a certain "pattern" exists. But how
could "pattern" be proved beyond reasonable doubt when in the first place the specific "criminal acts" from which such
pattern may be inferred are not even required to be proved?

And fourth, plunder is a very serious offense. What is at stake under the law is not only the liberty of the accused but his life and
property as well. Thus, it will be extremely unjust to lessen the prosecution’s burden of proof to such a degree not commensurate to
what the accused stands to suffer. If a person will lose his life, justice requires that every fact on which his guilt may be inferred must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Providing a rule of evidence which does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish every fact necessary to constitute the
crime is a clear infringement of due process. While the principles of the law of evidence are the same whether applied on civil or
criminal trials, they are more strictly observed in criminal cases. 12 Thus, while the legislature of a state has the power to prescribe
new or alter existing rules of evidence, or to prescribe methods of proof, the same must not violate constitutional
requirements or deprive any person of his constitutional rights.13 Unfortunately, under R.A. No. 7080, the State did not only
specify a lesser burden of proof to sustain an element of the crime; it even dispensed with proof by not considering the
specific "criminal acts" as essential elements. That it was the clear intention of the legislature is evident from the Senate
deliberation, thus:

"Senator Guingona. Since it is a series or a scheme,what amount of evidence will, therefore, be required? Must there be a pattern of
the criminal acts? Must there be a series of briberies, for example? Or, can there be only one?

Senator Tanada. Under Section 4 of the bill, Mr. President, it is provided that:

"For purposes of establishing the OFFENSE, of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the
accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth… But, there must be enough
evidence "sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy."

So, that is the quantum of evidence that would be required under this proposal measure.
Senator Guingona. That is sufficient to establish the prima facie case.14

xxxxxx

Senator Romulo. That, perhaps, is a good provision of the bill. But, may I ask, Mr. President, what is in this bill that would insure that
there would be a speedier process by which this crime of plunder would readily and immediately processed and convicted or acquitted
than is now existing in present laws?

Senator Tanada. Yes, x x x.

Now, on the second point, Mr. President, I believe that what could make faster and speedier prosecutions of these grafters would be a
change that will be authorized in this bill, at least, in the filing of information against the perpetrators. Under the existing criminal
procedure, as I said earlier, there can only be one offense charged per information. So, if there is going to be a series of overt or
criminal acts committed by the grafter, then that would necessitate the filing of so many informations against him. Now, if this bill
becomes a law, then that means that there can be only one information filed against the alleged grafter. And the evidence that will be
required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to
establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.15

xxxxxx

Senator Guingona. May I just be clarified Mr. President. In this Section 4, a pattern of the criminal acts is all that is required. Would
this pattern of criminal acts be also sufficient to establish a prima facie case?

Senator Tanada. Mr. President, under Section 4, it would not only be sufficient to establish a prima facie case. It would be sufficient to
establish guilt as long as the evidence, necessary to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt is presented." 16

In dispensing with proof of each criminal act, the clear objective of Congress is to render it less difficult for the prosecution to prove the
crime of plunder. While this presupposes a noble intention, I do not think there is a sufficient justification. I, too, have the strong desire
to eliminate the sickness of corruption pervading in the Philippine government, but more than anything else, I believe there are certain
principles which must be maintained if we want to preserve fairness in our criminal justice system. If the prosecution is not mandated to
prove the specific "criminal acts," then how can it establish the existence of the requisite "combination or series" by proof beyond
reasonable doubt?

II

Another valid constitutional objection to R.A. No. 7080 is the vagueness of the term "pattern." As stated by Mr. Justice Kapunan, in his
Dissent, the concept of "pattern of overt or criminal acts" embodied in the law was derived by Congress from the RICO (Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) statute.17 I am, therefore, constrained to refer to US law and jurisprudence. "Pattern" as defined
in the RICO statute means "as requiring at least two acts of racketeering activity….the last of which occurred within ten years….after
the commission of the prior act of racketeering activity.18

Mr. Justice Kapunan observed that unlike the RICO law, the law on plunder does not specify a) the number of criminal acts necessary
before there could be a "pattern," as well as b) the period within which the succeeding criminal acts should be committed. These
failures render the law void for its vagueness and broadness.

Indeed, Congress left much to be desired. I am at a quandary on how many delictual acts are necessary to give rise to a "pattern of
overt or criminal acts" in the crime of plunder. If there is no numerical standard, then, how should the existence of "pattern" be
ascertained? Should it be by proximity of time or of relationship? May an act committed two decades after the prior criminal act be
linked with the latter for the purpose of establishing a pattern?

It must be remembered that plunder, being a continuous offense, the "pattern of overt or criminal acts" can extend indefinitely, i.e., as
long as the succeeding criminal acts may be linked to the initial criminal act. This will expose the person concerned to criminal
prosecution ad infinitum. Surely, it will undermine the purpose of the statute of limitations, i.e., to discourage prosecution based on facts
obscured by the passage of time, and to encourage law enforcement officials to investigate suspected criminal activity promptly.19 All
these undesirable consequences arise from the fact that the plunder law fails to provide a period within which the next
criminal act must be committed for the purpose of establishing a pattern. I believe R.A. No. 7080 should have provided a cut-off
period after which a succeeding act may no longer be attached to the prior act for the purpose of establishing a pattern. In reiteration,
the RICO law defines "pattern" as requiring at least two acts of racketeering activity… the last of which occurred within ten years…
after the commission of the prior act of racketeering activity. Such limitation prevents a subsequent racketeering activity, separated by
more than a decade from the prior act of racketeering, from being appended to the latter for the purpose of coming up with a pattern.
We do not have the same safeguard under our law.

Significantly, in Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co.,20 the United States Supreme Court expressed dismay that Congress has failed to
properly define the term "pattern" at all but has simply required that a "pattern" includes at least two acts of racketeering activity. The
Court concluded that "pattern" involves something more than two acts, and after examining RICO’s legislative history, settled on
"continuity plus relationship" as the additional requirement.

Years later, in H.C. Inc. v. The Northwestern Bell Tel.,21 the U.S. Supreme Court conceded that "the continuity plus relationship" means
different things to different circuits. Nevertheless, it held firm to the Sedima requirement that "in order to establish a pattern, the
government has to show "that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal
activity." Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion in which three other justices joined, derided the "relationship" requirement as not "much
more helpful [to the lower courts] than telling them to look for a "pattern" - - which is what the statute already says." As for the continuity
requirement, Justice Scalia said: "Today’s opinion has added nothing to improve our prior guidance, which has created a kaleidoscope
of circuit positions, except to clarify that RICO may in addition be violated when there is a 'threat of continuity'. It seems to me this
increases rather than removes the vagueness. There is no reason to believe that the Court of Appeals will be any more unified in the
future, than they have in the past, regarding the content of this law."
Aware of the ambiguities present in the RICO law the drafters of the New York "Organized Crime Control Act" (a progeny of RICO) now
more specifically define "pattern of criminal activity" as conduct engaged in by persons charged in an enterprise corruption count
constituting three or more criminal acts that (a) were committed within ten years from the commencement of the criminal action; (b) are
neither isolated incidents, nor so closely related and connected in point of time or circumstance of commission as to constitute a
criminal offense or criminal transaction, as those terms are defined in section 40.10 of the criminal procedure law; and (c) are
either: (i) related to one another through a common scheme or plan or (ii) were committed, solicited, requested, importuned or
intentionally aided by persons acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof and associated with or in the
criminal enterprise.22

If the term "pattern" as defined in the RICO law is continuously subjected to constitutional attacks because of its alleged vagueness,
how much more the term "pattern" in R.A. No. 7080 which does not carry with it any limiting definition and can only be read in context.
Indeed, there is no doubt that the invalidity of the law based on vagueness is not merely debatable - it is manifest. Thus, this Court
should declare R.A. No. 7080 unconstitutional.

III

Lastly, the terms "combination" and "series" are likewise vague. Hence, on the basis of the law, a conviction of an accused cannot be
sustained. A statute that does not provide adequate standards for adjudication, by which guilt or innocence may be determined, should
be struck down.23 Crimes must be defined in a statute with appropriate certainty and definiteness. 24 The standards of certainty in a
statute prescribing punishment for offenses are higher than in those depending primarily on civil sanctions for their enforcement. 25 A
penal statute should therefore be clear and unambiguous. 26 It should explicitly establish the elements of the crime which it creates 27 and
provide some reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt. 28 It should not admit of such a double meaning that a citizen may act on one
conception of its requirements and the courts on another.29

I agree with the observation of Mr. Justice Kapunan that "resort to the dictionary meaning of the terms ‘combination’ and ‘series’ as well
as recourse to the deliberations of the lawmakers only serve to prove that R.A. No. 7080 failed to satisfy the requirement of the
Constitution on clarity and definiteness." The deliberations of our law-makers, as quoted verbatim in Justice Kapunan's Dissent, indeed,
failed to shed light on what constitute "combination" and "series." 30

I believe this is fatal.

The essence of the law on plunder lies in the phrase "combination or series of overt or criminal acts." As can be gleaned from the
Record of the Senate, the determining factor of R.A. 7080 is the plurality of the overt acts or criminal acts under a grand scheme
or conspiracy to amass ill-gotten wealth. Thus, even if the amassed wealth equals or exceeds fifty million pesos, a person cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of plunder if there is only a single criminal act. 31

Considering that without plurality of overt or criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder, due process of law demands that the terms
"combination" and "series" be defined with exactitude in the law itself. Equating these terms with mere "plurality" or "two or more," is
inaccurate and speculative. For one, a "series" is a group of usually three or more things or events standing or succeeding in order
and having like relationship to each other.32 The Special Prosecution Division Panel defines it as "at least three of the acts enumerated
under Section 1(d) thereof."33 But it can very well be interpreted as only one act repeated at least three times. And the Office of the
Solicitor General, invoking the deliberations of the House of Representatives, contends differently. It defines the term series as a
"repetition" or pertaining to "two or more." 34 The disparity in the Prosecution and OSG’s positions clearly shows how imprecise the term
"series" is.

This should not be countenanced. Crimes are not to be created by inference. 35 No one may be required, at the peril of life, liberty or
property to guess at, or speculate as to, the meaning of a penal statute. 36 An accused, regardless of who he is, is entitled to be tried
only under a clear and valid law.

Respondents argue that the vagueness of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, is cured when the Information clearly specified the acts
constituting the crime of plunder. I do not agree. It is the statute and not the accusation under it that prescribes the rule to govern
conduct and warns against aggression.37 If on its face, a statute is repugnant to the due process clause on account of vagueness,
specification in the Information of the details of the offense intended to be charged will not serve to validate it. 38

On the argument that this Court may clarify the vague terms or explain the limits of the overbroad provisions of R.A. No. 7080, I should
emphasize that this Court has no power to legislate.

Precision must be the characteristic of penal legislation. For the Court to define what is a crime is to go beyond the so-called positive
role in the protection of civil liberties or promotion of public interests. As stated by Justice Frankfurter, the Court should be wary of
judicial attempts to impose justice on the community; to deprive it of the wisdom that comes from self-inflicted wounds and the strengths
that grow with the burden of responsibility.39

A statute which is so vague as to permit the infliction of capital punishment on acts already punished with lesser penalties by clearly
formulated law is unconstitutional. The vagueness cannot be cured by judicial construction.

Also, not to be glossed over is the fact that R.A. 7080, as amended, is a novel law. Hence, there is greater need for precision of terms.
The requirement that law creating a crime must be sufficiently explicit to inform those subject to it, what conduct on their part will render
them liable to its penalties, has particular force when applied to statutes creating new offenses. For that reason, those statutes may
not be generally understood, or may be subject of generally accepted construction. 40

Today, I recall what James Madison remarked in presenting the Bill of Rights to the United States Congress in 1789: "if they (Bill of
Rights) are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; and
they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of
rights."41 Time did not render his foreboding stale. Indeed, in every constitutional democracy, the judiciary has become the vanguard of
these rights. Now, it behooves this Court to strike an unconstitutional law. The result, I concede, may not be politically desirable and
acceptable, nevertheless, I am fully convinced that it is constitutionally correct.
To recapitulate, R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional because it violates the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE of the Constitution. The vagueness
of its terms and its incorporation of a rule of evidence that reduces the burden of the prosecution in proving the crime of plunder
tramples upon the basic constitutional rights of the accused.

In fine, I can only stress that the one on trial here is not Mr. Estrada, but R.A. No. 7080. The issue before this Court is not the guilt or
innocence of the accused, but the constitutionality of the law. I vote to grant the petition, not because I favor Mr. Estrada, but because I
look beyond today and I see that this law can pose a serious threat to the life, liberty and property of anyone who may come under its
unconstitutional provisions. As a member of this Court, my duty is to see to it that the law conforms to the Constitution and no other. I
simply cannot, in good conscience, fortify a law that is patently unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition.

Footnotes

1As amended by Republic Act No. 7659 - "An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that
Purpose the Revised Penal Code, other Special Penal Laws and for other Purpose (1993).

2 Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

3 Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1995 Ed. p. 95.

4 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2nd 368.

5 Section 1 (b) Rule XVIII, Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan

"The unanimous vote of three Justices in a division shall be necessary for the rendition of a judgment or order. In the
event that three Justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate by raffle two justices
from among the other members of the Sandiganbayan to sit temporarily with them forming a special division of five
Justices, and the vote of a majority of such special division shall be necessary for the rendition of a judgment or
order.

6 Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080.

7 It is an elementary principle of criminal jurisprudence, a principle firmly embedded in the organic law of every free state and
vindicated by statutory guarantee as well as by innumerable judicial decisions, that every criminal, however hideous his
alleged crime, or however, debauched and fiendish his character, may require that the elements of that crime shall be clearly
and indisputably defined by law, and that his commission of and relationship to the alleged offense shall be established by
legal evidence delivered in his presence. (Rice, The Law of Evidence on Evidence, Vol. 3, p. 421.

8
29 Am Jur 2d Section 168, p. 192. Re Winship, 397 US 358, 25 L Ed 2d 368; State v. Krantz, 498 US 938, 112 L Ed 2d 306.

9In U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910), it was held that the crime must be the product of a free, intelligent, and intentional
act.

10 U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 134 (1909-1910).

11 Webster, Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, 1993, p. 1657.

12 Harris and Wilshere’s Criminal Law, Seventeenth Division, 1943, pp.513-514.

13 Burgett v. Texas, 389 US 109, 19 L Ed 2d 319, 88 Ct 258; 29 Am Jur 6.

14 Records of the Senate, June 5, 1989, Vol. IV, No. 140, p. 1314.

15 Records of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 140, p. 1316.

16
Records of the Senate, June 16, 1989, Vol. IV, No. 141, p. 1403.

See Records Joint Conference Committee Meeting, May 7, 1991, p. 12. Representative Pablo Garcia, Chairman of the
17

House of Representatives Committee on Justice, observed that R.A. No. 7080 was patterned after the RICO law.

18 Rotella v. Wood, United States Supreme Court, February 23, 2000.

19 Toussie vs. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970).

20 473 U.S. 479, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1985).

21 492 U.S. 229, 109 S. Ct. 2893, 106 L Ed. 2d 195 (1989).

22 The People of the State of New York v. Capaldo et al., 151 Misc. 2d 114 (1991).
23 21 Am Jur §349, p.399.

24
22 C.J.S. §24 (2) p. 62; Pierce v. United States 314 US 306; 86 L. Ed 226.

"The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to accused in placing him on trial for an offense
as to the nature of which he is given no fair notice. (American Communications Associations C.I.O. v. Douds, N.Y. 70
S. Ct. 674, 339 U.S. 382, 94 L. Ed 1391) In determining whether a statute meets the requirement of certainty, the test
is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribe conduct when measured by a
common understanding and practices. Penal statutes affecting public officers and employees and public funds or
property will be held invalid where the prohibited conduct is not sufficiently defined. (Jordan v. De George III341 U.S.
223, 95 L. Ed. 886; Winters v. People of State of New York. 333 U.S. 507; 92 L. Ed 840) The requirement of statutory
specificity has the dual purpose of giving adequate notice of acts which are forbidden and of informing accused of the
nature of offense charged so that he may defend himself. (Amsel v. Brooks, 106 A. 2d 152, 141 Conn. 288; 67 S. Ct.
125, 348 U.S. 880, 91 L. Ed. 693)".

25"Winters v. People of State of Newyork 333 US 507; 92 L. Ed. 840 -- "A penal statute must set up ascertainable standards
so that men of common intelligence are not required to guess at its meaning, either as to persons within the scope of the act or
as to the apllicable test to ascertain guilt."

26 Sullivan v. United States 332 U.S. 689; 92 L. Ed. 297.

27 United States v. Dettra Flag co. D.C. Pa., 86 F. Supp. 84.

28 Winters v. People of State of New York, supra.

29 State v. Tsutomu Ikeda, 143 P. 2d 880, followed in State v. Waller 143 P. 2d 884.

30"Senator Gonzales. To commit the offense of plunder, as defined in this Act and while constituting a single offense, it must
consist of a series of overt or criminal acts, such as bribery, extortion, malversation, of public funds, swindling, falsification of
public documents, coercion, theft, fraud and illegal exaction, and graft or corrupt practices act and like offenses. Now, Mr.
President, I think, this provision, by itself, will be vague. I am afraid that it might be faulted for being violative of the due
process clause and the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation of an accused. Because, what is meant by
"series of overt or criminal acts"? I mean, would 2, 3, 4 or 5 constitute a series? During the period of amendments, can we
establish a minimum of overt acts like, for example, robbery in band? The law defines what is robbery in band by the number
of participants therein. In this particular case, probably, we can statutorily provide for the definition of "series" so that two, for
example, would that already be a series? Or, three, what would be the basis for such a determination?" (Record of the Senate,
June 5, 1989, Vol. IV, No. 140, p. 1310).

31
"Senator Paterno. Mr. President, not too clear yet on the reason for trying to define a crime of plunder. Could I get some
further clarification?

Senator Tanada. Yes, Mr. President.

Because of our experience in the former regime, we feel that there is a need for Congress to pass the legislation
which would cover a crime of this magnitude. While it is true, we already have the Anti-Graft Law. But that does not
directly deal with plunder. That covers only the corrupt practices of public officials as well as their spouses and
relatives within the civil degree, and the Anti-Graft law as presently worded would not adequately or sufficiently
address the problems that we experienced during the past regime.

Senator Paterno. May I try to give the Gentleman, Mr. President, my understanding of the bill?

Senator Tanada. Yes.

Senator Paterno. I envision that this bill or this kind of plunder would cover a discovered interconnection of certain
acts, particularly, violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act when, after the different acts are looked at, a
scheme of conspiracy can be detected, such scheme or conspiracy consummated by the different criminal acts or
violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, such that the scheme or conspiracy becomes a sin, as a large
scheme to defraud the public or rob the public treasury. It is parang robo and banda. It is considered as that. And, the
bill seeks to define or says that P100 million is that level at which ay talagang sobra na dapat nang parusahan ng
husto. Would it be a correct interpretation or assessment of the intent of the bill?

Senator Tanada. Yes, Mr. President. The fact that under existing law, there can be only one offense charged in the
information, that makes it very cumbersome and difficult to go after these grafters if we would not come out with this
bill. That is what is happening now; because of that rule that there can be only one offense charged per information,
then we are having difficulty in charging all the public officials who would seem to have committed these corrupt
practices. With this bill, we could come out with just one information, and that would cover all the series of criminal
acts that may have been committed by him.

xxxxxx

Senator Romulo. To follow up the interpolations of Senator Paterno and Maceda, this crime of plunder as envisioned
here contemplates of a series or a scheme as responded by the distinguished Sponsor.

Senator Tanada. That is correct, Mr. President. (Record of Senate, June 5, 1989, Vol. IV, No. 140, p. 1315)

xxxxxx
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I was going to suggest prior to Senator Maceda that on line 24: "SHALL THROUGH
ONE overt or criminal act OR…." I was just thinking of one which is really not a "series.",

The President. If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts of
plunder" there should be, at least, two or more. (Record of the Senate, June 6, 1989, Vol. IV, No. 141, p. 1399).

32 Tarsia v. Nick’s Laundry & Linen Supply Co., 399 P. 2d 28, 29, 239 Or. 562; Words and Phrases, 38A p. 441.

For purposes of Rule permitting government to charge several defendants under one indictment if they have
participated in same "series" of acts or transactions, a "series" is something more than mere "similar" acts.

33 Opposition to the Motion to Quash of Accused Joseph Estrada dated June 21, 2001, p. 9.

34 Comment to the Amended Petition dated July 16, 2001, p. 14.

35 United States v. Laub, 385 US 475, 17 L Ed 2d 526, 87 S Ct 574.

36 State v. Nelson, 95 N.W. 2d 678.

3722 C.J.S. §24 (2); People v. Bevilacqua, 170 N.Y. S. 2d 423; Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S Ct 618, 83
L. Ed. 888; United States v. DeCadena, D.C. 105 F. Supp. 202.

38
21 Am Jur §17 p. 129.

39 Tresolini and Shapiro, American Constitutional Law, 3rd Edition, p. 23.

40 State v. Evans, 245 P. 2d 788, 73 Idaho 50.

41 Abraham, Perry, Freedom and the Court, 1998, p. 25.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

It is an ancient maxim in law that in times of frenzy and excitement, when the desire to do justice is tarnished by anger and vengeance,
there is always the danger that vital protections accorded an accused may be taken away.

The Plunder Law and its amendment were enacted to meet a national problem demanding especially immediate and effective attention.
By its very nature, the law deserved or required legislative drafting of the highest order of clarity and precision.

Substantive due process dictates that there should be no arbitrariness, unreasonableness or ambiguity in any law which deprives a
person of his life or liberty. The trial and other procedures leading to conviction may be fair and proper. But if the law itself is not
reasonable legislation, due process is violated. Thus, an accused may not be sentenced to suffer the lethal injection or life
imprisonment for an offense understood only after judicial construction takes over where Congress left off, and interpretation supplies
its meaning.

The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process 1 as well as the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.2 Substantive due process requires that a criminal statute should not be vague and
uncertain.3 More explicitly –

That the terms of a penal statute. . . must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to penalties, is a well–recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules
of law. And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process. 4

The doctrine of constitutional uncertainty is also based on the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation.5 Fundamental fairness dictates that a person cannot be sent to jail for a crime that he cannot with reasonable certainty
know he was committing.6 Statutes defining crimes run afoul of the due process clause if they fail to give adequate guidance to those
who would be law-abiding, to advise defendants of the nature of the offense with which they are charged or to guide courts trying those
who are accused.7 In short, laws which create crime ought to be so explicit that all men subject to their penalties may know what acts it
is their duty to avoid.8

A reading of the Plunder Law immediately shows that it is phrased in a manner not susceptible to ready or clear understanding. In the
desire to cover under one single offense of plunder every conceivable criminal activity committed by a high government official in the
course of his duties, Congress has come out with a law unduly vague, uncertain and broad.
The doctrines of overbreadth and void-for-vagueness in Constitutional Law were developed in the context of freedom of speech and of
the press. However, they apply equally, if not more so, to capital offenses. In the present case, what the law seeks to protect or regulate
involves the deprivation of life itself and not merely the regulation of expression.

In its early formulation, the overbreadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.9

A statute, especially one involving criminal prosecution, must be definite to be valid. A statute is vague or overbroad, in violation of the
due process clause, where its language does not convey sufficiently definite warning to the average person as to the prohibited
conduct. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. 10

It is not only prosecutors and judges who are concerned. The need for definiteness applies with greater force to the accused and those
in positions where opportunities for them to commit the proscribed offense are present. They must understand exactly what prohibited
activity will be punished by capital punishment. Sadly, even the record of deliberations in Congress cited in the motion to quash shows
that even the members of the Senate who are illustrious lawyers found the Plunder Law vague.

Under Section 1 of R.A. 7080 and Section 12 of R.A. 7659, the acquisition of at least P50,000,000.00 of ill-gotten wealth is punished
by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed as follows:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit
from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer concerned;

3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees
and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. 11

The crimes of malversation of public funds and bribery, which appear to be included among the modes of committing plunder, have
acquired well-defined meanings under our present penal statutes. The accused immediately knows how to defend and justify his
actions. The prosecution understands the quantum and nature of the evidence he has to produce in court. The Judge can apply the law
with straight and positive judgment because there is no vagueness about it.

The Sandiganbayan, however, has ruled that the Plunder Law does not make any reference to any specific provision of laws other than
R.A. 7080, as amended. It is an entirely new offense where malversation or bribery become "generic terms" according to the court. And
since "generic" refers to an entire group or class of related matters, the discretion given to the prosecutor and the judge figuratively runs
riot.

Under the same paragraph of the Plunder Law, malversation is lumped with "misuse of public funds." Misuse can be as innocuous as
error or it can be as severe as corruption or embezzlement. The terms "abuse," "distortion," "misapplication," "mismanagement," "poor
stewardship," "malpractice," "debasement," or "breach of trust," all conceivably fall under the generic term "misuse." Exactly when does
an administrative offense of misuse become the capital crime of plunder? What degree of misuse is contemplated under the law?

A penal law violates due process where inherently vague statutory language permits selective law enforcement. 12Under the Plunder
Law, a crusading public officer who steps on too many important toes in the course of his campaign could be prosecuted for a capital
offense, while for exactly the same acts, an official who tries to please everybody can be charged whether administratively or for a
much lighter offense.

For instance, direct bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code is punished with prision mayor in its medium or minimum
periods, prision correccional in its medium period, or prision mayor in its minimum period, depending on the manner of
commission.13 Indirect bribery under Article 211 is punished with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.14 Under the
Plunder Law, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The void-for-vagueness infirmity becomes all the more apparent if the
proscribed activity is "misuse of public funds." The prosecutor is given broad powers of selective law enforcement. For "misuse," exactly
the same acts could be punished with death under the Plunder Law, or mere dismissal with prejudice to future government employment
under the Civil Service Law.

The provision in the Plunder Law on "implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests"
also calls for more specific elucidation. If the only person benefited is himself, does that fall under "particular person?" Decrees and
orders issued by a top government official may be intended to benefit certain segments of society such as farmers, manufacturers,
residents of a geographical area and the like. If in the process a close relative acquires P50,000,000.00 because of development in that
sector solely because of the decree and without lifting a finger, is that plunder? The vagueness can be better appreciated by referring to
petitioner’s arguments that the element of mens rea in mala in se crimes has been abolished and the offenses have been converted
to mala prohibita. If the guilty intent is eliminated, even innocent acts can be plunder. The law was not drafted for petitioner alone. It
applies to all public officers.
As petitioner has stated, what Congress did in enacting the Plunder Law was to take out the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
malversation, estafa, bribery, and other crimes committed by public officers, mix these with special laws on graft and corruption and
together with a couple of non-criminal acts, combine them into a special law and call it "plunder."

Early in the history of this Court, it ruled that in acts mala in se, the criminal intent governs. But in those acts mala prohibita, the only
inquiry is: has the law been violated?15 Acts constituting malversation, estafa, and bribery are mala in se. The courts must inquire into
the criminal intent, the evil nature or wrongful disposition behind the criminal acts. In mala prohibita crimes, there is a violation of a
prohibitory law and the inquiry is, therefore, has the law been violated?

In the crime of plunder, it is enough that the acts defining malversation or bribery are described. The court then proceeds to determine
whether the acts fall under the prohibitory terms of the law. Criminal intent no longer has to be proved. The criminal intent to commit the
crime is not required to be proved. The desire to benefit particular persons does not have to spring from criminal intent under the
special law creating the crime of plunder. In malversation or bribery under the Revised Penal Code, the criminal intent is an important
element of the criminal acts. Under the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are committed.

Thus, even if the accused can prove lack of criminal intent with respect to crimes mala in se, this will not exonerate him under the
crime mala prohibita. This violates substantive due process and the standards of fair play because mens rea is a constitutional
guarantee under the due process clause. Indeed, as stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Morisette v. U.S.:16

The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to change the weights and balances in the scales of justice. The purpose
and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution’s party to conviction, to
strip the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the
freedom heretofore allowed juries. Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual should not be extended to
common law crimes on judicial initiative. (Emphasis ours)

By grafting several felonies, some mala in se and some mala prohibita, to constitute the crime of plunder and by doing away with the
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt for the component elements, the State would practically be given the judicial imprimatur to
impose the extreme penalty of death on the basis of proof only of the overall pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme
or conspiracy. This attempt of Congress to tip the scales of criminal justice in favor of the state by doing away with the element of mens
rea and to pave the way for the accused to be convicted by depriving him of the defense of criminal intent as to mala in se components
of plunder will be anathema to substantive due process which insures "respect for those personal immunities which are so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 17

Equally disagreeable is the provision of the Plunder Law which does away with the requirement that each and every component of the
criminal act of plunder be proved and instead limits itself to proving only a pattern of overt acts indicative of the unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.18 In effect, the law seeks to penalize the accused only on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy, and does away with
the rights of the accused insofar as the component crimes are concerned. In other words, R.A. No. 7080 circumvents the obligation of
the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime of plunder, because the law requires
merely proof of a pattern of overt acts showing an unlawful scheme or conspiracy. What aggravates matters on this point is that under
controlling case law, conspiracy to defraud is not punishable under the Revised Penal Code. 19 Cutting corners on the burden of proof is
unconstitutional because the standard of reasonable doubt is part of the due process safeguard accorded an accused. The due process
clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.20

Under R.A. 7659, plunder is a heinous crime punishable by death. It is described as grievous, odious and hateful because of its
inherent or magnified wickedness, viciousness, atrocity, and perversity. There can be no quarrel with the legislative objective of
reducing the upsurge of such crimes which affect sustainable economic development and undermine the people’s faith in Government
and the latter’s ability to maintain peace and order. Nevertheless, due process commands that even though the governmental purpose
is legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means so vague and broad that they infringe on life or stifle liberty
when the end can be more narrowly achieved through existing penal statutes.

Where the statute has an overbroad sweep just as when it is vague, the hazard of loss or impairment of life or liberty is critical. 21

The problem of vagueness is reduced or eliminated if the different schemes mentioned in the law as used in the acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth are prosecuted under existing penal law. The offenses are by their nature distinct and separate from each other and have
acquired established meanings.

Thus, the acts of misappropriation or malversation may be prosecuted as separate offenses. So may the receipt of commissions, gifts,
or kickbacks by higher officials in connection with government contracts. The four other methods or schemes mentioned in the law may
be the objects of separate penal statutes.

When the law creates a new crime of plunder through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts, the courts have to supply
missing elements if conviction is to be achieved.

Bribery is punished as plunder under the law only when there is a combination or series of criminal acts. But when do certain acts
constitute a combination or series? Does the Plunder law provide that two or three acts of one crime of bribery constitute a combination
or series which qualify bribery into plunder? Or does bribery have to be conjoined with the separate offense of malversation to become
a combination? Or with malversation and fraudulent conveyance or disposition of public assets or one of the other means or schemes
before it becomes a series?

I find it difficult to accept the wide discretion given to the prosecution by the Plunder Law. An elective official who is a political threat
may be charged for plunder as one single offense punishable by death while one in the good graces of the powers-that-be is charged
only under the Revised Penal Code.

The confusion generated by a vague law is exemplified in the informations filed against petitioner in this case. Petitioner was charged
with eight crimes, namely: [1] plunder; [2] violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019; [3] violation of Section 3 (a) of R.A. 3019; [4] another
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019; [5] violation of Section 3 (c) of R.A. 3019; [6] violation of Section 7 (d) of R.A. 6713; [7] perjury;
[8] illegal use of alias.
Only twelve days later, the prosecution withdrew five (5) of the informations which it consolidated into only one offense of plunder. The
prosecution was not clear about the steps to take in instances where the words "combination" or "series" may or may not apply. It could
not understand the coverage of the law as acts repetitive of the same offense or acts constituting one crime lumped up with other
crimes or both criminal and non-criminal acts punished as one new offense of plunder.

In the following exchange during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 733, Senators Neptali Gonzales and Wigberto Tanada voiced
serious doubts on the constitutionality of the definition of plunder, thus:

Senator Gonzales:

To commit the offense of plunder, as defined in this act, and while constituting a single offense, it must consist of a series of overt or
criminal acts, such as bribery, extortion, malversation of public funds, swindling, falsification of public documents, coercion, theft, fraud,
and illegal exaction and graft or corrupt practices and like offenses. Now, Mr. President, I think this provision, by itself will be vague.
I am afraid that it may be faulted for being violative of the due process clause and the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation of an accused. Because what is meant by "series of overt or criminal acts?" I mean, would 2, 4, or 5
constitute a series? During the period of amendments, can we establish a minimum of overt acts like, for example, robbery in band?
The law defines what is robbery in band by the number of participants therein. In this particular case, probably, we can statutorily
provide for the definition of "series" so that two, for example, would that already be a series? Or, three, what would be the
basis for such determination?

Senator Tanada:

I think, Mr. President, that would be called for, this being a penal legislation, we should be very clear as to what it encompasses;
otherwise, we may contravene the constitutional provision on the right of accused to due process. (Emphasis ours)22

The foregoing concerns to statutorily provide for the definition of "series" or "combination" have, however, not been addressed and the
terms were left undefined. The law, as presently crafted, does not specify whether a "series" means two, three, four or even more of the
overt or criminal acts listed in Section 1 (d) of R.A. 7080.

Even more difficult to accept is when the trial court has to supply the missing elements, in effect taking over corrective or punitive
legislation from Congress. The attempts of the Sandiganbayan in the questioned Resolution do not clarify. They instead serve to
confuse and increase the ambiguity even more.

The Sandiganbayan interprets the words "combination" and "series" of overt or criminal acts through terms found in American decisions
like "pattern," "conspiracy," "over-all unlawful scheme," or "general plan of action or method."

The above definitions are not found in the Plunder Law. The use of such phrases as "over-all scheme" or "general plan" indicates that
the Sandiganbayan is expanding the coverage of the law through the use of ambiguous phrases capable of dual or multiple
applications. When do two or three acts of the same offense of malversation constitute a "pattern," "a general plan of action," or an
"over-all scheme?" Would one malversation in the first week of a public officer’s tenure and another similar act six (6) years later
become a "combination," a "pattern," or a "general plan of action?"

I agree with petitioner’s concern over the danger that the trial court may allow the specifications of details in an information to validate a
statute inherently void for vagueness. An information cannot rise higher than the statute upon which it is based. Not even the
construction by the Sandiganbayan of a vague or ambiguous provision can supply the missing ingredients of the Plunder Law.

The right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is most often exemplified in the care with
which a complaint or information should be drafted. However, the clarity and particularity required of an information should also be
present in the law upon which the charges are based. If the penal law is vague, any particularity in the information will come from the
prosecutor. The prosecution takes over the role of Congress.

The fact that the details of the charges are specified in the Information will not cure the statute of its constitutional infirmity. If on its face
the challenged provision is repugnant to the due process clause, specification of details of the offense intended to be charged would not
serve to validate it.23 In other words, it is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and warns
against transgression. No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are
entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids. 24

Definiteness is a due process requirement. It is especially important in its application to penal statutes. Vagueness and unintelligibility
will invariably lead to arbitrary government action. The purpose of the due process clause is to exclude everything that is arbitrary and
capricious affecting the rights of the citizen.25 Congress, in exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime, must inform the
citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and know
what acts it is his duty to avoid.26

The questioned statutes were enacted purportedly in the interest of justice, public peace and order, and the rule of law. These purposes
are not served by R.A. Nos. 7080 and 7659. These statutes allow the prosecutors and the courts arbitrary and too broad discretionary
powers in their enforcement. Fair, equal and impartial justice would be denied.

For all the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition and nullify the Plunder Law for being unconstitutional.

Footnotes

1 Constitution, Article III, Sections 1, 12 & 14.


2 Constitution, Article III, Section 14.

3 People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186, 195 [1988].

4 Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 [1926].

5 Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 [1926].

6 People v. Nazario, supra; Scull v. Commonwealth, 359 U.S. 344, 353.

7 Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95; 92 L Ed. 562.

8 U.S. v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278, 35 L Ed. 190, 193.

9 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288.

10
U.S. v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1; U.S. v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169; U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100.

11 Republic Act No. 7080, Section 1 (d).

12 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566.

13"Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official
duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of
another, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three times the
value of the gift, in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed.

"If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime,
and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said
act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its medium period
and a fine of not less than twice the value of such gift.

"If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain from doing something
which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision correccionalin its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period and a fine of not less than three times the value of such gift.

"In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty of special
temporary disqualification.

"The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors, arbitrators, appraisal
and claim commissioners, experts or any other persons performing public duties."

14"The penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, suspension and public censure shall be imposed
upon any public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office."

15 U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 134 [1909].

16 342 U.S. 246.

17 Rochin v. California, 324 U.S. 165, 168.

18Republic Act No. 7080, "Section 4. Rule of Evidence. –-- For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate of acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy."

19 U.S. v. Lim Buanco, 14 Phil. 472 [1910]; U.S. v. Remigio, 39 Phil. 599 [1919].

20 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 ,364.

21See Keyshian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, 385 U.S. 589; and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479.

22
Record of the Senate, June 5, 1989, Vol. IV, No. 140, p. 1310.

23 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).

24 Ibid., p. 453.

25
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502.

26 Musser v. Utah, supra; Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399; United States v. Brewer, supra.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:

Before I explain my vote, I think it necessary to restate the basic facts.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was President of the Philippines until January 20, 2001 when he was forced to vacate the presidency
by people power and then Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo succeeded him in office.1He was charged, in eight cases filed with
the Sandiganbayan, with various offenses committed while in office, among them plunder, for allegedly having amassed ill-gotten
wealth in the amount of P4.1 billion, more or less. He moved to quash the information for plunder on the ground that R.A. No. 7080,
otherwise called the Anti-Plunder Law, is unconstitutional and that the information charges more than one offense.

In its resolution dated July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion, along with those filed by his co-accused, Edward
Serapio, and his son, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada. Petitioner brought this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to set aside the
Sandiganbayan’s resolution principally on the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law is void for being vague and overbroad. We gave due
course to the petition and required respondents to file comments and later heard the parties in oral arguments on September 18, 2001
and on their memoranda filed on September 28, 2001 to consider the constitutional claims of petitioner.

I. THE ANTI-PLUNDER LAW

The Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. No. 7080) was enacted by Congress on July 12, 1991 pursuant to the constitutional mandate that "the
State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption."2 Section 2 of the statute provides:

Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. ¾ Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives
by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at
least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and
all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the
deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. (As amended by Sec. 12, R.A. No. 7659).

The term "ill-gotten wealth" is defined in §1(d) as follows:

"Ill-gotten wealth," means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section
Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by
any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit
from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer concerned;

3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees
and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 4 of the said law states:

Rule of Evidence. ¾ For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

II. ANTI-PLUNDER LAW NOT TO BE JUDGED


"ON ITS FACE"

The amended information against petitioner charges violations of §2, in relation to §1(d)(1)(2), of the statute. It reads:

AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former President of the
Republic of the Philippines, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a "Asiong Salonga" and a.k.a "Jose Velarde," together with Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John Does & Jane Does, of the crime of plunder, defined and penalized under R.A.
No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then a public officer, being then the President of the Republic of the Philippines, by himself and/or in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates and/or other persons, by taking undue advantage of his official position, authority, relationship, connection, or influence,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by himself, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of four billion ninety seven million eight hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three pesos
and seventeen centavos [₱4,097,804,173.17], more or less, thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or
similar schemes or means, described as follows:

(a) by receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate amount of five hundred forty-
five million pesos (₱545,000,000.00), more or less, from illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any
form of pecuniary benefit, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie "Atong" Ang, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, and John Does and Jane Does, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal
gambling;

(b) by diverting, receiving, misappropriating, converting or misusing directly or indirectly, for his or their personal gain and
benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [₱130,000,000.00], more or less,
representing a portion of the two hundred million pesos [₱200,000,000.00] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province
of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie "Atong" Ang, Alma Alfaro, John
Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and other John Does and Jane
Does;

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, for his personal gain and benefit, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
to purchase 351,878,000 shares of stocks, more or less, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 shares of stocks,
more or less, of the Belle Corporation in the amount of more or less one billion one hundred two million nine hundred sixty five
thousand six hundred seven pesos and fifty centavos [₱1,102,965,607.50] and more or less seven hundred forty four million
six hundred twelve thousand and four hundred fifty pesos [₱744,612,450.00], respectively, or a total of more or less one billion
eight hundred forty seven million five hundred seventy eight thousand fifty seven pesos and fifty centavos
[₱1,847,578,057.50]; and by collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by himself and/or in connivance with John Does and
Jane Does, commissions or percentages by reason of said purchases of shares of stock in the amount of one hundred eighty
nine million seven hundred thousand pesos [₱189,700,000.00], more or less, from the Belle Corporation which became part of
the deposit in the Equitable-PCI Bank under the account name "Jose Velarde";

(d) by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares, percentages, kickbacks, or any form of pecuniary benefits, in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does, in the amount of more or less three billion two hundred thirty three million one
hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three pesos and seventeen centavos [₱3,233,104,173.17] and depositing the
same under his account name "Jose Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI Bank.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001

But, although this is a prosecution under §2, in relation to §1(d)(1)(2), what we are seeing here is a wholesale attack on the validity of
the entire statute. Petitioner makes little effort to show the alleged invalidity of the statute as applied to him. His focus is instead on the
statute as a whole as he attacks "on their face" not only §§1(d)(1)(2) of the statute but also its other provisions which deal with plunder
committed by illegal or fraudulent disposition of government assets (§1(d)(3)), acquisition of interest in business (§1(d)(4)), and
establishment of monopolies and combinations or implementation of decrees intended to benefit particular persons or special interests
(§1(d)(5)).

These other provisions of the statute are irrelevant to this case. What relevance do questions regarding the establishment of
monopolies and combinations, or the ownership of stocks in a business enterprise, or the illegal or fraudulent dispositions of
government property have to the criminal prosecution of petitioner when they are not even mentioned in the amended information filed
against him? Why should it be important to inquire whether the phrase "overt act" in §1(d) and §2 means the same thing as the phrase
"criminal act" as used in the same provisions when the acts imputed to petitioner in the amended information are criminal acts? Had the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code been subjected to this kind of line-by-line scrutiny whenever a portion thereof was involved in a
case, it is doubtful if we would have the jurisprudence on penal law that we have today. The prosecution of crimes would certainly have
been hampered, if not stultified. We should not even attempt to assume the power we are asked to exercise. "The delicate power of
pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised with reference to hypothetical cases . . . . In determining the
sufficiency of the notice a statute must of necessity be examined in the light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged."3

Nonetheless, it is contended that because these provisions are void for being vague and overbroad, the entire statute, including the part
under which petitioner is being prosecuted, is also void. And if the entire statute is void, there is no law under which he can be
prosecuted for plunder. Nullum crimen sine lege, nullum poena sine lege.

Two justifications are advanced for this facial challenge to the validity of the entire statute. The first is that the statute comes within the
specific prohibitions of the Constitution and, for this reason, it must be given strict scrutiny and the normal presumption of
constitutionality should not be applied to it nor the usual judicial deference given to the judgment of Congress. 4 The second justification
given for the facial attack on the Anti-Plunder Law is that it is vague and overbroad.5

We find no basis for such claims either in the rulings of this Court or of those of the U.S. Supreme Court, from which petitioner’s
counsel purports to draw for his conclusions. We consider first the claim that the statute must be subjected to strict scrutiny.
A. Test of Strict Scrutiny Not Applicable to Penal Statutes

Petitioner cites the dictum in Ople v. Torres6 that "when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this Court will give the challenged
law, administrative order, rule or regulation stricter scrutiny" and that "It will not do for authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties." As will presently be shown, "strict scrutiny," as used in that decision, is not the same thing as the
"strict scrutiny" urged by petitioner. Much less did this Court rule that because of the need to give "stricter scrutiny" to laws abridging
fundamental freedoms, it will not give such laws the presumption of validity.

Petitioner likewise cites "the most celebrated footnote in [American] constitutional law," i.e., footnote 4 of the opinion in United States v.
Carolene Products Co.,7 in which it was stated:

There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.

It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.

Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial
minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.

Again, it should be noted that what the U.S. Supreme Court said is that "there may be narrower scope for the operation of the
presumption of constitutionality" for legislation which comes within the first ten amendments to the American Federal Constitution
compared to legislation covered by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The American Court did not say that such
legislation is not to be presumed constitutional, much less that it is presumptively invalid, but only that a "narrower scope" will be given
for the presumption of constitutionality in respect of such statutes. There is, therefore, no warrant for petitioner’s contention that "the
presumption of constitutionality of a legislative act is applicable only where the Supreme Court deals with facts regarding ordinary
economic affairs, not where the interpretation of the text of the Constitution is involved." 8

What footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case posits is a double standard of judicial review: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with
freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and deferential or rational basis standard of review for economic legislation. As
Justice (later Chief Justice) Fernando explained in Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Ass’n v. The City Mayor,9 this simply means that
"if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous
and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects what are at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is wider."

Hence, strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race and facial
challenges are allowed for this purpose. But criminal statutes, like the Anti-Plunder Law, while subject to strict construction, are not
subject to strict scrutiny. The two (i.e., strict construction and strict scrutiny) are not the same. The rule of strict construction is a rule of
legal hermeneutics which deals with the parsing of statutes to determine the intent of the legislature. On the other hand, strict scrutiny is
a standard of judicial review for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of
fundamental freedoms. It is set opposite such terms as "deferential review" and "intermediate review."

Thus, under deferential review, laws are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest, without courts seriously
inquiring into the substantiality of such interest and examining the alternative means by which the objectives could be achieved. Under
intermediate review, the substantiality of the governmental interest is seriously looked into and the availability of less restrictive
alternatives are considered. Under strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental
interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. 10

Considering these degrees of strictness in the review of statutes, how many criminal laws can survive the test of strict scrutiny to which
petitioner proposes to subject them? How many can pass muster if, as petitioner would have it, such statutes are not to be presumed
constitutional? Above all, what will happen to the State’s ability to deal with the problem of crimes, and, in particular, with the problem of
graft and corruption in government, if criminal laws are to be upheld only if it is shown that there is a compelling governmental interest
for making certain conduct criminal and if there is no other means less restrictive than that contained in the law for achieving such
governmental interest?

B. Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrines, as Grounds for Facial Challenge,


Not Applicable to Penal Laws

Nor do allegations that the Anti-Plunder Law is vague and overbroad justify a facial review of its validity. The void-for-vagueness
doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." 11 The
overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." 12

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself
as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." 13 The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." 14 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,15 the Court ruled that "claims of
facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and,
again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to
be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative Act is … the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid."16 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others."17

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in
free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." 18 As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] ‘as applied’ to a particular defendant." 19 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner’s claim that
this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

C. Anti-Plunder Law Should be Construed "As Applied"

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not
before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. 20 It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement
of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. 21 But, as the U.S.
Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris:22

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute
is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the
impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line
analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided.

This is the reason "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly
and only as a last resort,"23 and is generally disfavored.24 In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which
are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. 25

This brings me to the question whether, as applied, §2, in relation to §1(d)(1)(2), of the Anti-Plunder Law is void on the ground of
vagueness and overbreadth.

III. ANTI-PLUNDER LAW NEITHER VAGUE NOR OVERBROAD

As earlier noted, the case against petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada in the Sandiganbayan is for violation of §2, in relation to
§1(d)(1)(2), of the Anti-Plunder Law, which, so far as pertinent, provide:

SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. ¾ Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death....

SEC. 1. Definition of Terms. ¾ ...

(d) "Ill-gotten wealth," means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of
Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit
from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer concerned;

The charge is that in violation of these provisions, during the period June 1998 to January 2001, petitioner, then the President of the
Philippines, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amassed wealth in the total amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, through "a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts," to wit: (1) by receiving or collecting the total amount of P545,000,000.00, more or less,
from illegal gambling by himself and/or in connivance with his co-accused named therein, in exchange for protection of illegal gambling;
(2) by misappropriating, converting, or misusing, by himself or in connivance with his co-accused named therein, public funds
amounting to P130,000,000.00, more or less, representing a portion of the share of the Province of Ilocos Sur in the tobacco excise tax;
(3) by ordering the GSIS and the SSS to buy shares of stocks of the Belle Corp., worth P1,102,965,607.50 and P744,612,450.00
respectively, or the total amount of P1,847,578,057.50, for which he received as commission the amount of P189,700,000.00, more or
less, from Belle Corp.; (4) by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares, percentages, and kickbacks in the amount of
P3,233,104,173.17, which he deposited in the Equitable-PCI Bank under the name of "Jose Velarde."
Anyone reading the law in relation to this charge cannot possibly be mistaken as to what petitioner is accused of in Criminal Case No.
26558 of the Sandiganbayan. But, repeatedly, petitioner complains that the law is vague and deprives him of due process. He invokes
the ruling in Connally v. General Constr. Co.26 that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law." He does this by questioning not only §2, in relation to §1(d)(1)(2), as applied to him, but also other provisions of the
Anti-Plunder Law not involved in this case. In 55 out of 84 pages of discussion in his Memorandum, petitioner tries to show why on their
face these provisions are vague and overbroad by asking questions regarding the meaning of some words and phrases in the statute,
to wit:

1. Whether "series" means two, three, or four overt or criminal acts listed in §1(d) in view of the alleged divergence of
interpretation given to this word by the Ombudsman, the Solicitor General, and the Sandiganbayan, and whether the acts in a
series should be directly related to each other;

2. Whether "combination" includes two or more acts or at least two of the "means or similar schemes" mentioned in §1(d);

3. Whether "pattern" as used in §1(d) must be related to the word "pattern" in §4 which requires that it be "indicative of an
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy";

4. Whether "overt" means the same thing as "criminal";

5. Whether "misuse of public funds" is the same as "illegal use of public property or technical malversation";

6. Whether "raids on the public treasury" refers to raids on the National Treasury or the treasury of a province or municipality;

7. Whether the receipt or acceptance of a gift, commission, kickback, or pecuniary benefits in connection with a government
contract or by reason of his office, as used in §1(d)(2), is the same as bribery in the Revised Penal Code or those which are
considered corrupt practices of public officers;

8. Whether "illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government," as used in
§1(d)(3), refers to technical malversation or illegal use of public funds or property in the Revised Penal Code;

9. Whether mere ownership of stocks in a private corporation, such as a family firm engaged in fishing, is prohibited under
§1(d)(4);

10. Whether the phrase "monopolies or other combinations in restraint of trade" in §1(d)(5) means the same thing as
"monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade" in the Revised Penal Code because the latter contemplates monopolies
and combinations established by any person, not necessarily a public officer; and

11. Whether under §1(d)(5) it is the public officer who intends to confer benefit on a particular person by implementing a
decree or it is the decree that is intended to benefit the particular person and the public officer simply implements it.

Many more questions of this tenor are asked in the memorandum of petitioner 27 as well as in the dissent of MR. JUSTICE KAPUNAN.
Not only are they irrelevant to this case, as already pointed out. It is also evident from their examination that what they present are
simply questions of statutory construction to be resolved on a case-to-case basis. Consider, for example, the following words and
phrases in §1(d) and §2:

A. "Combination or series of overt or criminal acts"

Petitioner contends that the phrase "combination or series of overt, or criminal acts" in §1(d) and §2 should state how many acts are
needed in order to have a "combination" or a "series." It is not really required that this be specified. Petitioner, as well as MR. JUSTICE
KAPUNAN, cites the following remarks of Senators Gonzales and Tañada during the discussion of S. No. 733 in the Senate:

SENATOR GONZALES. To commit the offense of plunder, as defined in this Act while constituting a single offense, it must consist of a
series of overt or criminal acts, such as bribery, extortion, malversation of public funds, swindling, falsification of public documents,
coercion, theft, fraud, and illegal exaction, and graft or corrupt practices act and like offenses. Now, Mr. President, I think, this provision,
by itself, will be vague. I am afraid that it might be faulted for being violative of the due process clause and the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation of an accused. Because, what is meant by "series of overt or criminal acts"? I mean, would 2, 3, 4
or 5 constitute a series? During the period of amendments, can we establish a minimum of overt acts like, for example, robbery in
band? The law defines what is robbery in band by the number of participants therein.

In this particular case, probably, we can statutorily provide for the definition of "series" so that two, for example, would that be already a
series? Or, three, what would be the basis for such a determination?

SENATOR TAÑADA. I think, Mr. President, that would be called for, this being a penal legislation, we should be very clear as to what it
encompasses; otherwise, we may contravene the constitutional provision on the right of the accused to due process. 28

But, as the later discussion in the Senate shows, the senators in the end reached a consensus as to the meaning of the phrase so that
an enumeration of the number of acts needed was no longer proposed. Thus, the record shows:

SENATOR MACEDA. In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result in such a big
amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or." To read, therefore: "or conspiracy
COMMITTED by criminal acts such." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.

SENATOR TAÑADA. That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.

THE PRESIDENT. Probably, two or more would be . . .


SENATOR MACEDA. Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.

SENATOR TAÑADA: Accepted, Mr. President.

....

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts of plunder"
there should be, at least, two or more.

SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President. 29

Indeed, the record shows that no amendment to S. No. 733 was proposed to this effect. To the contrary, Senators Gonzales and
Tañada voted in favor of the bill on its third and final reading on July 25, 1989. The ordinary meaning of the term "combination" as the
"union of two things or acts" was adopted, although in the case of "series," the senators agreed that a repetition of two or more times of
the same thing or act would suffice, thus departing from the ordinary meaning of the word as "a group of usually three or more things or
events standing or succeeding in order and having a like relationship to each other," or "a spatial or temporal succession of persons or
things," or "a group that has or admits an order of arrangement exhibiting progression." 30

In the Bicameral Conference Committee on Justice meeting held on May 7, 1991, the same meanings were given to the words
"combination" and "series." Representative Garcia explained that a combination is composed of two or more of the overt or criminal
acts enumerated in §1(d), while a series is a repetition of any of the same overt or criminal acts. Thus:

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say, THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR
CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are
two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of
the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?

....

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that ¾

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Two.

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes, combination is not twice ¾ but combination, two acts.

REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It can not be a repetition of the same
act.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): That be referred to series. Yeah.

REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): A series.

REP. ISIDRO: That’s not [a] series. It’s a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more,
‘di ba?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes, this distinguishes it, really, from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good
suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. So. . .

....

REP. ISIDRO: When you say "combination", two different?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA): Two different. . . .

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): For example, ha. . .

REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition. . .31

Thus, resort to the deliberations in Congress will readily reveal that the word "combination" includes at least two different overt or
criminal acts listed in R.A. No. 7080, such as misappropriation (§1(d)(1)) and taking undue advantage of official position (§1(d)(6)). On
the other hand, "series" is used when the offender commits the same overt or criminal act more than once. There is no plunder if only
one act is proven, even if the ill-gotten wealth acquired thereby amounts to or exceeds the figure fixed by the law for the offense (now
P50,000,000.00). The overt or criminal acts need not be joined or separated in space or time, since the law does not make such a
qualification. It is enough that the prosecution proves that a public officer, by himself or in connivance with others, amasses wealth
amounting to at least P50 million by committing two or more overt or criminal acts.

Petitioner also contends that the phrase "series of acts or transactions" is the subject of conflicting decisions of various Circuit Courts of
Appeals in the United Sates. It turns out that the decisions concerned a phrase in Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides:

(b) Joinder of Defendants: Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have
participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such
defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged on each count.
(Emphasis added)

The fact that there is a conflict in the rulings of the various courts does not mean that Rule 8(b) is void for being vague but only that the
U.S. Supreme Court should step in, for one of its essential functions is to assure the uniform interpretation of federal laws.

We have a similar provision in Rule 3, §6 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure. It reads:

SEC. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. ¾ All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise
provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all
such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any
plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest.
(Emphasis added)

This provision has been in our Rules of Court since 1940 but it has never been thought of as vague. It will not do, therefore, to cite the
conflict of opinions in the United States as evidence of the vagueness of the phrase when we do not have any conflict in this country.

B. "Pattern of overt or criminal acts"

Petitioner contends that it is not enough that there be at least two acts to constitute either a combination or series because §4 also
mentions "a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy," and "pattern" means "an arrangement or
order of things or activity."

A "pattern of overt or criminal acts" is required in §4 to prove "an unlawful scheme or conspiracy." In such a case, it is not necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy so long as those proven show a pattern indicating
the scheme or conspiracy. In other words, when conspiracy is charged, there must be more than a combination or series of two or more
acts. There must be several acts showing a pattern which is "indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy." As Senate President
Salonga explained, if there are 150 constitutive crimes charged, it is not necessary to prove beyond reasonable doubt all of them. If a
pattern can be shown by proving, for example, 10 criminal acts, then that would be sufficient to secure conviction. 32

The State is thereby enabled by this device to deal with several acts constituting separate crimes as just one crime of plunder by
allowing their prosecution by means of a single information because there is a common purpose for committing them, namely, that of
"amassing, accumulating or acquiring wealth through such overt or criminal acts." The pattern is the organizing principle that defines
what otherwise would be discreet criminal acts into the single crime of plunder.

As thus applied to petitioner, the Anti-Plunder Law presents only problems of statutory construction, not vagueness or overbreadth.
In Primicias v. Fugoso,33 an ordinance of the City of Manila, prohibiting the holding of parades and assemblies in streets and public
places unless a permit was first secured from the city mayor and penalizing its violation, was construed to mean that it gave the city
mayor only the power to specify the streets and public places which can be used for the purpose but not the power to ban absolutely
the use of such places. A constitutional doubt was thus resolved through a limiting construction given to the ordinance.

Nor is the alleged difference of opinion among the Ombudsman, the Solicitor General, and the Sandiganbayan as to the number of acts
or crimes needed to constitute plunder proof of the vagueness of the statute and, therefore, a ground for its invalidation. For sometime it
was thought that under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code convictions can be had for the complex crime of rebellion with murder,
arson, and other common crimes. The question was finally resolved in 1956 when this Court held that there is no such complex crime
because the common crimes were absorbed in rebellion. 34 The point is that Art. 134 gave rise to a difference of opinion that nearly split
the legal profession at the time, but no one thought Art. 134 to be vague and, therefore, void.

Where, therefore, the ambiguity is not latent and the legislative intention is discoverable with the aid of the canons of construction, the
void for vagueness doctrine has no application.

In Connally v. General Constr. Co.35 the test of vagueness was formulated as follows:

[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.

Holmes’s test was that of the viewpoint of the bad man. In The Path of the Law, Holmes said:

If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which
such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in
the vaguer sanctions of conscience.36

Whether from the point of view of a man of common intelligence or from that of a bad man, there can be no mistaking the meaning of
the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to petitioner.
IV. PLUNDER A COMPLEX CRIME REQUIRING PROOF OF MENS REA

Petitioner argues that, in enacting the statute in question, Congress eliminated the element of mens rea, or the scienter, thus reducing
the burden of evidence required for proving the crimes which are mala in se.37

There are two points raised in this contention. First is the question whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se or a malum
prohibitum. For if it is a malum prohibitum, as the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General say it is,38 then there is really a constitutional
problem because the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

A. Plunder A Malum In Se Requiring Proof of Mens Rea

Plunder is a malum in se, requiring proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in sethe element of mens
rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void,
petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S. No. 733:

SENATOR TAÑADA. . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual
criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder. 39

However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentleman’s view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAÑADA. Yes, Mr. President . . .40

Señator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and
every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however,
the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.

Indeed, §2 provides that ¾

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law
indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his
criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officers in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as
principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit,
but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."41

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the
decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes
are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echagaray:42

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously
taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as
a human being. . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of
the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses
involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted
on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive
arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme
of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the
population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and
syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or
misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of
the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery,
destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators
must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se43 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a
special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
B. The Penalty for Plunder

The second question is whether under the statute the prosecution is relieved of the duty of proving beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
the defendant. It is contended that, in enacting the Anti-Plunder Law, Congress simply combined several existing crimes into a single
one but the penalty which it provided for the commission of the crime is grossly disproportionate to the crimes combined while the
quantum of proof required to prove each predicate crime is greatly reduced.

We have already explained why, contrary to petitioner’s contention, the quantum of proof required to prove the predicate crimes in
plunder is the same as that required were they separately prosecuted. We, therefore, limit this discussion to petitioner’s claim that the
penalty provided in the Anti-Plunder Law is grossly disproportionate to the penalties imposed for the predicate crimes. Petitioner cites
the following examples:

For example, please consider the following ‘combination’ or ‘series’ of overt or criminal acts (assuming the P50 M minimum has been
acquired) in light of the penalties laid down in the Penal Code:

a. One act of indirect bribery (penalized under Art. 211 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods),

– combined with –

one act of fraud against the public treasury (penalized under Art. 213 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period,

- equals -

plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death plus forfeiture of assets under R.A. 7080)

b. One act of prohibited transaction (penalized under Art. 215 of the revised Penal Code with prision correccionalin its minimum
period or a fine ranging from P200 to P1,000 or both),

– combined with –

one act of establishing a commercial monopoly (penalized under Art. 186 of Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from P200 to P6,000, or both),

-equals-

plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets under R.A. 7080.

c. One act of possession of prohibited interest by a public officer (penalized with prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine
of P200 to P1,000, or both under Art. 216 of the Revised Penal Code),

– combined with –

one act of combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade (penalized under Art. 186 of the Revised penal Code with prision
correccional in its minimum period, or a fine of P200 to P1,000, or both,

- equals -

plunder, punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets)44

But this is also the case whenever other special complex crimes are created out of two or more existing crimes. For example, robbery
with violence against or intimidation of persons under Art. 294, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code is punished with prision correccional in
its maximum period (4 years, 2 months, and 1 day) to prision mayor in its medium period (6 years and 1 day to 8 years). Homicide
under Art. 249 of the same Code is punished with reclusion temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years). But when the two crimes are
committed on the same occasion, the law treats them as a special complex crime of robbery with homicide and provides the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death for its commission. Again, the penalty for simple rape under Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion perpetua, while that for homicide under Art. 249 it is reclusion temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years). Yet, when
committed on the same occasion, the two are treated as one special complex crime of rape with homicide and punished with a heavier
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Obviously, the legislature views plunder as a crime as serious as robbery with homicide or rape
with homicide by punishing it with the same penalty. As the explanatory note accompanying S. No. 733 explains:

Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use of high office for
personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that
may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought
to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute the plunder
of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine
statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the
previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting influences of power.

Many other examples drawn from the Revised Penal Code and from special laws may be cited to show that, when special complex
crimes are created out of existing crimes, the penalty for the new crime is heavier.

______________________
To recapitulate, had R.A. No. 7080 been a law regulating speech, I would have no hesitation examining it on its face on the chance that
some of its provisions ¾ even though not here before us ¾ are void. For then the risk that some state interest might be jeopardized,
i.e., the interest in the free flow of information or the prevention of "chill" on the freedom of expression, would trump any marginal
interest in security.

But the Anti-Plunder Law is not a regulation of speech. It is a criminal statute designed to combat graft and corruption, especially those
committed by highly-placed public officials. As conduct and not speech is its object, the Court cannot take chances by examining other
provisions not before it without risking vital interests of society. Accordingly, such statute must be examined only "as applied" to the
defendant and, if found valid as to him, the statute as a whole should not be declared unconstitutional for overbreadth or vagueness of
its other provisions. Doing so, I come to the following conclusions:

1. That the validity of R.A. No. 7080, otherwise known as the Anti-Plunder Law, cannot be determined by applying the test of
strict scrutiny in free speech cases without disastrous consequences to the State’s effort to prosecute crimes and that,
contrary to petitioner’s contention, the statute must be presumed to be constitutional;

2. That in determining the constitutionality of the Anti-Plunder Law, its provisions must be considered in light of the particular
acts alleged to have been committed by petitioner;

3. That, as applied to petitioner, the statute is neither vague nor overbroad;

4. That, contrary to the contention of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General, the crime of plunder is a malum in se and not
a malum prohibitum and the burden of proving each and every predicate crime is on the prosecution.

For these reasons, I respectfully submit that R.A. No. 7080 is valid and that, therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

Footnotes

1 See Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710, March 2, 2001; Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 146715, March 2, 2001.

2 CONST., ART., Art. II, §27.

3
United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 9 L.Ed.2d 561, 565-6 (1963) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

4
Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 4-7.

5 Id. at 11-66.

6 293 SCRA 161, 166 (1998).

7 304 U.S. 144, 152, 82 L.Ed. 1234, 1241 (1938) (cases cited omitted).

8
Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 5.

9 20 SCRA 849, 865 (1967).

10 Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 Univ. of Chi. L. Rev. 46, 50-53 (1987).

Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L.Ed. 328 (1926) cited in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
11

Ass’n v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849, 867 (1967).

12 NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 12 L.Ed.2d 325, 338 (1958); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960).

13 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521, 31 L.Ed.2d 408, 413 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).

14United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L.Ed.2d 697, 707 (1987). See also People v. De la Piedra, G.R. No.
121777, Jan. 24, 2001.

15 413 U.S. 601, 612-613, 37 L.Ed. 2d 830, 840-841 (1973).

16 United States v. Salerno, supra.

17 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 369 (1982).

United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 4 L.Ed.2d 524, 529 (1960). The paradigmatic case is Yazoo & Mississippi Valley
18

RR. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 57 L.Ed. 193 (1912).

19 K. Sullivan & G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 1299 (14th ed., 2001).


20Id. at 1328. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As Applied and Facial Challenges, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321 (2000), arguing that,
in an important sense, as applied challenges are the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication and that
determinations that statutes are facially invalid properly occur only as logical outgrowths of rulings on whether statutes may be
applied to particular litigants on particular facts.

21
Const., Art. VIII, §§1 and 5. Compare Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936): "[T]he power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis motapresented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities."

22401 U.S. 37, 52-53, 27 L.Ed.2d 669, 680 (1971). Accord, United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960); Board
of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989).

23
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 613, 37 L.Ed.2d at 841; National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580
(1998).

FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 223, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990); Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
24

Resources, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000 (Mendoza, J., Separate Opinion).

25 United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 9 L.Ed.2d 561, 565-6 (1963).

26269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L.Ed. 328 (1926) cited in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Ass’n v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA
849, 867 (1967).

27 Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 11-66.

28
4 Record of the Senate 1310, June 5, 1989.

29 4 Record of the Senate 1339, June 6, 1989.

30 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2073 (1993).

31 Deliberations of the Joint Conference Committee on Justice held on May 7, 1991.

32
Deliberations of the Conference Committee on Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Laws held on Nov. 15, 1988.

33 80 Phil. 71 (1948).

34
People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956); People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 (1956).

35
269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L.Ed. 328 (1926) cited in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Ass’n v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA
849, 867 (1967).

36 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897).

37 Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 32.

38 See Memorandum for the Respondents, pp. 79-88.

39 4 Record of the Senate 1316, June 5, 1989.

40
Id.

41
Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339, 73 L.Ed. 722, 728 (1929).

42
267 SCRA 682, 721-2 (1997) (emphasis added).

43 Black’s Law Dictionary 959 (1990); Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 324, 338 (1986).

44 Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 62-63 (emphasis in the original).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

(Concurring)

PANGANIBAN, J.:
In his Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada seeks the annulment of the
Sandiganbayan Resolution dated July 9, 2001, which denied his Motion to Quash. He further prays to prohibit the anti-graft court from
conducting the trial of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558, on the ground that the statute under which he has been charged – the
Anti-Plunder Law or Republic Act (RA) 7080 -- is unconstitutional.

In sum, he submits three main arguments to support his thesis, as follows:

1. "RA 7080 is vague and overbroad on its face and suffers from structural deficiency and ambiguity." 1

2. "RA 7080 reduces the standard of proof necessary for criminal conviction, and dispenses with proof beyond reasonable
doubt of each and every criminal act done in furtherance of the crime of plunder." 2

3. "RA 7080 has been admitted by respondent to be malum prohibita which deprives petitioner of a basic defense in violation
of due process."3

I have read former President Estrada’s Petition, Reply, Memorandum and other pleadings and listened carefully to his Oral Argument.
However, I cannot agree with his thesis, for the following reasons:

(1) RA 7080 is not vague or overbroad. Quite the contrary, it is clear and specific especially on what it seeks to prohibit and to
penalize.

(2) The Anti-Plunder Law does not lessen the degree of proof necessary to convict its violator -- in this case, petitioner.

(3) Congress has the constitutional power to enact laws that are mala prohibita and, in exercising such power, does not violate
due process of law.

First Issue: "Void for Vagueness" Not Applicable

In the main, petitioner attacks RA 7080 for being allegedly vague and ambiguous, for "wanting in its essential terms," and for failing to
"define what degree of participation means as [it] relates to the person or persons charged with having participated with a public officer
in the commission of plunder."4

In Dans v. People,5 reiterated recently in Sajul v. Sandiganbayan,6 this Court debunked the "void for vagueness" challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft Law (RA 3019, as amended) and laid down the test to determine whether a statute is
vague. It has decreed that as long as a penal law can answer the basic query "What is the violation?," it is constitutional. "Anything
beyond this, the ‘hows’ and the ‘whys,’ are evidentiary matters which the law cannot possibly disclose in view of the uniqueness of
every case x x x."

Elements of Plunder

The Anti-Plunder Law more than adequately answers the question "What is the violation?" Indeed, to answer this question, any law
student -- using basic knowledge of criminal law -- will refer to the elements of the crime, which in this case are plainly and certainly
spelled out in a straightforward manner in Sections 2 and 1(d) thereof. Those elements are:

1. The offender is a public officer acting by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons.

2. The offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth.

3. The aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth so amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least fifty million
pesos (₱50,000,000).

4. Such ill-gotten wealth -- defined as any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any of the aforesaid
persons (the persons within the purview of Section 2, RA 7080) -- has been acquired directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar
schemes:

(i) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

(ii) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of
pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of
the office or position of the public officer concerned;

(iii) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the national government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(iv) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest
or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

(v) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(vi) by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.7
Petitioner argues that, notwithstanding the above-detailed statement of the elements of the crime, there is still vagueness because of
the absence of definitions of the terms combination, series and pattern in the text of the law.

Citing People v. Nazario,8 petitioner adds that "a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."

I say, however, that in that very case cited by petitioner, the Court cautioned that "the act (or law) must be utterly vague on its face."
When it can be "clarified either by a saving clause or by construction," the law cannot be decreed as invalid. In other words, the
absence of statutory definitions of words used in a statute will not render the law "void for vagueness," if the meanings of such words
can be determined through the judicial function of construction.9

Solution: Simple
Statutory Construction

Indeed, simple statutory construction, not a declaration of unconstitutionality, is the key to the allegedly vague words of the Anti-Plunder
Law. And the most basic rule in statutory construction is to ascertain the meaning of a term from the legislative proceedings. Verily, in
the judicial review of a law’s meaning, the legislative intent is paramount. 10

Pervading the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Justice held on May 7, 1991 was the common understanding
of combination as a joining or combining of at least two dissimilar things or acts, and seriesas a repetition or recurrence of the same
thing at least twice.11 As a matter of fact, the same understanding of those terms also prevailed during the Senate deliberations on
Senate Bill No. 733 (Plunder) earlier held on June 6, 1989. 12 The Records of those deliberations speak for themselves.

It is true that during the deliberations in the Senate, the late Senator Neptali A. Gonzales initially raised concerns over the alleged
vagueness in the use of the terms combination and series. I respectfully submit, however, that the reliance 13 of petitioner on such
concerns is misplaced. That portion of the interpellations, evincing the late senator’s reservations on the matter, had taken place during
the session of June 5, 1989.14 And the clarificatory remarks of Senate President Jovito R. Salonga and Senators Wigberto Tañada,
Alberto Romulo and Ernesto Maceda, which threw light on the matters in doubt, happened the following day, June 6, 1989. 15 In brief,
the misgivings voiced by Senator Gonzales as to the use of the two terms were adequately addressed, answered and disposed of the
following day.

Thus, Senate Bill No. 733, defining and penalizing plunder, was passed and approved on third reading on July 25, 1989, with 19
affirmative votes (including those of Senators Gonzales, Tañada, Maceda, and petitioner himself) sans any negative vote or abstention.
Indeed, some of the sharpest legal minds in the country voted to approve the bill, even though it was bereft of statutory definitions.
Likewise, it would certainly be inconceivable for Senator Gonzales to have voted for the approval of the Bill had he believed that it was
vague to the point of constitutional infirmity; or at the very least, if he believed that his earlier reservations or apprehensions were not
fully satisfied.

At this juncture, may I call attention to the Record of the Joint Conference Meeting held on May 7, 1991. 16 The portion thereof relied
upon by petitioner17 features the exchanges involving Representatives Garcia and Isidro and Senator Tañada on the meanings of the
terms combination and series. The quoted part of the Record would suggest that, somehow, particularly towards the end of the
meeting, the discussion among the legislators seemed to have degenerated into a clutch of unfinished sentences and unintelligible
phrases. Still, I believe that the deliberations did not actually sound the way they were subsequently transcribed or as they now appear
on the Record. Even more reluctant am I to agree with petitioner that the apparent tenor of the deliberations evinced "a dearth of focus
to render precise the definition of the terms," or that the Committee members themselves were not clear on the meanings of the terms
in question.

Most of us in the legal profession are all too familiar with the vagaries of stenographic note-taking, especially in courtrooms and
legislative halls. Too often, lawyers, parties-litigants and even judges find themselves at the mercy of stenographers who are unfamiliar
with certain legal terms; or who cannot hear well enough or take notes fast enough; or who simply get confused, particularly when two
or more persons happen to be speaking at the same time. Often, transcripts of stenographic notes have portrayed lawyers, witnesses,
legislators and judges as blithering idiots, spouting utterly nonsensical jargon and plain inanities in the course of a proceeding. The
Record in question is no exception.

Rather than believe that the distinguished lawmakers went about their business uttering senseless half-sentences to one another, I
think that these learned and intelligent legislators of both chambers knew what they were talking about, spoke their minds, and
understood each other well, for the Record itself does not indicate the contrary. Neither does it show any details or minutiae that would
indicate that they abandoned their earlier common understanding of the terms combination and series.

Specific Number or
Percentage Not Always Necessary

Regrettably, I shall also have to take issue with petitioner’s disquisition to the effect that "when penal laws enacted by Congress make
reference to a term or concept requiring a quantitative definition, these laws are so crafted as to specifically state the exact number or
percentage necessary to constitute the elements of a crime," followed by a recitation of the minimum number of malefactors mentioned
in the statutory definitions of band, conspiracy, illegalrecruitment by syndicate, large-scale illegal recruitment, organized/syndicated
crime group, and swindling by a syndicate. Thus, he insinuates that, because RA 7080 has failed to specify precisely the minimum
number of malefactors needed for an offense to be properly classified as plunder, the law is vague or has somehow failed to meet the
standard for penal laws.

The aforequoted discourse would appear to be incongruous, if not totally misleading. As pointed out during the Oral Argument on
September 18, 2001, the crime of plunder can be committed by a public officer acting alone. Section 2 of RA 7080 reads as
follows: "Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. – Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with x x x." Thus, the
insistence on a mathematical specification or precise quantification is essentially without basis. And lest anyone believe that the Anti-
Plunder Law is unusual in this respect, let me just recall that the RICO law, to which petitioner made repeated references in his
Amended Petition, can likewise be violated by a single individual. 18
Not Oppressive
or Arbitrary

Neither can it be said that RA 7080 is oppressive or arbitrary for imposing a more severe penalty on a combinationor series of the
offenses enumerated in Section 1(d) of the law, than would otherwise be imposed if the said offenses were taken separately. As Mr.
Justice Mendoza lucidly pointed out in his interpellation during the Oral Argument, the Anti-Plunder Law is merely employing a
familiar technique or feature of penal statutes, when it puts together what would otherwise be various combinations of traditional
offenses already proscribed by existing laws and attaching thereto higher or more severe penalties than those prescribed for the same
offenses taken separately.

Here, Mr. Justice Mendoza is referring to special complex crimes like rape with homicide or robbery with homicide. During the Oral
Argument, he asked whether petitioner’s counsel was in fact suggesting that such special complex crimes -- a very important part of the
Revised Penal Code and well-entrenched in our penal system -- were violative of due process and the constitutional guarantees against
cruel and unusual punishment and should also be struck down. It goes without saying that the legislature is well within its powers to
provide higher penalties in view of the grave evils sought to be prevented by RA 7080.

Innocent Acts Not

Penalized by RA 7080

Petitioner insists that innocent acts are in effect criminalized by RA 7080, because it allegedly penalizes combinations or series of acts
coming within the purview of the means or similar schemes enumerated under items 4 and 5 of Section 1(d) of the law, which reads as
follows:

"4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other forms of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

"5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests"

That such contention "deserves scant attention" is an understatement of the extreme sort. The claim of "innocent acts" is possible only
because items 4 and 5 have been taken completely out of context and read in isolation instead of in relation to the other provisions of
the same law, particularly Section 2. The above-enumerated acts, means or similar schemes must be understood as having reference
to or connection with the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth by a public officer, by himself or in connivance with others. Those acts are
therefore not innocent acts. Neither are those prohibitions new or unfamiliar. The proscribed acts under item 4, for instance, may to
some extent be traced back to some of the prohibitions in RA 3019 (the Anti-Graft Law). Section 3, the pertinent part of such law, reads
as follows:

"SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

"(a) x x x x x x x x x

"(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party wherein the public officer in his official
capacity has to intervene under the law.

"(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from
any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government
permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section Thirteen of this Act.

"(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with
him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.

xxx xxx xxx

"(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

x x x x x x x x x."

On the other hand, the prohibited acts under item 5 have antecedents in the Revised Penal Code’s interdiction against monopolies and
combinations in restraint of trade. Clearly, the acts dealt with in Items 4 and 5 of Section 1(d) are in no wise the innocent or innocuous
deeds that petitioner would have us mistake them for.

RA 7080 Not Suffering from Overbreadth

In connection with the foregoing discussion, petitioner also charges that RA 7080 suffers from "overbreadth." I believe petitioner
misconstrues the concept. In the very recent case People v. Dela Piedra, 19 this Court held:

"A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the
Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be
constitutionally punished, is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the
constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute.
"In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections, for instance, we struck down as void for overbreadth provisions prohibiting the
posting of election propaganda in any place – including private vehicles – other than in the common poster areas sanctioned by the
COMELEC. We held that the challenged provisions not only deprived the owner of the vehicle the use of his property but also deprived
the citizen of his right to free speech and information. The prohibition in Adiong, therefore, was so broad that it covered even
constitutionally guaranteed rights and, hence, void for overbreadth. In the present case, however, appellant did not even specify
what constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the definition of ‘recruitment and placement’ that would render the same
constitutionally overbroad." (Italics supplied)

Similarly, in the instant case, petitioner has not identified which of his constitutionally protected freedoms, if any, are allegedly being
violated by the Anti-Plunder Law. As Mr. Justice Mendoza pointed out to petitioner’s counsel during the Oral Argument, specious and
even frivolous is the contention that RA 7080 infringes on the constitutional right of petitioner by depriving him of his liberty pending trial
and by paving the way for his possible conviction because, following that line of argument, the entire Revised Penal Code would be
reckoned to be an infringement of constitutional rights.

"Pattern of Overt or Criminal Acts"

Petitioner, in line with his "void for vagueness" attack on RA 7080, faults the statute for failing to provide a definition of the phrase a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy used in Section 4 of the law. This definition is
crucial since, according to him, such pattern is an essential element of the crime of plunder.

A plain reading of the law easily debunks this contention. First, contrary to petitioner’s suggestions, such pattern of overt or criminal
acts and so on is not and should not be deemed an essential or substantive element of the crime of plunder. It is possible to give full
force and effect to RA 7080 without applying Section 4 -- an accused can be charged and convicted under the Anti-Plunder Law without
resorting to that specific provision. After all, the heading and the text of Section 4, which I quote below, leave no room for doubt that it is
not substantive in nature:

"SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy." (Boldface supplied)

As Mr. Chief Justice Davide very astutely pointed out during the Oral Argument, Section 2 in relation to Section 1(d) deals with how the
crime of plunder is committed. Hence, these two sections constitute the substantive elements, whereas Section 4 deals with how the
crime is proved and is therefore not substantive, but merely procedural. It may be disregarded or discarded if found defective or
deficient, without impairing the rest of the statute.

Actually, the root of this problem may be traced to an observation made by Rep. Pablo Garcia, chair of the House Committee on
Justice, that RA 7080 had been patterned after the RICO Law.20 Petitioner apparently seized on this statement and on the assertions
in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell21 and other cases that a pattern of racketeering is a "key requirement" in the RICO Law and a
"necessary element" of violations thereof. He then used these as the springboard for his vagueness attacks on RA 7080. However, his
reliance on the RICO law is essentially misplaced. Respondent Sandiganbayan correctly held that the said legislation was essentially
different from our Anti-Plunder Law, as it pointed out in its Resolution of July 9, 2001, which I quote:

"Accused Joseph E. Estrada claims that the Anti-Plunder Law does not define ‘pattern of overt or criminal acts’ indicative of the overall
scheme or conspiracy, thereby giving prosecutors and judges unlimited discretion to determine the nature and extent of evidence that
would show ‘pattern.’" (Motion to Quash dated June 7, 2001, p. 13) The Court disagrees with this contention.

"x x x. According to the sponsors of the Anti-Plunder Law in Congress, the said law is similar to the U.S. RICO (Deliberations of the
House of Representatives Committee on Revision of Law and Justice, May 24, 1990). However, the similarities extend only insofar as
both laws penalize with severe penalties the commission by a single accused or multiple accused of a pattern of overt or criminal acts
as one continuing crime. However, the legislative policies and objectives as well as the nature of the crimes penalized respectively
by the RICO and the Anti-Plunder Law are different." (Boldface and underscoring supplied)

Indeed, a careful reading of RICO vis-à-vis RA 7080 can lead to no other conclusion than that the crimes being penalized are
completely different in nature and character, and that the legislative objectives and policies involved are quite dissimilar.

In the case of RICO, legislative concern focused on the threat of continued racketeering activity, and that was why pattern was imbued
with such importance. "Congress was concerned in RICO with long-term criminal conduct,"22 as the following quote indicates:

"RICO’s legislative history reveals Congress’ intent that to prove a pattern of racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show
that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. 23

xxx xxx xxx

"What a plaintiff or prosecutor must prove is continuity of racketeering activity, or its threat, simpliciter. This may be done in a variety of
ways, thus making it difficult to formulate in the abstract any general test for continuity. We can, however, begin to delineate the
requirement.

"‘Continuity’ is both a closed and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by
its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition. x x x. It is, in either case, centrally a temporal concept – and particularly so
in the RICO context, where what must be continuous, RICO’s predicate acts or offenses, and the relationship these predicates must
bear one to another, are distinct requirements. A party alleging a RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed period by
proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time. Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months
and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement. Congress was concerned in RICO with long-term criminal
conduct. Often a RICO action will be brought before continuity can be established in this way. In such cases, liability depends on
whether the threat of continuity is demonstrated."24 (italics and underscoring supplied)
However, in RA 7080, precisely because of the sheer magnitude of the crimes in question and their extremely deleterious effects on
society, the legislative sentiment of great urgency – the necessity of immediate deterrence of such crimes -- was incompatible with the
RICO concept of "pattern" as connoting either continuity over a substantial period of time or threat of continuity or repetition. The
legislative intent25 and policy of RA 7080 centered on imposing a heavy penalty in order to achieve a strong, if not permanent, deterrent
effect -- the sooner the better. The following Senate deliberations are instructive:

"Senator Paterno. Mr. President, [I’m] not too clear yet on the reason for trying to define a crime of plunder. Could I get some further
clarification?

"Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President.

"Because of our experience in the former regime, we feel that there is a need for Congress to pass the legislation which would cover a
crime of this magnitude. While it is true, we already have the Anti-Graft Law. But that does not directly deal with plunder. That covers
only the corrupt practices of public officials as well as their spouses and relatives within the civil degree, and the Anti-Graft law as
presently worded would not adequately or sufficiently address the problems that we experienced during the past regime.

"Senator Paterno. May I try to give the Gentleman, Mr. President, my understanding of the bill?

"Senator Tañada. Yes.

"Senator Paterno. I envision that this bill or this kind of plunder would cover a discovered interconnection of certain acts, particularly,
violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act when, after the different acts are looked at, a scheme or conspiracy can be detected,
such scheme or conspiracy consummated by the different criminal acts or violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, such that
the scheme or conspiracy becomes a sin, as a large scheme to defraud the public or rob the public treasury. It is parang
robo and banda. It is considered as that. And, the bill seeks to define or says that P100 million is that level at which ay talagang sobra
na, dapat nang parusahan ng husto. Would it be a correct interpretation or assessment of the intent of the bill?

"Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. X x x x x.

"Senator Paterno. Would the Author not agree that this crime of plunder should be considered a heinous crime, Mr. President?

"Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. That is why, the penalty imposed under this bill is life imprisonment, and permanent
disqualification from holding public office.

"Senator Paterno. I would really ask, Mr. President, whether the Author would not consider that this is a heinous crime which, for
compelling reasons, namely to try and dampen the graft and corruption, Congress should provide the death penalty for the crime of
plunder.

"Senator Tañada. I personally would have some problem with that, Mr. President, because I am against the restoration of death penalty
in our criminal code. I would submit that to this Body.

"Senator Paterno. I respect the ministerial attitude and the respect for human life of the author, Mr. President, but I just feel that graft
and corruption is such a large problem in our society that, perhaps, it is necessary for this Congress to express itself that this crime of
plunder is a heinous crime which should be levied the death penalty, Mr. President."26

Thus, it is clear and unarguable that "pattern," a key requirement or necessary element of RICO, is in no wise an essential element of
RA 7080.

This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that pattern, in the RICO law context, is nowhere to be found in the language of RA 7080
or in the deliberations of Congress. Indeed, the legislators were well aware of the RICO Act; hence, they could have opted to adopt its
concepts, terms and definitions and installed pattern in the RICO sense as an essential element of the crime of plunder, if that were
their intent. At the very least, they would not have relegated the term pattern to a procedural provision such as Section 4.

Second, to answer petitioner’s contention directly, the Anti-Plunder Law does in fact provide sufficient basis to get at the meaning of the
term pattern as used in Section 4. This meaning is brought out in the disquisition of Respondent Sandiganbayan in its challenged
Resolution, reproduced hereunder:

"The term ‘pattern’ x x x is sufficiently defined in the Anti-Plunder Law, specifically through Section 4 x x x, read in relation to Section
1(d) and Section 2 of the same law. Firstly, under Section 1(d) x x x, a pattern consists of at least a combination or a series of overt or
criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Section 1(d). Secondly, pursuant to Section 2 of the law, the ‘pattern’ of overt or
criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable a public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth; and [t]hirdly, there must either be an ‘overall unlawful scheme’ or ‘conspiracy’ to achieve said common goal. As
commonly understood, the term ‘overall unlawful scheme’ indicates ‘a general plan of action or method’ which the principal accused
and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such
overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a
conspiracy to attain said common goal.

"Parenthetically, it can be said that the existence of a pattern indicating an overall scheme or a single conspiracy would serve as the
link that will tie the overt or criminal acts into one continuing crime of plunder. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come into
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. (Art. 8, Revised Penal Code). To use an analogy made
by U.S. courts in connection with RICO violations, a pattern may be likened to a wheel with spokes (the overt or criminal acts which
may be committed by a single or multiple accused), meeting at a common center (the acquisition or accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by
a public officer) and with the rim (the over-all unlawful scheme or conspiracy) of the wheel enclosing the spokes. In this case, the
information charges only one count of [the] crime of plunder, considering the prosecution’s allegation in the amended information that
the series or combination of overt or criminal acts charged form part of a conspiracy among all the accused." 27

Judiciary Empowered to Construe and Apply the Law


At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is essentially judicial. To declare what the law shall be is a legislative power,
but to declare what the law is or has been is judicial.28 Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be expected to spell out with mathematical
precision how the law should be interpreted under any and all given situations. The application of the law will depend on the facts and
circumstances as adduced by evidence which will then be considered, weighed and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it is the
constitutionally mandated function of the courts to interpret, construe and apply the law as would give flesh and blood to the true
meaning of legislative enactments.

Moreover, a statute should be construed in the light of the objective to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed and
should be given such construction as will advance the purpose, suppress the mischief or evil, and secure the benefits intended. 29 A law
is not a mere composition, but an end to be achieved; and its general purpose is a more important aid to its meaning than any rule that
grammar may lay down.30 A construction should be rejected if it gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not
accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted and that tends to defeat the ends that are sought to be attained by its
enactment.31

As can be gleaned from the legislative deliberations, the Plunder Law was enacted to curb the "despoliation of the National Treasury by
some public officials who have held the levers of power" and to penalize "this predatory act which has reached unprecedented heights
and has been developed by its practitioners to a high level of sophistication during the past dictatorial regime." Viewed broadly, "plunder
involves not just plain thievery but economic depredation which affects not just private parties or personal interests but the nation as a
whole." Invariably, plunder partakes of the nature of "a crime against national interest which must be stopped, and if possible, stopped
permanently."32

No Patent and Clear Conflict with Constitution

Against the foregoing backdrop, I believe petitioner’s heavy reliance on the void-for-vagueness concept cannot prevail, considering that
such concept, while mentioned in passing in Nazario and other cases, has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. To this date,
the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity. 33 On the other hand, the constitutionality of
certain penal statutes has been upheld in several cases, notwithstanding allegations of ambiguity in the provisions of law. In Caram
Resources Corp. v. Contreras34 and People v. Morato,35 the Court upheld the validity of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) and PD 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms), respectively, despite constitutional challenges grounded on alleged ambiguity.

Similarly, the cases cited by petitioner involving U.S. federal court decisions relative to the RICO Law did not at all arrive at a finding of
unconstitutionality of the questioned statute. To repeat, reference to these U.S. cases is utterly misplaced, considering the substantial
differences in the nature, policies and objectives between the RICO Law and the Anti-Plunder Law. Verily, "the RICO Law does not
create a new type of substantive crime since any acts which are punishable under the RICO Law also are punishable under existing
federal and state statutes."36 Moreover, the main purpose of the RICO Law is "to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United
States."37

On the other hand, the Plunder Law creates an entirely new crime that may consist of both (a) criminal acts already punished by the
Revised Penal Code or special laws and (b) acts that may not be punishable by previously existing laws. Furthermore, unlike in the
RICO Law, the motivation behind the enactment of the Anti-Plunder Law is "the need to for a penal law that can adequately cope with
the nature and magnitude of the corruption of the previous regime" 38 in accordance with the constitutional duty of the State "to take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."39

In sum, the law must be proven to be clearly and unequivocally repugnant to the Constitution before this Court may declare its
unconstitutionality. To strike down the law, there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute allows to
be done.40 To justify the nullification of the law, there must be a clear, unequivocal breach of the Constitution; not a doubtful,
argumentative implication.41 Of some terms in the law which are easily clarified by judicial construction, petitioner has, at best, managed
merely to point out alleged ambiguities. Far from establishing, by clear and unmistakable terms, any patent and glaring conflict with the
Constitution, the constitutional challenge to the Anti-Plunder law must fail. For just as the accused is entitled to the presumption of
innocence in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt, so must a law be accorded the presumption of constitutionality without the
same requisite quantum of proof.

Second Issue:

Quantum of Evidence Not Lowered by RA 7080

I will now tackle petitioner’s impassioned asseverations that the Anti-Plunder Law violates the due process clause and the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

Section 4 of RA 7080 provides that, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. This is
because it would be sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.

Hence, petitioner now concludes that the Anti-Plunder Law "eliminates proof of each and every component criminal act of plunder by
the accused and limits itself to establishing just the pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy." He
thus claims that the statute penalizes the accused on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy to commit plunder, without the
necessity of establishing beyond reasonable doubt each and every criminal act done by the accused. From these premises, he
precipitately, albeit inaccurately, concludes that RA 7080 has ipso facto lowered the quantum of evidence required to secure a
conviction under the challenged law. This is clearly erroneous.

First, petitioner’s allegation as to the meaning and implications of Section 4 can hardly be taken seriously, because it runs counter to
certain basic common sense presumptions that apply to the process of interpreting statutes: that in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it will be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law; that the law-making body intended right
and justice to prevail;42 and that the legislature aimed to impart to its enactments such meaning as would render them operative and
effective and prevent persons from eluding or defeating them.
Second, petitioner’s allegation is contradicted by the legislative Records that manifest the real intent behind Section 4, as well as the
true meaning and purpose of the provision therein. This intent is carefully expressed by the words of Senate President Salonga:

"Senate Pres. Salonga. Is that, if there are let’s say 150 crimes all in all, criminal acts, whether bribery, misappropriation, malversation,
extortion, you need not prove all of those beyond reasonable doubt. If you can prove by pattern, let’s say 10, but each must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, you do not have to prove 150 crimes. That’s the meaning of this."43 (italics supplied)

All told, the above explanation is in consonance with what is often perceived to be the reality with respect to the crime of plunder -- that
"the actual extent of the crime may not, in its breadth and entirety, be discovered, by reason of the ‘stealth and secrecy’ in which it is
committed and the involvement of ‘so many persons here and abroad and [the fact that it] touches so many states and territorial
units.’"44 Hence, establishing a pattern indicative of the overall unlawful scheme becomes relevant and important.

Proof of Pattern Beyond Reasonable Doubt

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the indicative pattern must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. To my mind, this means
that the prosecution’s burden of proving the crime of plunder is, in actuality, much greater than in an ordinary criminal case. The
prosecution, in establishing a pattern of overt or criminal acts, must necessarily show a combination or series of acts within the purview
of Section 1(d) of the law.

These acts which constitute the combination or series must still be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On top of that, the prosecution
must establish beyond reasonable doubt such pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy, as well as
all the other elements thereof.

Thus, Respondent Sandiganbayan was correct in its ratiocination on that point:

"The accused misread the import and meaning of the above-quoted provision (Sec. 4). The latter did not lower the quantum of evidence
necessary to prove all the elements of plunder, which still remains proof beyond reasonable doubt. For a clearer understanding of the
import of Section 4 of the Anti-Plunder Law, quoted hereunder are pertinent portions of the legislative deliberations on the subject:

‘MR. ALBANO. Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not
work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality
of the crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?

‘MR. GARCIA (P). Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an
enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information – three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3
pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved only two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element
of the offense.

‘MR. ALBANO. I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important,
I feel that such a series of overt (or) criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate
only ₱50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts
as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?

‘MR. GARCIA (P). With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove
that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million.
Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption and in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million, but
there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in these transactions which were proved. Now,
if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder.’
(Deliberations of House of Representatives on RA 7080, dated October 9, 1990).’

xxx xxx xxx

"According to the Explanatory Note of Senate Bill No. 733, the crime of plunder, which is a ‘term chosen from other equally apt
terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed through a
series [or combination] of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth or secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many
persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units.’ For this reason, it would be unreasonable to require
the prosecution to prove all the overt and criminal acts committed by the accused as part of an ‘over-all unlawful scheme or conspiracy’
to amass ill-gotten wealth as long as all the elements of the crime of plunder have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, such as, the
combination or series of overt or criminal acts committed by a public officer alone or in connivance with other persons to accumulate ill-
gotten wealth in the amount of at least Fifty Million Pesos.

"The statutory language does not evince an intent to do away with the constitutional presumption of guilt nor to lower the quantum of
proof needed to establish each and every element or ingredient of the crime of plunder." 45

In connection with the foregoing, I emphasize that there is no basis for petitioner’s concern that the conspiracy to defraud, which is not
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, may have been criminalized under RA 7080. The Anti-Plunder Law treats conspiracy as
merely a mode of incurring criminal liability, but does not criminalize or penalize it per se.

In sum, it is clear that petitioner has misunderstood the import of Section 4. Apropos the foregoing, I maintain that, between an
interpretation that produces questionable or absurd results and one that gives life to the law, the choice for this Court is too obvious to
require much elucidation or debate.

Even granting arguendo that Section 4 of the Anti-Plunder law suffers from some constitutional infirmity, the statute may nonetheless
survive the challenge of constitutionality in its entirety. Considering that this provision pertains only to a rule on evidence or to a
procedural matter that does not bear upon or form any part of the elements of the crime of plunder, the Court may declare the same
unconstitutional and strike it off the statute without necessarily affecting the essence of the legislative enactment. For even without the
assailed provision, the law can still stand as a valid penal statute inasmuch as the elements of the crime, as well as the penalties
therein, may still be clearly identified or sufficiently derived from the remaining valid portions of the law. This finds greater significance
when one considers that Section 7 of the law provides for a separability clause declaring the validity, the independence and the
applicability of the other remaining provisions, should any other provision of the law be held invalid or unconstitutional.

Third Issue:

The Constitutional Power of Congress to Enact Mala Prohibita Laws

Petitioner maintains that RA 7080 "eliminated the element of mens rea from crimes which are mala in se and converted these crimes
which are components of plunder into mala prohibita, thereby rendering it easier to prove" since, allegedly, "the prosecution need not
prove criminal intent."

This asseveration is anchored upon the postulate (a very erroneous one, as already discussed above) that the Anti-Plunder Law
exempts the prosecution from proving beyond reasonable doubt the component acts constituting plunder, including the element of
criminal intent. It thus concludes that RA 7080 violates the due process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

While I simply cannot agree that the Anti-Plunder Law eliminated mens rea from the component crimes of plunder, my bottom-line
position still is: regardless of whether plunder is classified as mala prohibita or in se, it is the prerogative of the legislature -- which is
undeniably vested with the authority -- to determine whether certain acts are criminal irrespective of the actual intent of the perpetrator.

The Power of the Legislature to Penalize Certain Acts

Jurisprudence dating as far back as United States v. Siy Cong Bieng46 has consistently recognized and upheld "the power of the
legislature, on grounds of public policy and compelled by necessity, ‘the great master of things,’ to forbid in a limited class of cases the
doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer." Even earlier, in United States v.
Go Chico,47 Justice Moreland wrote that the legislature may enact criminal laws that penalize certain acts, like the "discharge of a
loaded gun," without regard for the criminal intent of the wrongdoer. In his words:

"In the opinion of this Court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by
statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the
statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many cases the act
complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect which the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is
produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. The case at
bar is a perfect illustration of this. The display of a flag or emblem used, particularly within a recent period, by the enemies of the
Government tends to incite resistance to governmental functions and insurrection against governmental authority just as effectively if
made in the best of good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The display itself, without the intervention of any other factor, is
the evil. It is quite different from that large class of crimes, made such by the common law or by statute, in which the injurious effect
upon the public depends upon the corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act. If A discharges a loaded gun and kills B, the
interest which society has in the act depends, not upon B’s death, but upon the intention with which A consummated the act. If the gun
were discharged intentionally, with the purpose of accomplishing the death of B, then society has been injured and its security violated;
but if the gun was discharged accidentally on the part of A, the society, strictly speaking, has no concern in the matter, even though the
death of B results. The reason for this is that A does not become a danger to society and its institutions until he becomes a person with
a corrupt mind. The mere discharge of the gun and the death of B do not of themselves make him so. With those two facts must go the
corrupt intent to kill. In the case at bar, however, the evil to society and to the Government does not depend upon the state of mind of
the one who displays the banner, but upon the effect which that display has upon the public mind. In the one case the public is affected
by the intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself."

Without being facetious, may I say that, unlike the act of discharging a gun, the acts mentioned in Section 1(d) -- bribery, conversion,
fraudulent conveyance, unjust enrichment and the like -- cannot be committed sans criminal intent. And thus, I finally arrive at a point of
agreement with petitioner: that the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) are by their nature mala in se, and most of them are in fact defined
and penalized as such by the Revised Penal Code. Having said that, I join the view that when we speak of plunder, we are referring
essentially to two or more instances of mala in se constituting one malum prohibitum. Thus, there should be no difficulty if each of the
predicate acts be proven beyond reasonable doubt as mala in se, even if the defense of lack of intent be taken away as the solicitor
general has suggested.

In brief, the matter of classification is not really significant, contrary to what petitioner would have us believe. The key, obviously, is
whether the same burden of proof -- proof beyond reasonable doubt -- would apply.

Furthermore, I also concur in the opinion of the solicitor general: if it is conceded that the legislature possesses the requisite power and
authority to declare, by legal fiat, that acts not inherently criminal in nature are punishable as offenses under special laws, then with
more reason can it punish as offenses under special laws those acts that are already inherently criminal. "This is so because the
greater (power to punish not inherently criminal acts) includes the lesser (power to punish inherently criminal acts). In eo plus sit,
semper inest et minus."48

Epilogue

"The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful or argumentative implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is
clear beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality x x x. To doubt is to sustain.’ x x x."49

A law should not be overturned on the basis of speculation or conjecture that it is unconstitutionally vague. Everyone is duty-bound to
adopt a reasonable interpretation that will uphold a statute, carry out its purpose and render harmonious all its parts. Indeed, the
constitutionality of a statute must be sustained if, as in this case, a ground therefor can possibly be found. For the unbending teaching
is that a law cannot be declared invalid, unless the conflict with the Constitution is shown to be clearly beyond reasonable doubt.
To lend color and vividness to the otherwise boring legalese that has been used to dissect RA 7080, the parties to this case laced their
arguments with interesting little stories. Thus, petitioner opened his Oral Argument with an admittedly apocryphal account of a
befuddled student of law who could not make heads or tails of the meanings of series, combination and pattern.

On the other hand, the solicitor general compares petitioner with Hans Christian Andersen’s fabled tailors who tried to fool the emperor
into walking around naked by making him believe that anyone who did not see the invisible garment, which they had supposedly sewn
for him, was "too stupid and incompetent to appreciate its quality." This is no doubt a parody of the alleged vagueness of RA 7080,
which is purportedly "invisible only to anyone who is too dull or dense to appreciate its quality." 50

I do not begrudge petitioner (or his lawyers) for exhausting every known and knowable legal tactic to exculpate himself from the
clutches of the law. Neither do I blame the solicitor general, as the Republic’s counsel, for belittling the attempt of petitioner to shortcut
his difficult legal dilemmas. However, this Court has a pressing legal duty to discharge: to render justice though the heavens may fall.

By the Court’s Decision, petitioner is now given the occasion to face squarely and on the merits the plunder charges hurled at him by
the Ombudsman. He may now use this opportunity to show the courts and the Filipino people that he is indeed innocent of the heinous
crime of plunder – to do so, not by resorting to mere legalisms, but by showing the sheer falsity of the wrongdoings attributed to him.

I think that, given his repeated claims of innocence, petitioner owes that opportunity to himself, his family, and the teeming masses he
claims to love. In short, the Court has rendered its judgment, and the heavens have not fallen. Quite the contrary, petitioner is now
accorded the opportunity to prove his clear conscience and inculpability.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition and to uphold the constitutionality of RA 7080.

Footnotes

1 Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 11.

2 Ibid., p. 66.

3 Id., p.76.

4 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 16.

5 285 SCRA 504, January 29, 1998, per Francisco, J.

6 GR No. 135294, November 20, 2000, per Kapunan, J.

7 §1(d), RA 7080, as amended.

8
165 SCRA 186, August 31, 1988, per Sarmiento, J.

9"Construction is the means by which the Court clarifies the doubt to arrive at the true intent of the law." Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, 1990 ed., p. 44; see also Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247, September 29, 1966.

10 See People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, November 20, 1978.

11 These deliberations are quoted in the Comment, pp. 14-15.

12 Record of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 141, June 6, 1989, at p. 1399; quoted in the Comment, p. 16.

13 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 19.

14
Records of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 140, June 5, 1989, at p. 1310.

15
See discussion of Senate Bill No. 733 on June 6, 1989.

16Record of the Joint Conference Meeting – Committee on Justice and Committee on Constitutional Amendments (S. No. 733
& H. No. 22752), May 7, 1991, pp. 40-43.

17
The relevant portions of the Record are as follows:

"REP. ISIDRO. I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say, THROUGH A COMBINATION OR
SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say
combination, we actually mean to say, if there are too or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or
number one and something else are included, how about a series of the same act? Fore example, through
misappropriation, conversation, misuse, will these be included also?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Yeah, because we say series.

REP. ISIDRO. Series.


THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Yeah, we include series.

REP. ISIDRO. But we say we begin with a combination.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Yes.

REP. ISIDRO. When we say combination, it seem that –

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Two.

REP. ISIDRO. Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO. Not twice?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Yes. Combination is not twice – but combination, two acts.

REP. ISIDRO. So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It can not be a
repetition of the same act.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). That be referred to series. Yeah.

REP. ISIDRO. No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). A series.

REP. ISIDRO. That’s not series. It’s a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say
that two or more, ‘di ba?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Yes. This distinguishes it really the ordinary --- That’s why I said, that’s a very
good suggestion, because if it’s only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime. But we have here a combination or
series, overt or criminal acts.

REP. ISIDRO. I know what you are talking about. For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or
malversation of public funds who raids the public treasury, now, for example, misappropriation, if there are a series of
.....

REP. ISIDRO.

. . . If there are a series of misappropriations?

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Yes.

REP. ISIDRO. So, these constitute illegal wealth.

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Yes, yes.

REP. ISIDRO. Ill-gotten

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA) Ill-gotten wealth.

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Series. One after the other eh di . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA), So, that would fall under the term ‘series’?

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Series, oo.

REP. ISIDRO. Now, if it is combination, ano, two misappropriations . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) It’s not, . . two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.

REP. ISIDRO. So, it is not a combination?

THA CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Yes.

REP. ISIDRO. When you say ‘combination’, two different?

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. TAÑADA.) Two different.


REP. ISIDRO. Two different acts.

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) For example, ha . . .

REP. ISIDRO. Now series, meaning, repetition . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA) Yes.

REP. ISIDRO. With that . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA) So, it cold be a series of any of the acts mentioned in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 of
Section 2 (2), or . . 1 (d) rather, or combination of any of he acts mentioned in paragraph 1 alone, or paragraph 2
alone or paragraph 3 or paragraph 4.

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) I think combination maybe . . which one? Series?

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA) Series or combination.

REP. ISIDRO. Which one, combination or series or series or combination?

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA) Okay, Ngayon doon sa definition, ano, Section 2, definition, doon sa portion ng . .
. Saan iyon? As mentioned, as described . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA) . . better than ‘mentioned’. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Okay?

REP. ISIDRO. Very good.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA) Oo, marami pong salamat.

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) maraming salamat po.

The meeting was adjourned at 1:33 p.m."

18H. J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell, (1999) 492 US 229, 106 L Ed 2d 195, 109 S Ct 2893, at p. 211: "One evident textual
problem with the suggestion that predicates form a RICO pattern only if they are indicative of an organized crime perpetrator –
in either a traditional or functional sense – is that it would seem to require proof that the racketeering acts were the work of an
association or group, rather than of an individual acting alone. RICO’s language supplies no grounds to believe that Congress
meant to impose such a limit on the scope of the Act. A second indication from the text that Congress intended no organized
crime limitation is that no such restriction is explicitly stated. In those titles of OCCA (the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970)
where Congress did intend to limit the new law’s application to the context of organized crime, it said so."

19 GR No. 121777, January 24, 2001, per Kapunan, J.

20The Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 USC §§1961-1968 [18 USCS §§1961-1968] which is
Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA).

21 Supra.

22 Ibid., at p. 209.

23 Id., at p. 208.

24 Id., at p. 209.

25 The relevant portion of the sponsorship speech of Senator Tañada reads as follows:

"It cannot be seriously disputed that much of our economic woes and the nation’s anguish are directly attributable to
the despoliation of the National Treasury by some public officials who have held the levers of power.

"It is sad to state, Mr. President, that there is presently no statute that either effectively discourages or adequately
penalizes this predatory act which reached unprecedented heights and which had been developed by its practitioners
to a high level of sophistication during the past dictatorial regime.

"For, while it is true that we have laws defining and penalizing graft and corruption in government and providing for
the forfeiture of unexplained wealth acquired by public officials, it has become increasingly evident that these
legislations x x x no longer suffice to deter massive looting of the national wealth; otherwise, this country would not
have been raided and despoiled by the powers that be at that time.
"Indeed, there is a need to define plunder, and provide for its separate punishment as proposed in Senate Bill No.
733; because, plunder involves not just plain thievery but economic depredation which affects not just private parties
or personal interest but the nation as a whole. And, therefore, Mr. President, it is a crime against national interest
which must be stopped and if possible stopped permanently."

26
Record of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 140, June 5, 1989, at pp. 1314-1315.

27 On pp. 19-20 of the Resolution.

28 Foote v. Nickerson, 54 L.R.A. 554.

29Intia Jr. v. Commission on Audit, 306 SCRA 593, April 30, 1999; Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167, January 10,
1997.

30 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 309 SCRA 87, June 25, 1999.

31 De Guia v. Commission on Elections, 208 SCRA 420, May 6, 1992.

32Quoted portions are excerpts from Senator Tañada’s speech sponsoring Senate Bill No. 733, Records of the Senate, June
5, 1989.

33During the Oral Argument, petitioner contended that Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad [271 US 500 (1926)] declared the
Bookkeeping Act unconstitutional for its alleged vagueness. This is incorrect. The reason for its unconstitutionality was the
violation of the equal protection clause. Likewise, Adiong v. Comelec (207 SCRA 712, March 31, 1992) decreed as void a
mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec (270 SCRA 106, March 19, 1997) declared a portion of
RA 6735 unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not because of vagueness.

34 237 SCRA 724, October 26, 1994.

35 224 SCRA 361, July 5, 1993.

36Jeff Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization," 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968; "Broadest of the Criminal Statutes,"
69 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1 (1978), p.1.

37 Ibid., at p. 2

38 Senator Angara’s vote explaining proposed Senate Bill No. 733; Records of the Senate, June 5, 1989.

39 Ibid.; see also Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution.

40
Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, January 31, 1968; Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, August 30, 1972.

41 Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 402, March 12, 1997; Francisco v. Permskul, 173 SCRA 324, May 12, 1989.

42
See Article 10, Civil Code.

Deliberations of the Committee on Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Laws, November 15, 1988; cited in the
43

Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated July 9, 2001.

44 Comment, p. 29, citing the House deliberations on House Bill No. 22572, October 9, 1990.

45 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated July 9, 2001, pp. 28-30.

30 Phil. 577, March 31, 1915, per Carson, J; see also US v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488, March 19, 1910 and Caram Resources
46

Corp. v. Contreras, supra.

47 14 Phil. 128, September 15, 1909, per Moreland, J.

Respondent’s Memorandum, pp. 84-85. The solicitor general cites illegal recruitment as an example of a malum in se crime,
48

which the law penalizes as malum prohibitum; that is, to punish it severely without regard to the intent of the culprit.

49 Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680, 698-699, October 15, 1991, per Davide, J. (now CJ).

50 Solicitor general’s Comment, pp. 1-2.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 160211 August 28, 2006


VENANCIO R. NAVA, Petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable Justices RODOLFO G. PALATTAO, GREGORY S. ONG, and MA. CRISTINA G. CORTEZ-ESTRADA as Members
of the Sandiganbayan’s Fourth Division, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

A meticulous review of the records and the evidence establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, the
prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime charged. Hence, the conviction of petitioner is inevitable.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 2, 2003 Decision 2 and September 29,
2003 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23627. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered convicting accused VENANCIO NAVA Y RODRIGUEZ of the crime
of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act particularly Section 3(g) thereof, or entering on behalf of government in any
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same whether or not the pubic officer profited or will profit
thereby. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years, and one (1) day as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day as
maximum and to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office. Accused Nava is further ordered to pay the government the amount
of P380,013.60 which it suffered by way of damages because of the unlawful act or omission committed by the herein accused
Venancio Nava.

"From the narration of facts, there hardly appears any circumstance that would suggest the existence of conspiracy among the other
accused in the commission of the crime.

"Thus in the absence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime complained of and as the herein other accused only acted upon the
orders of accused Venancio Nava, in the absence of any criminal intent on their part to violate the law, the acts of the remaining
accused are not considered corrupt practices committed in the performance of their duties as public officers and consequently, accused
AJATIL JAIRAL Y PONGCA, ROSALINDA MERKA Y GUANZON & JOSEPH VENTURA Y ABAD are hereby considered innocent of
the crime charged and are hereby acquitted." 3

The assailed Resolution dated September 29, 2003, denied reconsideration.

The Facts

The Sandiganbayan narrated the facts of this case as follows:

"The complaint involving the herein accused was initiated by the COA, Region XI, Davao City, which resulted from an audit conducted
by a team which was created by the COA Regional Office per COA Regional Assignment Order No. 91-74 dated January 8, 1991. The
objective of the team [was] to conduct an audit of the 9.36 million allotment which was released in 1990 by the DECS, Region XI to its
Division Offices.

"In the Audit Report, the amount of P603,265.00 was shown to have been released to the DECS Division of Davao del Sur for
distribution to the newly nationalized high schools located within the region. Through the initiative of accused Venancio Nava, a meeting
was called among his seven (7) schools division superintendents whom he persuaded to use the money or allotment for the purchase
of Science Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTD). In other words, instead of referring the allotment to the one hundred fifty-five (155)
heads of the nationalized high schools for the improvement of their facilities, accused Nava succeeded in persuading his seven (7)
schools division superintendents to use the allotment for the purchase of science education facilities for the calendar year 1990.

"In the purchase of the school materials, the law provides that the same shall be done through a public bidding pursuant to Circular No.
85-55, series of 1985. But in the instant case, evidence shows that accused Nava persuaded his seven (7) schools division
superintendents to ignore the circular as allegedly time was of the essence in making the purchases and if not done before the calendar
year 1990, the funds allotted will revert back to the general fund.

"In the hurried purchase of SLTD’s, the provision on the conduct of a public bidding was not followed. Instead the purchase was done
through negotiation. Evidence shows that the items were purchased from Joven’s Trading, a business establishment with principal
address at Tayug, Pangasinan; D’[I]mplacable Enterprise with principal business address at 115 West Capitol Drive, Pasig, Metro
Manila and from Evelyn Miranda of 1242 Oroqueta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. As disclosed by the audit report, the prices of the [SLTDs]
as purchased from the above-named sellers exceeded the prevailing market price ranging from 56% to 1,175% based on the
mathematical computation done by the COA audit team. The report concluded that the government lost P380,013.60. That the injury to
the government as quantified was the result of the non-observance by the accused of the COA rules on public bidding and DECS Order
No. 100 suspending the purchases of [SLTDs]." 4

The Commission on Audit (COA) Report recommended the filing of criminal and administrative charges against the persons liable,
including petitioner, before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.

Petitioner was subsequently charged in an Information 5 filed on April 8, 1997, worded as follows:

"That on or about the period between November to December 1990, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Digos, Davao Del
Sur and/or Davao City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Venancio R. Nava (DECS-Region XI
Director) and Ajatil Jairal (Division Superintendent, DECS, Davao del Sur), both high[-]ranking officials and Rosalinda Merka, and
Teodora Indin (Administrative Officer and Assistant Division Superintendent, respectively of DECS-Division of Davao Del Sur), all low
ranking officials, while in the discharge of their respective official functions, committing the offense in relation to their office and with
grave abuse [of] authority, conniving and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter,
on behalf of the government, into transactions with D’Implacable Enterprise and Joven’s Trading, respectively, represented by accused
Antonio S. Tan and Evelyn Miranda and Joseph Ventura for the purchase of Science Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTD) intended
for use by the public high schools in the area amounting to [P603,265.00], Philippine currency, without the requisite public bidding and
in violation of DECS Order No. 100, Series of 1990, which transaction involved an overprice in the amount of P380,013.60 and thus, is
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government." 6

Special Prosecution Officer II Evelyn T. Lucero-Agcaoili recommended the dismissal of the foregoing Information on the ground, among
others, that there was no probable cause. She argued that only estimates were made to show the discrepancy of prices instead of a
comparative listing on an item to item basis. 7 The recommendation was disapproved, however, by then Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

After due trial, only petitioner was convicted, while all the other accused were acquitted. 8

Petitioner was found guilty of violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, or entering on behalf of the government
any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public officer profited or would profit
thereby.

The Sandiganbayan (SBN) said that, in the purchase of the Science Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTDs), petitioner had not
conducted a public bidding in accordance with COA Circular No. 85-55A. As a result, the prices of the SLTDs, as purchased, exceeded
the prevailing market price from 56 percent to 1,175 percent, based on the mathematical computations of the COA team. 9 In his
defense, petitioner had argued that the said COA Circular was merely directory, not mandatory. Further, the purchases in question had
been done in the interest of public service.10

The Sandiganbayan did not give credence to the foregoing defenses raised by petitioner. On the contrary, it found the evidence
adduced by petitioner’s co-accused, Superintendent Ajatil Jairal, to be "enlightening," manifesting an intricate web of deceit spun by
petitioner and involving all the other superintendents in the process. 11

The graft court did not accept the claim of petitioner that he signed the checks only after the other signatories had already signed them.
The evidence showed that blank Philippine National Bank (PNB) checks had been received by Nila E. Chavez, a clerk in the regional
office, for petitioner’s signature. The
Sandiganbayan opined that the evidence amply supported Jairal’s testimony that the questioned transactions had emanated from the
regional office, as in fact, all the documents pertinent to the transaction had already been prepared and signed by petitioner when the
meeting with the superintendents was called sometime in August 1990. 12

In that meeting, the superintendents were given prepared documents like the Purchase Orders and vouchers, together with the
justification. 13 This circumstance prompted Jairal to conduct his own canvass. The Sandiganbayan held that this act was suggestive of
the good faith of Jairal, thereby negating any claim of conspiracy with the other co-accused and, in particular, petitioner.

In its assailed Resolution, the SBN denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. It held that the series of acts culminating in the
questioned transactions constituted violations of Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Order No. 100; and COA
Circular No. 85-55A. Those acts, ruled the SBN, sufficiently established that the contract or transaction entered into was manifestly or
grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Hence, this Petition. 14

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

"I. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the
findings of the Special Audit Team that irregularly conducted the audit beyond the authorized period and which team falsified the
Special Audit Report.

"II. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the
findings in the special audit report where the Special Audit Team egregiously failed to comply with the minimum standards set by the
Supreme Court and adopted by the Commission on Audit in violation of petitioner’s right to due process, and which report suppressed
evidence favorable to the petitioner.

"III. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the
findings in the Special Audit Report considering that none of the allegedly overpriced items were canvassed or purchased by the
Special Audit Team such that there is no competent evidence from which to determine that there was an overprice and that the
transaction was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

"IV. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in finding that
there was an overprice where none of the prices of the questioned items exceeded the amount set by the Department of Budget and
Management.

"V. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in selectively
considering the findings in the decision in Administrative Case No. XI-91-088 and failing to consider the findings thereon that petitioner
was justified in undertaking a negotiated purchase and that there was no overpricing.

"VI. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in selectively
considering the findings of XI-91-088 and failing to consider the findings thereon that petitioner was justified in undertaking a negotiated
purchase, there was no overpricing, and that the purchases did not violate DECS Order No. 100.
"VII. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in failing to
absolve the petitioner where conspiracy was not proven and the suppliers who benefited from the alleged overpricing were acquitted.

"VIII. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in admitting in
evidence and giving probative value to Exhibit ‘8’ the existence and contents of which are fictitious.

"IX. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in giving
credence to the self-serving and perjurious testimony of co-accused Ajatil Jairal that the questioned transactions emanated from the
regional office [in spite] of the documentary evidence and the testimony of the accused supplier which prove that the transaction
emanated from the division office of Digos headed by co-accused Ajatil Jairal.

"X. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in finding that
the petitioner entered into a transaction that was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government where the evidence clearly
established that the questioned transactions were entered into by the division office of Digos through co-accused Ajatil Jairal.

"XI. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in convicting the
petitioner in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt." 15

All these issues basically refer to the question of whether the Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors (not grave abuse of
discretion) in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(g), Republic Act No. 3019.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Procedural Issue:

Propriety of Certiorari

At the outset, it must be stressed that to contest the Sandiganbayan’s Decision and Resolution on June 2, 2003 and September 29,
2003, respectively, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not the present Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65. Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, 16 as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, 17 provides that "[d]ecisions and
final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of
law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court likewise provides that "[a] party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the x x x Sandiganbayan x x x whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must
be distinctly set forth."

Basic is the principle that when Rule 45 is available, recourse under Rule 65 cannot be allowed either as an add-on or as a substitute
for appeal. 18 The special civil action for certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, when the latter remedy is available. 19

This Court has consistently ruled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 20 A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency or as in this case, the
Sandiganbayan. 21 Since the assailed Decision and Resolution were dispositions on the merits, and the Sandiganbayan had no
remaining issue to resolve, an appeal would have been the plain, speedy and adequate remedy for petitioner.

To be sure, the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. 22 For this procedural lapse,
the Petition should have been dismissed outright.
Nonetheless, inasmuch as it was filed within the 15-day period provided under Rule 45, the Court treated it as a petition for review (not
certiorari) under Rule 45 in order to accord substantial justice to the parties. Thus, it was given due course and the Court required the
parties to file their Memoranda.

Main Issue:

Sufficiency of Evidence

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him, because the pieces of evidence to support the charges were not
convincing. Specifically, he submits the following detailed argumentation:

"1. the Special Audit Report was fraudulent, incomplete, irregular, inaccurate, illicit and suppressed evidence in favor of the Petitioner;

"2. there was no competent evidence to determine the overprice as none of the samples secured by the audit team from the Division of
Davao del Sur were canvassed or purchased by the audit team;

"3. the allegedly overpriced items did not exceed the amount set by the Department of Budget and Management;

"4. the decision in an administrative investigation were selectively lifted out of context;

"5. the administrative findings that Petitioner was justified in undertaking a negotiated purchase, that there was no overpricing, and that
the purchases did not violate DECS Order No. 100 were disregarded;

"6. Exhibit ‘8’, the contents of which are fictitious, was admitted in evidence and given probative value;
"7. The suppliers who benefited from the transactions were acquitted, along with the other accused who directly participated in the
questioned transactions; and

"8. The self-serving and perjury-ridden statements of co-accused Jairal were given credence despite documentary and testimonial
evidence to the contrary." 23

Petitioner further avers that the findings of fact in the Decision dated October 21, 1996 in DECS Administrative Case No. XI-91-
088 24 denied any overpricing and justified the negotiated purchases in lieu of a public bidding. 25 Since there was no overpricing and
since he was justified in undertaking the negotiated purchase, petitioner submits that he cannot be convicted of violating Section 3(g) of
Republic Act No. 3019.

Validity of Audit

The principal evidence presented during trial was the COA Special Audit Report (COA Report). The COA is the agency specifically
given the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of fund and property owned by or pertaining to the government. 26 It has the exclusive authority to define the scope
of its audit and examination and to establish the required techniques and methods. 27

Thus, COA’s findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, when they are not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 28 Only
upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion may the courts set aside decisions of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under their special technical knowledge and training. 29 In this case, the SBN correctly accorded credence
to the COA Report. As will be shown later, the Report can withstand legal scrutiny.

Initially, petitioner faults the audit team for conducting the investigation beyond the twenty-one day period stated in the COA Regional
Office Assignment Order No. 91-174 dated January 8, 1991. But this delay by itself did not destroy the credibility of the Report. Neither
was it sufficient to constitute fraud or indicate bad faith on the part of the audit team. Indeed, in the conduct of an audit, the length of
time the actual examination occurs is dependent upon the documents involved. If the documents are voluminous, then it necessarily
follows that more time would be needed. 30 What is important is that the findings of the audit should be sufficiently supported by
evidence.

Petitioner also imputes fraud to the audit team for making "it appear that the items released by the Division Office of Davao Del Sur on
21 February 1991 were compared with and became the basis for the purchase of exactly the same items on 20 February 1991." 31

The discrepancy regarding the date when the samples were taken and the date of the purchase of the same items for comparison was
not very material. The discrepancy per se did not constitute fraud in the absence of ill motive. We agree with respondents in their claim
of clerical inadvertence. We accept their explanation that the wrong date was written by the supplier concerned when the items were
bought for comparison. Anyway, the logical sequence of events was clearly indicated in the COA Report:

"1.5.1. Obtained samples of each laboratory tools and devices purchased by the Division of Davao del Sur, Memorandum Receipts
covering all the samples were issued by the agency to the audit team and are marked as Exhibits 1.2 and 3 of this Report."

"1.5.2. Bought and presented these samples to reputable business establishments in Davao City like Mercury Drug Store, Berovan
Marketing Incorporated and [A]llied Medical Equipment and Supply Corporation (AMESCO) where these items are also available, for
price verification.

"1.5.3. Available items which were exactly the same as the samples presented were purchased from AMESCO and Berovan Marketing
Incorporated, the business establishments which quoted the lowest prices. Official receipts were issued by the AMESCO and Berovan
Marketing Incorporated which are hereto marked as Exhibits 4,5,6 and 7 respectively." 32

The COA team then tabulated the results as follows: 33

Recanvassed
Total
Purchased Price + 10% % of Over- Quantity Amount of
Item Unit Cost Allow. Difference pricing Purchased Overpricing
Flask Brush made of
Nylon P112.20 P8.80 P103.40 1,175% 400 P41,360.00
Test Tube Glass
Pyrex (18x50 mm) 22.36 14.30 8.06 56% 350 2,821.00
Graduated Cylinder
Pyrex (100ml) 713.00 159.50 553.50 347% 324 179,334.00
Glass Spirit Burner
(alcohol lamp) 163.50 38.50 125.00 325% 144 18,000.00
Spring Balance
(12.5kg)Germany 551.00 93.50 457.50 489% 102 46,665.00
Iron Wire Gauge 16.20 9.90 6.30 64% 47 296.10
Bunsen Burner 701.00 90.75 610.25 672% 150 91,537.50

Total P380,013.60

What is glaring is the discrepancy in prices. The tabulated figures are supported by Exhibits "E-1," "E-2," "E-3," and "E-4," the Official
Receipts evidencing the equipment purchased by the audit team for purposes of comparison with those procured by petitioner. 34 The
authenticity of these Exhibits is not disputed by petitioner. As the SBN stated in its Decision, the fact of overpricing -- as reflected in the
aforementioned exhibits -- was testified to or identified by Laura S. Soriano, team leader of the audit team. 35 It is hornbook doctrine that
the findings of the trial court are accorded great weight, since it was able to observe the demeanor of witnesses firsthand and up
close. 36 In the absence of contrary evidence, these findings are conclusive on this Court.
It was therefore incumbent on petitioner to prove that the audit team or any of its members thereof was so motivated by ill feelings
against him that it came up with a fraudulent report. Since he was not able to show any evidence to this end, his contention as to the
irregularity of the audit due to the discrepancy of the dates involved must necessarily fail.

An audit is conducted to determine whether the amounts allotted for certain expenditures were spent wisely, in keeping with official
guidelines and regulations. It is not a witch hunt to terrorize accountable public officials. The presumption is always that official duty has
been regularly performed 37 -- both on the part of those involved with the expense allotment being audited and on the part of the audit
team -- unless there is evidence to the contrary.

Due Process

Petitioner likewise invokes Arriola v. Commission on Audit 38 to support his claim that his right to due process was violated. In that case,
this Court ruled that the disallowance made by the COA was not sufficiently supported by evidence, as it was based on undocumented
claims. Moreover, in Arriola, the documents that were used as basis of the COA Decision were not shown to petitioners, despite their
repeated demands to see them. They were denied access to the actual canvass sheets or price quotations from accredited suppliers.

As the present petitioner pointed out in his Memorandum, the foregoing jurisprudence became the basis for the COA to issue
Memorandum Order No. 97-012 dated March 31, 1997, which states:

"3.2 To firm up the findings to a reliable degree of certainty, initial findings of overpricing based on market price indicators mentioned in
pa. 2.1 above have to be supported with canvass sheet and/or price quotations indicating:

a) the identities of the suppliers or sellers;

b) the availability of stock sufficient in quantity to meet the requirements of the procuring agency;

c) the specifications of the items which should match those involved in the finding of overpricing;

d) the purchase/contract terms and conditions which should be the same as those of the questioned transaction"

Petitioner’s reliance on Arriola is misplaced. First, that Decision, more so, the COA Memorandum Order that was issued pursuant to the
former, was promulgated after the period when the audit in the present case was conducted. Neither Arriola nor the COA Memorandum
Order can be given any retroactive effect.

Second and more important, the circumstances in Arriola are different from those in the present case. In the earlier case, the COA
merely referred to a cost comparison made by the engineer of COA-Technical Services Office (TSO), based on unit costs furnished by
the Price Monitoring Division of the COA-TSO. The COA even refused to show the canvass sheets to the petitioners, explaining that the
source document was confidential.

In the present case, the audit team examined several documents before they arrived at their conclusion that the subject transactions
were grossly disadvantageous to the government. These documents were included in the Formal Offer of Evidence submitted to the
Sandiganbayan. 39 Petitioner was likewise presented an opportunity to controvert the findings of the audit team during the exit
conference held at the end of the audit, but he failed to do so. 40

Further, the fact that only three canvass sheets/price quotations were presented by the audit team does not bolster petitioner’s claim
that his right to due process was violated. To be sure, there is no rule stating that all price canvass sheets must be presented. It is
enough that those that are made the basis of comparison be submitted for scrutiny to the parties being audited. Indubitably, these
documents were properly submitted and testified to by the principal prosecution witness, Laura Soriano. Moreover, petitioner had ample
opportunity to controvert them.

Public Bidding

Petitioner oscillates between denying that he was responsible for the procurement of the questioned SLTDs, on the one hand; and, on
the other, stating that the negotiated purchase was justifiable under the circumstances.

On his disavowal of responsibility for the questioned procurement, he claims that the transactions emanated from the Division Office of
Digos headed by Jairal. 41 However, in the administrative case 42 filed against petitioner before the DECS, it was established that he
"gave the go signal" 43 that prompted the division superintendents to procure the SLTDs through negotiated purchase. This fact is not
disputed by petitioner, who quotes the same DECS Decision in stating that his "acts were justifiable under the circumstances then
obtaining at that time and for reasons of efficient and prompt distribution of the SLTDs to the high schools." 44

In justifying the negotiated purchase without public bidding, petitioner claims that "any delay in the enrichment of the minds of the public
high school students of Davao del Sur is detrimental and antithetical to public service." 45Although this reasoning is quite laudable, there
was nothing presented to substantiate it.

Executive Order No. 301 states the general rule that no contract for public services or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment
to the government or any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities may be renewed or entered into without public bidding. The rule
however, is not without exceptions. Specifically, negotiated contracts may be entered into under any of the following circumstances:

"a. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency which may involve the loss of, or danger to, life and/or property;

"b. Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to
the public service;

"c. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or manufacturer who does not have subdealers selling at lower prices
and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained elsewhere at more advantageous terms to the government;
"d. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two consecutive times, either due to
lack of bidders or the offers received in each instance were exorbitant or non-conforming to specifications;

"e. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed supplies through negotiated purchase is most advantageous to the
government to be determined by the Department Head concerned;

"f. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the government." 46

National Center for Mental Health v. Commission on Audit 47 upheld the validity of the negotiated contracts for the renovation and the
improvement of the National Center for Mental Health. In that case, petitioners were able to show that the long overdue need to
renovate the Center "made it compelling to fast track what had been felt to be essential in providing due and proper treatment and care
for the center’s patients." 48

This justification was likewise accepted in Baylon v. Ombudsman 49 in which we recognized that the purchases were made in response
to an emergency brought about by the shortage in the blood supply available to the public. The shortage was a matter recognized and
addressed by then Secretary of Health Juan M. Flavier, who attested that "he directed the NKTI [National Kidney and Transplant
Institute] to do something about the situation and immediately fast-track the implementation of the Voluntary Blood Donation Program of
the government in order to prevent further deaths owing to the lack of blood." 50

Unfortunately for petitioner, there was no showing of any immediate and compelling justification for dispensing with the requirement of
public bidding. We cannot accept his unsubstantiated reasoning that a public bidding would unnecessarily delay the purchase of the
SLTDs. Not only would he have to prove that indeed there would be a delay but, more important, he would have to show how a public
bidding would be detrimental and antithetical to public service.

As the COA Report aptly states, the law on public bidding is not an empty formality. It aims to secure the lowest possible price and
obtain the best bargain for the government. It is based on the principle that under ordinary circumstances, fair competition in the market
tends to lower prices and eliminate favoritism. 51

In this case, the DECS Division Office of Davao del Sur failed to conduct public bidding on the subject transactions. The procurement of
laboratory tools and devices was consummated with only the following documents to compensate for the absence of a public bidding:

"1.13.a Price lists furnished by the Supply Coordination Office

1.13.b. Price lists furnished by the Procurement Services of the Department of Budget and Management

1.13.c. Price lists of Esteem Enterprises" 52

The COA Report states that the Division Office merely relied on the above documents as basis for concluding that the prices offered by
D’Implacable Enterprises and Joven’s Trading were reasonable. But as found by the COA, reliance on the foregoing supporting
documents was completely without merit on the following grounds:

"a. The Supply Coordination Office was already dissolved or abolished at the time when the transactions were consummated, thus, it is
illogical for the management to consider the price lists furnished by the Supply Coordination Office.

"b. The indorsement letter made by the Procurement Services of the Department of Budget and Management containing the price lists
specifically mentions Griffin and George brands, made in England. However, the management did not procure these brands of [SLTDs].

"c. The price lists furnished by the Esteem Enterprises does not deserve the scantest consideration, since there is no law or regulation
specifically mentioning that the price lists of the Esteem Enterprises will be used as basis for buying [SLTDs]." 53

Granting arguendo that petitioner did not have a hand in the procurement and that the transactions emanated from the Division Office
of Davao del Sur, we still find him liable as the final approving authority. In fact, Exhibit "B-2" -- Purchase Order No. 90-024, amounting
to P231,012 and dated December 17, 1990 -- was recommended by Jairal and approved by petitioner. 54 This exhibit was part of the
evidence adduced in the Sandiganbayan to prove that the purchase of the SLTDs was consummated and duly paid by the DECS
without any proof of public bidding.

Although this Court has previously ruled 55 that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the
good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies or enter into negotiations, it is not unreasonable to expect petitioner to exercise
the necessary diligence in making sure at the very least, that the proper formalities in the questioned transaction were observed -- that
a public bidding was conducted. This step does not entail delving into intricate details of product quality, complete delivery or fair and
accurate pricing.

Unlike other minute requirements in government procurement, compliance or non-compliance with the rules on public bidding is readily
apparent; and the approving authority can easily call the attention of the subordinates concerned. To rule otherwise would be to render
meaningless the accountability of high-ranking public officials and to reduce their approving authority to nothing more than a mere
rubber stamp. The process of approval is not a ministerial duty of approving authorities to sign every document that comes across their
desks, and then point
to their subordinates as the parties responsible if something goes awry.

Suspension of Purchases

Obviously working against petitioner is DECS Order No. 100 dated September 3, 1990 which states thus:

"In view of the Government’s call for economy measures coupled with the deficiency in allotments intended for the payment of salary
standardization, retirement benefits, bonus and other priority items, the procurement of reference and supplementary materials, tools
and devices equipment, furniture, including land acquisition and land improvement shall be suspended for CY 1990. However, the
following items shall be exempted from the said suspension:

a) textbooks published by the Instructional Materials Corporation and its commercial edition;

b) elementary school desks and tablet arm chairs[.]"

As the COA Report succinctly states, the Administrative Order is explicit in its provisions that tools and devices were among the items
whose procurement was suspended by the DECS for the year 1990.

Petitioner claims that in the administrative case against him, there was no mention of a violation of DECS Order No. 100. 56 He alleges
that the purchases of SLTDs by the division superintendents were entered into and perfected on July 1, 1990; that is, more than two (2)
months before the issuance of DECS Order No. 100. He also alleged that the Sub-Allotment Advice (SAA) to the DECS Regional Office
No. XI in the amount of P9.36M -- out of which P603,265.00 was used for the procurement of the questioned SLTDs -- had been
released by the DECS Central Office in August 1990, a month before the issuance of DECS Order No. 100.

The Court notes that these arguments are mere assertions bereft of any proof. There was no evidence presented to prove that the SAA
was issued prior to the effectivity of DECS Order No. 100. On the other hand, the COA Report states that the DECS Division of Davao
del Sur received the following Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAA): 57

"LAA NO. AMOUNT DATE OF LAA

DO CO471-774-90 P141,956.00 October 24, 1990

DO-CO471-797-90 P161,309.00 November 16, 1990

DO-CO471-1007-90 P300,000.00 December 14, 1990"

The foregoing LAAs were attached as annexes 58 to the COA Report and were presented during trial in the Sandiganbayan. 59

Also, Schools Division Superintendent Jairal had sent a letter to petitioner, requesting favorable consideration of a forthcoming release
of funding for the different barangay and municipal high schools. The letter was dated October 16, 1990, 60 and was made well within
the effectivity of the DECS Order. In that letter, Jairal mentioned the receipt by his office of DECS Order No. 100, albeit wrongly
interpreting it as suspending only the purchases of reference books, supplementary readers, and so on, but allegedly silent on the
purchase of laboratory supplies and materials.61

Finally, the SLTDs were purchased within the covered period of DECS Order No. 100, as evidenced by the following relevant
documents adduced by the COA audit team, among others:

1) Disbursement Voucher dated November 27, 1990 for the payment of various laboratory supplies and materials by DECS, Davao del
Sur in the amount of P303,29.40 62

2) Official Receipt No. 455 dated January 7, 1991 amounting to P68,424.00 issued by Joven’s Trading 63

3) Report of Inspection dated November 26, 1990 signed by Jacinta Villareal and Felicisimo Canoy 64

4) Sales Invoice No. 044 dated November 26, 1990 issued by Joven’s Trading in favor of DECS amounting to P303,259.40 65

5) Certificate of Acceptance dated November 27, 1990 signed by Felicismo Canoy 66

6) Purchase Order No. 90-021 in favor of Joven’s Trading dated November 26, 1990 recommended for approval by Ajatil Jairal 67

7) Official Receipt No. 92356 dated January 7, 1991 issued by D’Implacable Enterprises amounting to P231,012.0068

8) Purchase Order No. 90-024 dated December 17, 1990 recommended for approval by Ajatil Jairal and approved Director Venancio
Nava amounting to P231,012.00." 69

The confluence of the foregoing circumstances indubitably establishes that petitioner indeed wantonly disregarded regulations.
Additionally, DECS Order No. 100 negates his claim that the negotiated transaction -- done instead of a public bidding -- was justified. If
that Order suspended the acquisition of tools and devices, then there was all the more reason for making purchases by public bidding.
Since the buying of tools and devices was specifically suspended, petitioner cannot argue that the purchases were done in the interest
of public service.

Proof of Guilt

To sustain a conviction under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, it must be clearly proven that 1) the accused is a public officer; 2)
the public officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and 3) the contract or transaction was grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government. 70

From the foregoing, it is clear that the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that the evidence presented warranted a verdict of conviction.
Petitioner is a public officer, who approved the transactions on behalf of the government, which thereby suffered a substantial loss. The
discrepancy between the prices of the SLTDs purchased by the DECS and the samples purchased by the COA audit team clearly
established such undue injury. Indeed, the discrepancy was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
We must emphasize however, that the lack of a public bidding and the violation of an administrative order do not by themselves satisfy
the third element of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(g); namely, that the contract or transaction entered into was manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government, as seems to be stated in the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. 71 Lack of public bidding alone does not result in a manifest and gross disadvantage. Indeed, the absence of a public
bidding may mean that the government was not able to secure the lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to graft and
corruption. Nevertheless, the law requires that the disadvantage must be manifest and gross. Penal laws are strictly construed against
the government. 72

If the accused is to be sent to jail, it must be because there is solid evidence to pin that person down, not because of the omission of a
procedural matter alone. Indeed, all the elements of a violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 should be established to prove
the culpability of the accused. In this case, there is a clear showing that all the elements of the offense are present. Thus, there can be
no other conclusion other than conviction.

We note, however, that petitioner was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day as minimum to twelve (12) years
and one (1) day as maximum. Under Section 9 of Republic Act 3019, petitioner should be punished with imprisonment of not less than
six (6) years and one (1) month nor more than fifteen years. Thus, we adjust the minimum penalty imposed on petitioner in accordance
with the law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
minimum sentence imposed shall be six (6) years and one (1) month, not six (6) years and one (1) day. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice
Chairperson, First Division

W E C O N C U R:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO SR., MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 3-66.

2
Id. at 68-88. Fourth Division. Penned by Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao and concurred in by Justices Gregory S. Ong (Division
chair) and Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada (member).

3 Assailed Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 19-20; rollo, pp. 86-87. (Emphases in the original)

4
Id. at 9-11; id. at 76-78.

5 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 23627.

6
Information dated March 17, 1997, p. 1; rollo, p. 145.

7 Order dated August 1, 1997; rollo, pp. 148-150.

8On May 27, 1998, the case against Teodora Indin was dismissed upon Motion of the Ombudsman; in the Order dated
December 4, 2000, the cases against Antonio S. Tan and Evelyn L. Miranda, the proprietor and authorized representative of
D’Implacable Enterprise, were ordered dismissed for failure of the prosecution to establish the charge against them by any
admissible and reliable proof.

Ajatil Jairal, Rosalinda Merka and Joseph Ventura were all acquitted by the Sandiganbayan.
9 Assailed Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 11; rollo p. 78.

10
Id. at 15; id. at 82.

11
Id. at 16; id. at 83. The Sandiganbayan ruled: "The evidence adduced by accused Superintendent Ajatil Jairal is very
enlightening. It supports the collective claim of all the other superintendents who were unnecessarily dragged into the case
because of the greed and evil mind of one man in the person of accused Venancio Nava. It was indeed Nava who brought
them to this cruel situation. x x x."

12
Id. at 17; id. at 84.

13 Id.

14This case was deemed submitted for decision on January 7, 2005, upon this Court’s receipt of petitioner’s Memorandum,
signed by Atty. Jose Armand C. Arevalo. Received on December 7, 2004 was respondent’s Memorandum, signed by Special
Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio, Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos, acting Director, ASAB-OSP Pilarita T. Lapitan
and Special Prosecution Officer II Cicero D. Jurado Jr.

15 Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 6-8.

16Presidential Decree No. 1606 (1978), Sec. 7. "Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating a Special Court to be Known
as ‘Sandiganbayan’ and for Other Purposes."

Republic Act No. 8249 (1997), Sec. 5. "An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the
17

Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes."

18
Pagoda Philippines, Inc. v. Universal Canning, Inc., GR No. 160966, October 11, 2005.

19 Chua v. Santos, 440 SCRA 365, October 18, 2004.

People v. Sandiganbayan, 449 SCRA 205, January 21, 2005; Rosete v. CA, 393 Phil. 593, August 29, 2000; Bernardo v.
20

CA, 275 SCRA 413, July 14, 1997. See also Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 1.

21 Nautica Canning Corp. v. Yumul, GR No. 164588, October 19, 2005.

22
People v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 20.

23 Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 8-9.

24 Rollo, pp. 287-305.

25 Petitioner’s Memorandum p. 54.

26 Constitution, Art. IX-D, Sec. 2(1).

27 Constitution, Art. IX-D, Sec. 2(2).

28 Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit, 166 SCRA 657, October 27, 1988.

29 Villanueva v. Commission on Audit, 453 SCRA 782, March 18, 2005;Olaguer v. Domingo, 359 SCRA 78, June 20, 2001.

30 Respondent’s memorandum, p. 19; rollo, p. 446.

31
Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 15.

32 COA Report, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 99-100.

33 Id. at 8; id. at 101.

34 Rollo, pp. 230-233.

35 Assailed Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 12; rollo, p. 79.

36 See People v. Baao, 142 SCRA 476, July 7, 1986.

37 See Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 362 SCRA 304, August 2, 2001.

38 202 SCRA 147, September 30, 1991.

39 See Formal Offer of Evidence, referring to Exhibits "A" – "E-7"; rollo, pp. 152-236.

40
Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 24; rollo, p. 451.
41 Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 72-82.

42 DECS Administrative Case No. XI-91-088, October 21, 1996 (rollo, pp. 287-305).

43 Id. at 290.

44 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 55.

45
Id. at 57.

46 Executive Order No. 301 (1987), Sec. 1.

47
265 SCRA 390, December 6, 1996.

48 Id. at 404, per Vitug, J.

49 372 SCRA 437, December 14, 2001.

50 Id. at 453, per Pardo, J.

51 COA Report p. 10, rollo p. 103.

52 Id. at 10-11; id. at 103-104.

53 Id. at 11-12; id. at 104-105.

54 Formal Offer of Evidence, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 153-154.

55 Arias v. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 309, December 19, 1989.

56 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 58.

57
COA Report, p. 14; rollo, p. 107.

58
Rollo, pp. 162-164 and 221-224.

59 Exhibits "A", "A-1", "A-2"; Formal Offer of Evidence, p. 1; rollo, p. 152.

60 Rollo, p. 236.

61 Id.

62 Exhibit "C"; rollo, p. 154.

63 Exhibit "C-4"; id. at 155.

64 Exhibit "C-5"; id.

65 Exhibit "C-6"; id.

66 Exhibit "C-7"; id.

67 Exhibit "C-8"; id.

68 Exhibit "B-3"; id. at 153.

69
Exhibit "B2"; id.

70
See Morales v. People, 385 SCRA 259, July 26, 2002.

71 Assailed Resolution dated September 29, 2003, p. 3; rollo, p. 142.

72 Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197, September 1, 1994.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation


EN BANC

[G.R. No. 5952. October 24, 1911.]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RUFINO PONTE, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.


Acting Attorney-General Harvey, for Appellant.

No appearance for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. MALVERSATION; PRINCIPALS IN CRIME. — Those who take a direct part in the commission of the crime of malversation of public funds by public
officials, as defined in Act NO. 1740, and those who cooperate in the commission of that crime by acts without which it could not have been
accomplished, are guilty as principals although they themselves may not be public officials.

DECISION

CARSON, J.:

Rufino Ponte, Pedro Pedraza, Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, Agapito Cada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban Verata, were charged with the crime of
malversation of public funds, as defined and penalized in Act No. 1740, in an information couched in the following terms: jg c:chan roble s.com. ph

"That on or about the 6th day of September, 1909, the defendant Rufino Ponte was a bonded employee of the provincial and municipal government of
Calabanga, Ambos Camarines, and as municipal treasurer of said pueblo had in his possession and in his charge the sum of P3,795.93 and a safe valued
at P50. The defendant Pedro Pedraza was the janitor or porter of the municipal treasury of Calabanga, and Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, Agapito
Cada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban Verata were municipal policemen of said pueblo of Calabanga, Ambos Camarines, and as such officers had
committed to them the guardianship and custody of the municipal treasury of Calabanga, where the said sum of P3,795.93 and the safe containing it
were kept.

"That the said defendant Rufino Ponte did maliciously, criminally and unlawfully misappropriate and make personal use of the said sum of P3,795.93,
and refused and failed to render account of the same, as well as of the safe containing it.

"That the defendants Pedro Pedraza, Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, Agapito Cada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban Verata, did, each and every one of
them, maliciously, criminally and unlawfully, directly aid said Rufino Ponte in this malversation by taking said safe with the said amount from the
municipal treasury and carrying it to the sitio of Inarian: in violation of law." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary

Counsel for the defendants Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, Agapito Cada, Alejandro Metram and Esteban Verata, demurred to the information on the
ground that as to these defendants the facts set out in the information did not constitute the crime with which they were charged. The grounds upon
which they base this contention are stated by counsel as follows: jgc:c han robles. com.ph

"The crime with which the above-named defendants are charged is provided for and penalized by a special Act, No. 1740, which has repealed such
provisions of the Penal Code relating to malversation and misappropriation as conflict with the provisions of said Act.

"According to the information cited, the above-named accused were municipal policemen of Calabanga, where the crime was committed, and their sole
participation therein was that they directly aided Rufino Ponte, the municipal treasurer, in said malversation by taking the safe with the sum
misappropriated and carrying it from the municipal treasury to the sitio of Inarian.

"It is evident from what has just been stated that the question relates to the guilt of the accused Alamida, Narvades, Cada, Metram and Verata as
accomplices in the crime of malversation. (3 Phil. Rep., 6; art. 14, Penal Code.)

"As accomplices, said defendants are not liable under Act No. 1740, because this Act only punishes the principals, the officers, whether bonded or not ,
who misapply or -misappropriate the funds they may have in their possession by reason of their office.

"The provisions of the Penal Code regarding the criminal responsibility of accomplices in crimes are applicable to this case, because the crime under
consideration is penalized by a special Act, which is the only law that should govern. "Therefore, in view- of the arguments adduced, the court is
requested to sustain this demurrer and order the dismissal of this cause with reference to the accused municipal policemen of Calabanga." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

The court below sustained the demurrer in the following order: jgc:c han robles. com.ph

"Careful perusal of section 1 of Act No. 1740 shows that it refers to bonded officers or employees and any other persons who, having charge, by reason
of their office or employment or by operation of law, of funds or property of the Government, who misappropriate, fail to render account, etc.

"Two requisites are therefore necessary for the existence of the crime of malversation, according to Act No. 1740, to wit: (1) That a bonded officer or
employee or any other person by reason of his office or employment or by operation of law have charge of funds or property of the Government; and
(2) that said officer or person refuse or fail to render account, or make personal use of the same or misappropriate them, etc.

"Are these requisites applicable to the accused policemen?

"No: for the office of municipal policeman does not carry with it any duty of guardianship or custody of Government funds, nor is there any law which
prescribes that by reason of being policemen they must take charge of and guard Government funds, nor is it alleged in the complaint that the funds in
question were turned over to them; it merely appears that it was their duty as policemen to guard the safe, or municipal treasury. The information itself
avers that ’as such officials they had committed to them the guardianship and custody of the municipal treasury of Calabanga, where the said sum of
P3,795.93 and the safe containing it were kept.’ More clearly: the law does not refer to those who guard or care for the municipal building or treasury,
but to those who are intrusted with or have in their charge funds or property of the Government.

"Accordingly, if the policemen abstracted the money and the safe containing it, and carried it to another place, as is alleged in the complaint, they
committed the crime of robbery, or some other crime against property, but not the crime of malversation as defined in Act No. 1740.

"Therefore the court sustains the demurrer, declaring this cause dismissed with reference to the policemen Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, Agapito
Cada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban Verata, with five-sixths of the costs de oficio, and orders the provincial fiscal again to investigate the facts and
then present an information against said policemen for robbery or some other crime against property." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

We are agreed with the trial judge in so far as he refused to give any weight to contention of counsel for the defense that the information merely
charges these defendants as accomplices in the commission of the crime defined and penalized in Act No. 1740, and that there is nothing in the Act
which penalizes the assistance rendered by accomplices in the commission of this crime; it will be seen that the information expressly alleges that "the
defendants did, each and every one of them, maliciously, criminally and unlawfully, directly aid said Rufino Ponte in this malversation by taking said
safe with the said amount from the municipal treasury and carrying it to the sitio of Inarian," thus charging them with having taken a direct part in the
commission of the crime, which could not have been successfully carried out had it not been for their direct participation an d cooperation. Clearly these
defendants are charged in the information as coprincipals and not as accomplices.

But we can not agree with the trial court in sustaining the demurrer on the ground that the accused, not having had the money in question in their
charge by reason of a public office held by them, could not commit the crime of malversation of public funds as defined in Act No. 1740, the true nature
of the crime committed by-them being, in the opinion of the trial judge, "robbery" or some other of the offenses against property defined and penalized
in the code. It may be that the acts committed by these defendants constituted the crime of robbery, but under all the circumstances, we have no
doubt that these acts also constituted the crime of malversation of public funds as defined in Act No. 1740.

Groizard, in his Commentaries on article 405 of the Spanish Penal Code, which is substantially identical with article 390 of the Philippine Code, says
that:
jgc:cha nrob les.com. ph

"Doubt, weighty doubt may arise, nevertheless, regarding the definition of the crime and of the penalty to be imposed upon the private party who
abstracts public funds with the consent of the officer charged with their custody. Shall the person so doing be guilty of the crime of malversation here
provided for, and shall he suffer the same penalty as the unfaithful officer, or shall he be guilty only of the crime of theft and undergo the punishment
he deserves therefor?

x x x

Without overlooking the force of the arguments we have just cited, we are inclined to take the first point of view. We are led thereto by the i the private
party who abstracts public funds as upon the employee who gives his consent thereto we recognize the differentiation with which crimes are always
described and penalized in the code. In the action which the text describes as a crime there is perfect unity: the private party does not act
independently from the public officer: rather, he knows that the funds of which he wishes to get possession are in the latters charge, and instead of
trying to abstract them by circumventing the other’s vigilance he resorts to corruption, and in the officer’s unfaithfulness seeks and finds the most
reprehensible means for accomplishing a deed which by having a public officer as its moral instrument assumes the character of a social crime. If the
article were not so interpreted, it would be necessary to agree that the act, inspite of its evident unity, would constitute not one but two distinct crimes,
and the persons participating therein, although they acted together throughout, would be guilty of two different kinds of wrongdoing. Moreover, the rule
of article 80, which prevents extension from some culprits to others of the responsibility that arises from their personal qualities, is restricted by
fundamental principles and by the article itself, wherein it is applied to the consideration of the extenuating and aggravating circumstances which may
affect the persons respectively responsible for the crime, and it neither can nor must influence in any way the characterizat ion of the facts. One who
helps a son kill his father is an accomplice of parricide: one who plans with a servant to commit a theft (hurto), and does commit it, is guilty of hurto
domestico. When the law clearly defines a crime, as it has here defined the crime of malversation, those who in any way participate therein must be
principals, accomplices or abettors thereof." (Vol. 4, p. 275.)

Viada, in his Commentaries upon the same article, says: jg c:chan roble s.com. ph

"Shall the person who participates or intervenes as coperpetrator, accomplice or abettor in the crime of malversation of public funds, committed by a
public officer, have the penalties of this article also imposed upon him? In opposition to the opinion maintained by some jurists and commentators
(among others the learned Pacheco) we can only answer the question affirmatively, for the same reasons (mutatis mutandis) we have already advanced
in Question I of the commentary on article 314. French jurisprudence has also settled the question in the same way on the ground that the person
guilty of the crime necessarily aids the other culprit in the acts which constitute the crime." (Vol. 2 4th edition, p. 653.)

The reasoning by which Groizard and Viada support their views as to the correct interpretation of the provisions of the Penal Code touching
malversation of public funds by a public official, is equally applicable in our opinion, to the provisions of Act No. 1740 defining and penalizing that crime,
and we have heretofore, in the case of the United States v. Dowdell (11 Phil. Rep., 4), imposed the penalty prescribed by this section of the code upon
a public official who took part with another in the malversation of public funds, although it was not alleged, and in fact clearly appeared, that those
funds were not in his hands by virtue of his office, though it did appear that they were in the hands of his coprincipal by virtue of the public office held
by him.

The order of the lower court sustaining the demurrer should be and is hereby overruled.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

December 5, 2017

G.R. No. 217874

OPHELIA HERNAN, Petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Resolution dated February 2, 2015 and Decision dated November 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division which affirmed, with
1 2

modification, the Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 7, Baguio City convicting petitioner of the
crime of malversation of public funds in Criminal Case No. 15722-R.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In October 1982, petitioner Ophelia Hernan joined the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC),Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) in Baguio City wherein she served as an accounting clerk. In September 1984, she was promoted to the
position of Supervising Fiscal Clerk by virtue of which she was designated as cashier, disbursement and collection officer. As such, 3

petitioner received cash and other collections from customers and clients for the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll foes, and special
message fees. The collections she received were deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP), Baguio City Branch. 4

On December 17, 1996, Maria Imelda Lopez, an auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA), conducted a cash examination of the
accounts handled by petitioner as instructed by her superior, Sherelyn Narag. As a result, Lopez came across deposit slips dated
September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of ₱11,300.00 and ₱81,348.20, rcspectively. Upon close scrutiny, 5

she noticed that said deposit slips did not bear a stamp of receipt by the LBP nor was it machine validated. Suspicious about what she
found, she and Narag verified all the reports and other documents turned-over to them by petitioner. On the basis of said findings,
6

Narag sent a letter to the LBP to confirm the remittances made by petitioner. After adding all the deposits made and upon checking with
the teller's blotter, Nadelline Orallo, the resident auditor of LBP, found that no deposits were made by petitioner for the account of
DOTC on September 19, 1996 for the amount of ₱11,300.00 and November 29, 1996 for the amount of ₱81,340.20. 7

Thereafter, the LBP's officer-in-charge, Rebecca R. Sanchez, instructed the bank's teller, Catalina Ngaosi, to conduct their own
independent inquiry. It was discovered that on September 19, 1996, the only deposit in favor of the DOTC was that made by its Ifugao
office in the Lagawe branch of the LBP. This prompted Lopez to write to petitioner informing her that the two (2) aforesaid remittances
8
were not acknowledged by the bank. The auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the ₱81,348.20 remittance but not for
the ₱11,300.00. Dissatisfied with petitioner's explanation as to the whereabouts of the said remittance, Narag reported the matter to the
COA Regional Director who, in turn wrote to the LBP for confirmation. The LBP then denied receiving any ₱11,300.00 deposit on
September 19, 1996 from petitioner for the account of the DOTC. Thus, the COA demanded that she pay the said amount. Petitioner,
9

however, refused. Consequently, the COA filed a complaint for malversation of public funds against petitioner with the Office of the
Ombudsman for Luzon which, after due investigation, recommended her indictment for the loss of ₱11,300.00. Accordingly, petitioner
10

was charged before the RTC of Baguio City in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about September 16, 1996, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Disbursing Officer of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, Baguio City, and as such an accountable officer, entrusted with and responsible for the amount of
₱1 1,300.00 which accused received and collected for the DOTC, and intended for deposit under the account of DOTC with the Land
Bank of the Philippines-Baguio City, by reason of her position, while in the performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her
position, did then and there, wilfully, feloniously, and unlawfully misappropriate or consent, or through abandonment or negligence,
permit other persons to take such amount of ₱11,300.00 to the damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 11

Upon arraignment on July 31, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Hence, trial on the merits ensued.

To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of two (2) COA auditors, namely, Maria Lopez and Sherelyn Narag as
well as three (3) LBP employees, namely, Rebecca Sanchez, Catalina Ngaosi, and Nadelline Orallo. In response, the defense
12

presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized as follows:

On September 19, 1996, petitioner and her supervisor, Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP Baguio branch and personally deposited the
exact amount of ₱11,300.00 with accomplished deposit slips in six (6) copies. Since there were many clients who came ahead of her,
13

she decided to go with her usual arrangement of leaving the money with the teller and telling her that she would just come back to
retrieve the deposit slip. Thus, she handed the money to Teller No. 2, whom she identified as Catalina Ngaosi. Upon her return at
around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, she retrieved four (4) copies of the deposit slip from Ngaosi. She noticed that the same had no
acknowledgment mark on it. Being contented with the initials of the teller on the deposit slips, she returned to her office and kept them
in her vault. It was only during the cash count conducted by auditor Lopez when she found out that the said amount was not remitted to
the account of the LBP. When demand was made on her to return the amount, she requested that she be allowed to pay only after
investigation of a complaint of Estafa that she would file with the National Bureau of Investigation against some personnel of the bank,
particularly Catalina Ngaosi. The complaint, however, was eventually dismissed.
14 15

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of
the decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered convicting accused Ophelia Hernan of Malversation and
hereby sentences her, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer imprisonment from 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day
of prision mayor medium period, as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum period to reclusion
temporalmaximum period, as maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱11,300.00.

Accused Ophelia Hernan is further sentenced to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification.

Likewise, accused Ophelia Hernan is hereby ordered to pay back to the government the amount of ₱11,300.00 plus legal interest
thereon at the rate of 12% per annum to be computed from the date of the filing of the Information up to the time the same is actually
paid.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED. 16

Erroneously, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed her conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Upon
motion, however, the CA set aside its decision on the finding that it has no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Instead, it is the
Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over petitioner occupying a position lower than Salary Grade 27. Petitioner's
17

new counsel, Atty. Leticia Gutierrez Hayes-Allen, then appealed the case to the Sandiganbayan. In a Decision dated November 13,
2009, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the RTC's judgment of conviction but modified the penalty imposed, the dispositive opinion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modifications that the indeterminate
penalty to be imposed on the accused should be from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months, and 21
days of prision mayor as maximum, together with the accessory penalties under Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and that interest
of only 6% shall be imposed on the amount of ₱11,300.00 to be restored by the accused.

SO ORDERED. 18

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 21, 2009 alleging that during the trial before the RTC, her counsel was
unable to elicit many facts which would show her innocence. Said counsel principally failed to present certain witnesses and documents
that would supposedly acquit her from the crime charged. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied the motion in a Resolution dated
August 31, 2010 on the ground that evidence not formally offered before the court below cannot be considered on appeal. 19

On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration became final and executory and was recorded in the
Book of Entries of Judgments. On July 26, 2013, petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Meshack Macwes, filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen
20

the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution. In a Resolution dated December 4, 2013, however, the
21 22

Sandiganbayan denied the motion and directed the execution of the judgment of conviction. It noted the absence of the following
requisites for the reopening of a case: (1) the reopening must be before finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by
the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent
a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty (30) days from
the issuance of the order. 23

Unfazed, petitioner filed on January 9, 2014 a Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the
Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment praying for a reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan' s recent Resolution, that the case be
reopened for further reception of evidence, and the recall of the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013. In a Resolution dated
24

February 2, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the petition for lack of merit. According to the said court, the motion is clearly a third
motion for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Court. Also, the grounds raised therein were merely a
rehash of those raised in the two previous motions. The claims that the accused could not contact her counsel on whom she merely
relied on for appropriate remedies to be filed on her behalf, and that she has additional evidence to present, were already thoroughly
discussed in the August 31, 2010 and December 4, 2013 Resolutions. Moreover, the cases relied upon by petitioner are not on point. 25

On May 14, 2015, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:

I.

THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN WAS FILED OUT OF TIME CONSIDERING TI-IE
EXTRAORDINARY AND EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CASE.

II.

THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE INTENDED TO BE PRESENTED BY PETITIONER SHOULD HER
MOTTON FOR REOPENING BE GRANTED, WAS PASSED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT.

III.

THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PRONOUNCING THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN AND THE PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION
FILED BY PETITIONER ARE CONSIDERED AS THE SECOND AND THIRD MOTIONS TO THE DENIAL OF THE DECISION.

Petitioner posits that her counsel, Atty. Hayes-Allen, never received the August 31, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying her
Motion for Reconsideration. This is because notice thereof was erroneously sent to said counsel's previous office at Poblacion, La
Trinidad, Benguet, despite the fact that it was specifically indicated in the Motion for Reconsideration that the new office is at the Public
Attorney's Office of Tayug, Pangasinan, following her counsel's appointment as public attorney. Thus, since her counsel was not
properly notified of the subject resolution, the entry of judgment is premature. In support of her assertion, she cites Our ruling in People
26

v. Chavez, wherein We held that an entry of judgment without receipt of the resolution is premature.
27

Petitioner also claims that during trial, she could not obtain the necessary evidence for her defense due to the fact that the odds were
against her. Because of this, she asks the Court to relax the strict application of the rules and consider remanding the case to the lower
court for further reception of evidence. In particular, petitioner seeks the reception of an affidavit of a certain John L. Ziganay, an
28

accountant at the Depaiiment of Science and Technology (DOST), who previously worked at the DOTC and COA, as well as two (2)
deposit slips. According to petitioner, these pieces of evidence would show that the ₱11,300.00 deposited at the Lagawe branch of the
LBP was actually the deposit made by petitioner and not by a certain Lanie Cabacungan, as the prosecution suggests. This is because
the ₱11,300.00 deposit made by Cabacungan consists of two (2) different amounts, which, if proper accounting procedure is followed,
shall be recorded in the bank statement as two (2) separate amounts and not their total sum of ₱11,300.00. Thus, the
29

Sandiganbayan's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen the case is capricious, despotic, and whimsical since the admission of her
additional evidence will prevent a miscarriage.

Finally, petitioner denies the Sandiganbayan's ruling that her motion to reopen and petition for reconsideration are considered as a
second and third motion for reconsideration, and are thus, prohibited pleadings. This is because the additional evidence she seeks to
introduce were not available during the trial of her case.

The petition is devoid of merit.

At the outset, the Court notes that as pointed out by respondent Office of the Special Prosecutor, petitioner's resort to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an improper remedy. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a
party aggrieved by a cou1i order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision he
intends to assail. It bears stressing that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if there is no appeal or any other
30

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. If the Order or Resolution sought to be assailed is in the nature of a
31

final order, the remedy of the aggrieved party would be to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioner, in the instant case, seeks to assail
32

the Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated December 4, 2013 and February 2, 2015 wherein said court denied her motion to reopen the
malversation case against her. Said resolutions are clearly final orders that dispose the proceedings completely. The instant petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 is, therefore, improper.

Even if We assume the propriety of petitioner's chosen action, the Court still cannot grant the reliefs she prays for, specifically: (1) the
reversal of the Sandiganbayan's December 4, 2013 and February 2, 2015 Resolutions denying her motion to reopen and petition for
reconsideration; (2) the reopening of the case for further reception of evidence; and (3) the recall of the Entry of Judgment dated June
26, 2013. 33

First of all, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that since her counsel was not properly notified of the August 31, 2010 Resolution as
notice thereof was erroneously sent to her old office address, the entry of judgment is premature. As the Court sees it, petitioner has no
one but herself to blame. Time and again, the Court has held that in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a
change of address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon the parties must be made at the last address of their counsel
on record. It is the duty of the party and his counsel to device a system for the receipt of mail intended for them, just as it is the duty of
34
the counsel to inform the court officially of a change in his address. If counsel moves to another address without informing the court of
35

that change, such omission or neglect is inexcusable and will not stay the finality of the decision. The court cannot be expected to take
judicial notice of the new address of a lawyer who has moved or to ascertain on its own whether or not the counsel of record has been
changed and who the new counsel could possibly be or where he probably resides or holds office. 36

Here, it is undisputed that petitioner's counsel failed to inform the court of the change in her office address from Poblacion, La Trinidad,
Benguet, to the Public Attorney's Office in Tayug, Pangasinan. The fact that said new address was indicated in petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration does not suffice as "proper and adequate notice" to the court. As previously stated, courts cannot be expected to take
notice of every single time the counsel of a party changes address. Besides, it must be noted that petitioner even expressly admitted
having received the subject resolution "sometime in September or October 2010." Easily, she could have informed her counsel of the
37

same. As respondent posits, it is not as if petitioner had no knowledge of the whereabouts of her counsel considering that at the time of
the filing of her Motion for Reconsideration, said counsel was already with the PA0. Moreover, the Court cannot permit petitioner's
38

reliance on the Chavez case because there, petitioner did not receive the resolution of the Court of Appeals through no fault or
negligence on his paii. Here, however, petitioner's non-receipt of the subject resolution was mainly attributable not only to her
39

counsel's negligence but hers, as well. Thus, the Court deems it necessary to remind litigants, who are represented by counsel, that
they should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. They should give the necessary
assistance to their counsel for what is at stake is their interest in the case. It is, therefore, their responsibility to check the status of their
case from time to time. 40

To recall, petitioner, on December 21, 2009, filed her Motion for Reconsideration seeking a reversal of the Sandiganbayan's November
13, 2009 Decision which affirmed the RTC's ruling convicting her of the crime of malversation. In a Resolution dated August 31, 2010,
the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Said resolution became final in the absence of any pleading filed
thereafter, and hence, was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on June 26, 2013. Subsequently, on July 12, 2013, petitioner,
through her new counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution, which
was denied through the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated December 4, 2013. Undeterred, petitioner filed her Petition for
41

Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay of Execution of Judgement on January 9,
2014 which was likewise denied in the Sandiganbayan's February 2, 2015 Resolution.

It seems, therefore, that petitioner waited almost an entire three (3) year period from the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration to act
upon the malversation case against her through the filing of her urgent motion to reopen. In fact, her filing of said motion may very well
be prompted only by her realization that the case has finally concluded by reason of the entry of judgment. Stated otherwise, the Court
is under the impression that had she not heard of the recording of the August 31, 2010 Resolution in the Book of Entries of Judgments
on June 26, 2013, petitioner would not even have inquired about the status of her case. As respondent puts it, the urgent motion to
reopen appears to have been filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal via a petition for review on certioraribefore the
Court. On this inexcusable negligence alone, the Court finds sufficient basis to deny the instant petition.
42

Second of all, petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan's denial of her motion to reopen the case is capricious, despotic, and whimsical
since the admission of her additional evidence will prevent a miscarriage has no legal nor factual leg to stand on. Section 24, Rule 119
and existing jurisprudence provide for the following requirements for the reopening a case: (l) the reopening must be before the finality
of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a
hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further
evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order. 43

But as the Sandiganbayan ruled, the absence of the first requisite that the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of
conviction already cripples the motion. The records of the case clearly reveal that the August 3l, 2010 Resolution of the
1âwphi 1

Sandiganbayan denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration had already become final and executory and, in fact, was already
recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013. Moreover, petitioner's supposed predicament about her former counsel
failing to present witnesses and documents should have been advanced before the trial court. It is the trial court, and neither the
44

Sandiganbayan nor the Court, which receives evidence and rules over exhibits formally offered. Thus, it was, indeed, too late in the
45

day to advance additional allegations for petitioner had all the opportunity to do so in the lower court. An appellate court will generally
not disturb the trial court's assessment of factual matters except only when it clearly overlooked certain facts or where the evidence fails
to substantiate the lower court's findings or when the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. 46

Ultimately, it bears stressing that the Court does not find that the Sandiganbayan acted in a capricious, despotic, or whimsical manner
when it denied petitioner's motion to reopen especially in view of the fact that the rulings it seeks to refute are legally sound and
appropriately based on the evidences presented by the parties. On this score, the elements of malversation of public funds under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a public officer; (2) that he had the custody or control of funds
or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or property were public funds or prope1iy for which he was
accountable; and (4) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them. This article establishes a presumption that when a public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public
funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, it shall be prima facieevidence that he has put such
missing funds to personal uses. 47

As duly found by the trial court, and affinned by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner's defense that she, together with her supervisor Cecilia
Paraiso, went to the LBP and handed the subject ₱11,300.00 deposit to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to where the
money went failed to overcome the presumption of law. For one, Paraiso was never presented to corroborate her version. For another,
when questioned about the subject deposit, not only did petitioner fail to make the same readily available, she also could not
satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the
accountable officer had received public funds, that she did not have them in her possession when demand therefor was made, and that
she could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so.48 Thus, even if it is assumed that it was somebody else who misappropriated
the said amount, petitioner may still be held liable for malversation. The Comi quotes, with approval, the trial court's ruling, viz.:

Even if the claim of Hernan, i.e., that she actually left the amount of ₱11,300.00 and the corresponding deposit slip with the
Bank Teller Ngaosi and she came back to retrieve the deposit slip later, is to be believed and then it came out that the said
₱11,300.00 was not credited to the account of DOTC with the Land Bank and was in fact missing, still accused Hernan should
be convicted of malversation because in this latter situation she permits through her inexcusable negligence another person
to take the money. And this is still malversation under Article 217. 49

Said ruling was, in fact, duly reiterated by the Sandiganbayan in its Decision, thus:
Shifting our gaze to the possibility that it was the bank teller Catalina Ngaosi who misappropriated the amount and should therefore be
held liable, as the accused would want to poltray, the Court doubts the tenability of that position. As consistently ruled by jurisprudence,
a public officer may be held liable for malversation even if he does not use public property or funds under his custody for his personal
benefit, but consents to the taking thereof by another person, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted such taking. The
accused, by her negligence, simply created the opportunity for the misappropriation. Even her justification that her deposits
which were not machine-validated were nonetheless acknowledged by the bank cannot fortify her defense. On the contrary, it
all the more emphasizes her propensity for negligence each time that she accepted deposit slips which were not
machinevalidated, her only proof of receipt of her deposits. 50

In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan's finding that petitioner's motion to reopen and petition for
reconsideration are practically second and third motions for reconsideration from its Decision dated November 13, 2009. Under the
rules, the motions are already prohibited pleadings under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court due to the fact that the grounds
raised in the petition for reconsideration are merely a rehash of those raised in the two (2) previous motions filed before it. These
grounds were already thoroughly discussed by the Sandiganbayan in its subject resolutions. Hence, as duly noted by the
Sandiganbayan, in the law of pleading, courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance, not to be misled by a false
or wrong name given to a pleading because the title thereof is not controlling and the court should be guided by its averments. Thus, 51

the fact that the pleadings filed by petitioner are entitled Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay
Execution and Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for Stay of Execution of
Judgment does not exempt them from the application of the rules on prohibited pleadings.

Let it be remembered that the doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound
practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some
definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro
tune entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions is present in this case.
52

Indeed, every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. Just as a losing party has
the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the "life of the law." To frustrate it by dilatory schemes
on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that this Court
should write finis to this litigation.53

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that it is still necessary to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated
June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, not for further reception of evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in order to modify the
penalty imposed by said court. The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and
may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether
it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. When, however, circumstances transpire after the
54

finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit en bane and give due regard to such exceptional
circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability. The same is in line with Section 3(c), Rule II of the Internal
55

Rules of the Supreme Court, which provides that cases raising novel questions of law are acted upon by the Court en bane. To the
Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 entitled An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage
on which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815 Otherwise
Known as the "Revised Penal Code" as Amended which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is an
example of such exceptional circumstance. Section 40 of said Act provides:

SEC. 40. Article 217 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act. No. 1060, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his
office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise
be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of pnswn correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or
malversation docs not exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000.00).

xxxx

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the
amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.

Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, We have here a novel situation wherein the judgment convicting the accused,
petitioner herein, has already become final and executory and yet the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the
passage of said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner's sentence be modified respecting the settled rule on the retroactive
effectivity of laws, the sentencing being favorable to the accused, she may even apply for probation, as long as she does not possess
56 57

any ground for disqualification, in view of recent legislation on probation, or R.A. No. 10707 entitled An Act Amending Presidential
58

Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976," As Amended. allowing an accused to apply for probation in the event
that she is sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than six (6) years when a judgment of conviction imposing
a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty. 59

Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a possible multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the
Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which
imposed the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-
one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum. Instead, since the amount involved herein is ₱11,300.00, which does not exceed
₱40,000.00, the new penalty that should be imposed is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which has a prison
term of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6) years. The Court, however, takes note of the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender appreciated by the Sandiganbayan in favor of petitioner. Hence, taking into
60

consideration the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance, the range of the
penalty that must be imposed as the maximum term should be prision correccional medium to prision correccional maximum in its
minimum period, or from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days, in
accordance with Article 64 of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the minimum term that should be
61

imposed upon petitioners is anywhere within the period of arresto mayor, maximum to prision correccional minimum with a range of four
(4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days prision correccional, as
maximum.

On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private counsels, and such other officers of the law are hereby advised to
similarly apply the provisions of RA No. 10951 whenever it is, by reason of justice and equity, called for by the facts of each case.
Hence, said recent legislation shall find application in cases where the imposable penalties of the affected crimes such as theft,
qualified theft, estafa, robbery with force upon things, malicious mischief, malversation, and such other crimes, the penalty of which is
dependent upon the value of the object in consideration thereof, have been reduced, as in the case at hand, taking into consideration
the presence of existing circumstances attending its commission. For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation
shall find application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if
service of sentence has already begun. The accused, in these applicable instances, shall be entitled to the benefits of the new law
warranting him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already begun serving his previous sentence, and said service
already accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. In the latter case, moreover, the Court, in the interest of justice and
expediency, further directs the appropriate filing of an action before the Court that seeks the reopening of the case rather than an
original petition filed for a similar purpose.

Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and
favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is
to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.

Henceforth: (1) the Directors of the National Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for Women are hereby ordered to determine if
there are accused serving final sentences similarly situated as the accused in this particular case and if there are, to coordinate and
communicate with the Public Attorney's Office and the latter, to represent and file the necessary pleading before this Court in behalf of
these convicted accused in light of this Court's pronouncement; (2) For those cases where the accused are undergoing preventive
imprisonment, either the cases against them are non-bailable or cannot put up the bail in view of the penalties imposable under the old
law, their respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the necessary pleading before the proper courts, whether undergoing trial in
the RTC or undergoing appeal in the appellate courts and apply for bail, for their provisional liberty; (3) For those cases where the
accused are undergoing preventive imprisonment pending trial or appeal, their respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the
necessary pleading if the accused have already served the minimum sentence of the crime charged against them based on the
penalties imposable under the new law, R.A. No. 10951, for their immediate release in accordance with A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC or
the Guidelines For Decongesting Holding Jails By Enforcing The Rights Of Accused Persons To Bail And To Speedy Trial; 62 and (4)
Lastly, all courts, including appellate courts, are hereby ordered to give priority to those cases covered by R.A. No. 10951 to avoid any
prolonged imprisonment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated February 2, 2015 and Decision dated
November 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.Petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum term, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20)
days prision correccional, as maximum term.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for dissemination to the First and Second Level
courts, and also to the Presiding Justices of the appellate courts, the Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, Public
Attorney's Office, Prosecutor General's Office, the Directors of the National Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for Women, and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information, guidance, and appropriate action.

Likewise, let the Office of the President, the Senate of the Philippines, and the House of Representatives, be furnished copies of this
Decision for their information.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

On wellness leave
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE


Associate Justice Associate Justice

On leave
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
No part, Prior action in SB
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

On leave
ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
On wellness leave.

**
On leave

***
No part.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Tere!iita V. Diaz-Baldos, with Associate Justices Napoleon E. Inoturan and Maria Cristina J.
Cornejo, concurring; rollo, pp. 35-39.

2
Penned by Associate Justice Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos, with Associate Justices Edilberto G. Sandoval and Samuel R. Martires,
concurring; id. at 40-49.

3
Id. at 6-7.

4
Id. at 103.

5
Id. at 41-42.

6
Id.

7
Id. at 103.

8
Id.

9
Id. at 104.

10
Id. at 43.

11
Id. at 9.

12
Id. at 105-106.

13
Id. at 7.

14
Id.at43.

15
Id.

16
Id. at 40-41.

17
Id. at 41.

18
Id. at 48.

19
Id. at 50-53.

20
Id. at 67.

21
Id. at IOI.
22
Id. at 30-34.

23
Id. at 32.

24
Id. at 33.

25
Id.at37.

26
Id. at 16-17

27
411 Phil. 482, 490 (2001).

28
Rollo, pp. 21-22.

29
Id. at 23-24.

30
Spouses Bergonia v. Court of Appeals, 680 Phil. 334, 339 (2012).

31
Id.

32
Id.

33
Rollo, p. 26.

34
Garrucho, v. Court of Appeals, et al.. 489 Phil. 150, 156 (2005).

35
Id.

36
Karen and Kristy Fishing Industry et al. v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, Fifth Division, 562

37
Rollo, P. 18.

38
Id. at 116.

39
Id.at37.

40
Garrucho v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra note 34, at 157.

41
Rollo, p. 36.

42
Id. at 114.

43
Id. at 32.

44
Id.

45
ld. at 33.

46
Id. at 31-32.

47
Id. at 45.

48
Id. at 47.

49
Id. at 120.

50
Id. at 47. (Emphasis ours; citation omitted)

51
Id. at 38.

52
Justice Angeles v. Hon. Gaile, 661 Phil. 657. 674(2011).

53
De Leon v. Public Estates Authority, 640 Phil. 594, 612 (2010).

Apo Fruits Corporation and Hija Plantation, Inc. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals and land Bank of the Philippines, 622 Phil.
54

215, 230 (2009).

55
Section 3(c) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, as amended) provides:

Section 3. Court en bane matters and cases. - The Court en bane shall act on the following matters and cases:
xxxx

(c) cases raising novel questions of law;

56
People v. Morilla, 726 Phil. 244, 255 (2014).

57
Section 1of R.A. No. 10707 provides:

SECTION I. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, is hereby further amended to

read as follows:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. - Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted
and sentenced a defendant for a probationable penalty and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period
and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best. No application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction: Provided, That when a judgment of
conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified
through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed to apply for probation
based on the modified decision before such decision becomes final. The application for probation based on the
modified decision shall be filed in the trial court where the judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable
penalty was rendered, or in the trial court where such case has since been re-raffled. In a case involving several
defendants where some have taken further appeal, the other defendants may apply for probation by submitting a
written application and attaching thereto a certified true copy of the judgment of conviction.

58
Section 2 of R.A. No. 10707 provides:

SEC. 2. Section 9 of the same Decree, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

SEC. 9. Disqualified Offenders. - The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those:

a. sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years;

b. convicted or any crime against the national security;

c. who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment or more
than six (6) months and one (I) day and/or a fine of more than one thousand pesos (₱1,000.00);

d. who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and

e. who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable
pursuant to section 33 hereof."

59
Supra note 57.

60
Rollo, p. 47.

61
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. - In cases in which the penalties
prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different
penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall
observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or
aggravating circumstances:

xxxx

2. When only a mitigating circumstances is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its
minimum period.

62
Sec. 5. Release after service of minimum imposable penalty. -The accused who has been detained for a period at least
equal to the minimum of the penalty for the offense charged against him shall be ordered released, motu proprio or on motion
and after notice and hearing, on his own recognizance without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him.
[Sec. 16, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. 10389)

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

April 18, 2017

G.R. No. 220598


GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, (First Division), Respondents

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN,, J.:

On July 19, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in Criminal Case No.
SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTSthe petitioners' respective demurrers to
evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIAMACAPAGAL-
ARROYO and BENIGNOAGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said petitioners;
and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 1

On August 3, 2016, the State, through the Office of the Ombudsman, has moved for the reconsideration of the decision, submitting that:

I. THIS HONORABLE COURT'S GIVING DUE COURSE TO A CERTIORARI ACTION ASSAILING AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
DENYING DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE VIOLA TES RULE 119, SECTION 23 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHICH PROVIDES
THAT AN ORDER DENYING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHALL NOT BE REVIEWABLE BY APPEAL OR BY
CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERRORS WHICH AMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OR DEPRIVATION OF THE
STATE'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

A. THE DECISION REQUIRES ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE PROSECUTION OF PLUNDER, VIZ. IDENTIFICATION
OF THE MAIN PLUNDERER AND PERSONAL BENEFIT TO HIM/HER, BOTH OF WHICH ARE NOT PROVIDED IN THE
TEXT OF REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) NO. 7080.

B. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT FULLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, INCLUDING BUT
NOT LIMITED TO THE IRREGULARITIES IN THE CONFIDENTIAL/INTELLIGENCE FUND (CIF) DISBURSEMENT
PROCESS, QUESTIONABLE PRACTICE OF CO-MINGLING OF FUNDSAND AGUAS' REPORTS TO THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT (COA) THAT BULK OF THE PHP365,997,915.00 WITHDRAWN FROM THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY
SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE'S (PCSO) CIF WERE DIVERTED TO THE ARROYO-HEADED OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.

C. ARROYO AND AGUAS, BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION, IN CONSPIRACY WITH THEIR COACCUSED IN SB-
12-CRM-0174, COMMITTED PLUNDER VIA· A COMPLEX ILLEGAL SCHEME WHICH DEFRAUDED PCSO IN
HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PESOS.

D. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER WERE NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PEOPLE SHOWS, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT ARROYO, AGUAS AND
THEIR COACCUSED IN SB-12-CRM-0174 ARE GUILTY OF MALVERSATION. 2

In contrast, the petitioners submit that the decision has effectively barred the consideration and granting of the motion for
reconsideration of the State because doing so would amount to the re-prosecution or revival of the charge against them despite their
acquittal, and would thereby violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.

Petitioner Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) points out that the State miserably failed to prove the corpus delicti of plunder; that the
Court correctly required the identification of the main plunderer as well as personal benefit on the part of the raider of the public treasury
to enable the successful prosecution of the crime of plunder; that the State did not prove the conspiracy that justified her inclusion in the
charge; that to sustain the case for malversation against her, in lieu of plunder, would violate her right to be informed of the accusation
against her because the information did not necessarily include the crime of malversation; and that even if the information did so, the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy already barred the re-opening of the case for that purpose.

Petitioner Benigno B. Aguas echoes the contentions of Arroyo in urging the Com1 to deny the motion for reconsideration.

In reply, the State avers that the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply because it was denied its day in court, thereby
rendering the decision void; that the Court should re-examine the facts and pieces of evidence in order to find the petitioners guilty as
charged; and that the allegations of the information sufficiently included all that was necessary to fully inform the petitioners of the
accusations against them.

Ruling of the Court

The Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit.

To start with, the State argues' that the consolidated petitions for certiorari were improper remedies in light of Section 23, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court expressly prohibiting the review of the denial of their demurrer prior to the judgment in the case either by appeal or
by certiorari; that the Court has thereby limited its own power, which should necessarily prevent the giving of due course to the petitions
for certiorari, as well as the undoing of the order denying the petitioners' demurrer to evidence; that the proper remedy under the Rules
of Court was for the petitioners to proceed to trial and to present their evidence-in-chief thereat; and that even if there had been grave
abuse of discretion attending the denial, the Court's certiorari powers should be exercised only upon the petitioners' compliance with
the stringent requirements of Rule 65, particularly with the requirement that there be no plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, which they did not establish.
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, pertinently provides:

Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. – xxx

xxxx

The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by
appeal or by certiorari before judgment. (n)

The argument of the State, which is really a repetition of its earlier submission, was squarely resolved in the decision, as follows:

The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari because the Sandiganbayan, as shall shortly be
demonstrated, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the
availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides
that "the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal
or by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence
of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused
was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to
be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do so -

x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the com1 that authority is not wanting to
show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of oursuperintending control over
other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case 'as the ends of justice may require.' So it is
that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.

The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice the duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a result of
capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by expressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII the following
provision:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The exercise of this power to correct
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is
because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is
committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the
petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. As we shall soon show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it
capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict. 3

We reiterate the foregoing resolution, and stress that the prohibition contained in Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is not an
insuperable obstacle to the review by the Court of the denial of the demurrer to evidence through certiorari. We have had many rulings
to that effect in the past. For instance, in Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, the Court expressly ruled that the petition for certiorari was the
4

proper remedy to assail the denial of the demurrer to evidence that was tainted with grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction,
or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

Secondly, the State submits that its right to due process was violated because the decision imposed additional elements for plunder
that neither ' Republic Act No. 7080 nor jurisprudence had theretofore required, i.e., the identification of the main plunderer, and
personal benefit on the part of the accused committing the predicate crime of raid on the public treasury. The State complains that it
was not given the opportunity to establish such additional elements; that the imposition of new elements fu1iher amounted to judicial
legislation in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; that the Court nitpicked on the different infirmities of the information
despite the issue revolving only around the sufficiency of the evidence; and that it established all the elements of plunder beyond
reasonable doubt.

The State cites the plain meaning rule to highlight that the crime of plunder did not require personal benefit on the part of the raider of
the public treasury. It insists that the definition of raids on the public treasury, conformably with the plain meaning rule, is the taking of
public money through fraudulent or unlawful means, and such definition does not require enjoyment or personal benefit on the part of
plunderer or on the part of any of his co-conspirators for them to be convicted for plunder.

The submissions of the State are unfounded.

The requirements for the identification of the main plunderer and for personal benefit in the predicate act of raids on the public
treasury have been written in R.A. No. 7080 itself as well as embedded in pertinent jurisprudence. This we made clear in the decision,
as follows:

A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all
of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution
did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain
conspiracy.

This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.


In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) states:

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder: Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value
of at least Fifty million pesos (₱50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and
all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the
deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [As Amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty
Law)]

Section l(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides:

Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:

xxxx

d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section
two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by
any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;

3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees
and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

6. By taking undue advantage of official positi0n, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice

The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who amassed, acquired or
accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is committed by any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the
criminal charge for plunder against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may
be members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordim1tes or other persons. In other
words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was appropriate because the main
plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Of course, implied conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but
that fact must be properly alleged and duly proven by the Prosecution.

This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where the Court explained the nature of the conspiracy charge and the
necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the amassment, accumulation and acquisition was made, thus:

There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy" is made up of a
complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In
the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality - to help the former President amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each
accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection
money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and
SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from
commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada. [bold 5

underscoring supplied for emphasis]

Indeed, because plunder is a crime that only a public official can commit by amassing, accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00, the identification in the information of such public official as the main
plunderer among the several individuals thus charged is logically necessary under the law itself. In particular reference to Criminal Case
No. SB-12-CRM-0174, the individuals charged therein - including the petitioners - were 10 public officials; hence, it was only proper to
identify the main plunderer or plunderers among the 10 accused who herself or himself had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-
gotten wealth with the total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00.

The phrase raids on the public treasury as used in Section 1 (d) of R. A. No. 7080 is itself ambiguous. In order to ascertain the objective
meaning of the phrase, the act of raiding the public treasury cannot be divided into parts. This is to differentiate the predicate act
of raids on the public treasury from other offenses involving property, like robbery, theft, or estafa. Considering that R.A. No. 7080 does
not expressly define this predicate act, the Court has necessarily resorted to statutory construction. In so doing, the Court did not adopt
the State's submission that personal benefit on the part of the accused need not be alleged and shown because doing so would have
defeated the clear intent of the law itself, which was to punish the amassing, accumulating, or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth in the
6

aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱150,000,000.00 by any combination or series of acts of misappropriation, conversion,
misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.

As the decision has observed, the rules of statutory construction as well as the deliberations of Congress indicated the intent of
Congress to require personal benefit for the predicate act of raids on the public treasury, viz.:

The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080, which provides:

Section l .Definition of Terms. – xxx

xxxx

d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, prope1iy, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section
Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by
any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

xxxx

To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the accompanying
words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds. This process is conformable with the maxim of
statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which the word
or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other
words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter.

To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own; to misappropriate means to own, to take
something for one's own benefit; misuse means "a good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforcsccably, or not as
intended;" and malversation occurs when "any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit
any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially." The common thread that binds all the four terms together is
that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms
that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use of the property taken.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act
of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the
property taken impliedly for his personal benefit. 7

The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit as a requirement for plunder. In not requiring personal
benefit, the Sandiganbayan quoted the following exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tafiada, viz.:

Senator Enrile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or person who conspired or knowingly benefited". One does not
have to conspire or rescheme. The only element needed is that he "knowingly benefited". A candidate for the Senate for instance,
who received a political contribution from a plunderer, knowing that the contributor is a plunderer and therefore, he knowingly benefited
from the plunder, would he also suffer the penalty, Mr. President, for life imprisonment?

Senator Tafiada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we have deleted these lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5, on page 3. But, in
a way, Mr. President, it is good that the Gentleman is bringing out these questions, I believe that under the examples he has given, the
Court will have to...

Senator Enrile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree with the plunderer to plunder the country but because she is a
dutiful wife or a faithful husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity to the spouse. And, of course, she enjoys the benefits out of
the plunder. Would the Gentleman now impute to her or him the crime of plunder simply because she or he knowingly benefited out of
the fruits of the plunder and, therefore, he must suffer or he must suffer the penalty of life imprisonment?

The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee amendment.

Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5 were stricken out in the Committee amendment. But, as I said, the
examples of the Minority Floor Leader are still worth spreading the Record. And, I believe that in those examples, the Court will have
just to take into consideration all the other circumstances prevailing in the case and the evidence that will be submitted.

The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been stricken off."

The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore, that what was removed from the coverage of the bill and
the final version that eventually became the law was a person who was not the main plunderer or a co-conspirator, but one who
personally benefited from the plunderers' action. The requirement of personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-
conspirators by virtue of their plunder was not removed.

As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally
benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable
doubt. 8

Thirdly, the State contends that the Court did not appreciate the totality of its evidence, particularly the different irregularities committed
in the disbursement of the PCSO funds, i.e., the commingling of funds, the non-compliance with LOI No. 1282, and the unilateral
approval of the disbursements. Such totality, coupled with the fact of the petitioners' indispensable cooperation in the pilfering of public
funds, showed the existence of the conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused.

The contention lacks basis.

As can be readily seen from the decision, the Court expressly granted the petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence and dismissed
the plunder case against them for insufficiency of evidence because:

x x x the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to
evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the
absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict. 9

Such disposition of the Court fully took into consideration all the evidence adduced against the petitioners. We need not rehash our
review of the evidence thus adduced, for it is enough simply to stress that the Prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of
plunder - that any or all of the accused public officials, particularly petitioner Arroyo, had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00.

Fourthly, in accenting certain inadequacies of the allegations of the information, the Court did not engage in purposeless nitpicking, and
did not digress from the primary task of determining the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the State against the petitioners. What
the Court thereby intended to achieve was to highlight what would have been relevant in the proper prosecution of plunder and thus
enable itself to discern and determine whether the evidence of guilt was sufficient or not. In fact, the Court categorically clarified that in
discussing the essential need for the identification of the main plunderer it was not harping on the sufficiency of the information, but was
only enabling itself to search for and to find the relevant proof that unequivocally showed petitioner Arroyo as the "mastermind" - which
was how the Sandiganbayan had characterized her participation - in the context of the implied conspiracy alleged in the information.
But the search came to naught, for the information contained nothing that averred her commission of the overt act necessary to
implicate her in the supposed conspiracy to commit the crime of plunder. Indeed, the Court assiduously searched for but did not find the
sufficient incriminatory evidence against the petitioners. Hence, the Sandiganbayan capriciously and oppressively denied their
demurrers to evidence.

Fifthly, the State posits that it established at least a case for malversation against the petitioners.

Malversation is defined and punished under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thusly:

Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of
his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall
otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or
malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.

2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two hundred pesos
but does not exceed six thousand pesos.

3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is
more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve
thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the
amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any
duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by
RA 1060).

The elements of malversation are that: (a) the offender is an accountable public officer; (b) he/she is responsible for the
misappropriation of public funds or property through intent or negligence; and (c) he/she has custody of and received such funds and
property by reason of his/her office. 10

The information in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 avers: 11

The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuse
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, SERGIO O. VALENCIA, MANUEL L. MORATO, JOSE R. TARUC V,
RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA AS. VALDES, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, REYNALDO A. VILLAR and NILDA B. PLARAS, of the
crime of PLUNDER, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
committed, as follows:

That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, then the President of the Philippines,
ROSARIO C. URIARTE, then General Manager and Vice Chairman, SERGIO 0. VALENCIA, then Chairman of the Board of Directors,
MANUEL L. MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA AS. VALDES, then members of the Board of
Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then Budget and Accounts Manager, all of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO),
REYNALDO A. VILLAR, then Chairman, and NILDA B. PLARAS, then Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both of
the Commission on Audit, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of
their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally 'amass,, accumulate and/or acquire directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth
in the aggregate amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal
acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows:

(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be
accessed and withdrawn at any time with minimal restrictions, and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or
transferring the proceeds drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also in several instances, to themselves, in the
guise of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;

(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-mentioned amount from the
Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and or unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their
possession and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious expenditures; and

(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, in several
instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

In thereby averring the predicate act of malversation, the State did not sufficiently allege the aforementioned essential elements of
malversation in the information. The omission from the information of factual details descriptive of the aforementioned elements of
malversation highlighted the insufficiency of the allegations. Consequently, the State's position is entirely unfounded.

Lastly, the petitioners insist that the consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State can amount to a violation
of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because their acquittal under the decision was a prior jeopardy within the
context of Section 21, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

The insistence of the petitioners is fully warranted. Indeed, the consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State
will amount to the violation of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.

The Court's consequential dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-12- CRM-0174 as to the petitioners for insufficiency of
evidence amounted to their acquittal of the crime of plunder charged against them. In People v. Tan, the Court shows why:
12

In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Com1 explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal
and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is ''filed after tile prosecution had rested its case," and
when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of
the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would
be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.

xxxx

The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., this Court stated that the only instance when
double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus:

... The only instance when double ,jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham.
However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must
clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice.13

The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the same offense bars not only a new and
independent prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy had attached. As such, every acquittal becomes
14

final immediately upon promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or amendment. With the acquittal being immediately final,
granting the State's motion for reconsideration in this case would violate the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because
it would effectively reopen the prosecution and subject the petitioners to a second jeopardy despite their acquittal.

It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy provides to the accused three related
protections, specifically: protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; protection against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. The rationale for
15

the three protections is expounded in United States v. Wilson: 16

The interests underlying these three protections arc quite similar. When a defendant has been once convicted and punished
for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he not be subjected to the possibility of further
punishment by being again tried or sentenced for the same offense.Ex pa rte Lange, 18 Wall 163 (1874); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S.
176 (1889). When a defendant has been acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to
make repeated attempts to convict him,

"thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal, and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that, even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1957).

The policy of avoiding multiple trials has been regarded as so important that exceptions to the principle have been only
grudgingly allowed. Initially, a new trial was thought to be unavailable after appeal, whether requested by the prosecution or
the defendant. See United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (No. 15,204) (CCD Mass. 1834) (Story, J.). It was not until 1896 that it
was made clear that a defendant could seek a new trial after conviction, even though the Government enjoyed no similar
right. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

I join J. Leonen’s Dissent


MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

I join J. Leonen's Dissent


PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

Please see concurring and


BIENVENIDO L. REYES Dissenting opinion in the main case
Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

I dissent. See separate opinion


FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Leonen


SAMUEL R. MARTIREZ
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S,. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

NOEL G. TIJAM
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo (G.R. No. 220953), Vol. III, p. 1866.

2
Rollo (G.R. No. 220598), Vol. VI, pp. 4158- 4159.

3
Rollo (G.R. No. 220953), Vol. III, pp. 1846-1847; bold underscoring is supplied for emphasis.

4
G.R. Nos. 175930-31, February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 324, 336.

5
Rollo (G.R. No. 220593). Vol. III, pp. 1851-1854.

6
See Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection, G.R. No. 170735, December 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 456, 472.
7
Bold underscoring is added for emphasis.

8
Rollo (G.R. No. 220953), Vol. 111, pp. 1863-1865.

9
Id. at 1847.

10
Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus, 1st Edition, 2000, National Book Store, Inc., p. 424.

11
Rollo (G.R. No. 220598), Vol. I, pp. 305-307-A.

12
G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 388.

13
Id. at 395-397 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis).

14
Republic v. Court of Appeals, No. L-41115, September 11, 1982, 116 SCRA 505, 556; People v. Pomeroy, 97 Phil 927
(1955); People v. Bringas, 70 Phil 528; People v. Yelo, 83 Phil. 618.

15
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 US 711, 717 (1969).

16
420 US 332, 343 (1975).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NOS. 142369-70 : April 13, 2007]

JUANITO T. MERENCILLO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,* Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This Petition for Review 1 assails the June 18, 1999 decision2 of the Sandiganbayan in A.R. Case Nos. 004-005 affirming3 the omnibus decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Branch 47, in Criminal Case Nos. 9482-83 finding petitioner Juanito T. Merencillo guilty of violating
Section 3(b) of RA 30195 and Article 2106 of the Revised Penal Code.

The information charging petitioner for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 in Criminal Case No. 9482 read:

That, on or about the 28th day of September, 1995, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused being then a public official connected with the Bureau of Internal Revenue as its Group Supervising Examiner, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent of personal gain, directly demand and extort from a certain Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar the
amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, in connection, in consideration and in exchange for the release of the
certification of her payment of the capital gains tax for the land purchased by the Ramasola [Superstudio] Inc. from one Catherine Corpuz Enerio, a
transaction wherein the aforesaid accused has to intervene in his official capacity, and to which the said Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar reluctantly
agreed but upon prior consultation with the military authorities particularly the elements of the 702nd Criminal Investigation Command [CIC] who set
up the accused for a possible entrapment resulting to (sic) his being caught in the act of receiving an envelope supposedly containing the amount of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) but consisting only of four (4) marked one hundred peso bills and the rest all bogus (paper) monies, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar in particular and the public and the government in general in the amount to be
proved during the trial of the case.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 3(b) of [RA] 3019. 7

On the other hand, the information for direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 9483 charged:

That, on or about the 28th day of September, 1995 in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused being then a public official connected with the performance of official duty as its Group Supervising Examiner, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent of personal gain, demand, extort and agree to perform an act constituting a crime, an act which is in
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, that is - that the certification for payment of the capital gains tax relative to the land purchased by
the Ramasola Superstudio Incorporated from Catherine Corpus Enerio be released by him only upon payment of an additional under the table
transaction in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, which Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar reluctantly
agreed, but upon prior consultation with the military authorities particularly the elements of the 702nd Criminal [Investigation] Command (CIC) who set
up the accused for a possible entrapment resulting to (sic) his being caught in the act of receiving an envelope supposedly containing the amount of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) but, consisting only of four (4) marked one hundred pesos bills and the rest all bogus (paper) monies, an act
performed by the accused in his official capacity as Group Supervising Examiner of the BIR, to the damage and prejudice of Mrs. Maria Angeles
Ramasola Cesar in particular and the public and the government in general in the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. 8

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges when arraigned. Thereafter trial ensued and the cases were tried jointly.

The Facts Established By The Prosecution

In the morning of September 13, 1995, Lucit Estillore went to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) office in Tagbilaran City to ask for the computation
of taxes due on the sale of real property to Ramasola Superstudio, Inc. and to apply for a certificate authorizing registration (CAR).9 At the BIR office,
she was entertained by revenue examiner Lourdes Fuentes who computed the documentary stamp tax (P37,500) and capital gains tax (P125,000) due
on the transaction. The computation was approved by petitioner in his capacity as group supervisor. Estillore paid the taxes in the bank and returned to
apply for a CAR. She submitted the application together with relevant documents to Fuentes for processing. Fuentes prepared the revenue audit reports
and submitted them together with the application for the CAR to petitioner for preliminary approval. [The application was to be forwarded thereafter to
the Revenue District Officer (RDO) for final approval.] Fuentes advised Estillore that the CAR would be released after seven days.
At around 10:00 a.m. of the same day, private complainant Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar 10 (Cesar) received a call from Estillore. She was told that
petitioner wanted to see her "for some negotiation." She proceeded to petitioner's office where the latter demanded P20,000 in exchange for the
approval of the CAR. Cesar replied that she needed to confer with her two brothers who were her business associates.

The following day, on September 14, 1995, Cesar received a call from petitioner who was following up his demand. Later that day, Cesar received
another call from petitioner who told her that she could get the CAR after four or five days.

Cesar was able to return to the BIR only on September 20, 1995. When petitioner saw her, he repeated his demand for P20,000 although the CAR had
in fact been signed by RDO Galahad Balagon the day before, on September 19, 1995, and was therefore ready for release. On Cesar's inquiry, the
releasing clerk, Susan Cabangon, informed Cesar that she (Cabangon) was still waiting for petitioner's go signal to release the document.

On September 22, 1995, Cesar visited RDO Balagon and complained about petitioner's refusal to release the CAR unless his demand was met. RDO
Balagon assured Cesar that he would look into her complaint. Subsequently, Cesar received a call from petitioner informing her that she could get the
CAR but reminded her of his demand. He told her that he was willing to accept a lesser amount. It was at this point that Cesar decided to report the
matter to the authorities. She sought the help of the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Bohol, Senior Superintendent Dionaid
Baraguer.

The following day, Sr. Supt. Baraguer referred Cesar's complaint to the chief of police of Tagbilaran City who coordinated with Cesar for the entrapment
of petitioner. Cesar was instructed to prepare two bundles of bogus money by putting a one-hundred peso bill on each side of each of the two bundles
to make it appear that the two bundles amounted to P10,000 each or a total of P20,000. After the serial numbers of the four one-hundred peso bills
were recorded, the entrapment was set for September 28, 1995.

On the appointed day, Cesar called petitioner and pleaded for the release of the CAR as well as for the reduction of petitioner's demand. Petitioner
cautiously told Cesar not to talk about the matter on the phone and asked her to see him instead. Cesar went to petitioner's office with the two bundles
of bogus money inside a white envelope.

Petitioner was entertaining a lady visitor when Cesar arrived. The members of the PNP entrapment team were already in petitioner's office posing as
civilians. On seeing Cesar, petitioner handed the CAR to her and, as she was signing the acknowledgment for the release of the CAR, he informed her
that he was going down to the second floor. Cesar took this as a cue for her to follow.

As petitioner left his office, he held the door open for Cesar to follow. On reaching the third floor lobby, petitioner uttered "Here only." Cesar handed the
envelope containing the two bundles of marked money to petitioner who, upon receiving it, asked "Why is this thick?" Before Cesar could answer, a
member of the PNP entrapment team photographed petitioner holding the envelope. Petitioner panicked, hid the envelope behind his back and turned
towards the window at the back of the BIR building. On seeing that the window was closed, he turned around towards the open window facing the
street. He threw the envelope towards the window but it hit the ceiling instead, bounced and fell to the first floor of the BIR building.11 The PNP
entrapment team then introduced themselves to petitioner and invited him to go with them to their headquarters.

Charges were filed against petitioner. During the trial, petitioner's evidence consisted of nothing more than a general denial of the charges against him.
He claimed that he never asked for money and that the allegations of demand for money existed only in Cesar's mind after she was told that there was
a misclassification of the asset and additional taxes had to be paid. He was surprised when policemen suddenly arrested him as soon as Cesar handed
him a white envelope the contents of which he suspected to be money.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Juanito T. Merencillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation,
defined and penalized by Section 3(b) of [RA] 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for eight (8) years and one (1) month as minimum to fifteen (15) years as maximum, there being aggravating
circumstances considered under Section 3(e) and Section (f) of [RA] 3019 in relation to Article 14(1) and (11) of the [RPC] in the sense that the
offender have taken advantage of his public position, and that the crime was committed in consideration of a price or promise, without any mitigating or
extenuating circumstances to neutralize or offset any of the aggravating circumstances, with perpetual disqualification from public office, and the Court
further finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation, for the crime of Direct Bribery defined and penalized by
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8)
years of prision mayor as maximum and a fine of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos, all as mandated by law. The accused Juanito T. Merencillo
likewise is ordered to indemnify private complainant [Cesar] to pay moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos. Costs shall also be taxed against the accused.

CONTRARY TO LAW.12

Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with
modification reducing the penalty of imprisonment for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 to an indeterminate sentence of six years and one month
of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten years of prision mayor, as maximum.13 Thus, this petition.

Petitioner basically raises two points: (1) the Sandiganbayan's refusal to believe his evidence over that of the prosecution's and (2) the
Sandiganbayan's failure to recognize that he was placed in double jeopardy.

Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for affirming the RTC decision and disregarding his evidence. He claims that, had the RTC and the Sandiganbayan
not ignored the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses, 14 he would have been acquitted. He also asserts that he was placed
twice in jeopardy when he was prosecuted for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 and for direct bribery.

Petitioner is wrong.

Trial Court's Evaluation of Evidence Will Not Be Disturbed

Both the RTC and the Sandiganbayan found the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses (that petitioner demanded and received money from private
complainant Cesar for the release of the CAR) sufficient and credible enough to sustain conviction.

This notwithstanding, petitioner now asks this Court to review the entire evidence anew, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses and make another
factual determination of the case - a course of action clearly improper given the nature of the instant petition. 15 Questions of fact cannot generally be
raised for the consideration of this Court.

The calibration of evidence and the relative weight thereof belongs to the appellate court. 16 Its findings and conclusions cannot be set aside by this
Court unless there is no evidence on record to support them.17 In this case, however, the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan, affirming the factual
findings of the RTC, were amply supported by evidence and the conclusions therein were not against the law and jurisprudence. There is no reason to
disturb the congruent findings of the trial and appellate courts.

Moreover, findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy the respect of appellate courts because trial courts have the
distinct advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. 18 In the absence of any arbitrariness in the trial court's findings and
evaluation of evidence tending to show that it overlooked certain material facts and circumstances, its findings and evaluation of evidence should be
respected on review.19 The presiding judge of the trial court had the opportunity to actually observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses on the
witness stand on direct examination by the prosecution, cross-examination by the defense as well as during clarificatory questioning by the trial judge
himself.20 Between the trial judge and this Court, the former was concededly in a better position to determine whether or not a witness was telling the
truth.21 Based on the records, we find no reason to disagree with the trial court's assessment and to discredit the prosecution's witnesses.

Contrary to petitioner's contention, the RTC and the Sandiganbayan considered the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. Both courts, however, ruled that the inconsistencies referred only to minor details that did not detract from the truth of the prosecution's
testimonial evidence. We agree.

Witnesses testifying on the same event do not have to be consistent in each and every detail. Differences in the recollection of the event are inevitable
and inconsequential variances are commonly regarded as signs of truth instead of falsehood. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their
testimony.22 In fact, such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony for they guard against memorized falsities.23

Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution's evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses'
honesty.24 The test is whether the testimonies agree on essential facts and whether the respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide with
each other so as to make a consistent and coherent whole.25 Thus, inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of
the crime cannot be successfully invoked as grounds for acquittal.26

The RTC and the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner were neither material nor re levant to the elements of
the offenses for which he was charged. For instance, whether or not it was petitioner himself who handed the CAR to private respondent was
immaterial. The fact was that petitioner demanded and received money in consideration for the issuance of the CAR.

Petitioner Was Not Placed In Double Jeopardy

Section 3 of RA 3019 begins with the following statement:

Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following [acts] shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under the Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either
concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a felony under the Revised Penal Code. 27 There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged
simultaneously or successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code.

The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. 28 The test is whether one offense is
identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. 29 An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter; and an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.30

A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and those of violation of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 shows that there is neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the two offenses.

Section 3(b) of RA 3019 provides:

Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared unlawful:

xxx

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with
any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the
law.

xxx

The elements of the crime penalized under Section 3(b) of RA 3019 are:

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) he requested or received a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit;

(3) he made the request or receipt on behalf of the offender or any other person;

(4) the request or receipt was made in connection with a contract or transaction with the government and

(5) he has the right to intervene, in an official capacity under the law, in connection with a contract or transaction has the right to intervene.31

On the other hand, direct bribery has the following essential elements:

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another;

(3) such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of
the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to
do and

(4) the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official duties. 32
Clearly, the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily inclusive of direct bribery. While they have common elements, not all
the essential elements of one offense are included among or form part of those enumerated in the other. Whereas the mere request or demand of a
gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a
gift or present is required in direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited only to contracts or transactions
involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene under the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider
and more general scope: (a) performance of an act constituting a crime; (b) execution of an unjust act which does not constitute a crime and (c)
agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an act which is his official duty to do.

Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses. No
double jeopardy attached since there was a variance between the elements of the offenses charged. 33 The constitutional protection against double
jeopardy proceeds from a second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one. 34

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The June 18, 1999 decision of the Sandiganbayan in A.R. Case Nos. 004-005 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

*
The Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) was impleaded as a respondent. However, under Rule 45, Section 4, of the Rules of Court, the lower court or
judges thereof need not be impleaded in petitions for review filed in this Court.

1
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2
Penned by Associate Justice Ma. Cristina Cortez-Estrada (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Minita V. Chico-Nazario (now a member of the
Supreme Court) and Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. (retired) of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan; rollo, pp. 60-83.

3
With modification as to the penalty of imprisonment imposed for petitioner's violation of Sec. 3(b) of RA 3019.

4
Dated January 13, 1997 and penned by Judge Raineldo T. Son; Sandiganbayan records (A.R. Case No. 004), pp. 122-151 and (A.R. Case No. 005),
pp. 114-142.

5
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

6
Defining and punishing the crime of direct bribery.

7
Sandiganbayan records (A.R. Case No. 004), pp. 4-5.

8
Sandiganbayan records (A.R. Case No. 005), pp. 4-5.

9
Estillore was acting as agent of the parties to the sale.

10
Co-owner of Ramasola Superstudio, Inc.

11
The envelope was recovered at the first floor of the BIR building and was presented to court during the trial.

12
Supra note 4.

13
Supra note 3. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the RTC erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of abuse of authority and in consideration
of a price, promise or reward because these circumstances are integral elements of the crime.

14
As pointed out by petitioner, these inconsistencies include the testimony of SPO4 Manuelito Antipala (a member of the entrapment team) that he saw
petitioner hand the CAR to Cesar while SPO2 Genaro Boja (another member of the entrapment team) failed to mention the handing over of the CAR to
Cesar by petitioner.

15
See Siccuan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 133709, 28 April 2005, 457 SCRA 458.

16
Ceremonia v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 511 (1999).

17
Id.

18
People v. Cabiles, 348 Phil. 220 (1998).

19
People v. Dio, G.R. No. 106493, 8 September 1993, 226 SCRA 176.

20
People of the Philippines v. Gado, 358 Phil. 956 (1998).

21
Id.

22
People of the Philippines v. Quimzon, G.R. No. 133541, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 261.

23
Id.

24
People of the Philippines v. Sibug, G.R. No. 108520, 24 January 1994, 229 SCRA 489.

25
Id.
26
People of the Philippines v. Crisanto, 411 Phil. 289 (2001).

27
Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NOS. 169727-28, 18 August 2006.

28
When one act violates two different statutes or two different provisions of a statute and that act results in two distinct offenses, prosecution under
one (statute or provision) is not a bar to prosecution under the other (statute or provision). (Bernas, S.J. Joaquin G., The 1987 Philippine Constitution:
A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2006 edition, Rex Bookstore, pp. 189-190) The test is not whether the accused has already been tried for the same act but
whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense. (People of the Philippines v. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82 [1922])

29
Suero v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 156408, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 350.

30
Sec. 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court.

31
Chang v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165111, 21 July 2006, 496 SCRA 321.

32
Tad-y v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 148862, 11 August 2005, 466 SCRA 474.

33
Suero v. People of the Philippines, supra.

34
Id.

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND
JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and immemorially acknowledged so to be[.]"1 ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition2 filed on March 25, 2015 by petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution 3 dated March 16, 2015 of public respondent
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which granted private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the implementation of the Joint Order 4 dated March 10, 20,15 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-
15-0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order) preventively suspending him and several other public officers and employees of the City Government of
Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b) the Resolution 5 dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s
petition for contempt6 in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.

Pursuant to the Resolution7 dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction 8 (WPI) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 which further enjoined
the implementation of the preventive suspension order, prompting the Ombudsman to file a supplemental petition 9 on April 13, 2015.

The Facts

10
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against
Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of
Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement
and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).13

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators 14 to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation
report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel). 15 Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special
Panel filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases17for Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases 18 for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases). 19

As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities attending the following procurement and construction phases
of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati:

Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)20


(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase III of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction
Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding contract 22 on September 28, 2010,23 without the required publication and the
lack of architectural design,24 and approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15,
2010;25 (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011;26 (3) P92,775,202.27 on February 25, 2011;27 (4) P57,148,625.51 on March 28, 2011;28 (5)
P40,908,750.61 on May 3, 2011;29 and (6) P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011;30

(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award31 for Phase IV of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently,
executed the corresponding contract32 on August 18, 2011,33 without the required publication and the lack of architectural design, 34 and approved the
release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P182,325,538.97 on October 4, 2O11;35 (2) P173,132,606.91 on October
28,2011;36 (3) P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011;37 (4) P62,878,291.81 on February 10, 2012;38 and (5) P59,639,167.90 on October 1, 2012;39

(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award 40 for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently,
executed the corresponding contract41 on September 13, 2012,42 without the required publication and the lack of architectural design, 43 and approved
the release of the funds therefor in the amounts of P32,398,220.05 44 and P30,582,629.3045 on December 20, 2012; and

Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016)46

(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the September 13, 2012 contract with
Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P27,443,629.97; 47 and
(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the contract 48 with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co.
(MANA) for the design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P429,011.48. 49

On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation and administrative
adjudication on the OMB Cases (2nd Special Panel).50Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued separate orders51 for each of the OMB
Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.52

Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the 2 nd Special Panel, issued on March 10,
2015, the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay,
during the pendency of the OMB Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer are
present,54 finding that: (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards
Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents on record negated the
publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were
administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; (2) said charges, if
proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay,
Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office
may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them. 55 Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the preventive suspension order against
Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.56

On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan, a member of
Binay, Jr.'s staff.57

The Proceedings Before the CA

On even date,58 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari59 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive
suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. 60Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be
held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I
and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election
as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative
cases against him moot and academic.61In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show
that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported irregularities. 62 In
support of his prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide vote
in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the charges against him, his
suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office. 63

On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive suspension order through the DILG National
Capital Region - Regional Director, Renato L. Brion, CESO III (Director Brion), who posted a copy thereof on the wall of the Makati City Hall after failing
to personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of entry to the Makati City Hall were closed. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor of
Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as
Acting Mayor.64

At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution 65 (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,66 notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s
assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.67Citing the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA,68 the CA found that it was more prudent on its part
to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if it were established that the acts
subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-
election meant that he can no longer be administratively charged. 69 The CA then directed the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition
for certiorari .70

On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested71 that the TRO did not state what act was being restrained and that since the preventive suspension
order had already been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain. 72

On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt, 73 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, accusing Secretary Roxas, Director Brion, the
officials of the Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to obey the CA, thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the
administration of justice.74 The Ombudsman and Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima were subsequently impleaded as additional
respondents upon Binay, Jr.'s filing of the amended and supplemental petition for contempt 75 (petition for contempt) on March 19, 2015. 76 Among
others, Binay, Jr. accused the Ombudsman and other respondents therein for willfully and maliciously ignoring the TRO issued by the CA against the
preventive suspension order.77

In a Resolution78dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, and, without
necessarily giving due course to Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt, directed the Ombudsman to file her comment thereto. 79 The cases were set
for hearing of oral arguments on March 30 and 31, 2015. 80

The Proceedings Before the Court

Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court, assailing
the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, and the March 20, 2015 Resolution directing
her to file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.81 The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to
grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770,82 or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ could be
issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's
jurisdiction;83 and (b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and improper, considering that
the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings. 84

In his comment85 filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial power to
review acts of any branch or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this case when said office issued the preventive suspension order against him.86 Binay,
Jr. posits that it was incumbent upon the Ombudsman to1 have been apprised of the condonation doctrine as this would have weighed heavily in
determining whether there was strong evidence to warrant the issuance of the preventive suspension order. 87 In this relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that
the CA correctly enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order given his clear and unmistakable right to public office, and that it is
clear that he could not be held administratively liable for any of the charges against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013 operated as a
condonation of any administrative offenses he may have committed during his previous term. 88 As regards the CA's order for the Ombudsman to
comment on his petition for contempt, Binay, Jr. submits that while the Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence, cannot be removed
from office except by way of impeachment, an action for contempt imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment, without necessarily resulting in
removal from office. Thus, the fact that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer should not deprive the CA of its inherent power to punish contempt. 89

Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution90 dated April 6, 2015, after the oral arguments before it were held,91 granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI,
which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the
final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v.
Santos.92 Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as
City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to
2013.93 In this regard, the CA added that, although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the
alleged payments on July 3, July 4, and July 24, 2013, 94 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held
administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,95 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica96 wherein the condonation doctrine
was still applied by the Court although the payments were made after the official's re-election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected
pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.97 To this, the CA added that there was no concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.'s participation for the
alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013.98

In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition99 before this
Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing
preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have
been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed
acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.100

On April 14 and 21, 2015,101 the Court conducted hearings for the oral arguments of the parties. Thereafter, they were required to file their respective
memoranda.102 In compliance thereto, the Ombudsman filed her Memorandum103 on May 20, 2015, while Binay, Jr. submitted his Memorandum the
following day.104

Pursuant to a Resolution105 dated June 16, 2015, the Court directed the parties to comment on each other's memoranda, and the OSG to comment on
the Ombudsman's Memorandum, all within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice.

On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each other's memoranda. 106Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG filed its
Manifestation In Lieu of Comment, 107 simply stating that it was mutually agreed upon that the Office of the Ombudsman would file its Memorandum,
consistent with its desire to state its "institutional position." 108 In her Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, the Ombudsman
pleaded, among others, that this Court abandon the condonation doctrine.109 In view of the foregoing, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. cha nrob leslaw

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the parties' respective pleadings, and as raised during the oral arguments conducted before this Court, the main issues to be resolved in
seriatim are as follows:

I. Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R.
SP No. 139504, is the Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; c ralawlawl ibra ry

II. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453; cra lawlawlib rary

III. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a preventive suspension
order issued by the Ombudsman; cra lawla wlibra ry

IV. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine; and
V. Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA- G.R. SP No. 139504 is
improper and illegal.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious. c hanro bl eslaw

I.

A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the
petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Sections 1 and 2 thereof provide:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, an d granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.

xxxx

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts r with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)

Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it
by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. 110

Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without
the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency, x x x." 111

In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition
for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition. 112 These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has
no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same
as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.113

In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions attend since, for the first time, the question on the authority of the CA - and of
this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is put to the fore.
This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of key government institutions - namely, the Office of the Ombudsman,
the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence, involves an issue of transcendental public importance that demands no less than a careful but
expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally important issue on the propriety of the continuous application of the condonation doctrine as invoked
by a public officer who desires exculpation from administrative liability. As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and prohibition before this
Court, notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504
before the CA, is justified.
cha nro bleslaw

II.

Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum, 114 it is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on the CA's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that a court's jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the
very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. 115 Hence, it should be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed
had subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as the same determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings
relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue,116 as he, in fact, duly
submitted his opposition through his comment to the Ombudsman's Memorandum.117 That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable objection
against ruling on this issue.

The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is
based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act, 118 which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this
Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure
question of law.

The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.

The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme Court 119) from issuing a writ of injunction to
delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally speaking, "[injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding
whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in
the main action."120 Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which connotes a suspension of an action while the main case remains pending, the
"writ of injunction" mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional
injunctive relief.

The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the office's
jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.121 Nonetheless, the
Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the
purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted. 122 Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative
cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of
a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 123

On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy may be heard against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This paragraph, which the Ombudsman
particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has
the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase "application
for remedy" or the word "findings" refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that the same be
taken only against a pure question of law. The task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.

"The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought in the words employed to express it, and that when
found[,] it should be made to govern, x x x. If the words of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look
beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what the circumstances were, under which the
action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; x x x [a]nd where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation, and in doing
so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this construction, especially if followed for some considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as
being very probably a true expression of the legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not conclusive."124

As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute of doubtful meaning. In
case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may be adopted, 125 albeit
not controlling in the interpretation of the law. 126

A. The Senate deliberations cited by the


Ombudsman do not pertain to the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.

The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section 14, RA 6770, particularly on the matter of judicial review of her office's decisions or
findings, is supposedly clear from the following Senate deliberations: 127

Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara, x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line 14, after the phrase "petition for" delete the word "review" and in lieu thereof,
insert the word CERTIORARI. So that, review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman would only be taken not on a petition for review, but
on certiorari.

The President [Jovito R. Salonga]. What is the practical effect of that? Will it be more difficult to reverse the decision under review?

Senator Angara. It has two practical effect ways, Mr. President. First is that the findings of facts of the Ombudsman would be almost
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Second, we would not unnecessarily clog the docket of the Supreme Court. So, it in
effect will be a very strict appeal procedure.

xxxx

Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.]. Does this mean that, for example, if there are exhaustive remedies available to a respondent, the respondent
himself has the right to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, that is correct.

Senator Guingona. And he himself may cut the proceeding short by appealing to the Supreme Court only on certiorari ?

Senator Angara. On question of law, yes.

Senator Guingona. And no other remedy is available to him?

Senator Angara. Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President?

Senator Guingona. Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for example, if he is a presidential appointee who is the respondent, if there is f
no certiorari available, is the respondent given the right to exhaust his administrative remedies first before the Ombudsman can take the appropriate
action?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to change the administrative law principle that before one can go to court, he must
exhaust all administrative remedies xxx available to him before he goes and seeks judicial review.

xxxx

Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales. What is the purpose of the Committee in changing the method of appeal from one of a petition for review
to a petition for certiorari?

Senator Angara. To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the provision here in the bill to the effect that the finding of facts of the
Ombudsman is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.

Senator Gonzales. A statement has been made by the Honorable Presiding Officer to which I concur, that in an appeal by certiorari , the appeal is
more difficult. Because in certiorari it is a matter of discretion on the part of the court, whether to give due course to the petition or
dismiss it outright. Is that not correct, Mr. President?

Senator Angara. That is absolutely correct, Mr. President

Senator Gonzales. And in a petition for certiorari , the issue is limited to whether or not the Ombudsman here has acted without
jurisdiction and has committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Is that not the consequence, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Gonzales. And it is, therefore, in this sense that the intention of the Committee is to make it harder to have a judicial review, but
should be limited only to cases that I have enumerated.
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Gonzales. I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has made a distinction between a petition for review and a petition for certiorari ;
because before, under the 1935 Constitution appeal from any order, ruling or decision of the COMELEC shall be by means of review. But under the
Constitution it is now by certiorari and the Supreme Court said that by this change, the court exercising judicial review will not inquire into the facts,
into the evidence, because we will not go deeply by way of review into the evidence on record but its authority will be limited to a determination of
whether the administrative agency acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or committed a grave abuse of discretion. So, I assume that that is the
purpose of this amendment, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.

Senator Gonzales. I just want to put that in the Record. Senator Angara. It is very well stated, Mr. President.

xxxx

The President. It is evident that there must be some final authority to render decisions. Should it be the Ombudsman or should it be the
Supreme Court?

Senator Angara. As I understand it, under our scheme of government, Mr. President, it is and has to be the Supreme Court to make the final
determination.

The President. Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.

Senator Angara. That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues have made a reservation to introduce an appropriate change during the period of
Individual Amendments.

xxxx

The President. All right. Is there any objection to the amendment inserting the word CERTIORARI instead of "review"? [Silence] Hearing none, the
same is approved.128

Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is, however, unconvinced that the provision debated on was Section 14, RA 6770, as the
Ombudsman invokes. Note that the exchange begins with the suggestion of Senator Angara to delete the word "review" that comes after the phrase
"petition for review" and, in its stead, insert the word "certiorari" so that the "review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman would not only be
taken on a petition for review, but on certiorari" The ensuing exchange between Senators Gonzales and Angara then dwells on the purpose of changing
the method of review from one of a petition for review to a petition for certiorari - that is, to make "the appeal x x x more difficult." Ultimately, the
amendment to the change in wording, from "petition for review" to "petition for certiorari" was approved.

Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the proposed "petition for certiorari" are nowhere to be found in the text of Section 14, RA
6770. In fact, it was earlier mentioned that this provision, particularly its second paragraph, does not indicate what specific procedural remedy one
should take in assailing a decision or finding of the Ombudsman; it only reveals that the remedy be taken to this Court based on pure questions of law.
More so, it was even commented upon during the oral arguments of this case 129 that there was no debate or clarification made on the current
formulation of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 per the available excerpts of the Senate deliberations. In any case, at least for the above-
cited deliberations, the Court finds no adequate support to sustain the Ombudsman's entreaty that the CA had no subject matter jurisdiction over the
main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.

On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these deliberations refer to another Ombudsman Act provision, namely Section 27, RA
6770. This is because the latter textually reflects the approval of Senator Angara's suggested amendment, i.e., that the Ombudsman's decision or
finding may be assailed in a petition for certiorari to this Court (fourth paragraph), and further, his comment on the conclusive nature of the factual
findings of the Ombudsman, if supported by substantial evidence (third paragraph):

Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.— (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written
notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds: c h anRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision; cra lawlawlib rary

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within
three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the
penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial
of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the ' Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally ambiguous in stating that a "petition for certiorari" should be taken in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, as it is well-known that under the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions for certiorari are governed by Rule 65 of the
said Rules. However, it should be discerned that the Ombudsman Act was passed way back in 1989 130and, hence, before the advent of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.131 At that time, the governing 1964 Rules of Court,132 consistent with Section 27, RA 6770, referred to the appeal taken thereunder
as a petition for certiorari , thus possibly explaining the remedy's textual denomination, at least in the provision's final approved version:

RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may appeal by certiorari , from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, by filing with the
Supreme Court a petition forcertiorari , within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of the denial of his motion for reconsideration filed in due
time, and paying at the same time, to the clerk of said court the corresponding docketing fee. The petition shall not be acted upon without proof of
service of a copy thereof to the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)

B. Construing the second paragraph of


Section 14, RA 6770.

The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 notwithstanding, the other principles of statutory
construction can apply to ascertain the meaning of the provision.

To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law." ; cral awlawlib rary

As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by
prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy" (subject to the exception below)
against the same. To clarify, the phrase "application for remedy," being a generally worded provision, and being separated from the term "appeal" by
the disjunctive "or",133 refers to any remedy (whether taken mainly or provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim generalia verba sunt
generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be understood in a general sense. 134 By the same principle, the word "findings," which is also separated
from the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would therefore refer to any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except a
decision.
The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is
fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy against "the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court on "pure questions of law," whether
under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court

RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

xxxx

Section 2. Contents of Petition. — The petition shall contain a concise statement of the matters involved, the assignment of errors made in the court
below, and the reasons relied on for the allowance of the petition, and it should be accompanied with a true copy of the judgment sought to be
reviewed, together with twelve (12) copies of the record on appeal, if any, and of the petitioner's brief as filed in the Court of Appeals. A verified
statement of the date when notice of judgment and denial of the motion for reconsideration, if any, were received shall accompany the petition.

Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set forth. If no record on appeal has been filed in the Court of Appeals,
the clerk of the Supreme Court, upon admission of the petition, shall demand from the Court of Appeals the elevation of the whole record of the case.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorarifrom a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies
and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified
motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 could be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Rules of Court or
the 1997 Rules of Procedure is a suggestion that defies traditional norms of procedure. It is basic procedural law that a Rule 65 petition is based on
errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment to which the classifications of (a) questions of fact, (b) questions of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact
and law, relate to. In fact, there is no procedural rule, whether in the old or new Rules, which grounds a Rule 65 petition on pure questions of law.
Indeed, it is also a statutory construction principle that the lawmaking body cannot be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile
systems on the same subject. Such a result would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the laws to uncertainty and
unintelligibility.135 There should then be no confusion that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 refers to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court, and no
other. In sum, the appropriate construction of this Ombudsman Act provision is that all remedies against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are
prohibited, except the above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the Court on pure questions of law.

C. Validity of the second paragraph of


Section 14, RA 6770.

Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal -which is
within the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this Court - can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts, 136 and not
against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon, Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot
alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory "findings" issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy
to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power
constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a
showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-
cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desiertoni137 (Fabian).138

In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.139 Moreover, this provision was
found to be inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of Procedure which, as above-intimated, applies only to a review of
"judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by
law;" and not of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy now being a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,140 the Court's ratiocinations and ruling in Fabian were recounted:

The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the application of Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman's Act) and Section 7,
Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) on the availability of appeal before the Supreme Court to assail a decision or
order of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7
and the other rules implementing the Act) insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions or orders of
the Ombudsman in administrative cases. We held that Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had the effect, not only of increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution; it was also
inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply only to a
review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or
other courts authorized by law." We pointedly said: c hanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the
regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under the provisions of Rule 43. 141 (Emphasis supplied)

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus -
similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 142 - attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice
and concurrence,143 it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman's
posturing,144Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they "cover the same specific or
particular subject matter,"145 that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over the
main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court
deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion146). This procedure, as was similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its bearings in
settled case law:

The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case,
but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.

Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support its
provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear , that a statute
transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and n ot the statute, governs in a case
before them for judgment.

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been recognized to admit of
certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter.
If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the
court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion. The
Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized
right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding. 147 (Emphasis supplied)

D. Consequence of invalidity.

In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to nullify the preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, an interlocutory order, 148 hence, unappealable.149

In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances150 of the Ombudsman
should be filed before the CA, and not directly before this Court:

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong151 (March 12, 2014), wherein a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman was -
similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by the public officer before the CA, the Court held that "[t]here being a
finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by
Section 1 of Rule 65."152

In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman153 (November 19, 2013), involving a Rule 65 petition for certiorariassailing a final and unappealable order of the
Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case, the Court remarked that "petitioner employed the correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a special
civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals."154 In this relation, it stated that while "a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts." Further, the Court upheld Barata v. Abalos, Jr.155 (June 6, 2001), wherein it was ruled that the remedy against final and
unappealable orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case was a Rule 65 petition to the CA. The same verdict was reached
in Ruivivar156(September 16, 2008).

Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the
CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition. That being said, the Court now examines the objections of the
Ombudsman, this time against the CA's authority to issue the assailed TRO and WPI against the implementation of the preventive suspension order,
incidental to that main case.

III.

From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been adamant that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ
against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with
her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770]
likewise insulated it from judicial intervention," 157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts," 158 claiming that said writs
may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would." 159

A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.

Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one
overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be
appointed. (Emphasis supplied)

In Gonzales III v. Office of the President160 (Gonzales III), the Court traced the historical underpinnings of the Office of the Ombudsman:

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as the people's medium for airing grievances and
for direct redress against abuses and misconduct in the government. Ultimately, however, these agencies failed to fully realize their objective for lack of
the political independence necessary for the effective performance of their function as government critic.

It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a constitutionally-mandated office to give it political independence and
adequate powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the ( 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487,
as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to
investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any administrative act of any administrative agency, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation. When the Office of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor were transferred to
the Tanodbayan himself. He was given the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file the
corresponding information, and control the prosecution of these cases.

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its
independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article II and the
standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions read: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. 161 (Emphasis supplied)

More significantly, Gonzales III explained the broad scope of the office's mandate, and in correlation, the impetus behind its independence:

Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the inept,
abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman
practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses , of the bureaucracy.
Pursuant to Section 13 (8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the
Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members
of Congress, and the Judiciary. ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry

As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the < Court has upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under the broad powers
granted [to] it by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with the law and
the Constitution.

The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials,
including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to
insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of external
reprisal by making it an "independent" office, x x x.

xxxx

Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful government constitutional agency that is considered "a
notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers, both constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate , with its daunting
task of enforcing accountability of public officers. 162 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other constitutional
bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed:
(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics - they do not
owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general
terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these 'independent' bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the
absence of 'independence' would result in the impairment of their core functions"163; cra lawlawlib rary

(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the
funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only [of] the express mandate of the Constitution, but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is
based";164 and

(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need for independence. In the deliberat ions of the 1973 Constitution, the
delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one created by law, on the
premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a similar manner, the deliberations of
the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the developments in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission
on Audit from political pressure."165

At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as that of the foregoing
independent bodies, meant freedom from control or supervision of the Executive Department:

[T]he independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be independent from executive control or
supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the
"independence" granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference.

In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA 358), we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have been
characterized under the Constitution as "independent," are not under the control of the President, even if they discharge functions that are
executive in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional the President's act of temporarily appointing the respondent in that case as Acting Chairman
of the [Commission on Elections] "however well-meaning" it might have been.

In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]), the Court categorically stated that the tenure of the commissioners of the independent
Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the discretionary power of the President.

xxxx

The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior - but is similar in degree and kind - to the independence
similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political interstices of a republican democracy
that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning. 166 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8 (2), RA 6770, which provides that "[a] Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from
office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process," partially unconstitutional insofar as
it subjected the Deputy Ombudsman to the disciplinary authority of the President for violating the principle of independence. Meanwhile, the validity of
Section 8 (2), RA 6770 was maintained insofar as the Office of the Special Prosecutor was concerned since said office was not considered to be
constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.167

As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:

First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be
removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made; c ralawlawl ibra ry

Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes
germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to impair said
functions; and

Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an
internal authority.

Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure, so as to free it
from the "insidious tentacles of politics."169

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence,
the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive
suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.

B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA


6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.

The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence notwithstanding, it remains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general
phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme
Court.170 As support, she cites the following Senate deliberations:

Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda. Mr. President, I do not know if an amendment is necessary. I would just like to inquire for the record whether
below the Supreme Court, it is understood that there is no injunction policy against the Ombudsman by lower courts. Or, is it necessary
to have a special paragraph for that?

Senator Angara. Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President, that will prevent an injunction against the Ombudsman being issued.

Senator Maceda. In which case, I think that the intention, this being one of the highest constitutional bodies, is to subject this only
to certiorari to the Supreme Court. I think an injunction from the Supreme Court is, of course, in order but no lower courts should be
allowed to interfere. We had a very bad experience with even, let us say, the Forestry Code where no injunction is supposed to be issued against the
Department of Natural Resources. Injunctions are issued right and left by RTC judges all over the country.

The President. Why do we not make an express provision to that effect?

Senator Angara. We would welcome that, Mr. President.

The President. No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other than the Supreme Court.

Senator Maceda. I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.171

Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, acts of the Ombudsman, including interlocutory
orders, are subject to the Supreme Court's power of judicial review As a corollary, the Supreme Court may issue ancillary mjunctive writs or provisional
remedies in the exercise of its power of judicial review over matters pertaining to ongoing investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman. Respecting
the CA, however, the Ombudsman begs to differ.172

With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the validity of the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it prohibits all courts, except
this Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman investigation. That the constitutionality of this provision is the lis
mota of this case has not been seriously disputed. In fact, the issue anent its constitutionality was properly raised and presented during the course of
these proceedings.173 More importantly, its resolution is clearly necessary to the complete disposition of this case.174

In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. The Electoral Commission (Angara),175 the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative[,] and the judicial departments of the government." 176 The constitutional demarcation of
the three fundamental powers of government is more commonly known as the principle of separation of powers. In the landmark case of Belgica v.
Ochoa, Jr. (Belgica),177 the Court held that "there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches
on the domain of another."178 In particular, "there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption
of another department's functions."179

Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is allocated to the Supreme Court and all such lower courts:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

This Court is the only court established by the Constitution, while all other lower courts may be established by laws passed by Congress. Thus,
through the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,180 known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," the Court of Appeals, 181 the Regional
Trial Courts,182 and the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts183were established. Later, through the
passage of RA 1125,184 and Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1486,185the Court of Tax Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan were respectively established.

In addition to the authority to establish lower courts, Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution empowers Congress to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of all courts, exceptthat it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5186 of the same Article:

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, ' and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

xxxx ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry

Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. In The Diocese ofBacolod v. Commission
on Elections,187 subject matter jurisdiction was defined as "the authority 'to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers.'"

Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court (subject to the aforementioned constitutional
limitations), the Court of Appeals, and the trial courts, through the passage of BP 129, as amended.

In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over Binay, Jr.'s main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 is Section
9(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended:

Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes,
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction[.]

Note that the CA's certiorari jurisdiction, as above-stated, is not only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts (under Section 21 (1),
Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the concurrence of these
courts' jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be followed. In People v. Cuaresma,188 the doctrine was
explained as follows:

[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue
of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.189

When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred unto it by law, said court may then exercise its
jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called judicial power.

Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts established by law, has been defined as the "totality of powers a court
exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case."190 Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes "the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."

In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.191 the Court explained the expanded scope of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The
second part of the authority represents a broadening of f judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to
wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the
executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because they are tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the
disposition of the judiciary.192

Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case conforms to the
limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court. In other words, procedure is the framework within which
judicial power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General,193 the Court elucidated that "[t]he power or authority of the court over the
subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it
simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in
conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not
mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter." 194

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice195 (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935196 and 1973
Constitutions,197 had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress.198 As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered
the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making
powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more independent judiciary."199

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show 200 that the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rule-making
powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement
the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court", right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged^" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the
former sentence and, instead, after the word "[underprivileged," place a comma (,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to
delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and
(b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes
were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5),
Article VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent
powers."201

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. As pronounced
in Echegaray:

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also r granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.202 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various rules of procedure, among others, the current 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Identifying the appropriate procedural remedies needed for the reasonable exercise of every court's judicial power, the
provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction were thus provided.

A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action.
They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole
objectof a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status
quo203 until the merits of the case can be heard. They are usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the
parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status
quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. In other words, they are preservative remedies for the protection of
substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to a main suit.204 In a sense, they are regulatory processes
meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.

Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the provisional remedies of a TRO and a WPI. A preliminary injunction is defined under
Section 1,205 Rule 58, while Section 3206 of the same Rule enumerates the grounds for its issuance. Meanwhile, under Section 5 207 thereof, a TRO may
be issued as a precursor to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under certain procedural parameters.

The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and
other means necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court which reads:

Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, f processes and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law208 or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears
comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules.Cha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,209 which is a case involving "[t]he supervisory power or jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax Appeals] to issue a writ
of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"210 over "decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by
them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction," 211 the Court ruled that said power "should coexist with, and be a complement to, its
appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the
latter:"212

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that ; will
preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that
jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to con trol all auxiliary
and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain
the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.213 (Emphasis supplied)

In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court endowed with subject matter jurisdiction:

[A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such
jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to
enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to t defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.

xxxx c ralawlaw lib rary

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly
conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are
essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate,
convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render
it effective in behalf of the litigants.214 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates the long-entrenched constitutional principle, articulated way back in the 1936 case
of Angara, that "where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance
of the other is also conferred."215

In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the principle, by which the courts deal with diverse matters over which they are thought
to have intrinsic authority like procedural [rule-making] and general judicial housekeeping. To justify the invocation or exercise of inherent powers, a
court must show that the powers are reasonably necessary to achieve the specific purpose for which the exercise is sought. Inherent
powers enable the judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally mandated functions."216

In Smothers v. Lewis217 (Smothers), a case involving the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited courts from enjoining the enforcement of a
revocation order of an alcohol beverage license pending appeal, 218 the Supreme Court of Kentucky held:

[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do that which is reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within
the scope of their jurisdiction. x x x [W]e said while considering the rule making power and the judicial power to be one and the same that ". . . the
grant of judicial power [rule making power] to the courts by the constitution carries with it, as a necessary incident, the right to make
that power effective in the administration of justice." (Emphases supplied)
Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional injunctive relief as an exercise of the court's inherent power, and to this end,
stated that any attempt on the part of Congress to interfere with the same was constitutionally impermissible:

It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the language framework of 28 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, Section 15, and once and for all
make clear that a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as an incidental to its constitutional grant of power, inherent power
to do all things reasonably necessary to the administration of justice in the case before it. In the exercise of this power, a court, when necessary
in order to protect or preserve the subject matter of the litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and to make its judgment effective, may
grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid of or ancillary to the principal action.

The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular instance the injunction, is exclusively within the constitutional realm of
the courts. As such, it is not within the purview of the legislature to grant or deny the power nor is it within the purview of the
legislature to shape or fashion circumstances under which this inherently judicial power may be or may not be granted or denied.

This Court has historically recognized constitutional limitations upon the power of the legislature to interfere with or to inhibit the performance of
constitutionally granted and inherently provided judicial functions, x x x

xxxx

We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as incidental to its general
jurisdiction, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary f to the administration of justice in the case before it. . ." This includes the inherent
power to issue injunctions. (Emphases supplied)

Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to provide a right to appeal in the statute does not necessarily mean that it could control the
appellate judicial proceeding:

However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal does not give it the right to encroach upon the constitutionally granted powers
of the judiciary. Once the administrative action has ended and the right to appeal arises the legislature is void of any right to control a
subsequent appellate judicial proceeding. The judicial rules have come into play and have preempted the field. 219 (Emphasis supplied)

With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away
from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's
constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions
of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not
create, define, and regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of implementing an existing right 220 since it only provided for temporary reliefs to
preserve the applicant's right in esse which is threatened to be violated during the course of a pending litigation. In the case of Fabian,211 it was stated
that:

If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive
matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry

Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court, as in the cases
of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/ Docket Fees;222 (b) Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees; 223 and (c) Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes224 While these cases involved legislative enactments exempting government owned and controlled corporations and
cooperatives from paying filing fees, thus, effectively modifying Rule 141 of the Rules of Court (Rule on Legal Fees), it was, nonetheless, ruled that the
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure 225 solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the legislative
and executive branches of government. On this score, the Court described its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure as
exclusive and "[o]ne of the safeguards of [its] institutional independence."226

That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2, Article
VIII supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII supra, does not result in an abnegation of the Court's own power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5), Article VIII supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are
nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its own sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and
delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates. The
first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives,227 because it does not define, prescribe,
and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under
the relevant sections of BP 129 which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered with a
provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and
inherent to every court's exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an
adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a
violation of the separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court's ability to carry out its functions. This
is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is
hearing the same. Accordingly, the court's acquired jurisdiction, through which it exercises its judicial power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force
of judicial power, especially under the present Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a court's inability to regulate what occurs during a proceeding's
course. As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over the subject matter is accorded by law and has been acquired by a court, its exercise thereof should
be undipped. To give true meaning to the judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court's duly promulgated rules of
procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional injunctive writs in whatever variant
should only subsist under rules of procedure duly promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over the same.

The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) and the Acting Solicitor General Florin T. Hilbay
(Acting Solicitor General Hilbay) mirrors the foregoing observations:

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the Rules of Court?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:


Rule 58, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct me if I will be mistaken under the rubric of what is called provisional remedies, our
resident expert because Justice Peralta is not here so Justice Bersamin for a while. So provisional remedy you have injunction, x x x.

xxxx

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, if you have a copy of the Constitution, can you
please read that provision? Section 5, Article VIII the Judiciary subparagraph 5, would you kindly read that provision?

ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY.


"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts..."

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. This is the power, the competence, the
jurisdiction of what constitutional organ?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
The Supreme Court, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII Sections 1 and 2 which we've already been discussed with you by my other colleagues, is that not
correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:


Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of Congress, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:


Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the Court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:


Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate case or is it part of litigation in an ordinary case?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:


It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:


Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of litigation, it will not be rendered moot and academic, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:


Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In that view, isn't Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:


No, Your Honor.

xxxx

JUSTICE LEONEN.
Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to Dismiss under Rule 16?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:


Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to create remedies, x x x.

JUSTICE LEONEN.
What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall have the power to issue the supplemental pleading called the bill of t particular [s]? It
cannot, because that's part of procedure...

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:


That is true.

JUSTICE LEONEN
...or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:


Correct.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
So what's different with the writ of injunction?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:


Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of jurisdiction on the part of a court that was created by Congress. In the absence of jurisdiction...
(interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words, when they create a special agrarian court it has all procedures with it but it does not
attach particularly to that particular court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY:


When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court...

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the concept of a TRO? It was a Rule. A rule of procedure and the Rules of Court, is that not
correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:


Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist unless it is [an] ancillary to a particular injunction in a court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:


Correct, Your Honor.

xxxx228 (Emphasis supplied)

In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 229 the Court instructed that "[i]t is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several departments. The Constitution is the
basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer." It would
then follow that laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional. 230
However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the
same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against
courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until
it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.

Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent
thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension
order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction
conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.

IV.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the CA gravely abused its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
against the preventive suspension order is a persisting objection to the validity of said injunctive writs. For its proper analysis, the Court first provides
the context of the assailed injunctive writs.

A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension order.

By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio,231 the
Court explained the distinction, stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his position and the powers and
prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case
against him:

Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by
considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved.

Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the
suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is
established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This
is the penalty.

That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure. (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry

Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So Section
25 of the same Rule XIV provides: ch anRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the
actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty.232(Emphases supplied) ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry

The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated in Section 24, RA 6770:

Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c)
the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay,
except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an
investigation, namely:

(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and

(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; cralaw lawlib rary

(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. 233 ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.

Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, show that the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the requisites provided in
Section 24, RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs.

The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA234 (Governor
Garcia, Jr.), wherein the Court emphasized that "if it were established in the CA that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed
committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then, following settled jurisprudence, he can no longer be administratively charged." 235 Thus, the
Court, contemplating the application of the condonation doctrine, among others, cautioned, in the said case, that "it would have been more prudent for
[the appellate court] to have, at the very least, on account of the extreme urgency of the matter and the seriousness of the issues raised in
the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x x"236 during the pendency of the proceedings.

Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed WPI was based on the condonation doctrine, citing the case
of Aguinaldo v. Santos237 The CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the nullification of the preventive
suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City
Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to
2013.238 Moreover, the CA observed that although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term , i.e., the
alleged payments on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013,239 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively
liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,240 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,241 wherein the condonation dobtrine was applied by
the Court although the payments were made after the official's election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts
executed before said re-election.242

The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation doctrine since it was a matter of defense which
should have been raised and passed upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary proceedings. 243 However, the Court agrees with the CA
that it was not precluded from considering the same given that it was material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive relief in conformity
with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the subsisting jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,244 the CA did not err in passing upon the same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the evidence of
guilt against him was not strong in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,245it appears that the CA found that the application of the condonation
doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Again, there is nothing aberrant with this since, as
remarked in the same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was established that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed
during Binay, Jr.'s prior term, then, following the condonation doctrine, he can no longer be administratively charged. In other words, with condonation
having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to determine if the evidence of
guilt against him was strong, at least for the purpose of issuing the subject injunctive writs.
With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs herein laid down, the Court now proceeds to determine if the CA gravely
abused its discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.

C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.

Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender
as if there had been no offense."246

The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon - is not based on
statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board ofNueva
Ecija,247 (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.

In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and was later re-elected to the
same position in 1955. During his second term, or on October 6, 1956, the Acting Provincial Governor filed administrative charges before the
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija against him for grave abuse of authority and usurpation of judicial functions for acting on a criminal complaint in
Criminal Case No. 3556 on December 18 and 20, 1954. In defense, Arturo Pascual argued that he cannot be made liable for the acts charged against
him since they were committed during his previous term of office, and therefore, invalid grounds for disciplining him during his second term. The
Provincial Board, as well as the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, later decided against Arturo Pascual, and when the case reached this Court on
appeal, it recognized that the controversy posed a novel issue - that is, whether or not an elective official may be disciplined for a wrongful act
committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office.

As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and "found that cases on the
matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with
respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct." 248Without going into the variables of
these conflicting views and cases, it proceeded to state that:

The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct
during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.249 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that there is really no established weight of author ity in the United States
(US) favoring the doctrine of condonation, which, in the words of Pascual, theorizes that an official's re-election denies the right to remove him from
office due to a misconduct during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out during the oral arguments of this case, at least seventeen (17) states in the US
have abandoned the condonation doctrine.250 The Ombudsman aptly cites several rulings of various US State courts, as well as literature published on
the matter, to demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly applied across all state jurisdictions. Indeed, the treatment is nuanced:

(1) For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of removing a public officer from his current term or office for misconduct which he
allegedly committed in a prior term of office is governed by the language of the statute or constitutional provision applicable to the facts of a particular
case (see In Re Removal of Member of Council Coppola).251 As an example, a Texas statute, on the one hand, expressly allows removal only for an act
committed during a present term: "no officer shall be prosecuted or removed from office for any act he may have committed prior to his election to
office" (see State ex rel. Rowlings v. Loomis).252 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma allows removal from office for "acts of commission,
omission, or neglect committed, done or omitted during a previous or preceding term of office" (see State v. Bailey)253 Meanwhile, in some states where
the removal statute is silent or unclear, the case's resolution was contingent upon the interpretation of the phrase "in office." On one end, the Supreme
Court of Ohio strictly construed a removal statute containing the phrase "misfeasance of malfeasance in office" and thereby declared that, in the
absence of clear legislative language making, the word "office" must be limited to the single term during which the offense charged against the public
officer occurred (see State ex rel. Stokes v. Probate Court of Cuyahoga County)254 Similarly, the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania decided that the phrase "in office" in its state constitution was a time limitation with regard to the grounds of removal, so that an officer
could not be removed for misbehaviour which occurred; prior to the taking of the office (see Commonwealth v. Rudman)255 The opposite was construed
in the Supreme Court of Louisiana which took the view that an officer's inability to hold an office resulted from the commission of certain offenses, and
at once rendered him unfit to continue in office, adding the fact that the officer had been re-elected did not condone or purge the offense (see State ex
rel. Billon v. Bourgeois).256 Also, in the Supreme Court of New York, Apellate Division, Fourth Department, the court construed the words "in office" to
refer not to a particular term of office but to an entire tenure; it stated that the whole purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute in question
could easily be lost sight of, and the intent of the law-making body be thwarted, if an unworthy official could not be removed during one term for
misconduct for a previous one (Newman v. Strobel).257

(2) For another, condonation depended on whether or not the public officer was a successor in the same office for which he has been administratively
charged. The "own-successor theory," which is recognized in numerous States as an exception to condonation doctrine, is premised on the idea that
each term of a re-elected incumbent is not taken as separate and distinct, but rather, regarded as one continuous term of office. Thus, infractions
committed in a previous term are grounds for removal because a re-elected incumbent has no prior term to speak of258 (see Attorney-General v.
Tufts;259State v. Welsh;260Hawkins v. Common Council of Grand Rapids;261Territory v. Sanches;262 and Tibbs v. City of Atlanta).263

(3) Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the continuing nature of an offense in cases where the condonation d octrine was invoked. In
State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden,264 the public officer charged with malversation of public funds was denied the defense of condonation by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, observing that "the large sums of money illegally collected during the previous years are still retained by him." In State ex
rel. Beck v. Harvey265 the Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that "there is no necessity" of applying the condonation doctrine since "the misconduct
continued in the present term of office[;] [thus] there was a duty upon defendant to restore this money on demand of the county commissioners."
Moreover, in State ex rel. Londerholm v. Schroeder,266 the Supreme Court of Kansas held that "insofar as nondelivery and excessive prices are
concerned, x x x there remains a continuing duty on the part of the defendant to make restitution to the country x x x, this duty extends into the
present term, and neglect to discharge it constitutes misconduct."

Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary conclusion in Pascual that there is a "weight of authority" in the US on the condonation
doctrine. In fact, without any cogent exegesis to show that Pascual had accounted for the numerous factors relevant to the debate on condonation, an
outright adoption of the doctrine in this jurisdiction would not have been proper.

At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this Court's decision-making. "[They] are not relied upon as precedents, but
as guides of interpretation."267 Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over
in numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from
revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing
considerations against its application.268 In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of
standing precedent.269 As the Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature
that develops and devolves along with the society within which it thrives. 270 In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, "[w]hat we can
decide, we can undecide."271

In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted.
Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the experience of the Filipino People under
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public
accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-examination.

D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.

Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:

First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct:

Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where
the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from
holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401;
Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex rel.Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. Shutter, 281
P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.272
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and

[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553.273(emphasis supplied)

Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers:

As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their
right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life
and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason
of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people. 274 (Emphases supplied)

The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as follows:

(1) Lizares v. Hechanova275 (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first applied the condonation doctrine, thereby quoting the above-stated passages
from Pascual in verbatim.

(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.276 (December 18, 1967) - wherein the Court clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case.
It was explained that a criminal case is different from an administrative case in that the former involves the People of the Philippines as a community,
and is a public wrong to the State at large; whereas, in the latter, only the populace of the constituency he serves is affected. In addition, the Court
noted that it is only the President who may pardon a criminal offense.

(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos277 (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a case decided under the 1987 Constitution wherein the condonation doctrine was
applied in favor of then Cagayan Governor Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo although his re-election merely supervened the pendency of, the proceedings.

(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.278 (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein the Court reinforced the condonation doctrine by stating that the same is
justified by "sound public policy." According to the Court, condonation prevented the elective official from being "hounded" by administrative cases
filed by his "political enemies" during a new term, for which he has to defend himself "to the detriment of public service." Also, the Court mentioned
that the administrative liability condoned by re-election covered the execution of the contract and the incidents related therewith.279

(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica280 (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999) - wherein the benefit of the doctrine was extended to then Cebu City Mayor Alvin
B. Garcia who was administratively charged for his involvement in an anomalous contract for the supply of asphalt for Cebu City, executed only four (4)
days before the upcoming elections. The Court ruled that notwithstanding the timing of the contract's execution, the electorate is presumed to have
known the petitioner's background and character, including his past misconduct; hence, his subsequent re-election was deemed a condonation of his
prior transgressions. More importantly, the Court held that the determinative time element in applying the condonation doctrine should be the time
when the contract was perfected; this meant that as long as the contract was entered into during a prior term, acts which were done to
implement the same, even if done during a succeeding term, do not negate the application of the condonation doctrine in favor of the
elective official.

(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman281 (Salumbides, Jr.; April 23, 2010) - wherein the Court explained the doctrinal innovations in
the Salalima and Mayor Garcia rulings, to wit:

Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the administrative
complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days b efore the
elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was
committed during the prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the
public official's culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection. 282 (Emphasis supplied)
ChanRob les Vi rtualawl ib rary

The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,283 also clarified that the condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since,
as to them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.

(7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -wherein the Court remarked that it would have been prudent for the appellate court
therein to have issued a temporary restraining order against the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman in view of
the condonation doctrine.

A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. - all cited by the CA to justify
its March 16, 2015 and April 6, 2015 Resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs - would show that the basis for condonation
under the prevailing constitutional and statutory framework was never accounted for. What remains apparent from the text of these cases is that the
basis for condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was - and still remains - the above-cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted from rulings of US
courts where condonation was amply supported by their own state laws. With respect to its applicability to administrative cases, the core premise of
condonation - that is, an elective official's re-election cuts qff the right to remove him for an administrative offense committed during a prior term - was
adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because the legality of that doctrine was never tested against existing legal norms. As in the
US, the propriety of condonation is - as it should be -dependent on the legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an
examination of our current laws in order to determine if there is legal basis for the continued application of the doctrine of condonation.

The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme law of the land; 284 thus, the unbending rule is that every statute should
be read in light of the Constitution.285 Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a workable government; hence, its interpretation must take into
account the complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of government. 286

As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent
with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust. The provision in the 1935 Constitution that comes closest in
dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II which states that "[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service." 287 Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution's silence on public
accountability, and considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well as the variance in the policy considerations, there was no
glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from select US cases existing at that time.

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers underwent a significant change. The new charter introduced an
entire article on accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively recognized, acknowledged, and declared that
"[p]ublic office is a public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people."

After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption."288 Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public servants under the regime of a dictator,
the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987
Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public officers to be accountable to the
people at all times:

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all timesbe accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Cha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

In Belgica, it was explained that:

[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder
that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which
embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability x x x.289 (Emphasis supplied) Cha nRobles Vi rt ualawlib rary
The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section of the Civil Service Commission, 290 and also, in the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.291

For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official from office are stated in Section
60 of Republic Act No. 7160,292 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and took
effect on January 1, 1992:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the r following
grounds: cha nRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary

(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; c ralawlawli bra ry

(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution; c ralawlawli bra ry

(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty; cra lawlawlib ra ry

(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor; c ralawlaw lib rary

(e) Abuse of authority; c ralawlawli bra ry

(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang barangay; c ralawlawli bra ry

(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.

Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those removed from office as a result of an administrative case shall
be disqualified from running for any elective local position:

Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

xxxx

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied) ChanRoble sVirt ualawlib ra ry

In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office:

Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. -

a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding
public office, and bar from taking the civil service examinations.

In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective local official nor
constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the provision only pertains to the
duration of the penalty and its effect on the official's candidacy. Nothing therein states that the administrative liability therefor is extinguished
by the fact of re-election:

Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x.

xxxx

(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor
shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office.

Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is
actually bereft of legal bases.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is
not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion
that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this
jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos293 to apply to administrative offenses:

The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of
impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for
the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation,
cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It
is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much
more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against an elective
local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first
place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct
disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding
public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.

To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of administrative liability
was supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect, that an officer cannot be removed by a misconduct committed during
a previous term,294 or that the disqualification to hold the office does not extend beyond the term in which the official's delinquency
occurred.295 In one case,296 the absence of a provision against the re-election of an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the
justification behind condonation. In another case, 297 it was deemed that condonation through re-election was a policy under their constitution -
which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our present Constitution's requirements on public accountability. There was even one case where the
doctrine of condonation was not adjudicated upon but only invoked by a party as a ground; 298 while in another case, which was not reported in full in
the official series, the crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was
deemed to be incompetent.299Hence, owing to either their variance or inapplicability, none of these cases can be used as basis for the continued
adoption of the condonation doctrine under our existing laws.

At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local
official's prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for re-election This treatment is similar to People ex rel Bagshaw v.
Thompson300 and Montgomery v. Novell301 both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer cannot be suspended for a misconduct committed
during a prior term. However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b) states that the elective local official's administrative liability is
extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.

Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate of their right to elect their
officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular constituency chooses an
individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is
there any legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official's
administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under our governing legal
mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory
provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate's will has been abdicated.

Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption
exists in any statute or procedural rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to human experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public
official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed
from the public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the electorate when
they cast their votes.303 At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus,
there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown. As observed in Walsh v. City Council of Trenton304 decided by the New Jersey Supreme
Court:

Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his removal for acts done in a preceding term of office are reasoned out on the
theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that theory because condonation, implying as it does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the
absence of knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive something of which one has no knowledge.

That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it
was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the current legal
regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases
following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. 305 Unto this
Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained in De
Castro v. Judicial Bar Council.306

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce
obedience to them.307

Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment.
Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected. The landmark case on this matter is People v. Jabinal,308 wherein it was ruled:

[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to
parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,309 it was further elaborated:

[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil C ode which provides that "laws
shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks
forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already
become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional. 310 ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight and rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it is truly
perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren of legal anchorage was able to endure in our jurisprudence for a considerable length of time, this
Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now abandons the condonation doctrine.

E. Consequence of ruling.

As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.

It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.311 It has also been held that "grave abuse of discretion arises
when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."312

As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases
enunciating the condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject TRO was based on the case
of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based on the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima,
Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly
remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above. Accordingly, the
WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly issued.

With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the merits.
However, considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty
of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office, for the present administrative charges against
him, the said CA petition appears to have been mooted.313 As initially intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that, at its
core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more purpose - and perforce, dissolves -
upon the termination of the office's process of investigation in the instant administrative case.

F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.

This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order subject
of this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica,
'"the moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases,
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review." 314 All of these scenarios obtain in this case:

First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that
its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued application of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the
auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the
people at all times.

Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape administrative
liability. It is the first time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is a situation of exceptional character which
this Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the
multitude of elective local officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that paramount public interest is involved.

Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public. The issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative law principles, but also puts to the forefront of legal discourse the potency
of the accountability provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court owes it to the bench, the bar, and the public to explain how this controversial
doctrine came about, and now, its reasons for abandoning the same in view of its relevance on the parameters of public office.
And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local officials against the administrative charges filed against them.
To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon
Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of
alleged misconduct - involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct - were placed beyond the reach
of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial powers." 315 Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must
therefore, not evade review.

In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and may
therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of
discussion moot. chan roble slaw

V.

With all matters pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 passed upon, the Court now rules on the final issue on whether or not the CA's
Resolution316 dated March 20, 2015 directing the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper
and illegal.

The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an impeachable officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge for indirect
contempt317 because this action is criminal in nature and the penalty therefor would result in her effective removal from office. 318 However, a reading of
the aforesaid March 20, 2015 Resolution does not show that she has already been subjected to contempt proceedings. This issuance, in? fact, makes it
clear that notwithstanding the directive for the Ombudsman to comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt
petition:

Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the
Ombudsman, and the Department of Interior and Local Government] are hereby DIRECTED to file Comment on the Petition/Amended and Supplemental
Petition for Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an inextendible period of three (3) days from receipt hereof. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry

Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a comment, wherein she may properly raise her objections to the contempt
proceedings by virtue of her being an impeachable officer, the CA, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, may still opt not to give due course to
Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition and accordingly, dismiss the same. Sjmply put, absent any indication that the contempt petition has been given due
course by the CA, it would then be premature for this Court to rule on the issue. The submission of the Ombudsman on this score is perforce denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this Decision, the Court resolves as follows:

(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the issuance of provisional
injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the first paragraph
of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly
issued therefor; c ralawlawl ibra ry

(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect; c ralawlawl ibra ry

(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its Joint Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively
liable in the six (6) administrative complamts, docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-
0062, and OMB-C-A-15-0063; and

(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's comment, the CA is DIRECTED to resolve Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in
CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED. chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary

Sereno, C.J. Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, and Jardeleza, JJ., no part.
Brion, J., no part/ on leave.
Mendoza, J., on leave.
Bersamin, J., please see my concurring & dissenting opinion.

Endnotes:

1
"The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the superintendence of his executor, John Bowring." Vol. II, Chapter IV, p. 423, London (1843).

2
With urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or a WPI. Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 6-36.

3
Id. at 43-47. Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. concurring.

4
Id. at 53-65. Issued by petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales.

5
Id. at 50-51.

6
Dated March 18, 2015. Id. at 362-373.

7
Id. at 613-627.

8
Id. at 629-630. Signed by Division Clerk, of Court Miriam Alfonso Bautista.

9
For certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI. Id. at 606-611

10
See rollo, Vol. II, pp. 749-757.

11
RA 7080, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER" (approved on Julv 12, 1991).

12
Approved on August 17, 1960.

13
Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 647.

14
Id.

15
Through Ombudsman Office Order No. 546, which was later on amended through Officer Order No. 546-A dated November 18, 2014. Id. at 758-759.

16
Dated March 3, 2015. Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 66-100.

17
Docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and OMB-C-A-15-0063. See id. at 53-
58.

18
Docketed as OMB-C-C-15-0059, OMB-C-C-15-0060, OMB-C-C-15-0061, OMB-C-C-15-0062, OMB-C-C-15-0063, and OMB-C-C-15-0064. See id. at 66.
See also rollo, Vol. II, p. 674.
19
As for Binay, Jr., only four (4) administrative cases and four (4) criminal cases were filed against him, particularly: (a) for administrative cases (1)
OMB-C-A-15-0058, (2) OMB-C-A-15-0061, (3) OMB-C- A-15-0062, and (4) OMB-C-A-15-0063; and (b) for criminal cases (1) OMB-C-C-15-0059, for
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Malversation of Public Funds involving the design, architectural, and engineering services of MANA Architecture
& Interior Design Co. covering the Makati Parking Building project, (2) OMB-C-C-15-0062, for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 and two (2) counts
of Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code in connection with Phase III of the Makati Parking Building project
involving Hilmarc's, (3) OMB-C-C-15-0063, for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 and two (2) counts of Falsification of Public Documents in
connection with Phase IV of the Makati Parking Building project involving Hilmarc's, and (4) OMB- C-C-1 5-0064, for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019 and two (2) counts of Falsification of Public Documents in connection with Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project involving Hilmarc's.
(Rollo, Vol. I, p. 12; rollo, Vol. II, p. 647.)

20
Specific period covered by his first term is from Noon of June 30, 2010 to Noon of June 30, 2013.

21
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 247.

22
Id. at 248-250.

23
The original contract amount was P599,395,613.34. Due to a change order, this was later increased to P599,994,021.05. See Disbursement Voucher;
id. at 284.

24
Id. at 86-87.

25
See Disbursement Voucher for 26% completion of Phase III; id. at 270.

26
See Disbursement Voucher for 52.49% completion of Phase III; id. at 273.

27
See Disbursement Voucher for 69% completion of Phase III; id. at 276.

28
See Disbursement Voucher for 79.17% completion of Phase III; id. at 278.

29
See Disbursement Voucher for 86.45% completion of Phase III; id. at 281.

30
See Disbursement Voucher for 100% completion of Phase III; id. at 284.

31
Id. at 312.

32
Id. at 290-292.

33
The original contract amount was f 649,275,681.73. This was later increased to f 649,934,440.96. See Disbursement Voucher; id. at 320.

34
Id. at 88.

35
See Disbursement Voucher for 33.53% completion of Phase IV; id. at 315.

36
See Disbursement Voucher for 63.73% completion of Phase IV; id. at 316.

37
See Disbursement Voucher for 76.94% completion of Phase IV; id. at 317.

38
See Disbursement Voucher for 87.27% completion of Phase IV; id. at 318.

39
See Disbursement Voucher for 100% completion of Phase IV; id. at 320.

40
Id. at 334.

41
Id. at 323-325.

42
The original contract amount was P141,649,366.00. Due to a change order, this was later increased to P143,806,161.00. See Disbursement Voucher;
id. at 349

43
Id. at 91.

44
See Disbursement Voucher for 27.31% completion of Phase V; id. at 340. See also id. at 337-339.

45
See Disbursement Voucher for 52.76% completion of Phase V; id. at 344. See also id. at 341-343.

46
Specific period covered by his second term is from Noon of June 30, 2013 to Noon of June 30, 2016.

47
See Disbursement Voucher for 100% completion of Phase V; rollo, p. 349. See also id. at 346-349.

48
For the contract amount of PI 1,974,900.00. Dated November 28,2007. Id. at 108-113.

49
See Disbursement Voucher for 100% completion of the MANA contract; id. at 126.

50
Through Ombudsman Office Order No. 178, which was later on amended through Office Order No. 180 dated March 9, 2015. See rollo, Vol. II, pp.
647-648.

52
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 648.

51
Not attached to the rollos.

53
See rollo, Vol. I, pp. 62 and 480.

54
Id. at 61.

55
Id.

56
See id. at 63 and 480. See also Ombudsman's Indorsement letter dated March 11, 2015; id. at 351.

57
See Personal Delivery Receipt; id. at 350. See also id. at 12.

58
See Binay, Jr.'s Comment/Opposition dated April 6, 2005; id. at 481. See also Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum dated May 21, 2015; rollo, Vol. 11, p. 806.
The Ombudsman, however, claims that the said petition was filed on March 12, 2015; see rollo, Vol II p 648

59
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 403-427.

60
See id. at 425-426.

61
Id. at 404.

62
Id. at 404-405.
63
Id. at 424-425.

64
See id. at 12-13. See also Director Brion's Memorandum dated March 16, 2015; id. at 352-353.

65
Id. at 43-47.

66
Id. at 47.

67
Id. at 13.

68
604 Phil. 677 (2009).

69
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 46.

70
Which directive the Ombudsman complied with on March 30, 2015 (rollo, Vol. II, p. 650). See also rollo, Vol. I, p. 47.

71
See Manifestation dated March 17, 2015; rollo, Vol. I, pp. 357-360.

72
Id. at 358.

73
Not attached to the rollos.

74
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 14; rollo, Vol. II, p. 649.

75
Dated March 18, 2015. Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 362-373.

76
Id.

77
See id. at 370.

78
Id. at 50-51.

79
Which the Ombudsman complied with on March 26, 2015 (rollo, Vol. II, p. 650). See also rollo, Vol I, p. 50.

80
The CA heard oral arguments with respect to Binay, Jr.'s application for a WP1 on March 30, 2015. On the other hand, the CA heard oral arguments
with respect to Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt on March 31, 2015 (see rollo, Vol. II, p. 650). See also rollo, Vol. I, p. 51

81
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 650.

82
Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," approved on November 17 1989.

85
See rollo, Vol. I, pp. 17-21.

84
See id. at 21-24.

85
See Comment/Opposition dated April 6, 2015; id. at 477-522.

86
See id. at 478-479.

87
See id. at 492-493.

88
See id. at 497-505.

89
Id. at 511.

90
Id. at 613-627.

91
Id. at 615.

92
G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 768.

93
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 619.

94
All of which pertains to the payment of Phase V. See id. at 346-349. See also id. at 623.

95
326 Phil. 847(1996).

96
372 Phil. 892(1999).

97
See rollo, Vol. I, pp. 619-620.

98
See id. at 623.

99
Id. at 606-611.

100
Id. at 609.

101
See Court Resolutions dated April 7, 2015 (id. at 524-525) and April 14, 2015 (id. at 634-638).

102
See April 21, 2015; id. at 639-640

103
Rollo, Vol. 11, pp. 646-745.

104
Dated May 21,2015. Id. at 803-865.

105
Id. at 951-952.

106
See Ombudsman's Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum dated July 3, 2015; id. at 1109-1161. See also Binay, Jr.'s Comment (to Petitioners'
Memorandum) dated July 3, 2015; id. at 2203-2240.

107
Id. at 959-960.

108
Id. at 959. See also Manifestation dated May 14, 2015; id. at 641.

109
See discussions on the condonation doctrine in the Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, pp. 708-733 and in the Ombudsman's Comment to
Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II pp 1144-1149,1153-1155, and 1158-1159.

110
See Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 313, 322-323.

111
See Bordomeo v. CA, G.R. No. 161596, February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 269, 286, citing Heirs of Spouses Reterta v. Spouses Mores, 671 Phil. 346,
359 (2011).

112
See AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Solid Homes, Inc., 658 Phil. 68, 19 (2011); citing Diamond Builders Conglomeration v. Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation, 564 Phil 756 769-770 (2007).

113
Republic v. Bayao, supra note 110, at 323, citing Siok Ping Tang v. Subic Bay Distribution Inc., 653 Phil. 124, 136-137(2010).

114
See Ombudsman's Memorandum dated May 14, 2015; rollo, Vol. II, pp. 661-669.

115
Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, 506 Phil. 407,415 (2005).

116
See Court Resolution dated June 16, 2015; rollo, Vol. II, pp. 951-952.

117
Id. at 2203-2240.

118
See id. at 662-666 and 98.

119
As the Ombudsman herself concedes; see Main Petition, rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 17-18; See also Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, pp. 661-666.

120
Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen, 487 Phil. 335, 346 (2004).

121
Section 21, RA 6770 states: cha nRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary

Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of Jthe Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members
of Congress, and the Judiciary.
122
Section 22, RA 6770 states: cha nRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary

Section 22. Investigatory Power. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly
committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.

In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a private person, the Ombudsman and his Deput ies shall have
jurisdiction to include such private person in the investigation and proceed against such private person as the evidence may warrant. The officer or
employee and the private person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the same penalties and liabilities.
123
See Alejandro v. Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 35, 44-46. t

124
Molina v. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167, 169 (1918).

125
See National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr., G.R. No. 106724, February 9, 1994, 229 SCRA, 801-807.

126
See Espino v. Cleofe, 152 Phil. 80, 87 (1973).

127
Records of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 6, August 2, 1998, pp. 174-187. As cited also in Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, p. 662.

128
Records of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 10, August 9, 1988, pp. 282-286 (full names of the senators in brackets supplied). See also Ombudsman's
Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, pp. 662-665, emphases and underscoring in the original.

129
See Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza's interpellation; TSN of the Oral Arguments April 14 2015, p. 7.

130
Approved on November 17, 1989.

131
Effective July 1, 1997.

132
Effective January 1, 1964.

133
"The word 'or' x x x is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word." (Dayao v. Commission on Elections,G.R. Nos. 193643 and 193704
January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 412,428-429.)

134
Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., p. 1720.

135
Bagatsing v. Ramirez, 165 Phil. 909, 914-915 (1976).

136
Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure states that a "party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution
of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

This is consistent with Item (e), Section 5 (2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which reads:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari , as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

137
356 Phil. 787(1998).

138
Note that "[o]ur ruling in the case of Fabian vs. Desierto invalidated Section 27 of Republic Act "No. 6770 and Section 7, Rule 111 of Administrative
Order No. 07 and any other provision of law implementing the aforesaid Act only insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases
from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as
the proper forum and of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters included In said section 27, including the finality
or non-finality of decisions, are not affected and still stand." (Lapid v. CA, 390 Phil. 236, 248 [2000]).

139
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence.

140
587 Phil. 100(2008).

141
Id. at 111-112.

142
For ease of reference, the provision is re-stated:

"In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing
a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court."

143
There should be no statement on the Court's lack of advice and concurrence with respect to the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 since the
deliberations are, in fact, silent on the said provision.
144
See Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, pp. 666-667. Note that nowhere does the fourth paragraph of Section 27 delimit the phrase "orders,
directives or decisions" to those rendered by the Ombudsman at the conclusion of the administrative proceedings, as the Ombud sman submits.

145
See Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Green Asia Construction and Development Corporation, 675 Phil. 846, 857(2011).

146
See Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., p. 615.

147
Fabian supra note 137, at 800-801.

148
A preventive suspension is a mere preventive measure, and not a penalty (see Quimbo v. Gervacio, 503 Phil. 886, 891 [2005]); and hence,
interlocutory in nature since it "does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by [the adjudicating
body] before the case is finally decided on the merits." (Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. CA, 408 Phil. 686, 694 [2001]; see also Banares II v.
Balising, 384 Phil. 567, 577 [2000]).

149
Gomales v. CA, 409 Phil. 684, 689 (2001).

150
Includes interlocutory orders, such as preventive suspension orders, as well as final and unappealable decisions or orders un der Section 27, RA 6770
which states that "[a]ny order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's
salary shall be final and unappealable."

151
G.R. No. 201643, March 12, 2014, 719 SCRA 209.

152
Id. at 219.

153
G.R. No. 184083, November 19, 2013, 709 SCRA 681.

154
Id. at 693.

155
411 Phil. 204(2001).

156
Supra note 140.

157
Rollo, Vol. 1, p. 18.

158
Id.

159
Id.

160
G.R. Nos. 196231 and 196232, January 28, 2014, 714 SCRA 611.

161
Id. at 639-641.

162
Id. at 641-642.

163
Id. at 643 (emphases supplied).

164
Id. at 644, citing Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150 (emphasis supplied).

165
Id. at 644-645 (emphases supplied).

166
Id. at 646-648.

167
See id. at 648-657.

168
See Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC July 31 2012 678 SCRA 1, 13.

169
See Gonzales III, supra note 160, at 650, citing the Record of the Constitutional Commission Vol 2 July 26, 1986, p. 294.

170
See rollo, Vol. I, pp. 670-671.

171
Records of the Senate, August 24, 1988, p. 619. See also rollo, Vol. II, pp. 670-671 (emphases and underscoring in the original).

172
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 672.

173
See discussions in Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. 11, pp. 670-678 and Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, pp. 825-833. See also TSN
of the Oral Arguments, April 14, 2015, pp. 5-9.

174
See People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 82 (1937), citing McGirr v. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil, 563, 568 (1915); 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-
782, 783.

175
63 Phil. 139(1936).

176
Id. at 157.

177
G.R.Nos. 208566, 208493, and 209251, November 19, 2013, 710 SCRA 1.

178
Id. at 108.

179
Id.

180
Entitled "AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (approved on August 14,
1981).

181
See Section 3, Chapter 1, BP 129.

182
See Section 13, Chapter II, BP 129.

183
See Section 25, Chapter III, BP 129.

184
Entitled "An ACT Creating THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS" (approved on June 16, 1954), which was later amended by RA 9282 (approved on March
30, 2004) and RA 9503 (approved on June 12, 2008).

185
Entitled "CREATING A SPECIAL COURT TO BE KNOWN AS 'SANDIGANBAYAN' AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (approved on June 11, 1978), which was
later amended by PD 1606 (approved on December 10, 1978), RA 7975 (approved on March 30, 1995), and RA 8249 (approved on February 5, 1997).

186
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari , prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari , as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

xxxx

187
See G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, citing Reyes v. Diaz 73 Phil 484, 486 (1941)

188
254 Phil. 418 (1989).

189
Id. at 427.

190
Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Ed., p. 959, as cited also in the
Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, p. 661.

191
G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792.

192
Id. at 810, citing Cruz, Isagani A., Philippine Political Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 226-227.

193
20 Phil. 523(1911).

194
Id. at 530-531.

195
See 361 Phil. 73, 86-91 (1999).

196
Article VIII, Section 13 of the 1935 Constitution provides: c hanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The
existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The National Assembly shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the w7 admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
197
Article X, Section 5 (5) of the 1973 Constitution provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration
of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batassing Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. (Emphasis supplied)

198
See Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees, 626 Phil. 93,
106-109 (2010).

199
Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes,627 Phil. 543,549(2010).

200
See discussions as in the Records of the Constitutional Commission, July 14, 1986, pp. 491-492.

201
Id. at 492.

202
Supra note 195, at 88.

203
"Status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy." (See Dolmar Real Estate Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 570
Phil. 434, 439 [2008] and Preysler, Jr. v. CA, 527 Phil. 129, 136 [2006].)

204
See The Incorporators of Mindanao Institute, Inc. v. The United Church of Christ in the Philippines, G.R. No. 171765, March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA
637, 647.

205
Section 1, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: chanRo blesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

Section 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. - A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may cilso require the performance of
a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Cha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

206
Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: chanRo blesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

Section. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of
the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; c ralawlaw lib rary

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of jthe rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
207
Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. — No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to
the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury
would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may
issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be
enjoined, except as herein provided, x x x.

However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and
irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining
order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to
service of summons and the documents to be served therewith, x x x.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)
208
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies may be specifically pointed out by law and thus, remain effective unless the Supreme
Court disapproves the same pursuant to Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: c ralawlawl ibra ry

(5) xxx. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

209
G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014, 715 SCRA 182.

210
Id. at 204.

211
Id. at 197.

212
Id. at 204.

213
Id. at 204-205.

214
Id. at 205.

215
Supra note 175, at 177, citing Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8 th Ed., Vol. I, pp. 138-139.

216
(last visited July 27, 2015). See also Black's Law Dictionary, 8 th Ed., p. 798.

217
672 S.W.2d 62 (1984).

218
The particular statute [KRS 243.580(2) and (3)] reads: c hanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary

(2) If a license is revoked or suspended by an order of the board, the licensee shall at once suspend all operations authorized under his license, except
as provided by KRS 243.540, though he files an appeal in the Franklin Circuit Court from the order of revocation of suspension.

(3) No court may enjoin the operation of an order of revocation or suspension pending an appeal. If upon appeal to the Franklin Circuit Court
an order of suspension or revocation is upheld, or if an order refusing to suspend or revoke a license is reversed, and an ap peal is taken to the Court of
Appeals, no court may enjoin the operation of the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court pending the appeal. (See Smothers, id.; emphasis supplied.)

219
See id.

220
"Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause
of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions." (Primicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 446, 452 [1953], citing Bustos v. Lucero, [46 Off. Gaz., January
Supp., pp. 445, 448], further citing 36 C. J. 27; 52 C. J. S. 1026); See alsoFabian, supra note 137.

221
Fabian, id. at 809.

222
629 Phil. 1 (2010).

223
Supra note 198.

224
Supra note 199.

225
Neypes v. CA, 506 Phil. 613, 626 (2005).

226
BAMARVEMPCO v. Cabato-Cortes, supra note 199, at 550.

227
See Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, pp. 668-669.

228
TSN of the Oral Arguments, April 14, 2015, pp. 64-68.

229
651 Phil. 374, 427(2010).

230
See 2 335 Phil. 82, 114 (1997).

231
503 Phil. 886 (2005).

232
Id. at 891-892.

233
The Ombudsman v. Valeroso, 548, Phil. 688, 695 (2007).

234
Supra note 68. See also rollo, Vol. I, p. 45.

235
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 46.

236
Governor Garcia, Jr. supra note 68, at 690.

237
Supra note 92.

238
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 619

239
All of which Pertains to the payment of Phase V. See id. at 346-349. See also id. at 623.

240
Supra note 95.

241
Supra note 96.

242
242 Id. at 619-620.

243
See Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, p. 703-704.

244
See rollo, Vol. I, pp. 410-415.

243
See id. at 415-422.

246
Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., p. 315.

247
106 Phil. 466 (1959).

248
Id. at 471.

249
Id.

250
See Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's (Chief Justice Sereno) Interpellation, TSN of the Oral Arguments, April 21, 2015, p. 191.
251
155 Ohio St. 329; 98 N.E.2d 807 (1951); cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., Removal of public officers for misconduct during previous term, 42 A.L.R.3d
691 (1972), published by Thomson Reuters (2015), p.

252
Tex Civ App 29 SW 415 (1895), cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., Removal of public officers for misconduct during previous term, 42 A.L.R.3d 691
(1972), published by Thomson Reuters (2015), p. 16, and in Silos, Miguel U., A Re-examination of the Doctrine of Condonation of Public Officers, 84
Phil. L.J. 22, 33 (2009).

253
1956 OK 338; 305 P.2d 548 (1956); cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., Removal of public officers for misconduct during previous term, 42 A.L.R3d 691
(1972), published by Thomson Reuters (2015), p. 15.

254
22 Ohio St. 2d 120; 258 N.E.2d 594 (1970); cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., Removal of public officers for misconduct during previous term, 42
A.L.R.3d 691 (1972), published by Thomson Reuters (2015), pp. 11 and 22.

255
1946 Pa. Dist. & Cnty.; 56 Pa. D. & C. 393 (1946); cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., Removal of public officers for misconduct during previous term, 42
A.L.R3d 691 (1972), published by Thomson Reuters (2015), pp. 11.

256
45 La Ann 1350, 14 So 28 (1893); cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., Removal of public officers for misconduct during previous term, 42 A.L.R.3d 691
(1972), published by Thomson Reuters (2015), pp. 26.

257
236 App Div 371, 259 NYS 402 (1932); cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., Removal of public officers for misconduct during previous term, 42 A.L.R.3d
691 (1972), published by Thomson Reuters (2015), pp. 27.

258
See Ombudsman's Memorandum p. 70, rollo, Vol. II, p. 715, citing Silos, Miguel U., A Re-examination of the Doctrine of Condonation of Public
Officers, 84, Phil. LJ 22, 69 (2009).

259
239 Mass. 458; 132 N.E. 322(1921)

260
109 Iowa 19; 79 N.W. 369(1899).

261
192 Mich. 276; 158 N.W. 953 (1916).

262
14 N.M. 493; 1908-NMSC-022 (1908).

263
125 Ga. 18; 53 S.E. 811 (1906)

264
85 Minn. 41; 88 N.W. 412 (1901), cited in Silos, Miguel U., A Re-examination of the Doctrine of Condonation of Public Officers, 84, Phil. LJ 22, 69
(2009).

265
148 Kan. 166; 80 P.2d 1095 (1938); cited in Silos, Miguel U., A Re-examination of the Doctrine of Condonation of Public Officers, 84, Phil. LJ 22, 70
(2009).

266
199 Kan. 403; 430 P.2d 304 (1967), applying State ex rel. Beck v. Harvey, id.

267
Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippines, 503 Phil. 485 (2005).

268
Supra note 177.

269
See Ombudsman Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, p. 718, citing Cardozo, Benjamin N., The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921), cited in
Christopher P. Banks, Reversal of Precedent and Judicial Policy- Making: How Judicial Conceptions of Stare Decisis in the U.S. Supreme Court Influence
Social Change, 32 Akron L. Rev. 233(1999).

270
Id. at 722-723.

271
Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2401; 192 L. Ed.; 192 L. Ed. 2d 463 (2015).

272
Pascual, supra note 247, at 471.

273
Id. at 471-472.

274
Id. at 472.

275
123 Phil. 916(1966).

276
129 Phil. 553 (1967). See also Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, 138 Phil. 546 (1967) and Oliveros v. Villaluz, 156 Phil. 137 (1974).

277
Supra note 92.

278
Supra note 95.

279
Id. at 921.

280
Supra note 96.

281
633 Phil. 325(2010).

282
Id. at 335

283
577 Phil. 52, 72 (2008).

284
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579, 607.

285
Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634, 646 (1945), citing 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, Section 96.

286
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766 and 113888 August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506, 523.

287
See Silos, Miguel U., A Re-examination of the Doctrine of Condonation of Public Officers, 84, Phil. LJ 22, 69 (2009), pp. 26-27.

288
Section 27, Article II.

289
Belgica, supra note 177, at 131, citing Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2003 Ed.,
p. 1108.

290
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall insure and promote the Constitutional mandate that appointments in the Civil Service shall be
made only according to merit and fitness; that the Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government shall establish a career
service, adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and courtesy in the civil service, strengthen the merit and rewards
system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability; that public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people; and
that personnel functions shall be decentralized, delegating the corresponding authority to the departments, offices and agencies where such functions
can be effectively performed. (Section 1, Book V, Title I, subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987; emphasis supplied).

291
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in public service. Public officials and
employees shall at all times be accountable to the people and shall discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity,
competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice, lead modest lives, and uphold public interest over personal interest. (Emphasis
supplied) See Section 2, RA 6713 (approved on February 20, 1989).

292
Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991" (approved on October 10 1991).

293
279 Phil. 920, 937(1991)

294
In Fudula's Petition (297 Pa. 364; 147 A. 67 [1929]), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cited (a) 29 Cyc. 1410 which states: "Where removal
may be made for cause only, the cause must have occurred during the present term of the officer. Misconduct prior to the present term
even during a preceding term will not justify a removal": and (b) "x x x Penal Code [Cal.], paragraph 772, providing for the removal of officers
for violation of duty, which states "a sheriff cannot be removed from office, while serving his second term, for offenses committed during
his first term." (Emphases supplied)

ln Board of Commissioners of Kingfisher County v. Shutler (139 Okla. 52; 281 P. 222 [1929]), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that
"[u]nder section 2405, C. O. S. 1921, the only judgment a court can render on an officer being convicted of malfeasance or misfeasance in office
is removal from office and an officer cannot be removedfrom office under said section for acts committed by him while holding the same
office in a previous term." (Emphases supplied)

295
In State v. Blake (138 Okla. 241; 280 P. 833 [1929]), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma cited State ex rel. Hill, County Attorney, v. Henschel, 175 P.
393, wherein it was said: "Under the Ouster Law (section 7603 of the General Statutes of 1915-Code Civ. Proc. 686a-), a public officer who is
guilty of willful misconduct in office forfeits his right to hold the office for the term of his election or appointment; but the disqualification to hold the
office does not extend beyond the term in which his official delinquency occurred." (Emphases supplied)

296
In Rice v. State (204 Ark. 236; 161 S.W.2d 401 [1942]), the Supreme Court of Arkansas cited (a) Jacobs v. Parham, 175 Ark. 86,298 S.W. 483,
which quoted a headnote, that "Under Crawford Moses' Dig., [(i.e., a digest of statutes in the jurisdiction of Arkansas)] 10335, 10336, a public officer
is not subject to removal from office because of acts done prior to his present term of office in view of Const., art. 7, 27, containing no provision
against re-election of officer removed for any of the reasons named therein." (Emphases supplied)

297
In State ex rel. Brlckell v. Hasty (184 Ala. 121; 63 So. 559 [1913]), the Supreme Court of Alabama held: "x x x If an officer is impeached and
removed, there is nothing to prevent his being elected to the identical office from which he was removed for a subsequent term, and, this
being true, a re election to the office would operate as a condonation under the Constitution of the officer's conduct during the previous term,
to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him from subsequent term for said conduct during the previous term. It seems to be the policy of our
Constitution to make each term independent of the other, and to disassociate the conduct under one term from the qualification or right to fill another
term, at least, so far as the same may apply to impeachment proceedings, and as distinguished from the right to indict and convict an offending
official." (Eijnphasis supplied)

298
In State Ex Rel. V. Ward (163 Tenn. 265; 43 S.W.2d. 217 [1931]), decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, Knoxville, it appears to be
erroneously relied upon in Pascual, since the proposition "[tjhat the Acts alleged in paragraph 4 of the petition involved contracts made by defendant
prior to his present term for which he cannot now be removed from office" was not a court ruling but an argument raised by the defendant in his
demurrer.

299
In Conant v. Grosan (6 N.Y.S.R. 322 [1887]), which was cited in Newman v. Strobel(236 A.D. 371; 259 N.Y.S. 402 [1932]; decided by the Supreme
Court of New York, Appellate Division) reads: "Our attention is called to Conant v. Grogan (6 N.Y. St. Repr. 322; 43 Hun, 637) and Matter of
King (25 N.Y. St. Repr. 792; 53 Hun, 631), both of which decisions are of the late General Term, and neither of which is reported in full in the
official series. While there are expressions in each opinion which at first blush might seem to uphold respondent's theory, an examination of
the cases discloses the fact that the charge against each official related to acts performed during his then term of office, and evidence of
some prior irregularity was offered which in no way pertained to the charge in issue. It was properly held that such evidence was
incompetent. The respondent was not called upon to answer such charge, but an entirely separate and different one." (Emphases supplied)

300
In People ex rel. Basshaw v. Thompson (55 Cal. App. 2d 147; 130 P.2d.237 [1942]), the Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District
cited Thurston v. Clark, (107 Cal. 285, 40 P. 435), wherein it was ruled: "The Constitution does not authorizethe governor to suspend an incumbent
of the office of county commissioner for an act of malfeasance or misfeasance in office committed by him prior to the date of the beginning of his
current term of office as such county commissioner." (Emphasis supplied)

301
Montgomery v. Nowell, (183 Ark. 1116; 40 S.W.2d 418 [1931]; decided by the Supreme Court of Arkansas), the headnote reads as follows:
"Crawford & Moses' Dig., 10, 335, providing for suspension of an officer on presentment or indictment for certain causes including malfeasance, in office
does not provide for suspension of an officer on being indicted for official misconduct during a prior term of office." (Emphasis supplied)

302
See Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's interpellation, TSN of the Oral Arguments, April 14, 2015, p. 43.

303
See Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. 11, p. 716, citing Silos, Miguel U., A Re-examination of the Doctrine of Condonation of Public
Officers, 84, Phil. LJ 22, 69 (2009), p. 67.

304
117 N.J.L. 64; 186 A. 818(1936).

305
See Article 8 of the Civil Code.

306
632 Phil. 657(2010).

307
Id. at 686.

308
154 Phil. 565 (1974).

309
G.R. Nos. 97973 and 97998, January 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515.

310
Id. at 527.

311
Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, 667 Phil. 474, 481-482 (2011).

312
Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 202202, March 19 2013 693 SCRA 574, 599-600.

313
See Press Release dated October 9, 2015 of the Office of the Ombdusman, (visited November 9, 2015).

314
Supra note 177, at 93.

315
See Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol II p 85.

316
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 50-51.

317
See Amended and Supplemental Petition for Contempt dated March 18, 2015 wherein private respondent Binay, Jr. charged, inter alia, the
Ombudsman for acts constituting indirect contempt under Section 3 (b), (c), and (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; id. at 362-375.

318
See rollo, Vol. II, pp. 734-743.

319
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 50.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

BERSAMIN, J.:

I am writing this separate opinion to memorialize my concurrence with the declaration of the ineffectiveness of the first paragraph of Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6770, and of the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph thereof. The main opinion has been written well by our esteemed
colleague, Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, who has exhibited her scholarly bent once again. But let me assure my colleagues in the Majority
that if I submit this concurrence, I do not mean to diminish in any way or degree the forcefulness and correctness of the justification for the declaration.
I simply want to underscore that Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down for authorizing the undue interference with the
prerogatives of the courts of law to adopt whatever means were allowed by law and procedure to exercise their jurisdiction in the cases properly
cognizable by them.

My dissent focuses on the main opinion's re-examination of the doctrine of condonation. This controversy does not call for the revisit of the doctrine,
and does not warrant its eventual abandonment. For the Court to persist in the re-examination, as it does now, and to announce its abandonment of
the doctrine despite the lack of the premise of justiciability is to indulge in conjecture or in unwarranted anticipation of future controversies. We should
refrain from the re-examination.

The Ombudsman's supplemental petition raised condonation for the first time but only to support her insistence that the CA could not validly rely on the
doctrine of condonation to justify its issuance of the injunction. She maintained then that condonation was a matter of defense to be properly raised
only in the appropriate administrative proceeding, viz:

6. It must be further emphasized that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant in the Ombudsman's determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong in issuing preventive suspension orders. Said doctrine does not go into the heart of subject-matter jurisdiction. Neither can it oust the
Ombudsman of her jurisdiction which she has already acquired. Private respondent's claim of condonation doctrine is equally a matter of defense which,
like any other defense, could be raised in the proper pleading, could be rebutted, and could be waived.

As a defense, condonation should be passed upon after a decision on the administrative proceedings, not this early in the proceeding.

7. The condonation doctrine, however, cannot abate the issuance of a preventive suspension order, precisely because an order of preventive suspension
does not render a respondent administratively liable. A respondent may be preventively suspended, yet may be exonerated in the end.

8. At all events, there is no condonation because private respondent committed the acts subject of the complaint after his re -election in 2013, as was
argued by petition in public respondent Court of Appeals.

9. As mentioned earlier, there is no condonation. The assailed act (i.e. payment), by private respondent's own admission during the proceedings before
public respondent Court of Appeals, took place during the period of June and July 2013, which was after his re-election in May 2013.1

The Ombudsman again discussed the doctrine of condonation at some length in her Memorandum as the fourth and last argument presented on the
issue of the propriety of the temporary restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction.2 She reiterated, however, that the doctrine was only a
matter of defense that was relevant only in imposing an administrative penalty on the respondent public elective official, to wit:

165. Thus, in deciding that the evidence of respondent Binay's guilt is strong, petitioner did not take into consideration the so-called "condonation
doctrine" the way respondent Court of Appeals did in its Third Resolution. The condonation doctrine is applicable and relevant only to the imposition of
an administrative penalty, not to the issuance of a preventive suspension, the latter being merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.

166. Since a preventive suspension does not hold a public officer liable, it will not be affected by any "condonation" that the electorate may extend to
the public officer. Verily, for purposes of aiding an investigation, a public officer may be preventively suspended even as, ultimately, he or she will be
exonerated from administrative liability due to the condonation doctrine. CONDONATION IS A MATTER OF DEFENSE - to be positively alleged and to be
weighed according to the evidence - during the administrative proceedings, and not at the very preliminary stage thereof. 3

I agree with the Ombudsman. The question of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA could be settled not by re-examining and overturning the
doctrine of condonation but by reference to Section 24 of the Republic Act No. 6770. It would be plain error for us to determine whether the Court of
Appeals (CA) gravely abused its discretion or not on the basis of the doctrine of condonation.

The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13 (1), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, 4 while her statutory mandate to
act on administrative complaints is founded on Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770, viz.:

Section 19. Administrative complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which:

1. Are contrary to law or regulation; cra lawlawlib rary

2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; cra lawlawlib rary

3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law; cra lawlawlib rary

4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; cralaw lawlib rary

5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or

6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification. ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry

In line with the power to investigate administrative cases, the Ombudsman is vested with the authority to preventively suspend respondent public
officials and employees pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770, which provides:

Section 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued
stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay,
except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

It is important to note, however, that the Ombudsman has no authority to issue the preventive suspension order in connection with criminal
investigations of government officials or employees because such authority rests in the courts in which the criminal cases are filed. 5

Under Section 24, supra, two requisites must concur to render the preventive suspension order valid. The first requisite is unique because it can be
satisfied in only one way, which is that the evidence of guilt is strong in the judgment of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman. But the second
requisite may be satisfied in three different ways, namely: (1) that the offense charged involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect
in the performance of duty; or (2) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (3) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him or her.6

Respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., along with other officers and employees of the City of Makati, were administratively charged in the Office of the
Ombudsman with grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. 7 In her joint order dated March 10,
2015, the Ombudsman stated that the requisites for the issuance of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. and his corespondents were
satisfied, specifically:
The first requisite is present in these cases, as shown by the supporting evidence attached as Annexes to the Complaint. These Annexes include,
among other things, sworn statements of alleged losing bidders and of some members of the Makati City BAC attesting to the irregularities in the
subject procurement; documents negating the purported publication of bids; and disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showing
disbursement of public funds by the city government.

As regard the second requisite, all the circumstances enumerated therein are likewise present. The Complaint charges respondents with Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. If proven true, they constitute grounds for removal from
public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Moreover, since the respondents' respective positions give them
access to public records and influence on possible witnesses, respondents' continued stay in office may prejudice the cases filed against them. Thus,
their preventive suspension without pay for a period of six (6) months is in order.

When he assailed the preventive suspension order by petition for certiorari in the CA, Binay, Jr. alleged that the preventive suspension order was illegal
and issued with grave abuse of discretion because: (1) it contravened well-settled jurisprudence applying the doctrine of condonation; and (2) evidence
of his guilt was not strong. He prayed that a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the implementation of the
preventive suspension order.

The CA heeded Binay, Jr.'s prayer for injunctive reliefs chiefly on the basis of the doctrine of condonation. In the resolution promulgated on March 16,
2015, the CA, citing the pronouncement in Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,8 granted Binay, Jr.'s application for the temporary restraining order, holding
as follows:

In Garcia v. Court of Appeals (GR No. 185132, April 24, 2009), the Supreme Court held that suspension from office of an elective official, whether as a
preventive measure or as a penalty will undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted
into office.

The Supreme Court in said case likewise found serious and urgent the question, among other matters, of whether the alleged acts were committed in
the previous term of office of petitioner therein. This is because if it were established that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed
committed during petitioner's prior term, then following settled jurisprudence, he can no longer be administratively charged. It further declared
imperative on the part of the appellate court, as soon as it was apprised of the said considerable grounds, to issue an injunctive writ so as not to render
moot, nugatory and ineffectual the resolution of the issues in the certiorari petition. (Garcia, supra)

The Supreme Court also declared that it would have been more prudent on the part of the CA, on account of the extreme urgency of the matter and the
seriousness of the issues raised in the certioraripetition, to issue a TRO while it awaits the respective comments of the respondents and while it
judiciously contemplates on whether or not to issue a writ of preliminary injunction. It pointed out that the basic purpose of a restraining order is to
preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction. That, it is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive
rights and interests. (Garcia, supra)

In view of the seriousness of the issues raised in the Petition for Certiorari and the possible repercussions on the electorate who will unquestionably be
affected by suspension of their elective official, the Court resolves to grant petitioner's prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order for a period
of sixty (60) days from notice hereof, conditioned upon the posting by petitioner of a bond in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00)9

In ultimately granting the writ of preliminary injunction through its April 6, 2015 resolution, the CA, relying on the doctrine of condonation adopted
in Garcia, Jr.; Joson III v. Court of Appeals;10Aguinaldo v. Santos;11 and Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,12 explained:

Garcia was simply an echo of teachings in Joson v. Cowl of Appeals (G.R. No. 160652, February 13, 2006) where the High Court declared that
suspension from office of an elective official would deprive the electorate of the services of the person they have voted into office.

Along this line, the concept of condonation, as advocated by petitioner and opposed by public respondent Ombudsman, will assume resonance.

Premised on Aguinaldo, Salalima and Garcia, petitioner asserted that the public respondent Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension of
petitioner, given his election in 2010 and re-election in 2013 as Makati City Mayor, relative to his perceived illegal participation in anomalous activities
for the Makati City Hall Building II project from 2007 to 2013.

xxxx

To reiterate, there was no disagreement that petitioner was elected in 2010 and re-elected as City Mayor of Makati in 2013. The acts constitutive of the
charges in the Complaint pertained to events from November 8, 2007, when City Ordinance No. 2007-A-015 appropriated P1,240,000,000.00 as
supplemental budget for 2007. From this budget, P400,000,000.00 was allocated for the parking building. It was allegedly during this time that a
Negotiated Contract for the architectural and engineering services were negotiated and approved. Disbursements allegedly favored Hilmarc and MANA
amidst irregularities in the bidding process during the term of petitioner as City Mayor of Makati.

Yet, to subscribe to public respondent Ombudsman's submission that condonation can only be appreciated by the investigating body after it is ventilated
as an exculpation by petitioner and considered solely by public respondent, following the exercise of its investigatory power, will ignore the Court's
constitutional power and duty to evaluate the factual and legal foundations for, nay, impediments to, a preventive suspension in an administrative
case.13

In my view, however, the CA erroneously banked on the pronouncements in Garcia, Jr., Joson III, Aguinaldo, and Salalima to espouse the doctrine of
condonation as the basis to issue the injunctive writs under its resolutions promulgated on March 16, 2015 and April 6, 2015. In
both Aguinaldo and Salalima,the Court applied the doctrine of condonation to avoid the imposition of administrative liability upon re-elected public
officials. Specifically, the Court held in Aguinaldo that:

Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending before Us moot and academic. It appears
that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the candidates for governoer of Cagayan province, xxx

xxxx

Clearly then, the rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his reelection to
office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule,
however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.14

while in Salalima, the Court maintained that:

xxx [A]ny administrative liability which petitioner Salalima might have incurred in the execution of the retainer contract in O.P. Case No. 5469 and the
incidents related therewith and in the execution on 6 March 1992 of a contract for additional repair and rehabilitation works for the Tabaco Public Market
in O.P. Case No. 5450 are deemed extinguished by his reelection in the 11 May 1992 synchronozed elections. So are the liabilities, if any, of petitioner
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Albay,who signed Resolution No. 129 authorizing petitioner Salalima to enter into the retainer contract in
question and who were reelected in the 1992 elections. This is, however, without prejudice to the institution of appropriate civil and criminal cases as
may be warranted by the attendant circumstances, xxx15

It is clear to me that, based on the language and the factual milieu of Aguinaldo and Salalima, which both cited Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva
Ecija,16 and of other akin rulings,17 condonation shall apply only in case of the re-election of a public officer who is sought to be permanently removed
from office as a result of his misconduct, not while such public officer is undergoing investigation. Condonation necessarily implies that the condoned act
has already been found to have been committed by the public officer. Hence, condonation applies to the penalty or punishment imposed after the
conduct of an administrative investigation. Under the circumstances, the pronouncements in Aguinaldo, Salalima and the others could not be applicable
to the preventive suspension order issued to Binay, Jr. pending his administrative investigation because preventive suspension pending the conduct of
an investigation was not yet a penalty in itself, but a mere measure of precaution to enable the disciplining authority to investigate the charges by
precluding the respondent from influencing the witnesses against him. 18

It is worth emphasis that preventive suspension is distinct from the penalty of suspension. The former is imposed on a public official during the
investigation while the latter, as a penalty, is served after the finaldisposition of the case.19 The former is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in
office, but a merely preventive measure, or a preliminary step in the administrative investigation. 20

As I see it, the CA misconstrued the milieu in Garcia, Jr. and Joson III as an application of the doctrine of condonation. The Court notably stated
in Garcia, Jr. and Joson III that "suspension from office of an elective official would deprive the electorate of the services of the person they voted into
office" in the context of determining the propriety of the issuance of the preventive suspension order. In other words, the statement only served to
remind the Ombudsman to issue the preventive suspension orders with utmost caution in view of the gravity of the effects of suspending an incumbent
elective local official. Hence, Garcia, Jr. and Joson III did not apply the doctrine of condonation.

I further underscore that the CA was then only resolving Binay, Jr.'s application for injunctive reliefs against the preventive suspension order issued by
the Ombudsman. At that point, the CA's application of the doctrine of condonation was irrelevant and unnecessary.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a
person to refrain from a particular act or acts.21 The requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining ordern
are clearly set forth in Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.22 The sole objective of the writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo
until the merits of the case can be heard fully. The writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence;23 hence, it
should not determine the merits of a case, or decide controverted facts, for, being a preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong,
further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled. 24 As held in Saulog v. Court of Appeals25 it is sufficient
that:

x x x for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a present right which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined.
And while a clear showing of the right claimed is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to
justify preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete but need only be a sampling intended merely to give the court
an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. This should really be so since our concern here
involves only the proprietary of the preliminary injunction and not the merits of the case still pending with the trial court.

Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private respondent needs only to show that it has the ostensible right to the final relief
prayed for in its complaint x x x. (bold emphasis supplied.)

By relying on the doctrine of condonation, therefore, the CA went beyond the parameters for determining whether or not to issue the injunctive writ. To
recall, Binay, Jr. had filed his petition for certiorari in the CA primarily to assail the validity of the preventive suspension order. What was raised for the
CA to determine was whether or not the Ombudsman satisfactorily complied with the requisites imposed by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 to
establish that Binay, Jr. and his co-respondents had the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their petition, which was the nullification or lifting
of the preventive suspension order. In this regard, the CA plainly exceeded its jurisdiction.

In the meanwhile, the Ombudsman found Binay, Jr. administratively liable, and dismissed him from the service. By such dismissal, the questions raised
against the CA's issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the Ombudsman were rendered moot and academic. I join the Majority in saying
that the preventive suspension order, being an ancillary issuance, was dissolved upon the Ombudsman's resolution of the administrative charges on the
merits. Thus, to dwell on the preventive suspension of Binay, Jr. and his co-respondents any further would be superfluous, for, as the Court said
in Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court:26

It is a rule of universal application that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual
interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy,
so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled
and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

In short, the Court should excuse itself from exercising jurisdiction because the main case, the administrative proceeding against the respondents, has
already been decided by the Ombudsman on the merits.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I VOTE to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition for certiorari and prohibition, and, accordingly, SET ASIDE the
Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2015 by the Court of Appeals.

I further VOTE to DISSOLVE the writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 8, 2015 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 139453; and to AFFIRM the Resolution
promulgated on March 20, 2015 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 139504.

Endnotes:

1
Supplemental Petition for Certiorari , p. 4.

2
Memorandum, pp. 646-734.

3
Id. at 703-704.

4
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient; x x x

5
See Luciano v. Provincial Governor, No. L-30306, June 20, 1969, 28 SCRA 517.

6
Office of the Ombudsman v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 177211, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 350.

7
Docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060 OMB-C-A-15-0061 OMB-C-A-15-0062, OMB-C-A-15-0063.

8
G.R. No. 185132, April 24, 2009.

9
CA Resolution dated March 16, 2015, pp. 4-5.

10
G.R. No. 160652, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 360.

11
G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 768.

12
G.R. No. 117589-92, May 22, 1996, 257 SCRA 55.

13
CA Resolution dated April 6, 2015, pp. 6-10.

14
Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.R. No. 94] 15, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 768

15
Salalima v, Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 117589-92, May 22, 1996, 257 SCRA 55, 1 16.

16
106 Phil. 467 (October 31, 1959).

17
Lizares v. Hechanova, No. L-22059, May 17, 1966, 17 SCRA 58; Office of the Ombudsman v. Torres, G.R. No. 168309, January 29, 2008, 543 SCRA
46; Garcia v. Mojica, G.R. No. 139043, September 10, 1999, 314 SCRA 207.
18
Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance Svstem v. Velasco, G R No 170463 February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 372, 387.

19
Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180700, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 658, 667.

20
Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)

21
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

23
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of
the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
c ralawlaw lib rary

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

23
Unilever Philippines, (PRC), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119280, August 10, 2006.

24
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Hontanosas, Jr., G.R. No. 157 163, June 25, 2014.

25
G.R. No. 119769, September 18, 1996, 262 SCRA 51.

26
G.R. No. 200238, November 20, 2012, 686 SCRA 35.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated
1 2

June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No.
3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
3

Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L.
Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those
charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then
DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.

On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein
respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he
was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.

Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as follows:

On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman
and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally
enter into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially
amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by
Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the
liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the
Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government
of the Republic of the Philippines. 4

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.

On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:

The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile,
his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case. 5

The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent
by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued
that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have conspired
with a public officer. 6

On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the ground that the operative facts adduced
7

therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also
contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

The prosecution filed its Opposition. 8

On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:

Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused
in this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in
court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case
is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed. 9

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL
LIBERTY

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 10

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

The elements of the above provision are:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. 11

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted
and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-
graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto. This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private
12

respondent. 13

The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for
conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior
to the filing of the Information.

Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was charged in the Information and,
as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.

The Court is not persuaded.


It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent can be charged for
violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their
alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death
did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated
differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A.
3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of
Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
14

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private
person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in
all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in
court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.

Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy. If two or more persons enter into a
15

conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are
jointly responsible therefor. This means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of
16

the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual
actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction
17

of the survivor or survivors. Thus, this Court held that:


18

x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of
two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a
co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense. 19

The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against respondent, which is deemed
hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A.
3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by
the other co-conspirators.

Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers
and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices," would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the
20

prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.

In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta as to the nature of and the principles governing
21

conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:

x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and
sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to commit a
crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of
their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.

However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a
conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of
conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that

While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute specifically
prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance,
when considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated crime and its
commission by the conspirators.

Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or
more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or
collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as
though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more
persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or
conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that x x x it
is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation
of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime must therefore
in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party
created by them, and they are all equally responsible x x x

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective
liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to
the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who
was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through
his moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.

In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation to all
of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule
for collectivizing criminal liability.

xxxx

x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who acted in
furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring
nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil
partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily liable. 22

This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the
absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters. Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against
23

respondent is better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its
presence.

Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion as well as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve that in a different case, he was likewise
24 25

indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering
into another agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the present case. The case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the Information
on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31,
2005, this Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution became final and executory on
January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.

The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail
for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with
26

petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction
over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. 27

Thus, it has been held that:

When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid
the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very
earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court
jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)

xxxx

As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:

"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily
appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do
so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted
himself to that jurisdiction."

Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be
for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed
to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person."

Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be
heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28

In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his
posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only
came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over his person.

As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract entered into by public officers
representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This
includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant
case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the
law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by
reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB
is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that
the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the
death of one of the alleged offenders.

Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the main case and the main case has
already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution
of the main case and it would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting respondent's Motion to
Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the
disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
No part, former counsel in related cases
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION


Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No part)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

On leave
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

On leave
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN*
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On leave.

1
Annex "A" to petition, rollo, p. 59.

2
Composed of Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi as Chairman, with Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz and
Norberto Y. Geraldez (now deceased), as members.

3
G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547and 155661, May 5, 2003, 402 SCRA 612.

4
Annex "B" to petition, rollo, pp. 61-62.

5
Annex "C" to petition, id. at 64.

6
See Annex "F" to petition, id. at 74-82.

7
Annex "G" to petition, id. at 84-88.

8
Annex "H" to petition, id. at 90-101.

9
Annex "A" to petition, id. at 59.

10
Rollo, p. 27.

11
Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, 549 Phil. 783, 799 (2007).

Gregorio Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 195011-19, September 30, 2013; Santillano v. People, G.R. Nos.
12

175045-46, March 3, 2010, 614 SCRA 164; Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, supra; Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 514
Phil. 536 (2005); Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149175, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 203; Luciano v. Estrella, G.R.
No. L-31622, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 769.
13
See Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, supra note 11.

14
Records, vol. 1, p. 106.

15
15 C.J.S. Conspiracy § 82, p. 1115.

16
§14 16 Am Jur 2d, pp. 134-135.

17
Id.

18
§19 16 Am Jur 2d, pp. 137-138.

Villa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 87186, 87281, 87466 snd 87524, April 24, 1992, 208 SCRA 283, 297-298, citing U.S. v.
19

Remigio, 37 Phil. 599 (1918). (Emphasis supplied)

20
See R.A. 3019, Sec. 1.

21
G.R. No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759.

22
Id. at 771-777. (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

People v. Dumlao, G.R. No. 168918, March 2, 2009, 580 SCRA 409, 432; Heirs of the late Nestor Tria v. Obias, G.R. No.
23

175887, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 91, 116.

24
Rollo, pp. 176-180.

25
Id. at 186-192.

26
Annex "J" to petition, id. at 112.

Miranda v. Tuliao, 520 Phil. 907, 918 (2006), citing Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA
27

633, 643; Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, 360 Phil. 559, 581 (1998); Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 315 Phil. 757, 770 (1995).

28
Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, supra, at 582-583. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 188165 December 11, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION & THIRD DIVISION, HERNANDO BENITO PEREZ, ROSARIO PEREZ, RAMON ARCEO
and ERNEST ESCALER, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 189063

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, SECOND DIVISION, HERNANDO BENITO PEREZ, ROSARIO SALVADOR PEREZ, ERNEST DE LEON
ESCALER and RAMON CASTILLO ARCEO, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The guarantee of the speedy disposition of cases under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution applies to all cases pending before
all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. Thus, the fact-finding investigation should not be deemed separate from the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman if the aggregate time spent for both constitutes inordinate and
oppressive delay in the disposition of any case.

The Case

The Court resolves the petitions for certiorari the State instituted to assail and nullify, in G.R. No. 188165, the Sandiganbayan’s
dismissal of Criminal Case SB-08-CRM-0265 entitled People of the Philippine v. Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest
Escaler, and Ramon A. Arceo, for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended; and, in G.R. No. 189063, the
Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of SB-08-CRM- 0266 entitled People of the Philippine v. Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest
Escaler, and Ramon A. Arceo, for robbery under Article 293, in relation to Article 294, of the Revised Penal Code.
Common Factual and Procedural Antecedents

On November 12, 2002, Congressman Wilfrido B. Villarama of Bulacan (Cong. Villarama) delivered a privilege speech in the House of
Representatives denouncing acts of bribery allegedly committed by a high ranking government official whom he then called the "2
Million Dollar Man." In reaction, the Office of the President directed the Presidential Anti- Graft and Commission (PAGC) to conduct an
1

inquiry on the exposé of Cong. Villarama. PAGC sent written communications to Cong. Villarama, Cong. Mark Jimenez, Senator Panfilo
Lacson and respondent Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez inviting them to provide information and documents on the alleged
bribery subject of the exposé. On November 18, 2002, Cong. Villarama responded by letter to PAGC’s invitation by confirming that
2

Secretary Perez was the government official who "ha[d] knowledge or connection with the bribery subject of his expose." In his own
3

letter of November 18, 2002, however, Secretary Perez denied being the Million-Dollar Man referred to in Cong. Villarama’s privilege
speech. On November 25, 2002, Cong. Jimenez delivered a privilege speech in the House of Representatives confirming Cong.
4

Villarama’s exposé, and accusing Secretary Perez of extorting US$2 Million from him in February 2001. 5

On November 25, 2002, then Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo requested PAGC to submit documents relevant to the exposé. On 6

November 26, 2002, Ombudsman Marcelo formally requested Cong. Jimenez to submit a sworn statement on his exposé. Cong. 7

Jimenez complied on December 23, 2002 by submitting his complaint-affidavit to the Office of the Ombudsman. The complaint-affidavit
was initially docketed as CPL-C-02-1992. On the same day, the Special Action Team of the Fact Finding and Intelligence Research
Office (FIRO) of the Office of the Ombudsman referred Cong. Jimenez’s complaint-affidavit to the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau and to the Administrative Adjudication Board, both of the Office of the Ombudsman, for preliminary investigation
and administrative adjudication, respectively. 8

The complaint-affidavit of Jimenez was re-docketed as OMB-C-C-02- 0857L, for the criminal case in which the respondents were
Secretary Perez, Ernest L. Escaler and Ramon C. Arceo, Jr.; and as OMB-C-A-02-0631L, for the administrative case involving only
Secretary Perez as respondent. 9

On January 2, 2003, a Special Panel composed of Atty. Evelyn Baliton, Atty. Mary Susan Guillermo and Atty. Jose de Jesus was
created to evaluate and conduct an investigation of CPL-C-02-1992.

On even date, Secretary Perez, through counsel, requested Ombudsman Marcelo that the Office of the Ombudsman itself directly verify
from the Coutt’s Bank whether he (Secretary Perez) had ever held any account in that bank to which the sum of US$2 Million had been
remitted by Cong. Jimenez. 10

On January 15, 2003, Ombudsman Marcelo approved the recommendation of the Special Panel to refer the complaint of Cong.
Jimenez to FIRO for a full-blown fact-finding investigation. 11

On June 4, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received the letter dated May 30, 2003 from the counsel of Cong. Jimenez, submitting
the supplemental complaint-affidavit dated April 4, 2003 of Cong. Jimenez.

In his letter dated July 3, 2003, Secretary Perez, through counsel, sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of probable cause. 12

On July 17, 2003, Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio S. Apostol informed Secretary Perez about the letter from Coutts Bank stating that
"Hernando B. Perez" had no account with it, and assured that the letter would be considered in the final resolution of the case. 13

On August 22, 2005, Ombudsman Marcelo created a new Special Panel to evaluate CPL-C-02-1992, and, if warranted, to conduct
administrative and preliminary investigations, thereby superseding the creation of the Special Panel formed on January 2, 2003. 14

On November 14, 2005, the Field Investigation Office (FIO) completed its fact-finding investigation and filed complaints against the
following individuals, namely:

A. Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernesto L. Escaler, Ramon C. Arceo and John Does for
violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019;

B. Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez for violation of the following: Section 8 in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No.
6713, Article 183 (Perjury) of the Revised Penal Code, and Article 171, par. 4 (Falsification) of the RPC; and

C. Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest L. Escaler, Ramon C. Arceo and John Does for
violation of the provisions of R.A. 1379.
15

On November 23, 2005, the Special Panel directed Secretary Perez (who had meanwhile resigned from office), his wife Rosario S.
Perez (Mrs. Perez), Escaler and Arceo to submit their counter-affidavits in OMB-C-C-02-0857-L, OMB-C-C-05-0633-K, OMB-C-C-05-
0634-K and OMB-C-C-05-0635-K (criminal cases). In another order of the same date, the Special Panel directed former Secretary
Perez to file his counter-affidavit in OMBC-A-02-0631-L (administrative case). 16

On November 29, 2005, the respondents filed an urgent motion for extension of time to file their counter-affidavits.

On December 2, 2005, the counsel for Escaler entered his appearance and sought the extension of the time to file Escaler’s counter-
affidavit.
17

On December 5, 2005, the Special Panel ordered the respondents to file their counter-affidavits within ten days from December 4,
2005, or until December 14, 2005. 18

On December 7, 2005, Asst. Ombudsman Apostol issued PAMO Office Order No. 22, Series of 2005, creating a new team of
investigators to assist in the preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication of OMB-C-C-02-0857L, OMB-C-A-02-0631L
(administrative case), OMB-CC-05-0633K to OMB-C-C-0635K (forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379). The office order
cancelled and superseded PAMO Office Order No. 01-2003, Series of 2003. 19
On December 12, 2005, former Secretary Perez, Mrs. Perez and Arceo filed an urgent motion to be furnished copies of the
complaints. On December 13, 2005, they submitted a consolidated joint counter-affidavit dated December 12, 2005.
20 21

On December 15, 2005, the respondents filed a manifestation to which they attached the affidavit of Atty. Chona Dimayuga. 22

On December 20, 2005, Escaler, instead of filing his counter-affidavit, moved to disqualify the Office of the Ombudsman from
conducting the preliminary investigation, and to require the Special Panel to turn over the investigation to the Department of Justice
(DOJ).23

On December 22, 2005, the respondents submitted the affidavit of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño. 24

On December 29, 2005, the Special Panel denied the motion to disqualify the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting the
preliminary investigation, and ordered Escaler to submit his counter-affidavit within five days from notice.25

On January 4, 2006, Cong. Jimenez filed an urgent motion for extension of the period to file his opposition to the motion earlier filed by
Escaler, and to be granted a new period to reply to the consolidated joint counter-affidavit of the Perezes and Arceo. 26

Between January 9, 2006 and February 10, 2006, Cong. Jimenez filed urgent motions for time to file his opposition, the last of them
seeking an extension until February 10, 2006. 27

On February 21, 2006, the Perezes and Arceo reiterated their urgent motion to be furnished copies of the complaints. 28

On February 22, 2006, Cong. Jimenez opposed Escaler’s motion to disqualify the Office of the Ombudsman. On the same date,
29

Escaler asked for at least 20 days from February 17, 2006 (or until March 9, 2006) within which to reply to Cong. Jimenez’s opposition
to his motion. On March 9, 2006, Escaler replied to Cong. Jimenez’s opposition. On March 28, 2006, Cong. Jimenez sought leave to
30 31

file a rejoinder to Escaler’s reply.


32

On May 15, 2006, Escaler moved for the reconsideration of the order of December 29, 2005. 33

On May 25, 2006, the Special Panel denied Escaler’s motion for reconsideration; directed the FIO "to let respondent Escaler examine,
compare, copy and obtain any and all documentary evidence described, attached to and forming part of the complaints" of the cases;
and granted Escaler an extension of five days within which to submit his counter-affidavit. 34

After Escaler failed to submit his counter-affidavit despite the lapse of the five day period given to him, the preliminary investigation was
terminated. 35

On August 23, 2006, Escaler commenced in this Court a special civil action for certiorari with application for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) docketed as G.R. No. 173967-71. On September 4, 2006, the Court required the Office of the Ombudsman to comment
36

on the petition of Escaler.37

On November 6, 2006, the Special Panel issued a joint resolution, finding probable cause and recommending that criminal informations
be filed against the respondents, as follows:

1) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest L. Escaler and Ramon S. Arceo, Jr. for Extortion (Robbery)
under par. 5 of Article 294 in relation to Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code;

2) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest L. Escaler and Ramon S. Arceo, Jr. for violation of Section
3 (b) of Rep. Act. 3019.

3) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171 par. 4 of the Revised Penal
Code.

4) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez for violation of Sec. 7, R.A. 3019 in relation to Section 8 of R.A. 6713. 38

On January 5, 2007, Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (Ombudsman Gutierrez), who had meanwhile replaced the resigned
Ombudsman Marcelo, approved the joint resolution of the Special Panel. 39

On January 11, 2007, the Perezes and Arceo sought the reconsideration of the joint resolution, and supplemented their motion for that
40

purpose with additional arguments on January 15, 2007. 41

On January 17, 2007, Arceo filed an ex parte motion for leave to admit attached supplemental motion for reconsideration. 42

On January 24, 2007, the Perezes and Arceo filed an urgent motion to suspend proceedings. On February 6, 2007, Escaler also filed a
motion to suspend proceedings ex abundanti ad cautelam. 43

On March 15, 2007, Cong. Jimenez asked for time to comment on the respondents’ motion for reconsideration. He filed another motion
for extension of the time to comment on April 27, 2007. 44

On September 18, 2007, the Perezes prayed that the proceedings be held in abeyance to await the ruling on their application for
intervention in Escaler’s action in the Court. On October 1, 2007, they filed a motion to dismiss. 45

On October 2, 2007, Cong. Jimenez submitted his affidavit of desistance. Thus, on October 4, 2007, the Perezes filed an ex
46

parte motion for resolution on the basis of the desistance by Cong. Jimenez. 47
On January 25, 2008, the Special Panel issued an omnibus resolution denying the original and supplemental motions for
reconsideration of the Perezes and Arceo; their motion to suspend the proceedings; Escaler’s motion to suspend proceedings ex
abundanti ad cautelam; and the Perezes’ motion to dismiss. 48

On April 18, 2008, the Perezes brought a petition for certiorari with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction in this Court (G.R.
No. 182360-63). In due time, the Court required the respondents in G.R. No. 182360-63 to file their comments on the petition.
49 50

On April 18, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan four informations against respondents, namely:

1. for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended;

2. for Robbery (Art. 293, in relation to Art. 294, Revised Penal Code;

3. for Falsification of Public/Official Document under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and

4. for violation of Section 7, Rep. Act 3019, as amended, in relation to Section 8, Rep. Act 6713. 51

Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265

[Violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019]

The information alleging the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-
0265 entitled People v. Hernando Benito Perez, et. al., and was raffled to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan, averred:
52

That during the month of February, 2001 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Hernando B. Perez, a high ranking public officer, being then the Secretary of the
Department of Justice, while in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his office and taking
advantage thereof, conspiring, confabulating and confederating with accused Ernest L. Escaler, Rosario S. Perez and Ramon C. Arceo,
all private individuals, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally request and demand the amount of US TWO MILLION
DOLLARS ($2,000,000.00) for himself and/or other persons from Mark Jimenez a.k.a. Mario B. Crespo, and thereafter succeeded in
receiving from the latter the sum of US$1,999,965.00 in consideration of accused Hernando S. Perez’s desisting from pressuring Mark
Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target personalities involved in the plunder case against former President Joseph ‘Erap’
Estrada and in connection with the pending application of Mark Jimenez for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the
government, over which transaction accused Hernando S. Perez had to intervene in his official capacity under the law, to the damage
and prejudice of Mark Jimenez.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 53

On May 8, 2008, the Perezes moved to quash the information. Escaler presented a similar motion to quash ex abundanti ad
54

cautelam on May 12, 2008, while Arceo adopted the motions of the Perezes and Escaler on May 13, 2008. On June 4, 2008, the
55 56

Office of the Ombudsman countered with a consolidated opposition. 57

On July 17, 2008, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan promulgated its resolution denying the motions to quash, disposing thusly:
58

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Quash of accused Hernando B. Perez and Rosario S. Perez and the urgent Ex-
Abudanti Ad Cautelam Motion to Quash of accused Ernest Escaler are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

Accordingly, let the arraignment of the accused herein proceed on July 18, 2008 at 8:30 in the morning as previously set by the Court.

SO ORDERED.

Respondents separately sought the reconsideration of the resolution of denial of their motions to quash.

On November 13, 2008, the Sandiganbayan First Division granted the motions for reconsideration, rendering the following
59

ratiocination, to wit:

xxxx

After a second hard look on the respective contentions of the parties, the Court is inclined to grant the Motions for Reconsideration of
the accused and perforce grant their motion to quash the Information filed against them in this case.

It is axiomatic that as a general rule prerequisite, a motion to quash on the ground that the Information does not constitute the offense
charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis of the factual allegations therein whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted; and on additional facts admitted or not denied by the prosecution. If the facts in the Information do not
constitute an offense, the complaint or information should be quashed by the court.

xxxx

It is clear that the ambit of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited only to contracts or transaction involving monetary
consideration where the public officer has authority to intervene under the law. Thus, the requesting or demanding of any gift, present,
share, percentage, or benefit covered by said Section 3(b) must be in connection with a "contract or transaction" involving "monetary
consideration" with the government wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. In this regard, the
Supreme Court in Soriano, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan construed the term "contract" or "transaction" covered by Section 3(b) of RA 3019, as
follows –
"It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term must
be construed as analogous to the terms which precedes it. A transaction like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the
petitioner." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, applying the above construction of the Supreme Court in the case at bench, the Court believes and so holds that the alleged
desistance of accused Hernando B. Perez "from pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target personalities involved
in the plunder case against former President Joseph ‘Erap’ Estrada and in connection with the pending application of Mark Jimenez for
admission into the WPP of the government", cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered as"contract" or "transaction" as
defined within the ambit of the fourth element of the offense under Section 3(b) of RA 3019 because no "monetary consideration" as in
credit transaction is involved.

The Court finds untenable the prosecution’s contention that the execution by Mark Jimenez of the affidavits in connection with his
pending application for admission in the WPP (and not the alleged desistance of accused Hernando B. Perez from pressuring Mark
Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target personalities involved in the plunder case against President Estrada) is the very contract
or transaction required by the offense charged in this case; and that all the elements of a contract contemplated therein are present as
there is allegedly consent between the government and Mark Jimenez, object or subject matter which is the execution of affidavits in
connection with his application for admission in the WPP, and a cause or consideration which consists of security and monetary
benefits to be given by the government to Mark Jimenez in exchange for his participation as a witness under the WPP.

For even assuming for the sake of argument that the pending application of Mark Jimenez for admission in the WPP can be considered
as a contract or transaction, it bears stressing that the principal consideration for the said application of Mark Jimenez is the latter’s
obligation to testify as a witness under the WPP on one hand and his entitlement to the protection granted to a witness in the WPP on
the other hand and as such, does not entail any money consideration. Certainly, this is not the (monetary) consideration which is
essential or involved in credit transactions. Any pecuniary or monetary expense that may be incurred by the Government as a result of
the implementation of the program in favour of Mark Jimenez is purely incidental. Such alleged monetary benefit is definitely not the
reason that impelled Mark Jimenez to allegedly avail of the WPP of the government.

More precisely, however, what appears as the main consideration of the alleged demand or receipt of accused Hernando B. Perez of
the sum of US$2,000,000.00 from Mark Jimenez is the former’s alleged desistance from pressuring the latter to execute affidavits
implicating targeted personalities in the plunder case against former President Estrada. In the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court
in Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, such alleged desistance of accused Hernando B. Perez (and even the application of Mark
Jimenez for admission into the WPP as argued by the prosecution) can hardly be considered as a "contract" or "transaction" that is
contemplated in Section 3(b) of RA 3019, as amended.

Moreover, the Court takes note of the admission made by the prosecution in its Memorandum that the transaction involving Mark
Jimenez’s execution of affidavits for his admission to the WPP is not yet a perfected contract between the Government and Mark
Jimenez since it is still in its "negotiation phase" because of the refusal of Mark Jimenez to execute the affidavits against certain
individuals. This admission is another indication that there is indeed no contract or transaction to speak of that is covered under the
fourth element of the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019.

Finally, it may be argued that while the material allegations in the subject information may not constitute the offense of violation of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019, as amended, the same material/factual allegations nevertheless constitute Direct Bribery or another felony
which is necessarily included in the offense charged herein so that the subject information in this case should not be quashed. It is
believed, however, that the filing of the Information charging the accused with Robbery in SB-08-CRM-00266 pending before the
Second Division of this Court on the basis of the same acts complained of in this case, constitutes a bar against the information for said
lesser felony as it would result into two differently charged felonies from a single act and thus, would unnecessarily or unjustifiably
expose the accused to the danger of suffering two penalties for a single offense if the subject information is not quashed. If a single act
results into two or more offenses, they should not be charged and/or punished separately unless the other offense with different
elements is penalized under a special law. To do so would violate, if not the principle of double jeopardy, the rule against splitting a
single act into various charges. It is settled that a defendant should not be harassed with various prosecutions upon the same act by
splitting the same into various charges, all emanating from the same law violated, when the prosecution could easily and well embody
them in a single information because such splitting of the action would work unnecessary inconvenience to the administration of justice
in general and to the accused in particular, for it would require the presentation of substantially the same evidence before different
courts.

All told, with the absence of the fourth element, the Court finds that the factual/material allegations in the subject Information do not
constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, as amended, and therefore, It is constrained to quash the said
Information. In this regard, the Court deems it unnecessary to discuss/resolve the other issues raised in the subject motions for
reconsideration of the herein accused and/or disturb the other findings contained in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered.

WHEREFORE, the instant Motions for Reconsideration of the herein accused are resolved accordingly and the subject Information for
violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019, as amended, is hereby QUASHED.

SO ORDERED.

The State moved for the reconsideration of the resolution quashing the information in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265.

During the pendency of the State’s motion for reconsideration, Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 was re-raffled to the Third Division
of the Sandiganbayan.

On April 21, 2009, the Third Division denied the Ombudsman’s motion for reconsideration, holding thusly:
60

xxxx

The core issue raised in the submission of the parties relates to the meaning of the word "transaction" as it is used in Sec. 3 (b) of RA
3019 to constitute an element of the offense. More particularly, has the meaning of the term "transaction" as enunciated in the Soriano
case been modified by subsequent rulings of the Supreme Court?
The meaning of "transaction" in Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 was enunciated in the Soriano case when the Supreme Court stated:

As stated above, the principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as a "contract or
transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. On this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit.

The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) …

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other
person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer
in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

The petitioner states:

Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner’s guilt, the facts make out a case of Direct Bribery defined and penalized under the provision of
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended.

The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all the offense of Direct Bribery, which is not the offense
charged and is not likewise included in or is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for violation of Section 3,
subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the accused is a public officer; in consideration of
₱4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited, ₱2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a
criminal complaint pending preliminary investigation before him, which may or may not constitute a crime; that the act of dismissing the
criminal complaint pending before petitioner was related to the exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity
that the offense proved, if at all is Direct Bribery. (Petition, p. 5.)

Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:

A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term ‘transaction’ as used thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to
a commercial or business transaction but includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature, pending
with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would have so stated in the "Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it did
not, perforce leaving no other interpretation than that the expressed purpose and object is to embrace all kinds of transaction between
the government and other party wherein the public officer would intervene under the law. (Comment, p. 8.)

It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this
term must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves
some consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the
petitioner. (Emphasis Supplied)

The argument of the Prosecution that the interpretation of the term "transaction" defined in the Soriano case has been modified by the
Mejia, Pelegrino and Chang cases does not persuade.

A review of the Mejia, Peligrino and Chang cases reveals that the main issue adjudicated in those cases involved an interpretation of
the element of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019, namely: the right to intervene of the public officer in the contract or transaction and not the
element of what is a contract or transaction with the government.

Thus, in the Mejia case, the Supreme Court ruled:

Under the sixth assigned error petitioner alleges that she does not intervene in the setting of the hearing of cases and she does not
formulate resolutions thereof. The branch clerk of court is the administrative assistant of the presiding judge whose duty is to assist in
the management of the calendar of the court and in all other matters not involving the exercise of discretion or judgment of the judge. It
is this special relation of the petitioner with the judge who presumably has reposed confidence in her which appears to have been taken
advantage of by the petitioner in persuading the complainants to give her money in consideration of a promise to get a favorable
resolution of their cases.

In the Peligrino case, the Supreme Court ruled:

Petitioner is a BIR Examiner assigned to the Special

Project Committee tasked "xxx to undertake verification of tax liabilities of various professionals particularly doctors within the
jurisdiction of Revenue Region 4-A, Manila xxx" Since the subject transaction involved the reassessment of taxes due from private
complainant, the right of petitioner to intervene in his official capacity is undisputed. Therefore, elements (1), (4) and (5) of the
offense are present. (Emphasis Supplied)

In the Chang case, the Supreme Court ruled:

San Mateo’s justification behind such refusal- that he had no authority to accept an amount less than the assessment amount- is too
shallow to merit belief, he being the Chief Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit Division of the Treasurer’s Office, who
had, on those various meetings, gone out of his way to negotiate the settlement of the assessed deficiency tax.

In the recent case of Merencillo vs. People, the Supreme Court identified the issues raised in the Petition as follows: (1) the
Sandiganbayan’s refusal to believe petitioner’s evidence over that of the prosecution and (2) the Sandiganbayan’s failure to recognize
that Petitioner was placed in double jeopardy.
In addressing the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled:

Clearly, the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily inclusive of direct bribery. While they have common
elements, not all the essential elements of one offense are included among or form part of those enumerated in the other. Whereas the
mere request or demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019,
acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or present is required in direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of Section 3(b) of RA
3019 is specific. It is limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary consideration where the public officer has
the authority to intervene under the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general scope: (a) performance of
an act constituting a crime; (b) execution of an unjust act which does not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or refraining from
doing an act which is his official duty to do. Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the same
act gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses. No double jeopardy attached since there was a variance between the elements of
the offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy proceeds from a second prosecution for the same offense,
not for a different one. (Emphasis Supplied)

Prosecution’s argument that the statement of the Supreme Court above-quoted is an obiter dictum is specious.

An obiter dictum is a "judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case
and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive)." In the Merencillo case, one issue raised by Petitioner was
precisely the issue of double jeopardy which the Supreme Court resolved by distinguishing the elements of violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA
3019 and Direct Bribery. As one of the elements of the offense of violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019, the Court adopted the meaning
given to the term "transaction" in the Soriano case. The above-quoted resolution was not a mere obiter dictum but the ratio
decidendi which is defined as:

"1. the principle or rule of law on which a court’s decision is founded; 2. The rule of law on which a later court thinks that a previous
court founded its decision xx"

The Prosecution argued that it is a maxim in statutory construction that a law must be read in its entirety and no single provision should
be interpreted in isolation with respect to the other provisions of the law. The Prosecution further argued that a close examination of RA
3019 in its entirety would show that the term "transaction" appears several times and was never confined to transactions involving
monetary consideration. Suffice it to say that a maxim in statutory construction cannot be superior to an express interpretation of the
law made by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the provisions in RA 3019 cited by Prosecution constitute different offenses with their
own different elements, with their own different modalities of commission.

The reference to the Congressional record by the Prosecution does not disprove the fact that for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019, the
transaction must involve monetary consideration. As pointed out earlier, no less than the Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning of
the term "transaction" as an element of violation of the said section. Likewise, as admitted by the Prosecution, the reference to the
deliberations of Congress which it cited involved deliberations on Sec. 5 of RA 3019 and not on Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019. The two
sections, i.e. Sec. 5 and Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 are different offenses with their own different elements.

Having resolved the core issue in the Motion For Reconsideration of the Prosecution, there is no further need to discuss the other
arguments of the Prosecution in its Motion.

WHEREFORE, Prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the First Division dated November 13, 2008 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

On June 22, 2009, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) assailed in this Court via petition for certiorari the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan promulgated on July 17, 2008 quashing the information in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 and the resolution
promulgated on April 21, 2009 denying the State’s motion for reconsideration.

On November 18, 2009, the Court denied the Perezes’ urgent motion for leave to file a motion to dismiss for being a prohibited
pleading, and instead required the respondents to comment on the petition, among other things. 61

Criminal Case SB-08-CRM-0266


[Robbery under Art. 293, in relation to
Art. 294, Revised Penal Code]

The information charging robbery under Article 293, in relation to Article 294, Revised Penal Code was raffled to the Second Division
(Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266). 62

On May 6, 2008, Escaler filed a motion to quash ex abundanti ad cautelam, alleging that the facts charged did not constitute an
offense. On May 2, 2008, the Perezes filed their own motion to quash the information. On May 6, 2008, Arceo filed an ex parte motion
63 64

to adopt the Perezes motion as well as Escaler’s motion to quash. 65

On June 26, 2008, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the respective motions to quash of respondents. 66

On June 30, 2008, Escaler moved to reconsider the denial. On July 10, 2008, Arceo also moved to reconsider the denial. The
67 68

Perezes filed their own motion for reconsideration on July 11, 2008. 69

On November 20, 2008, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan granted the motions for reconsideration, quashed the information
charging respondents with robbery, and dismissed Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266, holding as follows:
70

xxxx

The Court after a careful perusal of the issue and the record on hand, is persuaded. Extant in the record and which the prosecution
admits or at least does not deny are the following:
1. The alleged Robbery (extortion) was committed on February 13, 2001 (Joint Resolution signed by members of the Special
Panel composed of Orlando Ines, Adoracion Agbada, Mary Susan Geronimo, Jose de Jesus Jr., signed by Asst. Ombudsman
Pelagio Apostol, and approved by Ombudsman Mr. (sic) Merceditas N. Gutierrez.) (pp. 4-69, Vol. 1, Records; pp. 70-88,
Complaint-Affidavit of Mark Jimenez, Vol. 1, Records)

2. On February 23, 2001 the amount of US $1,999,965.00 was transferred to Coutts Bank Hongkong in favour of the
beneficiary of Account No. HO 13706, from Trade and Commerce Bank, Cayman Island through the Chase Manhattan Bank in
New York. Subsequently from March 6, 2001 to May 23, 2001 funds were transferred from Coutts Bank to other accounts,
among them a $250,000.00 bank draft/cheque issued to Ramon C. Arceo (pp. 10-11 Records).

3. On December 23, 2002 Congressman Mark Jimenez filed his complaint with the Ombudsman charging Hernando Perez,
Ernest Escaler, Ramon Arceo and several John Does (Mrs. Rosario Perez was not among those charged) with criminal
offenses of Plunder, Extortion, Graft and Corruption, Obstruction of Justice, Violation of the Penal Provision of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards R.A. 6713, and Administrative Offenses of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Oppression,
Committing acts Punishable under the Anti-Graft Law, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the service, and Violation of
Section 5 (2) of R.A. 6713. It was subscribed and sworn to on (the ) 23rd day of December 2002 (Complaint-Affidavit of Mario
Mark (MJ) Jimenez B. Crespo – pp. 70-88 Records).

4. On December 23, 2002, the FIRO (Fact Finding and Intelligence Research Office) recommended that the case be referred
to the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau and the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (p. 6 of the Records)

5. The information was filed with this Court only on April 18, 2008.

Having established, or at least as claimed by Complainant Mark Jimenez, that the Robbery (extortion) took place on February 13, 2001,
the Ombudsman should have demanded a reasonable explanation from the complainant who was then a Congressman, wealthy and
influential and in whose house the alleged intimidation took place, why he was filing the complaint only on December 23, 2002 a matter
of more than eighteen (18) months. This should have cautioned the Ombudsman as to the possible motive in filing the complaint.

At any rate, the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the office of the Ombudsman as nominal complainant filed a complaint with the
Ombudsman on November 14, 2005 charging Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario Salvador Perez, Ernest L. Escaler, Ramon Antonio C.
Arceo Jr. and John Does with Violation of Sec. 3(b) R.A. 3019, Sec. 8 in relation to Sec. 11 of R.A. 6713, Perjury (Art. 183 RPC) and
Art. 171 par. 4 Falsification, RPC and violation of R.A. 1379. (Pp. 132 to 170 of Records) Robbery is NOT one of the charges.

With the Ombudsman’s finding that the extortion (intimidation) was perpetrated on February 13, 2001 and that there was transfer of
Mark Jimenez US $1,999,965.00 to Coutts Bank Account HO 133706 on February 23, 2001 in favour of the accused, there is no reason
why within a reasonable period from these dates, the complaint should not be resolved. The act of intimidation was there, the
asportation was complete as of February 23, 2001 why was the information filed only on April 18, 2008. For such a simple charge of
Robbery there is nothing more to consider and all the facts and circumstances upon which to anchor a resolution whether to give due
course to the complaint or to dismiss it are on hand. The case is more than ripe for resolution. Failure to act on the same is a clear
transgression of the constitutional rights of the accused. A healthy respect for the constitutional prerogative of the accused should have
prodded the Ombudsman to act within a reasonable time.

The long wait of the accused is without valid cause or justifiable motive and has unnecessarily trampled upon their constitutional
prerogatives to a speedy disposition of the case. This is an impermissible course of action that our fundamental law loathes.

As Justice Laurel said, the government should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. It is
the moral and legal obligation of the Court to see that criminal proceedings come to an end (People vs. Calamba 63 Phil 496).

The Constitution of the Philippines provides:

Art. 3 Sec. 16: All persons shall have a right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial(,) quasijudicial or administrative
bodies.

Thus under our present fundamental law, all persons are entitled to a speedy resolution of their cases be it civil, administrative or
criminal cases. It is, in criminal cases however where the need to a speedy disposition of their cases is more pronounced. It is so,
because in criminal cases, it is not only the honor and reputation but even the liberty of the accused (even life itself before the
enactment of R.A. 9346) is at stake.

The charge is a simple case for Robbery. Certainly it does not involve complicated and factual issues that would necessitate
painstaking and gruelling scrutiny and perusal on the part of the Ombudsman. It may have its novel, and to it, valid reason for departing
from the established procedure and rules, but virtually in doing so, it has failed to discharge its duty as mandated by the Constitution to
promptly act on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officers and employees.

The totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances bears unmistakably the earmarks of inordinate delay, making the
applicability of the doctrine enunciated in Anchangco Jr. and Duterte cases cited in the parties’ pleadings irrefragable.

Accordingly, there being a clear violation of the constitutional right of the accused, the prosecution is ousted of any authority to file the
information and we hereby order the quashing of the information and the consequent dismissal of this case.

While the ground upon which the Court banked and relied this dismissal order was not invoked in the motions for reconsideration of
accused Escaler and Arceo, since they are similarly situated with their coaccused spouses Perez, this resolution applies to them with
equal force and effect.

On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, We hereby consider the Motion for Reconsideration of our resolution denying the motion for
consolidation moot and academic; even as, We rule that the said motion lacks persuasiveness considering that, per Manifestation of
accused Escaler he is not in any way a party to all the cases pending, the accused in each of the cases were charged with different
offenses, and the different cases are already at different stages of the proceedings, and considering the argument of the prosecution
that the different offenses in the four (4) cases consist of different elements necessitating presentation of different proofs and evidence
for each case.

Accused’(s) bonds are ordered cancelled and the Hold-Departure Order issued against them in this case is lifted and set aside.

So ordered.

The State moved to reconsider the resolution of November 20, 2008, but the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the motion
71

for reconsideration on June 19, 2009, stating thusly:


72

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the People of the Philippines dated December 8, 2008 seeking to reconsider the
Resolution of this Court promulgated on November 20, 2008 dismissing the case, as well as accused-spouses Perez Opposition dated
December 22, 2008, accused Arceo’s Comment/Opposition of even date, and the Opposition dated January 5, 2009 of accused Ernest
L. Escaler.

On record too, are the Plaintiff’s Consolidated Reply dated January 19, 2009 to the three (3) Opposition/Comment of the accused, the
three (3) Rejoinders of the accused of different dates, the plaintiff’s sub-rejoinder dated February 9, 2009, accused Perezes(‘)
Manifestation and Plaintiff’s Comment dated February 16, 2009 to Perezes(‘) Manifestation.

All these shall be considered and taken up by the Court in seriatim.

The first issue brought up by the accused is a supposed procedural lapse of the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration in that the same
was filed in violation of Sec. 4 Rule 15 of the Rules of Court which provides in substance that in every written motion required to be
heard, the notice of hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days
before the date of hearing.

Of course, it is not disputed that the accused-spouses received through registered mail their copy of plaintiff’s motion only on December
16, 2008 while it set the date of hearing on December 12, 2007 thus the motion was set for hearing before the other party received it.
Accused Ramon Arceo received his copy of the motion only on December 17, 2008 while accused Ernest Escaler received his copy
after December 18, 2008 giving the same situation as accused Perezes. It must be taken note of that the Court set the hearing of the
plaintiff’s motion on December 18, 2008, as on December 12, 2008 the date specified on plaintiff’s motion, no accused has received his
copy of the said motion.

Considering thus, the situation, there seems plausibility for the accused claim of transgression of the aforecited provision of the Rules of
Court.

Nonetheless, considering the transfer of the date of hearing, and that all the parties were given ample time to file and submit their
respective pleadings which at the time the issue was to be resolved had grown voluminous, the Court is not inclined to give due
consideration for this procedural impropriety.

The Court takes note however that the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was filed only on December 8, 2008 beyond the fifteenth
day period within which it should be filed, since it received a copy of the Resolution of this Court on November 21, 2008. Thus, the
fifteenth day fell on December 6, 2008 after which the said Resolution has become final and executory. The Resolution in question
therefore which finally disposes of the case is not only final but executory as well which is virtually beyond the reach of the motion for
reconsideration belatedly filed.

We will now tackle the merits of the grounds invoked by the People.

The first ground cited in the People’s motion was that the filing of complaint against former secretary Hernando B. Perez was not
attended by ill motive since it reasoned out that it was the intimation of the Court when it stated in its Resolution the Ombudsman xxx
"should have demanded a reasonable explanation from the complainant who was then a congressman, wealthy and influential and in
whose house the alleged intimidation took place, why he was filing the complaint only on December 23, 2002 a matter of more than
eighteen (18) months. This should have cautioned the Ombudsman as to the possible motive in filing the complaint. xxx "We take note
of the response of the prosecution "Jimenez thought that after the pay-off, Secretary Perez would stop threatening him and would leave
him in peace for good. This was the reason why Jimenez did not immediately file a complaint against Secretary Perez and his co-
accused."

The first and foremost impression We can gather is that the alleged about two million dollars which supposedly was the result of
accused Perez’ alleged extortion was delivered already to the accused. All along therefore, if the claim of the prosecution is to be
believed, Robbery has long been committed that was on or about February 2001 as alleged in the information. With or without ill-
motive, the Ombudsman should have acted within a reasonable time. Certainly eighteen (18) long months from the filing of the
complaint can not be considered within a reasonable time.

The movant then argued that the filing of the information only on April 18, 2008 were due to legal impediments which were beyond the
control of the office of the Ombudsman.

The Court can not understand those alleged "legal impediments" in the prosecution for Robbery. Here is the prosecution claiming
strongly that the filing of the complaint was not attended by ill-motive and that after the pay-off even if a crime has been committed
against complaint Congressman Mark Jimenez, the latter delayed his filing of the complaint because he thought the accused would
leave him in peace. This is the only impediment we can think of, and this definitely is not a legal impediment; certainly too this is not
beyond the control of the Office of the Ombudsman.

But the Court shall keep track of the movant’s argument about this supposed legal impediment. Admitting that the asportation was
complete on February 23, 2001, the prosecution reasoned out that the case can not be filed in Court at that time due to insufficiency of
evidence. As averred in the Opposition of accused Ernest Escaler, "xxx the plaintiff’s duty is to determine whether there exists probable
cause to hold the accused for trial for simple robbery", and those documents which the prosecution so capitalized it exerted so much
offer to obtain, are mere evidentiary matters. This is even admitted in the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.
Consider these facts all explicitly admitted by the prosecution:

On February 13, 2001 accused former Justice Secretary Hernando Perez accompanied by accused Ernest Escaler supposedly
threatened complainant Congressman Mark Jimenez to send him to jail where he will die of boil (Putang ina mo, sinasalsal mo lang
ako. Hindot ka. Ipakukulong kita sa Quezon City Jail. Doon mamamatay ka sa pigsa). On February 23, 2001 the amount of US
$1,999,965 owned by Congressman Mark Jimenez was transferred to Coutts Bank, Hongkong in favour of Account Number 13706 in
the name of Ernest Escaler (confirmed by Trade and Commerce Bank Payment Detail Report dated February 23, 2001)

Congressman Mark Jimenez did not file my complaint against the accused in any Court or prosecutor office. This, despite his claim in
his counter-affidavit that:

"12. Meanwhile, Pres. Estrada stepped down as President after the Armed Forces of the Philippines withdrew its support to him, and
the Arroyo Administration was installed on January 19, 2001. The new Secretary of Justice, Hernando B. Perez, was appointed by
Pres. Arroyo. Soon after his appointment. Sec. Perez sent feelers that I am his first target for inclusion in the criminal cases that he will
file against Pres. Estrada. He also threatened and intimidated me and my family with bodily harm and incarceration in a city jail with
hardened criminals and drug addicts unless I execute damaging affidavits against Pres. Estrada and his cronies and associates.
Because of the intense pressure upon me and my family, I was forced to come across with US $2.0 Million. (Page 73 of the Records)

It was only on December 23, 2002 as stated in our Resolution that Congressman Mark Jimenez filed his complaint with the
Ombudsman, even if the said offense was alleged to have been committed on Feb. 13, 2001 and it was only on April 18, 2008 that the
Ombudsman presented the information with this Court.

The complainant had hesitated into filing his complaint for about eighteen (18) months while the Ombudsman with double hesitation
dillydallied for about six (6) years. All in all, the delay from the supposed commission of such a simple offense of Robbery took more
than seven years – that is from February 13, 2001 to April 18, 2008. It is clear the socalled legal impediments are but empty assertion
to belatedly justify an impermissible action.

Taking exception to our ruling that the totality of facts and surrounding circumstances bear unmistakably the earmarks of inordinate
delay, the movant made a comparison of those cases dismissed by the Supreme Court for violation of the Constitutional right of the
accused to speedy disposition of cases, and this case, and wrongfully conclude there was no delay in their handling of the case at bar.

We have already resolved and passed upon rather adequately this issue in our Resolution with the observation that not anyone of the
cases cited involved the charge of Robbery. The movant’s discussion asserted no new and substantial reason and argument to
persuade us to reverse or modify our considered opinion. We however pose this question to the prosecution. If Asst. Ombudsman
Pelagio Apostol recommended the filing of the information against the accused on November 7, 2006 why did it take the Ombudsman
only on January 5, 2007 to approve the recommendation. And if, on January 11, 2007 the accused submitted their Motion for
Reconsideration, why did it take the Ombudsman up to April 15, 2008 – a matter of about fifteen (15) months to resolve the same when
there was NO OPPOSITION nor comment from the other party?

The argument that "the authority of the Ombudsman is not divested by the claimed delay in filing the information as this authority is
vested by law" is a reckless reasoning that only shows that while admitting there was undue delay in the disposition of the case, it could
still proceed with its information to charge the accused.

The prosecution need not be reminded of the uniform ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court dismissing the cases of Tatad,
Angchangco, Duterte and other cases for transgressing the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases. To
argue "that the authority of the Ombudsman is not divested by the claimed delay in filing the information xxx" is to limit the power of the
Court to act on blatant transgression of the constitution.

As to fact-finding investigation, the Court finds it so baseless for the movant to capitalize on what it supposedly did in the process of the
fact-finding stance; and then reasoning out as if clutching on straws that the sequences of events should excuse it from lately filing the
information. But it took the movant six (6) years to conduct the said fact-finding investigation, and then unabashedly it argues that is not
part of the preliminary investigation.

Determining probable cause should usually take no more than ninety (90) days precisely because it only involves finding out whether
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the persons charged could be held for trial or not. It does not require sifting through and
meticulously examining every piece of evidence to ascertain that they are enough to convict the persons involved beyond reasonable
doubt. That is already the function of the Courts.

As argued by accused Ramon Arceo, the claim of the movant that the preliminary investigation of the instant case commenced only on
November 14, 2005 when the Field Investigation Office (FIO) filed its complaint, and not on December 23, 2002 when Mark Jimenez
filed his complaint-affidavit, is rather specious and does not hold water as Robbery was not among the offenses included in the charge
of the FIO. As such, it is not correct to say that the counting of the period for delay should commence only in November 2005.

The conclusion thus, that the long waiting of six (6) years for the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve the simple case of Robbery is
clearly an inordinate delay, blatantly intolerable, and grossly prejudicial to the constitutional right of speedy disposition of cases, easily
commands assent. This Court, it must be made clear, is not making nor indulging in mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved.

In its sixth ground the movant argued that the First, Third and Fourth Divisions all junked the claimed inordinate delay of the accused
and asked that the Second Division should "xxx co-exist not work on cross-purposes with the other Court’s Division xxx". The argument
begs the question! Suppose if and when the incident reaches the Supreme Court, the highest Court of the land ruled that it is the
Second Division which is correct, and the other Divisions in error, what would happen now to the argument of the movant that "xxx
there is rhyme or reason for the Sandiganbayan, Second Division to co-exist xxx with the other Court’s Division xxx".

Moreover, the information in the first division charges the accused of Violation of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. 3019, in the third division the
accusation was for Falsification of Public Document under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code, while the accused have been indicted
for violating Sec. 7 R.A. 3019 in relation to Sec. 8 of R.A. 6713 before the Fourth Division. The Court can not say whether there is need
for paper trail or monitoring of documents in those cases, as the Divisions concerned can competently resolve and pass upon it but
certainly in this instant case of Robbery, to indulge in a prolonged fact-finding process is not a boon but a bane on the part of the
prosecution

In a distasteful exhibition of unsavoury language, bordering on derision and contempt, the prosecution argued that "xxx the assailed
resolution is a wanton display of arrogance, contemptuous and outright illegal for it mooted the same issue of inordinate delay pending
with the Honorable Supreme Court xxx". This only goes to show that the prosecution is totally ignorant of the hierarchy of Courts in our
judicial system.

xxx It must be remembered that delay in instituting prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State, but of peril to public
justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the law that prosecutions
should be prompt, and that statutes, enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts of grace,
but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the best
evidence that can be obtained.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration dated December 8, 2008 is denied for lack of merit.

So ordered.

On August 24, 2009, the State assailed the resolutions of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in this Court (G.R. No. 189063). 73

Consolidation of the petitions

On October 26, 2009, the Court directed that G.R. No. 189063 be consolidated with G.R. No. 182360-63 (entitled Hernando B. Perez
and Rosario S. Perez v. The Ombudsman, Field Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman and Mario B. Crespo a.k.a. Mark Jimenez)
and G.R. No. 173967-71 (Ernest B. Escaler v. The Office of the Ombudsman, et al.). 74

On April 7, 2010, the Court consolidated G.R. No. 188165 with G.R. Nos. 173967-71, G.R. Nos. 182360-63 and G.R. No. 189063
(People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 2nd Division, et al.). 75

G.R. No. 173967-71 and G.R. No. 182360-63 were special civil actions for certiorari to prevent the filing of the criminal informations
against the respondents.

Deconsolidation and dismissal of

G.R. No. 173967-71 and G.R. No. 182360-63

on the ground of their intervening mootness

On February 11, 2013, the Court deconsolidated G.R. No. 173967-71 and G.R. No. 182360-63 from G.R. No. 188165 and G.R. No.
189063 on the ground that the intervening filing of the informations in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 and Criminal Case No. SB-
08-CRM-0266 had rendered the petitions in G.R. No. 173967-71 and G.R. No. 182360-63 moot. 76

Issues

In G.R. No. 188165, the State raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN QUASHING THE INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL CASE SB-08-CRM-265, BY CONFINING THE
DEFINITION OF THE WORD "TRANSACTION" IN SECTION 3(B) OF R.A. 3019 AS TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING
MONETARY CONSIDERATION.

II.

WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN RELYING SOLELY ON THE CASE OF SORIANO, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND DISREGARDED
JURISPRUDENCE THAT SHOWS SECTION 3 (B) OF RA 3019 EXTENDS TO ANY DEALING WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

III.

WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WTH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RESOLVED THE MOTIONS
TO QUASH (ON THE GROUND THAT THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE INFORMATION DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE)
BY GOING BEYOND THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE INFORMATION AND CONSIDERING SUPPOSED FACTS WITHOUT
ANY BASIS. 77

In G.R. No. 189063, the State submits the following issues:

A. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN QUASHING THE INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL CASE SB-08-
CRM-0266 BY HOLDING THAT "THERE BEING A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED, THE PROSECUTION IS OUSTED OF ANY AUTHORITY TO FILE THE INFORMATION."

B. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THE TOTALITY OF THE FACTS AND THE
SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES BEARS UNMISTAKABLY THE EARMARKS OF INORDINATE DELAY, MAKING THE
APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN ANGCHONGCO JR. AND DUTERTE CASES CITED IN THE
PARTIES’ PLEADINGS IRREFRAGABLE. 78

The foregoing issues are restated thuswise:

I.

Whether or not it was the Office of the Solicitor General, not the Office of the Ombudsman, that had the authority to file the
petitions to assail the Sandiganbayan resolutions.

II.

Whether the State, as the petitioner in G.R. No. 188165 and G.R. No. 189063, resorted to the wrong remedy in assailing the resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan dismissing the criminal charges against the respondents through petitions for certiorari instead of petitions for
review on certiorari.

Specific Issue in G.R. No. 188165

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in quashing the
information by applying the definition of transaction in Soriano, Jr. v Sandiganbayan, 131 SCRA 188.

Specific Issue in G.R. No. 189063

Whether or not the Sandiganabayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the criminal case due to the inordinate delay of the Office of the Ombudsman in bringing the criminal action against
respondents as to violate their constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases.

Ruling

The petitions for certiorari are devoid of merit.

I.

The Office of the Ombudsman is empowered to


file an appeal or certiorari from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court.

Respondents contend that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to file the petitions for certiorari because only the Solicitor
General could file the petitions in this Court pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code as
amended by E.O. No. 292 ,which pertinently states:

Section 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceedings, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.
When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the
services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government
and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings
in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.

xxxx

The contention of the respondents is grossly erroneous.

That only the Solicitor General may represent the People on appeal or certiorari in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings is the general rule, but the rule admits the exception concerning "all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and
79

from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the
People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986." More specifically,
Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249 authorizes the exception, viz:

xxxx

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

xxxx

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and
may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review
filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court,
the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases
filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis provided)

xxxx
Consequently, the filing of the petitions in these cases by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the OSP, was authorized by law.

II.

Petitioner did not establish grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan

The petitions for certiorari brought by the State must nonetheless be dismissed for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Sandiganbayan in issuing the assailed resolutions.

A special civil action for certiorari is an independent action based on the specific grounds provided in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, and can prosper only the jurisdictional error, or the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
committed by the inferior court or judge is alleged and proved to exist.

In De los Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, the Court has expounded on the nature and reach of the extraordinary
80

remedy of certiorari, to wit:

We remind that the writ of certiorari – being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character, whose purpose is to keep an inferior
court within the bounds of its jurisdiction, or to prevent an inferior court from committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that courts have no power or authority in law to
perform) – is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every error committed by a lower court.

In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the King’s Bench,
commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more
sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior
court’s judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a
substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was
then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be
exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-
judicial acts.
1âwphi 1

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the common law. In this
jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or
situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose, viz:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of
section 3, Rule 46. (1a)

Pursuant to Section 1, supra, the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two,
there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or
nullifying the proceeding.

Considering that the requisites must concurrently be attendant, the herein petitioners’ stance that a writ of certiorari should have been
issued even if the CA found no showing of grave abuse of discretion is absurd. The commission of grave abuse of discretion was a
fundamental requisite for the writ of certiorari to issue against the RTC. Without their strong showing either of the RTC’s lack or excess
of jurisdiction, or of grave abuse of discretion by the RTC amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the writ of certiorari would not
issue for being bereft of legal and factual bases. We need to emphasize, too, that with certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, they
must strictly observe the rules laid down by law for granting the relief sought.

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ.
The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. (citations omitted)

Did the petitioner show grave abuse of discretion that would warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari prayed for?

A.

G.R. No. 188165

The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the


restrictive meaning of the term transaction as
used in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019
adopted in Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

In its questioned resolution dismissing Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265, the Sandiganbayan relied on the ruling in Soriano, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, in which the principal issue was whether or not the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by
81
petitioner Soriano, Jr., then a Fiscal, was a "contract or transaction" as to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of
Republic Act No. 3019, which punished any public officer for "[d]irectly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and
any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law." The Soriano, Jr. Court ruled in the
negative, and pronounced:

It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this
term must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves
some consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the
petitioner.

In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec.
3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. (Emphasis supplied)

The State now argues, however, that the Sandiganbayan thereby committed grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction for applying the interpretation of the term transaction in Soriano, Jr. considering that the term transaction should be
construed more liberally, and positing that Soriano, Jr. was already abandoned by the Court, citing for that purpose the rulings in Mejia
v. Pamaran, Peligrino v. People, and Chang v. People.
82 83 84

We disagree with the petitioner, and find for the respondents.

First of all, the interpretation in Soriano, Jr. of the term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 has not been
overturned by the Court.

In Mejia v. Pamaran, decided en banc on April 15, 1988, Mejia had demanded and received money from some persons involved in
certain cases in a trial court where Mejia was then serving as the branch clerk of court in consideration of a promise that she would help
in getting a favorable judgment for them. The issue was whether or not Mejia could be convicted under the information that alleged that
she had demanded a certain amount, although the Sandiganbayan found that the amount was different from that charged in the
information. The Court dismissed her petition, and ruled that "[i]n a prosecution under the foregoing provision of the Anti-Graft Law the
value of the gift, money or present, etc. is immaterial xxx [w]hat is penalized is the receipt of any gift, present, share, percentage, or
benefit by a public officer in connection with a contract or transaction with the Government, wherein the public officer has to intervene in
his official capacity." The Court nowhere ruled on the proper interpretation of the term transaction.

In Peligrino v. People, decided on August 13, 2001, Peligrino, an examiner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, was convicted of
violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 for demanding the amount of ₱200,000.00 from the complainant in connection with the
latter’s tax liabilities. Peligrino’s defense was that he did not "demand" the money, but the money was just given to him. He argued that
he had only informed the complainant of his tax deficiencies, and that the complainant had then requested the reduction of the amount
claimed as his tax deficiencies. The Court found no merit in Peligrino’s argument. The ruling had nothing to do with the interpretation of
the term transaction.

Chang v. People, decided on July 21, 2006, was a case in which two persons – Chang and San Mateo – were convicted of violating
Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 after being found to have received ₱125,000.00 in consideration of their issuance of a Certificate
of Examination to the effect that the complainant had "no tax liability" in favour of the municipality, notwithstanding that it had not settled
with them on their assessed deficiency tax of ₱494,000.00. Chang and San Mateo contended that the charge had resulted from an
involuntary contact whereby complainant Magat had simply tossed to them the brown envelope; that there had been no conspiracy
between them; and that what had transpired had been an instigation, not an entrapment. In affirming their conviction, the Court did not
touch on the proper interpretation of the term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019.

The three rulings the State has cited here did not overturn the interpretation made in Soriano, Jr. of the term transaction as used in
Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 because the proper interpretation of the term was clearly not decisive in those cases. On the
contrary, in the later ruling in Merencillo v. People, promulgated in 2007, the Court reiterated the restrictive interpretation given
85

in Soriano, Jr. to the term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 in connection with a differentiation between
bribery under the Revised Penal Code and the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 by holding that the latter is "limited
only to contracts or transactions involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene under the law."

And, secondly, it does not help the State any that the term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 is susceptible
of being interpreted both restrictively and liberally, considering that laws creating, defining or punishing crimes and laws imposing
penalties and forfeitures are to be construed strictly against the State or against the party seeking to enforce them, and liberally against
the party sought to be charged. 86

Clearly, the Sandiganbayan did not arbitrarily, or whimsically, or capriciously quash the information for failing to properly state the fourth
element of the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019.

B.

G.R. No. 189063

The Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave


abuse of discretion in finding that there had
been an inordinate delay in the resolution
against respondents of the charge in
Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266

Upon its finding that the Office of the Ombudsman had incurred inordinate delay in resolving the complaint Cong. Jimenez had brought
against the respondents, the Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266 mainly to uphold their constitutional right
to the speedy disposition of their case.
But now comes the State contending that the delay in the resolution of the case against the respondents was neither inordinate nor
solely attributable to the Office of the Ombudsman. Citing Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, in which the Court held that speedy
87

disposition of cases was also consistent with reasonable delays, the State supported its contention by listing the various incidents that
had caused the delay in the investigation, and then laying part of the blame on the respondents themselves.

The right to the speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, which declares:

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.

The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in
all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. While the
88

concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible, such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient, the
89

right to the speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. 90

According to Angchonco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, inordinate delay in resolving a criminal complaint, being violative of the constitutionally
91

guaranteed right to due process and to the speedy disposition of cases, warrants the dismissal of the criminal case. 92

Was the delay on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman vexatious, capricious, and oppressive?

We answer in the affirmative.

The acts of the respondents that the Office of the Ombudsman investigated had supposedly occurred in the period from February 13,
2001 to February 23, 2001. Yet, the criminal complaint came to be initiated only on November 25, 2002 when Ombudsman Marcelo
requested PAGC to provide his office with the documents relevant to the exposé of Cong. Villarama. Subsequently, on December 23,
2002, Cong. Jimenez submitted his complaint-affidavit to the Office of the Ombudsman. It was only on November 6, 2006, however,
when the Special Panel created to investigate Cong. Jimenez’s criminal complaint issued the Joint Resolution recommending that the
criminal informations be filed against the respondents. Ombudsman Gutierrez approved the Joint Resolution only on January 5,
2007. The Special Panel issued the second Joint Resolution denying the respondents’ motion for reconsideration on January 25,
93

2008, and Ombudsman Gutierrez approved this resolution only on April 15, 2008. Ultimately, the informations charging the respondents
with four different crimes based on the complaint of Cong. Jimenez were all filed on April 15, 2008, thereby leading to the
commencement of Criminal Case No. SB-08- CRM-0265 and Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266. In sum, the fact-finding
investigation and preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman lasted nearly five years and five months.

It is clear from the foregoing that the Office of the Ombudsman had taken an unusually long period of time just to investigate the
criminal complaint and to determine whether to criminally charge the respondents in the Sandiganbayan. Such long delay was
inordinate and oppressive, and constituted under the peculiar circumstances of the case an outright violation of the respondents’ right
under the Constitution to the speedy disposition of their cases. If, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that a delay of almost
94

three years in the conduct of the preliminary investigation constituted a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused to due
process and to the speedy disposition of his case, taking into account the following, namely: (a) the complaint had been resurrected
only after the accused had a falling out with former President Marcos, indicating that political motivations had played a vital role in
activating and propelling the prosecutorial process; (b) the Tanodbayan had blatantly departed from the established procedure
prescribed by law for the conduct of preliminary investigation; and (c) the simple factual and legal issues involved did not justify the
delay, there is a greater reason for us to hold so in the respondents’ case.

To emphasize, it is incumbent for the State to prove that the delay was reasonable, or that the delay was not attributable to it. In both
regards, the State miserably failed.

For one, the State explains that the criminal cases could not be immediately filed in court primarily because of the insufficiency of the
evidence to establish probable cause, like not having a document showing that the funds (worth US$1,999,965.00 as averred in the
complaint of Cong. Jimenez) had reached Secretary Perez; and that it could not obtain the document, and to enable it to obtain the
95

document and other evidence it needed to await the ratification of the Agreement Concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region (RP-HKSAR Agreement), and the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in
96

Criminal Matters between the Republic of the Philippines and the Swiss Confederation (RP-Swiss MLAT). 97

To us, however, the State’s dependence on the ratification of the two treaties was not a sufficient justification for the delay. The fact-
finding investigation had extended from January 15, 2003, when Ombudsman Marcelo approved the recommendation of the Special
Panel and referred the complaint of Cong. Jimenez for fact-finding investigation, until November 14, 2005, when the FIO completed its
fact-finding investigation. That period accounted for a total of two years and 10 months. In addition, the FIO submitted its report only on
November 14, 2005, which was after the Department of Justice had received on September 8, 2005 the letter from Wayne Walsh, the
Deputy Government Counsel of the Hongkong Special Administrative Region in response to the request for assistance dated June 23,
2005, and the reply of the Office of Justice of Switzerland dated February 10, 2005 and a subsequent letter dated February 21, 2005
98

from Liza Favre, the Ambassador of Switzerland, to Atty. Melchor Arthur Carandang, Acting Assistant Ombudsman, FIO, together with
documents pertaining to the bank accounts relevant to the investigation. For the Office of the Ombudsman to mark time until the
99

HKSAR Agreement and the Swiss-RP MLAT were ratified by the Senate before it would proceed with the preliminary investigation was
oppressive, capricious and vexatious, because the respondents were thereby subjected to a long and unfair delay.

We should frown on the reason for the inordinate delay because the State would thereby deliberately gain an advantage over the
respondents during the preliminary investigation. At no time should the progress and success of the preliminary investigation of a
criminal case be made dependent upon the ratification of a treaty by the Senate that would provide to the prosecutorial arm of the
State, already powerful and overwhelming in terms of its resources, an undue advantage unavailable at the time of the investigation. To
allow the delay under those terms would definitely violate fair play and nullify due process of law – fair play, because the field of contest
between the accuser and the accused should at all times be level; and due process of law, because no less that our Constitution
guarantees the speedy disposition of the case.
The State further argues that the fact-finding investigation should not be considered a part of the preliminary investigation because the
former was only preparatory in relation to the latter; and that the period spent in the former should not be factored in the computation
100

of the period devoted to the preliminary investigation.

The argument cannot pass fair scrutiny.

The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial,
quasijudicial or administrative bodies. The guarantee would be defeated or rendered inutile if the hair-splitting distinction by the State is
accepted. Whether or not the fact-finding investigation was separate from the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman should not matter for purposes of determining if the respondents’ right to the speedy disposition of their cases had been
violated.

There was really no sufficient justification tendered by the State for the long delay of more than five years in bringing the charges
against the respondents before the proper court. On the charge of robbery under Article 293 in relation to Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, the preliminary investigation would not require more than five years to ascertain the relevant factual and legal matters. The
basic elements of the offense, that is, the intimidation or pressure allegedly exerted on Cong. Jimenez, the manner by which the money
extorted had been delivered, and the respondents had been identified as the perpetrators, had been adequately bared before the Office
of the Ombudsman. The obtention of the bank documents was not indispensable to establish probable cause to charge them with the
offense. We thus agree with the following observation of the Sandiganbayan, viz:

With the Ombudsman’s finding that the extortion (intimidation) was perpetrated on February 13, 2001 and that there was transfer of
Mark Jimenez US $1,999,965.00 to Coutts Bank Account HO 133706 on February 23, 2001 in favor of the accused, there is no reason
why within a reasonable period from these dates, the complaint should not be resolved. The act of intimidation was there, the
asportation was complete as of February 23, 2001 why was the information filed only on April 18, 2008. For such a simple charge of
Robbery there is nothing more to consider and all the facts and circumstances upon which to anchor a resolution whether to give due
course to the complaint or dismiss it are on hand. The case is more than ripe for resolution. Failure to act on the same is a clear
transgression of the constitutional rights of the accused. A healthy respect for the constitutional prerogative of the accused should have
prodded the Ombudsman to act within reasonable time. 101

In fine, the Office of the Ombudsman transgressed the respondents' right to due process as well as their right to the speedy disposition
of their case.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions for certiorari for their lack of merit.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo (G.R. No. 189063, Vol. I), p. 9.

2
Id. at 9-10.

3
Id. at 10.

4
Id.

5
Id.
6
Id. at 10-11.

7
Id. at 11.

8
Id. at 12.

9
Id. at 12-13.

10
Id. at 13.

11
Id. at 14.

12
Id. at 14-15.

13
Id. at 15.

14
Id. at 15.

15
Id. at 16.

16
Id. at 17.

17
Id. at 17.

18
Id. at 18.

19
Id.

20
Id.

21
Id. at 18-19.

22
Id. at 19.

23
Id.

24
Id.

25
Id.

26
Id. at 19-20.

27
Id. at 20.

28
Id.

29
Id. at 21.

30
Id. at 20-21.

31
Id. at 21.

32
Id.

33
Id.

34
Id. at 21-22.

35
Id. at 22.

36
Rollo (G.R. No. 173967-71, Vol. I), pp. 3-71.

37
Id. at 1082.

38
Rollo (G.R. No. 189063, Vol. I), pp. 22-23.

39
Id. at 14-15.

40
Id. at 23.

41
Id.
42
Id.

43
Id. at 24.

44
Id.

45
Id.

46
Id.

47
Id. at 25.

48
Id. at 593-615.

49
Id. at 3-68.

50
Id. at 1247.

51
Id. at 25-26.

52
Rollo (G.R. No. 188165), p. 8.

53
Id. at 37.

54
Id. at 8.

55
Id.

56
Id.

57
Id.

Id. at 76-84; penned by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (now a Member of the Court), with the concurrence of
58

Associate Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada and Associate Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo.

Id. at 37-41; penned by Associate Justice Peralta, with the concurrence of Associate Justice Ponferrada and Associate
59

Justice Gesmundo (italicized and underlined portions are part of the original text).

Id. at 42-51; penned by Associate Justice Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. (later Presiding Justice, but already retired), joined by
60

Associate Justice Efren N. De la Cruz and Associate Justice Alex L. Quiroz.

61
Id. at 98.

62
Rollo (G.R. No. 189063, Vol. I), p. 620.

63
Rollo (G.R. No. 189063, Vol. II), p. 1069.

64
Id. at 2209.

65
Id. at 2209.

66
Id. at 2209-2213.

67
Id. at 1070.

68
Rollo (G.R. No. 189063, Vol. I), p. 86.

69
Id.

Id. at 86-95; penned by Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval (later Presiding Justice, but already retired), with Associate
70

Justice Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos and Associate Justice Samuel R. Martires concurring.

71
Id. at 96.

Id. at 96-104; penned by Associate Justice Sandoval, joined by Associate Justice Diaz-Baldos and Associate Justice
72

Martires (who filed a separate concurring opinion).

73
Id. at 2-82

74
Id. at 1037.
75
Rollo (G.R. No. 188165), p. 321.

76
Rollo (G.R. No. 173967-71, Vol. II), p. 2702.

77
Rollo, (G.R. No. 188165), pp. 11-12.

78
Rollo (G.R. No. 189063, Vol. I), pp. 26-27.

79
Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82483, September 26, 1990, 190 SCRA 63, 67.

80
G.R. No. 153852, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 410, 420-423.

81
No. L-65952, July 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 184, 188.

82
Nos. L-56741-42, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 457.

83
G.R. No. 136266, August 13, 2001, 362 SCRA 683.

84
G.R. No. 165111, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 321.

85
G.R. Nos. 142369-70, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 31, 46.

86
People v. Gatchalian, 104 Phil. 664 (1958).

87
G.R. Nos. 146368-69, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 423, 425-426.

88
Cadalin v. POEA’s Administrator, G.R. Nos. 105029-32, December 5, 1994, 238 SCRA 722, 765.

89
De la Peña v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144542, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 478, 485.

90
Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94750, July 16, 1991, 199 SCRA 298, 307.

91
G.R. No. 122728, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 301.

92
Id. at 304.

93
Rollo (G.R. No. 189063, Vol. I), pp. 22-23.

94
G.R. No. 72335-39, March 21, 1988, 159 SCRA 70, 82-83.

95
Rollo (G.R. No. 189063, Vol. I), pp. 31-32.

96
Id. at 47-48.

97
Id. at 120.

98
Id. at 48-49.

99
Id. at 49-50.

100
Id. at 53.

101
Id. at 93.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-48398 November 28, 1942

MELCHOR V. KATANIAG, petitioner,


vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Vicente del Rosario, Segundo M. Martinez and Baldomero Luque for petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor-General Reyes and Solicitor Zulueta for respondent.

MORAN, J.:
1. CRIMINAL LAW; INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS; ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS. — Whether during or after
office hours, if the removal by a public officer of any official document from its usual place of safe-keeping is for an illicit purpose, such
as to tamper with or to otherwise profit by it, or to do in connection therewith an act which would constitute a breach of trust in his
official care thereof, the crime of infidelity in the custody of public documents is committed. On the other hand, where the act of removal
is actuated with lawful or commendable motives, as when the public officer removes the public documents committed to his trust for
examination in connection with official duty, or with a view to securing them from imminent danger of loss, there would be no crime
committed under the law. This is so, because the act of removal, destruction or concealment of public documents is punished by law
only when any of such acts would constitute infidelity in the custody thereof. Several circumstances are set out in the body of the
decision to show conclusively that in the instant case there has been a removal effected for illicit purposes.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REMOVAL NEED NOT BE COUPLED WITH PROOF OF INTENTION TO CONCEAL; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
— To warrant a finding of guilt of infidelity in the custody of public documents, it is not necessary that the act of removal must be
coupled with proof of intention to conceal. The law punishes "any public officer who shall remove, destroy or conceal documents or
papers officially entrusted to him." (Art. 226, Revised Penal Code.) The word "or" is a disjunctive conjunction which, in the ordinary
usage, signifies dissociation and independence of one thing from each of the other things mentioned. While in the interpretation of
statutes, "or" may read "and" and vice versa, it is so only when the context so requires. And, in the instant case, there is nothing in the
context of the law which would require the giving to the conjunction "or" a meaning different from its ordinary usage.
Accordingly, removal, destruction and concealment must be viewed as distinct modes of committing the offense.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DAMAGE TO PUBLIC INTEREST OR TO THIRD PARTY. — Upon the matter of damage to public interest or to third
party, it is true that such damage must be actual and not hypothetical. But an actual damage need not necessarily be pecuniary or
material. It may consists in mere alarm to the public or in the allienation of its confidence in any branch of the government service. In
the instant case, aside from the necessity of maintaining the integrity of public records, the removal for illicit purposes by petitioner of
the documents in question from their usual place of safekeeping against the strictest surveillance ordered buy the higher authorities and
in the midst of the immigration scandal when the probe was in full swing, constitutes such a perversity of officials. Such effect
constitutes damage to public interest, and such damage is, under the circumstances stated, unquestionably a serious one.

4. ID.; ID.; CRIME COMMITTED IS CONSUMMATED AND NOT MERELY ATTEMPTED. — Petitioner has committed not merely the
attempted but the consummated crime of infidelity in the custody of public documents. True, at the moment of his arrest the records he
was caught carrying with him were intact, but as he had already succeeded in removing or secreting away the documents in question
from his office, for he was caught carrying them after he had locked the door of his office and was already out walking through the lobby
towards the main door of the building, the crime of removal of public documents summated, it being immaterial whether he has or has
not actually accomplished moved said documents.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 205316 June 29, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
ROMEO DE CASTRO and RANDOLF PABANIL, Accused-Appellants.
1

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal is the May 23, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04343 affirming appellants' conviction
2

for the crime of murder.

The factual antecedents:

Eric De Castro (Eric), Roland Pabanil (Roland) and appellants Romeo De Castro (Romeo) and Randolf Pabanil (Randolf) were charged
with Murder under the following Information:

That on or about the 16th day of August, 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with LPG tank, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent to kill, abuse of superior strength and insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his
rank, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hit on the head with the said LPG Tank one Senior
Police Officer II (SPOII)

Orlando De Leon, a police officer, while in the performance of his official duties, thereby inflicting upon the latter traumatic and fatal
injuries which caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

When arraigned, the four accused pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.

Evidence for the prosecution established that at around 3 :00 a.m. of August 16, 2006, Edwin Lonzame (Lonzame ), who works as a
baker at AMM Bakery at Apolinario Street, Bangkal, Makati City, saw the victim SPOII Orlando De Leon (De Leon) at their bakery
buying milk and bread. A man later identified as Randolf also came to buy from the bakery. Shortly, another man arrived and punched
Randolf. De Leon pacified them until the man ran away but he continued talking with Randolf and they had an altercation. At this point,
another man, later identified as Romeo, arrived and hit De Leon on the head. De Leon fell and was mauled by Randolf, Romeo, Eric
and Roland, the latter two are familiar with Lonzame as they used to stand-by at the bakery almost everyday being car wash boys in the
car wash area near the bakery. 4

While pinned down, De Leon was hit on the face by Randolf with a stove and gas tank he took from a nearby store. De Leon tried to
stand up but Romeo prevented him from doing so and they grappled for possession of De Leon's service firearm. The said gun went
off, and shortly Romeo again took it and pointed the gun at De Leon. When the gun did not fire, Romeo hit De Leon's head with the
gun, dragged him to the street and left. De Leon was again mauled by Randolf, Eric and Roland who took turns in hitting him with a gas
stove. When Romeo returned, he picked up the gas tank and dropped it on De Leon's face. 5

In the morning of the same day, all four accused were arrested and De Leon's service firearm was surrendered to the arresting officer,
Randy Laman Ozo. 6

In the meantime, Eric died and the case against him was dismissed. 7

Dr. Voltaire Nulud of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory testified that, based on his autopsy and medico-legal report, De
Leon died of intracranial hemorrhages and sustained traumatic head injuries caused by a heavy, solid material. 8

The defense gave a different version of the incident. Randolf testified that in the morning of August 16, 2006, he was drinking with his
brother, Roland and cousins Romeo and Eric, and with another friend they call "Kabayo" in the interior of Apolinario Street. Around 2:30
a.m., he went out to buy cigarettes at AMM Bakery and saw a man (De Leon) talking to Liezl, the bakery's saleslady who is his
(Randolfs) textmate. When Liezl finally attended to him, another man in white sando approached and hit him at the back of his ear and
ran away. He went after said man but he met De Leon who told him "Siga ka ba rito?" De Leon then poked his gun at him, kicked him
and told him to go home. He went back to his drinking session and told Romeo that he was punched at the bakery. Romeo went to the
place of the punching incident and he tried to stop Romeo, warning the latter that one of the men at the bakery had a gun. After five
minutes, he followed Romeo and saw him in front of the bakery having an altercation with De Leon who was trying to draw his gun. He
then approached De Leon slowly from the side so De Leon would not see him, thinking that De Leon would shoot Romeo. De Leon fell
after he hit him. Romeo then held De Leon's hand and he punched the man three times. The gun fired and he hit De Leon with a gas
tank. When he was about to hit De Leon a third time, Roland arrived, took the gas tank from him, and told him to go home. He then
9

stood up and took the gun from Eric. They left De Leon unconscious and bloodied.

Romeo gave similar statements as that of Randolf. He had a heated conversation with De Leon, they were hurling invectives. He 1âwphi1

testified that Randolf approached De Leon as the latter was trying to pull his gun. 10

On the part of Roland, he testified that he had nothing to do with the killing but merely pacified De Leon and his brother Randolf whom
he saw trying to hit De Leon with a gas tank. However, he failed to submit his counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation.

In its Decision dated December 4, 2009 in Criminal Case No. 06-1675, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, found
11

appellants guilty of murder. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay De Leon's heirs
₱12,000 as burial expenses, ₱50,000 as life indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral and exemplary damages, and costs. Roland Pabanil was
acquitted.12

In their appeal before the CA, appellants argued that the R TC erred in considering the qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and disregard of the respect due on account of De Leon's rank. They pointed out that the prosecution failed to prove the
13

qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. They claimed that Randolf punched De Leon as he thought the latter was about
to shoot Romeo. When De Leon fell and drew his gun, Randolf was forced to get the LPG tank and hit De Leon with it. Appellants also
argue that at the time of the incident, they did not know that De Leon is a police officer. 14

The CA denied the appeal and affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. Thefallo of the assailed CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated December 4, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 66 in Crim. Case No. 06-1675, which found ROMEO DE CASTRO alias "Omeng" and RANDOLF PABANIL alias "Oloy"
GUILTY of MURDER and sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
in that the amount of ₱12,000.00 as interment and burial expenses to be awarded [to] the heirs of Sr. Police Officer II Orlando De Leon
shall be DELETED. The amount of civil indemnity to be awarded [to] the heirs of SPO II De Leon shall also be increased from
₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00. In addition, Appellants ROMEO DE CASTRO and RANDOLF P ABANIL are ORDERED to pay the heirs of
SPO II De Leon moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 and temperate
damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00. All awards shall further incur interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED. 15

The CA agreed with the R TC that appellants failed to prove the elements of defense of a relative. The CA noted that there was no
unlawful aggression on the part of De Leon. In fact, Randolf hit De Leon because he thought that De Leon was with the man who
punched him and not because he was threatened by De Leon's gun. And if it was indeed the threat of a gun which prompted appellants
to hit De Leon, there was no more unlawful aggression when Randolf repeatedly attacked De Leon. The CA also said that Romeo
admitted he already had possession of the gun when appellant Randolf repeatedly hit De Leon with a gas tank. If De Leon was the
aggressor, De Leon's aggression ceased the moment he was disarmed. When Randolf repeatedly hit De Leon who had no more
weapon and had fallen, there is thus no more self-defense or defense of a relative, said the CA. The CA further noted that De Leon's
skull was broken into small pieces and held that the severity of De Leon's injuries reveals that the force used against him by appellants
was not reasonable to disarm him or prevent him from harming others.

But while the CA agreed with appellants that the prosecution failed to prove the circumstance of disregard of the respect due on
account of De Leon's rank, it nevertheless ruled that abuse of superior strength is present in this case. The CA said that De Leon was
already helpless when he was repeatedly attacked with a gas tank.

Hence, this appeal. Appellants filed a manifestation in lieu of supplemental brief. 16


Did the CA err in affirming appellants' conviction for the crime of murder?

We rule in the negative.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, defines the crime of murder, to wit:

ART. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of
means or persons to insure or afford impunity;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

To be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with
the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; and ( 4) the killing
neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.
17

In this case, the foregoing elements of the crime of murder were duly established. De Leon was killed. Appellants killed him. De Leon's
killing was attended by abuse of superior strength, one of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 ( 1) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. De Leon's killing is not parricide or infanticide. In fact, appellants do not dispute the first, second and fourth
elements. They merely questioned the second element, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

To take advantage of superior strength is to purposely use excessive force, out of proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked. Is We agree with the CA that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present in this case. As aptly
pointed out by the CA, De Leon was already helpless when he was repeatedly attacked with a gas tank. Appellants clearly used
excessive force against the already unarmed and defenseless De Leon. This is clear from Romeo's own testimony:

Q - You said that your cousin Randolf Pabanil came, where did he come from?

A - From behind, sir.

Q - From behind of whom?

A - Behind the man wearing leather jacket, sir.

xxxx

Q - x x x what did Randolf do to this man?

A - He suddenly punched the man behind his ear, sir.

Q - So what happened to the man wearing leather jacket?

A - He went off balance but he was able to draw his gun.

Q - Now, what did you do next, Mr. Witness?

A - I was able to grab the gun and then Randolf punched the man 3 times.

Q - You said you were able to get hold the gun and you also said that Randolf was able to punch that man, how many times he
punched that man?

A - Two or three times, sir.

Q - Now what happened after Mr. Randolf Pabanil punched him 2 to 3 times, what happened next, Mr. Witness?

A - Nabitawan ko yong baril.

Q - Mr. Witness, you said that the man wearing leather jacket was able to draw the gun and you said that you were able to get hold of
this, you likewise stated that Mr. Randolf Pabanil punched him while he was still holding the gun, now what happened after this?

A - The gun went-off sir.

Q - Now, was there anything that was hit by this gunshot?

A - None, sir.

Q - Now, after the gun went-off what happened next?

A - The man dropped his gun and then Randolf got the gas tank and hit him on his neck.
Q - After the gun was dropped what did you do next Mr. Witness?

A - I took the gun, sir.

Q- Now, while you are holding the gun what was Mr. Randolf Pabanil doing?

A - He hit the man another (sic) times, sir.

Q - What did he hit the man with?

A - LPG gas tank, sir.

Q - So all in all how many time[s] did Randolf Pabanil hit the man with the LPG gas tank?

A - Twice, sir. (Emphasis supplied)


19

And as testified to by Lonzame, after the accused left, appellant Romeo returned, picked up the gas tank and dropped it to De Leon. 20

Indeed, the justifying circumstances of self-defense or defense of a relative cannot be appreciated in favor of appellants. Article 11 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, reads: ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural, or adopted
brothers or sisters or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided
that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.

xxxx

Unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of a relative. Here, we
21

agree with the CA that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of De Leon. Randolf himself testified that he hit De Leon because
he thought that De Leon was with the man who punched him and not because he was threatened by De Leon's gun, to wit:

Atty. Villalon:

Why did you hit him, Mr. Witness?

Witness:

Because I thought he was with the guy who punched me, sir.

xxxx

Atty. Villalon:

So what did you think when you saw Mr. Orlando de Leon holding his gun and cursing your cousin and telling him not to come near
him, what did you think?

Witness:

Nothing, sir, I just thought of hitting him, sir.

Atty. Villalon:

Why?

Witness:

Because I thought that he was the one who ordered that I would be hit, sir. 22

As to the award of damages, the CA correctly awarded ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral damages, ₱30,000 as exemplary
damages and ₱25,000 as temperate damages. The award of 6% interest per annum on the monetary awards from the date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid is also correct.23
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM the May 23, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04343.

With costs against the accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO** JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ***


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE****
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2071 dated June 23, 2015.

** Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 2084-A dated June 29, 2015.

*** Designated additional Member per Raffle dated March 30, 2015.

**** Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 2072 dated June 23, 2015.

1
Also spelled as Randolph in some parts of the records.

2
Rollo, pp. 2-18. Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and
Agnes Reyes-Carpio concurring.

3
Records, p. 1.

4
Rollo, pp. 3-4; TSN, July 17, 2008, pp. 4-11.

5
Id. at 4; TSN, July 17, 2008, pp. 15-19.

6
CA rollo, p. 80.

7
Rollo, p. 5; TSN, August 23, 2007, pp. 3 & 6.

8
Id.; TSN, September 13, 2007, pp. 16, 21-27.

9
Id. at 6-7; TSN, December 10, 2008, pp. 5-27.

10
Id. at 7; TSN, March 25, 20 9, p. 5.

11
CA rollo, pp. 78-85. Penned by Presiding Judge Joselito C. Villarosa.
12
Id. at 85.

13
Id. at 72.

14
Id. at 73-75.

15
Rollo, pp.17-18.

16
Id. at 33-34.

17
People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014, 714 SCRA 107, 127.

18
People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 186528, January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 660, 676.

19
TSN, March 25, 2009, pp. 5-6.

20
TSN, July 17, 2008, p. 19.

21
People v. Mediado, G.R. No. 169871, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 366, 369.

22
TSN, December 10, 2008, pp. 19-20.

23
People v. Bosito, G.R. No. 209346, January 12, 2015, p. 8.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 208623 July 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
VIRGILIO ANTONIO y RIVERA, Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

For review is the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) on October 8, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04149 affirming, albeit
1 2

with modification8 as to the damages imposed, the Judgment dated September 4, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
3

Tuguegarao City, Branch 4, in Criminal Case Nos. 10244-10245, convicting Virgilio Antonio y Rivera (accused-appellant) of two counts
of Rape committed against AAA, a minor.
4

Antecedents

Two separate informations for rape were filed against the accused-appellant before the RTC, viz:

Criminal Case No. 10244

That on or about and sometime in the year 2001, in the Municipality of Alcala, Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, VI[R]GILIO ANTONIO, with lewd design and by the use of force, threat, and intimidation, did [then] and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the offended party, [AAA], a minor 14 years of age against her will.
5

That in the commission of the offense[,] the aggravating circumstance of uninh[a]bited place was present.

Contrary [to law]. 6

Criminal Case No. 10245

That on or about August 26, 2003, in the Municipality of Alcala, Province of Cagayan[,] within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, VIRGILIO ANTONIO,being then the guardian of the private complainant [AAA], a minor 14 years of age[,] who was
then under his care and custody[,] with lewddesign and by the use of force, threat and intimidation, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the offended party, [AAA], a minor 14 years of [age] against her will.

Contrary to law. 7

The accused-appellant entered a not guilty plea during the arraignment.

On February 23, 2005, pre-trial was conducted. The prosecution proposed for the parties to stipulate on the following, which the
defense admitted: (a) the identity of the accused-appellant; (b) his relationship as AAA’s godfather; (c) the dates, times and places of
the commission of rape; and (d) AAA’s minority at the time the crimes were allegedly perpetrated. 8
The prosecution marked and offered: (a) AAA’s birth certificate indicating that she was born on May 28,1989; (b) the medicolegal
certificate dated September 2,2003, which was preparedby Dr. Rafael Sumabat (Dr. Sumabat); and (c) AAA’s affidavit. The defense, on
its part, offered no documentary evidence. 9

In the joint trial that ensued, the prosecution offered the testimonies of AAA and Dr. Sumabat. On the other hand, the accused-appellant
was the defense’s lone witness.

Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) aptly summed up the prosecution’s version of the events as follows:

In March of 2001, eleven[-]year old [AAA] began living with [accused-appellant’s] family in Maraburab, Alcala, Cagayan Province after
her parents had separated. [Accused-appellant] and his wife, Rose, are [AAA’s] godparents[,] who treated her as one of their own
children x x x. Sometime in April 2001, [accused-appellant], who maintains a farm in the highlands of Cagayan, asked [AAA] to help him
harvest palay there. Alone together, [accused-appellant] and [AAA], started for the farm very early that April morning. After an hour’s
walk, they reached the place and immediately began to harvest palay x x x.

Just before lunch time, [accused-appellant] led [AAA] to a bamboo grove within the farm. Once there, hethreatened to kill her if she told
anyone regarding what he was about to do. [Accused-appellant] lost no time in making [AAA] lie down. After which, he took off her
shorts and underwear. Although very much alarmed, he likewise removed his own shorts and underwear. [AAA] could not do anything
as she was afraid because they were alone x x x.

With both their private parts now uncovered, [accused-appellant] inserted his penis into [AAA’s] vagina. She felt pain course through
her genitals. Helpless, [AAA] could only cry and mutter "aray". After awhile, she felt liquid emitting from [accused-appellant’s] penis.
Satiated, [accused-appellant] threatened [AAA] with death once again if she reveals to anyone that he had abused her. They went
home later that afternoon. Fearful of [accused-appellant’s] threat, [AAA] did not dare to reveal to anyone regarding her ordeal and went
on to stay with [accused-appellant] and his family x x x.

On the evening of August 26, 2003, Rose Antonio, together with her two children with [accused-appellant], went to the town proper of
Alcala to celebrate its fiesta. [AAA]and [accused-appellant] were left alone in the house on that night. She went to bed around eight in
the evening. However, around 10PM, she was awakened by the weight of [accused-appellant] bearing down on her body. [Accused-
appellant] was wearing a shirt and nothing else. She realized to her horror that her shorts and underwear had already been removed.
[Accused-appellant] soon began to insert his penis into her vagina. He made a push-pull movement for awhile. [AAA] was not able to
shout a single word inside the room which had no light on x x x.

[In] the morning of August 27, 2003, May Dumalay, [accused-appellant’s] niece, confronted[AAA] regarding her suspicions that
something happened between her and [accused-appellant]. [AAA] finally admitted that [accused-appellant] had raped her. May
Dumalay then told [accused-appellant’s] wife, Rose Antonio what [AAA] related to her. In turn, Rose Antonio told [AAA’s] father
regarding the unfortunate developments. When her father and the barangay captain of Maraburab confronted [AAA], she told all the
incidents of sexual abuse committed by [accused-appellant] x x x.

On August 28, 2003, Barangay Captain Rey De Luna of Maraburab accompanied [AAA] to the local office of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD). After being interviewed, [AAA] was brought to the police station in Alcala[,] Cagayan x x x.
Eventually, she was examined by the Medico-legal Officer of Alcala, Dr. Rafael Sumabat x x x. His findings on [AAA] were: 1) On
examination[,] abdomen is soft, palpable mass noted. External genitalia and thighs are normal. No evidence of trauma; 2) On
examination of genitalia, there are old lacerations of hymen at 3-6-9 o’clock respectively; 3) Vagina admits one finger easily and
presence of whitish secretions inside vagina. Pregnancy test negative x x x. 10

Version of the Defense

The accused-appellant was vehement in denying the charges against him. He insisted that AAA only started living with them in May of
2002. Hence, he could not have perpetrated the rape ascribed to him which allegedly occurred in April of 2001. As to what transpired in
August of 2003, he narrated that Rose, his wife, and AAA left their house to attend a town fiesta on August 25, 2003. The two returned
home drunk on August 28, 2003. Rose and the accused-appellant then had a fight because the latter received an information that the
former and AAA had a male companion while attending the town festivities. Rose and AAA denied the accusation, which irked the
accused-appellant, who in turn ordered the two to leave their house. 11

Ruling of the RTC

On September 4, 2009, the RTC rendered a Judgment convicting the accused-appellant of two counts of rape. The trial court found
12

that AAA had no ill motive to testify against the accused-appellant, whom she had considered as her guardian or foster father. Further,
AAA’s testimony as to the sordid acts committedby the accused-appellant was spontaneous and categorical, and her statements were
corroborated by Dr. Sumabat’s medical findings. On the other hand, the accused-appellant’s defenses of denial and alibiwere weak and
could not prevail over AAA’s positive testimony. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision thus reads:

ACCORDINGLY, accused VIRGILIO ANTONIOy Rivera is hereby found GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape for two
(2) counts, in Criminal Case Nos. 10244 and 10245 defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act 7659 and further amended by Republic Act No. 8353; and Article 266 (A) No. 1 in relation to Article 266 (B) No. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
each case; to pay [AAA] the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND ([P]150,000[.00]) PESOS as civil indemnity,
ONEHUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND ([P]150,000.00) PESOS as moral damages and FIFTY THOUSAND ([P]50,000.00) PESOS as
exemplary damages.

The preventive imprisonment of the accused shall be credited in full in his favor if he abided in writing by the rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 13

The Contending Parties’ Arguments Before the CA

The accused-appellant challenged the above disquisition before the CA. He pointed out that according to AAA herself, Dr. Sumabat
performed a physical examination on her on August 29, 2003, or three days after the alleged second rape incident occurred. However,
this did not complement Dr. Sumabat’s explanation that the healed lacerations at "3-6-9 o’clock" positions could have been inflicted at
least seven days prior to the examination. The accused-appellant further claimed that it was unusual for a rape victim, whose virtue was
allegedly at stake, not to have (a) shouted at all to repel the sexual advances, (b) tried to escape when she had the chance to do so,
and (c) prevented at all cost that she be left alone in the company of her assailant. 14

The OSG, on its part, argued that AAA’s failure to shout during the rape incidents should not affect the credibility of her claims. AAA
was then a minor, and understandably, she must have been overcome by feelings of helplessness especially since her assailant is her
godfather and de facto guardian. AAA likewise cried during the trial dispelling insinuations that her testimony was rehearsed. 15

Ruling of the CA

On October 8, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the accused-appellant’s conviction and imposing upon him the penalty of
16

reclusion perpetuafor each of the two counts ofrape. However, for each count, the CA reduced the award of (a) civil indemnity to
₱50,000.00, (b) moral damages to ₱50,000.00, and (c) exemplary damages to ₱30,000.00.

The CA declared that any inconsistency in AAA’s testimony anent the date she was examined by Dr. Sumabat was not enough to
destroy her credibility. As a child witness, she cannot be expected to perfectly remember all the details of her harrowing experience.
Besides, Dr. Sumabat merely made nothing more but a rough estimate that AAA’s hymenal lacerations could have been inflicted at
least seven days prior to the examination. Citing People v. Corpuz, the CA emphasized that AAA was intimidated by the accused-
17

appellant and her alleged lack of resistance did not signify voluntariness or consent to the sexual advances.

Anent the appreciation of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the informations, the CA slightly differed from the RTC in the
following wise:

In Our review of the penalty imposed on [accused-appellant], We have noted that the trial court considered the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of relationship, since [accused-appellant] is supposedly the guardian of [AAA].

In People v. Flores, the Supreme Court held that the guardian must be a person who has legal relationship with his ward. The court
adhered to the theory that a guardian must beone who has been legally appointed.

In this case, however, We note withgreat significance that the fact of being a guardian was not alleged inthe Informations as a qualifying
aggravating circumstance. Instead, there was merely a stipulation during the pre-trial hearing that accused-appellant was the
"godfather" of [AAA], without showing that accused-appellantwas legally constituted in law as the "guardian" of [AAA]. On the other
hand, the factof minority of [AAA] has been proven by her birth certificate and confirmed by her physical appearance.

Consequently, on the first count of rape, We find the existence of the aggravating circumstances of minority of [AAA] and commission of
the sexual abuse in an uninhabited place. On the second count of rape, We find the fact of minority of [AAA] as the sole aggravating
circumstance. Both crimes are penalized by Reclusion Perpetua. However, We shall reduce the award of civil indemnity from
₱75,000.00 to 50,000.00 and moral damages from ₱75,000.00 to ₱50,000.00, for each count of rape since accused-appellantis only
guilty of simple rape. On the other hand, the award of exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 should be increased to
₱30,000.00, for each count of rape in line with the recent jurisprudence, to set an example for public good. (Citations omitted)
18

Issue

Aggrieved, the accused-appellant is now before this Court once again insisting on his innocence and reiterating the issue of whether or
not his guilt for allegedly having raped AAA on two separateoccasions was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The accused-appellant and the OSG both dispensed with the filing of supplemental briefs and merely adoptedtheir respective
arguments raised before the CA.

Ruling of the Court

The Court affirms the CA’s verdict, but modifies the same by imposing interests upon the damages awarded to AAA.

"It is a fundamental rule that the trial court’s factual findings, especially its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great
weight and respect and binding upon thisCourt, particularly when affirmed by the [CA]. This Court has repeatedly recognized that the
trial court is in the best position to assess the credibilityof witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique position of having
observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is
denied tothe appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or
sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath. These are significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of
witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth. The appellate courts will generally not disturb such findings unless it plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, mightaffect the result of the case." 19

"For conviction to be had in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused
had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation; or (b) when the
victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the victim is twelve years of age, or is demented." 20

"[I]n rape through force or intimidation, the force employed by the guilty party need not be irresistible. Itis only necessary that such force
is sufficient to consummate the purpose for which it was inflicted. Similarly, intimidation should be evaluated in light of the victim’s
perception at the time of the commission of the crime. Itis enough that it produced the fear in the mind of the victim that if she did not
yield to the bestial demands of her ravisher, some evil would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter. Hence, what is important
is that because of force and intimidation, the victim was made to submit to the will of the appellant." 21

In the case at bar, the Court findsthe RTC and CA’s factual findings as sufficiently supported by evidence and jurisprudence.

The following is AAA’s account of the rape incident which happened in April of 2001:

Q: What was that incident thathappened while you and your ninong were in the mountain?

A: We went in the bamboo groves, sir.

Q: And when you reached the bamboo groves, what happened there[,] madam witness?

COURT: Make it of record that the witness started crying.

A: My ninong threatened me, sir.

Q: How did he threaten you?

A: He told me that he will kill me if I will report the matter to anybody, sir.

Q: After he uttered those threatening words to you, what happened next if there was any?

A: He laid me down, sir.

Q: After that[,] what happened next when he laid you down?

A: After he laid me down, he removed my short pants and my underwear and after that[,] he removed his pants and brief, sir.

Q: When he was removing his pants and brief, why did you not ran (sic) away?

A: Because I was afraid because nobody was there[.] [W]e do (sic) not have any companion, sir.

Q: After removing his pants and brief, what happened next?

A: He inserted his private part into my vagina, sir.

Q: What was your position when he inserted his penis in your vagina[?]

A: I was lying down, sir. 22

AAA likewise recounted the second rape incident, which occurred on August 26, 2003, viz:

Q: You said that you were left behind in the house of your uncle the night of August 26, 2003[.][W]hat time[,] if you can still recall[,]
when you went to bed to sleep?

A: 8:00 o’clock, sir.

Q: How about your ninong Virgilio Antonio[?] [W]here was he when you went to sleep[,] madam witness?

A: He also went to sleep, sir.

Q: Do you recall if your sleep was interrupted?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What time [was that] when you were awaken? (sic)

A: About 10:00 o’clock in the evening, sir.

Q: Why, what happened during that night?

A: When I woke up, I noticed thatmy ninong was on top of me, sir.

Q: Can you describe his appearance when he was on top of you?

A: He moved in a push and pull position.

Q: Was he with his pants at that time?

A: He has (sic) his t-shirt but he was naked down.


Q: What were you wearing when you slept that night?

A: T-shirt and underwear, sir.

Q: What about your clothing[?] [W]hat happened with your clothing?

A: When I woke up[,] I [no longer had] my short[s] and panty.

Q: When you noticed that you werealready naked, did you not shout?

A: I shouted, sir.

Q: What did you utter when you shouted?

A: I did not shout, sir.

Q: Aside from noticing that you were naked down, what did you notice?

A: He inserted his penis in my vagina, sir.

Q: How long did he insert his penis in your vagina?

A: I cannot remember because I was sleeping at that time, sir.

Q: Can you describe his body movementwhen he inserted his penis in your vagina?

A: He was doing the push and pull movement[,] sir. 23

"The eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings attesting to her non-virgin state, should be enough to confirm
the truth of her charges." 24

AAA’s testimonies on the two rape incidents were impressively straightforward and categorical. In April of 2001, while in the farm up in
1âwphi 1

the mountain, the accused-appellant threatened her with death. Against her will, he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. In
her statements regarding the second rape incident on August 26, 2003, AAA did not mention that the accused-appellant threatened to
kill her. Nonetheless, the accused-appellant’s moral ascendancy over AAA takes the place of the force and intimidation that is required
in rape cases. It is expected that for a minor like AAA, fear and memories from her previous harrowing experience already loomed
25

over her. They weremore than enough to cow her to submission at the time of the second rapeincident. This is especially true here
where the accused-appellant is AAA’s own godfather and de facto guardian.

In the physical examination performed after the second rape incident, Dr. Sumabat found lacerations in AAA’s hymen. The accused-
1âwphi 1

appellant alleged that there were inconsistencies in the dates of the commission of the crime, on one hand, and the conduct of the
physical examination, on the other. However, this stance, taken together with the accused-appellant’s uncorroborated defenses of
denial and alibi, pales vis-à-visAAA’s positive testimony and the medical evidence which prove that, indeed, AAA’s hymen sustained
lacerations, albeit healed. As we held in People v. Laog, 26

Discrepancies referring only to minordetails and collateral matters—not to the central fact of the crime—do not affect the veracity or
detract from the essential credibility of witnesses’ declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole.
For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the
innocence of the appellant for the crime charged. It cannot be overemphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let
alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony. (Citations omitted)
27

The Court agrees with the CA’s findings that only the generic aggravating circumstances of commission of the crime in an uninhabited
place and minority can be appreciated relative to the first rape incident. As regards the second rape incident, guardianship was alleged
in the information and was not assailed by the defense. The Court notes, too, that the parties stipulated during the pre-trial that the
28

accused-appellant was AAA’s godfather. Notwithstanding the foregoing, jurisprudence strictly dictates that the guardian must be a
29

person who has a legal relationship with his ward, which does not obtain in the case before this Court. Ineluctably, guardianship
30

cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance and the accused-appellant can only be convicted of simple rape.

Nonetheless, this Court sustains the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the RTC and CA on the accused-appellant for each of
the two counts of rape which he committed. The aggravating circumstances of minority and commission of the crime in an uninhabited
31

place were present as regards the first rape incident. The second rape was,on the other hand, aggravated by minority alone since legal
guardianship was not proven. The aggravating circumstances attendant in the instant case are all merely generic and not qualifying.
Generic aggravating circumstances increase the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same o the next
higher degree. In the accused-appellant's case, the two counts of rape were committed through the use of force and intimidation. The
32

crime falls under Article 266-A(l)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Article 266-B of the same code provides that the said crime is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, which is an indivisible penalty. Therefore, despite the attendance of generic aggravating
circumstances, the penalty imposable upon the accused-appellant for each count of rape remains the same.

In precis, the Court finds no compelling ground to reverse the accused-appellant's conviction for two counts of simple rape by both the
RTC and the CA. The Court likewise finds proper the CA's modification of the amount of civil indemnity and damages imposed by the
RTC. However, to conform to prevailing jurisprudence, an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all the damages awarded shall be
imposed, to be computed from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
33

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 2012, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04149, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Virgilio Antonio y Rivera is directed to pay interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum on
all the damages awarded to AAA, to be computed from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuarit to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusicns in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the cLse was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 14-15.

2
Penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios, with Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Normandie B.
Pizarro, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 110-121.

3
Issued by Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino; id. at 14-25.

4
The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances and other information which tend to establish or compromise her
identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed to protect her privacy and
fictitious initials shall, instead, be used, in accordance with People v. Cabalquinto (533 Phil. 703 [2006]), and A.M. No. 04-11-
09-SC dated September 19, 2006.

5
According to AAA’s birth certificate and the parties’ stipulation, she was born on May 28, 1989, thus, she was 11 years old
and not 14 when the alleged first rape incident took place in April of 2001; CA rollo, p. 17.

6
Id. at 14.

7
Id. at 15.

8
Id.

9
Id. at 16.

10
Id. at 86-88.

11
Id. at 55.

12
Id. at 14-25.

13
Id. at 24-25.

14
Please seeBrief for the Accused-Appellant; id. at 56-59.

15
Please seeBrief for the Plaintiff-Appellee, id. at 93, 98.

16
Id. at 110-121.

17
597 Phil. 459 (2009).

18
CA rollo, pp. 119-120.
People of the Philippines v. Hermenigildo Delen y Esco Billa, G.R. No. 194446, April 21, 2014, citing People v. Leonardo,
19

G.R. No. 181036, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 166, 193.

20
People v. Valdez, 466 Phil. 116, 129 (2004), citing People v. Colisao, 423 Phil. 229, 238 (2001).

21
Id. at 129-130, citing People v. Flores, 423 Phil. 687, 698-699 (2001).

22
CA rollo,pp. 116-117.

23
Id. at 117-118.

24
People of the Philippines v. Hermenigildo Delen y Esco Billa, supra note 19, citing People v. Oden, 471 Phil. 638, 667
(2004).

25
Id.

26
G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 654.

27
Id. at 671.

28
CA rollo, p. 15.

29
Id.

30
People v. Flores, G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 478, 493.

31
AAA was 11 and not 14 years old when the first rape incident occurred. However, the case does not fall under Article 266-
A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code punishing rape perpetrated against victims who are under 12 years of age, because the
information filed in court alleged that AAA was 14 years old. To the accused-appellant pertains the inviolable right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him (Please see People v. Arcillas, G.R. No. 181491, July 30,
2012, 677 SCRA 624, 637).

32
eople v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 70 l, 723 (2009), citing Palaganas v. People, 533 Phil. 169, 194 (2006).

33
People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 201728, July 17, 2013, 701 SCRA 548, 559-560.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect his wife, to give her a home, to provide her with
the comforts and the necessities of life within his means, to treat her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x x
x; it is his duty not only to maintain and support her, but also to protect her from oppression and wrong." 1

REYES, J.:

Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not
consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

The Case

This is an automatic review of the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, which
2 3

affirmed the Judgment dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos.
4

99-668 and 99-669 convicting him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.

The Facts

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii ved together since then and raised their four (4)
5

children as they put up several businesses over the years.


6

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m.
7

of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the
accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint Resolution, finding probable cause for grave
8

threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and recommending that the appropriate criminal information be filed against the
accused-appellant.

On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-668 and Criminal
9

Case No. 99-669. The Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as follows:
10

That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s will.

Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:

That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter's will.

Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999. On August 18, 1999, the accused-appellant filed a
11

Motion for Reinvestigation, which was denied by the trial court in an Order dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the accused-
12 13

appellant was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. 14

On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information averring that the name of the private complainant
15

was omitted in the original informations for rape. The motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit dated November 15,
1999, attested that the true dates of commission of the crime are October 16, 1998 and October 1 7, 1998 thereby modifying the dates
16

stated in her previous complaint-affidavit. The motion was granted on January 18, 2000. Accordingly, the criminal informations were
17

amended as follows:

Criminal Case No. 99-668:

That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.

Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. 18

Criminal Case No. 99-669:

That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.

Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. 19

The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to both indictments and a joint trial of the two
cases forthwith ensued.

Version of the prosecution

The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters MMM and 000, which, together with pertinent
physical evidence, depicted the following events:

KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the laborers. They got married after a year of
courtship. When their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store. Later on, they engaged in
20 21

several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for the rice mill, which, ideally, was
under the accused-appellant's supervision with the help of a trusted employee. In reality, however, he merely assisted in the rice mill
business by occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul goods. 22

Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's dedication. Even the daughters observed
the disproportionate labors of their parents. He would drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who actively managed the
23

businesses. 24

She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand, did not acquiesce with that objective. 25

In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Three of the
26

children transferred residence therein while KKK, the accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She
shuttled between the two places regularly and sometimes he accompanied her. In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City
27

most of the days of the week. On Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store and then
28

returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same day. 29

Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and
fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal
30
in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of
lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission. 31

In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed to attend to him. She was
preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman must stay
in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of providing a good future for the
children. 32

Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant slept together in Cebu City where
the graduation rites of their eldest daughter were held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were already back in Cagayan de Oro
City.
33

On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about their nightly routine. The family store in their
residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls' bedroom at the
mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while the accused-appellant watched television in the living room. OOO and MMM then
34

prepared their beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to their conjugal bedroom in the third
floor of the house. KKK complied. 35

Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant
and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the
c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to] our bed."
36

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her
reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on
the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed. 37

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her
lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well. 38

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them
down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.
39 40

The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster, stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him
41

away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by
desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."42

With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the spouses' bedroom, KKK's pleas were audible
43

in the children's bedroom where MMM lay awake.

Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on me," MMM woke up 000 who
44

prodded her to go to their parents' room. MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her parents' bedroom and
45

inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?" The accused-appellant then quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the door
46

and said: "[D]on 't interfere because this is a family trouble," before closing it again. Since she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM
47

ignored his father's admonition, knocked at the bedroom door again, and then kicked it. A furious accused-appellant opened the door
48

wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and
crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother and asked: "Ma, why are you crying?" before asking
her father: "Pa, what happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is torn[?]" 49

When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up in order to bring her to the girls' bedroom.
KKK then picked up her tom underwear and covered herself with a blanket. However, their breakout from the room was not easy. To
50

prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK to
"[S]tay here, you sleep in our room," when the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go out." He then held KKK's hands but she
pulled them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned against door and embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way out. 51

In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what happened. KKK relayed: "[Y]our father is an
52

animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let her rest." 53

The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family store on October 17, 1998, KKK and the
children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join them since, according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere. After
resting for a short while, KKK and the children proceeded to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend the night
in the room's small bed and the girls were already fixing the beddings when the accused-appellant entered.

"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that she preferred to sleep with the children. He 54

then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go with me, anyway, there are women that could be paid [P] 1,000.00." She dismissed his
comment by turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the room. 55

He returned 15 minutes later and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and
56

attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Lets go to our bedroom." When she defied him, he
grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart. At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because we are in front
57

of you." 58

The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled, "[E]ven in front of you, I can have sex of your
mother [sic J because I'm the head of the family." He then ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and
went to the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother resonate with the creaking bed. 59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no
heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do
[sic]. I cannot withstand sex."
60

After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted her and forced himself inside her. Once
gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly
uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters' bedroom.
61

Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs but found the door locked. MMM pulled out
a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for the doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and OOO
found their mother crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are you crying?"
KKK replied: "[Y}our father is a beast and animal, he again forced me to have sex with him even if I don't feel well. "62

Version of the defense

The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent to that of KKK's father. He came to know KKK
because she brought food for her father's laborers. When they got married on October 18, 1975, he was a high school graduate while
she was an elementary graduate.

Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life. Through their joint hard work and efforts, the
couple gradually acquired personal properties and established their own businesses that included a rice mill managed by the accused-
appellant. He also drove their trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or com.63

The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that on those dates he was in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met an accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He
left the truck by the roadside because he had to attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK. When they returned to
Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can take care of
the truck and buy some com. 64

Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated the above claims. According to him, on
October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the vicinity of the rice mill's loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-
up truck. On October 17, 1998, he and the accused-appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of com into the truck. They
finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the
former attended a fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a helper and a
mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow the stalled truck left there by the accused-appellant in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to
Cagayan de Oro City together with the separate truck loaded with com.

They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck around and hoist it to the towing bar of the other truck.
At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City where they
arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The accused-appellant went to Gusa while the other three men brought the damaged truck to
Cugman. 65

The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control and
management of their businesses as well as the possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant was provoked
to do so when she failed to account for their bank deposits and business earnings. The entries in their bank account showed the
balance of ₱3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only a month or on November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled to a measly
₱9,894.88. Her failure to immediately report to the police also belies her rape allegations.
66 67

KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually detected from her odd behavior. While in Cebu
on October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation rites, the accused-appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse. He was surprised when his
wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her after having sex. He tagged her request as "high-tech," because they did not do the same
when they had sex in the past. KKK had also become increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives home, it was an employee, not
her, who opened the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself and would no longer ask for his permission whenever she went out. 68

Bebs, KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant several love letters purportedly addressed to
69

Bebs but were actually intended for KKK. 70

KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey,
somebody from the military or the Philippine National Police, another one is a government employee, a certain Fernandez and three
other priests. Several persons told him about the paramours of his wife but he never confronted her or them about it because he
71

trusted her. 72

What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2, 1998. At that time, OOO was listening loudly
to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a television program, he asked OOO to tum down the volume of the cassette player.
She got annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around and hit the accused-appellant's head with the socket. His head bled. An
altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK thereafter followed because the latter took OOO's side. During the argument, OOO
blurted out that KKK was better off without the accused-appellant because she had somebody young, handsome, and a businessman
unlike the accused-appellant who smelled bad, and was old, and ugly. 73

KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to her and one-fourth to the accused-appellant.
However, the separation did not push through because the accused-appellant's parents intervened. Thereafter, KKK pursued legal
74

separation from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case No. 00588-99 before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a Certificate to File Action dated February 18, 1999. 75

Ruling of the RTC


In its Judgment dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by giving greater weight and credence
76

to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and genuine
the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify against their own father for a crime such as rape
if the same was not truly committed.

The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-appellant's accusations of extra-marital affairs
and money squandering against KKK. The trial court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on inconsistent
testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as to the accused-appellant's actual whereabouts
on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of
rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as
moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum of (P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the
costs.

SO ORDERED. 77

Ruling of the CA

In its Decision dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA held that Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
78

Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the original informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not prejudiced by the
amendment because he was re-arraigned with respect to the amended informations.

The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim herself and the corroborative declarations of
MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-appellant
had carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and intimidation.

The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not negate the commission of the crime because a
medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.

The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband and wife with mutual obligations of and right to
sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK
such as bruises. The CA explained that physical showing of external injures is not indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for
rape; what is necessary is that the victim was forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.

In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses only reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's
accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her husband of having raped her if it were not true.

The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she stated that she only found out that a wife may
charge his husband with rape when the fiscal investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and physical injuries told her about
it.

Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at
his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place
where he allegedly was, is only about four or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 79

Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified the parties that, if they so desire, they may
80

file their respective supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation and Motion dated September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the Office of
81

the Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant, through
counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not in Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged rape incidents took place, and
the presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of going with him to the conjugal bedroom on October
16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up resistance or seek help from police authorities; and ( c) the absence of a medical certificate and of
blood traces in KKK's panties. 82

Our Ruling

I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection

The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride capture' whereby a man conquered a woman
through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby a man abducted a woman and married her. 83

The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity but rather to punish the act of obtaining the
heiress' property by forcible marriage or to protect a man's valuable interest in his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity.
84 85

If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and if a man raped his wife, he was merely using his
property.86

Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was justified under three ideologies.

Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of her father until she marries to become the
property of her husband. If a man abducted an unmarried woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy her from the owner; buying
87

and marrying a wife were synonymous. 88


From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and the law denied her political power and status
under the feudal doctrine of coverture. 89

A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within the family. 90

This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon marrying, the woman becomes one with her
husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue another, own personal property or write a will. 91

II. The marital exemption rule

In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the irrevocable implied consent theory that would
later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in rape. He stated that:

[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and
contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract. 92

The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America (USA) and England. It gives legal immunity to a
man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act which would be rape if committed against a woman not his wife. In those
93

jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not the wife of the perpetrator."
94

The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v. Fogerty promulgated in 1857. The Supreme
95

Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it would always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim. Several other
courts adhered to a similar rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory as basis.
96

The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was endowed with absolute immunity from
prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but
97

he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her. 98

In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for its abolition for being violative of married
women's right to be equally protected under rape laws. 99

In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the application of the rule in cases where the husband and
wife are living apart pursuant to a court order "which by its terms or in its effects requires such living apart," or a decree, judgment or
written agreement of separation. 100

In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of Appeals of New York declared the same
unconstitutional in People v. Liberta for lack of rational basis in distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The
101

decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:

We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape. The various rationales which have
been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to
marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New
York statute to be unconstitutional.

Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual intercourse has been cited most frequently in
support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a
sexual act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the victim and
frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act is irrational and absurd.
Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on
demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with
impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If a husband feels
"aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in the courts governing domestic relations, not in
"violent or forceful self-help x x x."

The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law doctrines that a woman was the property of her
husband and that the legal existence of the woman was "incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband x x x." Both these
doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world - [or] in any modem society - is
a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole
human being x x x." (Citations omitted)
102

By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District of Columbia, outlawing the act without
exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when the wife is mentally
or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to consent. 103

III. Marital Rape in the Philippines

Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It appears, however, that the old provisions of
rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief
Justice Ramon C. Aquino, a husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal separation,
104

the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.105

In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (UN-CEDAW). Hailed as the first international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first major instrument that
106

contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against women. The Philippines assumed the role of promoting gender equality and
women's empowerment as a vital element in addressing global concerns. The country also committed, among others, to condemn
107

discrimination against women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of eliminating
discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if
not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle;

(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination
against women;

xxxx

(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and
practices which constitute discrimination against women;

(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women. 108

In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined the principle of gender equality in the 1987
Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof, thus:

Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

xxxx

Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men. The Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the generally accepted principles of international law such as the
CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:

Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
all nations. (Emphasis ours)

The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype
concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC. The law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of
109

crimes against chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the law's most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of
Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration, viz:

Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the
penalty imposed.

In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is
void ab initio.

Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353
penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal relationship with his victim, thus:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.

The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th Congress on the law's
progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to conservative
Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general
definition of 'rape,' viz:

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point

of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never agreed to marital rape. But under Article 266-C, it
says here: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender... " Does this presuppose that there is now marital rape? x x x.

MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17 years of private practice in the legal profession, Madam
Speaker, and I believe that I can put at stake my license as a lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a husband from
being sued by the wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence that prohibits a wife from suing a husband. That
is why even if we don't provide in this bill expanding the definition of crime that is now being presented for approval, Madam Speaker,
even if we don't provide here for marital rape, even if we don't provide for sexual rape, there is the right of the wife to go against the
husband. The wife can sue the husband for marital rape and she cannot be prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction there is
no law that prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put second paragraph of 266-C because it is the belief of many of us. x x
x, that if it is true that in this jurisdiction there is marital rape even if we don't provide it here, then we must provide for something that
will unify and keep the cohesion of the family together that is why we have the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically House Bill No. 6265 our provision on a husband
forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital sexual assault.

MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.

MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual assault. So, Your Honor, direct to the point, under
Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the second paragraph, quote: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, this
refers to marital rape filed against the husband? Is that correct?

MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.

MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call- it?

MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.

MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already stated that. Because under 1 and 2 it is all
denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual assault. That is why I am sorry that our House version which provided for sexual
assault was not carried by the Senate version because all sexual crimes under this bicameral conference committee report are all now
denominated as rape whether the penalty is from reclusion perpetua to death or whether the penalty is only prision mayor. So there is
marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?

xxxx

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of punishing the husband who forces the wife even to
30 years imprisonment. But please do not call it marital rape, call it marital sexual assault because of the sanctity of marriage. x x
x. (Emphasis ours)
110

HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not excluded.

HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.

HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.

xxxx

HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be implicitly contained in the second paragraph. x x
x So marital rape actually was in the House version x x x. But it was not another definition of rape. You will notice, it only says, that
because you are the lawful husband does not mean that you cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your wife until
she's blue. And if the wife complains she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot raise the defense x x x[:] I am the husband.
But where in the marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up? That's all it means. That is why if we stop referring to it as marital
rape, acceptance is easy. Because parang ang marital rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying is you're
[the] husband but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That's why to me it's not alarming. It was just a way of saying you're [the] husband, you
cannot say when I am charged with rape x x x.

PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]

HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not mean you can have carnal knowledge by force[,]
threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife reason, a grave abuse of authority, I don't know how that cannot apply. Di ba yung, or
putting an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to have another classification of rape. It is all the same definition
x x x.

xxxx

HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can say that this rule is implicit already in the first proviso. It
implies na there is an instance when a husband can be charged [with] rape x x x.

HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.

HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is understood that this rule of evidence is now
transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.

PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove marital rape.

HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the one on page 8, the effect of pardon. x x x [I]t is
inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a rule of evidence. But I think we should understand that a husband cannot beat at his
wife to have sex. Di ha? I think that should be made clear. x x x.

xxxx

HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is that if you're [the] legal husband, Jesus Christ,
don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my wife, why do you have to beat me up.

So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I mean, we can face up, I hope, to the women and they
would understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or creating a new crime but instead, we are just
defining a rule of evidence. x x x.

HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the fact that he is husband is not, does not negate. 111

CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The only disagreement now is where to place it. Let
us clear this matter. There are two suggestions now on marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with force or intimidation or any of
the circumstances that would define rape x x x immaterial. The fact that the husband and wife are separated does not come into the
picture. So even if they are living under one roof x x x for as long as the attendant circumstances of the traditional rape is present, then
that is rape.
112

PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his provision on marital rape, it does not actually change the
meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody's mind, whether or not rape can indeed be committed by the husband against
the wife. So the bill really says, you having been married to one another is not a legal impediment. So I don't really think there is any
need to change the concept of rape as defined presently under the revised penal code. This do[es] not actually add anything to the
definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has evidence to show that she was really brow beaten,
or whatever or forced or intimidated into having sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of rape has been committed against
her by the husband, notwithstanding the fact that they have been legally married. It does not change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.

PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x x. 113

The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262, which regards rape within
114

marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz:

Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in.
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not
limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning
and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch
obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the
abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of non-personal violence are the most common type of
spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among ever-married women. One in seven ever-married women experienced physical
violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual violence. 115

IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments

The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied consent theory. In his appeal brief before the CA,
he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual,
obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to copulation is
presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.

The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently from ordinary rape cases and that the
standards for determining the presence of consent or lack thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual community is a mutual
right and obligation between husband and wife. 116

The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.

The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have already been superseded by
modem global principles on the equality of rights between men and women and respect for human dignity established in various
international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the
traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them.
Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. One of such measures is R.A. No 8353
117

insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his
wife's body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.

Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women,
which was Promulgated by the UN General Assembly subsequent to the CEDA W. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of
118

gender-based violence that constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified 'marital rape' as a species of sexual violence, viz:
Article 1

For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is
likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.

Article 2

Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the
household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal
violence and violence related to exploitation; (Emphasis ours)
119

Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without
her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W and its
accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife is not
merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal to that he accords himself. He
120

cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the
Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital
activities that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.
121

It is true that the Family Code, obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as
122

expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
123

Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual
intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual
communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive
interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening marital relationship. When it
124

is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court
will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved
by his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to declare
her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital obligation. But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from
125

her coercively or violently.

Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in
the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws ordains that
126

similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no person
or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances. 127

As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault;
and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows
that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords
protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other man alike.

The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married rape victims over unmarried rape victims
because it withholds from married women raped by their husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all rape victims.

Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to those raised by herein
accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married
woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an unmarried woman. She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual
128

intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.

Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their
sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. Women do not divest themselves of
129

such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that human rights are inalienable. 130

In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide for different definition or elements for
either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and
unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it
would inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from the victims of non-marital rape.

Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the
aggressor is the woman's own legal husband. The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases
should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the accused and his accuser.

Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the established legal principles and evidentiary policies in
the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and found that no reversible error can be imputed to the conviction meted the accused-
appellant.

The evidence for the prosecution was


based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict mandate that all courts must
examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party. While the accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony of
the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the victim's testimony is justified. Courts
must ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature. If the testimony of the complainant
meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. 131

It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect.
This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct and attitude, especially
during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and
value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on appeal. 132

After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the entire records of the trial proceedings and the
transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the Court found no justification to disturb its findings.

Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand on six
separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her statements vacillate between uncertainty and certitude. She remained
consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid during the rigorous cross-examination and on rebuttal examination, she was able to
convincingly explain and debunk the allegations of the defense.

She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her refusal on October 16, 1998. He initially
ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In order not to aggravate his
temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to have sex. When she rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and
headache, his request for intimacy transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her panties but the accused-appellant
forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the small clothing to tear apart. She reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him
to stop. But no amount of resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped her hands, mounted her, rested his
own legs on hers and inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued pleading but he never desisted. 133

Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7, 1998 is likewise unmistakable. After the appalling episode in the
conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK decided to sleep in the children's bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the beddings,
the accused-appellant barged into the room and berated her for refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted
to stay in the children's bedroom, the accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-appellant
further enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the family he could do whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his
role as patriarch, he ordered the children to go out of the room and thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He
forcibly pulled down her short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and
I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex." But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed his
134

shorts and briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying himself,
he got dressed, left the room as he chuckled: "Its nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." 135

Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must be proved is the absence of the victim's
consent to the sexual congress. 136

Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent machinations or
grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.

Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her through force and intimidation both of which
were established beyond moral certainty by the prosecution through the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz:

On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:

(Direct Examination)

ATTY. LARGO:

Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you remember what happened?

A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.

Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?

A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his hand.

Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?

A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or knocking her lap which means that he wanted to
have sex."

Q So, what did you do after that?

A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture the witness is sobbing)

Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?

A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was tom.
Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?

A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong.

xx xx

Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did he do?

A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.

Q So after that what else did he do?

A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how I wrestled but I failed because he is stronger than
me.

COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony.

ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)

Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode on you and held your two hands?

A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is aching."

Q How did you say that to your husband?

A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."

Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?

xxxx

A I shouted when I uttered that words.

xxxx

Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?

xxxx

A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything. 137

(Cross-Examination)

ATTY. AMARGA;

Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove your panty?

A Yes, Sir.

Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according to you he normally do that if he have sex with
you?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?

A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't want to have sex with him at that time.

Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?

A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.

xxxx

Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your nightgown?

A No, Sir.
Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?

A He raised my duster [sic] up.

Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?

A No, only on the breast level. 138

On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:

(Direct Examination)

ATTY. LARGO

Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?

A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie forcible.

Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?

A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot
withstand sex."

Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?

A It was tom.

Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?

A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me and succeeded in having sex with me. 139

The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping her hands, flexing her legs and then resting his
own legs thereon in order to facilitate the consummation of his much-desired non-consensual sexual intercourse.

Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His actuations prior to the actual moment of
the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed his distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay
with him on the bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.

The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their bed, when she insisted to sleep in the children's
bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance over her as husband all cowed KKK into submission.

The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched to
mean that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse that ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was
customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such act of KKK because at that juncture there
were no indications that sexual intercourse was about to take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the
same is legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the person from whom the consent was desired. The significant point
when consent must be given is at that time when it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case,
that point is when the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual
intercourse, which she refused.

Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.

We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit him to convey that she was resisting his sexual
onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape and the law does not impose upon the victim the burden to prove resistance much 140

more requires her to raise a specific kind thereof.

At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-appellant to recognize that she seriously did not
assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her panties to prevent him from undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and she
repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.

Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the desired result.
What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind or is of such
141

a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission. 142

Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack of a medical certificate do not
negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on the victim's underwear that determines the fact of rape inasmuch as a
143

medical certificate is dispensable evidence that is not necessary to prove rape. These details do not pertain to the elements that
144

produce the gravamen of the offense that is -sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. 145

The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy, the evidentiary circumstances of which are, however,
146

disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the testimony of the complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent, and was
controverted by the prosecution's medico-legal expert witness who stated that force was not applied based on the position of her
hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the absence of any sign of physical violence on the victim's body is an indication
of consent. Here, however, KKK's testimony is, as discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous and forthright.
147
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.

The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative value as they did not witness the actual rape is
bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who can
testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse. Hence, the probative value of MMM and OOO's testimonies rest not on
148

whether they actually witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony with KKK's narration of the circumstances,
preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape incidents.

MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration. MMM heard KKK shouting and crying: "Eddie, don’t do
that to me, have pity on me" on the night of October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant went to their conjugal
149

bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on her mother, the accused-appellant admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to aid her
mother who persistently cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the accused-appellant was prompted to open it and rebuke MMM once
more. OOO heard all these commotion from the room downstairs.

MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while her tom panty lay on the floor. After a brief
struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were finally able to escape and retreat to the children's bedroom where KKK
narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well. "

KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-appellant barged inside the children's bedroom.
The couple had an argument and when MMM tried to interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out after bragging
that he can have sex with his wife even in front of the children because he is the head of the family. The girls then stayed by the
staircase where they afterwards heard their mother helplessly crying and shouting for the accused-appellant to stop.

Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-appellant, through the use of force and
intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.

KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and physical resistance were clear manifestations
of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw her on the bed after the accused appellant opened the door on October 16, 1998, her
conduct towards the accused-appellant on her way out of the room, and her categorical outcry to her children after the two bedroom
episodes - all generate the conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were against her will.

Failure to immediately report to the


police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.

The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they failed to report the rape incidents to the police
authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults does not
necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained.
150

At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to submit to sexual intercourse is considered rape.
In fact, KKK only found out that she could sue his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told
her about it when she filed the separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries against the accused-appellant. 151

It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing marital exemption in rape cases
hence it is understandable that it was not yet known to a layman as opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique. In addition,
fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape victims from reporting the crime to the authorities is
more cumbersome in marital rape cases. This is in view of the popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife's absolute obligation to
submit to her husband's carnal desires. A husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or trivialized as
simple domestic trouble.

Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and public scrutiny that could have befallen KKK
and her family had the intervention of police authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable explanations for the failure
or delay in reporting the subject rape incidents.

The victim -S testimony on the


witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.

The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in view of the credible, candid and positive
testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial evidence carries more weight than the affidavit since it underwent the rudiments of
a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations. Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and
inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court.
152

Ill motive imputed to the victim

The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it is riddled with loopholes generated by
incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was able to establish that the ₱3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank account was
the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction sheet dated October 31,
1996 in the amount of ₱3,149,840.63 is the same amount the accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to her wife. Although the
accused-appellant denied being aware of such loan, he admitted that approximately ₱3 Million was spent for the construction of their
house. These pieces of evidence effectively belie the accused appellant's allegation that KKK could not account for the money
deposited in the bank. 153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how Bebs could be his wife KKK when the letter-
sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on October 28 while KKK's birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also did not present
Bebs herself, being a more competent witness to the existence of the alleged love letters for KKK. He likewise failed, despite promise to
do so, to present the original copies of such love letters neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed extra-marital affairs by presenting
witnesses who could corroborate his claims. Further, the Court finds it unbelievable that an able man would not have the temerity to
confront his wife who has fooled around with 10 men - some of whom he has even met. The accused-appellant's erratic statements on
the witness stand are inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it reasonable to infer that he merely made up those
malicious stories as a desperate ploy to extricate himself out of this legal quandary.

At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's unfounded suspicions that hold no evidentiary weight
in law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK's credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the defense failed to present sufficiently
convincing evidence that KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is harassing the accused-appellant with fabricated rape charges.

Alibi

It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the accused-appellant has essentially admitted the
facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the two criminal informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi
and any discussion thereon will thus be irrelevant.

At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.

Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper motive
to testify falsely.
154

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of
the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical
impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime was
committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the two places. 155

Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling com with
Equia on the dates of commission of the crime, the same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to adduce clear
and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the
commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be traversed by about four or five hours from Cagayan de Oro City, and even less
by private vehicle which was available to the accused appellant at any time. Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the
156

situs criminis at the dates and times when the two rape incidents were committed.

Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and credible testimony of the victim, and her two
daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter, especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to falsely testify against the
accused-appellant.

Conclusion

All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently overcome by KKK's clear, straightforward,
credible, and truthful declaration that on two separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her
consent and against her will. Evidence of overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is extant from KKK's narration as
believably corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based
thereon, the reason and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of
October 16 and 17, 1998.

Penalties

The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the accused-appellant for being in accord with
Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which
states that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua,
by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended." 157

The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of ₱50,000.00. Moral damages are granted to rape victims without need
of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent. 158

The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took place. Considering that the crime committed is
1âwphi1

simple rape, there being no qualifying circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate amount is ₱50,000.00 and not 159

₱75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.

To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic violence, an award of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages is imperative. 160

The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.161

A Final Note

Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's value and dignity as a human being. It
respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown
in the present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against her by her husband who vowed to
be her refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they seek
from their sexually coercive husbands.

Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not own his wife's body
by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and
thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to
engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor before the Family
Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.

Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological communion that achieves the marital purpose of
procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual
coercion or imposition.

The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing personalities may use this as a tool to
harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and
scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made
answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole. He is further
ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, for each count of rape. The award of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSMAIN


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
26 Am Jur SSS, p. 636.

2
Pursuant to People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640, 653-658.

3
Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr.,
concurring; rollo, pp. 5-30.

4
Issued by Judge Anthony E. Santos; records, pp. 760-769.

5
The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances and other information which tend to establish or compromise her
identity, as well as those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed to protect her privacy and
fictitious initials shall, instead, be used, in accordance with People v. Cabalquinto (533 Phil. 703 [2006]), and A.M. No. 04-11-
09-SC dated September 19, 2006.

6
Pre-trial Order dated November 16, 1999, records, pp. 71-74.

7
Id. at 23-24.

8
Id. at 3-5.
9
Id. at 2.

10
Id. at 13.

11
Id. at 27.

12
Id. at 44-48.

13
Id. at 50.

14
Id. at 49.

15
Id. at 84-85.

16
Exhibit "7".

17
Records, p. 89.

18
Id. at 86.

19
Id. at 87.

20
TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 93-95.

21
Id. at 98-99.

22
Id. at 101; TSN, July 3, 2000, p. 5.

23
TSN, February 10, 2000, pp. 26-27.

24
TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 21.

25
TSN, May 24, 2000, p. 99.

26
Id.

27
Id. at 100; TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 21-22.

28
TSN, February 4, 2000, p. 30.

29
TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 23.

30
TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 95-97.

31
TSN, July 3, 2000, p. 17; TSN, July 13, 2000, p. 14; KKK's Complaint Affidavit dated February 19, 1999, records, pp. 10-11.

32
TSN, July 3, 2000, pp. 6-7.

33
TSN, February 4, 2000, p. 37.

34
TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 8-9; TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 45-47; TSN, August 2, 2000, pp. 5-6.

35
TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 9-10; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 74-75.

36
TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 75-76.

37 38
Id. at 76-77.

38
Id. at 77-78.

39
Id. at 78-79; Exhibit "A".

40
TSN, July I 3, 2000, p. 11.

41
Id.

42
TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 79-81.

43
TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 46-47.

44
Id. at 49-50.
45
TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 8.

46
TSN, February 3, 2000, p. 11

47
Id. at 12; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 81-82.

48
TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 11-13; TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 8.

49
TSN, February 3, 2000, Id.

50
Id. at 14; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 82-83.

51
TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 56-59.

52
TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 14-15.

53
Id. at 16; TSN, May 24, 2000, p. 83; TSN, August 2, 2000, pp. 9-10.

54
TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 17-19; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 84-86; TSN, August 2, 2000, pp. 11-13.

55
TSN, February 10, 2000, pp. 40-41.

56
Id. at 44-45.

57
Exhibit "B".

58
TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 19-20; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 86-87; TSN, August 2, 2000, pp. 13-14.

59
TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 21-22; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 87-88; TSN, August 2, 2000, pp. 14-16.

60
TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 88-89.

61
Id. at 89-90.

62
Id. at 90; TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 23-24; TSN, August 2, 2000, pp. I 6, 18-19.

63
TSN, October 24, 2000, pp. 4-7.

64
Id. at 17.

65
TSN, April 30, 2001, pp. 6-8.

66
TSN, October 24, 2000, pp. 7, 10-11; Exhibit" I".

67
Id. at 7.

68
Id. at 12-13.

69
Also referred to as Bebie in the other parts of the records.

70
Id. at 14; Exhibit "3".

[[71] TSN, February 2, 2001, pp. 14-15.

72
Id. at 16-17.

73
TSN, October 24, 2000, pp. 19-21; TSN, March 12, 2001, p. 155.

74
TSN, October 24, 2000, p. 18.

75
Id. at 18-19; Exhibit "2".

76
Records, pp. 760-769.

77
Id. at 769.

78
Rollo, pp. 5-30.

79
Id. at 29.

80
Id. at 35-36; The contents of the Resolution was reiterated in another Resolution dated November 15, 2010, id. at 47-48.
81
Id. at 37-38.

82
Id. at 78-93.

Cassandra M. DeLaMothe, Liberta Revisited: A Call to Repeal the Marital Exemption for All Sex Offenses in New York's
83

Penal Law, 23 Fordham Urban Law Journal, p. 861 (1995). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj, last accessed on March 31, 2014.

84
Maria Pracher, The Marital Rape Exemption: A Violation of a Woman's Right of Privacy, 11 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., p. 725
(1981 ). http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol 11/iss3/1, last accessed on March 31, 2014.

85
Supra note 83.

86
Id.

87
Id. at 860.

88
Id. at 860-861, citing Arthur R. Cleveland, Woman Under the English Law 71 (Fred B. Rothman 7 Co. 1987) (1896), p. 24.

89
Id. at 859-860.

Id. at 860, citing l William Blackstone Commentaries *432 and Katherine M. Schelong, Domestic Violence and the State:
90

Responses to and Rationales for Spousal Battering, Marital Rape and Stalking, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 81 (1994).

91
Id., citing Schelong, 86. (Other citations omitted)

1 Hale, History of Pleas of the Crown, pp. 628-629 (1736), as cited in People v. Liberta, Court of Appeals of New York, 474
92

N.E. 2D 567 (1984).

93
Supra note 84, at 717. (Citations Omitted)

Julie Allison and Lawrence Wrightsman, Rape, The Misunderstood Crime, United States, Sage Publications, Inc., p. 87 (
94

1993).

95
74 Mass 489, as cited in People v. Liberta, supra note 92.

96
See People v. Liberta, supra note 92.

97
DeLaMothe, supra note 83, at 862, citing N.Y. Penal Law SS 2010 (Consol. 1909), viz:

"A person who penetrates an act of sexual intercourse with a female not his wife, against her will or without her
consent. .. [i]s guilty of rape in the first degree and punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty years.

A person who penetrates an act of sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife, under the age of eighteen years,
under circumstances not amounting to rape in the first degree, is guilty of rape in the second degree, and punishable
with imprisonment for not more than ten years."

Id., citing the 1922 case of People v. Meli (193 N .Y.S. 365 [Sup. Ct. 1922]). John Meli was convicted of rape for aiding and
98

abetting another man in raping his wife. Meli did not commit the rape himself but he was present while the rape was being
committed and he actually helped to overcome his wife.

99
Racquel Kennedy Bergen, Ph.D., Marital Rape, Applied Research Forum, National Electronic Network on Violence Against
Women, p. 2 (1999). www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/Marital Rape.pdf, last accessed on April 1, 2014, citing Bidwell, L., & White,
P., The family context of marital rape. The Journal of Family Violence, I, pp. 277-287 (1986) and Finkelhor, D., & Yllo, K.,
License to Rape: Sexual Abuse of Wives, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston (1985).

100
People v. Liberta, supra note 92.

101
Id.

102
Id.

Bergen, supra note 99, citing Bergen, R.K., Wife Rape: Understanding the Response of Survivors and Service Providers.
103

Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage (1996) and Russell, D.E.H., Rape in Marriage, New York, Macmillan Press (1990).

104
Tenure: November 20, 1985 to March 6, 1986.

105
Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Volume Ill, Central Lawbook Supply, Inc. (1988 Ed.), pp. 382-383.

http://pcw.gov.ph/intemational-commitments/cedaw/state-obligations, last visited on March 20, 2014; CEDAW came into


106

effect on September 4, 1981, the Philippines has signed it on July 17, 1980 and ratified it on July 19, 1981, the first
Association of South East Asian Nation country to do so.
CA Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal, Women Empowerment,
107

http://ca.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php?action=mnuactual_contents&ap=j8040&p=y, last accessed on April 1, 2014.

108
CEDA W, Article 2, Part I.

Also known as The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the law took effect on October 22, 1997; See People v. Maceda, 405 Phil. 698,
109

721 (2001).

110
Consideration of the Conference Committee Reports, September 3, 1997.

111
Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting, Committee on Revision of Laws J/W Committee on Women, March 17, 1997.

Sub-committee on Disadvantaged Women (Committee on Women) JT. Sub-committee on Criminal Laws Committee on
112

Revision of Laws), November 15, 1995.

113
Committee on Revision of Laws J/W Committee on Women, January 29, 1996.

114
ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004.

115
http://pcw.gov. ph/statistics/201304/statistics-vio lence-against-filipino-women, last visited on March 18, 2014.

116
CA rollo, pp. 150-151.

117
CEDAW, Article 5, Part I.

UN General Assembly, December 20, 1993. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48rl 04.htm, last accessed on April 1,
118

2014.

119
Id.

120
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article I:

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

121
UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, Article 4:

States should condemn violence against women and should not invoke any custom, tradition or religious
consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its elimination. States should pursue by all appropriate means
and without delay a policy of eliminating violence against women x x x.

Article 68. - The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
122

help and support. (Emphasis ours)

123
See Tsai v. CA, 334 Phil. 294, 304 (1997).

124
Id. at 304.

Refusal to have sexual intercourse must be rooted on psychological incapacity which in turn must be established by the
125

requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; Baccay v. Baccay, G.R. No. 173138, December 1, 2010, 636
SCRA 350, 368-369; See also the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion in the case stating that: "The failure
to consummate the marriage by itself, however, does not constitute as a ground to nullify the marriage. The spouse's refusal to
have intimate sexual relations must be due to causes psychological in nature, i.e., the psychological condition of the spouse
renders [her] incapable of having intimate sexual relations with the other. x x x." 636 SCRA 350, 375.

126
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 1.

127
City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 326 (2005).

128
Supra note 92.

Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, The Fourth World Conference on Women, September 15, 1995, paragraph 96.
129

http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf, last accessed on April 3, 2014. According to the Philippine


Commission on Women, the Philippines acceded to the commitments set forth in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action.

http://www.pcw.gov.ph/intemational-commitments, last accessed on April 3, 2014.

130
R.A. No. 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women), Section 3:

Principles of Human Rights of Women. - Human rights are universal and inalienable. All people in the world are
entitled to them. The universality of human rights is encompassed in the words of Article l of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, which states that all human beings are free and equal in dignity and rights. (Emphasis ours)
131
People v. Publico, G.R. No. 183569, April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 734, 742.

132
People v. Agustin, G.R. No. 194581, July 2, 2012, 675 SCRA 424, 434.

133
TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 75-81.

134
Id. at 87-89.

135
Id. at 89-90.

136
Sison v. People, G.R. No. 187229, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 645, 659.

137
TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 77-81.

138
TSN, July 13, 2000, pp. 10-11.

139
TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 88-89.

140
People v. Estoya, G.R. No. 200531, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 376, 386.

141
People v. Dimanawa, G.R. No. 184600, March 9, 20 I 0, 614 SCRA 770, 778.

142
People v. Magtibay, 435 Phil. 353, 365 (2002).

143
v. Baltazar, 397 Phil. 277, 288 (2000).

144
People of the Philippines v. Joey Bacatan, G.R. No. 203315, September 18, 2013.

145
Id.

146
321 Phil. 279 ( 1995).

147
Id. at 318.

148
People v. Cias, G.R. No. 194379, June I, 2011, 650 SCRA 326, 337.

149
TSN, February 3, 2000, p. IO; TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 48-50.

150
People v. Satioquia, 460 Phil. 167, 173 (2003).

151
TSN, July 3, 2000, pp. 13-14.

152
See People v. Cabtalan, G.R. No. I 75980, February I 5, 2012, 666 SCRA 174, 192-193.

153
TSN, November 21, 2000, pp. 13-14.

People v. Ogarte, G.R. No. 182690, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 395, 413, citing People v. Palomar, 343 Phil. 628, 663-664
154

(1997).

155
People v. Viojela, G.R. No. 177140, October 17, 2012, 684 SCRA 241, 257-258. 156

156
TSN, May 11, 2001, p. 171.

157
People of the Philippines v. Joey Bacatan, supra note 144.

158
Id.

159
Id.

160
Id.

161
Id.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 183094 September 22, 2010


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
REYNALDO BARDE, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated 24 September 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01245, which affirmed with
modifications, the Decision2 dated 29 January 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, 5th Judicial Region, Branch 1, in
Criminal Case No. 8661, finding herein appellant Reynaldo Barde (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
multiple murder with multiple frustrated murder. The appellate court, however, increased the penalty imposed upon the appellant by the
court a quo from reclusion perpetua to the ultimate penalty of death, being the maximum penalty prescribed by law, for the crime of
murder. In view, however, of the subsequent passage of Republic Act No. 9346 3 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the
appellate court reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court further increased the amount of moral and temperate
damages awarded by the court a quo to the heirs of each of the deceased victims from ₱30,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 and from ₱5,000.00
to ₱25,000.00, respectively. The heirs of each of the deceased victims were also awarded exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00. With
respect to the surviving victims, Purisima Dado (Purisima) and Ligaya Dado (Ligaya), the appellate court similarly increased the
temperate damages awarded to them by the court a quo from ₱5,000.00 to ₱25,000.00 each. They were also awarded exemplary
damages of ₱25,000.00 each.

On the other hand, appellant’s co-accused and brother, Jimmy Barde (Jimmy), was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove
conspiracy and for insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt for the crime charged. No civil liability has been adjudged against him as
there was no preponderance of evidence to prove the same.

Appellant and Jimmy were charged in an Information 4 dated 13 August 1999 with the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 15th day of April, 1999 at more or less 12:30 o’clock in the morning, at Sitio Santo Niño, Barangay Liguan,
Municipality of Rapu-Rapu, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
[appellant and Jimmy], conspiring and confederating and acting in concert to achieve a common purpose, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill and committed with the qualifying circumstances of treachery (alevosia), evident premeditation, and by
means of explosion, did then and there roll and explode a hand grenade (M26-A1 Fragmentation grenade) inside the dance area which
exploded and resulted to the instantaneous deaths of the following persons, to wit:

1. FRANCISCO BIAGO, JR. alias Tikboy5

2. ROGER SISO6

3. NICANOR OLOROSO

4. MARGIE BAÑADERA

5. VICTOR BAÑADERA

6. BIENVENIDO BAÑADERA

7. DIOSDADO BAÑADERA7

8. WILLIAM BUTIAL

9. MARYJANE BECHAYDA

10. RICHARD BLANSA8

11. EFREN YASUL9

12. JOSE BOMBALES10

13. DEONY BALIDOY11

14. DAISY OLOROZO12

15. ROLLY BELGA13

This single act of exploding the hand grenade (M26-A1 Fragmentation grenade) by the above-named [appellant and Jimmy] also
caused and resulted in the injuries and wounding on the different and various parts of the bodies of at least seventy six (76) persons,
namely, to wit:

1. JOEL MORALES 39. WILLIAM BALUTE, JR.

2. MARGARITA YASOL 40. JESUS CAÑO

3. SANTOS BAÑADERA, JR. 41. BIENVENIDO CAÑO


4. LEA BAÑADERA 42. VICTOR BORJAL

5. LIGAYA DADO14 43. VIRGILIO BALINGBING

6. VIRGILIO BAÑADERA 44. ALEJANDRO BALUTE

7. MANUEL BAÑADERA 45. GIL BINAMIRA, JR.

8. RODOLFO GALANG, JR. 46. RODELITA BARNEDO

9. PURISIMA DAO15 47. SANTIAGO BARNIDO

10. MELCHOR BALIDOY 48. LEVI MAGALONA

11. ABUNDIO BARCENILLA 49. JUANITO CAÑO

12. LOURDES BALIDOY 50. ARELFA BETCHAYDA

13. JULIO ROMANGAYA 51. EDITHA BELCHES

14. FRANDY SANGCAP 52. JANET BOMBALES

15. LOLIT BERSABE 53. MARILOU BETCHAYDA

16. DONDON BERSABE 54. MARIFE BETCHAYDA

17. FERMIN BARNEDO, JR. 55. ROSEMARIE BEQUIO

18. THERESA BAJARO 56. ALEXANDER BASALLOTE

19. ANTONIO ECAL 57. VICTOR BALLARES

20. FLORENCIA ECAL 58. LUIS OLOROSO, JR.

21. MA. NETOS ECAL 59. DOMINGO SISO

22. VENUS ECAL 60. DOMINGO MICALLER

23. NELIZ MORALINA 61. JENIFER OLOROSO

24. NORMA BAJARO 62. CATALINO ARCINUE

25. ALEX BAÑADERA 63. VIOLETA BUEMIA

26. ALADIN MORALINA 64. TIRSO BARBERAN

27. PEDRO BIÑAS, JR. 65. NELLY BUEMIA

28. ROMEO MORALINA 66. RODOLFO BOMBITA

29. PABLITO FORMENTO 67. BIENVENIDO BAÑADERA

30. ANGELES BOMBALES 68. BERNARDINO BARBERAN, JR.

31. SARDONINA BERSABE 69. MYLEN CERILLO

32. DOLORES BAÑADERA 70. DIONY BALIDOY

33. CATALINO BARRAMEDA 71. PO3 SAMUEL BATAS

34. ABIGAEL BROSO 72. LITO BERMAS

35. NILDA YASOL 73. JOSEPHINE BEJORO

36. ESPERANZA BARDE 74. ROGER BELARO

37. RYAN BALUTE 75. ADELA VERGARA

38. ROBERTO BETITO 76. VINCENT BERMEJO

these wounds and injuries caused being fatal and mortal; and thus the above-named [appellant and Jimmy] have already performed all
the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Multiple Murder but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the [appellant and Jimmy], that is, the able and timely medical assistance given to these victims which
prevented their deaths, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of those who died herein and also those who suffered injuries on
the various parts of their bodies.16 [Emphasis supplied].

Upon arraignment,17 appellant and Jimmy, assisted by counsels de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.

As culled from the records and testimonies of prosecution witnesses, the facts of this case are as follows:

On 14 April 1999, at around 9:00 p.m., Elmer Oloroso (Elmer), one of the prosecution witnesses and first cousin of appellant and
Jimmy, was at a dancing place18 at Sitio Sto. Niño, Liguan, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, to attend a dance held in connection with the feast day
celebration thereat. The dancing place, which was more or less ten (10) meters long and eight (8) meters wide, was enclosed by
bamboo fence and properly equipped with long benches. It was well-lighted by the fluorescent lights surrounding it and an oscillating
light located at the center thereof. While sitting on the bench inside the dancing place, near the front gate thereof, Elmer saw appellant
and Jimmy outside holding flashlights and focusing the same toward the people inside. 19

At around 11:00 p.m., Jimmy entered the dancing place and approached the person sitting beside Elmer. The latter overheard Jimmy
telling the person beside him to go out and look for their companions. Not long after, Jimmy went out of the dancing place and it was
the last time Elmer saw him on that particular day.20

Then, at around 12:00 midnight, which was already 15 April 1999, Elmer spotted appellant, who was wearing maong pants and maong
jacket with a belt bag tied around his waist, entered the dancing place and walked towards the people who were dancing. At that time,
Jimmy was no longer there. Elmer, who was only more or less three (3) meters away from the appellant, saw the latter get a rounded
object from his belt bag, which he believed to be a hand grenade as he has previously seen one from military men when he was in
Manila. Later, appellant pulled something from that rounded object, rolled it to the ground towards the center of the dancing place
where the people were dancing, and left immediately. Five seconds thereafter, the rounded object exploded. At that moment, appellant
was already one-half meter away from the gate of the dancing place.21

The lights went off, people scampered away, and many died and were seriously injured as a result of the said explosion. Elmer went
out of the dancing place, together with the crowd, through the destroyed bamboo fence. Realizing his brothers and sisters might still be
inside the dancing place, Elmer went back, together with the people carrying flashlights and torches, to look for his siblings. There he
saw the lifeless body of his brother, Nicanor Oloroso (Nicanor). His other brother, Luis Oloroso (Luis), on the other hand, was seriously
injured. Elmer’s two other siblings, Jenny and Edwin, both surnamed Oloroso, was slightly injured. Elmer immediately brought Luis at
Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital (BRTTH), Albay Provincial Hospital, where the latter was confined for almost three
months.22

The second prosecution witness, Antonio Barcelona (Antonio), corroborated Elmer’s testimony on material points. Antonio first met
appellant on 20 March 1999 as the latter’s brother, Rafael Barde (Rafael), invited him to their house to attend a dance in Mancao,
Rapu-Rapu, Albay. There they had a little conversation and appellant told Antonio that he would not enter any dancing place without
creating any trouble. On 14 April 1999 at around 9:30 p.m., Antonio again met appellant at the dancing place at Sitio Sto. Niño, Liguan,
Rapu-Rapu, Albay. While Antonio was inside the dancing place, appellant saw him and summoned him to go out. Then, Antonio and
appellant, who was then with his brothers, Jimmy and Joel, both surnamed Barde, conversed about their work. 23 Suddenly, appellant
uttered, "Diyan lang kamo, dai kamo maghale sa Tokawan na iyan, to kong may ribok man, yaon kami sa likod lang." 24 Appellant told
Antonio that he would just be behind him and his companions because there might be a trouble. Thereafter, Antonio went inside the
dancing place. 25

At about 11:30 p.m., the dance was declared open to all. At this juncture, appellant and his two brothers went inside the dancing place.
Jimmy then approached Antonio. Then, at around 12:30 a.m. of 15 April 1999, Antonio noticed appellant walking slowly towards the
crowd inside the dancing place with his hands partly hidden inside his maong jacket with an eagle figure at the back thereof. Suddenly,
appellant stopped, looked around, got something from his waist line, rolled it to the ground towards the crowd and hastily left. Antonio
confirmed that what was rolled to the ground by appellant was a grenade because after more or less four seconds that thing exploded.
Appellant was already in front of the gate of the dancing place when the explosion occurred. Antonio was not injured as he was more or
less four (4) meters away from the place where the explosion occurred. Darkness followed after the explosion as the lights went off.
People bustled. Many died and were injured.26

Other prosecution witnesses, Alexander Basallote (Alexander) and Nilda Yasol (Nilda) - the Barangay Captain of Liguan, Rapu-Rapu,
Albay, also corroborated the testimonies of Elmer and Antonio.

The prosecution likewise presented Senior Police Officer 2 Hipolito Talagtag (SPO2 Talagtag), 27 who was assigned at R-4 Division,
Explosive and Ordinance Disposal, Police Regional Office 5 at Camp Simeon Ola, Legazpi City. On 15 April 1999, SPO2 Talagtag
received a call from Colonel Delos Santos (Col. Delos Santos), Chief of R-4 Division, Supply of RECOM 5, informing him about the
explosion incident happened in a dancing place at Sitio Sto. Niño, Liguan, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, and asking assistance from them. In
response thereto, a team was organized composed of members from the Crime Laboratory, IID Investigators, CIS Investigating Agents
and the Explosive Ordinance Team. Thereafter, the team proceeded to the scene of the crime. They reached the place at more or less
11:00 a.m. of 16 April 1999. The team found a crater inside the dancing place that served as their lead in determining the kind of
explosive used. In the course of their investigation, they interviewed people living nearby who told them that the explosion was loud.
Later, SPO2 Talagtag placed a magnet in the crater inside the dancing place and recovered several shrapnels similar to those that can
be found in an M26-A1 fragmentation grenade. By reason thereof, SPO2 Talagtag concluded that the explosion was caused by an
M26-A1 fragmentation grenade. Thereafter, the recovered shrapnels were turned over to the crime laboratory at Camp Simeon Ola,
Legazpi City, for examination.28
1avvphi 1

Engineer Ma. Julieta Razonable (Engr. Razonable), Police Senior Inspector and Forensic Chemical Officer assigned at Camp Simeon
Ola, Legazpi City, received the specimen, i.e., the shrapnels recovered at the scene of the crime, for physical examination. Her
examination yielded positive result, meaning, the specimen submitted to her were part of a hand grenade fragmentation, M26-A1.29 This
result was subsequently reduced into writing as evidenced by Physical Identification Report No. PI-601-A-99 dated 16 April 1999.30

In his defense, appellant vehemently denied the charge against him and offered a different version of the incident.

Appellant asseverated that at around 7:00 p.m. on 14 April 1999 he was at home in Mancao, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, organizing the plates,
spoons, forks and other kitchen utensils that they were about to bring to the house of Teodora Arsenue (Teodora) at Sitio Sto. Niño,
Liguan, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, in connection with the feast day celebration in the said place. Then, at around 7:30 p.m., the appellant,
together with his mother Gloria Barde (Gloria) and brothers Jimmy, Joel, Rafael, Jovito, Jr., all surnamed Barde, proceeded to the
house of Teodora and reached the same before 9:00 p.m. Teodora offered them food. After eating, they acceded to the suggestion of
Jovito, Jr., to go to the dancing place also located at Sitio Sto. Niño, Liguan, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, only a ten minute-walk away from the
house of Teodora.31

Upon reaching the dancing place, they stayed outside as they had no tickets. At around 11:30 p.m., through the help of William Gutchal
(William),32 appellant and his brothers Joel and Jimmy, both surnamed Barde, were able to enter the dancing place while his mother
and other brothers remained outside. They immediately proceeded to the left side of the dancing place near the baffles of the sound
system and stood behind the benches as the same were already occupied. The three of them remained in that place until the explosion
occurred inside the dancing place, which was more or less twenty-five (25) meters away from them. The people dancing in the area of
the explosion died and some were injured.33
Appellant claimed that he had no idea how the explosion started because at that time he and his brother Jimmy were talking to Roger
Springael (Roger), who was standing outside the bamboo fence surrounding the dancing place, as the latter was interested in buying a
fighting cock from him. His other brother, Joel, was also with them, but he was sleeping. In the course of their conversation, he
suddenly heard an explosion. All lights went off and there was a total blackout inside the dancing place. People were then pushing each
other in order to get out. Appellant was able to go out and run towards a lighted place nearby. When the people carrying torches came,
appellant went back to the dancing place to look for his mother and brothers. It was already 2:00 a.m. of 15 April 1999, when he saw his
mother and brothers. They went home afterwards. When they reached their house, appellant and his father went to the house of his
injured cousin to inform the latter’s family of what happened. 34

The following day, or on 16 April 1999, appellant and Jimmy were invited by Police Officer, Efren Cardeño (Cardeño), at Camp Simeon
Ola, Legazpi City, to be utilized as witnesses to the explosion incident happened on 15 April 1999. They refused the invitation as they
did not actually witness the explosion. But, Cardeño insisted. On 17 April 1999, appellant and Jimmy went with Cardeño at Camp
Simeon Ola, Legazpi City. Thereafter, they did not see Cardeño anymore. 35

While appellant was at Camp Simeon Ola, Legazpi City, he was brought in one of the offices there and was told to be a witness to the
explosion incident happened at Sitio Sto. Niño, Liguan, Rapu-Rapu, Albay. Shortly thereafter, the investigator showed him a typewritten
document and was ordered to sign the same but, he refused because he did not understand its contents. Appellant maintained that he
was even promised money and work should he sign it and testify but, once again, he refused. Due to his incessant refusal, he was
ordered to go out. There he saw Jimmy who told him that he was also made to sign a certain document but, he also refused. 36

Between 10:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. of 17 April 1999, appellant and Jimmy were awakened but the latter continued sleeping. As such, it
was only appellant who was brought in another room and was made to drink wine by persons in civilian clothes. When appellant
declined, he was then accused as the person responsible for the explosion incident. Appellant, however, strongly denied the
accusation. At this instance, appellant was kicked and boxed and was ordered to admit the accusation but he refused to admit it.
Appellant was subsequently brought inside a detention cell. When he met Jimmy, the latter told him that he was also tortured. 37

The next day, or on 18 April 1999, appellant and Jimmy were brought at the office of a certain General Navarro and they were ordered
to stand up with more than 30 people. Later, Antonio arrived. Appellant avowed that a certain person in civilian clothes instructed
Antonio to point at them as the perpetrators of the explosion incident, which Antonio did. When they were pinpointed as the authors of
the crime, they neither reacted nor denied the accusations. Afterwards, appellant and Jimmy were brought back inside their detention
cell.38

Appellant similarly denied having met Antonio on 20 March 1999 at a dance in Mancao, Rapu-Rapu, Albay. Appellant likewise denied
having told Antonio that whenever he enters a dance hall he would always create trouble. Appellant maintained that he saw Antonio for
the first time when the latter pinpointed him and Jimmy at the office of a certain General Navarro. The second time was when Antonio
testified in court. Appellant, however, confirmed that Elmer is his first cousin and he did not know any reason why he would accuse him
with such a grave offense. 39

Other defense witnesses, Roger, Jimmy and Gloria corroborated appellant’s testimony.

Wilfredo Echague (Wilfredo), a radio broadcaster at Radio Filipino, DWRL, since 19 February 1991, testified that on 11 August 2001
while conducting series of interviews in relation to the explosion incident that happened on 15 April 1999 at Sitio Sto. Niño, Liguan,
Rapu-Rapu, Albay, he met Violeta Buemia (Violeta) at the latter’s residence in Cabangan, Villa Hermosa, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, who
claimed personal knowledge about the explosion incident. Wilfredo’s interview on Violeta was recorded by the former. On 17 August
2001, he accompanied Violeta to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Legazpi City, where she executed her sworn statement
before Atty. Raymundo D. Sarga, Jr. (Atty. Sarga), Head Agent of NBI, Legazpi City. 40

Violeta affirmed that Wilfredo had interviewed her regarding the explosion incident and he had also accompanied her in executing her
sworn statement before the NBI, Legazpi City.41 During her testimony, she disclosed that at around 10:00 p.m. of 14 April 1999, she and
her daughter entered the dancing place at Sto. Niño, Liguan, Rapu-Rapu, Albay. Her daughter sat down while she stood near the gate.
At round 12:00 a.m., which was already 15 April 1999, she went out to urinate. In a distance of more or less two (2) meters, she saw
Eddie Oloroso (Eddie) standing outside the dancing place and then throw something inside that hit the wire beside a fluorescent bulb
causing some sparks. The place became very bright and she confirmed that it was really Eddie who threw that something. Eddie then
ran away. The thing exploded when it fell on the ground. The place became dark thereafter. She was hit by the flying pebbles coming
from the explosion. She then looked for her daughter and was able to find her. Many died and seriously injured in the said explosion
incident.42

Violeta also explained that it took her more than two years after the incident happened to come out and testify because she was afraid.
Her conscience, however, kept bothering her so she decided to divulge what she knew about the incident. 43 Later in her testimony,
Violeta admitted that she saw Eddie outside the dancing place and it was appellant and Jimmy, whom she saw sitting inside the
dancing place at the far end of the fence.44

Finding the defense of appellant and Jimmy unmeritorious vis-a-vis the evidence proffered by the prosecution, the trial court rendered
its Decision on 29 January 2005 finding appellant guilty of the complex crime of multiple murder with multiple frustrated murder and
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to pay the legal heirs of each of the deceased victims the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱5,000.00 as temperate damages, as well as each of the
surviving victims, Purisima and Ligaya, the amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral damages and ₱5,000.00 as temperate/actual damages.
Jimmy, on the other hand, was acquitted of the crime charged for the prosecution’s failure to prove conspiracy and for insufficiency of
evidence. No civil liability was adjudged against him there being no preponderance of evidence to prove the same. 45

Aggrieved, appellant moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid RTC Decision but it was denied in an Order46dated 15 June 2005
for lack of merit.

Accordingly, appellant elevated the 29 January 2005 RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals with the lone assignment of error, thus:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [APPELLANT] GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.47
On 24 September 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is Denied. The Decision dated [29 January 2005] of the [RTC] of Lega[z]pi City, Branch 1, in Criminal Case
No. 8661, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that:

1. The [appellant] shall suffer the penalty of Death. However, in view of the subsequent passage of R.A. No. 9346, which was
approved on [24 June 2006], which repealed R.A. No. 8177 48 and R.A. No. 7659,49 the penalty of Death is REDUCED to
RECLUSION PERPETUA.

2. The [appellant] is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the amount of ₱50,000.00, as moral
damages, ₱25,000.00, as temperate damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. [Appellant] is also ordered to pay
each Purisima Dado and Ligaya Dado temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 and exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱25,000.00.50 [Emphasis supplied].

Appellant moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision, but to no avail.51

Unable to accept his conviction, appellant appeals to this Court reiterating the same assignment of error he raised before the Court of
Appeals, to wit: the trial court gravely erred in finding appellant guilty of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Appellant asserts that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the evidence presented by the prosecution was not
sufficient to overcome his constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. He casts doubts on the credibility of prosecution
witness Elmer because his statements were replete with inconsistencies. According to appellant, Elmer, at first, declared that after the
explosion, lights went off and he saw appellant leave the dancing place but Elmer later stated that immediately after appellant threw the
grenade, the latter went out and upon reaching the gate, the explosion occurred. These inconsistent statements of Elmer allegedly
created doubts as to what actually transpired and who the real culprit was. Appellant then claims that there is a possibility that Elmer is
a rehearsed witness as such inconsistencies relate to material points.

Appellant’s contentions are not well-founded, thus, his conviction must stand.

Primarily, it has been jurisprudentially acknowledged that when the issues revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of
fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is because the trial court has the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth. 52 In this case,
it is notable that the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the trial court, according credence and great weight to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Settled is the rule that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court, 53 unless the trial court had overlooked, disregarded,
misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and significance which if considered would have altered the result of
the case.54 None of these circumstances is attendant in this case. This Court, thus, finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual
findings arrived at by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Prosecution witnesses, Elmer and Antonio, actually witnessed the explosion incident. Both of them narrated in detail the events that
transpired prior, during and after the explosion. They had a vivid recollection of how appellant entered the dancing place, walked
towards the people who were dancing, got a rounded object from the belt bag tied on his waist, pulled something from it, rolled it to the
ground towards the people who were dancing and left the place rapidly. Immediately thereafter, the explosion occurred. The trial court
characterized their testimonies as candid, spontaneous and straightforward that despite rigid cross-examination their testimonies on
who and how the crime was committed remained unshaken and undisturbed. 55

With certainty, these prosecution witnesses positively identified appellant as the person who rolled a rounded object, which was later
confirmed as an M26-A1 fragmentation grenade, towards the people who were dancing, the explosion killing and causing injuries to
many. The identity of appellant was clear to the prosecution witnesses because the dancing place where the explosion occurred was
well lighted. Besides, Elmer and Antonio knew the appellant well. Elmer is appellant’s first cousin. Antonio met appellant prior to the
explosion incident at a dance in Mancao, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, where they engaged in some conversations. Given these circumstances,
the prosecution witnesses could not have been mistaken as to appellant’s identity.

The records were also wanting in evidence that would show that these witnesses were impelled by improper motive to impute such a
grave offense against the appellant. Even appellant himself admitted that he did not know any reason why Elmer would accuse him with
such an offense with pernicious consequences on his life and liberty, considering the fact that they are relatives.

It bears stressing that Elmer’s brother, Nicanor, died, his other brother, Luis, was seriously injured and almost died and his two other
siblings were also injured because of the explosion. Elmer had more than enough reason to identify the appellant. 56 Indeed, his
relationship to the victims cannot be taken against him and it does not automatically impair his credibility and render his testimony less
worthy of credence since that no improper motive can be ascribed to him for testifying. 57 It would be unnatural for a relative who is
interested in seeking justice for the victims to testify against an innocent person and allow the guilty one to go unpunished.58 Rather, his
inherent desire to bring to justice those whom he personally knew committed a crime against his close relative makes his identification
of the appellant all the more credible.59

In comparison with the clear and straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses, all that appellant could muster is the defense of
denial and alibi. It is well-entrenched that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have always been viewed with disfavor by the courts
due to the facility with which they can be concocted. They warrant the least credibility or none at all and cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses. 60 For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-
serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.61 Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification is inherently weak and if
uncorroborated regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 62
In this case, appellant himself and all his witnesses admitted that appellant was at the scene of the crime until the explosion occurred.
With that, the defense ultimately failed to meet the necessary requisites for the proper invocation of alibi as a defense.

Appellant’s defense of denial cannot also be given any considerable weight as it was unsubstantiated. The testimony of Violeta pointing
at Eddie as the real culprit is intended to bolster appellant’s defense of denial. However, it cannot be given credence. Her testimony
was given only after more than two years from the time the incident happened, and she failed to offer any convincing evidence to justify
such delay. Records do not show that there was any threat on Violeta’s life that might have prevented from coming out to testify. She
herself admitted that after the explosion incident she did not see Eddie anymore. Eddie then could not have possibly threatened her.
She could freely testify on what she knew about the explosion incident had she wanted to. Her alleged fear is unfounded. It cannot
justify her long delay in disclosing it before the court a quo. Moreover, if she was, indeed, afraid, she would not have allowed herself to
be interviewed by a radio broadcaster and would not have divulged to him all that she knew about the incident. Instead of directly
disclosing it to the proper authorities, she had chosen to tell it first to a radio broadcaster. Further, the only reason she gave the court
for her silence of more than two years was that she began to be bothered by her conscience as she recently kept on dreaming of those
who died in the explosion incident especially during "All Souls Day." Violeta, in other words, cannot rely on the doctrine that delay of
witnesses in revealing what they know about a crime is attributable to their natural reticence against involvement therein. 63

More telling is Violeta’s categorical admission that Eddie was outside the dancing place and it was appellant whom she saw inside the
dancing place prior to the explosion incident. With this testimony, Violeta made appellant’s defense of denial even weaker.

In light of the categorical and positive identification of the appellant by prosecution witnesses, without any showing of ill-motive on the
part of the latter testifying on the matter, appellant's defense of bare denial and alibi cannot prosper. 64

As regards the alleged inconsistencies on Elmer’s narration of events, this Court considers the same trivial, inconsequential and do not
affect the credibility of the statement that it was appellant who rolled the hand grenade towards the people dancing inside the dancing
place, the explosion killing and injuring scores of victims. Furthermore, the alleged inconsistencies pointed to by appellant have been
properly clarified in the course of Elmer’s testimony. As the Court of Appeals stated in its Decision, thus:

Records reveal that during the direct examination, Elmer testified that immediately after the [appellant] rolled the grenade, he went out
and when he was about to reach the gate the grenade exploded, while on cross-examination, Elmer testified that he saw [appellant]
leave the [dancing place] after the explosion. However, when the trial court and [appellant’s counsel] asked him about the
inconsistency, Elmer clarified and confirmed that [appellant] left the dance place before the explosion.65

Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to minor and insignificant details do not destroy their credibility. They,
instead, manifest truthfulness and candor and erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 66

All told, this Court affirms the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that, indeed, appellant was the author of the explosion
incident that happened on 15 April 1999 inside the dancing place at Sitio Sto. Niño, Liguan, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, which took away the
lives and caused injuries to the people thereat.

As to the crime committed. The trial court and the appellate court convicted appellant of the complex crime of multiple murder with
multiple frustrated murder. This Court believes, however, that appellant should only be convicted of the complex crime of multiple
murder with double attempted murder.

Appellant’s act of detonating a hand grenade, particularly an M26-A1 fragmentation grenade, inside the dancing place at Sitio Sto.
Niño, Liguan, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, resulted in the death of 15 people, namely: Francisco Biago, Jr., Roger Siso, Nicanor Oloroso, Margie
Bañadera, Victor Bañadera, Bienvenido Bañadera, Diosdado Bañadera, William Butial, Maryjane Bechayda, Richard Blansa, Efren
Yasul, Jose Bombales, Deony Balidoy, Daisy Olorozo and Rolly Belga. The fact of death of these deceased victims was evidenced by
their respective certificates of death and testimonies of their respective relatives. The defense similarly admitted that these victims died
as a result of the explosion incident.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the
defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

xxxx

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall
of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin. [Emphasis
supplied].

From the afore-quoted provision of law, the killing of the aforesaid deceased victims with the use of explosive, i.e., hand grenade
particularly M26-A1 fragmentation grenade, certainly qualifies the crime to murder.

Treachery, which was alleged in the Information, also attended the commission of the crime. Time and again, this Court, in a plethora of
cases, has consistently held that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from
the defense that the offended party might make. There are two (2) conditions that must concur for treachery to exist, to wit: (a) the
employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or
method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. 67 "The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape."68

As elucidated by the trial court in its Decision:


The victims were completely unaware of the danger forthcoming to them as they were in the midst of enjoying a dance. The [appellant]
who caused the rolling of the hand grenade was at a complete advantage knowing that no risk to his life was involved as he can
immediately fled [and] run away from the scene of the crime before any explosion could occur. There was no defense so to speak of
that may came from the victims because they were completely unaware of the danger about to happen in their midst resulting as it did
to deaths and injuries to many people among the crowd dancing. The act of rolling the hand grenade is unpardonable. It is a
treacherous heinous act of the highest order. The victims can do nothing but to cry to high heavens for vengeance.

xxxx

As supported by the evidence adduced at the trial, [it] is fully convinced that the crime charge was committed under a cloak of
treachery, and there is no doubt about it. The attacker suddenly came armed with a live fragmentation grenade, removed its pin and
threw it towards the crowd who were enjoying a dance, unsuspecting of any danger that larks in their midst, thereby depriving them of
any real opportunity to defend themselves. The attacker has employed a swift and unexpected attack to insure its execution without risk
to himself x x x.69

As the killing, in this case, is perpetrated with both treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying
circumstance since it is the principal mode of attack. Reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense while
treachery will be considered merely as a generic aggravating circumstance. 70

The Information also alleged that evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime. For evident premeditation to be
appreciated, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an
overt act showing that the accused clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a period of time between the
decision and the execution of the crime sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act. 71 However, none of
these elements could be gathered from the evidence on record.

Appellant’s act of detonating a hand grenade, particularly M26-A1 fragmentation grenade, inside the dancing place at Sitio Sto. Niño,
Liguan, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, likewise resulted in the wounding of several persons. But, out of the 76 injured victims named in the
Information, only Purisima and Ligaya, both surnamed Dado, appeared personally in court to testify on the injuries and damages
sustained by them by reason thereof.

Purisima affirmed that after the explosion she was brought to the hospital because she suffered punctured wounds on her legs and
forehead by reason thereof. Also, she was not able to walk for two (2) weeks. She was not confined though. 72 She was issued medical
certificate73 dated 23 April 1999 in relation thereto stating that her injuries will incapacitate her or will require medical assistance for one
to two weeks. Her testimony, as well as her medical certificate, however, never mentioned that the wounds or injuries sustained by her
were fatal or mortal and had it not for the timely medical assistance accorded to her she would have died. In the same way, Ligaya
stated that because of the explosion she suffered blasting injuries on her chest and right forearm. She was confined and treated for five
days at BRTTH, Legazpi City,74 as evidenced by her medical certificate75 dated 26 April 1999. There was also no mention that her
injuries and wounds were mortal or fatal.

Despite the fact that the injuries sustained by Purisima and Ligaya were not mortal or fatal, it does not necessarily follow that the crimes
committed against them were simply less serious physical injuries,76 because appellant was motivated by the same intent to kill when
he detonated the explosive device inside the dancing place.77 Since the injuries inflicted upon them were not fatal and there was no
showing that they would have died if not for the timely medical assistance accorded to them, the crime committed against them is
merely attempted murder.

As this Court has previously stated, the rest of the injured victims named in the Information failed to testify. Though their medical
certificates were attached in the records, they were not marked as exhibits and were not formally offered as evidence by the
prosecution. Consequently, this Court cannot consider the same to hold that the crime committed as to them is frustrated murder and to
grant damages in their favor. This Court has held in People v. Franco,78 thus:

We thus reiterate the rule that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. So fundamental is this
injunction that litigants alike are corollarily enjoined to formally offer any evidence which they desire the court to consider. Mr. Chief
Justice Moran explained the rationale behind the rule in this wise:

The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties to the suit.79 [Emphasis supplied].

Without the testimonies of the other injured victims or their medical certificates, the court will have no basis to hold that appellant
committed the crime of frustrated murder as to them.

Given the foregoing, it is clear that this case falls under the first clause of Article 4880 of the Revised Penal Code because by a single
act, that of detonating an explosive device inside the dancing place, appellant committed two grave felonies, namely, (1) murder as to
the 15 persons named in the Information; and (2) attempted murder as to Purisima and Ligaya.

Therefore, this Court holds appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of multiple murder with double attempted
murder.

As to penalty. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code explicitly states:

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. [Emphasis supplied].

A complex crime is committed when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. Appellant’s single act of
detonating an explosive device may quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component
criminal offenses should be considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed because the offender was
impelled by a single criminal impulse which shows his lesser degree of perversity. 81 Thus, applying the aforesaid provision of law, the
maximum penalty for the most serious crime, which is murder, is death. Pursuant, however, to Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits
the imposition of the death penalty, the appellate court properly reduced the penalty of death, which it previously imposed upon the
appellant, to reclusion perpetua.

As to damages. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are
entitled to be indemnified for the death of the victim without need of any evidence or proof thereof.82 Moral damages like civil indemnity,
is also mandatory upon the finding of the fact of murder. 83 To conform with recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the proper
imposable penalty is death, if not for Republic Act No. 9346, the award of civil indemnity and moral damages to the heirs of each of the
deceased victims are both increased to ₱75,000.00 each. 84

It is settled that exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of civil liability if the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances.85 In this case, the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the
crime. The award of exemplary damages, therefore, is in order. To conform to current jurisprudence, this Court likewise increased the
award of exemplary damages given by the appellate court to the heirs of each of the deceased victims to ₱30,000.00 each.86

Actual damages cannot be awarded for failure to present the receipts covering the expenditures for the wake, coffin, burial and other
expenses for the death of the victims. In lieu thereof, temperate damages may be recovered where it has been shown that the victim’s
family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty as provided for under Article 2224 of the
Civil Code.87 This Court finds the award of ₱25,000.00 each to the heirs of each of the deceased victims proper.

The surviving victims, Purisima and Ligaya, are also entitled to moral, temperate and exemplary damages.

Ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that the wounds inflicted upon the surviving victims, Purisima and Ligaya would
naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injuries. It is only justifiable to grant them moral
damages in the amount of ₱40,000.00 each in conformity with this Court’s ruling in People v. Mokammad. 88

This Court affirms the appellate court’s award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages to each of the surviving victims, Purisima and
Ligaya. It is beyond doubt that these two surviving victims were hospitalized and spent money for their medication. However, Purisima
failed to present any receipt for her hospitalization and medication. Nevertheless, it could not be denied that she suffered pecuniary
loss; thus, it is only prudent to award ₱25,000.00 to her as temperate damages. 89 Ligaya, on the other hand, presented receipts for her
hospitalization and medication but the receipts were less than ₱25,000.00. In People v. Magdaraog 90 citing People v. Andres,
Jr.,91 when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than ₱25,000.00 as in this case, the award of temperate
damages for ₱25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount.

Finally, the award of exemplary damages is also in order considering that the crime was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.92 The award of exemplary damages to Purisima and Ligaya is increased to ₱30,000.00 to conform to current jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01245 dated 24 September 2007 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is found guilty of the complex crime of multiple murder with double attempted
murder. In view, however, of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole. The award of civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages to the
heirs of each of the deceased victims are hereby increased to ₱75,000.00, ₱75,000.00, and ₱30,000.00, respectively. The surviving
victims, Purisima and Ligaya, are also awarded moral damages of ₱40,000.00 each. The award of exemplary damages to these
surviving victims is likewise increased to ₱30,000.00 each.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES* PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Per Special Order No. 884, Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales is designated as an additional member of the First
Division in place of Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, who is on Official Leave.

1Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and
Sesinando E. Villon, concurring. Rollo, pp. 3-23.

2 Penned by Judge Romeo S. Dañas. CA rollo, pp. 13-49.

3Also known as, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." It was signed into law on 24 June
2006.

4 Records, pp. 166-168.

5 As evidenced by Certificate of Death dated 5 July 1999. Exhibit "1," records, p. 373.

6 As evidenced by Certificate of Death dated 19 April 1999, Exhibit "F," id. at 370.

7 Per Certificate of Death dated 16 April 1999, it should be "Diosdado Bañadera, Jr., Exhibit "L," id. at 29.

8
In Richard’s Certificate of Death dated 3 May 1999 his surname is spelled as "Blanza," Exhibit "K," id. at 375.

9 In Efren’s Certificate of Death dated 19 April 1999, his surname is spelled as "Yasol," Exhibit "G," id. at 371.

10 As evidenced by Certificate of Death dated 21 May 1999, Exhibit "H," id. at 372.

11
Per Certificate of Death dated 21 April 1999, Balidoy’s first name is spelled as "Junnie," Exhibit "P," id. at 380.

12 Per Certificate of Death dated 15 April 1999, Daisy’s surname is spelled as "Oloroso," Exhibit "J," id. at 374.

13 As evidenced by Certificate of Death dated 23 April 1999, Exhibit "M," id. at 28.

14 As evidenced by Medical Certificate dated 26 April 1999, Exhibit "R," id. at 382.

15
As evidenced by Medico-legal Certificate issued on 23 April 1999, Exhibit "Q," id. at 381.

16 Records, pp. 166-168.

17 Per Order dated 19 October 1999, id. at 201.

18It was simply called a "dancing place," instead of dancing hall because it was just an open space properly enclosed with
bamboo fence.

19 TSN, 12 November 1999, pp. 6-10, 12-13 and 35; TSN, 17 November 1999, pp. 5 and 38; TSN, 25 November 1999, p. 7.

20 TSN, 12 November 1999, pp. 11 and 13.

21TSN, 12 November 1999, pp. 14-16, 20, 23, 53 and 63; TSN, 17 November 1999, pp. 8 and 29-31; TSN, 18 November
1999, pp. 14 and 37; TSN, 24 November 1999, pp. 9-12; TSN, 25 November 1999, p. 3.

22 TSN, 12 November 1999, pp. 22-24, 26-32, 36-39 and 43; TSN, 18 November 1999, pp. 12-13.

23 TSN, 26 November 1999, pp. 4-7 and 24; TSN, 9 February 2000, p. 50.

24 TSN, 26 November 1999, p. 9.

25 Id. at 10.

26 Id. at 12-17, 21-22; TSN 10 February 2000, pp. 19 and 22.

27
He is a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) since 1981. In 1998, he had undergone training at Camp Bagong
Diwa, Taguig City, as scout ranger, airborne SWAT and in Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD). During the course of his
training, he studied different kinds of explosives, i.e., hand grenade, riffle grenade, bombs, TNT, death cord and the like. He
was able to complete the 45 days of training in the said field [TSN, 28 September 2000, pp. 3-5].

28 TSN, 28 September 2000, pp. 7-16.

29 TSN, 11 January 2001, pp. 3-4.

30 Exhibit "O," Records, pp. 4-5.

31 TSN, 16 May 2003, pp. 4-9.


32 Sometimes spelled as Butial.

33
TSN, 16 May 2003, pp. 10-15.

34 Id. at 16-21.

35 Id. at 24-28.

36
Id. at 29-32.

37 Id. at 33- 38.

38
TSN, 18 July 2003, pp. 4-8.

39 Id. at 10-11 and 19.

40 TSN, 5 December 2001, pp. 3-15.

41 TSN, 16 May 2002, p.4.

42 TSN, 10 April 2002, pp. 6-17.

43 TSN, 16 May 2002, pp. 6-8.

44 TSN, 10 July 2001, pp. 5-6.

45 CA rollo, pp. 46-49

46
Records, pp. 625-630.

47 CA rollo, pp. 66-67.

48"An Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection as the Method of Carrying Out Capital Punishment Amending for the Purpose
of Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7659."

"An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as
49

amended, other Special Penal Laws and for Other Purposes."

50 CA rollo, pp. 21-22.

51 Id. at 211.

52
People v. Lalongisip, G.R. No. 188331, 16 June 2010.

53 People v. Beltran, Jr., G.R. No. 168051, 27 September 2006, 503 SCRA 715, 730.

54
People v. Cahindo, 334 Phil. 507, 512 (1997).

55 CA rollo, p. 40.

56 People v. Gaviola, 384 Phil. 314, 319 (2000).

57 People v. Batidor, 362 Phil. 673, 685 (1999).

58 People v. Gaviola, supra note 56; People v. Batidor, id.

59 People v. Gaviola, id. at 319-320.

60 People v. Estepano, 367 Phil. 209, 217-218 (1999).

61 People v. Berdin, 462 Phil. 290, 304 (2003).

62 People v. Francisco, 397 Phil. 973, 985 (2000).

63
People v. Berja, 331 Phil. 514, 526 (1996).

64
People v. Ondalok, 339 Phil. 17, 26 (1997).

65 Rollo, p. 18.

66 People v. Mallari, 369 Phil. 872, 884-885 (1999).


67 People v. Mokammad, G.R. No. 180594, 19 August 2009, 596 SCRA 497, 509.

68
People v. Lansang, 436 Phil. 71, 78 (2002).

69 CA rollo, pp. 37-38.

70 Malana v. People, G.R. No. 173612, 26 March 2008, 549 SCRA 451, 470-471.

71
People v. Caballes, G.R. Nos. 102723-24, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 83, 97-98.

72 TSN, 11 January 2001, pp. 9-10.

73
Records, p. 381.

74 TSN, 11 January 2001, pp. 12-14.

75 Records, p. 382.

76ART. 265. Less serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall inflict upon another physical injuries not described in the
preceding articles, but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical
attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
[Revised Penal Code].

77 Malana v. People, supra note 70.

78
336 Phil. 206 (1997).

79 Id. at 210.

80ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period. (As amended by Act No. 4000).

81
Malana v. People, supra note 70 at 468.

82 People v. Galladan, 376 Phil. 682, 687 (1999).

83
People v. Catian, 425 Phil. 364, 380 (2002).

84
People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 188610, 29 July 2010 citing People v. Regalario, G.R. No. 174483, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA
738.

85 People v. Alajay, 456 Phil. 83, 96 (2003).

86 People v. Sanchez, supra note 84.

87 Nueva España v. People, G.R. No. 163351, 21 June 2005, 460 SCRA 547, 557.

88 Supra note 67 at 513.

89
People v. Mokammad, supra note 67.

90 G.R. No. 151251, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 529, 543.

91 456 Phil. 355 (2003).

92 People v. Mokammad, supra note 67 at 513.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. 137347 March 4, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,


vs.
PO3 FERDINAND FALLORINA Y FERNANDO, appellant.
DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

For automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, convicting appellant PO3 Ferdinand
1

Fallorina y Fernando of murder for the killing of eleven-year-old Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. while the latter was flying his kite on top of a roof.
The court a quo sentenced the appellant to suffer the death penalty.

The accusatory portion of the Information charging the appellant with murder reads:

That on or about the 26th day of September 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, by means
of treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and employ personal violence upon the person of VINCENT JOROJORO, JR. y MORADAS, a minor, eleven (11) years of
age, by then and there, shooting him with a gun, hitting him on the head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound
which was the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 2

Upon arraignment on October 20, 1998, the appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.

Case for the Prosecution 3

Eleven-year-old Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. was the third child of Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro. The family lived at Sitio Militar, Barangay
Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon City. Vincent, nicknamed "Hataw," was a grade three pupil whose education was sponsored by the
Spouses Petinato, an American couple, through an educational foundation. 4

The appellant was an officer of the Philippine National Police detailed in the Traffic Management Group (TMG) based in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, but was on detached service with the Motorcycle Unit of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA).

At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent asked permission from his mother Felicisima if he could play outside. She
agreed. Together with his playmate Whilcon "Buddha" Rodriguez, Vincent played with his kite on top of the roof of an
5

abandoned carinderia beside the road in Sitio Militar, Barangay Bahay Toro. Beside this carinderiawas a basketball court, where
fourteen-year-old Ricardo Salvo and his three friends, nicknamed L.A., Nono and Puti, were playing backan, a game of basketball.

Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming from the main road across the basketball court. He was nonplussed when he
looked at the person driving the motorcycle and recognized the appellant. Ricardo knew that the appellant abhorred children playing on
the roof of the carinderia and berated them for it. His friend Ong-ong had previously been scolded by the appellant for playing on the
roof.

Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When the appellant saw Vincent and Whilcon, the former stopped
his motorcycle and shouted at them, "Putang inang mga batang ito, hindi kayo magsibaba d'yan!" After hearing the shouts of the
appellant, Whilcon immediately jumped down from the roof. Vincent, meanwhile, was lying on his stomach on the roof flying his kite.
6

When he heard the appellant's shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. Vincent turned his back, ready to get down from the
roof. Suddenly, the appellant pointed his .45 caliber pistol towards the direction of Vincent and fired a shot. Vincent was hit on the left
7

parietal area. He fell from the roof, lying prostrate near the canal beside the abandoned carinderia and the basketball court. 8

Whilcon rushed to help Vincent up but was shocked when he saw blood on the latter's head. Whilcon retreated and left his friend. The 9

appellant approached Vincent and carried the latter's hapless body in a waiting tricycle and brought him to the Quezon City General
Hospital. Vincent was pronounced dead on arrival.

Meantime, word reached Vincent's parents that their son was shot and brought to the hospital. They rushed to the hospital, only to see
their son's already lifeless body. The appellant was nowhere to be found.

Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot of the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an autopsy where he
made the following findings:

Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds.

Abrasion, 7.0 x 2.0 cms., right arm, middle third, postero-lateral aspect.

Contused-abrasion, 14.5 x 2.5 cms., postero-lateral chest wall, right side.

Gunshot Wound, Entrance, 3.0 x 0.8 cms., roughly ovaloid, with irregular edges, abrasion collar widest postero-inferiorly,
located at the head, left parietal area, 9.0 cms. above and 8.0 cms. behind the left external auditory meatus, directed forward
upward and from left to right, involving the scalp, fracturing the left parietal bone (punched-in), lacerating the left and right
cerebral hemispheres of the brain, fracturing the right parietal bone (punched-out), lacerating the scalp, making an Exit wound,
3.3 x 1.0 cms., stellate with everted and irregular edges, 12.0 cms. above and 2.0 cms. in front of the right external auditory
meatus.

Intracranial hemorrhage, subdural and subarachnoid, extensive, bilateral.

Scalp hematoma, fronto-parietal areas, bilateral.


Visceral organs, congested.

Stomach, one-fourth (1/4) filled with partially digested food particles.

CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT WOUND, HEAD. 10

Dr. Baluyot testified that the victim died from a single gunshot wound in the head. The bullet entered the left upper back portion of the
head (above the level of the left ear) and exited to the right side. Dr. Baluyot signed Vincent's certificate of death.
11 12 13

At about 3:00 p.m., SPO2 Felix Pajarillo and Police Inspector Abelardo P. Aquino proceeded to the scene of the shooting but failed to
find the victim and the appellant. They proceeded to the Quezon City General Hospital where they heard that the victim had died. They
returned to the crime scene and recovered an empty shell from a .45 caliber gun. 14

On September 28, 1998, Major Isidro Suyo, the Chief of the MMDA Motorcycle Unit to which the appellant was assigned on detached
service, reported to the Sangandaan Police Station that the appellant had not reported for duty. At 2:10 p.m. of September 29, 1998,
15

Police Senior Superintendent Alfonso Nalangan, the Regional Director of the PNP-TMG, NCR, surrendered the appellant to the
Sangandaan Police Station together with his .45 caliber pistol bearing Serial No. AOC-38701. 16

Meantime, upon the urging of Vicente Jorojoro, Ricardo was brought to the Department of Justice where he was enrolled under its
Witness Protection Program. He gave his sworn statement to NBI Special Agent Roberto Divinagracia on September 29, 1998. On the 17

same date, P/Insp. Abelardo Aquino wrote the Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory Examination Unit requesting for the ballistic
examination of the .45 caliber pistol with Serial No. AOC-38701 and the empty shell of a .45 caliber gun found at the scene of the
shooting. Before noon on September 30, 1998, Divinagracia arrived at the station and turned over two witnesses, Raymond Castro and
18

Ricardo Salvo. He also turned over the witnesses' sworn statements. On October 2, 1998, on orders of the police station
19

commander, Pajarillo took pictures of the crime scene, including the carinderia and the roof with a bullet hole as part of the office
20

filing. He did not inform the prosecution that he took such pictures, nor did he furnish it with copies thereof. However, the appellant's
21

counsel learned of the existence of the said pictures.

On October 5, 1998, P/Insp. Mario Prado signed Firearms Identification Report No. FAIB-124-98 stating that:

FINDINGS:

Microscopic examination and comparison of the specimen marked "FAP" revealed the same individual characteristics
with cartridge cases fired from the above-mentioned firearm.

CONCLUSION:

The specimen marked "FAP" was fired from the above-mentioned caliber .45 Thompson Auto Ordnance pistol with
serial number AOC-38701. 22

Vincent's family suffered mental anguish as a result of his death. As evidenced by receipts, they spent P49,174 for the funeral. 23

Case for the Appellant

The appellant denied shooting Vincent. He testified that at about 1:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Macario Ortiz, a resident of Sitio
San Jose, Quezon City, asked for police assistance; Macario's brother-in-law was drunk and armed with a knife, and was creating
trouble in their house. The appellant's house was located along a narrow alley (eskinita) perpendicular to the main road. It was 200
meters away from Macario's house. Responding to the call, the appellant took his .45 service revolver, cocked it, put the safety lock in
24

place and tucked the gun at his right waistline. He brought out his motorcycle from the garage and slowly negotiated the bumpy alley
leading to the main road. Macario, who was waiting for him at the main road, called his attention to his revolver which was about to fall
off from his waist. The appellant got distracted and brought his motorcycle to the right side of the road, near the abandoned carinderia
where he stopped. As he stepped his right foot on the ground to keep himself from falling, the appellant lost his balance and slipped to
the right. At this point, the revolver fell to the ground near his foot and suddenly went off. Bystanders shouted, "Ano yon, ano yon,
mukhang may tinamaan." He picked up his gun and examined it. He put the safety latch back on and tucked it at his right waistline. He
then told Macario to wait for a while to check if somebody was really hit. He went near the abandoned carinderia and saw Vincent
sprawled to the ground. He picked up the bloodied child, boarded him on a tricycle on queue and instructed its driver, Boy Candaje, to
bring the boy to the hospital. On board the tricycle were Jeffrey Dalansay and Milbert Doring.
25

The appellant rode his motorcycle and proceeded to his mother's house in Caloocan City but did not inform her of the incident. He then
called his superior officer, Major Isidro Suyo, at the Base 103, located at Roces Avenue, Quezon City. The appellant informed Major
Suyo that he met an accident; that his gun fell and fired; and, that the bullet accidentally hit a child. He also told his superior that he
might not be able to report for work that day and the following day. He assured his superior that he would surrender later. He then went
to Valenzuela City to the house of his friend PO3 Angelito Lam, who was a motorcycle unit cop. The appellant stayed there for three
days. He also visited friends during that time.

On September 29, 1998, he went to the office of Major Suyo and surrendered his .45 caliber pistol. Major Suyo accompanied and
turned over the appellant to the commanding officer at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The appellant was subjected to a neuro and drug
test. He stated that the results of the drug test were negative. The appellant was then referred to the Sangandaan Police Station for
investigation. The pictures of the crime scene were given to him by Barangay Tanod Johnny Yaket, shown in one of the pictures
26 27

pointing to a bullet hole. The appellant's testimony was corroborated in pari materia by Macario Ortiz.

Leonel Angelo Balaoro, Vincent's thirteen-year-old playmate, testified that at 1:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, he was playing
basketball at Barangay Bahay Toro, at the basketball court along the road beside the chapel. With him were Ricardo, Puti and Nono.
Vincent was on the rooftop of the carinderia with Whilcon. While Puti was shooting the ball, an explosion ensued. He and Ricardo ran
beside the chapel near the basketball court. He looked back towards the basketball court and saw the appellant, about 15 meters away
from the canal, holding the prostrate and bloodied Vincent. He did not see the appellant shoot Vincent. He did not report what he saw to
the police authorities. He was ordered by his father to testify for the appellant. He also testified that his mother was related to Daniel,
the appellant's brother.

On January 19, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of murder, qualified by treachery and aggravated by
abuse of public position. The trial court did not appreciate in favor of the appellant the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined in and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, and in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage by the accused of his
public position (par. 1, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code), is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH.

The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the amounts of P49,174.00, as actual
damages; P50,000.00, as moral damages; P25,000.00, as exemplary damages; and, P50,000.00, as death indemnity.

The accused is to pay the costs.

The .45 caliber pistol, service firearm (Exh. "R") of the accused, shall remain under the custody of the Court and shall be
disposed of in accordance with the existing rules and regulations upon the finality of this decision. 28

The appellant assigned the following errors for resolution:

1. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE CREDENCE TO RELEVANT PHYSICAL EVIDENCE,
WHICH IF CONSIDERED COULD HAVE ALTERED THE CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT BY THE COURT AND THE
OUTCOME OF THE CASE.

2. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED BY OVERSTEPPING THE LINE OF JUDGING AND ADVOCACY, AND GOING
INTO THE REALM OF SPECULATION, PATENTLY DEMONSTRATING BIAS AND PARTIALITY.

3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF RICARDO SALVO, ALLEGED
PROSECUTION EYEWITNESS, WHOSE TESTIMONY IS WANTING IN PROBABILITY, AS IT IS CONTRARY TO THE
COMMON EXPERIENCE OF MANKIND.

4. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN INEQUITABLY APPRECIATING EXCULPATORY AND INCULPATORY
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.

5. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.

6. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TAKING
ADVANTAGE OF HIS POSITION BY ACCUSED. 29

The appellant asserts that the trial court failed to appreciate in his favor the physical evidence, viz., the hole found on the rooftop of
the carinderia where Vincent was when he was shot. The appellant contends that the picture taken on October 2, 1998 by no less than
30

SPO2 Felix Pajarillo, one of the principal witnesses of the prosecution, and the pictures showing Barangay Tanod Yaket pointing to a
31

hole on the roof buttress the defense of the appellant that the shooting was accidental. The appellant maintains that his service revolver
fell to the ground, hit a hard object, and as the barrel of the gun was pointed to an oblique direction, it fired, hitting the victim who was
on the rooftop. The bullet hit the back portion of the victim's head, before exiting and hitting the rooftop. The appellant posits that the
pictures belie Ricardo's testimony that he deliberately shot the victim, and, instead, complements Dr. Baluyot's testimony that the
gunshot wound came from somewhere behind the victim, somewhere lower than the point of entrance. The appellant invokes P/Insp.
Mario Prado's testimony that if a gun hits the ground in an oblique position, the gun will fire and the bullet will exit in the same position
as the gun, that is, also in an oblique position.

The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, asserts that the contention of the appellant is based on speculations and surmises, the
factual basis for his conclusion not having been proven by competent and credible evidence. There is no evidence on record that the
hole shown in the pictures was caused by a bullet from a .45 caliber pistol. The appellant did not present Barangay Tanod Johnny
32

Yaket, who was shown in the pictures, to testify on the matter. The appellant failed to prove that any slug was found on the rooftop or
under the roof which came from the appellant's .45 caliber pistol. According to the Solicitor General, the pictures relied upon by the
appellant cannot overcome the positive and straightforward testimony of the young eyewitness Ricardo Salvo.

We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability is a factual issue. The
appellant was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, his affirmative defense that the victim's death was caused by his
gun accidentally going off, the bullet hitting the victim without his fault or intention of causing it; hence, is exempt from criminal liability
under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which reads –

The following are exempt from criminal liability:

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of
causing it.

The basis for the exemption is the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused. For the accused to be guilty
of a felony, it must be committed either with criminal intent or with fault or negligence. 33
The elements of this exempting circumstance are (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to
another by mere accident; and (4) without any fault or intention of causing it. An accident is an occurrence that "happens outside the
34

sway of our will, and although it comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences." If the consequences are plainly foreseeable, it will be a case of negligence.

In Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that an accident is a fortuitive circumstance, event or happening; an
35

event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstance is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. Negligence, on the other hand, is the failure to observe, for
the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand
without which such other person suffers injury. Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the
other. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
36

without malice. The appellant must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution because by
37

admitting having caused the death of the victim, he can no longer be acquitted.

In this case, the appellant failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, his defense.

First. The appellant appended to his counter-affidavit in the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor the pictures showing the hole on the
roof of the carinderia38 to prove that he shot the victim accidentally. However, when the investigating prosecutor propounded
clarificatory questions on the appellant relating to the pictures, the latter refused to answer. This can be gleaned from the resolution of
the investigating prosecutor, thus:

Classificatory questions were propounded on the respondent but were refused to be answered. This certainly led the
undersigned to cast doubt on respondent's allegations. The defenses set forth by the respondent are evidentiary in character
and best appreciated in a full-blown trial; and that the same is not sufficient to overcome probable cause. 39

Second. The appellant did not see what part of the gun hit the victim. 40 There is no evidence showing that the gun hit a hard object
when it fell to the ground, what part of the gun hit the ground and the position of the gun when it fell from the appellant's waist.

Third. In answer to the clarificatory questions of the court, the appellant testified that the chamber of his pistol was loaded with bullets
and was cocked when he placed it on his right waistline. 41 He also testified that the gun's safety lock was on. He was asked if the gun
would fire if the hammer is moved backward with the safety lock in place, and the appellant admitted that even if he pulled hard on the
trigger, the gun would not fire:

Q Is this your service firearm?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q So the chamber might have been loaded when you went out of the house?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q What about the hammer, how was the hammer at that time when you tucked the gun in your waistline?

A The hammer was cocked like this.

COURT:

Can you not stipulate that the hammer is moved backwards near the safety grip.

ATTY. AND PROS. SINTAY:

Admitted, Your Honor.

ATTY. PEREZ:

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT: (to the witness)

Q You are a policeman, if there is a bullet inside the barrel of the gun and then the hammer is moved backwards and
therefore it is open, that means that if you pull the trigger, the bullet will fire because the hammer will move forward and then
hit the base of the bullet?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Therefore, the gun was cocked when you came out?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q You did not place the safety lock before you went out of your house?

A I safety (sic) it, sir.

Q So when you boarded the motorcycle, the gun was on a safety lock?
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Will you please place the safety lock of that gun, point it upwards.

(witness did as instructed)

It is now on a safety locked (sic)?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Pull the trigger if the hammer will move forward?

(witness did as instructed)

A It will not, Your Honor.

COURT: (to the parties)

Q Can you not admit that at this position, the accused pulled the trigger, the hammer did not move forward?

PROS. SINTAY AND ATTY. PRINCIPE:

Admitted, Your Honor.

COURT: (to the witness)

Q And therefore at this position, even if I pull the trigger many times, a bullet will not come out from the muzzle of the gun
because the hammer is on a safety locked (sic)?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Even if I pushed it very hard, it will not fire the gun?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Alright, I will ask you again a question. If the hammer of the gun is like this and therefore it is open but it is on a safety
lock, there is space between the safety grip which is found below the hammer, there is a space, is it not?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q That even if I pushed the safety grip forward, like this.

The Court gave the gun to the accused for him to demonstrate.

(to the witness)

You push it forward in order to push the hammer. Hard if you want but do not remove the safety lock.

(witness did as instructed)

The witness tried to push the safety grip and it does not touch the hammer even if the hammer is cocked. 42

Fourth. The trial court was witness as the appellant's counsel himself proved that the defense proffered by the appellant was incredible.
This can be gleaned from the decision of the trial court:

3. More importantly, and which the Court considers it as providential, when the counsel of the accused was holding the gun in
a cocked position and the safety lock put in place, the gun accidentally dropped on the cemented floor of the courtroom and
the gun did not fire and neither was the safety lock moved to its unlock position to cause the hammer of the gun to move
forward. The safety lock of the gun remained in the same position as it was when it dropped on the floor. 43

Fifth. After the shooting, the appellant refused to surrender himself and his service firearm. He hid from the investigating police officers
and concealed himself in the house of his friend SPO3 Angelito Lam in Valenzuela City, and transferred from one house to another for
three days to prevent his arrest:

Q So did you surrender that afternoon of September 26, 1998?

A No, Your Honor.

Q I thought you were surrendering to Major Suyo?

A I was but I was not able to surrender to Major Suyo, Your Honor.
Q Why, you were already able to talk to Major Suyo?

A Because at that time I was already confused and did not know what to do, Your Honor.

ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)

Q What is your relation with PO3 Angelito Lam of Valenzuela?

A Just my co-motorcycle unit cop in the TMG, sir.

Q Did I hear you right that you slept at the residence of PO3 Lam for three days?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why instead of going home to your residence at Bahay Toro?

A Because I am worried, sir.

COURT: (to the witness)

Q So what did you do for three days in the house of PO3 Lam?

A During daytime, I go to my friends, other friends and in the evening, I go back to the house of PO3 Lam, Your Honor.

Q So if you were able to visit your friends on September 27 or 28, 1998 and then returned to the house of PO3 Lam in the
evening, why did you not go to Major Suyo or to your 103 Base?

A Your Honor, during those days I am really calling Major Suyo.

Q Why did you not go to your office at Camp Crame, Quezon City?

A At that time, I did not have money, Your Honor.

Q What is the connection of you having money to that of informing your officer that you will surrender?

A What I know, Your Honor, is that if I do that I will already be detained and that I will have no money to spend.

ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)

Q Mr. Witness, from the time of the incident up to Sept. 29, 1998, you did not even visit your family in Barangay Bahay
Toro?

A No, sir.

COURT: (to the witness)

Q Did you send somebody to visit your family?

A No, Your Honor.

ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)

Q Did you cause to blotter the shooting incident of Vincent?

A I was not able to do that, sir.

Q You did not even talk to the Bgy. Officials in Bgy. Bahay Toro?

A No sir, because I already brought the child to the hospital. 44

The conduct of the appellant after the shooting belies his claim that the death of the victim was accidental and that he was not
negligent.

We agree with the encompassing disquisitions of the trial court in its decision on this matter:

The coup de grace against the claim of the accused, a policeman, that the victim was accidentally shot was his failure to
surrender himself and his gun immediately after the incident. As a police officer, it is hard to believe that he would choose to
flee and keep himself out of sight for about three (3) days if he indeed was not at fault. It is beyond human comprehension that
a policeman, who professes innocence would come out into the open only three (3) days from the incident and claim that the
victim was accidentally shot. Human behavior dictates, especially when the accused is a policeman, that when one is innocent
of some acts or when one is in the performance of a lawful act but causes injury to another without fault or negligence, he
would, at the first moment, surrender to the authorities and give an account of the accident. His failure to do so would invite
suspicion and whatever account or statement he would give later on becomes doubtful.

For the accused, therefore, to claim that Vincent was accidentally shot is odious, if not, an insult to human intelligence; it is
incredible and unbelievable, and more of a fantasy than a reality. It was a deliberate and intentional act, contrary to accused's
claim, that it happened outside the sway of his will. 45

It is a well-entrenched rule that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, its assessment of the
credibility of the said witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect by the
appellate court, as the trial judge was in a better position to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses as they testified. We 46

have carefully reviewed the records of the case and found no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court.

The testimony of prosecution witness Ricardo Salvo deserves credence. He testified in a positive and straightforward manner, which
testimony had the earmarks of truth and sincerity. Even as he was subjected to a grueling cross-examination by the appellant's
counsel, he never wavered in his testimony. He positively identified the appellant as the assailant and narrated in detail how the latter
deliberately aimed his gun and shot the victim. The relevant portions of his testimony are quoted:

Q: While playing basketball with Nono, LA and Puti, do you remember of any unusual incident which took place?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was that unusual incident?

A: When Vincent was shot, sir.

Q: Who shot Vincent?

A: Ferdinand Fallorina, sir.

Q: And in what place that Vincent was shot by Fallorina?

A: He was at the roof of the karinderia, sir.

Q: Was there any companion of Vincent?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was the position of Vincent at that time that you saw him and Fallorina shot him?

A: "Nakatalikod po siya."

Q: You included in this Exhibit O your drawing the figure of a certain Jeffrey and you and his tricycle? Why did you include
this drawing?

A: Because it was in the tricycle where Vincent was boarded to and brought to the hospital.

(Witness referring to Exhibit O-11)

Q: And who was the driver of that tricycle?

A: It was Jeffrey who drove the tricycle, sir.

Q: You also drew here a motorcycle already marked as Exhibit O-7. Why did you include the motorcycle?

A: Because Fallorina was riding on that motorcycle at that time.

COURT: (to the witness)

Q: So when Ferdinand Fallorina shot the boy, the motorcycle was moving?

A: It was stationary, your Honor.

Q: Did you see where he came from, I am referring to Fallorina before you saw him shot the boy?

A: He came from their house, Your Honor.


Q: What was his attire, I am referring to Ferdinand Fallorina?

A: He was wearing white shirt and blue pants, Your Honor.

ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)

Q: At that time that Fallorina shot the victim, was Buddha still there?

A: He ran, sir. He jumped in this place, sir.

(Witness is pointing to a place near the canal already marked as Exhibit O-14).

Q: Now from the witness stand that you are now seated. Can you tell the Court how far where (sic) you from Fallorina at
that time of the shooting?

COURT:

Can the prosecution and the accused stipulate that the distance pointed to by the witness is more or less 7 meters.

ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)

Q: How about the distance of Fallorina from Vincent, can you tell that?

COURT: (to the witness)

Can you point a distance between Fallorina and the boy at that time the body (sic) was shot?

COURT:

10 meters more or less?

Q: How long have you known Ferdinand Fallorina before the incident?

A: More or less two years, sir.

Q: Why do you know him?

A: I usually see him in that place at Sitio Militar, especially on Sundays, sir.

Q: How many shots did you hear?

A: Only one, sir.

Q: Do you recognize the gun used by Fallorina?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was that gun?

A: .45 cal., sir.

Q: Are you familiar with .45 cal.?

A: No, sir.

Q: Why do you know that it was .45 cal.?

A: Because that kind of gun, I usually see that in the movies, sir.

Q: Ricardo, you said that you have known Fallorina for two (2) years and you saw him shot Vincent on September 26,
1998 at around 2:30 in the afternoon. Please look around the courtroom now and point at the person of PO3 Ferdinand
Fallorina?
CT. INTERPRETER:

Witness is pointing to a male person the one seated at the back of the lady and wearing a yellow shirt and maong pants and
when asked of his name, he stated his name as Ferdinand Fallorina.

ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)

Q: Can you tell to the Court whether you heard utterances at that time that he shot the victim?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was that?

A: "Putang inang mga batang ito, hindi kayo magsisibaba diyan!"

Q: After Fallorina shot Vincent Jorojoro, you saw Vincent Jorojoro falling from the roof, what about Fallorina, what did he
do?

A: He was still on board his motorcycle and then he went at the back of the karinderia where Vincent fell, Your Honor.

Q: And after he went at the back of the karinderia and looked at Vincent Jorojoro, what did he do?

A: He carried Vincent, Your Honor.

Q: And after carrying Vincent, what did he do?

A: He boarded Vincent in the tricycle.

Q: What about the gun, what did he do with the gun?

A: I do not know anymore. 47

The appellant even uttered invectives at the victim and Whilcon before he shot the victim. In fine, his act was deliberate and intentional.

It bears stressing that of the eyewitnesses listed in the Information as witnesses for the prosecution, only Ricardo Salvo remained
steadfast after he was brought under the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice. He explained that the reason why
he testified for the prosecution, despite the fact that the appellant was a policeman, was because he pitied the victim's mother who was
always crying, unable to obtain justice for her son. We find no ill motive why Ricardo would falsely testify against the appellant. It was
48

only his purest intention of ferreting out the truth in this incident and that justice be done to the victim. Hence, the testimony of Ricardo
49

is entitled to full faith and credence.

The Crime Committed by the Appellant

We agree with the trial court that the appellant committed murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code qualified by treachery.
As the trial court correctly pointed out, Vincent was shot intentionally while his back was turned against the appellant. The little boy was
merely flying his kite and was ready to get down from the roof when the appellant fired a shot directed at him. The essence of treachery
is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Nonetheless, Vincent was
50

an eleven-year-old boy. He could not possibly put up a defense against the appellant, a police officer who was armed with a gun. It is
not so much as to put emphasis on the age of the victim, rather it is more of a description of the young victim's state of
helplessness. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person
51

illegally attacks a child, treachery exists. The abuse of superior strength as alleged in the Information is already absorbed by treachery
52

and need not be considered as a separate aggravating circumstance. 53

We, however, note that the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position in this case. We reverse the
trial court on this score.

There is no dispute that the appellant is a policeman and that he used his service firearm, the .45 caliber pistol, in shooting the victim.
However, there is no evidence on record that the appellant took advantage of his position as a policeman when he shot the victim. The 54

shooting occurred only when the appellant saw the victim on the rooftop playing with his kite. The trial court erred in appreciating abuse
of public position against the appellant.

The trial court did not, however, err in ruling that the appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Surrender is said to be voluntary when it is done by the accused spontaneously and made in such a manner that it shows the intent of
the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the
trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. 55

In this case, the appellant deliberately evaded arrest, hid in the house of PO3 Lam in Valenzuela City, and even moved from one house
to another for three days. The appellant was a policeman who swore to obey the law. He made it difficult for his brother-officers to
arrest him and terminate their investigation. It was only after the lapse of three days that the appellant gave himself up and surrendered
his service firearm.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since there is no modifying
circumstance in the commission of the crime, the appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The appellant PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the amount
of P49,174 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; P50,000 as civil indemnity; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna,
and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on leave.
Panganiban, J., on official leave.

Footnotes

1
Penned by Judge Diosdado Madarang Peralta.

2
Rollo, p. 6.

The prosecution presented the following as its witnesses: Felicisima Jorojoro, Ricardo Salvo, Dr. Ravell Baluyot and P/Insp.
3

Mario Prado.

4
TSN, 13 November 1998, p. 18.

5
Id. at 8.

6
TSN, 20 November 1998, p. 23.

7
Exhibit "R."

8
TSN, 20 November 1998, p. 20.

9
TSN, 4 December 1998, p. 10.

10
Exhibit "I."

11
TSN, 13 November 1998, p. 59.

12
Id. at 40-41, 61.

13
Exhibit "B."

14
Exhibit "R-1."

15
Exhibit "M-1."

16
Exhibit "R."

17
Exhibits "P" and "Q."

18
Exhibit "K."

19
Exhibit "M-1" to "M-2."

20
TSN, 18 November 1998, pp. 34-35.

21
Exhibit "U-1."

22
Exhibit "S."

23
Exhibits "C" to "C-4."

24
TSN, 15 December 1998, p. 20.

25
TSN, 16 December 1998, pp. 6-16.
26
Id. at 16-21.

27
Exhibits "1" to "1-K."

28
Rollo, p. 153.

29
Id. at 77-78.

30
Exhibit "U-1."

31
Exhibits "1" to "1-K."

32
Exhibits "U-1," "1," "1-A," "1-B," "1-C," "1-G" and "1-J."

33
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code.

34
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 18th ed., p. 225.

35
321 SCRA 375 (1999).

36
Ibid.

37
People v. Oasis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943).

38
Supra, note 31.

39
Records, p. 3.

40
TSN, 16 December 1998, p. 33.

41
Id. at 36.

42
Id. at 36-39.

43
Rollo, pp. 29-30.

44
TSN, 16 December 1998, pp. 45-47.

45
Rollo, pp. 31-32.

46
People of the Philippines v. Jerryvie Gumayao y Dahao @ Bivie, G.R. No. 138933, October 28, 2003.

47
TSN, 20 November 1998, pp. 7-32.

48
Id. at 40.

49
Id. at 41.

People of the Philippines v. Allen Bustamante, G.R. Nos. 140724-26, February 12, 2003; People v. Magno, 322 SCRA 494
50

(2000).

51
People v. Abuyen, 213 SCRA 569 (1992).

52
People v. Sancholes, 271 SCRA 527 (1997).

53
People v. Macahia, 307 SCRA 404 (1999).

54
People v. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655 (1999).

55
People v. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559 (1998).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 147932 January 25, 2006

LAILA G. DE OCAMPO, Petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, MAGDALENA B. DACARRA, and ERLINDA P. ORAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for certiorari1 assails the Resolutions dated 15 September 2000 and 19 April 2001 of the Secretary of the Department of
Justice ("DOJ Secretary") in I.C. No. 99-6254.2 The DOJ Secretary3 denied Laila G. De Ocampo’s ("petitioner") petition for review of the
investigating prosecutor’s finding of probable cause against her for homicide 4 in relation to Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No.
7610 ("RA 7610")5 and for violation of the same provision of RA 7610. The DOJ Secretary6 also denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

The Facts

The present case arose from a sworn statement of respondent Magdalena B. Dacarra ("Magdalena") executed before the Women’s
Desk of the CPD Police Station in Batasan Hills, Quezon City on 10 December 1999. Magdalena stated that on 4 December 1999, her
nine-year-old son Ronald complained of dizziness upon arriving home at about six in the evening. Ronald then vomited, prompting
Magdalena to ask what happened. Ronald replied that petitioner, who was Ronald’s teacher, banged his head against that of his
classmate Lorendo Orayan ("Lorendo"). Magdalena inspected Ronald’s head and saw a woundless contusion. Due to Ronald’s
continued vomiting, Magdalena brought him to a quack doctor (arbularyo) on 5 December 1999. The following morning, Magdalena
brought Ronald to the East Avenue Medical Center where he underwent an x-ray. The attending physician informed Magdalena that
Ronald’s head had a fracture. Blood oozed out of Ronald’s nose before he died on 9 December 1999.

Lorendo also executed a sworn statement narrating how petitioner banged his head against Ronald’s.

During the inquest proceedings on 14 December 1999, Assistant Quezon City Prosecutor Maria Lelibet Sampaga ("inquest prosecutor")
ruled as follows:

Evidence warrants the release of the respondent for further investigation of the charges against her. The case is not proper for inquest
as the incident complained of happened on December 4, 1999. Further, we find the evidence insufficient to support the charge for
homicide against the respondent. There is no concrete evidence to show proof that the alleged banging of the heads of the two minor
victims could be the actual and proximate cause of the death of minor Ronald Dacarra y Baluton. Besides, the police report submitted
by the respondent in this case states that said victim bears stitches or sutures on the head due to a vehicular accident. There is no
certainty, therefore, that respondent’s alleged wrongdoing contributed or caused the death of said victim.7

Subsequently, the case was referred to Assistant Quezon City Prosecutor Lorna F. Catris-Chua Cheng ("investigating prosecutor") for
preliminary investigation. She scheduled the first hearing on 6 January 2000.

Respondent Erlinda P. Orayan ("Erlinda"), Lorendo’s mother, attended the hearing of 6 January 2000 and alleged that petitioner offered
her P100,000, which she initially accepted, for her and her son’s non-appearance at the preliminary investigation. Erlinda presented the
money to the investigating prosecutor.

On 7 January 2000, Jennilyn Quirong, who witnessed the head-banging incident, and Melanie Lugales, who claimed to be another
victim of petitioner’s alleged cruel deeds, filed their sworn statements with the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor.

On 18 January 2000, petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit. Petitioner invoked the disposition of the inquest prosecutor finding
insufficient evidence to support the charges against her. Petitioner assailed the omission in Magdalena’s sworn statement about
Ronald’s head injury due to a vehicular accident in November 1997. Petitioner pointed out the absence of damage or injury on Lorendo
as borne out by his medical certificate. Petitioner contended that the head-banging incident was not the proximate cause of Ronald’s
death, but the failed medical attention or medical negligence. Petitioner also alleged that Jennilyn Quirong and Melanie Lugales have
immature perception. Petitioner further asserted that the causes of death stated in Ronald’s Death Certificate are hearsay and
inadmissible in the preliminary investigation.

Ronald’s Death Certificate shows the immediate cause of his death as "Cardio Pulmonary Arrest," the underlying cause as "Cerebral
Edema," and other significant conditions contributing to death as "Electrolyte imbalance and vomiting." The Autopsy Report, obtained
by the investigating prosecutor from the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, states the cause of death as "Intracranial hemorrhage
secondary to traumatic injury of the head."

The investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for the offenses charged. The dispositive
portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that [petitioner] be charged with Homicide in relation to Art. VI,
Sec. 10 of R.A. 7610 and Violation of Art. VI, Sec. 10(a) of R.A. 7610 with no bail recommended for the Homicide since par. 6 of Art. VI
of Sec. 10 of R.A. 7610 provides that:

"For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262, par. 2 and 263, par. 1 Act No.
3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation and serious physical
injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age."

Bail recommended: No bail recommended – Homicide, in relation to Art. VI, Sec. 10, R.A. 7610; and Twenty Thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) – Viol. of Sec. 10(a) of R.A. 76108

Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ.

In her appeal to the DOJ, petitioner contended that the investigating prosecutor showed bias in favor of complainants Magdalena and
Erlinda ("complainants") for not conducting a clarificatory hearing and unilaterally procuring the autopsy report. Petitioner argued that
the investigating prosecutor erred in concluding that her alleged act of banging Ronald and Lorendo’s heads was the cause of Ronald’s
injury and that such was an act of child abuse. Petitioner also alleged that it is the Office of the Ombudsman which has jurisdiction over
the case, and not the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.

The Resolution of the DOJ Secretary

The DOJ Secretary denied the petition for review. The DOJ Secretary held that there was no bias in complainants’ favor when the
investigating prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory hearing and unilaterally procured the autopsy report as nothing precluded her
from doing so.

The DOJ Secretary upheld the investigating prosecutor’s finding that Ronald’s injury was the direct and natural result of petitioner’s act
of banging Ronald and Lorendo’s heads. The DOJ Secretary stated that petitioner never denied such act, making her responsible for all
its consequences even if the immediate cause of Ronald’s death was allegedly the failed medical attention or medical negligence. The
DOJ Secretary held that assuming there was failure of medical attention or medical negligence, these inefficient intervening causes did
not break the relation of the felony committed and the resulting injury.

The DOJ Secretary rejected petitioner’s claim that she is innocent as held by the inquest prosecutor. The inquest prosecutor did not
dismiss the case. She merely recommended petitioner’s release for further investigation since the case was not proper for inquest and
the evidence was then insufficient.

The DOJ Secretary further stated that the omission in Magdalena’s sworn statement about Ronald’s head injury due to a vehicular
accident in November 1997 and the absence of any injury on Lorendo are inconsequential.

Moreover, the DOJ Secretary ruled that whether the statements of the causes of death in the death certificate and autopsy report are
hearsay, and whether Jennilyn Quirong and Melanie Lugales have immature perception, are evidentiary matters which should be
determined during trial. The DOJ Secretary also sustained the investigating prosecutor’s conclusion that the banging of Ronald and
Lorendo’s heads is an act of child abuse.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 9 which the DOJ Secretary denied in his Resolution dated 19 April 2001. 10

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. Whether petitioner was denied due process during the preliminary investigation; and

2. Whether there is probable cause against petitioner for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 and for violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

Before resolving the substantive issues in this case, the Court will address the procedural issue raised by the Office of the Solicitor
General ("OSG").11 The OSG contends that instead of Rule 65, Rule 43 is applicable to the present case. Thus, the OSG argues that
the petition should be dismissed outright for being filed with this Court, instead of with the Court of Appeals, under a wrong mode of
appeal. On the other hand, assuming Rule 65 applies, the OSG points out that the petition for certiorari should be filed with the Court of
Appeals.

Based on Memorandum Circular No. 58,12 the resolution of the DOJ Secretary is appealable administratively to the Office of the
President since the offenses charged in this case are punishable by reclusion perpetua.13 From the Office of the President, the
aggrieved party may file an appeal with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 43. 14

Even assuming that the DOJ Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed Resolutions amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, petitioner should have filed the instant petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Hence, on the issue alone
of the propriety of the remedy sought by petitioner, this petition for certiorarimust fail. However, considering the gravity of the offenses
charged and the need to expedite the disposition of this case, the Court will relax the rules and finally resolve this case in the interest of
substantial justice.

Whether petitioner was denied


due process during the preliminary investigation

Absence of a clarificatory hearing

The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that she was denied due process when the investigating prosecutor did not conduct a
clarificatory hearing. A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during preliminary investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a
clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the investigating officer as evidenced by the use of the term "may" in Section 3(e) of Rule
112. This provision states:

(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory
questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right
to examine or cross-examine. xxx15 (emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "may" in a statute commonly denotes that it is directory in nature. The term "may" is generally permissive only and
operates to confer discretion.16 Under Section 3(e) of Rule 112, it is within the discretion of the investigation officer whether to set the
case for further hearings to clarify some matters.

In this case, the investigating prosecutor no longer conducted hearings after petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit. This simply
means that at that point the investigating prosecutor believed that there were no more matters for clarification. It is only in petitioner’s
mind that some "crucial points" still exist and need clarification. In any event, petitioner can raise these "important" matters during the
trial proper.

Petitioner was not deprived of due process since both parties were accorded equal rights in arguing their case and presenting their
respective evidence during the preliminary investigation. Due process is merely an opportunity to be heard.17 Petitioner cannot
successfully invoke denial of due process since she was given the opportunity of a hearing. 18 She even submitted her counter-affidavit
to the investigating prosecutor on 18 January 2000.

Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits. 19 Its sole purpose is to determine whether a
crime has been committed and whether the respondent is probably guilty of the crime.20 It is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. 21 Hence, if the investigating prosecutor is already satisfied that he can reasonably determine
the existence of probable cause based on the parties’ evidence thus presented, he may terminate the proceedings and resolve the
case.

Obtaining a copy of the autopsy report

Petitioner argues that she was denied the right to examine evidence submitted by complainants when the investigating prosecutor
unilaterally obtained a copy of the autopsy report from the PNP Crime Laboratory.

Petitioner fails to persuade us. Though the autopsy report is not part of the parties’ evidence, the Rules on preliminary investigation do
not forbid the investigating prosecutor from obtaining it. Neither is there a law requiring the investigating prosecutor to notify the parties
before securing a copy of the autopsy report. The autopsy report, which states the causes of Ronald’s death, can either absolve or
condemn the petitioner. Unfortunately for petitioner, the investigating prosecutor found that the autopsy report bolstered complainants’
allegations.

Moreover, there is nothing to support petitioner’s claim that the investigating prosecutor was biased in favor of complainants. There are
other pieces of evidence aside from the autopsy report upon which the investigating prosecutor based her finding of probable cause.
The autopsy report is not the sole piece of evidence against petitioner. The sworn statement of the other victim, Lorendo, and the
eyewitness account of Jennilyn Quirong, substantiate the charges against petitioner. Petitioner’s failure to deny the occurrence of the
head-banging incident also strengthened complainants’ allegations.

Petitioner mistakenly cites Section 3(d) of Rule 112 22 in arguing that the investigating prosecutor should not go beyond the evidence
presented by complainants in resolving the case. This provision applies if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or if subpoenaed fails
to submit her counter-affidavit within the prescribed period. Such is not the case here where petitioner filed her counter-affidavit and
both parties presented their respective evidence.

Whether there is probable cause


for the offenses charged against petitioner
Existence of probable cause

Petitioner challenges the finding of probable cause against her for the offenses charged arguing that the head-banging incident was not
the proximate cause of Ronald’s death. Petitioner insists that efficient intervening events caused Ronald’s death.

We do not agree. There is probable cause for the offenses charged against petitioner. Probable cause is the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty of the crime.23

In the present case, Ronald, a nine-year-old student, died five days after his teacher, petitioner in this case, allegedly banged his head
against that of his classmate Lorendo. There is nothing in the records showing petitioner’s specific denial of the occurrence of such act.
Petitioner simply stated that "the head-banging incident happened but [she] did not perpetrate it." 24 In effect, petitioner admits the
occurrence of the head-banging incident but denies committing it.

The alleged intervening events before Ronald died, namely: (a) the consultation with a quack doctor, and (b) the three-day confinement
in the East Avenue Medical Center, are not sufficient to break the relation of the felony committed and the resulting injury. Were it not
for the head-banging incident, Ronald might not have needed medical assistance in the first place.

These circumstances which allegedly intervened causing Ronald’s death are evidentiary matters which should be threshed out during
the trial. The following are also matters better left for the trial court to appreciate: (a) the contents of the death certificate and autopsy
report, (b) the medical records of Ronald’s accident in November 1997, (c) the perception of witnesses Jennilyn Quirong and Melanie
Lugales, and (d) the alleged lack of medical assistance or medical negligence which caused Ronald’s death.

To repeat, what is determined during preliminary investigation is only probable cause, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. 25 As implied
by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or moral certainty. 26

Asserting her innocence, petitioner continues to invoke the disposition of the inquest prosecutor finding insufficient evidence for the
charges against her. As correctly ruled by the DOJ Secretary, the inquest prosecutor did not dismiss the case but merely recommended
it for further investigation since it was not proper for inquest and the evidence was then insufficient. Moreover, petitioner’s active
participation in the preliminary investigation without questioning the propriety of such proceedings indicates petitioner’s agreement with
the recommendation of the inquest prosecutor for the further investigation of the case.

Charges of Homicide and Child Abuse


Petitioner’s single act of allegedly banging the heads of her students had two distinct victims, namely Ronald and Lorendo. Therefore,
petitioner has to face prosecution for cruelty to each victim. For Ronald’s death, petitioner is being charged with homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code27 in relation to Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 punishable by reclusion perpetua.28 However, this
does not mean that petitioner is being charged with the distinct offenses of homicide and child abuse for Ronald’s death. On the other
hand, for her cruelty to Lorendo, petitioner is being charged with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 punishable by prision
mayor in its minimum period.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 is clear. This provision reads:

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial
to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or more
things at the same time. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one interpretation. 29 In the present case, petitioner fails
to show convincingly the ambiguity in Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610.

Section 3(b), Article VI of RA 7610 defines "child abuse" as the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes
physical abuse and cruelty. Petitioner’s alleged banging of the heads of Ronald and Lorendo is clearly an act of cruelty.

In a petition for certiorari like this case, the primordial issue is whether the DOJ Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court rules that the DOJ Secretary did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding
that there is probable cause to charge petitioner of the crimes of homicide and child abuse. The Court further rules that the investigating
prosecutor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in securing motu proprio the autopsy report and in not calling for a clarificatory
hearing. This ruling does not diminish in any way the constitutional right of petitioner to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice dated 15 September 2000 and
19 April 2001 in I.C. No. 99-6254. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 Subsequently became Criminal Cases No. Q-00-90184 and 85.

3
The DOJ Secretary then was Artemio G. Tuquero.

4 Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.


5An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination,
Providing Penalties for its Violation, and for Other Purposes. This law is otherwise known as the "Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

6 The DOJ Secretary was already Hernando B. Perez.

7 Rollo, p. 34.

8 Rollo, pp. 44-45.

9 Rollo, pp. 80-88.

10 Ibid., p. 89.

11 Representing the DOJ Secretary.

12Reiterating and Clarifying the Guidelines Set Forth in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983) Concerning the
Review by the Office of the President of Resolutions Issued by the Secretary of Justice Concerning Preliminary Investigations
of Criminal Cases.

13
See Dee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111153, 21 November 1994, 238 SCRA 254.

14
Section 1 of Rule 43 provides:

SECTION 1. Scope. – This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals
and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social
Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees’ Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of
Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. (Emphasis
supplied)

15 Substantially reiterated in Section 3(e), Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

16
Agpalo, Ruben E., Statutory Construction, Second Edition 1990, p. 239 citing Bersabel v. Salvador, G.R. No. 35910, 21 July
1978, 84 SCRA 176; Dizon v. Encarnacion, 119 Phil. 20 (1963); Cabaluna v. Ventura and Agoncillo, 47 Phil. 165 (1924);
Castillo v. Sian, et al., 105 Phil. 622 (1959).

17Amarillo v. Sandiganbayan, 444 Phil. 487 (2003); Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Macaraeg, 443 Phil. 866
(2003).

18
Alauya, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 443 Phil. 893 (2003).

19 Reyes v. Camilon, G.R. No. 46198, 20 December 1990, 192 SCRA 445.

20Section 1 of Rule 112, which is substantially reiterated in Section 1 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
reads:

SECTION 1. Definition. – Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has
been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

21 Baytan v. COMELEC, 444 Phil. 812 (2003). See also Ang v. Lucero, G.R. No. 143169, 21 January 2005, 449 SCRA 157
citing People v. CA, 361 Phil. 401 (1999).

22
Section 3 of Rule 112, which is substantially reiterated in Section 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
provides:

SEC. 3. Procedure. -- The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

xxx

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10)
day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.

23 Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 32 Phil. 363 (1915).

24
Rollo, p. 17.

25 See Rizon v. Desierto, G.R. No. 152789, 21 October 2004, 441 SCRA 115.
26Ang v. Lucero, G.R. No. 143169, 21 January 2005, 449 SCRA 157 citing Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No.
140946, 13 September 2004, 438 SCRA 224.

27 Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 249. Homicide. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another without the
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide
and be punished by reclusion temporal.

28
The last paragraph of Section 10, Article VI of RA 7610 provides:

For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262, paragraph
2, and 263, paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of murder, homicide,
other intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age. xxx

29 Agpalo, Ruben E., supra note 16, p. 45 citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p. 66 (1961).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while
his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts 1is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed
this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

The issue raised is one of the first impression.

Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In
answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in
the context of penal law.

The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the
grounds that —

1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to
any right or interest — not even the police power of the State.

2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without representation.

3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandates
entrusted to him by the people.

4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be heard.

5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.

6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of government to respect
its mandate.

7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.

8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.

The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to
perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State.
He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the
continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from
having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.

We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the
majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government office, by
itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a
position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that privilege has always been granted in
a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department.

Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of
the peace be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same, . . .

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the
accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was
subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.

The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:

Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same.

For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of
immunity and intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:

. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its
adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman
to the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For
relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.

The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution which states that —

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of
the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos2, which states, inter alia, that —

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to
deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that
they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the
people.

will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the
administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from
the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is
not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It
also serves as an example and warning to others.

A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,3 it
is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the
Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding. 4

The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that
he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.

It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his
colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is
now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be
countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the
aims of the State's penal system.

Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his
cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:

a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to
expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;

b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City;

c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center, Makati City;

d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case, accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and
private vehicle.

He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise
allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit.

a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and
2) planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own
vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his place of confinement.

b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City.

c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart condition.

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary
leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.

What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position.
Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v.
Morfe:5

The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full
recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to
the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their
conscience of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to
freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and
in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can
perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an
unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in
seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the
government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards
thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an
attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in
each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.

The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that
since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect
his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and
that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.

We remain unpersuaded. 1âwphi1.nêt

No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a
congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City,
manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an
office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant
further admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his
salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a member of the
House of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant
should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts.

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within
the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he suffering from a terminal
illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws." 6 This simply means that all persons
similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. 7 The organs of government may not show
any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial
differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks
highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the
Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need to its
exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to
save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must
maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are
validly restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups
or types of individuals.8

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority
to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. 9

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.10

Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of
locomotion.11

More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a
court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused. 12 The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any
prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure and will. 13 Imprisonment is the
detention of another against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion14 and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It
includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier." 15

It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual's status in society.16 Prison officials have the
difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide
rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment
and elimination of certain rights.17

Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to
any other right or interest, including the police power of the State.

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and also in separate opinion of Justice Reyes.
Bellosillo, J., I concur in the main and separate opinion.
Melo, J., I join the majority as well as the separate opinion.
Puno, J., I concur with the main and separate opinion.
Vitug, J., I concur in both the ponencia and the separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., I concur in this as well as in the separate opinion of Justice Gonzaga-Reyes.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., See separate concurring opinion.

Separate Opinions

GONZAGA-REYES, J., concurring opinion;

For resolution in this case is a motion filed by accused-appellant Romeo G. Jalosjos, who has been convicted by the trial court of two
counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, which judgment is currently pending appeal before this Court. As a
member of the House of Representatives, accused-appellant claims that his constituents are deprived of representation by reason of
his incarceration pending appeal of the judgment of conviction and that he should therefore be allowed to discharge his legislative
functions, including attendance of legislative sessions and committee meetings.

I concur in the ponencia of my colleague Madame Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago in holding that accused-appellant's motion is
bereft of any legal merit.

The Bill of Rights provides —

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.1 (emphasis supplied)

This constitutional provision denying the right to bail for offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong
is reiterated in Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz —

Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In People v.
Divina2 we held that the trial court's judgment of conviction imports that the evidence of guilt of the crime charged is strong.
Unquestionably, the continued incarceration of accused-appellant is a valid and constitutionally mandated curtailment of his rights to
provisional liberty pending appeal of his conviction.

Neither may the constitutional provision granting immunity from arrest to legislators provide legal justification for accused-appellant's
motion. The Constitution states that —

A Senator of Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in
any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. 3

I agree with the ponencia that to allow accused-appellant to attend legislative sessions would constitute an unjustified broadening of the
privilege from the arrest bestowed by the Constitution upon members of Congress. Neither the legislative history of this provision nor
the general principles of official immunity support an expanded interpretation of such privilege.

Unlike the present Constitution, the 1935 Constitution4 limited the privilege from arrests to "all cases except treason, felony, and breach
of the peace." This provision was taken from the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, which was in turn based upon the American
Constitution. In accordance with American precedents, the word "treason, felony and breach of the peace" have been construed to
include all indictable offenses.5 Thus, under the 1935 Constitution the freedom from arrest only encompassed civil arrest.

Under the 19736 and the 1987 Constitution, the privilege was broadened to include arrests for crimes punishable by imprisonment of six
years or less. Despite the expansion of the privilege, the rationale for granting members of Congress immunity from arrest remained the
same — to ensure that they are not prevented from performing their legislative duties.7 In fact, the 1986 Constitutional Commission
rejected the proposal of one of its members to expand the scope of the parliamentary immunity to include searches because, unlike
arrest, it was not demonstrated that the conduct of searches would prevent members of Congress from discharging their legislative
functions.8

It is a well-established principle that official immunity is a necessary adjunct to the vigorous and effective performance of official
functions. Members of Congress in particular, who are called upon to exercise their discretion and judgment in enacting laws
responsive to the needs of the people, would certainly be impeded in the exercise of their legislative functions if every dissatisfied
person could compel them to vindicate the wisdom of their enactments in an action for damages or question their official acts before the
courts.9

It was never the intention of the framers of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions to shield a member of Congress from the consequences of
his wrongdoing. Thus, despite the widening of its scope to include criminal offenses, the privilege from arrest is still circumscribed by
the nature or the gravity of the offenses of which the accused is charged. Hence, the commission of serious crimes, i.e., crimes
punishable by afflictive penalties or with capital punishment, does not fall within the scope of the constitutional privilege. A member of
Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrest for relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by correctional penalties. As
enunciated in Martinez v. Morfe,10 "when it comes to freedom from arrest, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without
justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in
Congress and in going to and returning from the same"

The accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory rape which is punishable by reclusion perpetua, an afflictive penalty, is
obviously not entitled to the privilege of parliamentary immunity and, proceeding from the above stated rationale for legislative
immunity, a liberal construction of the constitutional privilege is not in order.

It should also be mentioned that, under the factual circumstances of this case, the applicability of this privilege from arrest to accused-
appellant is already moot and academic. The constitutional provision contemplates that stage of the criminal process at which personal
jurisdiction is sought to be acquired over the accused by means of his arrest. Accused-appellant is no longer at the point of merely
being arrested. As a matter of fact, he has already been arrested, tried and convicted by the trial court.

Accused-appellant's contention that his re-election constitutes a renewal of his mandate and that such an expression of the popular will
should not be rendered inutile by even the police power of the State is hollow. In Aguinaldo v. Comelec,11 Aguinaldo v. Santos12 and
in Salalima v. Guingona13 we laid down the doctrine that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed
during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to criminal acts which the re-elected official
may have committed during his previous term.14 The administrative liability of a public officer is separate and distinct from his penal
liability.
1âwphi 1.nêt

Penal laws are obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory. Since the Constitution itself provides for the immunities
from the general application of our criminal laws which a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may enjoy, it follows that
any expansion of such immunities must similarly be based upon an express constitutional grant.

I vote to deny the motion.


Footnotes

1 RTC Decision, pp. 54-55.

2 212 SCRA 768, at 773 [1992].

3
19 Phil, 208, 212.

4 Cubillo v. City Warden, 97 SCRA 771 [1980].

5
44 SCRA 37 [1972].

6 Art. III, Sec. 1.

7 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.

8 Skinuer v. Oklahoma, 315 US 535.

9 See Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Edition, p. 548.

See Felwa v. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155: Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95
10

SCRA 392 [1980]; Ceniza v. Commission on Elections, 96 SCRA 763 (1980); People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12.

11
Black's Law Dictionary, Special Deluxe 5th Ed., p. 681.

1220 Words And Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 466, citing US v. Safeway Stores [Tex.] C.C.C.A. Kan. 140F 2d 834, 839 and US
v. Mitchell, 163 F. 1014, 1016 at p. 470.

13 Ibid, p. 470, citing Pine v. Okzewski, 170 A. 825, 827, 112 N.J.L. 429.

14 Id., p. 472, citing US v. Benner, 24 Fed. Gas. 1084, 1087.

15 Id., citing Bird v. Jones, 4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 158, 159.

16 Sheldon, Krantz, 1088 Supplement. The Law of Correction and Prisoners' Rights, 3rd Ed., p. 121.

17 Ibid.

GONZAGA-REYES, J., concurring opinion;

1
1987 Constitution, Art. III, sec. 13.

2 221 SCRA 209 (1993).

3 Art. VI, sec. 11.

4Art. VI, sec. 15. — The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treasons, felony,
and breach of the peace, be privileged from the arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to
and returning from the same; and for any speech and debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

5 Martinez v. Morfe, 44 SCRA 22 (1972), citing Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425.

6 Art. VIII, sec. 9. — A member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privilege from arrest during his attendance at its sessions, and in going to and returning from the same; but
the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the custody of the law within twenty-four hours after its
adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so. A member shall
not be questioned nor held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Batasan or in any committee thereof.

7
1987 Constitution, II RECORD 90.

8 Ibid., 178-185.

9 Mechem, F.R., A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers (1890), 431.

10
Supra.

11
Res., G.R. Nos. 105128-30, May 14, 1992.

12 212 SCRA 768 (1992).


13 257 SCRA 55 (1996).

14 Salalima v. Guingona, id.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR., alias "BOY," EDGARDO AQUINO Y
PAYUMO and ROGELIO CAÑAL Y SEVILLA, defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for plaintiff-appellee.

Baizas, Alberto and Associates, Andreciano F. Caballero and Lota, Paraiso, Garcia and Dueñas for defendant-appellant Jaime G. Jose.

Mabanag, Eliger and Associates for defendant-appellant Basilio Pineda, Jr.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for defendant-appellant Edgardo P. Aquino.

Antonio Coronel Law Office and Roberto J. Ignacio for defendant-appellant Rogelio S. Canial.

PER CURIAM:

The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below, reads as follows:

The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR. Alias "BOY," EDUARDO
AQUINO Y PAYUMO alias "EDDIE" and ROGELIO CAÑAL Y SEVILLA alias "ROGER," as principals, WONG LAY
PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON Y ROMERO and JESSIE GUION Y ENVOLTARIO as accomplices, of the crime of
Forcible Abduction with rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named principal accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design, forcibly abduct the undersigned complainant against
her will, and did, then and there take her, pursuant to their common criminal design, to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay
City, where each of the four (4) accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a deadly weapon,
have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount
as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the civil code.

That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and JESSIE GUION y ENVOLTARIO without taking a
direct part in the execution of the offense either by forcing, inducing the principal accused to execute, or cooperating
in its execution by an indispensable act, did, then and there cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts, that is, by cooperating, aiding, abetting and permitting the principal accused in sequestering the
undersigned complainant in one of the rooms of the Swanky Hotel then under the control of the accused Wong Lay
Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, thus supplying material and moral aid in the
consummation of the offense.

That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following aggravating circumstances:

1. Use of a motor vehicle.

2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to make its discovery difficult;

3. Abuse of superior strength;

4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act;
and

5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not
necessary for the commission.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the charge imputed in the above-quoted amended complaint; however, in an
order dated July 11, 1967, the court reserved judgment "until such time as the prosecution shall have concluded presenting all of its
evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances listed in the complaint." Upon the other hand, the rest of the defendants went to trial
on their respective pleas of not guilty. After the merits, the court below rendered its decision on October 2, 1967, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio Cañal, Eduardo Aquino and Basilio Pineda, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape as described under Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to the death penalty to be executed at a date to be set
and in the manner provided for by law; and each to indemnify the complainant in the amount of ten thousand pesos.
On the ground that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against the accomplices Wong Lay
Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero, and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf
is hereby granted, and the case dismissed against the aforementioned accused.

Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which Jaime Jose identified by pointing to it from the window of
the courtroom and pictures of which were submitted and marked as Exhibits "M" and "M-1," and which Jaime Jose in
his testimony admitted belonged to him, pursuant to Art. 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires the
confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime, the Court hereby orders its confiscation.

This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr., Edgardo Aquino, and Jaime Jose, and for
automatic review as regards Rogelio Cañal. However, for practical purposes all of them shall hereafter be referred to as appellants.

The complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the incident, 25 years old and single; she graduated from high
school in 1958 at Maryknoll College and finished the secretarial course in 1960 at St. Theresa's College. Movie actress by profession,
she was receiving P8,000.00 per picture. It was part of her work to perform in radio broadcasts and television shows, where she was
paid P800.00 per month in permanent shows, P300.00 per month in live promotional shows, and from P100.00 to P200.00 per
appearance as guest in other shows.

So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, homeward bound from the ABS Studio on Roxas
Blvd., Pasay City, was driving her bantam car accompanied by her maid Helen Calderon, who was also at the front seat. Her house
was at No. 48, 12th Street, New Manila, Quezon City. She was already near her destination when a Pontiac two-door convertible car
with four men aboard (later identified as the four appellants) came abreast of her car and tried to bump it. She stepped on her brakes to
avoid a collision, and then pressed on the gas and swerved her car to the left, at which moment she was already in front of her house
gate; but because the driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for the second
time. This prompted Miss De la Riva, who was justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith, Pineda stopped the car which he was
driving, jumped out of it and rushed towards her.

The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her car continuously. Undaunted, Pineda opened the
door of Miss De la Riva's car and grabbed the lady's left arm. The girl held on tenaciously to her car's steering wheel and, together with
her maid, started to scream. Her strength, however, proved no match to that of Pineda, who succeeded in pulling her out of her car.
Seeing her mistress' predicament, the maid jumped out of the car and took hold of Miss De la Riva's right arm in an effort to free her
from Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was able to drag Miss De la Riva toward the Pontiac convertible car, whose motor was all the
while running.

When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very near the Pontiac car, the three men inside started to assist their
friend: one of them held her by the neck, while the two others held her arms and legs. All three were now pulling Miss De la Riva inside
the car. Before she was completely in, appellant Pineda jumped unto the driver's seat and sped away in the direction of Broadway
Street. The maid was left behind.

The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the back seat; Basilio Pineda, Jr. was at the wheel, while
Rogelio Cañal was seated beside him. Miss De la Riva entreated the appellants to release her; but all she got in response were jeers,
abusive and impolite language that the appellants and threats that the appellants would finish her with their Thompson and throw acid
at her face if she did not keep quiet. In the meantime, the two men seated on each side of Miss De la Riva started to get busy with her
body: Jose put one arm around the complainant and forced his lips upon hers, while Aquino placed his arms on her thighs and lifted her
skirt. The girl tried to resist them. She continuously implored her captors to release her, telling them that she was the only breadwinner
in the family and that her mother was alone at home and needed her company because her father was already dead. Upon learning of
the demise of Miss De la Riva's father, Aquino remarked that the situation was much better than he thought since no one could take
revenge against them. By now Miss De la Riva was beginning to realize the futility of her pleas. She made the sign of the cross and
started to pray. The appellants became angry and cursed her. Every now and then Aquino would stand up and talk in whispers with
Pineda, after which the two would exchange knowing glances with Cañal and Jose.

The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed towards Victoria Street. Then the car proceeded to
Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. When the car reached Makati, Aquino
took a handkerchief from his pocket and, with the help of Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva. The latter was told not to shout or else she
would be stabbed or shot with a Thompson. Not long after, the car came to a stop at the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City The blindfolded
lady was led out of the car to one of the rooms on the second floor of the hotel.

Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a bed. Her blindfold was removed. She saw Pineda and Aquino standing in front of
her, and Jose and Cañal sitting beside her, all of them smiling meaningfully. Pineda told the complainant: "Magburlesque ka para sa
amin." The other three expressed their approval and ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe. The complainant ignored the command. One
of the appellants suggested putting off the light so that the complainant would not be ashamed. The idea, however, was rejected by the
others, who said that it would be more pleasurable for them if the light was on. Miss De la Riva was told to remove her stocking in
order, according to them, to make the proceedings more exciting. Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so slowly did she proceed with
the assigned task that the appellants cursed her and threatened her again with the Thompson and the acid. They started pushing Miss
De la Riva around. One of them pulled down the zipper of her dress; another unhooked her brassiere. She held on tightly to her dress
to prevent it from being pulled down, but her efforts were in vain: her dress, together with her brassiere, fell on the floor.

The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling in front of her and feasting their eyes on her
private parts. This ordeal lasted for about ten minutes, during which the complainant, in all her nakedness, was asked twice or thrice to
turn around. Then Pineda picked up her clothes and left the room with his other companions. The complainant tried to look for a blanket
with which to cover herself, but she could not find one.
Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva, who was sitting on the bed trying to cover her
bareness with her hands, implored him to ask his friends to release her. Instead of answering her, he pushed her backward and pinned
her down on the bed. Miss De la Riva and Jose struggled against each other; and because the complainant was putting up stiff
resistance, Jose cursed her and hit her several times on the stomach and other parts of the body. The complainant crossed her legs
tightly, but her attacker was able to force them open. Jose succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the complainant. He then left the
room.

The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued between him and Miss De la Riva during which he
hit, her on different parts of the body. Like Jose, Aquino succeeded in abusing the complainant. The girl was now in a state of shock.
Aquino called the others into the room. They poured water on her face and slapped her to revive her. Afterwards, three of the accused
left the room, leaving Pineda and the complainant After some struggle during which Pineda hit her, the former succeeded in forcing his
carnal desire on the latter. When the complainant went into a state of shock for the second time, the three other men went into the room
again poured water on the complainant's face and slapped her several times. The complainant heard them say that they had to revive
her so she would know what was happening. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then left the room. It was now appellant Canal's turn. There was
a struggle between him and Miss De la Riva. Like the other three appellants before him, he hit the complainant on different parts of the
body and succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her.

Mention must be made of the fact that while each of mention must be made the four appellants was struggling with the complainant, the
other three were outside the room, just behind the door, threatening the complainant with acid and telling her to give in because she
could not, after all, escape what with their presence.

After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la Riva her clothes, told her to get dressed and put
on her stockings, and to wash her face and comb her hair, to give the impression that nothing had happened to her. They told her to tell
her mother that she was mistaken by a group of men for a hostess, and that when the group found out that she was a movie actress,
she was released without being harmed. She was warned not to inform the police; for if she did and they were apprehended, they
would simply post bail and later hunt her up and disfigure her face with acid. The appellants then blindfolded Miss De la Riva again and
led her down from the hotel room. Because she was stumbling, she had to be carried into the car. Inside the car, a appellant Jose held
her head down on his lap, and kept it in that position during the trip, to prevent her from being seen by others.

Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to drop Miss De la Riva. They finally decided on a spot in front of
the Free Press Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to make it appear, according to them, that the
complainant had just come from the studio. Pineda asked Jose to alight and call a taxicab, but to choose one which did not come from
a well-known company. Jose did as requested, letting several taxicabs pass by before flagging a UBL taxicab. After they warned again
Miss De la Riva not to inform anyone of what had happened to her, appellant Canal accompanied her to the taxicab. The time was a
little past 6:00 o'clock. When Miss De la Riva was already inside the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke down
and cried. She kept asking the driver if a car was following them; and each time the driver answered her in the negative.

It was 6:30 o'clock — or some two hours after the abduction — when Miss De la Riva reached home. Her mother, her brother-in-law
Ben Suba, as well as several PC officers, policemen and reporters, were at the house. Upon seeing her mother, the complainant ran
toward her and said, "Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." The mother brought her daughter upstairs.
Upon her mother's instruction, the complainant immediately took a bath and a douche. The older woman also instructed her daughter to
douche himself two or three times daily with a strong solution to prevent infection and pregnancy. The family doctor, who was
afterwards summoned, treated the complainant for external physical injuries. The doctor was not, however, told about the sexual
assaults. Neither was Pat. Pablo Pascual, the police officer who had been sent by the desk officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the De la Riva
residence when the latter received from a mobile patrol a report of the snatching. When Miss De la Riva arrived home from her
harrowing experience, Pat. Pascual attempted to question her, but Ben Suba requested him to postpone the interrogation until she
could be ready for it. At that time, mother and daughter were still undecided on what to do.

On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant family gathered to discuss what steps, if any, should be taken. After some
agonizing moments, a decision was reached: the authorities had to be informed. Thus, early on the morning of June 29, 1967, or on the
fourth day after the incident, Miss De la Riva, accompanied by her lawyer, Atty. Regina O. Benitez, and by some members of the family,
went to the Quezon City Police Department Headquarters, filed a complaint and executed a statement (Exh. "B") wherein she narrated
the incident and gave descriptions of the four men who abused her. In the afternoon of the same day, the complainant submitted herself
ito a medico-internal examination by Dr. Ernesto Brion, NBI Chief Medico-Legal Officer.

During the physical examination of the complainant by Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967, Pat. Pascual was also at the NBI office. There he
received a telephone call from the police headquarters to the effect that one of the suspects had been apprehended. That evening, the
complainant and Pat. Pascual proceeded to the headquarters where Miss De la Riva identified appellant Jaime Jose from among a
group of persons inside the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City as one of the four men he abducted and raped her. She
executed another statement (Exh. "B-1") wherein she made a formal identification of Jose and related the role played by him.

At about 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, appellant Jose executed a statement (Exh. "I") before Pat. Marcos G. Viñas. In his
statement, which was duly sworn. Jose admitted that he knew about, and was involved in, the June 26 incident. He named the other
line appellants as his companions. Jose stated, among other things, that upon the initiative of Pineda, he and the other three waited for
Miss De la Riva to come out of the ABS Studio; that his group gave chase to the complainant's car; that it was Pineda who blindfolded
her and that only Pineda and Aquino criminally assaulted the complainant.

After Exh, "I" was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Vinas with a picture of appellant Edgardo Aquino. The picture was
shown to Miss De la Riva, who declared in her sworn statement (Exh. "B-3") that the man in the picture was one of her abductors and
rapists. The same picture was shown to Jose, who, in another sworn statement (Exh. "I-l"), identified the man in the picture as appellant
Aquino.

After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into the hands of the authorities: Pineda and Cañal on July 1, 1967, in Lipa
City, and Aquino on July 5, 1967, in the province of Batangas. On the evening of July 1, 1967. Miss De la Riva pointed to Pineda and
Cañal as among the four persons who abducted and raped her. She picked them out from among several person in the Office of the
Chief of Police of Quezon City. Later in the same evening, Miss De la Riva executed a sworn statement (Exh. B-2)wherein she made
the same identification of the two appellants from among a group of persons in the Office of the Chief of the Detective Bureau, adding
that appellant Cañal had tattoo marks on his right hip. After the identification, one of the policemen took appellant Cañal downstairs and
undressed him, and he saw, imprinted on the said appellant's right hip, the words "Bahala na Gang."
Appellant Cañal and Pineda executed and swore to separate statements on the day of their arrest. In his statement (Exh. "G"),
appellant Cañal confirmed the information previously given by Jose that the four of them waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from
the ABS Studio, and that they had planned to abduct and rape her. Appellant Cañal admitted that all four of them participated in the
commission of the crime, but he would make it appear that insofar as he was concerned the complainant yielded her body to him on
condition that he would release her. Pineda executed a statement (Exh. "J") stating that he and his other three companions wept to the
ABS Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la Riva was there, they made plans to wait for her and to follow her. He admitted that his
group followed her car and snatched her and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He would make it appear, however, that the complainant
voluntarily acceded to having sexual intercourse with him.

In his medical report (Exh. "K"), Dr. Brion noted the presence of multiple contusions and bruises on different parts of the complainant's
body, as well as of genital injuries. On the witness stand the doctor was shown several photographs of the complainant taken in his
presence and under his supervision. With the aid of the photographs and the medical reports, the doctor explained to the court that he
found contusions or bruises on the complainant's chest, shoulders, arms and fore-arms, right arm index finger, thighs, right knee and
legs. He also declared that when he was examining her, Miss De la Riva complained of slight tenderness around the neck, on the
abdominal wall and at the sites of the extragenital physical injuries, and that on pressing the said injuries, he elicited a sigh of pain or
tenderness on the part of the subject. The injuries, according to Dr. Brion, could have been caused blows administered by a closed fist
or by the palm of the hand, and could have been inflicted on the subject while she was being raped. It was the doctor's opinion that they
could have been sustained on or about June 26, 1967. In connection with the genital examination, the doctor declared that he found
injuries on the subject's genitalia which could have been produced by sexual intercourse committed on June 26, 1967. He said that he
failed to find spermatozoa. He explained, however, that spermatozoa are not usually found in the vagina after the lapse of three days
from the last intercourse, not to mention the possibility that the subject might have douched herself.

The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Cañal) took the witness stand. We quote hereunder the portions of the
decision under review relative to the theory of the defense:

Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to the Ulog Cocktail Lounge somewhere in Mabini
street in Manila, and there killed time from 9:30 in the evening of June 25 until closing time, which was about 3:30 in
the early morning of the next day. At the cocktail lounge they had listened to the music while enjoying some drinks.
Between them they had consumed a whole bottle of whisky, so much so that at least Aquino became drunk,
according to his own testimony. They had been joined at their table by a certain Frankie whom they met only that
night. Come time to go home, their new acquaintance asked to be dropped at his home in Cubao. The five men piled
into the red-bodied, black topped two-door convertible Plymouth (Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the
wheel repaired to Cubao After dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered the car to España Extension to bring
Aquino to his home in Mayon Street. But somewhere in España Extension before the Rotonda a small car whizzed to
them almost hitting them. They saw that the driver was a woman. Pineda gave chase and coming abreast of the
small car he shouted, "Putang ina mo, kamuntik na kaming mamatay." The woman continued on her way. Now
Pineda saying "let us teach her a lesson," sped after her and when she swerved ostensibly to enter a gate, Pineda
stopped his car behind being hurriedly got down, striding to the small car, opened the door and started dragging the
girl out. Both Jose and Aquino confirm the presence of another woman inside the girl's car, who helped the girl
struggle to get free from Pineda's grip; and that the struggle lasted about ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded
in pushing the girl into the red convertible. All the three accused insist they did nothing to aid Pineda: but they also
admit that they did nothing to stop him.

Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around the area just to scare the girl who was in truth so
scared that she begged them to let her be and return her to her home. She turned to Jose in appeal, but this one told
her he could net do anything as the "boss" was Pineda. Aquino heard her plead with Jose "do you not have a sister
yourself?" but did not bear the other plea 'do you not have a mother?' Then Pineda stopped at the corner of the street
where he had forcibly snatched the girl presumably to return her, but then suddenly changing his mind he said, 'why
don't you do a strip tease for us. I'll pay you P1,000.00 and the girl taunted, 'are you kidding?': that after a little while
she consented to do the performance as long as it would not last too long and provided the spectators were limited to
the four of them.

Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and Maggie alighted first, but not before Maggie had
borrowed a handkerchief from one of them to cover her face as she went up the Hotel. The three followed, and when
they saw the pair enter a room, they quickly caught up. All the three accused testify that as soon as they got into the
room, Maggie de la Riva asked the boys to close the windows before she. undressed in front of them. They
themselves also removed their clothing. Two of them removed their pants retaining their briefs, while Boy Pineda and
Cañal stripped to the skin "because it was hot." The three accused declared that they saw Boy Pineda hand P100.00
to Maggie and they heard him promise her that he would pay the balance of P900.00 later. Whereupon, the show
which lasted about 10 minutes began with the naked girl walking back and forth the room about 4 to 5 times. This
accomplished, all of them dressed up once more and the three accused (Jaime Jose, Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio
Cañal) left the room to wait in the car for Boy Pineda and Maggie de la Riva who were apparently still discussing the
mode of payment of the balance. Three minutes later Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda joined them. Now, the
question of how and where to drop Maggie came up and it is testified to by the accused that it was Maggie's idea that
they should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if she had just come from her work.

Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29 along Buendia Avenue. Aquino testifies how, on June
29 Pineda went to him with a problem. He did not have the P900.00 with which to pay Maggie the balance of her
"show" and he was afraid that if he did not pay, Maggie would have her goons after him. He wanted Aquino to go with
him to Lipa City where he had relatives and where he could help raise the money. Aquino readily obliged, and to
make the company complete they invited Cañal to join them. They used another car of Jaime Jose, different from the
one they had used the day before. At Lipa, Aquino detached himself from his compassions and proceeded alone to
the barrio allegedly to visit his relatives. In the meantime his two companions had remained in the City and had,
according to Canal, gone to live in a house very close to the municipal hall building. They later moved to another
house where the PC and Quezon City police posse found and arrested them. Aquino was the last to be apprehended,
when having read in the newspapers that he was wanted, he surrendered on July 5 to Mrs. Aurelia Leviste, wife of
the governor of Batangas.

The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is anchored, defies one's credulity and reason, and had utterly to
counteract the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the complainant's testimony and Dr. Brion's medical report and testimony. We
quote with approval the able dissertion of the trial judge on this point:
As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance the proposition that nothing happened in Swanky
Hotel except a strip-tease exhibition which the complaint agreed to do for them for fee of P1,000.00, P100.00 down
and the balance to be paid "later." The flaw in this connection lies in its utter inverisimilitude. The Court cannot
believe that any woman exists, even one habitual engaged in this kind of entertainment (which Maggie de la Riva has
not been proven to be) who would consent (and as easily and promptly as defense claims) to do a performance, not
even for all money in the worlds after the rough handling she experienced from these wolves in men's clothing who
now hungered for a show. There is no fury to match a woman stirred to indignation. A woman's pride is far stronger
than her yen for money, and her revenge much more keen. The Court cannot believe that after the rudeness and
meanness of these men to her, Maggie would in so short an interval of time forget her indignation and so readily
consent to satisfy their immoral curiosity about her. The woman in her would urge her to turn the men's hankering as
a weapon of revenge by denying them their pleasure.

Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is again something beyond even the wildest
expectations. Assuming that the woman whom the accused had abducted was in this kind of trade assuming that the
price offered was to her satisfaction, whom woman would be willing to perform first and be paid later? It is simply
preposterous to believe that Maggie de la Riva should have consent to do a striptease act for a measly down-
payment of P100.00 and the balance to be paid God knows when. Since when are exposition of the flesh paid on the
installment basis? By the very precautious nature of their pitiful calling, women who sell their attractions are usually
very shrewed and it is to be expected that they could demand full payment before curtain call. How was Maggie to
collect later when she did not even know who these man were, where they lived, whether they could be trusted with a
promise to pay later (!) whether she could ever find them again? If there is anything that had struck the Court about
the complaint, it is her courage, her intelligence and her alertness. Only a stupid woman, and a most stupid one that,
could have been persuaded to do what the defense want this Court to believe Maggie de la Riva consented to do.

Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this circumstances during their interview with
anyone, either the press, their police interrogator, the person who negotiated their surrender (as in the case of
Aquino) or even their counsel. One cannot escape the very strong suspicion that this story is a last ditch, desperate
attempt to save the day for the accused. It truly underscores the hopelessness of their stand and projects all the more
clearly their guilt.

Then there is the incident of the men's stripping themselves. Why was there need for this? The Court realizes that in
its desperate need of an explanation for Maggie's positive identification of Cañal as the man with the tattoo mark on
his right buttock, the defense concocted the sickeningly incident story that the four men removed their underclothing
in the presence of a woman simply "because it was hot." What kind of men were these who were so devoid of any
sense of decency that they thought nothing of adding insult to injury by not only inducing a woman a strip before
them, but for forcing her to perform before a naked audience? And then they have gall to argue that "nothing"
happened. For males of cold and phlegmatic blood and disposition it could be credible, but not for men of torrid
regions like ours where quick passions and hot tempers are the rule rather than the exception!

All of these consideration set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that the version of the defense has not been able to explain
away a very vital piece of evidence of prosecution which, if unexplained, cannot but reduce any defense unavailing. The result of the
physical (external and internal) examination conducted on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the afternoon of June 29, the pertinent
findings of which quoted earlier in this decision, establish beyond doubt that at the time that Maggie de la Riva was examined she bore
on her body traces of physical and sexual assault.

The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is either one of the following: (1) the insinuation that when
Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda were left behind in the hotel room the bruises and the sexual attack could have
taken place then. But then, the defense itself says that these two persons rejoined the three after three or
four minutes! It is physically impossible, in such a short time, for Boy Pineda to have attacked the girl and inflicted on
her all of these injuries; (2) it was suggested by the defense that Maggie de la Riva could have inflicted all of those
injuries upon herself just to make out a case against the accused. The examining physician rules out this
preposterous proposition, verily it does not take much stretch of the imagination to see how utterly impossible this
would be, and for what purpose? Was P900.00 which she had failed to collect worth that much self-torture? And what
about all the shame, embarrassment and publicity she would (as she eventually did) expose herself to? If she really
had not been raped would she have gone thru all of these tribulation?

A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has much more to lose in the notoriety the case will reap
her, her honor and that of her family, than in the redress she demands (Canastre 82-480; Medina, C.A. 1943 O.G.
151; Medina y Puno, CA O.G. 338; CA 55 O.G. 7666; Galamito, L-6302, August 25, 1954); (3) it could also be argued
that the contusions and bruises could have been inflicted on Maggie during her struggle with Pineda when the latter
pulled and pushed her into the red convertible car. The telltale injuries, however, discount this possibility, for the
location in which many of the bruises and traumas were located (particularly on the inner portion of her thighs) could
not have been cause by any struggle save by those of a woman trying to resists the brutal and bestial attack on her
honor.

In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie's sole and uncorroborated testimony should not be rated any
credence at all as against the concerted declaration of the the accused. In the first place, it is not correct to say that
Maggie's declaration was uncorroborated — she has for corroboration nothing less than the written extra-judicial
statements of Jose and Canal. But even assuming that Maggie stood alone in her statements, the cases cited by the
accused in their Memorandum notwithstanding which the Court does not consider in point anyway, jurisprudence has
confirmed the ruling that numbers is the least vital element in gauging the weight of evidence. What is more important
is which of the declarations is the more credible, the more logical, the more reasonable, the more prone to be biased
or polluted. (Ricarte 44 OG 2234; Damian CA-GR No. 25523, April 24, 1959). Besides, it should be borne in maid that
in the most detestable crime of rape in which a man is at his worst the testimony of the offended party most often is
the only one available to prove directly its commission and that corroboration by other eyewitnesses would in certain
cases place a serious doubt as to the probability of its commission, so trial courts of justice are most often placed in a
position of having to accept such uncorroborated testimony if the same is in regards conclusive, logical and probable
(Landicho, VIII ACR 530).

We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in their briefs.
1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal deny having had anything to do with the abduction of Miss De la Riva. They point to Pineda (who
entered a plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they generously contend that even as to him the act was purged at any taint of
criminality by the complainant's subsequent consent to perform a striptease show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is claimed, negated
the existence of the element of lewd design. This line of defense has evidently leg no to stand on. The evidence is clear and
overwhelming that all the appellants participated in the forcible abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in
her sworn statements, that they helped one another in dragging her into the car against her will; that she did not know them personally;
that while inside the car, Jose and Aquino, between whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the former forcing his lips on hers, and
the latter touching her thighs and raising her skirt; that meaningful and knowing glances were in the meanwhile being exchanged
among the four; and that all of them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This testimony, whose evidentiary weight has
not in the least been overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to establish the crimes charged in the amended complaint. In the
light thereof, appellants' protestation that they were not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual basis.

2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below, likewise been clearly established. Jose, Aquino
and Canal contend that the absence of semen in the complainant's vagina disproves the fact of rape. The contention is untenable. Dr.
Brion of the NBI, who testified as an expert, declared that semen is not usually found in the vagina after three days from the last
intercourse, especially if the subject has douched herself within that period. In the present case, the examination was conducted on the
fourth day after the incident, and the complainant had douched herself to avoid infection and pregnancy. Furthermore, the absence of
spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the important consideration being, not the emission of semen, but
penetration (People vs Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980). Aquino's suggestion that the abrasions on the cervix were caused by the tough tip of
a noozle deliberately used by the complainant to strengthen her alleged fabricated tale of rape, is absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult to
imagine that any sane woman, who is single and earning as much Miss Dela Riva did, would inflict injuries on her genital organ by
puncturing the same with a sharply-pointed instrument in order to strike back at four strangers who allegedly would not pay her the sum
of P900.00 due her for a striptease act. Besides, Dr. Brion testified that the insertion of such an instrument in the genital organ would
not result in the kind of injuries he found in the mucosa of the cervix.

3. Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably establish the commission of successive rapes by the four appellants.
Upon Miss De la Riva's arrival at her house in the morning of June 26, 1967, she immediately told her mother, " Mommy Mommy, I
have been raped. All four of them raped me." This utterance, which is part of the res gestae, commands strong probative value,
considering that it was made by the complainant to her mother who, in cases of this nature was the most logical person in whom a
daughter would confide the truth. Aquino and Canal would make capital of the fact that Miss De la Riva stated to the reporters on the
morning of June 26, that she was not abused. Her statement to the press is understandable. At that time the complainant, who had not
yet consulted her family on a matter which concerned her reputation as well as that of her family, and her career, was not then in a
position to reveal publicly what had happened to her. This is one reason why the complainant did not immediately inform the authorities
of the tragedy that befell her. Another reason is that she was threatened with disfiguration. And there were, of course, the traumas
found by Dr. Brion on different parts of the complainant's body. Could they, too, have been self-inflicted? Or, as suggested, could they
possibly have been inflicted by appellant Pineda alone, when the story given by the other three is that Pineda and the complainant were
left in the hotel room for only three or four minutes, and that they came out to join them in what they would picture to be a cordial
atmosphere, the complainant even allegedly suggesting that she be dropped on a spot where people would reasonably presume her to
have come from a studio? Equally important is the complainant's public disclosure of her tragedy, which led to the examination of her
private parts and lay her open to risks of future public ridicule and diminution of popularity and earnings as a movie actress.

4. Jose and Canal seek the exclusion of their extrajudicial statements from the mass of evidence on the grounds that they were secured
from them by force and intimidation, and that the incriminating details therein were supplied by the police investigators. We are not
convinced that the statements were involuntarily given, or that the details recited therein were concocted by the authorities. The
statements were given in the presence of several people and subscribed and sworn to before the City Fiscal of Quezon City, to whom
neither of the aforesaid appellants intimated the use of inordinate methods by the police. They are replete with details which could
hardly be known to the police; and although it is suggested that the authorities could have secured such details from their various
informers, no evidence at all was presented to establish the truth of such allegation. While in their statements Jose and Canal admitted
having waited — together with the two other appellants — for Miss De la Riva at the ABS Studio, each of them attempted in the same
statements to exculpate himself: appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and Aquino criminally abused the complainant; while appellant
Canal would make it appear that the complainant willingly allowed him to have sexual intercourse with her. Had the statements been
prepared by the authorities, they would hardly have contained matters which were apparently designed to exculpate the affiants. It is
significant, too, that the said two appellants did not see it fit to inform any of their friends or relatives of the alleged use of force and
intimidation by the police. Dr. Mariano Nario of the Quezon City Police Department, who examined appellant Canal after the latter made
his statement, found no trace of injury on any part of the said appellant's body in spite of the claims that he was boxed on the stomach
and that one of his arms was burned with a cigarette lighter. In the circumstances, and considering, further, that the police officers who
took down their statements categorically denied on the witness stand that the two appellants were tortured, or that any detail in the
statements was supplied by them or by anyone other than the affiants themselves, We see no reason to depart from the trial court's
well-considered conclusion that the statements were voluntarily given. However, even disregarding the in-custody statements of Jose
and Canal, We find that the mass of evidence for the prosecution on record will suffice to secure the conviction of the two.

The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose on the other ground that he was not assisted by
counsel during the custodial interrogations. He cites the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377
U.S. 201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436).

The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of which provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel ..." While the said provision is identical to
that in the Constitution of the United States, in this jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs.
Beecham, 23 Phil., 258 (1912), in connection with a similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of July
1, 1902) to mean proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said constitutional
provision, We have provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be
entitled ... (b) to be present and defend in person and by attorney at every stage of the proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to the
promulgation of the judgment." The only instances where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are
during the second stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18). The rule in
the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding effect here, but also
because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution the meaning attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be
considered. And even there the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the absence of unanimity in the voting by the
members of the United States Supreme Court in all the three above-cited cases.

5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial resulting in gross miscarriage of justice. He contends
that because the charge against him and his co-appellants is a capital offense and the amended complaint cited aggravating
circumstances, which, if proved, would raise the penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his presence during all stages
of the trial. The contention is untenable. While a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission of all the
material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is capital, for the
admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime (People vs.
Boyles, et al., L-15308, May 29, 1964, citing People vs. Ama, L-14783, April 29, 1961, and People vs. Parete, L-15515, April 29, 1961).
Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much
less to require his presence in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested the court to allow him to prove mitigating
circumstances, for then it would be the better part of discretion on the part of the trial court to grant his request. (Cf. People vs.
Arconado, L-16175, February 28, 1962.) The case of U.S. vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil., 91), cited by Pineda, is not in point, for there this Court
ordered a new trial because it found for a fact that the accused, who had pleaded guilty, "did not intend to admit that he committed the
offense with the aggravating circumstances" mentioned in the information. We are not in a position to make a similar finding here. The
transcript of the proceedings during the arraignment shows that Pineda's counsel, Atty. Lota prefaced his client's plea of guilty with the
statement that .

I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain simple language of the contents of aggravating
circumstances and apprised him of the penalty he would get, and we have given said accused time to think. After a
while I consulted him — for three times — and his decision was still the same.

Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that he had always been averse to Pineda's idea of pleading guilty,
because "I know the circumstances called for the imposition of the maximum penalty considering the aggravating circumstances," but
that he acceded to his client's wish only after the fiscal had stated that he would recommend to the court the imposition of life
imprisonment on his client. To be sure, any such recommendation does not bind the Court. The situation here, therefore, is far different
from that obtaining in U.S. vs. Agcaoili, supra.

6. Two of the appellants — Jose and Cañal — bewail the enormous publicity that attended the case from the start of investigation to the
trial. In spite of the said publicity, however, it appears that the court a quo was able to give the appellants a fair hearing. For one thing,
three of the seven (7) original accused were acquitted. For another thing, Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge "had not
been influenced by adverse and unfair comments of the press, unmindful of the rights of the accused to a presumption of innocence
and to fair trial."

We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together to commit the crimes imputed to them in the amended
information quoted at the beginning of this decision. There is no doubt at all that the forcible abduction of the complainant from in front
of her house in Quezon City, was a necessary if not indispensable means which enabled them to commit the various and the
successive acts of rape upon her person. It bears noting, however, that even while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime
of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so that each of the three succeeding (crimes of the same nature can not legally
be considered as still connected with the abduction — in other words, they should be detached from, and considered independently of,
that of forcible abduction and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter.

What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, under
paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No. 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964, and which provides as follows:

ART. 335. When and how rape committed.—Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two
next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty shall be likewise death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes committed, the latter is definitely the
more serious; hence, pursuant the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its
maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity
to consider the attendance of aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be imposed.

Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining the proper penalty to be imposed in each of
the other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us to make a definite finding in this connection to the effect that the commission of
said crimes was attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such
circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been committed by the four
appellants in conspiracy with one another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy, since the appellants in
ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a
circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to appellants
Jose, Aquino and Ca_¤_al, none of these aggravating circumstances has been offset by any mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda
should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least affect the
nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a
result, appellants should likewise be made to suffer the extreme penalty of death in each of these three simple crimes of rape. (Art. 63,
par. 2, Revised Penal Code.)

In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the trial court applied by analogy Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the maximum duration of all the penalties therein imposed upon the appellant shall not be
more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon the appellant, which should not
exceed forty years." The said court is of the opinion that since a man has only one life to pay for a wrong, the ends of justice would be
served, and society and the victim would be vindicated just as well, if only one death penalty were imposed on each of the appellants.

We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only be taken into account in connection with the service
of the sentence imposed, not in the imposition of the penalty (People vs. Escares, 55 Off. Gaz., 623). In holding that only one death
penalty should be imposed because man has only one life, the trial court ignored the principle enunciated in the very case it cited,
namely, U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil., 260, where this Court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court, found the accused guilty of two
murders and one homicide and imposed upon him two death sentences for the murders and a prison term for the homicide. In not
applying the said principle, the court a quo said that the case of Balaba is different from the present case, for while in the former case
the accused was found to have committed three distinct offenses, here only one offense is charged, even if complex. As We have
explained earlier herein, four crimes were committed, charged and proved. There is, therefore, no substantial difference between the
two cases insofar as the basic philosophy involved is concerned, for the fact remains that in the case of Balaba this Court did not
hesitate to affirm the two death sentences imposed on the accused by the trial court. In People vs. Peralta, et al., L-19060, October 29,
1968, in which this Court imposed on each of the six accused three death penalties for three distinct and separate crimes of murder,
We said that "since it is the settled rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then each
conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious acts committed as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and
severity of the appropriate penalties prescribed by law." In the said case (which was promulgated after the decision of the court a
quo had been handed down) We had occasion to discuss at length the legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties,
thus:

The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality, an exercise in futility. It is
contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict, like all mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And because of this
physiological and biological attribute of man, it is reasoned that the imposition of multiple death penalties is
impractical and futile because after the service of one capital penalty, the execution of the rest of the death penalties
will naturally be rendered impossible. The foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of death penalties suffers
from four basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish
between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be
served simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties.

The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct, though related, concepts. The imposition of
the proper penalty or penalties is determined by the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and proved,
whereas service of sentence is determined by the severity and character of the penalty or penalties imposed. In the
imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not concern itself with the possibility or practicality of the
service of the sentence, since actual service is a contingency subject to varied factors like the successful escape of
the convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go into the imposition of the proper
penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature, gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved and the
corresponding penalties prescribed by law.

Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed simultaneously. A cursory
reading of article 70 will show that there are only two moves of serving two or more (multiple) penalties:
simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that two or more penalties shall be served simultaneously if the
nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does
not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.

The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical importance. The
sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which
may not be accurately projected by the imposition of only one death sentence irrespective of the number of capital
felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of the convict in its real dimensions, the
possibility of a grant of executive clemency is justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of
multiple death penalties could effectively serve as deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or commutation. Faced
with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious restraint in
recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf.

Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional power to pardon (one of the
presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute) deems it proper to commute the multiple death penalties to
multiple life imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the convict has to serve the maximum forty (40) years of
multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to life imprisonment, the convict
will have to serve a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life sentence.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the existence of conspiracy among them and of our finding as regards the nature and
number of the crimes committed, as well as of the presence of aggravating circumstances, four death penalties should be imposed in
the premises.

————

Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation asking for reversal of that portion of the
judgment of the court below ordering the confiscation of the car used by the appellants in abducting the complainant. The aforesaid car
is a 1965 two-door Pontiac sedan with Motor No. WT-222410, Serial No. 2376752110777, Plate No. H-33284, File No. 11584171,
alleged by the intervenor to be in the custody of Major Ernesto San Diego of the Quezon City Police Department. The car is registered
in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez.
On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of an appellant Jaime G. Jose, bought the car from the Malayan Motors Corporation and
simultaneously executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price of P13,200, which was stipulated to be
payable in 24 monthly installments of P550 beginning May 4, 1967 up to April 4, 1969. The mortgage was duly registered with the Land
Transportation Commission and inscribed in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. The mortgage lien was annotated on the motor registration
certificate. On April 17, 1967, for value received and with notice to Mrs. Gomez, the Malayan Motors Corporation assigned its credit
against Mrs. Gomez, as well as the chattel mortgage, to the intervenor. The assignment was duly registered with the Land
Transportation Commission and annotated on the registration certificate.

Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of which the intervenor filed on July 5, 1967, an action for replevin against
her (Civil Case No. 69993, Court of First Instance of Manila) as a preliminary step to foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. On July 7,
1967, the court issued an order for the seizure of the car. The sheriff, however, could not enforce the writ of replevin because the car
was not in Mrs. Gomez' possession, the same having been used by her son, appellant Jaime G. Jose, together with the other
appellants in this case, in the abduction of Miss De la Riva, as a result of which the car was seized by the Quezon City police and
placed in the custody of Major San Diego, who refused to surrender it to the sheriff on the ground that it would be used as evidence in
the trial of the criminal case.

During the pendency of that criminal case in the court below, or on July 26, 1967, the intervenor filed with the said court a petition for
intervention. The said petition was not, however, acted upon. On October 2, 1967, the trial court rendered its judgment in the present
case ordering the car's confiscation as an instrument of the crime. Although not notified of the said decision, the intervenor filed, on
October 17, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the order of confiscation; but the same was denied on October 31, 1967, on the
ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the automatic elevation thereof to this Court. The intervenor then
filed a petition for relief from judgement, but the same was also denied.

On February 5, 1968, judgement was rendered in the replevin case ordering Mrs. Gomez to deliver the car to the intervenor so that the
chattel mortgage thereon could be foreclosed, or, in the alternative, to pay the intervenor the sum of P13,200 with interest thereon at
12% per annum from July 5, 1968, the premium bond, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. The judgment became final and executory.
Attempts to execute the judgment against the properties of Mrs. Gomez were unavailing; the writ of execution was returned by the
sheriff unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the present petition for intervention was filed with this Court, which allowed the intervenor to file a
brief. In his brief the Solicitor General contends, among others, that the court a quo having found that appellant Jose is the owner of the
car, the order of confiscation is correct.

Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez, who, in the absence of strong evidence to the
contrary, must be considered as the lawful owner thereof; that the only basis of the court a quo in concluding that the said car belongs
to appellant Jose were the latter's statements during the trial of the criminal case to that effect; that the said statement were not,
however, intended to be, nor could constitute, a claim of ownership over the car adverse to his mother, but were made simply in answer
to questions propounded in court for the sole purpose of establishing the identity of the defendant who furnished the car used by the
appellants in the commission of the crime; that the chattel mortgage on the car and its assignment in the favor of the intervenor were
made several months before the date of commission of the crimes charged, which circumstance forecloses the possibility of collusion to
prevent the State from confiscating the car; that the final judgement in the replevin case can only be executed by delivering the
possession of the car to the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and the Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the
confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the crime if such "be the property of a third person not
liable for the offense," it is the sense of this Court that the order of the court below for confiscation of the car in question should be set
aside and that the said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in the replevin case, Civil Case No. 69993.

————

Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court received a formal manifestation on the part of the Solicitor General to the
effect that Rogelio Cañal, one of the herein appellants, died in prison on December 28, 1970. As a result of this development, this case
is hereby dismissed as to him alone, and only insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de
oficio.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P.
Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, and each and every one of them is likewise
convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all
of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of
40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs.

Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a quo for its confiscation is hereby set aside;
and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to deliver its possession to intervenor Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation
in accordance with the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 69993 thereof.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Barredo and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19069 October 29, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
AMADEO PERALTA, ET AL., defendants,
ANDRES FACTORA, LEONARDO DOSAL, ANGEL PARUMOG, AMADEO PERALTA, FLORENCIO LUNA and GERVASIO
LARITA, defendants-review.
Assistant Solicitors General Vicente A. Torres and Antonio Ibarra for plaintiff-appellee.
J. R. Nuguid for defendants-review.

PER CURIAM:

In the decision in criminal case 7705 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,subject of the present automatic review, Amadeo Peralta,
Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two defendants1 charged
therein with multiple murder) were pronounced guilty, and all sentenced to death, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of each of
the victims, namely, Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosaand Santos Cruz, in the sum of P6,000, and each to pay his corresponding share
of the costs.

The information recites:

That on or about the 16th day of February, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, who are convicts confined in the New Bilibid Prisons by
virtue of final judgments, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another, with evident premeditation
and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill Jose Carriego,
Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing and striking them with
ice picks, clubs and other improvised weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious
injuries which directly caused their deaths.

That the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the commission of the crime in that the crime was
committed after the accused have been convicted by final judgments and while they are serving the said judgments in the New
Bilibid Prisons.

Contrary to law with the following aggravating circumstances:

1. That the crime was committed with insult to public authorities;

2. That the crime was committed by a band;

3. That the crime was committed by armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity;

4. That use of superior strength or means was employed to weaken the defense;

5. That as a means to the commission of the crime doors and windows have been broken;

6. That means was employed which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act;

7. That the crime was committed where public authorities were engaged in the discharge of their duties.

Upon motion of the provincial fiscal before trial, the lower court dismissed the charge against one of the accused 2for lack of evidence.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the charges against six of the accused 3 were dismissed for failure of the prosecution to
establish a prima facie case against them. One of the defendants died4during the pendency of the case. After trial, the court a
quo acquitted eight5 of the remaining defendants.

As early as in 1956, a great number of inmates confined in the national penitentiary at Muntinglupa arrayed themselves into two warring
gangs, the "Sigue-Sigue" and the "OXO", the former composed predominantly of Tagalog inmates, the latter comprised mainly of
prisoners from the Visayas and Mindanao. Since then the prison compound has been rocked time and time again by bloody riots
resulting in the death of many of their members and suspected sympathizers. In an effort to avert violent clashes between the
contending groups, prison officials segrerated known members of the "Sigue-Sigue" from those of the "OXO". Building 1 housed
"Sigue-Sigue" members, while a majority of the prisoners confined in Bldg. 4 belonged to the "OXO". Even in Bldg. 4, which is
composed of four brigades, namely, 4-A and 4-B (upper floor) and 4-C and 4-D (first floor), inmates from Visayas and Mindanao, from
whom the "OXO" drew most of its members, were confined in 4-A.

It was at about 7:00 a.m. on February 16, 1958, while the inmates of the penitentiary were preparing to attend Sunday mass, that a fight
between two rival members of the "Sigue-Sigue" and "OXO" gangs occurred in the plaza where the prisoners were assembled, causing
a big commotion. The fight was, however, quelled, and those involved were led away for investigation, while the rest of the prisoners
were ordered to return to their respective quarters. Hardly had conditions returned to normal when a riot broke out in Bldg. 1, a known
lair of the "Sigue-Sigue". The inmates thereof tried to invade Bldg. 4, where many members and sympathizers of the "OXO" gang were
confined. The timely arrival of the guards forced the invading inmates to retreat and return to Bldg. 1. Moments later, another riot
erupted in Bldg. 4, as the inmates of brigade 4-A destroyed the lock of their door and then rampaged from one brigade to another. The
invading prisoners from 4-A, mostly "OXO" members and sympathizers, clubbed and stabbed to death Jose Carriego, an inmate of 4-B.
Afterwards, they forcibly opened the door of 4-C and killed two more inmates, namely, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz.

The three victims sustained injuries which swiftly resulted in their death — before they could be brought to the hospital.

Jose Carriego: (a) lacerated wound on the lower lip, 5 cm. in length and 3 cm.in depth; (b) contusion and hematoma of the back of the
neck, about 2 inches in diameter; and (c) five punctured wounds in the chest, penetrating the lungs. Cause of death: internal
hemorrhage from multiple fatal wounds in the chest.

Eugenio Barbosa: (a) lacerated wound in the occipital region, 3 inches in length and 1 cm. in depth; (b) two penetrating wounds in the
abdomen, puncturing the intestines; (c) lacerated wounds on the right oxilla, 3 cm. in length and 2 cm. in depth; and (d) several bruises
at the right and left lower extremities. Cause of death: shock, secondary to internal hermorrhage in the abdomen.
Santos Cruz: (a) lacerated wound on the head, 2 inches in length; (b) fractured skull; (c) wound on the upper lip cutting the lip in two;
(d) seven punctured wounds in the chest, two of which were penetrating; (e) hematoma on the right hand; and (f) three punctured
wounds on the left hand. Cause of death: fractured skull.

Romeo Pineda, an inmate and first quarter-in-charge of brigade 4-B, testified that while he was taking his breakfast with Jose Carriego,
who was at the time the representative of the prisoners confined in 4-B to the inmate carcel, he "suddenly heard commotion" near the
door of their brigade; that his fellow prisoners started shouting "pinapasok na tayo," as the invading inmates from brigade 4-A
stampeded into 4-B; that he and Carriego took hold of their clubs and stood at the end of the passageway; that he saw Carriego
surrender his club to Andres Factora, an "OXO" member from 4-A; that as Carriego started to walk away, Factora clubbed Carriego on
the nape causing the latter to fall; that Factora turned up the face of his fallen victim and struck him again in the face; that while
Carriego was in this prostrate position, Amadeo Peralta and Leonardo Dosal, companions of Factora, repeatedly stabbed him.

The testimony of Pineda was corroborated in all its material points by Juanito Marayoc and Avelino Sauza, both inmates of 4-B. These
two prosecution witnesses identified Factora, Peralta and Dosal as the assailants of Carriego.

From 4-B, the invading inmates of 4-A went down and forcibly entered 4-C. According to Oscar Fontillas, an inmate of 4-C, he saw the
prisoners from 4-A rushing toward their brigade; that among the invading inmates who forced open the door of 4-C, with help from the
inside provided by Visayan prisoners confined in 4-C, were Factora, Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervacio Larita, Ernesto Fernandez and
Jose Tariman; that he saw Factora, Larita and Fernandez kill Barbosa, while the rest of their companies instructed the Visayans to
leave their cell and ordered the "Manila boys" (Tagalogs) to remain. Antonio Pabarlan, another inmate of 4-C, declared that he saw
Peralta stab Barbosa, as Dosal, Larita, Florencio Luna, Parumog and Factora clubbed the hapless victim. Another inmate of 4-C, Jose
Halili, not only corroborated the testimony of Fontillas and Pabarlan but as well added grim details. He declared that while Barbosa was
trying to hide under a cot, he was beaten and stabbed to death by Dosal, Parumog, Factora and Fernandez, with Luna, Larita, Pedro
Cogol and Eilel Tugaya standing guard, armed with clubs and sharp instruments, in readiness to repel any intervention from the
Tagalog inmates. Carlos Espino, also confined in 4-C, declared that he saw Parumog, Peralta Factora and Larita assault and kill
Barbosa.

The same witnesses for the prosecution testifies that after killing Barbosa, the invading "OXO" members and sympathizers proceeded
to hunt for Santos Cruz, another Tagalog like Carriego and Barbosa. Halili testified, that he saw Peralta, Larita, Cogol and Tugaya take
Santos Cruz to 4-A from 4-C; that Santos Cruz knelt down and pleaded for his life, saying, "Maawa kayo sa akin. Marami akong anak;"
that Luna and Peralta were unmoved as they stabbed Santos Cruz to death. Pabarlan declared that after the death of Barbosa, Santos
Cruz was brought to 4-A by the invading inmates but Cruz was able to slip back to his cell only to be recaptured by Factora, Dosal and
Luna and brought to near the fire escape where he was clubbed and stabbed to death by Parumog, Dosal, Factora and Peralta.
Fontillas and Espino corroborated the declarations of Halili and Pabarlan with respect to the killing of Santos Cruz, and both mentioned
Larita as one of the assailants of Cruz.

The trial judge summarized the evidence for the prosecution, thus:

"... it clearly appears that the three killings in question were an offshoot of the rivalry between the two organizations. All those
who were killed, namely, Barbosa, Carriego and Santos Cruz, were Tagalogs and well known as members if not sympathizers
of the Sigue Sigue, while the accused so charged with their killing were mostly members if not sympathizers of the Oxo
organization. These three killings were sparked by the commotion that happened in the plaza between 8:00 and 9:00 in the
morning, while the prisoners were preparing to go the mass ... It was evident that the clash that occurred in the plaza produced
a chain reaction among the members and followers of the two organizations. The inmates of Building No. 1, known lair of the
Sigue Sigues bolted the door of their cells and tried to invade Building No. 4 where a big number of the Oxo members and
their sympathizers were confined, but, however, were forced to retreat by the timely arrival of the guards who sent them back
to their building. When the members of the Oxo in Building No. 4 learned about this, they went on a rampage looking for
members of the Sigue Sigue or their sympathizers who were confined with them in the same building. As the evidence of the
prosecution shows, the accused who were confined in Brigade 4-A of Building No. 4 led the attack. They destroyed the lock of
their dormitories and with the help of their companions succeeded in bolting the door of the different brigades, and once they
succeeded in bolting the doors of the different brigades, they went inside and tried to segregate the Tagalogs from their group;
that as soon as they discovered their enemies they clubbed and stabbed them to death ...

Admitting that he was one among several who killed Jose Carriego, Peralta nevertheless claims self-defense. He testified that on the
morning of the riot he was attacked by Carriego and Juan Estrella near the door of 4-A while he was returning to his brigade from the
chapel with some companions; that Carriego clubbed him on the head; that he was able to parry the second blow of Carriego and then
succeeded in squeezing Carriego's head with his hands; that forthwith he whipped out an improvised ice pick and stabbed Carriego
several times; that when he (Peralta) was already dizzy due to the head wound he sustained from the clubbing, Carriego managed to
slip away; that he then became unconscious, and when he regained consciousness he found himself on a tarima with his head
bandaged.

Peralta's declarations do not inspire belief. The impressive array of prosecution witnesses who saw him actively participate in the killing
of the three victims pointed to him as the aggressor, not the aggrieved. Pineda, Marayoc and Sauza positively identified him as one of
the assailants of Carriego. Contrary to the pretensions of Peralta, Carriego an alleged "Sigue-Sigue" member, would not have attacked
him, knowing fully well that Building No. 4 was an "OXO" lair where the "Sigue-Sigue" members were outnumbered. Anent the killing of
Barbosa and Santos Cruz, Peralta failed to offer any explicit defense to rebut the inculpatory declarations of prosecution witnesses
Pabarlan and Espino who saw him participate in the killing of Barbosa and those of Halili, Fontillas and Espino who identified him as
one of the murderers of Santos Cruz.

For his part, Leonardo Dosal stated that he killed Santos Cruz, but also claims self-defense in exculpation. He declared that Santos
Cruz, Jose Carriego, Juanita Espino, Carlos Espino and Oscar Fontillas invaded 4-A where he was confined; that a free-for-all forthwith
ensued; that he then heard Santos Cruz call Carlos Espino, and advise the latter to go away as "I will be the one to kill that person
(Dosal);" that with a sharp instrument, Cruz hit him on the head and then on the nose; that as Cruz was about to hit him again, he got
hold of his ice pick and stabbed Cruz repeatedly until the latter fell.

Dosal's avowal is clearly belied by the positive testimonies of Pabarlan, Halili and Espino who saw him participate in the killing of
Santos Cruz. If it is true that Dosal killed Santos Cruz in self-defense when the latter together with his companions supposedly invaded
Dosal's brigade (4-A), why is it that the body of Santos Cruz was found at the fire escape near the pasillo between 4-C and 4-D of the
first floor of Bldg. 1 instead of in 4-A which is located in the upper floor? Moreover, Dosal failed to explain why he was seen in 4-C,
which he does not deny, since he was an inmate of 4-A where he was allegedly attacked. With respect to the murder of Carriego and
Barbosa with which Dosal was also charged, he did not offer any evidence in his behalf. Hence, the testimonies of Pineda, Marayoc
and Sauza identifying him as one of the killers of Carriego and those of Pabarlan, Halili and Espino implicating him in the death of
Santos Cruz, stand unrebutted.

Andres Factora declared that he clubbed Carriego and Santos Cruz under compulsion of his co-accused who threatened to kill him if he
disobeyed their order; that he did not hit Barbosa anymore because the latter was already dead; that it was his co-accused who actually
killed the three victims. Again, the declarations of the prosecution witnesses, which were accorded full credence by the trial court,
expose the guilt of Factora beyond reasonable doubt. In fact, according to Pineda, whose testimony was corroborated by Marayoc, it
was Factora who started the mass assault by clubbing Carriego treacherously. Fontillas, Halili, Pabarlan and Espino pointed to Factora
as one of the killers of Barbosa, while at least three prosecution witnesses, namely, Pabarlan, Fontillas and Espino, saw Factora
participate in the slaying of Santos Cruz. The active participation of Factora in the killing, which is clear index of voluntariness, thus
negates his claim of compulsion and fear allegedly engendered by his co-accused.

Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna take refuge in the exculpatory device of alibi. Parumog testified that he did not
participate in the killing of the three inmates because he stayed during that entire hapless day in the office of the trustees for
investigation after the fight in the plaza; that he was implicated in the killing by the prosecution witnesses because of his refusal to
accede to their request to testify against his co-accused; that he is not a Visayan but a Tagalog from Nueva Ecija. Larita claims that he
did not know about the killing until he was informed that three inmates had died; that on the day in question he was brought to the
police trustee brigade for investigation after the incident in the plaza; that he was escorted back to his brigade only in the afternoon.
Luna likewise disclaims any knowledge of the killing and asserts that for the entire duration of the riot he remained in his cell (brigade 4-
A).

The alibis of Parumog, Larita and Luna merit no credence when set against the positive testimonies of prosecution witness identifying
them as participants in the killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz. Pabarlan, Espino and Fontillas declared that Larita was one of the killers
of Barbosa; Espino and Fontillas declared that they saw Larita kill Santos Cruz; Pabarlan, Halili and Espino testified that they saw
Parumog participate in the murder of Barbosa; Espino, Fontillas and Pabarlan stated that Parumog took part in the killing of Santos
Cruz. Pabarlan and Halili declared that Luna participated in the fatal assault on Barbosa and Santos Cruz.

The alibis of the accused are thus sufficiently overcome by strong evidence to the contrary. The defense of alibi is generally weak since
it is easy to concoct. For this reason, courts view it with no small amount of caution, and accept it only when proved by positive, clear
and satisfactory evidence.6 In the case at bar, if Parumog and Larita were really confined in the police trustee brigade for investigation
on the day of the incident, there should have been a record of the alleged investigation. But none was presented. The testimony of
Luna that throughout the riot he stayed in his cell is quite unnatural. He claims that he did not even help his cellmates barricade their
brigade with tarimas in order to delay if not prevent the entry of the invading inmates. According to him, he "just waited in one corner."

The rule is settled that the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification by prosecution witnesses pointing to the
accused as particeps criminis.7 Moreover, the defense of alibi is an issue of fact the resolution of which depends almost entirely on the
credibility of witnesses who seek to establish it. In this respect the relative weight which the trial judge accords to the testimony of the
witnesses must, unless patently inconsistent without evidence on record, be accepted. 8 In the case at bar, the trial court, in dismissing
the alibis of Parumog, Larita and Luna, said that "their mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the witnesses who saw
them participate directly in the execution of the conspiracyto kill Barbosa, Carriego and Santos Cruz."

The killing of Carriego constitutes the offense of murder because of the presence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance: Carriego
was clubbed by Factora from behind, and as he lay prostrate and defenseless, Peralta and Dosal stabbed him repeatedly on the chest.
The blow on the nape and the penetrating chest wounds were all fatal, according to Dr. Bartolome Miraflor. Abuse of superior strength
qualified the killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz to the category of murder. The victims, who were attacked individually were completely
overwhelmed by their assailants' superiority in number and weapons and had absolutely no chance at all to repel or elude the attack.
All the attackers were armed with clubs or sharp instruments while the victims were unarmed, as so found by the trial court. In fact,
Halili testified that Barbosa was clubbed and stabbed to death while he was trying to hide under a cot, and Santos Cruz was killed while
he was on his knees pleading for his life.

The essential issue that next confronts us is whether conspiracy attended the commission of the murders. The resolution of this issue is
of marked importance because upon it depends the quantity and quality of the penalties that must be imposed upon each of the
appellants.

For this purpose, it is not amiss to briefly restate the doctrine on conspiracy, with particular emphasis on the facets relating to its nature,
the quantum of proof required, the scope and extent of the criminal liability of the conspirators, and the penalties imposable by mandate
of applicable law.

Doctrine. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.9 Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in
treason,10 rebellion11 and sedition.12 The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the
Philippines.13 An agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the conspirators do
not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the
public remains undisturbed. However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more
malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In
stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto14 opined that

While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute
specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact
of vital importance, when considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the
consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.

Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.15 The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two
or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or
collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as
though performed by himself alone." 16 Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more
persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or
conspiracy."17 The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case 18 where this Court held that

... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and
inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement ...
The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ... accused, be regarded as
the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible ...

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective
liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to
the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who
was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through
his moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.

In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation to all
of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule
for collectivizing criminal liability.

The ensnaring nature of conspiracy is projected in bold relief in the cases of malversation and rape committed in furtherance of a
common design.

The crime of malversation is generally committed by an accountable public officer who misappropriates public funds or public property
under his trust.19 However, in the classic case of People vs. Ponte20 this Court unequivocally held that a janitor and five municipal
policemen, all of whom were not accountable public officers, who conspired and aided a municipal treasurer in the malversation of
public funds under the latter's custody, were principally liable with the said municipal treasurer for the crime of malversation. By reason
of conspiracy, the felonious act of the accountable public officer was imputable to his co-conspirators, although the latter were not
similarly situated with the former in relation to the object of the crime committed. Furthermore, in the words of Groizard, "the private
party does not act independently from the public officer; rather, he knows that the funds of which he wishes to get possession are in the
latter's charge, and instead of trying to abstract them by circumventing the other's vigilance he resorts to corruption, and in the officer's
unfaithfulness seeks and finds the most reprehensible means of accomplishing a deed which by having a public officer as its moral
instrument assumes the character of a social crime." 21 In an earlier case22 a non-accountable officer of the Philippine Constabulary who
conspired with his superior, a military supply officer, in the malversation of public funds was adjudged guilty as co-principal in the crime
of malversation, although it was not alleged, and in fact it clearly appeared, that the funds misappropriated were not in his custody but
were under the trust of his superior, an accountable public officer.

In rape, a conspirator is guilty not only of the sexual assault he personally commits but also of the separate and distinct crimes of rape
perpetrated by his co-conspirators. He may have had carnal knowledge of the offended woman only once but his liability includes that
pertaining to all the rapes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Thus, in People vs. Villa,23 this Court held that

... from the acts performed by the defendants front the time they arrived at Consolacion's house to the consummation of the
offense of rape on her person by each and everyone of them, it clearly appears that they conspired together to rape their
victim, and therefore each one is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him, but also that committed by the
others, because each sexual intercourse had, through force, by each one of the defendants with the offended was
consummated separately and independently from that had by the others, for which each and every one is also responsible
because of the conspiracy.

The rule enunciated in People vs. Villa was reiterated in People vs. Quitain24 where the appellant Teofilo Anchita was convicted of
forcible abduction with double rape for having conspired and cooperated in the sexual assault of the aggrieved woman, although he
himself did not actually rape the victim. This Court observed:

We have no doubt all in all that Teofilo Anchita took part in the sexual assault ... the accused inserted his fingers in the
woman's organ, and widened it. Whether he acted out of lewdness or to help his brother-in-law consummate the act, is
immaterial; it was both maybe. Yet, surely, by his conduct, this prisoner conspired and cooperated, and is guilty.

With respect to robbery in band, the law presumes the attendance of conspiracy so much so that "any member of a band who is
present at the commission of a robbery by the band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band,
unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same." 25 In this instance, conspiracy need not be proved, as long as the existence
of a band is clearly established. Nevertheless, the liability of a member of the band for the assaults committed by his group is likewise
anchored on the rule that the act of one is the act of all.

Proof of conspiracy. While conspiracy to commit a crime must be established by positive evidence, 26 direct proof is not essential to
show conspiracy.27 Since by it nature, conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can seldom be proved by direct
evidence.28 Consequently, competent and convincing circumstantial evidence will suffice to establish conspiracy. According to People
vs. Cabrera,29 conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances which vary according to
the purposes to be accomplished. If it be proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part
and another another part of the same, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, one will be justified in the
conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect the object." Or as elucidated in People vs. Carbonel30the presence of the
concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from "proofs of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in
fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be
inferred though no actual meeting among to concert means is proved ..." In two recent cases, 31 this Court ruled that where the acts of
the accused, collectively and individually, clearly demonstrate the existence of a common design toward the accomplishment of the
same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident.

Conspiracy presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan or agreement; however, to establish conspiracy, "it is not essential that
there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors committed shall have acted in
concert pursuant to the same objective." 32 Hence, conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the
malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert.

Liability of conspirators. A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators
who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals.33 This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the
ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of
their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarity liable.

However, in order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he performed an overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy. The difference between an accused who is a principal under any of the three
categories enumerated in Art. 17 of the Revised Penal Code and a co-conspirator who is also a principal is that while the former's
criminal liability is limited to his own acts, as a general rule, the latter's responsibility includes the acts of his fellow conspirators.

In People vs. Izon, et al.,34 this Court acquitted appellant Francisco Robles, Jr., who was convicted by the trial court of robbery with
homicide as a conspirator, on the ground that although he may have been present when the conspiracy to rob was proposed and
made, "Robles uttered not a word either of approval or disapproval. There are authorities to the effect that mere presence at the
discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of conviction." In
a more recent case,35this Court, in exonerating one of the appellants, said:

There is ample and positive evidence on record that appellant Jose Guico was absent not only from the second meeting but
likewise from the robbery itself. To be sure, not even the decision under appeal determined otherwise. Consequently, even if
Guico's participation in the first meeting sufficiently involved him with the conspiracy (as he was the one who explained the
location of the house to be robbed in relation to the surrounding streets and the points thereof through which entrance and exit
should be effected), such participation and involvement, however, would be inadequate to render him criminally liable as a
conspirator. Conspiracy alone, without the execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special
instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, however, do not include robbery.

Imposition of multiple penalties where conspirators commit more than one offense. Since in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all,
then, perforce, each of the conspirators is liable for all of the crimes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Consequently, if the
conspirators commit three separate and distinct crimes of murder in effecting their common design and purpose, each of them is guilty
of three murders and shall suffer the corresponding penalty for each offense. Thus in People vs. Masin,36 this Court held:

... it being alleged in the information that three crimes were committed not simultaneously indeed but successively, inasmuch
as there was, at least, solution of continuity between each other, the accused (seven in all) should be held responsible for said
crimes. This court holds that the crimes are murder ... In view of all these circumstances and of the frequently reiterated
doctrine that once conspiracy is proven each and every one of the conspirators must answer for the acts of the others,
provided said acts are the result of the common plan or purpose ... it would seem evident that the penalty that should be
imposed upon each of the appellants for each of their crimes should be the same, and this is the death penalty ... (emphasis
supplied).

In the aforesaid case, however, the projected imposition of three death penalties upon each of the conspirators for the three murders
committed was not carried out due to the lack of the then requisite unanimity in the imposition of the capital penalty.

In another case,37 this Court, after finding that conspiracy attended the commission of eleven murders, said through Mr. Justice Tuason:

Some members of this Court opine that the proper penalty is death, under the circumstances of the case, but they fall short of
the required number for the imposition of this punishment. The sentence consequently is reclusion perpetua; but each
appellant is guilty of as many crimes of murder as there were deaths (eleven) and should be sentenced to life imprisonment for
each crime, although this may be a useless formality for in no case can imprisonment exceed forty years. (Emphasis
supplied.)

In People vs. Masani,38 the decision of the trial court imposing only one life imprisonment for each of the accused was modified by this
Court on appeal on the ground that "inasmuch as their (the conspirators') combined attack resulted in the killing of three persons, they
should be sentenced to suffer said penalty (reclusion perpetua) for each of the three victims (crimes)." (Emphasis supplied.)

It is significant to note that in the abovementioned cases, this Court consistently stressed that once conspiracy is ascertained, the
culpability of the conspirators is not only solidary (all co-principals) but also multiple in relation to the number of felonies committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy. It can also be said that had there been a unanimous Court in the Masin and Macaso cases, multiple
death penalties would have been imposed upon all the conspirators.

Legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties upon conspirators. An accused who was charged with three distinct crimes
of murder in a single information was sentenced to two death penalties for two murders, 39 and another accused to thirteen (13) separate
death penalties for the 13 killings he perpetrated. 40 Therefore there appears to be no legal reason why conspirators may not be
sentenced to multiple death penalties corresponding to the nature and number of crimes they commit in furtherance of a conspiracy.
Since it is the settled rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then each conspirator must
be held liable for each of the felonious acts committed as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the
appropriate penalties prescribed by law.

The rule on the imposition of multiple penalties where the accused is found guilty of two or more separate and distinct crimes charged
in one information, the accused not having interposed any objection to the multiplicity of the charges, was enunciated in the leading
case of U.S. vs. Balaba,41 thus: Upon conviction of two or more offenses charged in the complaint or information, the prescribed
penalties for each and all of such offenses may be imposed, to be executed in conformity with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal
Code [now article 70 of the Revised Penal Code]. In other words, all the penalties corresponding to the several violations of law should
be imposed. Conviction for multiple felonies demands the imposition of multiple penalties.
The two conceptual exceptions to the foregoing rule, are the complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and the special
complex crime (like robbery with homicide). Anent an ordinary complex crime falling under article 48, regardless of the multiplicity of
offenses committed, there is only one imposable penalty — the penalty for the most serious offense applied in its maximum period.
Similarly, in special complex crimes, there is but a single penalty prescribed by law notwithstanding the number of separate felonies
committed. For instance, in the special complex crime of robbery with hommicide the imposible penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death42 irrespective of the number of homicides perpetrated by reason or on occasion of the robbery.

In Balaba, the information charged the accused with triple murder. The accused went to trial without objection to the said information
which charged him with more than one offense. The trial court found the accused guilty of two murders and one homicide but it imposed
only one death penalty. In its review en consulta, this Court modified the judgment by imposing separate penalties for each of the three
offenses committed. The Court, thru Mr. Justice Carson (with Mr. Justice Malcolm dissenting with respect to the imposition of two death
penalties), held:

The trial judge was erroneously of the opinion that the prescribed penalties for the offenses of which the accused was
convicted should be imposed in accord with the provisions of article 89 of the Penal Code. That article is only applicable to
cases wherein a single act constitutes two or more crimes, or when one offense is a necessary means for committing the
other. (U.S. vs. Ferrer, 1 Phil. Rep., 56)

It becomes our duty, therefore, to determine what penalty or penalties should have been imposed upon the accused upon
conviction of the accused of three separate felonies charged in the information.

There can be no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the convict of two separate crimes of asesinato (murder) marked with the
generic aggravating circumstances mentioned in the decision of the trial judge ... It follows that the death penalty must and
should be imposed for each of these offenses ...

Unless the accused should be acquitted hereafter on appeal of one or both the asesinatos with which he is charged in the
information, it would seem to be a useless formality to impose separate penalties for each of the offenses of which he was
convicted, in view of the nature of the principal penalty; but having in mind the possibility that the Chief Executive may deem it
proper to grant a pardon for one or more of the offenses without taking action on the others; and having in mind also the
express provisions of the above cited article 87 of the Penal Code, we deem it proper to modify the judgment entered in the
court below by substituting for the penalty imposed by the trial judge under the provisions of article 89 of the Code, the death
penalty prescribed by law for each of the two separate asesinatos of which he stands convicted, and the penalty of 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal (for the separate crime of homicide) ... these separate penalties to be executed in
accord with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

The doctrine in Balaba was reiterated in U.S. vs. Jamad43 where a unanimous Court, speaking again thru Mr. Justice Carson (with Mr.
Justice Malcolm concurring in the result in view of the Balaba ruling), opined:

For all the offenses of which the accused were convicted in the court below, the trial judge imposed the death penalty, that is
to say the penalty prescribed for the most serious crime committed, in its maximum degree, and for this purpose made use of
the provisions of article 89 of the Penal Code [now article 48 of the Revised Penal Code]. But as indicated in the case of
the United States vs. Balaba, recently decided wherein the controlling facts were substantially similar to those in the case at
bar, "all of the penalties corresponding to the several violations of law" should have been imposed under the express
provisions of article 87 [now engrafted in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code] and under the ruling in that case, the trial court
erred in applying the provision of article 89 of the code.

We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be reversed, ... and that the following separate penalties
should be imposed upon him [the accused Jamad], to be executed in accordance with article 87 of the Penal Code: (1) The
penalty of death for the parricide of his wife Aring; (2) the penalty of life imprisonment for the murder of Labonete; (3) the
penalty of life imprisonment for the murder of Torres; (4) the penalty of 12 years and one day of cadena temporal for the
frustrated murder of Taclind ...

The doctrine in Balaba was reechoed in People vs. Guzman,44 which applied the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code, where
this Court, after finding the accused liable as co-principals because they acted in conspiracy, proceeded to stress that where an
"information charges the defendants with the commission of several crimes of murder and frustrated murder, as they failed to object to
the multiplicity of the charges made in the information, they can be found guilty thereof and sentenced accordingly for as many crimes
the information charges them, provided that they are duly established and proved by the evidence on record." (Emphasis supplied.)

The legal and statutory justification advanced by the majority in Balaba for imposing all the penalties (two deaths and one life
imprisonment) corresponding to the offense charged and proved was article 87 of the old Penal Code which provided:

When a person is found guilty of two or more felonies or misdemeanors, all the penalties corresponding to the several
violations of law shall be imposed, the same to be simultaneously served, if possible, according to the nature and effects of
such penalties.

in relation to article 88 of the old Code which read:

When all or any of the penalties corresponding to the several violations of the law can not be simultaneously executed, the
following rules shall be observed with regard thereto:

1. In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they may be executed
successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed,
or should they have been served out.

The essence and language, with some alterations in form and in the words used by reason of style, of the above-cited provisions have
been preserved in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code which is the product of the merger of articles 87 and 88 of the old Penal Code.
Article 70 provides:
When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so
permit; otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:

In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they may be executed
successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed,
or should they have been served out.

Although article 70 does not specifically command, as the former article 87 clearly did, that "all the penalties corresponding to the
several violations of law shall be imposed," it is unmistakable, however, that article 70 presupposes that courts have the power to
impose multiple penalties, which multiple penal sanctions should be served either simultaneously or successively. This presumption of
the existence of judicial power to impose all the penalties corresponding to the number and nature of the offenses charged and proved
is manifest in the opening sentence of article 70: "When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit ..." (Emphasis supplied.) Obviously, the two or more penalties which the
culprit has to serve are those legally imposed by the proper court. Another reference to the said judicial prerogative is found in the
second paragraph of article 70 which provides that "in the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be
followed ..." Even without the authority provided by article 70, courts can still impose as many penalties as there are separate and
distinct offenses committed, since for every individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed by law. Each single crime
is an outrage against the State for which the latter, thru the courts ofjustice, has the power to impose the appropriate penal sanctions.

With respect to the imposition of multiple death penalties, there is no statutory prohibition or jurisprudential injunction against it. On the
contrary, article 70 of the Revised Penal Code presumes that courts have the power to mete out multiple penalties without distinction as
to the nature and severity of the penalties. Moreover, our jurisprudence supports the imposition of multiple death penalties as initially
advocated in Balaba and thunderously reechoed in Salazar where the accused was sentenced on appeal to thirteen (13) death
penalties. Significantly, the Court in Balaba imposed upon the single accused mixed multiple penalties of two deaths and one life
imprisonment.

The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality, an exercise in futility. It is contended, undeniably
enough, that a death convict like all mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And because of this physiological and biological attribute of
man, it is reasoned that the imposition of multiple death penalties is impractical and futile because after the service of one capital
penalty, the execution of the rest of the death penalties will naturally be rendered impossible. The foregoing opposition to the multiple
imposition of death penalties suffers from four basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it
fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be
served simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties.

The imposition of a penalty and the service of sentence are two distinct, though related, concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty
or penalties is determined by the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and, proved, whereas service of sentence is
determined by the severity and character of the penalty or penalties imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the
court does not concern itself with the possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since actual service is a contingency
subject to varied factors like successful escape of the convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go
into the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature, gravity and number of the offenses charged and
proved and the corresponding penalties prescribed by law.

Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article
70 will show that there are only two modes of serving two or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is
that two or more penalties shall be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple capital
penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.

The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical importance. The sentencing of an accused
to several capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be accurately projected by the
imposition of only one death sentence irrespective of the number of capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the
reprehensible character of the convict in its real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is justifiably reduced in no
small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death penalties could effectively serve as a deterrent to an improvident grant of
pardon or commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious
restraint in recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf.

Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional power to pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives
which is almost absolute) deems it proper to commute the multiple death penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical
effect is that the convict has to serve the maximum of forty (40) years of multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed,
and then is commuted to life imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life
sentence.

Reverting now to the case at bar, it is our considered view that the trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the commission of
the murders. We quote with approval the following incisive observations of the court a quo in this respect:

Although, there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the Court can safely say that there are several circumstances to show that
the crime committed by the accused was planned. The following circumstances show beyond any doubt the acts of
conspiracy: First, all those who were killed, Barbosa, Santos Cruz and Carriego, were Tagalogs. Although there were many
Tagalogs like them confined in Building 4, these three were singled out and killed thereby showing that their killing has been
planned. Second, the accused were all armed with improvised weapons showing that they really prepared for the
occasion. Third, the accused accomplished the killing with team work precision going from one brigade to another and
attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for liquidation and lastly, almost the same people took part in the
killing of Carriego, Barbosa and Santos Cruz.

It is also important to note that all the accused were inmates of brigade 4-A; that all were from either the Visayas or Mindanao except
Peralta who is from Masbate and Parumog who hails from Nueva Ecija; that all were either "OXO" members or sympathizers; and that
all the victims were members of the "Sigue-Sigue" gang.

The evidence on record proves beyond peradventure that the accused acted in concert from the moment they bolted their common
brigade, up until the time they killed their last victim, Santos Cruz. While it is true that Parumog, Larita and Luna did not participate in
the actual killing of Carriego, nonetheless, as co-conspirators they are equally guilty and collectively liable for in conspiracy the act of
one is the act of all. It is not indispensable that a co-conspirator should take a direct part in every act and should know the part which
the others have to perform. Conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony; it is not participation in all the details of the execution
of the crime. All those who in one way or another help and cooperate in the consummation of a felony previously planned are co-
principals.45 Hence, all of the six accused are guilty of the slaughter of Carriego, Barbosa and Santos Cruz — each is guilty of three
separate and distinct crimes of murder.

We cannot agree, however, with the trial court that evident premeditation was also present. The facts on record and the established
jurisprudence on the matter do not support the conclusion of the court a quo that evident premeditation "is always present and inherent
in every conspiracy." Evident premeditation is not inherent in conspiracy as the absence of the former does not necessarily negate the
existence of the latter.46 Unlike in evident premeditation where a sufficient period of time must elapse to afford full opportunity for
meditation and reflection for the perpetrator to deliberate on the consequences of his intended deed, conspiracy arises at the very
instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to commit it. 47 This view finds added support
in People vs. Custodia,48 wherein this Court stated:

Under normal conditions, where the act of conspiracy is directly established, with proof of the attendant deliberation and
selection of the method, time and means of executing the crime, the existence of evident premeditation can be taken for
granted. In the case before us, however, no such evidence exists; the conspiracy is merely inferred from the acts of the
accused in the perpetration of the crime. There is no proof how and when the plan to kill Melanio Balancio was hatched, or
what time elapsed before it was carried out; we are, therefore, unable to determine if the appellants enjoyed "sufficient time
between its inception and its fulfillment dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences." (cf. People vs. Bangug, 52
Phil. 91.) In other words, there is no showing of the opportunity of reflection and the persistence in the criminal intent that
characterize the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation (People vs. Mendoza, 91 Phil. 58; People vs. Iturriaga, 47
Off. Gaz., [Supp to No. 12] 166; People vs. Lesada 70 Phil., 525.)

Not a single extenuating circumstance could be appreciated in favor of any of the six accused, as they did neither allege nor prove any.

In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, as all of the six accused at the time of the
commission of the offenses were serving sentences 49 in the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa by virtue of convictions by final judgments
the penalty for each offense must be imposed in its maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the
Revised Penal Code. Viada observes, in apposition, that the severe penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of his
perversity and incorrigibility.50

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog,
Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each
sentenced to three death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in
the sum of P12,000;51 each will pay one-sixth of the costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ.,concur.
Zaldivar, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1
Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita, Florencio Luna, Jose Tariman, Silverio
Lumanog, Leonardo Amora, Eilel Tugaya, Gabriel Baclatin, Roberto Abada, Ubaldo Peralta, Arsenio Cunanan, Pedro Cogol,
Jesus Baldueza, Felicisimo Aguipo, Jose Loyola, Beltran Agrava, Alfredo Paunil and Ernesto Fernandez.

2 Roberto Abada.

3 Alfredo Paunil, Ambrosio Paunil, Ubaldo Peralta, Arsenio Cunanan, Jesus Baldueza and Beltran Agrava.

4 Gabriel Buclatin.

5Pedro Cogol, Ernesto Fernandez, Jose Tariman, Felicisimo Aguipo, Eilel Tugaya, Silverio Lumanog, Leonardo Amora and
Jose Loyola.

6People vs. Pasiona, L-18295, February 28, 1966; People va. Bautista, L-17772, October 31, 1962, cited in People vs.
Dayday, L-20806-07, August 14, 1965.

7
People vs. Tansiangco, L-19448, February 28, 1964; People vs. Riveral, L-14077, March 31, 1964; cited in People va.
Berdida, et al., L-20183, June 30, 1966.

8 People vs. Berdida, et al., supra, citing People vs. Constante, L-14639, December 28, 1964.

9 Article 8, Revised Penal Code.

10 Article 115, Revised Penal Code.

11 Article 136, Revised Penal Code.

12 Article 141, Revised Penal Code.


13 U.S. vs. Lim Buanco, 14 Phil. 472; U.S. vs. Remigio, 37 Phil. 599, 614; People vs. Asaad 55 Phil. 697.

14
36 Phil. 149.

15
U.S. vs. Ramos, 2 Phil. 434; U.S. vs. Maza, 5 Phil. 346; U.S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil. 122; U.S. vs. Ipil, 27 Phil. 530
and the cases therein cited.

16 U.S. vs. Snyder, 3 McCrary 377; See also People vs. Bannaisan, 49 Phil. 423; U.S. vs. Maza, supra.

17
U.S. vs. Ipil, supra; U.S. vs. Grant, supra.

18 U.S. vs. Bundal, et al., 3 Phil. 89.

19 See Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

20
20 Phil. 379.

21 Quoted in People vs. Ponte, supra.

22
U.S. vs. Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4.

23 81 Phil. 193, 198.

24 99 Phil. 226.

25
See second paragraph of Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code.

26 People vs. Ancheta, et al., 66 Phil. 638.

27 People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.

28 People vs. Cadag, L-13830, May 31, 1961; People vs. Romualdez, 57 Phil. 148.

29 43 Phil. 64, citing 5 RCL 1088.

30 See note 27, p. 876.

31 People vs. Condemena, L-22426, May 29, 1968; People vs. Fontillas, L-25298, April 16, 1968.

32 People vs. San Luis, 86 Phil. 485.

33U.S. vs. Bundal, supra; U.S. vs. Maza, supra; U.S. vs. Matanug, 11 Phil. 188; U.S. vs. Ipil, supra; People vs. Go, 88 Phil.
203; People vs. Jaravata, L-22029, August 15, 1967; People vs. Fontillas, supra.

34 104 Phil. 690.

35
People vs. Pelagio, L-16177, May 24, 1967.

36 64 Phil. 757.

37 People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819.

38 L-3973, September 18, 1952.

39 United States vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260.

40 People vs. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1060.

41 See note 39.

42 See Article 294, subdivision 1, Revised Penal Code.

43 37 Phil. 305.

44
L-7530, August 30, 1958.

45
People vs. Valeriano, L-2859, September 19, 1951.

46 People vs. Datu Dima Binasing, et al., 98 Phil. 902.

47 People vs. Monroy, et al., L-11177, October 30, 1958.


48 97 Phil. 698, 704-705.

49Amado Peralta was serving sentences for robbery (two counts), evasion of sentence (two counts) and murder; Andres
Factora was serving sentences for illegal possession of hand grenade and frustrated homicide (two counts); Leonardo Dosal
was serving sentence for frustrated homicide and murder; Angel Parumog was serving sentence for qualified theft; Gervasio
Larita was serving sentence for robbery in band with physical injuries and rape; and Florencio Luna was serving sentence for
homicide, murder and evasion of sentence.

50 1 Viada, 4th edition, p. 562, cited in Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, vol. p. 930.

51 See People vs. Pantoja, L-18793, October 11, 1968.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20183 June 30, 1966

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,


vs.
EDUARDO BERDIDA Y INGUITO, ET AL., defendants.
EDUARDO BERDIDA Y INGUITO, LORETO SABERON Y CASAS, VICENTE ABERAS Y CORDERO and JESUS FELICIA Y
BALIDBID, defendants and appellants.

Senen S. Ceniza, Emilio G. Opinion and Agustin R. Romeras for defendants and appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General A. A. Alafriz, Acting Assistant Solicitor General I. C. Borromeo and Solicitor S. C. Jacob for plaintiff and
appellee.

PER CURIAM:

This is an automatic review of death sentence pursuant to the Rules of Court.1

On 10 May 1960, an information for frustrated murder 2 of Antonio Maravilla and another information for murder 3 of Federico Cañalete,
were filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Said informations were directed against the same eight accused: Eduardo Berdida y
Inguito, Jesus Felicia y Balidbid, Vicente Aberas y Cordero, Cristoto Mitilla y Paral, Demetrio Garin y Payos, Protacio Libres y Corona,
Loreto Saberon y Casas and Mario Mustrado y Sumaya.

After the defendants pleaded not guilty at their arraignment on 16 May 1960, the two cases were tried jointly. Acting on a motion to
dismiss filed by defendants Cristoto Mitilla and Mario Mustrado, after the prosecution rested its case, the court dismissed the charges
against Mario Mustrado, with costs de oficio. After the trial, the Court of First Instance rendered on 27 July 1962 the decision now under
review. Its dispositive portion states:

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the defendants Eduardo Berdida, Loreto Saberon, Vicente Aberas and
Jesus Felicia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. This Court has in previous cases endeavored to avoid
the imposition of the capital punishment. In the case at bar, however, where the offenders, pretending to be police officers,
kidnapped the victims and mercilessly beat one of them to death, the Court finds no other alternative, in pursuance to the
mandate of the law, but to impose, as it hereby imposes upon the said defendants, the death penalty, to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of Federico Cañalete in the sum of P4,000.00 and to pay the costs. May God have mercy on their souls.

In Criminal Case No. 52338, above-said defendants are also hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
attempted murder and considering the aggravating circumstances present, they are sentenced each to suffer a maximum
penalty of TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor and a minimum of SIX (6) YEARS ofprision correccional, and to pay the costs,
without prejudice on the part of the complainant to institute a separate civil action for the recovery of damages.

The defendants Garin, Mitilla and Libres are hereby acquitted, in both cases, with costs de oficio, and their immediate release
is hereby ordered.

So ordered.

The records show the prosecution's evidence, as follows:

At about 10 o'clock in the evening of 7 May 1960, Antonio Maravilla, Federico Cañalete, Virgilio Haban and Pedrito Rapadas left the
store of one Mang Terio at Mabuhay Street, North Harbor, Tondo, Manila, and proceeded walking towards their homes. They were met
on their way by Eduardo Berdida, Antonio Louie, one Tiquio and one aliasIfugao, who identified themselves as detectives, told them not
to move, and pointed sharp and long bolos to them.4Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete raised their hands, but Pedrito Rapadas
and Virgilio Haban were able to run away. Antonio Louie then dealt a fist blow on Antonio Maravilla. After that, the group took Antonio
Maravilla and Federico Cañalete along the rail tracks, telling them that they had done something wrong.

At the end of the rail tracks, said group tied the hands of Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete. After doing this, they dragged the
two and took them to a place in Pier 8 at the North Harbor near Vicente Aberas' house. In said place, there were others who joined the
group, among them, Jesus Felicia, Loreto Saberon and Vicente Aberas. At this point Eduardo Berdida told Antonio Maravilla and
Federico Cañalete to dig their graves, but they refused. Arturo Macabebe, who also joined the group, took two sticks of cigarettes and
told Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete to smoke. Antonio Maravilla again refused. Following said refusal, the victims were hit
with a piece of wood. Eduardo Berdida and Jesus Felicia then held Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete, respectively, by the hands
and from behind. As they were thus held, Vicente Aberas delivered fist blows on them, first on Antonio Maravilla, then on Federico
Cañalete.5 Furthermore, Loreto Saberon also held Federico Cañalete while others gave fist blows to the latter. 6 At about 1 o'clock in the
morning of 8 May 1960, Antonio Maravilla lost consciousness, shortly after hearing Loreto Saberon say that the group would cut off the
ears of Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete for appetizer or "pulutan". 7

Antonio Maravilla's sister, Elizabeth, had meanwhile been informed by Virgilio Haban, one of those who were able to run away, that her
brother and Federico Cañalete were taken by armed men. She therefore went out with some companions in search of her brother. She
asked the help of Patrolman Carlos Pili, who was then at the corner of Kaguitingan and Lakandula Streets in front of Pier 6. Patrolmen
Amado Santos and Fabricante also joined them. As the other policemen took to separate directions, Patrolman Pili and Elizabeth
Maravilla went along Mabuhay Street. They came upon a group of men, between Piers 6 and 8, who were hesitant to answer their
inquiries. So they proceeded further, entering a small alley. As they went on, Elizabeth found the shoes of her brother. So they
continued until they met Vicente Aberas, stripped to the waist, with bloodstains on his hands. 8 Patrolman Pili detained him. Since
somebody threatened them should they proceed any further, Patrolman Pili and Elizabeth Maravilla went to Precinct 3, taking along
Vicente Aberas. Assistance from the Mobile Patrol was then requested. Accompanied by her neighbors and more policemen, Elizabeth,
together with Patrolman Pili, returned and went further to the interior of Mabuhay Street. Finally, they came upon Federico Cañalete
and Antonio Maravilla, sprawled on the ground, the former face down, the latter flat on his back. Federico Cañalete was found dead.
Antonio Maravilla was alive, though his face was swollen, rendering him barely recognizable. Antonio Maravilla was taken to the North
General Hospital.

Patrolman Pili, meanwhile, went still further to the interior and saw, about 12 meters away from where they found the victims, a group
drinking liquor. At the approach of Patrolman Pili, about four men ran away, leaving behind four men, namely, Loreto Saberon, Mario
Mustrado, Cristoto Mitilla and Protacio Libres, the last mentioned being then drunk and asleep on a bamboo bed. 9 A Mobile Patrol car
thereafter arrived and apprehended them, except Libres. Patrolman Pili next went towards a house near Tagumpay Street in which
direction the others had fled. In said house, which was that of Crisanta Melgar, the patrolman found some persons who pretended to be
sleeping, namely, Demetrio Garin, Jesus Felicia and Eduardo Berdida. Patrolman Pili brought them outside and they were taken by the
Mobile Patrol to the Detective Bureau.

Furthermore, the body of Federico Cañalete was examined at the scene where it was found by officers of the Mobile Patrol. Detective
Bureau agents likewise went to said place. Finding bloodstains near an a alley to Tagumpay Street, they went to a house thereat and
found Protacio Libres sleeping on a bamboo bed. Said detectives took Libres to the headquarters.

At the police station, all the apprehended suspects were made to mingle with other persons. Antonio Maravilla, who was fetched to
point out therefrom the persons who attacked him and Federico Cañalete identified Eduardo Berdida, Vicente Aberas, Loreto Saberon
and Jesus Felicia.

An autopsy was made on 8 May 1960 on the body of Federico Cañalete by Dr. Luis Larion, Medical Examiner of the Manila Police
Department. The post mortem findings in his report are as follows: (Exh. M):

CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM:

Hemorrhage extensive, subarachnoid brain.

CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM:

Laceration, blood vessels, brain and spleen.

RESPIRATORY SYSTEM:

Contusion, posterior lung, bilateral.

Congestion, lungs, bilateral.

GASTROINTESTINAL SYSTEM:

About 150 cc. partially digested rice meal with slight alcoholic odor.

Hemoperitoneum about 100 cc. blood, abdominal cavity.

SPLEEN: Maceration spleen.

PANCREAS: Contusion, hemorrhagic, pancreas.

BONES AND JOINTS:

Fracture-separation, left parieto-occipital and right fronto-temporal skull.

MISCELLANEOUS:

Wound, stab, non-penetrating, 1.3 x 0.5 cm. x 1.5 cm. deep, right lumbar region.

Wound, lacerated, 3 x 0.5 cm. occipital region.

Wound, lacerated, 2.5 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 1 cm. deep, non-penetrating, left abdomen.

Hematoma, frontal, right; left, parieto-occipital, and occipital, scalp, head.


Contusion, multiple, left forehead; left lower eyelids; left face; nose; lower lip; left lateral neck; posterior neck; left
shoulder; left and right posterior chest.

Contused abrasion, anterior left lower chest and right abdomen.

CAUSE OF DEATH:

Shock and hemorrhage due to traumatic fracture of the skull with maceration of spleen, contusion of the lungs and
extensive subarachnoid hemorrhages in the brain.

Antonio Maravilla, as shown in the medico-legal certificate of Dr. Cumalinga Espinosa of the North General Hospital (Exh. R), sustained
these injuries:

Contusion with abrasion, and periorbital hematoma, eye right.

Contusion upper and lower lip.

Contusion 2" mental region.

Contusion with slight hematoma, malar right, and mandible bilateral.

Abrasion, 3", lateral neck left.

Abrasion, 2" #2 level of the 10th rib right, along the MCL.

For the defense of herein appellants, the following evidence was presented to establish alibi:

Sometime between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening of 7 May 1960 Crisanta Melgar was filling drums with water in her house at 1205
Tagumpay Street, Tondo, Manila. Shortly thereafter, Eduardo Berdida, Loreto Saberon and Jesus Felicia arrived. Since her husband
was on night duty and her brother- in-law was ill, Crisanta Melgar asked the three to remain and help her fill up the drums with water,
intending to sell the same the next morning. Said defendants consented and for some time helped Crisanta fill the drums with water. At
about 9 o'clock in the evening, however, said defendants went to sleep in the ground floor of Crisanta's new house, still under
construction, adjacent to the house aforementioned. At about midnight a policeman and someone in civilian clothes knocked at the door
and inquired from Crisanta if there were three persons sleeping in her house. She said yes, and opened the door. The policeman then
told Crisanta that a dead man was found near their place. The one in civilian attire went to the back of the house. Crisanta told the
policeman she knew nothing of any incident and that the three men had been in her house for some time. She then awoke the
defendants Berdida, Saberon and Felicia. The policeman told them to stand up and the man in civilian was asked if they were the ones
involved. Said man looked at the defendants and replied in the negative. The policeman and the civilian then left and the defendants
went back to sleep. After a while, Crisanta, who was restless and could not sleep, went down, awoke the defendants, and told them that
it was better for them to leave. So, the said defendants left, but a policeman stopped them at Tagumpay Street and took them to the
police headquarters.

As to the defendant Vicente Aberas, his defense of alibi is as follows:

In the evening of 7 May 1960, he was on board the fishing boat "Don Paulino." At about 10:30 o'clock in the evening, after unloading
their catch of fish, he left for home, bringing with him a tulingan fish. Juan, a co-worker of his, invited him to drink beer in a store near
Pier 8. For some time they stayed there, then he left for home. On the way he met five men beating up somebody. Approaching them,
he asked them to have pity on the man and not to beat him. Someone in the group, armed with a club, warned him not to interfere, so,
becoming afraid, he left. In reaching home, he took off his shirt, cut the fish he brought with him in half, lengthwise, and took one of the
halves to the house of Emiliano Retone, another co-worker of his, who did not report for work that day. Retone invited him to drink gin.
After drinking, he headed for home, but on his way he met two policemen and a woman. After being asked where he came from, which
he answered, and whether he had seen a fight, to which he said yes, he was taken to Precinct 3.

Appellants would, first of all, assail Antonio Maravilla's testimony identifying them as the assailants, for the reason that he lost
consciousness, and, therefore, could not be relied upon to make said identification. Appellants would further insist on their defense of
alibi. Antonio Maravilla, it is true, lost consciousness' at about 1 o'clock in the morning of 8 May 1960. It is however equally true that
before his sense faded out he saw herein appellants perform their atrocities on himself as well as on Federico Cañalete. It cannot
therefore be doubted that he made no mistake in pointing out to herein appellants as definitely among their assailants. This he did, not
only at the police station but also in open court during the trial. It is furthermore not disputed by defendants-appellants that Antonio
Maravilla has no reason or motive to falsely accuse them of murder and attempted murder. The positive identification he made must
therefore be given credence.

It follows that the defense of alibi cannot be sustained. The rule is settled, to the point of being trite, that the defense of alibi is worthless
in the face of positive identification by prosecution witnesses, pointing to the accused as participants in the crime. 10

The trial court, moreover, found the above-related defenses of alibi not credible. For, according to said court, if defendants Berdida,
Felicia and Saberon really went to help Crisanta Melgar, their provincemate, fill drums with water at her house, it is rather unusual that
they went to sleep at about 9 o'clock in the evening. Furthermore, the policeman who inquired about persons sleeping in Crisanta
Melgar's house strangely knew their number, that is, three persons. And, finally, it is unbelievable that said policeman did not take them
to the headquarters for identification by Antonio Maravilla himself. 1äwphï1.ñët

And, with respect to the defendant-appellant Vicente Aberas, the trial court found it too surprising to believe that he went to such
lengths of amiability, as to go, shirtless at that, to his friend Retone, at an unholy hour, to share with him one-half of his tulingan fish. No
previous agreement, or urgent need for such an act obtained. It could have waited for the next morning, especially since, having
allegedly come from work, defendant Aberas must have been tired.
As this Court stated in People vs. Constante, L-14639, December 28, 1964, the defense of alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on
credibility; that the credibility of an alibi depends so much on the credibility of the witnesses who seek to establish it; and that, in this
inspect, the relative weight which the trial judge assigns to the testimony of said witnesses must, unless patently and clearly
inconsistent with the evidence on record, be accepted. For, as is well recognized, his proximate contact with those who take to the
witness chair places him, compared to appellate Justices, in the more competent position to discriminate be between the true and the
false.

And in the present appeal, we find no warrant to depart from the lower court's finding on defendants-appellants' defense of alibi.

It is also contended by appellants that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, abuse of superior strength, and evident
premeditation should not be appreciated in fixing the penalty. Appellants would argue that nighttime was not purposely sought to
facilitate the offense or to afford impunity. At any rate, they would further argue, nighttime as well as abuse of superior strength are
deemed absorbed in treachery. As to evident premeditation, they aver that the premeditation, if any, is not evident, for lack of sufficient
lapse of time between the execution of the offense and a previous showing of intent to commit it, so as to show that the offenders clung
to their determination to commit the crime.

The presence of one generic aggravating circumstance, apart from the qualifying circumstance of treachery, suffices to fix the penalty
for murder at the extreme punishment of death. For there is no mitigating circumstance in the present case. From the facts and
evidence of record in this case, it is clear that appellants took advantage of nighttime in committing the felonies charged. For it appears
that to carry out a sentence they had pronounced upon Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete for the death of one Pabling, they had
evidently chosen to execute their victims under cover of darkness, at the dead of night, when the neighborhood was asleep. Inasmuch
as the treachery consisted in the fact that the victims' hands were tied at the time they were beaten, the circumstance of nighttime is not
absorbed in treachery, but can be perceived distinctly therefrom, since the treachery rests upon an independent factual basis. A special
case therefore is present to which the rule that nighttime is absorbed in treachery does no apply. 11

In addition, the presence of evident premeditation is likewise borne out by the record. For the victims were told at the start, when they
were taken captives, that they had done something wrong, that they were the ones who stabbed and killed one Pabling, and that for this
reason they were to go with the group (T.s.n., 10 October 1960, pp. 20, 22; Exh. D). Not only that; the victims were then taken to a spot
where they were ordered to dig their graves. The assailants were previously armed with deadly weapons, and their assault was a
concerted and group action. From the time of apprehension of the victims, About 10 o'clock in the evening, to the time Antonio Maravilla
lost consciousness, about 1 o'clock early the following morning, is sufficient time for the offenders to meditate and reflect on the
consequences of their act.

In People vs. Lopez, 69 Phil. 298, this Court found the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation present, in view of the
repeated statements of the defendants that the hour of reckoning of the victim would arrive, the existing enmity between them, the fact
that they were previously armed with deadly weapons, and the fact that the aggression was simultaneous and continuous until the
deceased was left unconscious on the ground. And in People vs. Lazada, 70 Phil. 525, four hours was held sufficient lapse of time for
purposes of the presence of evident premeditation. Furthermore, sufficient lapse of time in this regard is not simply a matter of the
precise number of hours, but of the reasonable opportunity, under the situation and circumstances, to ponder and reflect upon the
consequences. In the present case, we find the facts and circumstances obtaining sufficient to support the trial court's finding of the
attendance of evident premeditation.

Following previous instances, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased in this case should be increased to P6,000. 12

Anent the attempted murder case, no appeal therefrom was taken. The record shows that defendants perfected no appeal from the
judgment below. The present automatic review is limited only to the murder case in which the death penalty was imposed. It was only
because of the joint trial that the record of the attempted murder case was likewise elevated herein. Since no appeal was taken in the
attempted murder case, the judgment with respect thereto has become final. It therefore cannot now be reviewed herein, as some of
the appellants would ask. And defendants-appellants, who are detained, should accordingly be deemed to have started serving their
respective sentence in said attempted murder case from the time the decision of the trial court became final as to said case.

Wherefore, the death penalty imposed on defendants-appellants is hereby affirmed, and the indemnity to the heirs of Federico Cañalete
is hereby increased from P4,000 to P6,000, with costs. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Sec. 9, Rule 122, formerly Sec. 9, Rule 118.

2Docketed in the CFI as Crim. Case No. 52338.

3Docketed in the CFI as Crim. Case No. 52339.

4T.s.n., 10 October 1960, p. 13.

5T.s.n., 10 October 1960, p. 14.

6T.s.n., 23 November 1960, p. 2.

7T.s.n., 23 November 1960, p. 2.

8
Tsn 13 July 1961, pp. 2, 4.

9T.s.n., 27 March 1961, p. 48.


People v. Tansiangco L-19448, February 28, 1964; People v. Riveral, L-14077, March 31, 1964.
10

See, People v. John Doe, L-2463, March 31, 1950: 2 Viada, Codigo Penal, 274-275.
11

People v. Hernandez, 91 Phil. 334; People v. Banlos, L-3413, December 29, 1955.
12

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 173793 December 4, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
CONRADO M. GLINO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

BEWARE of drunk passengers. They pose danger to life and limb. Merely talking to them or telling them to sit properly can be fatal, as
what happened to one of two victims in the case at bar.

The present law prohibits and punishes only drunk driving. 1 There is no law banning a drunk person from riding a public vehicle, or the
latter's driver from allowing a person who appears to be drunk to board a public conveyance. 2

A drunk passenger or one under the influence of liquor or drug poses a veritable peril to the other passengers. He is prone to react
irrationally and violently, due to lack or diminution of self-control. Senseless loss of lives and physical harm can be avoided, and the
riding public duly protected, if the potential danger posed by drunk passengers can be addressed properly.

It is the duty of the court, whenever it has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by
law, to report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act
should be made the subject of legislation.3 We leave it to the authorities concerned to do the needful as they see fit.

MAG-INGAT sa mga lasing na pasahero. Sila'y mapanganib. Ang kausapin o sabihan lamang sila na umupo nang maayos ay
maaari mong ikasawi. Ganito ang sinapit ng isa sa dalawang biktima sa kasong ito.

Ang kasalukuyang batas ay nagbabawal at nagpaparusa lamang sa pagmamaneho ng lasing. Walang batas na nagbabawal
sa taong lasing na sumakay sa pampublikong sasakyan, o sa drayber na payagan ang taong sa kilos ay lasing na sumakay sa
pampublikong sasakyan.

Ang pasaherong lasing o sino man na nasa impluwensya ng alak o droga ay may dalang panganib sa ibang pasahero.
Malamang na sila ay kumilos nang walang katwiran o manakit dahil sa kabawasan ng pagwawari o pagpipigil sa sarili.
Maiiwasan ang walang kabuluhang pagkitil ng buhay at pagkapinsala, at ang mga namamasahe ay mapangangalagaan laban
sa panganib, kung ito'y mabibigyan ng karampatang lunas.

Tungkulin ng hukuman, kung alam nito na ang isang gawa ay marapat supilin at hindi pa ipinagbabawal ng batas, na
ipagbigay-alam sa Pangulo, sa pamamagitan ng Kagawaran ng Katarungan, ang mga dahilan na pinaniniwalaan ng hukuman
kung bakit ang nasabing gawa ay dapat maging layon ng pagsasabatas. Ipinapaubaya namin sa kinauukulang
maykapangyarihan kung ano ang dapat gawin.

Before the Court is an appeal under Rule 124, Section 13(c)4 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-
03-SC, from the Judgment5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming in toto the Decision 6of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Las Piñas
City, Metro Manila, convicting accused-appellant Conrado Glino of murder and attempted murder for the senseless killing of Domingo
Boji and the stabbing of his wife, Virginia Boji.

The Facts

On November 15, 1998, at around 7:20 p.m., in Moonwalk, Las Piñas City, husband and wife Domingo and Virginia Boji hailed a
passenger jeepney bound for Alabang-Zapote Road. The couple sat on the two remaining vacant seats on opposing rows of the
jeepney. Virginia seated herself on the vehicle's left side while Domingo occupied the vacant seat at the right row.7

Moments later, the woman seated next to Virginia alighted. Accused-appellant Conrado Glino took her place. He was reeking of liquor.
As the jeepney ran its normal route, Virginia noticed accused-appellant inching closer to her. His head eventually found its way on
Virginia's shoulder. Irked, Virginia sought accused-appellant's attention and asked him to sit properly, citing adequate space. Accused-
appellant angrily replied, "Oh, kung ayaw mong may katabi, bumaba ka, at magtaxi ka!" Virginia decided to ignore his snide remarks.
She then turned her back on him.8

Accused-appellant, however, persisted in violating Virginia's personal space, leaning on the latter's shoulders. It was at this point that
Domingo decided to tell Glino to sit properly. Accused-appellant arrogantly retorted, "Anong pakialam mo?" Domingo reasoned out that
he is Virginia's husband. Domingo further said, "Kasi lalasing-lasing ka, hindi mo naman kaya!"9
Marvin Baloes, who, it turned out, was Glino's equally drunk companion, cursed Domingo. Baloes then provokingly asked the latter,
"Anong gusto mo?" Domingo replied, "Wala akong sinabing masama."10 After the heated verbal tussle, accused-appellant and Baloes
appeared to have calmed down, confining themselves to whispering to one another. 11

When the jeepney approached Casimiro Village, Baloes turned to the driver and told him that he and Glino were about to alight. As the
jeepney ground to a halt, Baloes unexpectedly drew an improvised knife and stabbed Domingo in the chest. 12 Accused-appellant then
unfolded a 29-inch Batangas knife (balisong) and joined Baloes in stabbing Domingo. Surprised and shocked at the sudden attack,
Domingo failed to offer any form of resistance to the duo's vicious assault. In all, Domingo sustained nine stab wounds throughout his
body.13

Virginia tried vainly to shield Domingo from his assailants. She tightly embraced Domingo. Virginia's efforts, however, all went for
naught as accused-appellant Glino and Baloes were unrelenting. When the senseless assault ceased, Virginia found herself bloodied
from incised wounds in her fingers.14

The other passengers of the jeepney scampered for the nearest exit immediately after the first blow was struck. Some of them had to
resort to jumping from the vehicle's window to avoid harm's way. 15

Accused-appellant Glino and Baloes attempted to flee the scene of the crime and ran towards Camella Center. Baloes, however, fell
down to the ground due to intoxication. Glino, unmindful of his companion, was able to run a distance of 45 meters before he was
apprehended by traffic enforcers Alvin Cristobal and Ruben Ramirez. The two traffic aides, who were the first to respond to the crime
scene, caught sight of the slow-moving jeepney and of the passengers jumping off it. With the help of a concerned motorist, they were
able to pin Baloes and Glino to the ground. They later turned the two suspects over to the police, who arrived shortly thereafter. 16

Subsequently, Virginia and Domingo were brought to the University of Perpetual Help, Rizal Medical Center in Las Piñas City. Domingo
was, however, pronounced dead after a few minutes. Domingo's chest wound proved mortal. 17

On November 18, 1998, accused-appellant Glino and Baloes were indicted for murder 18 for the death of Domingo Boji and attempted
murder19 for the stabbing of Virginia Boji. The accusatory part of the Information for murder reads:

Criminal Case No. 98-1310:

That on or about the 15th day of November 1998, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and
aiding each other, with intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation and without any justifiable cause, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with bladed weapons one Domingo Boji y Daza,
suddenly and without warning hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal stab
wounds which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.20

The indictment for attempted murder bears the following accusation:

Criminal Case No. 98-1311:

That on or about the 15th day of November 1998, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually
helping and aiding each other, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, and without any justifiable cause,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and stab with bladed weapons one Virginia Boji y
Revillas, suddenly and without warning, thereby commencing the commission of murder directly by overt acts but did not
perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of murder as a consequence by reason of some cause or
accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, because the injury inflicted to Virginia Boji y Revillas was not
sufficient to cause her death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.21

On June 15, 1999, accused Marvin Baloes succumbed to cardio-pulmonary arrest while on detention.22Consequently, his name was
dropped from the information. Pre-trial commenced with respect only to accused-appellant Glino. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The People's evidence, which essayed the foregoing facts, was principally supplied by Enrique Villaruel, Virginia Boji, SPO2 Wilfredo
Dalawangbayan and Alvin Cristobal.

Villaruel testified that he was a co-passenger of the spouses Boji in the jeepney where the gruesome stabbing incident took place.
Villaruel was then on his way home to Anabu I, Cavite. He witnessed the crime as it unfolded. According to him, accused-appellant
Glino and Baloes both stabbed Domingo; that accused-appellant was armed with a Batangas knife while Baloes used an improvised
knife; that the improvised knife was left on the floor of the jeepney as accused-appellant and Baloes fled the scene of the crime.23

Virginia narrated that she distinctly saw Baloes stab Domingo in the chest area. Glino was blocking her path, preventing her from giving
aid to her husband. When Domingo was about to fall down from where he was seated, she embraced him. As she was holding
Domingo, a knife was thrusted into her, wounding her in the hands. 24

On cross-examination, she disclosed she did not see who between accused-appellant and Baloes caused her wounds; that she saw
accused-appellant Glino stab her husband; that they met accused-appellant and Baloes only in the jeepney.25

SPO2 Dalawangbayan testified that he was the investigator assigned to handle the case involving accused-appellant and Baloes. The
two suspects were turned over to him by traffic aides Cristobal and Ramirez. Likewise turned over to him was a bladed weapon, a 12-
inch improvised knife, confiscated from the person of Baloes.26
At the hospital, he found Domingo in critical condition. He later learned that the victim expired shortly after his visit. Virginia suffered
from incised wounds in her right hand.27 After concluding his investigation, he prepared a report. 28

Cristobal narrated that he is a traffic aide assigned at the Casimiro and BF Resort intersection in Las Piñas City. On the night in
question, he noticed a slow-moving passenger jeepney creeping onto the sidewalk. Moments later, the jeepney's passengers were
jumping out of its windows.29

Suspecting a robbery, he and his partner Ramirez immediately gave chase. A man with bloodied clothes, later identified as Baloes, ran
away from the vehicle but fell to the ground shortly after. Another man, accused-appellant Glino, was able to run for more than five
minutes before they caught up with him.30 He and Ramirez later executed a Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay.31

Upon the other hand, the trial court summed up accused-appellant's defense, anchored on plain denial, in the following tenor:

The evidence for the defense consists mainly of the lone testimony of accused Conrado Glino, who testified that he is the
same accused in this case for murder. He did not know the other accused Marvin Baloes prior to November 15, 1998 whom he
knew only at the UI for the first time. On November 15, 1998, at around 7:20 in the evening, he was inside the passenger
jeepney which he boarded at Equitable, Las Piñas City near Moonwalk to go home at Imus, Cavite. He did not have any
companion. He rode on a passenger jeep bound to Zapote. He could not recall the number of people inside the jeepney
because the seats were all occupied. He occupied the right side seat of the driver at the middle of the seat on the right side.
Then he saw the victim was stabbed by accused Baloes. He knew the name of Baloes while they were detained at the UI. He
did not know who was stabbed. The stabbing took place between the areas of Casimiro and Uniwide. The person stabbed
died. He was there watching while the person was being stabbed by Baloes who was seated also at the right side inside the
jeep but seated at the rear most portion of the jeep. The person stabbed seated at the left seat inside the jeep and seating also
at the rear portion of the jeep. Baloes stabbed the person in his body, started at the chest, stomach and other parts of the
body. He did not know how many times Baloes stabbed the victim. There was an argument between Baloes and the wife of
the victim prior to the stabbing incident. They had an argument for a short period of time which he did not know what it was
about. They were at the vicinity near Uniwide when the argument started. He would not know how long the argument lasted
and would not recall the statements of the lady. He said they were having an argument because the lady seating beside
Baloes and after that lady was only a passenger away from him. Victim said to Baloes while pointing his finger "Tumigil ka
dyan, susuntukin kita." Then Baloes suddenly drew a bladed weapon and stabbed him. Together with other passengers, they
alighted from the vehicle because he was afraid. He waited for another passenger jeep so he could go home. He was not able
to go home because he was arrested by the police. He could not estimate how many minutes lapsed after he was able to go
down that jeep when he was arrested as he had no wrist watch, but that was for a short period of time. Ramirez, the not so tall
police officer, arrested them and they were brought to the UI after he and Baloes were immediately handcuffed using only 1
handcuff. Baloes hurriedly went down and ran away after the incident, going back towards Moonwalk. He was not arrested at
the same place where Baloes was arrested. He denied the testimony of Mrs. Boji that he and Baloes had an argument inside
the jeepney they were riding regarding some space and requested that he move a bit which caused the commotion resulting to
this incident. While they were having an argument, he was seated inside the jeep and he just looked at them. He denied
having argued with Mrs. Boji and said that none argued with him. He knows that Baloes died already (TSN, 1 September
2004).

On cross-examination, he declared that his complete name is Conrado Montes Glino. Her mother's name is Juliana Montes
Glino. He denied knowing the middle name of co-accused Marvin, Montes Baloes. Shown a copy of the Information where it
appeared that the middle name of Marvin Baloes is also Montes, he agreed that the middle name is Montes. His place of
residence is Malagasan 1st, Imus, Cavite. Baloes did not tell him while they were under the custody of the police that he is
also a resident of Malagasan 1st, Imus, Cavite. He did not ask Baloes where he was from while they were together at the UI.
But he admitted that on November 15, 1998, at around 7:20 in the evening, he and Baloes were on board one and the same
jeepney bound for Zapote; that while the jeep was near Uniwide Metro Mall, there was an untoward incident that took place
inside the jeep; that in that incident, a certain Domingo Boji was stabbed to death. He did not know that Virginia Boji was also
stabbed and wounded. He would not know how many the passengers were in that jeepney as he failed to count, but there
were many passengers. Both seats at the back were occupied by passengers, but he did not notice if the seat in front of the
jeepney was also occupied. There was a commotion when Domingo was stabbed. He immediately alighted the vehicle
because he was afraid and waited for another jeepney to transfer to another bound to Zapote.

He admitted that among the passengers, only he and Baloes were arrested by the police officers because he was pointed to
by the witness as the assailant of Domingo Boji. Until the time of hearing, no one among the jeepney passengers were
arrested for the death of Domingo and injury inflicted to Virginia Boji. His co-accused, in this case, Marvin Baloes is already
dead. He has no other co-accused except Baloes. He came to know her before she took the witness stand and positively
identified him as the assailant. When he was arrested by the police officers, he shouted why they arrested him and the police
said that he had to go with them and just explain at the police precinct. He did not resist when the police officers arrested him.
He was forced to go with them because they handcuffed him. He was waiting for a ride as he would transfer to another
jeepney in going home. It was PO Ramirez who arrested him. He did not file a case against Ramirez for arresting him without
a valid reason because he was at the detention cell nor seek for help in filing a case against Ramirez because he did not know
how as that was the first time he had a case. He had plan to file the case against Ramirez who brought him at the UI before
PO1 Dalawangbayan. They were not investigated nor interrogated. He stayed at the UI for one week, then he was transferred
at the Las Piñas City jail. He told the police investigator, PO1 Dalawangbayan, that it was Baloes who stabbed and killed
Domingo Boji but that was not included in the incident. PO1 Dalawangbayan did not do anything when he told him that he was
not included in the stabbing incident because the one who was talking only was Virginia Boji. He did not ask PO1
Dalawangbayan to enter his statement in the blotter. Before he was transferred to the city jail of Las Piñas City, he was
brought to the City Prosecutor's Office for inquest (TSN, 22 September 2004). 32

RTC and CA Dispositions

On November 22, 2004, the RTC handed down a judgment of conviction, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding accused Conrado M. Glino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and Attempted
Murder and hereby sentenced as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 98-1310, to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and its accessory penalty and indemnify the heirs
of Domingo Boji y Daza the sum of P50,000.00;

2. Criminal Case No. 98-1311, to suffer an indeterminate prison term of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional medium
as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor medium as maximum and to suffer the accessory penalty provided for by
law and pay Virginia Boji y Revillas the sum of P101,549.00 actual damages and the sum of P100,000.00 moral damages;

3. And to pay the costs in both cases.

SO ORDERED.33

Accused-appellant elevated his conviction to the CA by way of an intermediate review, conformably with the ruling in People v.
Mateo.34 On May 26, 2006, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in full. The fallo of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated November 22, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275,
Las Piñas City in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-1310 and 98-1311 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.35

Issues

Undaunted, accused-appellant interposed the present recourse.

On September 13, 2006, We resolved to require the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within
thirty (30) days from notice.

In a Manifestation dated November 13, 2006, the Office of the Solicitor General, for plaintiff-appellee, opted to dispense with the filing of
a supplemental brief. Accused-appellant, through the Public Attorney's Office, hoists the same lone error he raised before the appellate
court, viz.:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT'S ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT STAB HER HUSBAND AND THAT SHE DID
NOT SEE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT STABBED HER.36

In his supplemental brief, accused-appellant contends that the identity of the assailant was not firmly established. The evidence, he
argues, points to Baloes, who died even before the trial began, as the perpetrator of Domingo's killing and Virginia's stabbing. In the
alternative, accused-appellant submits that he is guilty of homicide and attempted homicide only, not murder and attempted murder,
due to the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. 37

Our Ruling

We first tackle the conviction for murder.

Positive Identification

Accused-appellant makes capital of Virginia's identification of Baloes as the person who stabbed her husband, Domingo. According to
him, the trial court gravely erred in rejecting his defense that he was an innocent bystander. He insists he was not acquainted with
Baloes. They met each other only when they were both tagged by the police as the persons responsible for the melee.

We are unconvinced. The witnesses for the People were consistent in the identification of accused-appellant as one of two assailants
who mortally stabbed Domingo. Villaruel, a key eyewitness for the prosecution, testified thus:

Q: Mr. Witness, at about seven-twenty in the evening of November 15, 1998, do you remember where you were then?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Where were you at that time?

A: I was at the corner of Angela Village in Alabang, Zapote Road waiting for a ride.

Q: While you are waiting there, waiting for a ride at the said place, do you remember what happened next, if any?

A: So when I was able to take a ride a jeepney in the road going to Baclaran, that is the time that I witness the incident.

Q: And then, by the way, where were you going at that time, Mr. Witness?

A: I was on my way going on at Anabu I, Cavite.

Q: Mr. Witness, after you took a ride in a passenger jeepney going to on your way home, do you remember what happened
next, if any?

A: When I boarded the jeepney, the jeepney has no vacancy, so I just hang-on at the back of the jeepney.
Q: And then, what else happened after that, if you remember?

A: When we are already traveled a short distance, one of the passenger alighted, sitted (sic) on the left side.

Q: And, what happened next, after you are able to take a sit inside the passenger jeepney. After one of the passenger
alighted?

A: After a while, another passenger alighted on the right seat of the jeepney.

Q: What else happened after another passenger alighted from the said jeepney?

A: And then, that is the time that I noticed that the two male persons moved closely to the woman, who is sitted in front of me.

Q: And then, what happened next, after you noticed two men moved closely to a woman, in front of yours?

A: One of the male passengers, who moved closely to the woman, little bit lay down his head on the shoulder of the woman.

Q: And, what the woman do after this male passenger lay down his head on the shoulder of the woman?

A: I saw that the woman is avoiding the male passenger, and one of my seatmates on my right side spoke and asked the male
passenger to sit properly.

Q: And what did this male passenger do after the man sitted before you told him to sit properly?

A: He answered and said "ANONG PAKIALAM MO!"

Q: And what was the reaction of the man sitted beside you, when the male passenger said "ANONG PAKIALAM MO!"?

A: And that, and he answered that because that woman were you lying is my wife.

Q: And what did the male passenger do after the said man introduced himself as the husband of the female passenger?

A: "NAGMURA PO."

Q: What else happened after the male passenger coursed him?

A: And then the other male passenger who moved closely to the woman told that "KASI, LALASING-LASING KA HINDI MO
NAMAN KAYA."

Q: And what else happened after that?

A: The man sitted beside me thought that it was already okay, but it is not, because the two male persons, who moved closely
to the woman, were companions, were together and one of them asked to alight from the vehicle.

Q: And what happened next after one of the two male persons, who moved closely to the woman, told to alight?

A: Now, we thought that they are going to alight from the vehicle but when they stood up, they talked to one another and
suddenly stabbed the male passenger, sitted beside me.

Q: Who among these two male passengers stabbed the man sitted beside you?

A: The one who stabbed is the one who pacified the incident that happened before and the second stabbed was made by the
other male passenger.

Q: How many times did these two male passengers stabbed the man, who was sitted beside you?

A: I cannot count but I know it is many times.38

Villaruel's account of the incident dovetails significantly with that of Virginia:

Q: Madam Witness, at about seven-twenty in the evening of November 15, 1998, do you remember where you were then?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Where were you at that time?

A: We were at Moonwalk.

Q: You said we, who are your companions at that time?

A: My husband, Sir.
Q: Who is your husband?

A: Domingo Boji, Sir.

Q: Why were you there at the said place during that particular date and time with your husband?

A: We bought fish.

Q: And, after you bought fish, do you remember what happened next, if any?

A: And then after that my husband stopped a jeepney bound to Alabang Zapote.

Q: What happened next, after your husband stopped a passenger jeepney bound for Zapote?

A: Then we boarded a jeepney, with one vacant seat on the right and one on the left.

Q: And where did you seat when you boarded a passenger jeepney?

A: On the left side, Sir.

Q: And how about your husband, where did he seat?

A: On the right side, Sir.

Q: And then, while you were then on board of the said passenger jeepney, at that time, do you remember what happened
next, if any?

A: While we are on board of the jeepney and the jeepney is on motion, seated on my right side is a lady.

Q: And how about on your left side, do you know who was sitting?

A: A lady also, Sir.

Q: And what else happened after that?

A: And then, after a while, the lady on my right side alighted.

Q: And then, what happened next, after the lady sitting on your right side alighted from the jeepney?

A: Suddenly, who is drunk get near to me.

Q: And how did you come to know that this man, who went near beside you, was drunk?

A: Because he smells liquor.

Q: And then what happened next after this man, you claimed drunk, seated beside you?

A: And then he leaned on my shoulder.

Q: And what did you do after this man on your shoulder?

A: I asked him to move away, considering that there is still a space.

Q: And what was the reaction of this man?

A: He got mad at me and he said "OH, KUNG AYAW MONG MAY KATABI, BUMABA KA, AT MAG-TAXI KA."

Q: And what did you do after this man got mad at you and ordered you to alight from the said jeepney?

A: So I turned my back to him.

Q: And what happened next after you turned your back to him?

A: And again he leaned on my shoulder.

Q: What happened next after this man leaned again on your shoulder?

A: And he was accosted by my husband.

Q: How did your husband accosted this man?


A: My husband asked him to sit properly, and he said that I am his wife.

Q: And what was the reaction of this man?

A: His companion got mad.

Q: Where was the companion of the drunk man seated, who got angry?

A: Beside the man, who is drunk.

Q: And then what else happened?

Court:

This man, who was leaning on your shoulder, and the man, who got mad, was seated side by side?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: What did this companion of the man, seated beside you, tell you, if any?

A: He answered my husband and asked "what do you want."

Q: And what was the reply of your husband?

A: My husband answered "I did not say anything wrong."

Q: What was the reply of this companion of the man seated beside you?

A: None, Sir.

Q: What else happened, while you were there on board of the said passenger jeepney?

A: While we are still on board on the jeepney approaching the place of Casimiro Village, and the jeepney moves slowly, the
companion of this drunk man asked the driver to stop because they will alight.

Q: And then what happened after that, after the companion of this drunk man ordered the driver to stop?

A: When this man asked his companion, the drunk man, to alight from the vehicle, and I am seated, while I am looking down
and I noticed, I looked to them they are going to alight the vehicle I noticed that they suddenly stabbed my husband. And the
two persons announced "HOLDAP ITO." And when I look to them, I saw that they stabbed my husband.

Court Interpreter:

As the witness demonstrating while it seems that she was stabbed on the downward thrust and the husband was
stabbed on the chest.

Q: Who are these man, you are referring to, who stabbed your husband?

A: The one who died already, Marvin.

Q: Who was this Marvin, the one seated beside you or the companion of the drunk man?

A: The other man, Sir.

Q: Did you notice how many times Marvin stabbed your husband?

A: When I look again, I noticed that only once because the knife is still on the chest of my husband.

Court:

Where was your husband seated in relation to your seat?

A: In front of me, Your Honor, on the other side.

Q: And what did you do when you saw Marvin stabbed your husband?

A: None, Sir, I am just looking to nothing.

Q: And after Marvin stabbed your husband, do you remember what happened next, if any?

A: Because Conrado is blocking me, he is in front of me, it seems that they are gambling to a knife to one another.
Q: And then, what else happened after that?

A: And then, when I looked at them again, I saw that my husband seems to fall from where he was seated, so I embraced,
then another stab came in hit my hands.39

As this Court has reiterated often enough, the matter of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses is best left to the discretion of
the trial judge.40 In People v. Quijada,41 the Court aptly held:

Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight
and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or
falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a
reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the
sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full
realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.

The doctrine was reiterated with greater firmness in the ponencia of now Chief Justice Reynato Puno in People v. Ave:42

x x x It is an established rule that when it comes to credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally do not overturn the
findings of trial courts. The latter are in a best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses
through their actual observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying, demeanor, and behavior in court. x x x

Verily, compared to appellate magistrates who merely deal and contend with the cold and inanimate pages of the transcript of
stenographic notes and the original records brought before them, the trial judge confronts the victim or his heirs, the accused and their
respective witnesses. He personally observes their conduct, demeanor and deportment while responding to the questions propounded
by both the prosecutor and defense counsel. Moreover, it is also the trial judge who has the opportunity to pose clarificatory questions
to the parties. Elsewise stated, when a trial judge makes his findings as to the issue of credibility, such findings, especially if affirmed by
the CA, bear great weight, at times even finality, on the Court.43 We see no cogent reason to depart from these settled doctrines.

Conspiracy

Even assuming, for the nonce, that it was Marvin Baloes who inflicted the fatal stab, accused-appellant cannot escape culpability. Their
obvious conspiracy is borne by the records. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence. It may be inferred from the
conduct of accused indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. 44

It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an
unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. Proof that accused acted in concert, each of them doing
his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim will suffice to support a conviction. 45 In conspiracy, it matters not who among the
accused actually killed the victim. The act of one is the act of all; hence, it is not necessary that all the participants deliver the fatal blow.
Tersely put, each of the accused will be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.46

The acts of accused-appellant Glino and Baloes before, during and after the killing of Domingo are indicative of a joint purpose,
concerted action and concurrence of sentiment. In her testimony before the trial court, Virginia categorically narrated that while Baloes
was stabbing Domingo, accused-appellant Glino was blocking her path, effectively preventing her from rendering aid to her
husband.47 Accused-appellant later joined Baloes in stabbing Domingo with a Batangas knife. 48

Lame Denial

Too, we sustain the RTC and the CA's rejection of accused-appellant's defense founded on denial. Time and again, this Court has ruled
that denial is the weakest of all defenses. It easily crumbles in the face of positive identification by accused as the perpetrator of the
crime.49 Here, no less than two eyewitnesses in Villaruel and victim Virginia positively and categorically named Glino as one of the Boji
couple's assailants. Their identification of accused-appellant was unwavering, made in a simple and straightforward manner. Corollarily,
they had no ill motive to testify falsely against Glino. 50 Upon the other hand, other than his bare denial, no corroborating evidence was
put forth to substantiate accused-appellant's disparate account of the incident.

Treachery

Accused-appellant next argues that he should be made liable for homicide only. He claims treachery did not attend the killing of
Domingo.

That treachery or alevosia was present is incontrovertible. The essence of this qualifying circumstance is the sudden and unexpected
attack by the assailant on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself. 51 It is employed to ensure
the commission of the crime without the concomitant risk to the aggressor. The rule is well-settled in this jurisdiction that treachery may
still be appreciated even though the victim was forewarned of danger to his person. 52 What is decisive is that the attack was executed in
a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate. 53

Concededly, victim Domingo was caught unaware that an attack was forthcoming. Although he had a verbal exchange with accused-
appellant and Baloes, the assault was sudden, swift and unexpected. All of the passengers inside the jeepney, including Domingo,
thought all along that the tension had ceased and that Glino and Baloes were about to alight. Domingo was overpowered by accused-
appellant Glino and Baloes, who took turns in stabbing the hapless victim. By all indications, Domingo was without opportunity to evade
the knife thrusts, defend himself, or retaliate. In sum, the finding of treachery stands on solid legal footing.

No Attempted Murder But


Less Serious Physical Injuries
We now proceed to calibrate accused-appellant's liability for the incised wounds sustained by Virginia. Both the trial court and the
appellate court found Glino liable for attempted murder. The RTC and the CA are in agreement that there was intent to kill Virginia as
well.

An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to
kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution
must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.54

In People v. Delim,55 the Court had occasion to explain the rudiments of proving intent to kill in crimes against persons. It may consist
in: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; (4) the circumstances under which the crime was
committed; and (5) the motives of accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is
presumed.56

In the case under review, intent to kill Virginia is betrayed by the conduct of accused-appellant and his co-assailant Baloes before, at
the time of, and immediately after the commission of the crime. In her testimony before the trial court, Virginia disclosed that she was
shocked and was initially unable to come to Domingo's succor as the first blow was struck; that as Domingo was about to fall down from
where he was seated, she embraced him; that she tried to shield him from further attacks; that when the assault ceased, her finger was
gushing with blood.57

If the assailants also intended to kill her, they could have easily stabbed her in any vital part of her body. They did not. The nature and
location of her wound militates against the finding of their intent to kill. According to the physician who examined her immediately after
the incident, Virginia suffered from an incised wound measuring 2.5 centimeters by 0.2 centimeter in her fifth digit, right hand.58

Gleaned from the foregoing, it is crystal-clear that the wound on Virginia was inflicted during her attempt to shield Domingo from
accused-appellant's and Baloes' knife thrusts. It bears stressing that Virginia embraced Domingo while the assault upon him was at its
peak. Evidently, the wound was inflicted while she was in that position.

The wound required medical attendance, and rendered Virginia incapable of labor, for a period of ten (10) to thirty (30) days.59 Clearly,
accused-appellant Glino should be held liable for less serious physical injuries only, and not attempted murder.

Although the indictment was for attempted murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of less serious physical injuries is tenable,
considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former. 60

The essential ingredients of physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the felony of murder. 61Simply put, an accused
may be convicted of slight, less serious or serious physical injuries in a prosecution for homicide or murder, inasmuch as the infliction of
physical injuries could lead to any of the latter offenses when carried out to its utmost degree despite the fact that an essential requisite
of the crime of homicide or murder – intent to kill – is not required in a prosecution for physical injuries. 62

Penalties

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, penalizes murder in this wise:

Article 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provision of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of Murder
and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the
defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;

There being no averment of mitigating nor aggravating circumstance 63 that attended the killing of Domingo, the proper imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the RPC.

On the other hand, Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes less serious physical injuries in the following manner:

Article 265. Less serious physical injuries. – Any person who shall inflict upon another physical injuries not described in the
preceding articles but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical
attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.

Again, absent any appreciable mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty of arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months)
should be imposed in its medium period (between 2 months and 1 day to 4 months). 64

The Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no application in both cases. The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that the law is not
applicable when the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, the law does not apply to those whose
maximum term of imprisonment is less than one year. 65

Damages

We have arrived at the award of damages. When death results due to a crime, the heirs of the victim are entitled to the following
damages: (1) civil indemnity; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate
damages.66

Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the murder victim without need of further proof.67 Under current jurisprudence,
the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto is in order.

We sustain the award of actual damages in the amount of P101,549.00. The heirs of the victim Domingo were able to prove during the
trial, with proper receipts, that they incurred the said expense.
The trial court and the CA, however, blundered a bit in awarding P100,000.00 as moral damages. Prevailing jurisprudence dictates that
in murder, an award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is sufficient. 68 For the less serious physical injuries inflicted on
Virginia Boji, moral damages in the sum of P10,000.00 is warranted.69

The heirs of the victim Domingo Boji are likewise entitled to an additional award of P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages since the
People clearly established treachery in the prosecution for murder. 70 Exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 should also be
awarded to Virginia Boji in the separate conviction for less serious physical injuries. 71 When a crime is committed with an aggravating
circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.72

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is MODIFIED in that, in Criminal Case No. 98-1310, accused-appellant Conrado Glino is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder for the killing of Domingo Boji and is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua with its
accessory penalties. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P101,549.00 as
actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In Criminal Case No. 98-1311, accused-appellant is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Less Serious Physical
Injuries for wounding Virginia Boji and he is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the
victim the sums of P10,000.00 as moral damages and another P10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales*, Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Vice Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Raffle dated November 19, 2007. Justice Nachura was the Solicitor
General who represented the People of the Philippines in this case.

1
Republic Act No. 4136, Chapter IV, Art. V, Sec. 53, known as Land Transportation and Traffic Code, provides that no person
shall drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor or narcotic drug. Sec. 56 imposes a fine of not less than P1,000
or imprisonment of not less than 3 nor more than 6 months or both, at the discretion of the Court (as amended by B.P. Blg.
398, Sec. 12).

2
What is extant is Memorandum Circular No. 94-002 issued by then LTFRB Chairman Dante Lantin imposing fines and
penalties on taxi operators whose drivers refuse to convey passengers.

3
Revised Penal Code, Art. 5.

4 Rule 124, Sec. 13(c) provides:

Sec. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court. –

(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall
render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of
appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.

5Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Sesinando
E. Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-17.

6 Penned by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda; CA rollo, pp. 54-62.

7 TSN, September 20, 1999, pp. 5-6.

8 Id. at 6-8; TSN, August 9, 1999, p. 8.

9 Id. at 8-9; id. at 9-10.

10 Id.

11 TSN, August 9, 1999, p. 10.

12
Id. at 10-11.

13 Id.

14
Id. at 12; TSN, September 20, 1999, pp. 8-9.

15
TSN, July 10, 2002, pp. 7-8.

16 Id. at 8-10.
17 Records, pp. 12-13.

18
Criminal Case No. 98-1310.

19 Criminal Case No. 98-1311.

20 Records, p. 3.

21
Id. at 5.

22 Id. at 38.

23
TSN, August 9, 1999, pp. 5-18.

24 TSN, September 20, 1999, pp. 4-12.

25 Id. at 20-22.

26 TSN, February 20, 2002, pp. 5-10.

27 Id.

28 Exhibit "I."

29 TSN, July 10, 2002, pp. 6-11.

30 Id.

31
Exhibit "B."

32 CA rollo, pp. 59-61.

33
Id. at 62.

34
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

35 CA rollo, p. 106.

36 Id. at 102.

37 Rollo, pp. 22-30.

38
TSN, August 9, 1999, pp. 5-11.

39 TSN, September 20, 1999, pp. 4-12.

40People v. Barcenal, G.R. No. 175925, August 17, 2007; People v. Matito, G.R. No. 144405, February 24, 2004, 423 SCRA
617, 625; People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 128890, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 485, 494; People v. Durado, G.R. No. 121669,
December 23, 1999, 321 SCRA 498, 512; People v. Naguita, G.R. No. 130091, August 30, 1999, 313 SCRA 292, 304-305.

41 G.R. Nos. 115008-09, July 24, 1996, 259 SCRA 191, 212-213.

42 G.R. Nos. 137274-75, October 18, 2002, 391 SCRA 225, 235-236.

43People v. Barcenal, supra note 40; People v. Rayles, G.R. No. 169874, July 27, 2007; People v. Piedad, 441 Phil. 818, 839
(2002); People v. Lua, G.R. Nos. 114224-25, April 26, 1996, 256 SCRA 539, 546.

People v. Barcenal, supra note 40; People v. Pagalasan, 452 Phil. 341, 363 (2003); People v. Hajili, G.R. Nos. 149872-73,
44

March 14, 2003, 399 SCRA 188; People v. Suela, G.R. Nos. 133570-71, January 15, 2002, 373 SCRA 163; People v.
Gundran, G.R. No. 105666, December 17, 1993, 228 SCRA 583, 594.

45
People v. Deuna, G.R. No. 87555, November 16, 1993, 227 SCRA 788, 801.

46 People v. Gundran, supra.

47 TSN, September 20, 1999, pp. 4-12.

48 TSN, August 9, 1999, pp. 5-11.

People v. Surongon, G.R. No. 173478, July 12, 2007; People v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, April 27, 2004, 428 SCRA 51;
49

People v. Sequiño, G.R. No. 117397, November 13, 1996, 264 SCRA 79.
People v. Rodas, G.R. No. 175881, August 28, 2007; People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 169082, August 17, 2007; People v.
50

Surongon, supra; People v. Brecinio, G.R. No. 138534, March 17, 2004, 425 SCRA 616; People v. Molina, G.R. No. 125397,
August 10, 1999, 312 SCRA 130.

51People v. Barcenal, supra note 40; People v. Surongon, supra note 49; People v. Santos, 464 Phil. 941, 956 (2004); People
v. Botona, G.R. No. 161291, September 27, 2004, 439 SCRA 294.

52 People v. Villonez, 359 Phil. 95, 112 (1998).

53
People v. Rodas, supra note 50.

54 Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 188.

55 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003).

56 Id.

57 TSN, September 20, 1999, pp. 4-12.

58
Records, p. 13.

59 Id.

60 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 120, Sec. 4 provides: "When there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which
is included in the offense proved."

61Aradillos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135619, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 514, 535, citing People v. Vicente, G.R. No.
142447, December 21, 2001, 372 SCRA 765, 776-777.

62 Id.

63Although drunkenness or intoxication is an alternative circumstance, i.e., aggravating if it is intentional or habitual, and
mitigating if it is not intentional or habitual under Art. 15, RPC, the new rule requires both allegation and proof to warrant
appreciation of the aggravating circumstance. (2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Sec. 9; People v. Rodas, supra
note 50)

On the other hand, the person pleading intoxication must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the
commission of the crime, as would blur his vision. Mere claim of intoxication does not entitle him to the mitigating
circumstance. (People v. Bernal, G.R. Nos. 132791 & 140465-66, September 2, 2002, 388 SCRA 211)

64 Revised Penal Code, Art. 64(1).

65
Reyes, Luis B., Revised Penal Code, 1993 rev. ed., pp. 789-790.

66 People v. Rodas, supra note 50, citing People v. Beltran, Jr., G.R. No. 168051, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 715.

67 People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 727.

68 People v. Rodas, supra note 50, citing People v. Bajar, 460 Phil. 683 (2003).

69 Aradillos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 61; People v. Tan, G.R. Nos. 116200-02, June 21, 2001, 359 SCRA 283.

70 People v. Beltran, Jr., supra note 66.

71 People v. Tan, supra note 69.

72 People v. Barcenal, supra note 40, citing People v. Aguila, G.R. No. 171017, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 642, 663.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,


vs.
PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO accused.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita finally did away with frustrated rape and allowed only attempted rape and consummated
1 2

rape to remain in our statute books. The instant case lurks at the threshold of another emasculation of the stages of execution of rape
by considering almost every attempt at sexual violation of a woman as consummated rape, that is, if the contrary view were to be
adopted. The danger there is that that concept may send the wrong signal to every roaming lothario, whenever the opportunity bares
itself, to better intrude with climactic gusto, sans any restraint, since after all any attempted fornication would be considered
consummated rape and punished as such. A mere strafing of the citadel of passion would then be considered a deadly fait accompli,
which is absurd.

In Orita we held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim since by it he attained
his objective. All the elements of the offense were already present and nothing more was left for the offender to do, having performed
all the acts necessary to produce the crime and accomplish it. We ruled then that perfect penetration was not essential; any penetration
of the female organ by the male organ, however slight, was sufficient. The Court further held that entry of the labia or lips of the female
organ, even without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, was sufficient to warrant conviction for consummated rape. We
distinguished consummated rape from attempted rape where there was no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of
execution were performed as the offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. The inference that
3

may be derived therefrom is that complete or full penetration of the vagina is not required for rape to be consummated. Any penetration,
in whatever degree, is enough to raise the crime to its consummated stage.

But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of penetration in rape by requiring entry into the labia or lips of the female organ, even if
there be no rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, to warrant a conviction for consummated rape. While the entry of the penis
into the lips of the female organ was considered synonymous with mere touching of the external genitalia, e.g., labia majora, labia
minora, etc., the crucial doctrinal bottom line is that touching must be inextricably viewed in light of, in relation to, or as an essential part
4

of, the process of penile penetration, and not just mere touching in the ordinary sense. In other words, the touching must be tacked to
the penetration itself. The importance of the requirement of penetration, however slight, cannot be gainsaid because where entry into
the labia or the lips of the female genitalia has not been established, the crime committed amounts merely to attempted rape.

Verily, this should be the indicium of the Court in determining whether rape has been committed either in its attempted or in its
consummated stage; otherwise, no substantial distinction would exist between the two, despite the fact that penalty-wise, this
distinction, threadbare as it may seem, irrevocably spells the difference between life and death for the accused — a reclusive life that is
not even perpetua but only temporal on one hand, and the ultimate extermination of life on the other. And, arguing on another level, if
the case at bar cannot be deemed attempted but consummated rape, what then would constitute attempted rape? Must our field of
choice be thus limited only to consummated rape and acts of lasciviousness since attempted rape would no longer be possible in light
of the view of those who disagree with this ponencia?

On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the court a quo to the extreme penalty
of death, hence this case before us on automatic review under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.
5 6

As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan,
mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her
two (2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into
ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy
preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw
7

Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already
removed, while his short pants were down to his knees.

According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she cursed the accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko
iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block
his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their
compound, to chase the accused. Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who answered Corazon's call for help. They held
8

the accused at the back of their compound until they were advised by their neighbors to call the barangay officials instead of detaining
him for his misdeed. Physical examination of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was
noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthel's body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter.

Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He maintained his innocence and assailed the charge as a mere
scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will against him for his refusal to run an errand for her. He asserted that in truth
9

Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down
on the floor. It was in this fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them and became hysterical. Corazon slapped him and accused
him of raping her child. He got mad but restrained himself from hitting back when he realized she was a woman. Corazon called for help
from her brothers to stop him as he ran down from the second floor.

Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her call for help and accosted Primo. Vicente punched him and threatened to kill him.
Upon hearing the threat, Primo immediately ran towards the house of Conrado Plata but Vicente followed him there. Primo pleaded for
a chance to explain as he reasoned out that the accusation was not true. But Vicente kicked him instead. When Primo saw Vicente
holding a piece of lead pipe, Primo raised his hands and turned his back to avoid the blow. At this moment, the relatives and neighbors
of Vicente prevailed upon him to take Primo to the barangay hall instead, and not to maul or possibly kill him.

Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his innocence, the trial court on 27 May 1997 found him guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him
to the extreme penalty of death, and ordered him to pay his victim P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages,
and the costs.

The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the credibility of Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He argues that her narration should not be
given any weight or credence since it was punctured with implausible statements and improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature
and experience. He claims that it was truly inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that Crysthel's younger sister was also
in the room playing while Corazon was just downstairs preparing Milo drinks for her daughters. Their presence alone as possible
eyewitnesses and the fact that the episode happened within the family compound where a call for assistance could easily be heard and
responded to, would have been enough to deter him from committing the crime. Besides, the door of the room was wide open for
anybody to see what could be taking place inside. Primo insists that it was almost inconceivable that Corazon could give such a vivid
description of the alleged sexual contact when from where she stood she could not have possibly seen the alleged touching of the
sexual organs of the accused and his victim. He asserts that the absence of any external signs of physical injuries or of penetration of
Crysthel's private parts more than bolsters his innocence.

In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the testimony of Corazon that she saw Primo with his short pants down
to his knees kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were supposedly "already removed" and that Primo was "forcing his
penis into Crysthel's vagina." The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as
provided in Art. 335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal Code. Crysthel was only four (4) years old when sexually molested, thus raising the
penalty, from reclusion perpetuato death, to the single indivisible penalty of death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended party being
below seven (7) years old. We have said often enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the
vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the external genitalia by
the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. But the act of touching should be
10

understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons
pubis or the pudendum.

In People v. De la Peña we clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the attacker's penis merely touched the external
11

portions of the female genitalia were made in the context of the presence or existence of an erect penis capable of full penetration.
Where the accused failed to achieve an erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the victim's
vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on the basis of the victim's testimony that the accused repeatedly tried,
but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the
lips of her vulva, or that the penis of the accused touched the middle part of her vagina. Thus, touching when applied to rape cases
12 13

does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external
layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed
touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the
14

mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the
conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.

The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia
majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after
puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of
the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented,
while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is
the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the
15 16

penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the
pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.,
touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not
acts of lasciviousness.

Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the female organ," but has also
17

progressed into being described as "the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum," or "the bombardment of the
18

drawbridge." But, to our mild, the case at bar merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated, a
19

"strafing of the citadel of passion.

A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of proving that Primo's penis was able
to penetrate Crysthel's vagina however slight. Even if we grant arguendo that Corazon witnessed Primo in the act of sexually molesting
her daughter, we seriously doubt the veracity of her claim that she saw the inter-genital contact between Primo and Crysthel. When
asked what she saw upon entering her children's room Corazon plunged into saying that she saw Primo poking his penis on the vagina
of Crysthel without explaining her relative position to them as to enable her to see clearly and sufficiently, in automotive lingo, the
contact point. It should be recalled that when Corazon chanced upon Primo and Crysthel, the former was allegedly in a kneeling
position, which Corazon described thus:

Q: How was Primo holding your daughter?

A: (The witness is demonstrating in such a way that the chest of the accused is pinning down the victim, while his right hand is
holding his penis and his left hand is spreading the legs of the victim).

It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration that Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible.
Not even a vantage point from the side of the accused and the victim would have provided Corazon an unobstructed view of Primo's
penis supposedly reaching Crysthel's external genitalia, i.e., labia majora, labia minora, hymen, clitoris, etc., since the legs and arms of
Primo would have hidden his movements from Corazon's sight, not to discount the fact that Primo's right hand was allegedly holding his
penis thereby blocking it from Corazon's view. It is the burden of the prosecution to establish how Corazon could have seen the sexual
contact and to shove her account into the permissive sphere of credibility. It is not enough that she claims that she saw what was done
to her daughter. It is required that her claim be properly demonstrated to inspire belief. The prosecution failed in this respect, thus we
cannot conclude without any taint of serious doubt that inter-genital contact was at all achieved. To hold otherwise would be to resolve
the doubt in favor of the prosecution but to run roughshod over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent.

Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain himself from pursuing his wicked intention despite her timely appearance, thus giving her the
opportunity to fully witness his beastly act.

We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with man's instinct of self-preservation to remain where he is and persist in satisfying his lust
even when he knows fully well that his dastardly acts have already been discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother of his
victim. For, the normal behavior or reaction of Primo upon learning of Corazon's presence would have been to pull his pants up to avoid
being caught literally with his pants down. The interval, although relatively short, provided more than enough opportunity for Primo not
only to desist from but even to conceal his evil design.

What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the accused was Crysthel's answer to the question of the court —

Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ?


A: Yes, sir.

But when asked further whether his penis penetrated her organ, she readily said, "No." Thus —

Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ?

A: No, sir. 20

This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that enshrouds the question of whether rape in this case was
consummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primo's penis penetrating her vagina, however slight. Crysthel made a categorical
statement denying penetration, obviously induced by a question propounded to her who could not have been aware of the finer
27

distinctions between touching and penetration. Consequently, it is improper and unfair to attach to this reply of a four (4)-year old child,
whose vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped as her sex and whose language is bereft of worldly sophistication, an adult interpretation
that because the penis of the accused touched her organ there was sexual entry. Nor can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate the
victim's organ the penis of the accused touched the middle portion of her vagina and entered the labia of her pudendum as the
prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts to penetrate Crysthel. Corazon did not say, nay, not even hint that
22

Primo's penis was erect or that he responded with an erection. On the contrary, Corazon even narrated that Primo had to hold his
23

penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim.

Antithetically, the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the child's own assertion that she resisted
Primo's advances by putting her legs close together; consequently, she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about
24

what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!" In cases where penetration was not fully
25

established, the Court had anchored its conclusion that rape nevertheless was consummated on the victim's testimony that she felt
pain, or the medico-legal finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was already gaping with redness, or
the hymenal tags were no longer visible. None was shown in this case. Although a child's testimony must be received with due
26

consideration on account of her tender age, the Court endeavors at the same time to harness only what in her story appears to be true,
acutely aware of the equally guaranteed rights of the accused. Thus, we have to conclude that even on the basis of the testimony of
Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held liable for consummated rape; worse, be sentenced to death. 1âwphi 1

Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case that there were no external signs of physical injuries on
complaining witness' body to conclude from a medical perspective that penetration had taken place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained,
although the absence of complete penetration of the hymen does not negate the possibility of contact, she clarified that there was no
medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and the victim. 27

In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all respects complement each other;
otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be
productive of unwarranted or even mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis of the accused in reality
entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that rape was consummated. Failing in this, the thin line that
separates attempted rape from consummated rape will significantly disappear.

Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of
rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape — and only of attempted rape — are
present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.

The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the offense charged, which is statutory
rape of a minor below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower is reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of
which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years, in any of its periods.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y BELLO guilty of statutory rape and
sentencing him to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED. He is instead found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED. 1âw phi1.nêt

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Pnganiban, J., in the result.

Footnotes

1
People v. Ceilito Orita alias "Lito," G.R. No. 88724, 3 April 1990, 184 SCRA 105.

2
People v. Eriñia, 50 Phil. 998 (1927).

3
See Note 1.

4
People v. Quinañola, G.R. No. 126148, 5 May 1995.
5
Decision penned by Judge Benjamin T. Antonio RTC-Br. 170, Malabon, Metro Manila (Crim. Case No. 16857-MN).

6
An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, effective on 31 December 1993.

7
"Ayoko," apparently is a contraction of "ayaw ko." "Ayoko, ayoko" means "I don't like, I don't like."

Corazon's brother Vicente Plata responded to her call, as well as others living within the compound namely, Criselda Carlos
8

Manalac, Fernando Bondal, Jose Carlos and Reynoso Carlos.

Accused alleged that the charge of rape was merely concocted by Ma. Corazon Pamintuan because of his refusal to buy
9

medicine for her, and perform the other tasks asked of him by her relatives.

See the following American cases where the doctrine originated: Kenny v. State, 65 L.R.A. 316; Rodgers v. State, 30 Tex.
10

App. 510; Brauer v. State, 25 Wis. 413, as cited in People v. Oscar, 48 Phil. 528 (1925).

11
G.R. No. 104947, 30 June 1994, 233 SCRA 573.

People v. Bacalso, G.R. No. 89811, 22 March 1991, 195 SCRA 557; People v. Hangdaan, G.R. No. 90035, 13 September
12

1991, 201 SCRA 568; People v. De la Peña, G.R. No. 104947, 30 June 1994, 233 SCRA 573; People v. Clopino, G.R. No.
117322, 21, May 1998, 290 SCRA 432; People v. Quinañola, G.R. No. 126248, 5 May 1999.

13
People v. Navarro, G.R. No. 96251, 11 May 1993, 221 SCRA 684.

In People v. Quinañola (G.R. No. 126148, 5 May 1999) the Court held the word "touching" to be synonymous with the entry
14

by the penis into the labia declaring that ". . . the crime of rape is deemed consummated even when the man's penis merely
entered the labia or lips of the female organ, or as once said in a case, by the "mere touching of the external genitalia by the
penis capable of sexual act" . . .

15
Mishell, Stenchever Droegemueller, Herbst Comprehensive Gynecology, 3rd Ed., 1997, pp. 42-44.

People v. Escober, G.R. Nos. 122980-81, 6 November 1997, 281 SCRA 498; People v. Galimba, G.R. Nos. 121563-64, 20
16

February 1996, 253 SCRA 722; People v. Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 98402-04, 16 November 1995, 250 SCRA 14; People v.
Lazaro, G.R. No. 99263, 12 October 1995, 249 SCRA 234; People v. Rejano, G.R. Nos. 105669-70, 18 October 1994, 237
SCRA 627; People v. Salinas, G.R. No. 107204, 6 May 1994, 232 SCRA 274; People v. Palicte, G.R. No. 101088, 27 January
1994, 229 SCRA 543; People v. Arce, G.R. Nos. 101833-34, 20 October 1993, 227 SCRA 406; People v. Garcia, G.R. No.
92269, 30 July 1993, 244 SCRA 776; People v. Tismo, No. L-44773, 4 December 1991, 204 SCRA 535; People v. Mayoral,
G.R. Nos. 96094-95, 13 November 1991, 203 SCRA 528, People v. Hangdaan, G.R. No. 90035, 13 September 1991, 201
SCRA 568; People v. Caballes, G.R. Nos. 93437-45, 12 July 1991, 199 SCRA 152; People v. Bacalso, G.R. No. 89811, 22
March 1991, 195 SCRA 557.

17
People v. Clopino, G.R. No. 117322, 21 May 1998, 290 SCRA 432.

18
See Note 4.

19
People v. Escober, G.R. Nos. 122980-81, 6 November 1997, 281 SCRA 498.

20
TSN, 7 October 1996, p. 20.

21
In Dulla v. CA (G.R. No. 123164, 18 February 2000) the Court considered the testimony of a child aged three (3) years and
ten (10) months old sufficient and credible even if she answered "yes" or "no" to questions propounded to her. However, the
victim therein, who was much younger than Crysthel in the instant case, demonstrated what she meant when unable to
articulate what was done to her, even made graphic descriptions of the accused's penis and demonstrated the push and pull
movement made by the accused. Yet conspicuously, the Court in the Dulla case found the accused guilty only of acts of
lasciviousness on the basis of certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim on whether or not petitioner took off her
underwear.

In People v. Clopino (G.R. No. 117322, 21 May 1998) the Court rejected the argument of the accused that he should only be
22

convicted of either attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. It adopted the reasoning of the Solicitor General and declared
that it was impossible for the penis of accused-appellant not to have touched the labia of the pudendum in trying to penetrate
her. However, such logical conclusion was deduced in the light of evidence presented that accused-appellant made
determined attempts to penetrate and insert his penis into the victim's vagina and even engaged her in foreplay by inserting
his finger into her genitalia. The same inference cannot be made in the instant case because of the variance in the factual
milieu.

Decisions finding the accused guilty of consummated rape even if the attacker's penis merely touched the female external
23

genitalia were made in the context of the presence of an erect penis capable of full penetration, failing in which there can be
no consummated rape (People v. De la Peña, see Note 11).

24
See Note 16, p. 21.

25
Ibid.

People v. Villamayor, G.R. Nos. 97474-76, 18 July 1991, 199 SCRA 472; People v. Palicte, G.R. No. 101088, 27 January
26

1994, 229 SCRA 543; People v. Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 98402-04, 16 November 1995, 250 SCRA 14; People v. Gabris, G.R. No.
116221, 21 July 1996, 258 SCRA 663; People v. Cabayron, G.R. No. 102018, 21 August 1997, 278 SCRA 78.
Q: Will you tell the Court, what do you mean by this No. 1. conclusion appearing in Exhibit "A" which I quote "no evident sign
27

of extra-genital injury noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination?"

A: That means I was not able to see injuries outside the genital of the victim, sir.

Q: I presumed (sic) that you conducted genital physical examination on the victim in this case?

A: Yes sir.

Q: And you also made the result of the genital physical examination shows (sic) that there is no injury on any part of
the body of the patient, correct, Doctor?

A: Yes sir.

Q: There was no medical basis for the saying that might have a contact between the patient and the accused in this
case?

A: Yes sir (TSN, 8 October 1996, pp. 3-4).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 179031 November 14, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
BENJAMIN SORIA y GOMEZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This case involves a father’s detestable act of abusing his daughter through rape by sexual assault.

Factual Antecedents

Accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez (appellant) seeks a review of the December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals
1

(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01442 which affirmed with modification the June 30, 2005 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
2

Quezon City, Branch 94, in Criminal Case No. Q-01-98692. Said RTC Judgment found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape committed against his daughter "AAA", as described in an Information, the relevant portion of which reads:
3 4

That on or about the 26th day of February, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, who is the father of private complainant
"AAA", did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously with force and intimidation commit an act of sexual assault upon the
person of one "AAA", a minor, 7 years of age[,] by then and there inserting his penis into [the] genital of said complainant, all against
her will and consent, which act debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said "AAA", as a human being, in
violation of said law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

On February 26, 2000, "AAA" and her siblings enjoyed the spaghetti their father (appellant) brought home for merienda. After eating,
"AAA" went to the bedroom to rest. Thereafter, appellant also entered the room and positioned himself on top of "AAA", took off her
clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. "AAA" felt intense pain from her breast down to her vagina and thus told her father that it
was painful. At that point, appellant apologized to his daughter, stood up, and left the room. This whole incident was witnessed by
"AAA’s" brother, "BBB".

The pain persisted until "AAA’s" vagina started to bleed. She thus told her aunt about it and they proceeded to a hospital for treatment.
Her mother was also immediately informed of her ordeal. Subsequently, "AAA" was taken into the custody of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development.

On March 15, 2000, Medico-Legal Officer Francisco A. Supe, Jr., M.D. (Dr. Supe) examined "AAA", which examination yielded the
following results:

GENERAL AND EXTRA-GENITAL: Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child. Breasts are undeveloped. Abdomen is
flat and soft.

GENITAL: There is absent growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex, and coaptated with light brown labia minora presenting in
between. On separating the same, disclosed an elastic, fleshy type, hyperemic and intact hymen. Posterior fourchette is sharp.
CONCLUSION: The subject is in virgin state physically. There are no external signs of application of any form of physical trauma. 6

Version of the Defense

Appellant admitted that he was at home on the day and time of "AAA’s" alleged rape but denied committing the same. Instead, he
claimed that the filing of the rape case against him was instigated by his wife, whom he confronted about her illicit affair with a man
residing in their community. According to appellant, he could not have molested "AAA" because he treated her well. In fact, he was the
only one sending his children to school since his wife already neglected them and seldom comes home.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On June 30, 2005, the trial court rendered its Judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape against
7

"AAA", his daughter of minor age, as charged in the Information. It ruled that the lack of tenacious resistance on the part of "AAA" is
immaterial considering that appellant’s moral ascendancy and influence over her substitute for violence and intimidation. It also held
8

that his wife could not have instigated the filing of the rape case since as the mother of "AAA", it would not be natural for her to use her
child as a tool to exact revenge especially if it will result in her embarrassment and stigma. The trial court gave credence to the
9

testimony of "AAA" and her positive identification of appellant as her rapist, and rejected the latter’s defense of denial. The dispositive
portion of the Judgment reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the herein accused, BENJAMIN SORIA Y GOMEZ −
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged and sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH and to
indemnify the offended party the amount of P75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and the amount of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse proclivities for aberrant sexual behavior for sexually abusing
their own daughters.

SO ORDERED. 10

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated December 29, 2006, the CA found partial merit in the appeal. While the appellate court was convinced that
11

appellant raped "AAA", it nevertheless noted the prosecution’s failure to present her birth certificate as competent proof of her minority.
Thus, the CA concluded that the crime committed by appellant against his daughter was only simple rape and accordingly modified the
penalty imposed by the trial court from death to reclusion perpetua and reduced the civil indemnity awarded from P75,000.00 to
P50,000.00. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the June 30, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 94, in Criminal Case No. Q-01-98692, is hereby MODIFIED, in that, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion
perpetua instead of death and the civil indemnity to be paid by the offender to the victim is hereby reduced to the amount of P50,000.00
instead of P75,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence as explained in this decision.

Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated September
28, 2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004, this judgment of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court
by notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED. 12

Still insisting on his innocence, appellant comes to this Court through this appeal.

Assignment of Errors

Appellant adopts the same assignment of errors he raised before the appellate court, viz:

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE X X X.

II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON HIM. 13

Appellant asserts that he should be acquitted of the crime of rape since there is no evidence that would establish the fact of sexual
intercourse. Aside from the prosecution’s failure to prove penile contact, "AAA’s" testimony was also wanting in details as to how he
took off her underwear or whether she saw his penis during the incident despite leading questions propounded on the matter by the
prosecution. The medical report even revealed that "AAA’s" hymen remained intact and that there were no notable lacerations or
external physical injuries thereon. Appellant therefore surmises that his wife merely instigated "AAA" to file this baseless rape case
against him in retaliation for his act of confronting her about her illicit relationship with a neighbor.

Our Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The crime of rape under Article 266-A of


the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, classified the crime of rape as a crime against persons. It also
amended Article 335 of the RPC and incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present;

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault
by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.

Thus, rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or by sexual assault. Rape under paragraph 1 of the above-cited
article is referred to as rape through sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge is the central element and it must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. It is commonly denominated as "organ rape" or "penile rape" and must be attended by any of the circumstances
14 15

enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.

On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A is commonly known as rape by sexual assault. The perpetrator, under any
of the attendant circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1, commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth
or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. It is also called "instrument or object rape",
also "gender-free rape". 16

The Information did not specify whether


the crime of rape was committed through
sexual intercourse or by sexual assault.

The Information in this case did not specify with certainty whether appellant committed the rape through sexual intercourse under
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, or rape by sexual assault as described in paragraph 2 thereof. The Information stated that appellant
inserted his penis into the genital of "AAA," which constituted rape by sexual intercourse under the first paragraph of Article 266-A. At
the same time, the Information alleged that appellant used force and intimidation to commit an act of sexual assault. While these
allegations cause ambiguity, they only pertain to the mode or manner of how the rape was committed and the same do not invalidate
the Information or result in the automatic dismissal of the case. "[W]here an offense may be committed in any of the different modes
and the offense is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes specified, the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact
that the different means of committing the same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The allegation in the
information of the various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a description of only one offense and the information is
not thereby rendered defective on the ground of multifariousness." Any objection from the appellant with respect to the Information is
17

held to have been waived failing any effort to oppose the same before trial. He therefore can be convicted of rape through sexual
18

intercourse or rape by sexual assault, depending on the evidence adduced during trial.

The findings of the RTC and the CA on

the credibility of "AAA" deserve respect

and great weight.

Both the trial court and the CA held that "AAA" was a credible witness. They ruled that her testimony deserved credence and is
sufficient evidence that she was raped by appellant. We find no cogent reason to overturn these findings.

It would be highly inconceivable for "AAA" to impute to her own father the crime of raping her unless the imputation is true. In fact, it
19

takes "a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father in jail for the
rest of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame" unless the imputation is true.
20

When a rape victim’s testimony on the manner she was defiled is "straightforward and candid, and is corroborated by the medical
findings of the examining physician as in this case, the same is sufficient to support a conviction for rape." 21

Appellant is guilty of rape by sexual

assault and not through sexual

intercourse.

The trial court’s conviction of the appellant was for rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A. The CA
sustained the trial court’s finding that appellant had sexual intercourse with "AAA" against her will.

In determining whether appellant is indeed guilty of rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, it is essential to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of "AAA". There must be proof that his penis touched the labia of
"AAA" or slid into her female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, to ensure his conviction of rape by sexual
intercourse. 22
1ªvvph!1
We reviewed the testimony of "AAA" and found nothing therein that would show that she was raped through sexual intercourse. W hile
"AAA" categorically stated that she felt something inserted into her vagina, her testimony was sorely lacking in important details that
would convince us with certainty that it was indeed the penis of appellant that was placed into her vagina.

When "AAA" was placed on the witness stand, she narrated that:

Q - The earlier statement which you made when you said that you wanted to explain something about your father, is that true?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - So, you said that you wanted to explain something about your father, what was that?

A - What he did, sir.

Q - What was that?

A - I was raped, sir.

Q - What did he do when you said he raped you?

A - He laid on top of me, sir. 23

xxxx

Q - So when you said he laid on top of you, did you feel anything? Did you feel any pain in any part of your body?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - In what part of your body did you feel pain?

A - I felt pain in my breast and my stomach.

Q - What about your private part?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - Did you know why your stomach as well as your body and your private part hurt or become painful?

A - I don’t know, sir.

Q - Did you feel something inserted into your private part?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - What is that, if you know?

A - The bird of my papa.

Q - Why did you know that?

A - Because my brother, "BBB", told me.

Q - Why? Was "BBB", your brother, present when your father was on top of you?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - Why do you know that he was there?

A - He told me so, sir.

Q - Who?

A - "BBB".

Q - Okay, when you felt pain as something was inserted [into] your private part, what did you say to your father?

A - He left the room.

Q - Before he went away and left?

A - It was painful, sir.


Q - And what was the answer of your father?

A - He said sorry, sir.

Q - How long was he or how long were you in that position, you were lying down and your father was on top of you?

A - I do not know, sir. 24

xxxx

Q - Earlier, you were making reference to your father whom you said abused you. I am asking you now to tell us if your father is
around?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - Will you please point x x x to him?

A - Yes, sir. (Witness pointing to a man who is wearing yellow t-shirt and maong pants who when asked identified himself as Benjamin
Soria.)

Q - Is he the same person who according to you laid on top of you and inserted something into your vagina or private part?

A - Yes, sir. 25

It is evident from the testimony of "AAA" that she was unsure whether it was indeed appellant’s penis which touched her labia and
entered her organ since she was pinned down by the latter’s weight, her father having positioned himself on top of her while she was
lying on her back. "AAA" stated that she only knew that it was the "bird" of her father which was inserted into her vagina after being told
by her brother "BBB". Clearly, "AAA" has no personal knowledge that it was appellant’s penis which touched her labia and inserted into
her vagina. Hence, it would be erroneous to conclude that there was penile contact based solely on the declaration of "AAA’s" brother,
"BBB", which declaration was hearsay due to "BBB’s" failure to testify. Based on the foregoing, it was an error on the part of the RTC
and the CA to conclude that appellant raped "AAA" through sexual intercourse.

Instead, we find appellant guilty of rape by sexual assault. It cannot be denied that appellant inserted an object into "AAA’s" female
organ. "AAA" categorically testified that appellant inserted something into her vagina. She claimed to have suffered tremendous pain
during the insertion. The insertion even caused her vagina to bleed necessitating her examination at the hospital. Both the trial court
and the CA found "AAA’s" testimony to be credible. We find no compelling reason not to lend credence to the same.

This defilement constitutes rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC, which provides that rape by sexual assault is
committed "by any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault
by inserting x x x any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person."

Moreover, Dr. Supe corroborated her testimony as follows:

Q - Doctor, with respect to Exhibit A, the Medico-Legal Report pertaining to the entry into the genital, which reads: On separating the
hymen, disclosed was an elastic, fleshy type, hyperemic and intact hymen. Will you please tell us, Doctor, what is this hyperemic
hymen?

A - Hyperemic hymen, sir, means that at the time of examination, I found out that it was reddish in color.

Q - Considering the age of the child or the patient, the victim whom you examined at that time who was about 6 years old, will you be
able to tell us, Doctor, what could have caused this kind of injury, because this is an injury to the hymen?

A - Hyperemic, sir, is observed whenever there is friction applied to an area, such as in the form of scratching.

Q - What about insertion of object, would this result into hyperemic hymen?

A - If the object is being rubbed, sir, there is a possibility.

Q - A finger will produce this kind of injury?

A - Possible, sir. 26

According to Dr. Supe, it is possible that "AAA’s" hyperemic hymen may be the result of the insertion of a finger or object. While Dr.
Supe said that the injury could also be attributed to scratching, "AAA’s" testimony is bereft of any showing that she scratched her
genital organ thus causing the reddening. Appellant would also want to make it appear that the injury of "AAA" was the result of friction
from playing or riding a bicycle since the doctor testified that this was also possible. However, there is likewise no evidence that friction
was applied on "AAA’s" female organ when she played hide and seek with her playmates or that she actually rode a bicycle. On the
other hand, "AAA" was categorical in stating that in the afternoon of February 26, 2000, appellant removed her clothes, laid on top of
her, and that she felt something being inserted into her vagina and that thereafter she experienced pain in her genitals. The foregoing
thus proved that appellant inserted an object into "AAA’s" vagina against her will and without consent. Simply put, appellant committed
the crime of rape by sexual assault.

The following are the elements of rape by sexual assault:


(1) That the offender commits an act of sexual assault;

(2) That the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:

(a) By inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice; or

(b) By inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person;

(3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:

(a) By using force and intimidation;

(b) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or

(d) When the woman is under 12 years of age or demented. 27

In the instant case, it was clearly established that appellant committed an act of sexual assault on "AAA" by inserting an instrument or
object into her genital. We find it inconsequential that "AAA" could not specifically identify the particular instrument or object that was
inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. To require "AAA" to
identify the instrument or object that was inserted into her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process. It would
be akin to requiring "AAA" to establish something that is not even required by law. Moreover, it might create problems later on in the
application of the law if the victim is blind or otherwise unconscious. Moreover, the prosecution satisfactorily established that appellant
accomplished the act of sexual assault through his moral ascendancy and influence over "AAA" which substituted for violence and
intimidation. Thus, there is no doubt that appellant raped "AAA" by sexual assault.

Appellant’s contentions are untenable.

The failure of "AAA" to mention that her panty was removed prior to the rape does not preclude sexual assault. We cannot likewise give
credence to the assertion of appellant that the crime of rape was negated by the medical findings of an intact hymen or absence of
lacerations in the vagina of "AAA". Hymenal rupture, vaginal laceration or genital injury is not indispensable because the same is not an
element of the crime of rape. "An intact hymen does not negate a finding that the victim was raped." Here, the finding of reddish
28 29

discoloration of the hymen of "AAA" during her medical examination and the intense pain she felt in her vagina during and after the
sexual assault sufficiently corroborated her testimony that she was raped.

Likewise undeserving of credence is appellant’s contention that his wife merely instigated "AAA" to file the charge of rape against him in
retaliation for his having confronted her about her illicit affair with another man. This imputation of ill motive is flimsy considering that it is
unnatural for appellant’s wife to stoop so low as to subject her own daughter to the hardships and shame concomitant with a
prosecution for rape, just to assuage her hurt feelings. It is also improbable for appellant’s wife to have dared encourage their daughter
30

"AAA" to publicly expose the dishonor of the family unless the rape was indeed committed. 31

Penalty

Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for rape by sexual assault is prision mayor. However, the penalty is increased to reclusion
temporal "if the rape is committed by any of the 10 aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article". The Information
alleged the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority. It was alleged that appellant is the father of "AAA". During the pre-trial
conference, the parties stipulated that "AAA" is the daughter of appellant. During trial, appellant admitted his filial bond with
32

"AAA". "Admission in open court of relationship has been held to be sufficient and, hence, conclusive to prove relationship with the
33

victim."
34

With respect to minority, however, the Information described "AAA" as a 7-year old daughter of appellant. While this also became the
subject of stipulation during the pre-trial conference, same is insufficient evidence of "AAA’s" age. Her minority must be "proved
conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself". "There must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the
35

testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the accused." Documents such as her original or duly certified birth
36

certificate, baptismal certificate or school records would suffice as competent evidence of her age. Here, there was nothing on record
37

to prove the minority of "AAA" other than her testimony, appellant’s absence of denial, and their pre-trial stipulation. The prosecution
38

also failed to establish that the documents referred to above were lost, destroyed, unavailable or otherwise totally absent. 39

It is settled that "when either one of the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded
in the information and proved by the evidence may be considered as an aggravating circumstance." As such, appellant’s relationship
40

with "AAA" may be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

In view of these, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal which ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor which ranges from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years. Hence, a penalty of twelve (12) years of prison mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, is imposed upon appellant.

Damages

In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the awards of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages are each modified to P30,000.00. "AAA" is also entitled to an interest on all the amounts of damages awarded at
41

the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. 42

WHEREFORE, the December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01442 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual
assault and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prison mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. He is also ordered to pay "AAA" the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages,
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. "AAA" is entitled to an interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

CA rollo, pp. 83-96; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevara
1

Salonga and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.

2
Records, pp. 76-81; penned by Judge Romeo F. Zamora.

3
"The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her
immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing for Stronger
Deterrence And Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation And Discrimination, And for Other Purposes; Republic
Act No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women And Their Children, Providing For Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, And for Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the Rule on
Violence against Women and Their Children, effective November 5, 2004." People v. Dumadag, G.R. No.176740, June 22,
2011, 652 SCRA 535, 538-539.

4
Records, p. 1.

5
Id.

6
Id. at 4.

7
Id. at 76-81.

8
Id. at 79.

9
Id. at 79-80.

10
Id. at 81.

11
CA rollo, pp. 83-96.
12
Id. at 95-96.

13
Id. at 21.

14
People v. Brioso, G.R. No. 182517, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 485, 493.

15
People v. Abulon, G.R. No. 174473, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 675, 702.

16
Id.

17
Jurado v. Suy Yan, 148 Phil. 677, 686 (1971).

18
Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija v. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, 79 Phil. 165, 168 (1947).

19
People v. Felan, G.R. No. 176631, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 449, 453-454.

20
Id. at 453-454, citing People v. Javier, 370 Phil. 128, 139 (1999).

21
People v. Sumingwa, G.R. No. 183619, October 13, 2009, 603 SCRA 638, 652.

22
People v. Brioso, supra note 14 at 495.

23
Records, unpaginated; TSN, February 10, 2003, pp. 3-4.

24
Id., id. at 4-5. Emphases supplied.

25
Id., id. at 8.

26
Id.; TSN, July 30, 2002, p. 5.

27
Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, Seventeenth Edition, p. 557.

28
People v. Valenzuela, G.R. No. 182057, February 6, 2009, 578 SCRA 157, 169-170.

29
People v. Tampos, 455 Phil. 844, 858 (2003).

30
People v. Palgan, G.R. No. 186234, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 725, 731.

31
Id. at 731-732.

32
Records, p. 14.

33
Id.; TSN, October 22, 2003, p. 3.

34
People v. Padilla, G.R. No. 167955, September 30, 2009, 601 SCRA 385, 397.

People v. Albalate, Jr., G.R. No. 174480, December 18, 2009, 608 SCRA 535, 546, citing People v. Manalili, G.R. No.
35

184598, June 23, 2009, 590 SCRA 695, 716.

36
Id., citing People v. Tabanggay, 390 Phil. 67, 91 (2000).

37
People v. Padilla, supra at 397-398.

38
Id. at 398.

39
Id.

People v. Hermocilla, G.R. No. 175830, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 296, 304-305, citing People v. Esperanza, 453 Phil. 54, 75-
40

76 (2003).

41
People v. Alfonso, G.R. No. 182094, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 431, 452.

42
People v. Flores, G.R. No. 177355, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 631, 643.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:

I DISSENT as I believe that the prosecution has not proven beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Benjamin Soria is guilty of rape
through sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

As my discussions below will show, the appellant should be acquitted of this crime on grounds of reasonable doubt, and should instead
be convicted of the lesser crime and included crime of acts of lasciviousness -the crime that, under the available evidence, has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The Antecedents:

The evidence for the prosecution showed that in the afternoon of February 26, 2000, AAA 1 and her siblings ate the spaghetti that their
father (the appellant) brought home for merienda. The records also show that after AAA finished eating, the appellant went on top of her
and removed her clothes.2 AAA felt pain in her breasts and in her stomach; she also felt that "something" had been inserted into her
private part. When AAA told the appellant that she felt pain in her private part, the latter apologized to her and then left the room. The
incident was allegedly witnessed by BBB, who told AAA that it was the appellant’s "bird" that had been inserted into her vagina. AAA
reported the incident to her aunt, CCC, who told her that the appellant was a bad person. CCC accompanied AAA to the hospital when
AAA’s vagina started to bleed. AAA also informed her mother what the appellant did to her. Thereafter, AAA was committed to the care
and custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City. In its judgment3 of June 30, 2005, the RTC
found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual intercourse,4 and it imposed the death penalty. It also
ordered him to pay the victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC judgment with the following modifications: (1) the appellant was found guilty of
simple rape only; (2) the death penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (3) the amount of civil indemnity was reduced to
P50,000.00.5

The ponencia affirmed the CA decision with the following modifications: (1) the appellant is found guilty of rape through sexual assault
under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (2) he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
twelve

(12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and (3) on his liability for damages –
(a) the amount of civil indemnity is reduced from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00; (b) the amount of moral damages is reduced from
P50,000.00 to P30,000.00; (c) the amount of exemplary damages is increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00; and (d) the appellant is
ordered to further pay the victim interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of the
judgment until fully paid.

The Dissent:

I clarify at the outset that I agree with the ponencia’s conclusion that the appellant cannot be convicted of rape by sexual intercourse
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the element of carnal knowledge.

My opposition stems from the ponencia’s finding that the appellant should be convicted of rape through sexual assault under Article
266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape through sexual assault is committed "by any person
who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into
another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person." 6

In the present case, there is no admissible evidence to show that the appellant inserted his penis into AAA’s mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object into the victim’s genital or anal orifice. In her testimony, AAA merely "felt" that something had been inserted in
her private part, as a result of which, she felt pain. To be sure, had there been any testimony that it was the appellant’s "bird" that had
been inserted into her vagina, the appellant’s conviction for rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 should have
followed. No such testimony, however, was ever given; AAA merely admitted that her brother BBB told her it was the appellant’s bird
that had been inserted. This testimony, of course, is clearly hearsay; BBB was never presented in court to testify.

On the basis of this evidence, the ponencia holds that while it had not been clearly established that it was the appellant’s penis that had
been inserted into AAA’s vagina, it cannot be denied that the appellant "inserted an object" into the victim’s female organ. The ponencia
based its conclusion on the following circumstances: (a) AAA "experienced pain when the appellant inserted something in her
vagina";7 and (b) Dr. Francisco Supe, Jr. testified that the victim’s hyperemic hymen could have been caused by an object being
"rubbed" on her private part.

I find the ponencia’s reasoning and conclusion seriously flawed.

First, it is a dangerous proposition to equate AAA’s testimony of pain in her private part with rape; it is the insertion of an instrument or
object into the victim’s genital or anal orifice, not pain, that constitutes rape through sexual assault. Thus, the victim’s testimony should,
at the very least, have mentioned that the appellant inserted an object or instrument in her vagina or anal orifice or she should have
testified on circumstances that would lead us to reasonably conclude that the appellant inserted an instrument or object into her genital
or anal orifice. As earlier stated, AAA merely felt pain; it was BBB who told her that it was the appellant’s "bird" that had been inserted
into her vagina. At most, AAA merely "assumed" that something had been inserted into her vagina. This is what the totality of her
testimony implied.
Significantly, the records bear out that the appellant removed only AAA’s clothes, and not her underwear, during the incident. To
directly quote from the records:

FISCAL BEN DELA CRUZ:

Q: So you said you wanted to explain something about your father, what was that?

AAA:

A: What he did, sir.

Q: What is that?

A: I was raped, sir.

Q: What did he do when you said he raped you?

A: He laid on top of me, sir.

Q: Did you have your dress on when he did that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What about your underwear? Did you have your underwear on?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: He did not remove any of your clothes?

A: Only my clothes, sir.8 (emphasis ours)

This circumstance makes the insertion of an object or instrument into the victim’s genital highly improbable. Considering that AAA also
testified that she felt pain in her breasts and stomach when the appellant went on top of her, it is not far-fetched that the pain she felt in
her private part could have been caused by the appellant’s weight being pressed against her whole body, and it was not due to the
insertion of an object into her vagina.

Second, Dr. Supe’s Medico-Legal Report and court testimony did not support the ponencia’s conclusion that the appellant inserted an
object or even his penis into AAA’s vagina. Dr. Supe testified that he conducted a medical examination on AAA on March 3, 2000, and
made the following findings:

GENERAL AND EXTRA-GENITAL: Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child. Breasts are undeveloped. Abdomen is
flat and soft.

GENITAL: There is absent growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex, and coaptated with light brown labia minora presenting in
between. On separating the same, disclosed an elastic, fleshy type, hyperemic and intact hymen. Posterior fourchette is sharp.

CONCLUSION: The subject is in virgin state physically. There are no external signs of application of any form of physical
trauma.9 (emphasis ours)

According to Dr. Supe, a hyperemic hymen is the result of the application of friction, such as scratching, on the hymen. Dr. Supe further
stated that the insertion of an object could result to a hyperemic hymen if this object was "rubbed." For clarity and precision, I quote the
relevant portions of Dr. Supe’s testimony:

ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR BEN DELA CRUZ:

Q: Doctor, with respect to Exhibit A, the Medico-Legal Report pertaining to the entry on the genital, which reads: On separating the
hymen, disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type, hyperemic and intact hymen. Will you please tell us, Doctor, what is this hyperemic hymen?

DR. FRANCISCO SUPE, JR.:

A: Hyperemic hymen, sir, means that at the time of the examination, I found out that it was reddish in color.

Q: Considering that the age of the child or the patient, the victim whom you examined at that time which was about 6 years old, will you
be able to tell us, Doctor, what could have caused this type of injury, because this is an injury to the hymen?

A: Hyperemic, sir, is observed whenever there is friction applied to an area, such as in the form of scratching.

Q: What about insertion of an object, would this result into hyperemic hymen?

A: If the object is being rubbed, sir, there is a possibility.

Q: A finger would produce that kind of injury?


A: Possible, sir.

xxxx

ATTY. JOSEPH SIA:

Q: The friction that caused the hyperemic hymen would be caused by other activities of the child, like for example playing or bicycle
riding?

DR. SUPE, JR:

A: If there is a friction, it is possible.10 (emphases ours)

Clearly, there was no categorical declaration by Dr. Supe that an instrument or object had been inserted into the victim’s private part.
Notably, Dr. Supe also declared that the victim’s other activities, like playing of riding a bicycle, could lead to a hyperemic hymen if
friction had been applied on the area. The prosecution thus failed to establish the medical basis for a finding of rape through sexual
assault.

Finally, I point out that Dr. Supe found AAA to be in a "virgin state physically"; 11 he also found her hymen to be intact. I am not
unmindful of the oft-repeated doctrine that an intact hymen does not necessarily preclude a finding that the victim had been raped.
However, when the prosecution’s evidence fails to establish with moral certainty all the elements necessary to consummate the crime
of rape, a finding by the medico-legal officer that the victim is in a "virgin state," and that her hymen is intact, suffices to cast doubt on
the appellant’s culpability.

In rape cases, the prosecution bears the primary duty to present its evidence with clarity and persuasion, to the end that conviction
becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. "The freedom of the accused is forfeited only if the requisite quantum of proof
necessary for conviction be in existence. This, of course, requires the most careful scrutiny of the evidence for the State, both oral and
documentary, independent of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Every circumstance favoring the accused's innocence must
be duly taken into account. The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged."12

Lewd or Lascivious Conduct Proven

Notwithstanding the prosecution's failure to prove the appellant's guilt for rape, I take the view that sufficient evidence exists to convict
him of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. A charge of acts of lasciviousness is necessarily included in
a complaint for rape. "The elements of acts of lasciviousness are: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation, (b) when the offended woman is deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age; and (3) that the offended party is
another person of either sex."13

"‘Lewd’ is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, or lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality related to moral impurity, or that which
is carried on a wanton manner."14 In Sombilon, Jr. v. People,15 the Court explained this concept as follows:

The term "lewd" is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene; it is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual
desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be
inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. The presence or
absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances.

The evidence in the present case established that the appellant went on top of AAA, and removed her clothes. The appellant only
stopped when the victim told him that she felt pain in her private part. To my mind, the appellant’s acts of mounting her very own
daughter, and then removing her clothes, showed lewdness that constitutes acts of lasciviousness. These acts are clearly indecent and
inappropriate; it undeniably demonstrates the appellant’s gross moral depravity.

In light of these considerations, I maintain that - on grounds of reasonable doubt - the appellant should be acquitted of the crime of rape
through sexual assault unde1· Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He should instead be convicted of
the lesser and included crime of acts of lasciviousness as the evidence on record shows the presence of all the elements of this crime.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 See our ruling in People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006).

2 There is nothing in the transcript of stenographic notes that supports the ponencia's narration that AAA went in the bedroom
to rest after eating.

3 Penned by Judge Romeo F. Zamora; CA rollo, pp. 39-44.

4 Qualified by relationship and minority.


5Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, and concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevara Salonga and
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.; rollo, pp. 2-15.

6 Underscoring ours.

7
Ponencia, p. 11.

8 TSN, February 10, 2003, pp. 3-4.

9 Ponencia, p. 3.

10 TSN, July 30, 2002, pp. 5-6.

11 Records, p. 4.

12
See People v. Fabito, G.R. No. 179933, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 591, 614.

People v. Poras, G.R. No. 177747, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 624, 645, citing People v. Mingming, G.R. No. 174195,
13

December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 509, 534-535.

14 Ibid., citing People v. Lizada, 444 Phil. 67 (2003).

15 G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009, 601 SCRA 405, 414.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 177218 October 3, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,


vs.
NOEL T. SALES, Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may not employ sadistic beatings and inflict fatal injuries
under the guise of disciplining them.

This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that
affirmed the August 3, 2005 Joint Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal
Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789, convicting appellant Noel T. Sales (appellant) of the crimes of parricide and slight physical
injuries, respectively. The Information3 for parricide contained the following allegations:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 o’clock in the evening at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with evident premeditation
and [in] a fit of anger, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit [several] times, the different parts of the body of his
legitimate eldest son, Noemar Sales, a 9-year old minor, with a [piece of] wood, measuring more or less one meter in length and one
[and] a half inches in diameter, [thereby] inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death of the said victim, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.4

On the other hand, the Information5 in Criminal Case No. RTC’03-789 alleges that appellant inflicted slight physical injuries in the
following manner:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 o’clock in the evening, at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [accused] assault[ed] and hit with a
piece of wood, one Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his second legitimate son, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which
have required medical attendance for a period of five (5) days to the damage and prejudice of the victim’s heirs in such amount as may
be proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.6

When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant pleaded not guilty for the charges of parricide 7 and slight physical
injuries8 respectively. The cases were then consolidated upon manifestation of the prosecution which was not objected to by the
defense.9 During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to stipulate that appellant is the father of the victims, Noemar Sales
(Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr. (Junior); that at the time of the incident, appellant’s family was living in the conjugal home located in
Barangay San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur; and, that appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police. 10
Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial
procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother,
Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s
rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home at
around 8 o’clock in the evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick
which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemar’s and Junior’s hands and feet tied to a coconut
tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood. During the beating Maria stayed inside the house and did not do
anything as she feared for her life.

When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house with appellant assisting Noemar as the latter was staggering,
while Junior fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack in Noemar’s head and injuries in his legs. She also saw injuries in the right portion
of the head, the left cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried to revive him
and when Noemar remained motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant that their son was already dead. However, appellant
refused to believe her. Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told them that they have to
bring Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take
them to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is
already dead, appellant brought his son back to their house.

Noemar’s wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the following day. His body was never examined by a doctor.

The Version of the Defense

Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their residence on three separate occasions without the permission of their
parents. Each time, appellant merely scolded them and told them not to repeat the misdeed since something untoward might happen to
them. During those times, Noemar and Junior were never physically harmed by their father.

However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their parents’ permission on September 16, 2002 and failed to return for
several days. Worse, appellant received information that his sons stole a pedicab. As they are broke, appellant had to borrow money so
that his wife could search for Noemar and Junior. When his sons finally arrived home at 8 o’clock in the evening of September 20,
2002, appellant scolded and hit them with a piece of wood as thick as his index finger. He hit Noemar and Junior simultaneously since
they were side by side. After whipping his sons in their buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was chilling and frothing. When
Noemar lost consciousness, appellant decided to bring him to a hospital in Naga City by waiting for a vehicle at the crossroad which
was seven kilometers away from their house.

Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his difficulty in breathing. The pupils of Noemar’s eyes were
also moving up and down. Appellant heard him say that he wanted to sleep and saw him pointing to his chest in pain. However, they
waited in vain since a vehicle never came. It was then that Noemar died. Appellant thus decided to just bring Noemar back to their
house.

Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child. He claimed that Noemar died as a result of
difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained of the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to
a hospital more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart.

On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and
passes out. But he would regain consciousness after 15 minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when
scolded.

The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay captain. 11 Thereafter, appellant surrendered voluntarily.12

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In a Joint Decision,13 the trial court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove that appellant was guilty
of committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries in the manner described in the Informations. In the crime of parricide,
the trial court did not consider the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against appellant since there is no proof that he
planned to kill Noemar. But the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong. The dispositive portion of said Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of Noel Sales, beyond reasonable doubt, he is found
guilty of parricide in Crim. Case No. RTC’03-782 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to
pay the heirs of Noemar Sales, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; ₱25,000,00 as exemplary
damages and to pay the costs.

Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries in Crim. Case No.
RTC’03-789 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty (20) days of Arresto Menor in its medium period.

Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided under the Revised Penal Code. Considering that herein
accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the time he has undergone
preventive imprisonment in accordance with and subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.14

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal15 which was given due course in an Order16 dated September 21, 2005.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The dispositive portion of its Decision17 reads
as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision dated August 3, 2005 in Criminal Case Nos.
RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789 for Parricide and Slight Physical Injuries, respectively, is AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant may appeal this case to the Supreme Court
via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.

SO ORDERED.18

Issues

Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-fold issues:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIMES CHARGED.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE WITNESSES. 19

Our Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

The Charge of Parricide

Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a disciplinary measure, but denies battering Noemar to death. He
believes that no father could kill his own son. According to him, Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting of loss of
consciousness and froth in his mouth. He claims that Noemar was conscious as they traveled to the junction where they would take a
vehicle in going to a hospital. However, Noemar had difficulty in breathing and complained of chest pain. He contends that it was at this
moment that Noemar died, not during his whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria, who testified that
Noemar indeed suffered seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.

The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of parental discipline on children of tender years must always be with the
view of correcting their erroneous behavior. A parent or guardian must exercise restraint and caution in administering the proper
punishment. They must not exceed the parameters of their parental duty to discipline their minor children. It is incumbent upon them to
remain rational and refrain from being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended punishment. A deviation will undoubtedly result in
sadism.

Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they left the family dwelling without permission and that
was already preceded by three other similar incidents. This was further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab thereby
putting him in disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still had to borrow so that his wife could look for the children
and bring them home. From these, it is therefore clear that appellant was motivated not by an honest desire to discipline the children for
their misdeeds but by an evil intent of venting his anger. This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of Noemar in his head,
face and legs. It was only when Noemar’s body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied and lost consciousness that
appellant stopped the beating. Had not Noemar lost consciousness, appellant would most likely not have ceased from his sadistic act.
His subsequent attempt to seek medical attention for Noemar as an act of repentance was nevertheless too late to save the child’s life.
It bears stressing that a decent and responsible parent would never subject a minor child to sadistic punishment in the guise of
discipline.

Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However,
the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

xxxx

In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a
felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the
perpetrator.20 Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony.
As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellant’s criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar,
is thus clear.

Appellant’s claim that it was Noemar’s heart ailment that caused his death deserves no merit. This declaration is self-serving and
uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence. While Dr. Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur issued a death certificate indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same is not sufficient to prove that his
death was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing that Noemar’s cadaver was never examined. Also, even if appellant
presented his wife, Maria, to lend credence to his contention, the latter’s testimony did not help as same was even in conflict with his
testimony. Appellant testified that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death while Maria declared that Noemar
was suffering from epilepsy. Interestingly, Maria’s testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence.

Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of parricide are present in this case.

All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.

We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that appellant committed the crime of parricide.

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:

Art. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

"Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused."21

In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person was killed. Maria testified that her son
Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor
declared Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him the day
after. Noemar’s Death Certificate22 was also presented in evidence.

There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the deceased. Same is sufficiently
established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. Maria testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger
brother, Junior, were whipped by appellant, their father, inside their house. The whipping continued even outside the house but this
time, the brothers were tied side by side to a coconut tree while appellant delivered the lashes indiscriminately. For his part, Junior
testified that Noemar, while tied to a tree, was beaten by their father in the head. Because the savagery of the attack was too much for
Noemar’s frail body to endure, he lost consciousness and died from his injuries immediately after the incident.

As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child. While Noemar’s birth certificate was not presented,
oral evidence of filial relationship may be considered. 23 As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the fact that he is the father of Noemar
during the pre-trial conference and likewise made the same declaration while under oath. 24 Maria also testified that Noemar and Junior
are her sons with appellant, her husband. These testimonies are sufficient to establish the relationship between appellant and Noemar.

Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.

There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of Intention to Commit so Grave a Wrong

The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of appellant since the evidence shows
that he went to the police station a day after the barangay captain reported the death of Noemar. The presentation by appellant of
himself to the police officer on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his intent "to save the authorities the trouble and
expense that may be incurred for his search and capture" 25 which is the essence of voluntary surrender.

However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. Appellant adopted
means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while
they were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that immediately
caused his death. "The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be
appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the
victim."26

The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide

We find proper the trial court’s award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages. However, the award of exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 should be increased to ₱30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.27 "In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest
at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid."28

As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua when it considered the presence of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave
a wrong. However, even if we earlier ruled that the trial court erred in considering the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong, we maintain the penalty imposed. This is because the exclusion of said mitigating circumstance does not result to a
different penalty since the presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no aggravating
circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
provides in part as follows:

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof:

xxxx

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.
xxxx

The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, which
is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty
of death on appellant was thus proper.29

The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries

The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they
were tied to a coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a physician
thereafter.30 Maria corroborated her son’s testimony.31

Junior’s testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino Primavera, Jr. (Dr. Primavera) of Tinambac Community Hospital who
examined him for physical injuries. He issued a Medical Certificate for his findings and testified on the same. His findings were (1)
muscular contusions with hematoma on the right side of Junior’s face just below the eye and on both legs, which could have been
caused by hitting said area with a hard object such as a wooden stick and, (2) abrasions of brownish color circling both wrist with crust
formation which could have been sustained by the patient due to struggling while his hands were tied. When asked how long does he
think the injuries would heal, Dr. Primavera answered one to two weeks. 32 But if applied with medication, the injuries would heal in a
week.33

We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony of Junior that he was beaten by his father and that by reason
thereof he sustained injuries. His testimony deserves credence especially since the same is corroborated by the testimony of his
mother, Maria, and supported by medical examination. We thus find that the RTC correctly held appellant guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuries.
1awphil

Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries

We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera testified that the injuries sustained by Junior should heal in one
week upon medication. Hence, the trial court correctly meted upon appellant the penalty under paragraph 1, Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides:

ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to
nine days or shall require medical attendance during the same period.

xxxx

There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be in its medium
period. The RTC was thus correct in imposing upon appellant the penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor in its medium period.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the Joint
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789,
convicting Noel T. Sales of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the award of
exemplary damages is increased to ₱30,000.00. In addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all monetary awards from date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes

1CA rollo, pp. 101-110, penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by Presiding Justice Ruben T.
Reyes and Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso.

2
Id. at 15-32; penned by Judge Freddie D. Balonzo.

3 Records (Criminal Case No. RTC’03-782), p. 1.

4 Id.

5 Records (Criminal Case No. RTC’03-789), p. 1.

6 Id.

7
See Order dated April 11, 200, records (Criminal Case No. RTC’03-782), p. 15.

8 See Order dated July 1, 2003, records (Criminal Case No. RTC’03-789), p. 24.

9
See p. 2 of the RTC’s Joint Decision, supra note 3.

10 See Pre-Trial Order, records (Criminal Case No. RTC’03-782), p. 22.

11 See Certification of the Tinambac Municipal Police Station dated July 26, 2003, id. at 25.

12
See Certification of the Tinambac Municipal Police Station dated June 26, 2003, id. at 26.

13 Supra note 2.

14 CA rollo, p. 32.

15 Id. at 33.

16 Id. at 34.

17 Supra note 1.

18 CA rollo, pp. 109-110.

19 Id. at 42.

20 Reyes, L. B. The Revised Penal Code, Volume I, 2008, p. 68.

21 People v. Castro, G.R. No. 172370, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 586, 606.

22 Records (Criminal Case RTC’03-782), p. 35.

23 People v. Malabago, 333 Phil. 20, 27 (1996).

24
TSN, September 22, 2004, p. 2.

25 People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 174479, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 616, 637.

26 Oriente v. People, G.R. No. 155094, January 30, 2007, 513 SCRA 348, 365.

27 People v. Latosa, G.R. No. 186128, June 23, 2010.

28 People v. Campos, G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011.

29 People v. Juan, 464 Phil. 507, 513-515 (2004).

30 TSN, November 11, 2003, pp. 6-8.

31 TSN, September 3, 2003, pp. 3-5.

32 TSN, August 26, 2003, pp. 3-9.

33 Id. at 13.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation


FIRST DIVISION

January 23, 2017

G.R. No. 218466

MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA and SERVILLANO NACIONAL, Petitioners,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 221425

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA a.k.a "JOHN," "KONYONG" SALONGA and SERVILLANO NACIONAL @ "INONG" @
DIONISIO NACIONAL, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in these consolidated cases is the Decision dated April 28, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05095,
1 2

which affirmed the Decision dated December 8, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan, Branch 70 (RTC) in Criminal
3

Case No. B-243, convicting accused-appellants Manny Ramos (Ramos), Roberto Salonga (Salonga), and Servillano Nacional
(Nacional; collectively, accused-appellants) of the crime of Murder Aggravated with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Republic Act No. (RA) 8294. 4

The Facts

The instant cases stemmed from an Information filed before the RTC, charging accused-appellants of the aforementioned crime, the
accusatory portion of which states:

That on or about January 20, 2002, in the evening, at Brgy. Cabanaetan, Municipality of Mabini, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength and at night time, armed
with an unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot ROLANDO NECESITO y F ABRIGAS which
caused his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. 5

The prosecution alleged that between 9:00 to 10:00 o'clock in the evening of January 20, 2002, eyewitness Reynaldo Necesito
(Reynaldo) was walking towards the store of Leonida Fabrigas when he chanced upon accused-appellants having an altercation with
the victim, Rolando Necesito (Rolando). From his vantage point, Reynaldo heard Ramos yell, "Okinam patayan ka!" (Son of a bitch! I
will kill you!) and saw accused-appellants chase and eventually surround Rolando at an area around seven (7) meters away from where
Reynaldo was hiding. Reynaldo then heard four (4) successive gunshots, making him hide under the trunk of the duhat tree for fear of
being hit. It was on the sound of the fourth shot when Reynaldo witnessed Rolando fall face down on the ground. To ensure Rolando's
demise, Ramos approached Rolando and shot him again. Thereafter, accused-appellants fled the scene. 6

The next day, Rolando's body was found near the duhat tree, prompting police officers to conduct an investigation from which were
gathered the following evidence and information: (a) a piece of bamboo was recovered three (3) meters away from Rolando's
corpse; (b) Rolando purportedly had a previous misunderstanding with Ramos sometime in 1997, yet the same was settled before the
barangay; and (c) Rolando allegedly had a drinking spree with his friends at the time of the incident. An autopsy was likewise
conducted on Rolando's body, revealing that there were four (4) incised wounds on his left hand, a stab wound on his left chest, and
five (5) gunshot wounds on his body; that based on the nature and sizes of his wounds, it was possible that the firearm used was of the
same caliber; and that his injuries could not have been inflicted by a single person.7

For their respective parts, accused-appellants similarly invoked the defenses of denial and alibi. Essentially, they insisted that they
1âwphi1

were somewhere else when the incident occurred. In addition, Ramos maintained that the declarations of Reynaldo against him were
motivated by a personal grudge, while Nacional claimed that the corpus delicti was not proven with exact certainty since the cadaver
that was exhumed and examined was already in an advanced stage of decomposition, having been interred for more than a month. 8

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision dated December 8, 2010, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and
9

accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole, and ordered to pay jointly and severally
Rolando's heirs the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages. 10

In so ruling, the R TC gave credence to the direct, straightforward, and categorical eyewitness testimony of Reynaldo positively
identifying each of the accused-appellants as co-perpetrators of the crime, further noting that Reynaldo had no ill-motive to falsely
testify against them. On the other hand, it found the defense testimonies to be untenable, as they were riddled with various
inconsistencies and contradictions. Further, the RTC found the presence of the circumstance of abuse of superior strength which
qualified the killing to Murder, considering that the accused-appellants took advantage of their combined strength and their several
weapons to overcome their unarmed victim and assure the success of their felonious design. In view of the foregoing, the RTC
concluded that accused-appellants "are equally guilty of the crime of Murder aggravated with the use of unlincensed firearm, there
having been proven the existence of implied conspiracy between them." 11

Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed to the CA. 12

The CA Ruling

In a Decision dated April 28, 2015, the CA affirmed accused-appellants' conviction for the crime of Murder with the Use of an
13

Unlicensed Firearm with modification, increasing the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages to ₱75,000.00 each and imposing
legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from finality of the judgment until fully paid. It held that Reynaldo
14

was able to positively identify accused-appellants as Rolando's killers, given that he was only seven (7) meters away from the situs
criminis. The CA likewise held that the accused-appellants took advantage of their combined superior strength as they even used
several weapons to render the unarmed victim completely defenseless. 15

Hence, the instant consolidated cases.

Dissatisfied, Nacional filed a Notice of Appeal, (G.R. No.221425) while Ramos and Salonga filed a petition for review
16

on certiorari before the Court (G.R. No. 218466).

The IssuesBefore the Court

The issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld accused-appellants' conviction for the crime of
Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.

The Court's Ruling

Preliminarily, the Court notes that Nacional elevated the matter before the Court thru a Notice of Appeal (G.R. No. 221425) filed before
17

the CA; on the other hand, Ramos and Salonga filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Court (G.R. No. 218466). As a
18

general rule, appeals of criminal cases shall be brought to the Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court; except when the CA imposed the penalty of "reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty," in which case,
19

the appeal shall be made by a mere notice of appeal filed before the CA. In this case, Ramos and Salonga clearly availed of a wrong
20

mode of appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari before the Court, despite having been sentenced by the CA of reclusion
perpetua. Nonetheless, in the interest of substantial justice, the Court will treat their petition as an ordinary appeal in order to resolve
the substantive issue at hand with finality.

At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds
other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law.21

As will be explained hereunder, the accused-appellants should only be held liable for simple Murder, and not Murder with the Use of an
Unlicensed Firearm.

To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established: (a) that a person was killed; (b) the
accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code; and (d) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
22

In the instant case, the prosecution, through the testimony of eyewitness Reynaldo, had established beyond reasonable doubt that: the
accused-appellants chased, ganged up, and eventually, killed Rolando, and likewise, it was shown that they deliberately used
weapons (i.e., gun and bamboo stick), which rendered Rolando defenseless from their fatal attacks. Thus, such killing was attended
with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which perforce warrants accused-appellants' conviction for Murder.
23

The foregoing notwithstanding, the courts a quo erred in convicting accused-appellants of Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed
Firearm.

Under Section 1 of RA 8294, "[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance." There are two (2) requisites to establish such circumstance,
namely: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the
corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the
Information lies with the prosecution.
24

In this case, while it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five (5) gunshot wounds which led to his demise, it is unclear from the
records: (a) whether or not the police officers were able to recover the firearm used as a murder weapon;
and (b) assuming arguendo that such firearm was recovered, whether or not such firearm was licensed. The Court notes that the
disquisitions of the courts a quo were silent regarding this matter. As the Information alleged that accused-appellants used an
unlicensed firearm in killing Rolando, the prosecution was duty-bound to prove this allegation. Having failed in this respect, the Court
25

cannot simply appreciate the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.

In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby modifies accused-appellants' conviction to simple Murder.

Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659, Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. There being no
26

aggravating or mitigating circumstance present (except for abuse of superior strength which was used to qualify the killing to Murder),
accused-appellants must be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Further, to conform with existing jurisprudence, accused-
appellants must be ordered to jointly and severally pay Rolando's heirs the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱75,000.00
as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with six percent (6%) legal interest per
annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.27
WHEREFORE, the consolidated appeals are DENIED. The Decision dated April 28, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 05095 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows: accused-appellants Manny Ramos, Roberto Salonga, and
Servillano Nacional are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to jointly and
severally pay Rolando Necesito's heirs the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00
as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages with six percent (6%) legal interest per annum on all the monetary awards
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
See Petition for Review on Certiorari dated June 22, 2015, rollo (G.R. No. 218466), pp. 18-41; Notice of Appeal dated May
15, 2015, rollo (G.R. No. 221425), pp. 16-19.

2
Rollo (G.R. No. 221425), pp. 2-15. Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. with Associate Justices Jose C.
Reyes, Jr. and Francisco P. Acosta concurring.

3
CA rollo (G.R. No. 221425), pp. 23-42. Penned by Executive Judge Ma. Ellen M. Aguilar.

4
Entitled "AN ACT AMENDING THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1866, AS AMENDED, ENTITLED
'CODIFYING THE LAWS OF ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION, OR
DISPOSITION OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF
FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS
THEREOF, AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES,"' approved on June 6, 1997. Note that the crime was committed prior to the
enactment of RA 10591, otherwise known as the "COMPREHENSIVE FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION REGULATION ACT,"
approved on May 29, 2013.

5
See CA rollo (G.R. No. 221425), p. 23.

6
Rollo (G.R. No. 221425), p. 3.

7
Id. at 3-5.

8
Id. at 6-9.

9
CA rollo (G.R. No. 221425), pp. 23-42.

10
Id. at 41.

11
Id. at 35-41.

12
See Notices of Appeal dated January 31, 2011 and January 20, 2011, CA rollo (G. R. No. 221425), pp. 44 and 46.

13
Rollo (G.R. No. 221425), pp. 2-15.

14
Id. at 14.
15
Id. at 10-14.

16
Id. at 16.

17
Id. at 16.

18
Rollo (G.R. No. 218466), pp. 18-41.

19
Section 3 (e), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure reads:

Section 3. How appeal taken. -

xxxx

(e) Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

20
Section 13 (c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure reads:

Section 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court. -

xxxx

(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and
enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the
Court of Appeals.

21
See People v. Bagamano, G.R. No. 222658, August 17, 2016, citing People v. Comboy, G.R. No. 218399, March 2, 2016.

22
See People v. Las Piñas, G.R. No. 191723, July 23, 2014, 730 SCRA 571, 595, citing People v. Gabrino, 660 Phil. 485, 495
(2011).

23
"Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime." "The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does
not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength
of the aggressors and the victim." The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that
they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. "To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked." The appreciation of this
aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. (Fantastico v. Malicse, Sr., G.R. No. 190912,
January 12, 2015, 745 SCRA 123, 141-142; citations omitted)

24
People v. Castillo, 382 Phil. 499, 507 (2000), citing People vs. Eubra, 340 Phil. 306 (1997).

25
See id. at 507-508.

26
Entitled "AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT
PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"
(December 13, 1993).

27
See People v. Jugueta, G .R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 180501 December 24, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
ROGER MENDOZA y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00651, modifying the
Decision dated October 27, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 276 in Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No. 00-410. The
RTC adjudged accused-appellant Roger Mendoza guilty of rape.

The Facts
On April 28, 2000, accused-appellant was charged with rape in an Information which reads as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of April 2000, in the city of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, with force, intimidation and grave abuse of confidence, accused being
employed as a driver in the business of the father of [AAA],1 a six (6) year old minor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously insert his finger inside the latter’s vagina against the will and consent of the said complainant.

Contrary to law.2

When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.

During trial, the prosecution presented AAA and both her parents as witnesses. Accused-appellant appeared as the lone witness for the
defense.

The gist of AAA’s account of the incident is as follows: It occurred in the early afternoon of April 25, 2000 after her parents had left for
work. She was then six (6) years old. At home with her on that day was the maid and accused-appellant, who was reapplying as family
driver. As she was playing with the water hose in the garage, her dress got wet forcing her to repair to her room to change. Accused-
appellant followed. Once inside the room, accused-appellant tried to undress her, tightly held her hands, and told her to lie in the bed.
He thereupon pulled her panties down. In reaction, she pulled it up but accused-appellant quickly pulled it down again. It was at this
moment when, according to AAA, accused-appellant touched her vagina with his fingers and kissed her on the left cheek. All the while,
he repeatedly assured her of being her friend and that they were just playing the mother-and-father roles. Shortly after, she ran to her
parents’ room and locked the door. Accused-appellant followed but left after AAA ignored his insistence to continue with the father-
mother game.

Later in the evening, AAA told her parents about her ordeal, after which they reported the matter to barangayofficials and the police.
AAA was then asked to undergo a medical examination. 3

In the course of her direct examination, AAA was presented a sketch of a female body to assist her pinpoint what part of her body
accused-appellant touched. In response, she shaded the area in between the legs of the female figure. 4

AAA’s father testified that accused-appellant first applied as a driver in 1995. He came back to reapply on April 24, 2000, was asked to
drive on that day, and stayed for the night. The following morning, her father left early for work leaving the still sleeping applicant
behind.

The father narrated what his daughter disclosed when he arrived home from work, adding that, when he routinely called the house at
about 3:00 in the afternoon, the answering AAA called accused-appellant "bastos" and explained why so.

AAA’s mother corroborated for the most part her husband’s testimony. She attested that AAA was only six years old when it happened.

Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant admitted to being at AAA’s family home on April 24, 2000 and staying overnight. He
remained in the house the following day waiting for AAA’s father to return so he could collect what he earned for a day’s work. To while
his time away, he went outside to watch and talk to persons doing road repair work. And while outside, he suddenly felt water falling
upon him. As it turned out, AAA was playing in the yard with the water hose aimed at him, which he did not mind. 5 She continued to
play with the hose and ended up flooding the garage. Thereafter, he asked the road workers about the possibility of working with them
only to be told he would need a barangay clearance. He then left, returning a few days later to submit his clearance to the workers’
foreperson and to collect his one-day salary. According to accused-appellant, AAA’s father was so angry at him for not waiting last April
25, 2000 that he pushed accused-appellant and banged his head against the garage wall. After AAA’s mother pacified her irate
husband, barangay officials arrived and brought accused-appellant to the police station. Once there, accused-appellant was charged
with molesting AAA, who, however, did not say anything at the police station; it was her mother who answered all the questions of the
police investigator. He was charged with fingering the sexual organ of AAA. He denied the accusation, asserting that he did not touch
the child, being outside their house on the day in question watching men doing road repair work.6

On October 27, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of rape. The dispositive portion of the RTC’s
decision reads:

Under these declarations and these statutes, the Court is convinced that the crime of Rape has been committed by accused
ROGER MENDOZA Y DELA CRUZ as defined and penalized by the aforesaid laws. He is therefore sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for all of his natural life or to life imprisonment. This sentence will be served at the New Bilibid Prison, pending
appeal should he desire to so appeal. The Jail Warden is therefore directed to commit the said Accused, to the said prison.

It is SO ORDERED.7

Accused-appellant appealed the RTC decision to the CA. Before the appellate court, accused-appellant raised the following errors
allegedly committed by the trial court: (1) in not dismissing the case on account of the violation of his right to speedy trial; (2) in
considering the prosecution’s testimonial evidence which was not formally offered; and (3) in convicting him for rape without the
prosecution presenting proof of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

As preliminarily indicated, the CA modified the RTC’s decision, the modification consisting of downgrading the crime to and finding
accused-appellant guilty of acts of lasciviousness, a crime which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the underlying
Information. The fallo of the CA decision dated June 29, 2007 reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the October 27, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City,
Branch 276 in Criminal Case No. 00-410 finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape and sentencing him to life
imprisonment, is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Roger Mendoza y De La Cruz is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, as defined and penalized under article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation
to Article III, Section 5 (b), of Republic Act No. 7610, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1
day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 15 years, 6 [months] and 20 days of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the
victim the amount of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.8

The CA predicated its modificatory disposition on the interplay of the following premises: The RTC hastily concluded that rape was
committed because there was insertion by accused-appellant’s finger into the private part of AAA.9The records, however, show that
accused-appellant merely stroked the external surface of AAA’s vagina. 10 The medical findings also showed that there was no physical
manifestation of insertion into AAA’s vagina, bolstering the inference that no insertion took place. 11

On July 12, 2007, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal of the CA decision.

On February 18, 2008, the Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. They, however, manifested
willingness to submit the case on the basis of available records, logically suggesting that they are, in the main, reiterating the very same
arguments they raised before the CA.

Thus, the issues tendered in this appeal may be formulated, as follows:

1) whether or not accused-appellant’s right to speedy trial was violated below;

2) whether or not the trial court erred in considering the testimonial evidence of the prosecution not formally offered;

3) whether or not the CA erred in convicting accused-appellant for the crime of acts of lasciviousness on the basis of the
evidence presented.

The Court’s Ruling

Right to Speedy Trial Not Violated

Accused-appellant states that while he has been detained since April 26, 2000, his arraignment came only on March 2, 2001 and the
prosecution started to present its evidence only on May 9, 2001. To compound matters, the prosecution was not deemed to have
terminated its presentation of evidence until April 14, 2004. 12 Accused-appellant thus argues that the delays attending his case should
have been enough for the trial court to have dismissed it.

The Court is not convinced.

The right to speedy trial, as an adjunct to the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases before judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies, requires that court proceedings should be conducted according to fixed rules and must be free from vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays.13 The same right may also be considered violated when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the parties having their case
tried.14 None of these circumstances are, to us, present in the instant case. While perhaps there might have been delays, accused-
appellant does not state in some detail what or who caused the delays, or whether these are of the vexatious or oppressive kind.

What is more, accused-appellant belatedly invoked his right to speedy trial only before the CA. The proceedings cannot now be claimed
to be attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. Accused-appellant cannot plausibly seek the protection of the law to
benefit from the adverse effects of his failure to assert his right at the first instance. 15 As the CA correctly and judiciously observed:

As can be gleaned from the records, accused-appellant never invoked in the RTC that he has been deprived of his right to
speedy trial and speedy disposition of case. As it is, any allegation of violations of rights should first be ventilated with the RTC
concomitant with the prayer to dismiss the case with prejudice. It is a bit too late in the day for herein accused-appellant to
invoke now his right to speedy trial (People vs. Tee, 395 SCRA 443 [2003]). By raising this point belatedly with the [CA],
accused-appellant has thus waived his objection and accordingly forfeits his right to the aforesaid constitutional guarantees. 16 x
xx

Objection to Prosecution’s Defective Offer of Evidence Waived

Accused-appellant next questions the manner in which AAA’s testimonial evidence was offered. He claims that her testimony was only
offered for the purpose of establishing her minority, 17 not to establish the fact of molestation. The trial court, he says, supposedly erred
in considering evidence which did not conform to the purpose specified in the offer, in accordance with Section 34 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.18

Accused-appellant posture is valid to a point. But despite the improper formal offer of AAA’s testimony, the defense failed to make a
timely objection to the presentation of such testimonial evidence. Accused-appellant in fact proceeded with the trial of the case and, as
the CA noted, "even subjected the witness to a rigorous cross-examination."19 The unyielding rule is that evidence not objected to may
be deemed admitted and be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. 20 In point is People v. Sanchez,21 in which the
prosecution called several persons to testify. No formal offer of testimonial evidence was made prior to or after their testimonies. The
trial court, nonetheless, considered the testimonies owing to the adverse party’s failure to object to the presentation of such testimonial
evidence. The Court sustained the trial court, reproducing what it earlier said in People v. Java:

x x x Section 36 [of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court22] requires that an objection in the course of the oral examination of a
witness should be made as soon as the grounds [therefor] shall become reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the
admissibility of evidence was made in the court below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal shall not be considered.23

Accused-appellant’s belated invocation of the strict application of the rules on evidence to suit his purpose is quite misplaced, for
evidence not objected to, AAA’s testimony in this case, becomes the property of the case, and all the parties to the case are considered
amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence. 24
The Prosecution Presented Sufficient Proof of Accused-Appellant’s Guilt

In a bid to escape liability owing to insufficiency of evidence, accused-appellant avers, in context, that the medical findings presented in
court do not support the conclusion made by the trial court that accused-appellant inserted his fingers into AAA’s sexual organ, causing
it to hurt. He likewise insists that the testimonies of AAA’s parents were hearsay. 25

The direct examination of AAA yields the following:

Q And where did he touch you after he pulled down your shorts and panties?

A Here.

Q What do you call that here?

ATTY GARCIA

Witness pointing to the private part. You just say, what do you call that? What do you call that? When you pointed to
this, what do you call that?

xxxx

COURT

What part of your body did he touch? You stand and point.

ATTY GARCIA

You just point. May I request, Your Honor that the witness be made to draw in her own capacity to identify this. You
draw a female. Draw a woman.

COURT

We are going to put that on record. The part of the body that she pointed.

ATTY. GARCIA

Q Where did Roger touch you? Which part is this? Is this your belly or is this your stomach or is this your vagina?

COURT

Where did she [point] to?

ATTY. GARCIA

The vagina.

Q That is put in between your legs, the Judge is asking?

A Yes, Ma’am.

Q Aside from touching your private part, that part between your legs. Where else did Roger touch you?

A No more.

Q And aside from touching you, what else did he do?

COURT:

No answer?

ATTY. GARCIA:

There was an answer, Your Honor.

A He was over the window. He was telling me that we were friends. I did not listen to him and he already went out of our
house. He was already out.

Q Let’s go back to touching first, [AAA]. So after he touched you, what else did he do to you? Did he kiss you [AAA]?

A Yes, Ma’am.
Q Where did he kiss you?

A On the cheek.

Q Which part of your cheek if you recall?

A Left.

Q Did he kiss your private part, [AAA]?

(No answer)

COURT

Aside from your cheek, did he kiss also your neck, your ears, breast, the private part in between your legs?

A No, Your Honor.

COURT

How about your breast, did he kiss your breast? Did he touch your breast, [AAA]? Do you remember[?] You do not
have to be ashamed, we are all women.

A I don’t remember.

ATTY. GARCIA

I would like to manifest at this point, Your Honor please, to reiterate what I mean is really shaking, Your Honor. I just
got the right word now.

COURT

You mean he did not kiss your breast? What about the portion of your body in between your legs. Did he also kiss it?

A No, Ma’am.

Q Where did he put his fingers, [AAA?] You said he used his fingers. Where did he use his fingers, [AAA?] Please answer
and when you said he touched you on your private part, [AAA] did he?

COURT

After he touched you[,] you said he went out of your room. When did he [put] your dry panty [back on,] after he
[touched] you[?] You said he went out of the room. How about your dry panty?

A After he touched me.

COURT

He removed your wet panties and then he put on the dry one. When did that happen[?] After he touched you or
before? Because you said he went out.

ATTY. GARCIA

The answer was before, Your Honor.

COURT

You said that he pulled down your shirt. Then he pulled down your wet panties and then you said that he touched
your part in between your legs and then he put on your dry panties. Was it before he touched your private part or
after you were touched?

A Before.

COURT

So you mean when he touched you in between the legs you already [had] the dry panties or no panties yet?

A No panties yet.26

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of rape which in turn resolves itself into the question
of whether or not he inserted his fingers into AAA’s sexual organ. The issue has been peremptorily answered in the negative by the CA,
basing its resolution on the relevant finding of the examining doctor and on the testimony of AAA, who, at best, was tentative in her
response when queried about the finger-insertion aspect of the incident. Also, the People does not challenge the determination. And
precisely because of the fact of non-insertion that the appellate court was impelled, and rightly so, to downgrade the criminal act to acts
of lasciviousness. The records appear to support the appellate court’s modificatory action. Consider the following answer given by AAA
to the prosecution’s question: "Where did Roger touch you?" AAA pointed to the vagina of a female figure she had drawn.27

The following exchanges subsequently between the trial court and AAA, however, while proving in a convincing way malicious touching,
provoke doubts whether indeed accused-appellant inserted his finger into the child’s vagina.

Q [AAA], when you said he [touched] the things between your legs[,] did he use his fingers?

COURT

Did he use anything in touching you that he used other than his hands. Did he use anything in touching you? Did he
use his fingers, his hands?

A Yes, Your Honor, fingers.

Q Did he insert it inside your private part the thing between your legs, [AAA]?

A No.28

We, thus, sustain the finding of the CA, viz:

Absent any showing of the actual insertion of the finger in the private part of the child, there can be no consummated rape.
Thus, the failure of the prosecution to establish accused-appellant’s guilt for rape notwithstanding, this Court finds him liable
for the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. This latter crime is considered an offense included or subsumed in the rape
charge. Thus in Dulla v. Court of Appeals and People v. Bon, the Supreme Court convicted the accused with the crime of acts
of lasciviousness even though the information charged the crime of rape. 29 (Citations omitted.)

The touching of a female’s sexual organ, standing alone, is not equivalent to rape, not even an attempted one. With regard to penile
rape, People v. Campuhan explains:

x x x Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs,
a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There
must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely
stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. x x x

x x x Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis
to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of
the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female
organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.30 (Citations omitted.)

By analogy, we hold that for a charge for rape by sexual assault (with the use of one’s fingers as the assaulting object, as here) to
prosper, there should be evidence of at least the slightest penetration of the sexual organ and not merely a brush or graze of its
surface. This is in consonance with Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,
which provides:

Art. 266-A. Rape; when and how committed.–Rape is committed–

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the
genital or anal orifice of another person.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Rape through sexual assault, thus, requires that the assault be specifically done through "insertion" into the genital or anal orifices of
the victim, a circumstance absent in this case, or at least not established by the required quantum of evidence.

Accused-appellant’s virtual contention that his guilt for acts of lasciviousness has not been proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt
deserves scant consideration. While the RTC and the CA had disagreed as to what crime was committed, the disagreement stemming
from their differing findings on whether or not accused-appellant inserted his fingers into AAA’s vagina, both the courts were one in
saying that accused-appellant indeed kissed AAA on the face and fondled her most private part, or, in fine, that he committed lascivious
acts on a six-year girl.31 The Court loathes to disturb the ensuing findings of the CA, confirmatory of that of the RTC:
The prosecution’s evidence introduced during the entire trial established the presence of all the elements of the crime of acts
of lasciviousness. The testimony of the victim shows that accused-appellant committed lewd acts against her when he pulled
down her panties, kissed her on her left cheek, touched her private part and then squeezing her arm causing her extreme
pain.32 x x x

As the CA observed, AAA’s telling testimony deserves full faith and credit, given as it were in a categorical manner by a young and an
immature girl who had no motive–and none was ascribed by the defense–to falsely impute the commission of a serious crime against
the accused.33 And if we may add, in cases of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, is sufficient to
establish the guilt of the accused.34 The Court, thus, need not dwell into the probative value of the corroborative testimony on the
molestation incident of AAA’s parents which accused-appellant assails as hearsay.

Finally, we also sustain the award of moral damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 35

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision dated June 29, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00651 finding accused-appellant
Roger Mendoza y Dela Cruz guilty of acts of lasciviousness and imposing upon him the penalty defined therein is AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1The name and personal circumstances of the victim are withheld pursuant to People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693,
September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419.

2
Rollo, p. 3.

3 Id. at 3-4.
4 Id. at 4-7.

5
Id. at 8.

6 Id. at 9.

7 CA rollo, pp. 17-18. Penned by Presiding Judge N.C. Perello.

8Rollo, p. 21. Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and
Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.

9 Id. at 14.

10 Id. at 15.

11
Id. at 17.

12 CA rollo, p. 35. Appellant’s Brief.

13
Acosta v. People, No. L-17427, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 774, 779.

14 Cabarles v. Sanz, G.R. No. 161330, February 20, 2007, 516 SCRA 303, 319-320; citations omitted.

15 Gaas v. Mitmug, G.R. No. 165776, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 335, 343.

16
Rollo, p. 10.

17 CA rollo, p. 36.

Sec. 34. Offer of evidence.–The court shall consider no evidence which has not formally been offered. The purpose for
18

which the evidence is offered must be specified.

19 Rollo, p. 12.

20 Heirs of Marcelino Doronio v. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio, G.R. No. 169454, December 27, 2007, 541 SCRA 479, 494;
citations omitted.

21 G.R. No. 118423, June 16, 1999, 308 SCRA 264.

22Sec. 35 of Rule 132 provides further: When to make offer.–As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at
the time the witness is called to testify.

23 G.R. No. 104611, November 10, 1993, 227 SCRA 668, 679-680.

24 Quebral v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101941, January 25, 1996, 252 SCRA 353, 365.

25
CA rollo, p. 39.

26 TSN, October 1, 2003, pp. 12-18.

27 Id. at 13.

28
Id. at 15.

29 Rollo, p. 18.

30 G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000, 329 SCRA 270, 280-282.

31 Rollo, pp. 9-10.

32 Id. at 19.

33 Navarrete v. People, G.R. No. 147913, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 509, 522-523.

34 Id.; citing People v. Bon, G.R. No. 149199, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 506, 515.

35 People v. Fetalino, G.R. No. 174472, June 19, 2007, 525 SCRA 170, 196.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation


EN BANC

April 5, 2016

G.R. No. 202124

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
IRENEO JUGUETA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252. The
1

CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, finding accused-appellant Ireneo
Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in
Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a caliber.22
firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot with said firearm Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who suffered the following:

"Gunshot wound -

Point of Entry – lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level of the umbilicus, directed upward toward the left
upper abdomen."

and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age, who suffered the following:

"Gunshot wound -

Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter

Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"

which directly caused their instant death.

That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the attack and the accused took
advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.

Contrary to law. 2

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted
Murder, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of
Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery,
with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and
shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of
Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or
accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and
children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils and who are minors, were not hit.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said proceedings, one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his
sworn statement stating that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it
was only appellant who was carrying a firearm while the other two had no participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated
that Roger San Miguel was not present at the crime scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found
no prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel. Thus, upon motion of the prosecution, the case for Attempted
4

Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to appellant. 5

At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes Taguinod who executed the
Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr.
Taguinod noted that the trajectory of the bullet wounds showed that the victims were at a higher location than the shooter, but she could
not tell what kind of ammunitions were used. 6

Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of June 6, 2002, as his entire family lay down
on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut was suddenly stripped off, and only the supporting
bamboo (fences) remained. With the covering of the wall gone, the three (3) men responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto
clearly saw their faces which were illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3 men as
appellant, Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.

The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The men then uttered, "Magdasal ka na at
katapusan mo na ngayon." Norberto pleaded with them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin, matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong
kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a gunshot was fired, and Norberto immediately threw his body over his children
and wife in an attempt to protect them from being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the direction where his
family huddled together in their hut.
7

When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2) young daughters were wounded. His wife
went out of their house to ask for help from neighbors, while he and his older daughter carried the two (2) wounded children out to the
street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the hospital, while Claudine expired at the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to
revive her. 8

In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto replied that he had a previous altercation
with appellant who was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed a case against appellant's two other brothers for molesting his
daughter. 9

On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense. Appellant's testimony, along with those of Gilbert
Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he (appellant) was just watching TV at the house of Isidro
San Miguel, where he had been living for several years, at the time the shooting incident occurred. However, he and the other
witnesses admitted that said house was a mere five-minute walk away from the crime scene. 10

Finding appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto, the trial court ruled that the
evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two other assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the family of Norberto.
Appellant was then convicted of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No.
7702-G.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:

WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Double
Murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for
the death of Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for
the death of Claudine Divina and accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00. In
addition, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs.

SO ORDERED. 11

On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7702-G, reads:

WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Multiple
Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum for each of the offended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann
Divina. Further, accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED. 12

Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming
appellant's conviction for the crimes charged. 13

Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution notifying
14

the parties that they may submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Both parties manifested that they will no longer submit
supplemental briefs since they had exhaustively discussed their positions before the CA. 15

The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, such as his failure to state from
the beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to categorically identify appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill Norberto’s
children.

The appeal is unmeritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative
weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the
Court will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. 16

The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant acted in concert with two
other individuals, all three of them carrying firearms and simultaneously firing at Norberto and his family, killing his two young
daughters. Norberto clearly saw all of the three assailants with their firearms as there is illumination coming from a lamp inside their
house that had been laid bare after its walling was stripped off, to wit:

Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the same time, do you have light in your house?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of light was there?


A: A gas lamp.

Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?

A: In the middle of our house.

xxxx

Q: when did they fire a shot?

A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.

Q: How many gunshots did you hear?

A: Only one.

Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm?

A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)

xxxx

Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot?

A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters were hit.

xxxx

Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?

A: All of them.

Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were

having one firearm each?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And they fired shots at the same time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that night?

A: To the place where we were.

Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was your position then?

A: I ordered my children to lie down.

Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie down?

A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and ordering them to line (sic) down face down)

Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house?

A: Less than five minutes, sir.

Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what happened to them?

A: Yes, sir, they were hit.

xxx 17

Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's daughters because, as ruled by the trial
court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of the
crime is not necessary as long as their concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the
act of all.18 Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto together, each with his own
firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly fired from appellant's firearm that killed
the children.

Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide,
attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. The presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in
19

Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing as murder. The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder
20

because treachery attended the killing of Norberto’s two children, thus:

x x x Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side by side about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at
around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped off by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San
Miguel and Gilberto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite his plea for
mercy, they fired at them having hit and killed his two (2) daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children were
at very tender ages. Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years old and 3 ½ years old respectively. In this
case, the victims were defenseless and manifestly overpowered by armed assailants when they were gunned down. There was clear
showing that the attack was made suddenly and unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to defend themselves.
Norberto and his wife and his children could have already been asleep at that time of the night. x x x 21

Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As held in People v. Fallorina, the essence of
22

treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Minor children,
who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery
exists.

As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states that a felony is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
In Esqueda v. People, the Court held:
23

If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the
offender had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender
intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the
commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e)
the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.

In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as shown by the use of firearms, the words
uttered during, as well as the manner of, the commission of the crime. The Court thus quotes with approval the trial court’s finding that
24

appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.:

In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder first by suddenly stripping off the wall of their
house, followed by successive firing at the intended victims when Norberto Divina refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If
only there were good in aiming their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely all the rest of the family would
surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted
Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one
charged in this case, he alone is liable for the crime committed. 25

Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state from the very beginning that all three
assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant’s firearm that killed the children, are too trivial and
inconsequential to put a dent on said witness's credibility. An examination of Norberto's testimony would show that there are no real
inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled in People v. Cabtalan, "[m]inor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do
26

not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime." Both the
27

trial court and the CA found Norberto's candid and straightforward testimony to be worthy of belief and this Court sees no reason why it
should not conform to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People that: 28

Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses,
especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent
facts and circumstances that would justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's
determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude
under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to
appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor x x x. 29

The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or exceptional circumstance to justify a
deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no cogent reason to overturn the trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence,
particularly the testimony of Norberto Divina identifying appellant as one of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus, the prosecution
evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime.

However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify the crimes for which appellant
was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder"
in convicting appellant, and yet imposing penalties which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to penalize appellant for two (2)
separate counts of Murder and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder.

The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show that appellant is guilty of 2
counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was not the result of a single act but of several acts of
appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple
Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply with the
requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one offense.
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. The reason for the rule is
stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al., thus:
30

The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the
charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more
charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or
information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he
enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.

However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of the Informations, he is
deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed
to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in
paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."

It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it
before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for
each offense. 31

Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2
counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during trial.

Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida, the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as defined in Article 4833 of the Revised Penal
32

Code, thus:

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender
they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a
compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as a complex crime
proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet
results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply
rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. 34

Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in firing successive and indiscriminate
shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several
gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill several individuals.
Hence, they are committing not only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime
because as held in People v. Nelmida, "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular
35

moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime." 36

Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as an ordinary, aggravating
circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that
effect, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:

That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the attack and the accused took
advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense. 37

Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:

x x x the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of
undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto
Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution
which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused x x x 38

In People v. Agcanas, the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is aggravating because of the
39

sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty
than he who offends him elsewhere." Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party
provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor. The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of appellant
40

violated the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein, without provocation on the part of the latter.
Hence, the trial court should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.

In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed on appellant. Murder is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death
for each of two (2) counts of murder. However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death
41

penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility
for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for each count is prision mayor. With one
ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4)
counts of attempted murder.

Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards criminal cases where the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal cases, there are three kinds of damages awarded by the
Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages in
some instances.

First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the
prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in
civil law. This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
42

It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when
appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
43

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though
there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid
to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the
deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the
time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an
heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the
person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the
damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil
indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also
ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum
amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for
the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the
present circumstance warrants it. 44

The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of
Appeals expounded on the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:
45

Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in
the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although
incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of
indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant,
and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. x x x.
46 47

Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or
mental anguish resulting from a wrong." They may also be considered and allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for
48

humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of
provocation, the reasonableness of the force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental
distress." 49

The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he award of moral damages is
aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted."
50

Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is
51

discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral
damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity. 52

Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus:

ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty
of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use
of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for
53

the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant – associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness,
malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud – that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or
54

vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from
similar conduct in the future. 55
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or
generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other
upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver
felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in
its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due
the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the
civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 56

The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary
57

or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. It is in order not to trample on the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature of the alleged offense that he or she has committed. A criminal complaint or information should basically contain
the elements of the crime, as well as its qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively determine the
proper penalty it should impose. This, however, is not similar in the recovery of civil liability. In the civil aspect, the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged in the information but proven during trial would entitle the victim to an award of exemplary
damages.

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In
much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main
provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other
58

fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v.
Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in
59

sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. In People v. Cañada, People v. Neverio and People v. Layco, Sr., the Court awarded
60 61 62

exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter
from sexual abuse.

Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at ₱30,000.00, despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance. The
63

Court finds it proper to increase the amount to ₱50,000.00 in order to deter similar conduct.

If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346,
prevailing jurisprudence sets the amount of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
64

Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first consider the penalty imposed by law. Under RA
7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for
Other Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and special penal laws were amended to impose the death penalty under certain
circumstances. Under the same law, the following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general, mutiny on the high
65 66

seas, and simple rape. For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: qualified
67 68

piracy; qualified bribery under certain circumstances; parricide; murder; infanticide, except when committed by the mother of the
69 70 71 72

child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for the same purpose; kidnapping and serious
73

illegal detention under certain circumstances; robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under certain
74

circumstances; destructive arson, except when death results as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under
75

the article; attempted or frustrated rape, when a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder; and carnapping,
76 77

when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof. Finally, RA 7659 imposes the death penalty on the following crimes:
78

(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.

(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii) when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention; (iii) when
the victim is raped, subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.

(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Article 320, death
results.

(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or homicide is committed; (ii) when
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: (1) when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities; (3)
when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old; (5) when the offender knows that he is
afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when committed by any member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or on the
occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.

From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible penalties or single indivisible penalty, all of
them must be taken in relation to Article 63 of the RPC, which provides:

Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall
be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof:
1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
applied.

2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be
applied.

3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the
lesser penalty shall be applied.

4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow
them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in
accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)

Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the court has the duty to ascertain the presence
of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the
court can impose either reclusion perpetua or death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.

But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death
penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law
violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC. 79

As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the principal
consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v. Salome and People v. Quiachon, is "the penalty provided by
80 81

law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender." 82

When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death penalty were it not for RA 9346, the Court has
ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor, that the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable by death
83

should be ₱75,000.00 We reasoned that "[t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the
financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity." Such reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was later increased to ₱100,000.00.
84 85

In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa, ₱50,000.00 was awarded as moral damages
86

without need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that the victim's injury is concomitant with and necessarily
results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages. Subsequently, the amount was increased to
87

₱75,000.00 in People v. Soriano and P100,000.00 in People v. Gambao.


88 89

Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the imposable penalty as provided by the
law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty
imposed. 1avv phi 1

Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary aggravating circumstance but due to
the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence pegs the amount
90

of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱100,0000.00 as moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the
ordinary aggravating circumstances present, the amount of ₱100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity
and moral damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be fixed at
₱100,000.00. "[T]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time,
but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes x x x." 91

When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating
circumstance, the Court rules that the proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and
₱75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present.

When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the offender caused several crimes, the fact that
those were the result of a single design, the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages will depend on the penalty and the number of
victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should be properly compensated. If it is multiple murder without any ordinary aggravating
circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC
wherein the maximum penalty shall be imposed, then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with ₱100,000.00 as
92

civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC, the following doctrines are
noteworthy:

In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog, this Court ruled that special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its
93

own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case
of People v. Barros, explained that composite crimes are "neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex
94

crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave
felonies [compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex crime proper].
However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is
imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses." 95

In People v. De Leon, we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:
96

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion
or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before,
during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with
homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homic ide,
must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or
that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed
by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony
would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is
robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and
infanticide.
97

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder
and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery,
98

abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the
same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery
with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we
ruled in People v. Macabales: 99

Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstance of treachery is present. They aver
that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in this case
correctly characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by
appellants in defending himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant
Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance.

Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. There is no special
complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances proven
concerning the actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder but, as generic
aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be imposed. 100

Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it cannot be imposed due to RA 9346 and what is
actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral damages will be ₱100,000.00 each, and another
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the heinousness of the crime and to set an example. If there is another composite crime
included in a special complex crime and the penalty imposed is death, an additional ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 moral
damages and ₱100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite crime committed.

For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide wherein three (3) people died as a consequence of the crime, the heirs of the victims
101

shall be entitled to the award of damages as discussed earlier. This is true, however, only if those who were killed were the victims of
the robbery or mere bystanders and not when those who died were the perpetrators or robbers themselves because the crime of
robbery with homicide may still be committed even if one of the robbers dies. This is also applicable in robbery with rape where there
102

is more than one victim of rape.

In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in which the crime was committed and
proven during the trial. Article 6 of the RPC provides:

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted,
are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when
an offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be ₱100,000.00 and another
₱100,000.00 for exemplary damages or when the circumstances of the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the civil
indemnity and moral damages should be ₱75,000.00 each, as well as exemplary damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00. If, however,
the crime proven is in its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be ₱50,000.00, and
an award of ₱25,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱25,000.00 moral damages when the crime proven is in its attempted stage. The difference
in the amounts awarded for the stages is mainly due to the disparity in the outcome of the crime committed, in the same way that the
imposable penalty varies for each stage of the crime. The said amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of
felonies in their frustrated or attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes committed constitute complex crime under Article 48
of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with attempted murder, the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages is ₱100,000.00 each, while in the attempted murder, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is
₱25,000.00 each.

In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several victims (except the robbers) sustained injuries,
they shall likewise be indemnified. It must be remembered that in a special complex crime, unlike in a complex crime, the component
crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages because the intention of the offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is to rob
but in the process of committing the said crime, another crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with homicide,
other victims sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still robbery with homicide as the injuries become part
of the crime, "Homicide", in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and now forms part
of the essential element of robbery, which is the use of violence or the use of force upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity of
103

the injuries sustained by the victims must still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil indemnity and damages. If a victim
suffered mortal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the victim should be awarded civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages equivalent to the damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that are
not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages
awarded in an attempted stage.

In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, like homicide, death under
tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be ₱50,000.00
and ₱50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary damages being awarded. However, an award of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages in
a crime of homicide shall be added if there is an aggravating circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the
information.

Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases. The award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under
104

Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered
pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as
105

temperate damages to ₱50,000.00.

In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were further made atrocious by the fact that the
victims are innocent, defenseless minors – one is a mere 3½-year-old toddler, and the other a 13-year-old girl. The increase in the
amount of awards for damages is befitting to show not only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over such crimes and wastage of
lives.

In summary:

I. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation, Infanticide, and other crimes involving death
106 107 108 109 110

of a victim where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00


ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00


111

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted: 112

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or sexual abuse results, the civil
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty, extent of violence and sexual abuse; and the
number of victims where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed. In other complex crimes where
death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages
depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty imposed, as the case may be.

IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide, Robbery with Rape, Robbery with Intentional
113 114

Mutilation, Robbery with


115

Arson, Rape with Homicide, Kidnapping with Murder, Carnapping with Homicide or Carnapping with Rape, Highway
116 117 118 119 120

Robbery with Homicide, Qualified Piracy, Arson with Homicide, Hazing with Death, Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation and
121 122 123 124

other crimes with death, injuries, and sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the penalty consists of indivisible
penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the penalty imposed is
Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua although death did not occur.

1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the
125

following shall be awarded:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua.

2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the
following shall be awarded:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

In Robbery with Physical Injuries, the amount of damages shall likewise be dependent on the nature/severity of the
126

wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.

The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s or perpetrator/s are themselves
killed or injured in the incident.
1âwphi 1

Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that for every additional rape
committed, whether against the same victim or other victims, the victims shall be entitled to the same damages
unless the other crimes of rape are treated as separate crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple
rape/qualified rape shall apply.

V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under
Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender, Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel,
127

Intentional Abortion and Unintentional Abortion, etc.:

1.1 Where the crime was consummated:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00


b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where there are no stages, i.e.,
Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00

If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the Information, in
128

addition to the above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00
exemplary damages for consummated; ₱30,000.00 for frustrated; and ₱20,000.00 for attempted, shall be
awarded.

VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death occurs in the course of the
rebellion, the heirs of those who died are entitled to the following:
129

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00 130

B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion and could have died if not for a
timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in court, the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded.

To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity is P3,000.00, but does not
provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be
validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it. 131

Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling,
appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the following damages: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of the two
children who died; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages for each of the two victims; (3) another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages for
each of the two victims; and (4) temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For the four (4) counts
of Attempted Murder, appellant should pay ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each of the four victims. In addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages
payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully
paid.
132

Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges against Gilberto Estores and Roger San
Miguel who had been identified by Norberto Divina as the companions of appellant on the night the shooting occurred. Norberto had
been very straightforward and unwavering in his identification of Estores and San Miguel as the two other people who fired the
gunshots at his family. More significantly, as noted by the prosecutor, the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who insisted they
were not at the crime scene, tended to conflict with the sworn statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was the basis for the Provincial
Prosecutor's ruling that he finds no probable cause against the two. Danilo Fajarillo's sworn statement said that on June 6, 2002, he
saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm and
the two other people with him had no participation in the shooting incident. Said circumstances bolster the credibility of Norberto
Divina's testimony that Estores and San Miguel may have been involved in the killing of his two young daughters.
After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy because the same only attaches if the
following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached before the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated;
and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b)
before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted
or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In this case, the case against Estores and
133

San Miguel was dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus, there can be no double jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served by
reinvestigating the real participation, if any, of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine Divina.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
03252 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) counts of the crime of murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, and hereby sentences him to suffer two (2) terms of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole
under R.A. 9346. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina the following amounts for each
of the two victims: (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (d) ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four
(4) counts of the crime of attempted murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised
Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder. He is ORDERED to PAY moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of PS0,000.00 to each of the four victims,
namely, Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina.

(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and
temperate damages.

(4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice, be FURNISHED a copy of this Decision. The
Prosecutor General is DIRECTED to immediately conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the possible criminal liability of Gilbert
Estores and Roger San Miguel regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice
for his information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION


Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

On leave
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE *

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

No part
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA **

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
On leave .

**
No part.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora T. Lantion, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Rodil V. Zalameda,
concurring; rollo. pp. 2-21.

2
Record, Vol. 1, pp. 2-3.

3
Record, Vol. II., p. 2.

4
Order of the Provincial Prosecutor, Record, Vol. I, pp. 12-14.

5
RTC Order, Record, Vol. II, pp. 66-67.

6
TSN, February 5, 2004, Folder of TSN's.

7
TSN, March 3, 2004, Folder of TSN's.

8
Id.

9
TSN, June 28, 2004, Folder of TSN's.

10
TSN's, February 10, 2005, April 7, 2005, February 15, 2006, August 3, 2006, September 6, 2006 and June 7, 2006.

11
Record, Vol, I, pp. 293-294.

12
Record, Vol. II, p. 131.

13
Supra note 1.

14
Rollo, p. 27.

15
Rollo, pp. 33-34.

16
People of the Philippines v. Renandang Mamaruncas, 680 Phil. 192, 211 (2012).

17
TSN, July 14, 2004, pp. 6-8.

18
People v. Nazareno, 698 Phil. 187, 193 (2012).

19
People v. Adviento, et al., 684 Phil. 507, 519 (2012)

20
Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder
and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a
street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving
great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his
person or corpse.
21
Supra note 11, at 287.

22
468 Phil. 816, 840 (2004), citing People v. Bustamante; 445 Phil. 345, 363-364 (2003); People v. Magno, 379 Phil. 531, 554
(2000).

23
607 Phil. 480, 505 (2009).

24
"Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon."

25
Supra note 12, at 128-129.

26
682 Phil. 164 (2012).

27
People v. Cabtalan, supra, at 168.

28
G.R. No. 161308, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 311.

29
Medina, Jr. v. People, supra, at 320.

30
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015.

31
People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al., supra.

32
694 Phil. 529, 581 (2012).

33
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period.

34
People v. Nelmida, supra note 32, at 569-570. (Emphasis omitted)

35
Supra note 32.

36
People v. Nelmida, supra, at 570.

37
Supra note 2.

38
Supra note 3.

39
674 Phil. 626, 635 (2011).1

40
People v. Evangelio, 672 Phil. 229, 248-249 (2011).

41
Revised Penal Code, Art. 63, par. (1), provides, in part, that when the penalty consists of two (2) indivisible penalties and is
attended by one or more aggravating circumstances, the greater penalty shall be applied, and in this case, the death penalty
shall be imposed.

42
People v. Combate, 653 Phil. 487, 504 (2010), citing People v. Victor, 354 Phil. 195, 209 (1998).

43
Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014, 724 SCRA 1, 57.

44
Id. at 58-59.

45
G.R. No. 104576, January 20, 1995, 240 SCRA 348, 356-357.

46
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1)A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;


(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover
moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brother and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this
article, in the order named.

47
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.

48
Bagumbayan Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-66274, September 30, 1984, 132 SCRA 441, 446.

49
6A C.J.S. Assault § 68.

50
G.R. No. 160709, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 285, 296.

51
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.

52
Lito Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, supra note 43, at 59.

53
People v. Dalisay, 620 Phil. 831, 844 (2009), citing People v. Catubig, 416 Phil. 102, 119 (2001), citing American Cent. Corp.
v. Stevens Van Lines, Inc., 103 Mich App 507, 303 NW2d 234; Morris v. Duncan, 126 Ga 467, 54 SE 1045; Faircloth v.
Greiner, 174 Ga app 845, 332 SE 2d 905; §731, 22 Am Jur 2d, p. 784; American Surety Co. v. Gold, 375 F 2d 523, 20 ALR 3d
335; Erwin v. Michigan, 188 Ark 658, 67 SW 2d 592.

54
§762, 22 Am Jur 2d pp. 817-818.

55
§733, 22 Am Jur 2d, p. 785; Symposium: Punitive Damages, 56 So Cal LR 1, November 1982.

56
People v. Catubig, supra note 53, at 119-120.

57
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it. (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. (Emphasis supplied)

58
G.R. Nos. 82223-24, November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 613, 634.

59
322 Phil. 551 (1996).

60
617 Phil. 587 (2009).

61
613 Phil. 507 (2009).

62
605 Phil. 877 (2009).

63
People v. Abellera, 553 Phil. 307 (2007).

64
People v. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508, 533-534.

65
People v. Combate, supra note 41, at 509.

66
Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member
of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment or passengers. The
same penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters.
67
Id.

68
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion temporal. x x x

69
Art. 123. Qualified piracy. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon those who commit any of the
crimes referred to in the preceding article, under any of the following circumstances:

1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same;

2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves or;

3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape.

70
Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or
prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted. x x x

Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
71

ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.

Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder
72

and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a
railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste
and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his
person or corpse.

Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon
73

any person who shall kill any child less than three days of age.

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other
74

manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill
him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a
public officer.

xxxx

75
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of
violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or
arson.

x x x x.

76
Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:

1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous
burnings, committed on several or different occasions.

2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people usually gather or
congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental function or business, private
transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such
as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and
regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.

3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for public
use, entertainment or leisure.

4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the service of
public utilities.

5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of
law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.

Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more persons or by a
group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely
constitutes an overt act in the commission or another violation of law.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:

1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordnance, storehouse, archives
or general museum of the Government.

2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.

xxxx

77
Republic Act No. 7080 (1991), Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall
be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the
said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all
ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from
the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.

78
Republic Act No. 6539 (1972), Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term
is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by x x x the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or
raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.

79
RA 9346, Sec. 2.

80
532 Phil. 368, 385 (2006).

81
532 Phil. 414, 428 (2006).

82
See People v. Sarcia, 615 Phil. 97 (2009).

83
Supra note 41.

84
People v. Victor, supra, at 210.

85
People v. Gambao, supra note 64, at 533.

86
384 Phil. 766 (2000).

87
People v. Arizapa, supra.
88
436 Phil. 719 (2002).

89
Supra note 64.

90
People v. Gambao, supra note 64.

91
People v. Victor, supra note 42, at 210.

92
ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same
to be applied in its maximum period.

93
674 Phil. 444 (2011).

94
315 Phil. 314 (1995).

95
Id. at 338.

96
608 Phil. 701 (2009).

People v. De Leon, supra, at 716-717, citing People v. Salazar, 342 Phil. 745, 765 (1997); People v. Abuyen, G.R. No.
97

77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569, 582; People v. Ponciano, G.R. No. 86453, December 5, 1991, 204 SCRA 627,
639 and People v. Mangulabnan, et al., 99 Phil. 992, 999 (1956).

People v. Nanas, 415 Phil. 683 (2001), citing People v. Penillos, G.R. No. 65673, January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 546, 564
98

and People v. Sequiño, 332 Phil. 90 (1996).

99
400 Phil. 1221 (2000).

100
People v. Macabales, supra, at 1236-1237, citing People v. Vivas, G.R. No. 100914, May 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 238, 242.

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery with the use of
101

violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed.

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical
injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been inflicted; Provided, however, that when the robbery
accompanied with rape is committed with a use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death (As amended by PD No. 767).

3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, any of the physical injuries
penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted.

4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, if the violence or
intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for
the commission of the crime, or when the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person
not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by sub-divisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263.
(As amended by R.A. 18)

5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases. (As
amended by R. A. 18).

102
People v. De Leon, supra note 96; People v. Ebet, 649 Phil. 181 (2010).

Revised Penal Code, Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. - Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal
103

property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, shall
be guilty of robbery.

104
People v. Tagudar, 600 Phil. 565, 590 (2009), citing People v. Dacillo, 471 Phil. 497, 510 (2004).

105
Id., citing People v. Surongon, 554 Phil. 448, 458 (2007).

106
Article 255, RTC.

107
Article 248, RTC.

108
Article 246, RTC.

109
Article 262, RTC.
Note that if the crime penalized in Article 255 [Infanticide] was committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of
110

concealing her dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods, and if said crime
was committed for the same purpose by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal. (As amended by R.A. 7659). Hence, the damages to be awarded should be the same as in Roman Numeral Number
Five (V) of the summary, i.e., In other crimes that result in the death of the victim and the penalty consists of divisible, because
the prescribed penalties are divisible.

111
Exemplary damages in rape cases are awarded for the inherent bestiality of the act committed even if no aggravating
circumstance attended the commission of the crime.

112
There is no frustrated stage in the crime of rape.

113
Art. 294 (1), RPC.

114
Id.

115
Id.

116
Id.

117
Art. 266-A, RPC as amended by RA 8353.

118
Art. 267, RPC.

119
RA No. 6539.

120
Id.

121
P.D. 532.

122
Art. 123, RPC.

123
Art. 320, RPC.

124
RA No. 8049.

This is so because there are no stages of the component crime in special complex crimes but the victims must be
125

compensated as if the component crimes were separately committed.

126
Art. 294 (3), RPC.

If the crime of infanticide in Art. 255 of the RPC was committed by the mother of the child or by the maternal grandparent/s
127

in order to conceal her dishonor, the penalties against them are divisible, i.e., prision mayor in its medium and maximum
periods, and reclusion temporal, respectively.

128
See People v. Catubig, supra note 53.

Although the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion perpetua, the damages awarded should be the same as those where the
129

penalty is death due to the gravity of the offense and the manner of committing the same.

130
In order to deter the commission of the crime of rebellion and serve as an example, exemplary damages should be awarded.

131
Supra note 38.

132
See Dario Nacar v. Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr., G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439, 459.

133
Quiambao v. People, G.R. No. 185267, September 17, 2014, 735 SCRA 345, 356-357.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. 137299 August 21, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
FRANCISCO NANAS alias "IKOT", accused-appellant.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
For our review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 31, dated July 31, 1998 finding the accused-appellant
1

Francisco Nanas, alias "Ikot" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide in Criminal Case No. 43624 and
sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death.

The accused-appellant Francisco Nanas was charged with the crime of rape with homicide in an information dated May 23, 1994 which
2

reads as follows:

"That on or about April 25, 1994, in the municipality of Miagao, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, bolo, and a piece of bamboo, and by the use of force and intimidation,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse with Edna Fabello without her consent and
against her will and on the occasion of such rape, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab, hack and strike said Edna Fabello with the weapons which the
accused was then provided, hitting the victim on the different parts of her body which caused her death."

On August 3, 1994, accused-appellant was arraigned whereupon he entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged. 3

The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses: Dr. Mary Joyce M. Faeldan, Bienvenido Beatisola, Serapion Feronilmo, and Primitivo
Fabello. The case against the accused-appellant, as culled from the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the
prosecution, is as follows:

At about 8:00 in the evening of April 25, 1994, witness Bienvenido Beatisola and a certain Esteban Jumadron arrived at the dance hall
in Barangay Tugara-ao, Miagao, Iloilo, where a dance was being held on the occasion of the fiesta of the barangay. Beatisola saw the
victim Edna Fabello at the gate of the dance hall pinning ribbons on some of the revelers at the dance hall. As he was acquainted with
the victim, he approached her and exchanged some pleasantries. Edna Fabello asked Beatisola to help her sister who was a candidate
in the fund raising contest but he replied that he has no money .4

After this brief conversation with the victim, Beatisola went out of the dance hall to urinate and there he saw accused-appellant
Francisco Nanas, alias "Ikot", drinking beer at the store under a camachile tree located some six (6) arms length from him. The
appellant offered him a drink but he declined and instead he went back to the dance hall . 5

Beatisola noticed that Edna Fabello constantly went in and out of the dance hall. She had no companions. He last saw her going out of
the dance hall and he was able to observe her passing the place where accused-appellant was drinking on her way to the rice paddies . 6

Beatisola and his companion Esteban Jamadron left the dance hall at about 12:00 o'clock midnight and they proceeded to the house of
a certain Elias Monsale, the brother-in-law of the witness. While walking thru the rice paddies, Beatisola paused to urinate by the
bushes. He then heard a thudding sound and when he looked around, he saw a person lying face down on the ground. He surmised
that the person was a girl as she had long hair tapering down to her shoulders. The girl was being beaten up by two other persons with
the use of a wooden bamboo pole. From his vantage point, he was able to identify accused-appellant as one of the persons beating up
the girl. He was able to identify him because of the moonlight and because during one instance, accused-appellant's companion
pointed a flashlight at accused-appellant's face .
7

The companion of accused-appellant apparently saw the witness hiding behind some cassava and banana plants and told accused-
appellant about it. Instead of running away, accused-appellant allegedly drew his bolo and said "make them come because I will kill
them." Accused-appellant then hacked the girl twice. Beatisola and his companion became scared and they ran to the house of his
brother-in-law. When they reached the house, Beatisola immediately told his brother-in-law about what he witnessed and that accused-
appellant had killed a person. However, he did not initially report the incident he witnessed to the authorities .
8

It was only in June 1996 that Beatisola became aware that the person who was killed was Edna Fabello. She learned this from her
sister Editha who apparently was the aunt of the victim. He decided to testify on what he had witnessed because of the pleas of his
sister .
9

Primitivo Fabello, the father of the victim, also attended the fund raising dance. He left the dance hall at around 3:00 in the early
morning of April 26, 1994 and he began looking for Edna whom he noticed was missing. He proceeded to the cornfield and there he
chanced upon the accused-appellant who was apparently searching for something. When Primitivo asked what he was doing, accused-
appellant told him that he was looking for his knife. Primitivo then continued to search for his daughter .10

A short while later and while accused-appellant was still nearby, Primitivo found the shoes, hairpin and handkerchief of his daughter.
The accused-appellant suddenly became agitated and he immediately fled the scene. After appellant was gone, Primitivo continued
looking for his daughter and he was able to see bloodstains on the dike and on a bamboo pole. He followed the trail of blood and this
led him to the dead body of his daughter lying face down in a canal. Thereafter, he reported the incident to the Barangay Captain and
later on he turned over the personal effects of his daughter to the police .
11

Police Officer Serafin Feronilmo, who received the report about the crime, went to the crime scene and there he found the dead body of
Edna Fabello in the canal. Edna's neck was slashed and her body bore stab wounds. Nearby, he found a bloodstained bamboo pole, a
pair of slippers, the scabbard of a knife, a toy gun and a hair clip.

As Primitivo Fabello had earlier told him that he had chanced upon accused-appellant near the place where the body was found, he
proceeded to the place of accused-appellant to continue his investigation. Accused-appellant was in his house and so the police officer
invited the accused-appellant to the police station for questioning. In the station, accused-appellant allegedly admitted to the police
officer that he owned the pair of red rubber slippers found at the crime scene but he denied responsibility for the crime . 12

The body of Edna Fabello was retrieved and it was examined by Dr. Mary Joyce M. Faeldan, the acting Municipal Health Officer of
Miag-ao, Iloilo. She identified her medico-legal report in open court. However, she was deemed by the trial court as not qualified to be
13

an expert witness and so she was not allowed to elaborate on her findings . Her report showed that the witness died from avulsion of
14

the parts of the brain and asphyxia secondary to a hack wound. Her body bore contusions and hematoma and she was found to have
been stabbed and hacked twelve (12) times on different parts of her body. The speculum examination on her sex organ revealed that
there were "positive multiple minute lacerations around the external (opening) of the cervix" and "positive hymenal lacerations at (the) 3
o'clock and 10 o'clock positions."15
For his part, accused-appellant denied the charge leveled against him. He admitted that on April 25, 1994, the date of the criminal
incident, he was in Miag-Ao, Iloilo as he was taking part in the fiesta celebrations. He admitted further that he was at the dance hall of
the barangay with his brother, sister, and daughter as his companions. He denied ever seeing witness Bienvenido Beatisola at the
dance hall. He claimed that he was at the dancehall all night and that he only left the place at around 4:00 a.m. the following day as he
was already sleepy and he had work that morning . His companions stayed behind as the dance was still ongoing.
16

On his way home, accused-appellant passed through some corn paddies and when he was about fifty meters away from the dancehall,
he saw Primitivo Fabello, the father of the victim. He denied, however, the testimony of Primitivo that he was looking for his knife and
that he ran away when the shoes of Edna were found. He claimed that Primitivo only asked him whether he had seen his daughter
Edna Fabello to which he replied that that he saw her earlier in the evening but he had not seen her since. He then continued on his
17

way home and he arrived there past 4:00 in the morning.

He woke up the following morning at around 8:00 a.m. He was then told by a barangay councilor that the policemen were looking for
him and so he looked for the policemen on the road. When he met the policemen, he was asked whether he was Francisco Nanas to
which he replied in the affirmative. The policemen then took him to his house where they proceeded to look for his clothes and bolo.
They were able to find his clothes and bolo but there were no bloodstains on them. The policemen left the clothes and the weapon and
instead they said that accused-appellant should accompany them to the police station for questioning. There he was placed inside a
prison cell and since then he had not been released from detention. 18

He denied that he raped and killed Edna Fabello and that he admitted in the police station that he owned the red rubber slippers found
at the crime scene. He likewise denied the accusation of Bienvenido Beatisola that he beat up and hacked a girl in the corn paddies. He
claimed that Beatisola was a planted witness who had a quarrel with him sometime in 1980.

Teresa Napilanga, the sister of the accused, corroborated the account of her brother regarding the incident which happened at their
house in the morning of April 26, 1994, right after the body of Edna Fabello was found. She claimed that the police came to their house
and questioned her brother about the death of Edna Fabello and that they also searched the house for evidence against the accused-
appellant. They were not able to find any evidence linking his brother to the crime yet the policemen still brought accused-appellant to
the police station for questioning and thereafter proceeded to detain him. Teresa likewise corroborated the testimony of her brother on
19

the long-standing enmity between him and the witness Bienvenido Beatisola. 20

Romeo Famanila, the barangay captain of Calagtangan, Miag-Ao, Iloilo and a distant relative of accused-appellant, testified that there
was a fight between accused-appellant and witness Bienvenido Beatisola in their barangay sometime in May 1980. The two of them
were fighting with knives but they ran away when they saw him. According to him, Beatisola likewise assaulted accused-appellant the
day after the fighting incident. On cross-examination, Famanila admitted that the incident was never recorded in the barangay nor
21

reported to the police.


22

After trial on the merits, the court a quo convicted accused-appellant of the complex crime of rape with homicide and sentenced him to
the supreme penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the decision dated July 31, 1998 reads:

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused Francisco Nanas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape with Homicide,
under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the
said accused to suffer the penalty of death, and further ordering the accused to pay the heirs of Edna Fabello the sum of
P50,000.00 for civil indemnity and P100,000.00 for exemplary and moral damages. Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED." 23

Due to the imposition by the trial court of capital punishment, the case is now before us on automatic review.

In his Appellant's Brief, accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors: 24

A. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OR RAPE HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED.
THE ELEMENTS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION ARE THE
FOLLOWING:

A.1 THE ELEMENT OF CARNAL KNOWLEDGE OR SEXUAL INTERCOURSE AS NO EXPERT MEDICAL


OPINION WAS PRESENTED TO PROVE SUCH FACT AND LACERATIONS REFLECTED IN THE MEDICAL
REPORT, BY ITSELF, DO NOT CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH SEXUAL INTERCOURSE.

A.2 ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE PROSECUTION ESTABLISHED SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, IT
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENT OF RAPE THAT THE INTERCOURSE IS ACCOMPLISHED BY THE
FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES, TO WIT:

a) By using force or intimidation;

b) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

c) When the woman is under 12 years of age;

A.3 ASSUMING THAT A SEXUAL INTERCOURSE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED
UNDER THE ABOVE-ENUMERATED THREE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ACCOMPLISHING RAPE, THERE IS NO
EXPERT TESTIMONY SHOWING THAT IT WAS MADE DURING THE DAY OF THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME AND NO EVIDENCE THAT THE AUTHOR OF IT IS THE ACCUSED.

A.4 PROSECUTION WITNESS BIENVENIDO BEATISOLA, ASSUMING HIS TESTIMONY TO BE CREDIBLE, HAS
ONLY WITNESSED CIRCUMSTANCES TO HOMICIDE AND NOT RAPE WHILE THE REST OF THE WITNESSES
TESTIFIED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON HOMICIDE AND NOT RAPE.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING IN THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS BIENVENIDO BEATISOLA
AS HE IS NOT A CREDIBLE WITNESS, WITH UNREBUTTED CRIMINAL RECORDS AND HAS THE MOTIVE TO
FABRICATE AGAINST THE ACCUSED.

C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE ACCOUNT OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHICH IS INCREDIBLE
AND FULL OF INCONSISTENCIES.

D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION ESTABLISHED THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF
THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

E. THAT TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
AND INTOXICATION.

It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established beyond
reasonable doubt. In this regard, we have held that the crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very
25

often only the victim is left to testify for herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is
committed because the victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes of rape with homicide resort to circumstantial evidence is usually
unavoidable. 26

In the case at bench, there was no eyewitness to the crime of rape allegedly committed on the person of Edna Fabello. Bienvenido
Beatisola only witnessed the accused beating-up and hacking a woman, acts which are consistent with homicide but not with rape. The
father of the victim Primitivo Fabello merely testified that he saw accused-appellant near the scene of the crime at the time of the
incident. He did not actually witness accused-appellant rape his daughter. As such, if the crime of rape is to be proven, resort must be
had to circumstantial evidence.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. Sadly, not one of these requisites is present in the case at bar.
27

In the present case, the only evidence offered by the prosecution which has any connection with a finding that the victim has been
raped is the report of Dr. Mary Joyce M. Faeldan which stated that there were multiple lacerations around the external opening of the
cervix of the victim and on her hymen.

It is axiomatic that hymenal laceration is not necessary to prove rape. Thus, the presence of lacerations does not likewise conclusively
28

prove its commission.

In People vs. Domantay, we had occasion to expound on the evidentiary value of a finding of hymenal lacerations. To wit:
29

"(A) medical certificate or the testimony of the physician is presented not to prove that the victim was raped but to show that
the latter had lost her virginity. Consequently, standing alone, a physician's finding that the hymen of the alleged victim was
lacerated does not prove rape. It is only when this is corroborated by other evidence proving carnal knowledge that rape may
be deemed to have been established.

This conclusion is based on the medically accepted fact that a hymenal tear may be caused by other objects other than the
male sex organ or may arise from other causes." (citations omitted)

In the case at bar, not only is there an absence of other circumstances from which it might be reasonably inferred that rape was
committed, there is also no testimony that the hymenal lacerations themselves may have been caused in the course of coitus or by a
male organ. It must be recalled that Dr. Faeldan merely identified the medico-legal report which she executed. Because of her lack of
experience, the trial court, to which the prosecution agreed, deemed her not to be an expert on the matter and thus, she was prevented
from giving expert medical opinion on the implications of her findings.

For their part, the prosecution did not present any other doctor or witness who was qualified to render a medical opinion that rape may
indeed have occurred. As such, there is no proof that the lacerations and ruptures found on the sex organ of the victim were caused by
sexual intercourse. Consequently, the trial court erred in concluding that rape was committed.
30

To be sure, this Court has sustained a number of convictions for rape with homicide based on purely circumstantial evidence. In those
instances however, the prosecution was able to present other telltale signs of rape such as the location and description of the victim's
clothing, especially her undergarments, the position of the body when found, and the like. In the case at bar, there is no convincing
31

circumstantial evidence from which we might establish beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant sexually abused the victim.
There is no evidence that the victim was naked when found, that her undergarments were torn or missing, that there was spermatozoa
in the girl's vaginal canal and other such evidence from which we might infer that rape was committed.

While we sustain the contention of accused-appellant that rape was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, we do not agree with his
argument that his guilt of the crime of homicide was likewise not proven beyond reasonable doubt. In contrast with the evidence for
rape offered by the prosecution, the circumstantial evidence linking accused-appellant to the death of Edna Fabello is sufficient to
convict him of the crime of homicide.

We quote with approval the following finding of the trial court on the circumstantial evidence linking the accused-appellant to the death
of Edna Fabello:

"It is argued that evidence with respect to the identity of the victim is circumstantial in nature. Yet, the circumstantial evidence if
you may, is not isolated, but consist of a chain of circumstances, like the finding and recovery of the personal effects of Edna
Fabello by her father who without doubt is very familiar with the personal belongings of his daughter since they live under the
said roof, the fact that as testified to by Bienvenido Biatisola, he saw the accused hack twice a person lying in the canal whom
he suspected to be a girl with long hair that tapers to her shoulder, the fact that when Primitivo Fabello met the accused at the
cornfield at around 3 o'clock in the morning of April 26, 1994, he was looking for his knife, the scabbard of which was likewise
found by Fabello in the cornfield together with the victim's shoes, hairpin, and handkerchief, and the fact that no other victim
except Edna Fabello was found dead in the canal the following morning after her disappearance from the dance hall. (These)
are overwhelming circumstantial evidence, which together with the oral testimony of eyewitnesses Primitivo Fabello and
Bienvenido Beatisola point to no other logical conclusion except that of the guilt of the accused Francisco Nanas . . . " 32

Aside from these pieces of circumstantial evidence cited by the trial court, we likewise have the testimony of Police Officer Serapion
Feronilmo who stated that accused-appellant admitted in the police station that he was the owner of the red slippers recovered from the
crime scene.

To the unprejudiced mind, the circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken together, leads to no other
conclusion except that of accused-appellant's culpability for the death of the victim. Accused-appellant admitted that he was near the
crime scene at the time the crime was being committed. He was seen by a witness beating up and hacking a girl with a bolo. He was
seen by the father of the victim lingering near the crime scene apparently looking for his knife. He ran away from the crime scene when
the personal effects of the victim were found. The dead body of Edna Fabello was found near the place where he was seen beating up
and hacking a girl. Finally, he admitted before the police authorities that he owned the pair of rubber slippers found at the crime scene.
Conviction based on circumstantial evidence will be upheld, provided the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, a conclusion
33

adequately established in this case.

It is suggested by accused-appellant that the testimony of witness Bienvenido Beatisola should be rejected considering the witness's
questionable reputation and personal background as evidenced by the criminal charges filed against him . 34

It is true that under the Rules of Court, a witness may be impeached by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad. However, a witness cannot be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts unless there is a showing of previous
conviction by final judgment . Such that not even the existence of a pending information may be shown to impeach him . In the present
35 36

case, there was no testimony that the reputation of Beatisola for truth, honesty or integrity is bad. The defense merely presented
evidence of the witness's alleged previous wrongful acts by the introduction into evidence of criminal complaints filed by police officers
and offended parties against the witness before the municipal trial court. There is no showing that these cases were eventually tried
and that Beatisola was convicted thereof. Thus, they only establish that criminal complaints were filed against the witness and as such,
the fact thus established will not detract from Beatisola's competence as a witness . 37

Accused-appellant likewise points to the alleged bad blood between him and Beatisola as the motive behind his testimony linking him to
the crime. Allegedly, they engaged in a knife fight sometime in 1980 which was witnessed by the people in their barangay.

We cannot give credence to the alleged motive of witness Beatisola in testifying against accused-appellant. Besides the fact that there
is absolutely no record of the fight between the two either with the barangay or in court, the witnesses who testified on this matter were
admittedly biased and interested witnesses. Moreover, even if there had been a fight between accused-appellant and Beatisola
sometime in 1980, it is incredible to believe that the latter would be inclined to wait for fourteen (14) years before exacting his revenge if
such indeed was his inclination.

As to accused-appellant's argument that Beatisola only came out to testify about six months after the death of Edna Fabello and not
immediately after, suffice it to say that it is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show some reluctance about getting involved in a
criminal case. In fact, the natural reticence of most people to get involved is a matter of judicial notice. As aptly explained by Beatisola,
38

he only decided to testify when his sister, a relative by affinity of the victim, cried before him and told him to testify as to his knowledge
about the incident .
39

Moreover, as previously shown, the trial court did not convict accused-appellant solely on the testimony of Beatisola. The trial court
likewise took into account the testimonies of the father of the victim and the policeman who investigated the killing. The Court notes that
accused-appellant merely imputes a motive against Beatisola for falsely testifying against him. He cannot impute any ill motive against
the other witnesses as in fact, there was none.

Finally, accused-appellant argues that the trial court erred in relying on the account of prosecution witnesses which allegedly was
incredible and full of inconsistencies. According to accused-appellant, no person in his right mind would stay at the scene of the crime
despite knowing that he was already noticed and that no person will talk to the father of his victim at the scene of the crime despite the
fact that he was already recognized and the body of the victim was still at the crime scene.

The submission of accused-appellant is bereft of any sustainable basis. The improbabilities alluded to are more imagined than real and
they do not adversely affect the credibility of the witnesses . Moreover, we have previously held that the criminal mind is generally an
40

irrational mind and hence, its actuations are often abnormal, erratic, and unpredictable . 41

In view of the foregoing, we hold that it was only the crime of homicide which was proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is well settled in
this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offense,
the accused can be convicted of the other. It is true that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to
42

be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape . 43

However, in rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the
qualifying circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature of the offense for which he is charged . In the case at bench, no circumstance which would qualify the killing to
44

murder was sufficiently alleged in the information charging accused-appellant with rape with homicide. Consequently, considering that
the evidence presented fails to support the charge for rape, accused-appellant may only be convicted of homicide.

With regards to the imposable penalty, we are not persuaded by the submission of accused-appellant that the mitigating circumstances
of voluntary surrender and intoxication should be appreciated in his favor. With respect to the circumstance of voluntary surrender,
accused-appellant claims that the same must be appreciated considering that he voluntarily went to the police station when his
presence was requested the morning immediately following the incident.

However, for voluntary surrender to be considered, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offender was not actually arrested; (2)
he surrendered to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntarily . A surrender to be
45
voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because (a)
he acknowledges his guilt or (b) he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture . 46

That accused-appellant submitted himself to the custody of law even though there was yet no warrant of arrest or information against
him is of no moment. The police authorities had to go to the house of accused-appellant in order to take the latter to the police station.
Accused-appellant did not present himself voluntarily to the police; neither did he ask them to fetch him at his house so he could
surrender. The fact alone that he did not resist but went peacefully with the police officers does not mean that he voluntarily
surrendered . Besides, voluntary surrender presupposes repentance . This circumstance was not present in the instant case as
47 48

accused-appellant denied any participation and knowledge of the crime when he was in the custody of the police authorities. Hence, the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated.

Neither can we appreciate in favor of accused-appellant the alternative circumstance of intoxication. To be mitigating, the accused must
show that (1) at the time of the commission of the criminal act, he has taken such quantity of alcoholic drinks as to blur his reason and
deprive him of a certain degree of self-control; and (2) such intoxication is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony .49

No such evidence was presented in the case at bar. The fact that accused-appellant was seen drinking before the incident does not
lead to the conclusion that he has taken such quantity of liquor so as to deprive him of self-control. Similarly, there is also no evidence
that his intoxication was not habitual.

Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Considering that no mitigating
or aggravating circumstance may be appreciated, the penalty is to be imposed in its medium period. Applying the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant may thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and
one day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum . 50

Consistent with current jurisprudence, we maintain the award made by the trial court in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for
the death of Edna Fabello . The trial court erred, however, in awarding the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary and moral damages.
51

Exemplary damages may not be awarded considering that such damages can only be recovered in criminal cases when the crime is
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances . In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to prove that the killing of Edna
52

Fabello was attended by any aggravating circumstance. Consequently, the award for exemplary damages must be deleted for lack of
legal basis. 53

Likewise, despite the demise of the victim on account of the felonious act of accused-appellant, moral damages cannot be awarded to
the victim's heirs. The prosecution here did not present evidence, testimonial or otherwise, to show that the heirs of the deceased are
entitled thereto . Under the present stage of case law on crimes involving the taking of human life, evidence must be adduced by the
54

offended parties to warrant an award for moral damages . 55

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Iloilo City finding accused-appellant Francisco Nanas
guilty of the crime of rape with homicide is hereby MODIFIED. As modified, Francisco Nanas is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one day ofprision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accused-appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Edna Fabello the
sum of P50,000 as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De
Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Penned by Judge Recaredo P. Barte; Rollo, pp. 19-27.

2
Rollo, pp. 4-5.

3
Records, p. 33.

4
T.S.N., October 12, 1994, pp. 3-10.

5
Ibid, pp. 8-9.

6
Ibid, p. 11.

7
Ibid, pp. 14-16.

8
T.S.N., October 26, 1994, p. 6.

9
Ibid.

10
T.S.N., August 24, 1995, pp. 4-10.

11
T.S.N., August 24, 1995, pp. 11-19.
12
T.S.N., May 10, 1995, pp. 2-15.

13
Exh. "A."

14
T.S.N., September 1, 1994, p. 4.

15
Exhibit "A", Records, p. 14.

16
T.S.N., September 11, 1997, pp. 1-7.

17
Ibid, pp. 9-10.

18
Ibid, pp. 17-21.

19
T.S.N., June 26, 1997, pp. 4-9.

20
Ibid, pp. 12-13.

21
T.S.N., August 15, 1997, pp. 1-4.

22
Ibid, p. 9.

23
Decision dated July 31, 1998, p. 9; Rollo, p. 27.

24
Rollo, pp. 45-46.

25
People vs. Quisay, 320 SCRA 450; People vs. Dino, 160 SCRA 197.

26
People vs. Robles, 305 SCRA 273.

27
Revised Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section 4.

28
People vs. Butron, 272 SCRA 352; People vs. Gabris, 258 SCRA 663; People vs. Alimon, 257 SCRA 658.

29
307 SCRA 1.

30
People vs. Gallarde, 325 SCRA 835.

31
People vs. Domantay, supra; People vs. Magana, 259 SCRA 380; People vs. Develles, 208 SCRA 101.

32
Decision dated July 31, 1998, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 26-27.

33
People vs. Lopez, 313 SCRA 114; People vs. Bionat, 278 SCRA 454; People vs. Grefaldia, 273 SCRA 591.

34
Exhibits "3" to "8".

35
Revised Rules of Court, Rule 132. Section 11.

36
De Leon vs. People, 210 SCRA 151; People vs. Arceo, 187 SCRA 265.

37
De Leon vs. People, supra.

38
People vs. Lagmay, 306 SCRA 157.

39
T.S.N. October 26, 1994, pp. 5-6.

40
People vs. Sioc, 319 SCRA 12.

41
People vs. Batulan, 253 SCRA 52.

42
People vs. Gallarde, supra; U.S. vs. Lahoylahoy, 38 Phil. 330.

43
People vs. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546; People vs. Sequino, 264 SCRA 79.

44
People vs. Gallarde, supra; People vs. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559.

45
People vs. Rapanut, 263 SCRA 515.

46
People vs. Camahalan, 241 SCRA 558; People vs. Lee, 204 SCRA 900.

47
People vs. Deopante, 263 SCRA 691; People vs. Camahalan, supra.
48
People vs. Rabanillo, 307 SCRA 613.

49
People vs. Boduso, 60 SCRA 60.

50
People vs. Mangahas, 311 SCRA 384; People vs. Albao, 287 SCRA 129.

51
People vs. Silvestre, 307 SCRA 68.

52
New Civil Code, Article 2230; People vs. Sagaysay, 308 SCRA 455; People vs. Langres, 316 SCRA 769.

53
People vs. Pineda, 311 SCRA 368; People vs. Panique, 316 SCRA 757.

54
People vs. Caballes, 274 SCRA 83; People vs. Ballabare, 264 SCRA 350.

55
People vs. Benito, 303 SCRA 468.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013

GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No.
7610.1 Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the
Revised Penal Code.

The Case

On June 22, 2005,2 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a)
of Republic Act No. 7610.

Antecedents

On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutor’s Office of Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legazpi City with
child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, alleging as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of May 2000, in the City of Legazpi Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit on the person of JAYSON DELA CRUZ, a twelve
year-old,

Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute, Legazpi City, acts of physical abuse and/or maltreatment by striking said JAYSON DELA CRUZ with
his palm hitting the latter at his back and by slapping said minor hitting his left cheek and uttering derogatory remarks to the latter’s
family to wit: "Mga hayop kamo, para dayo kamo digdi, Iharap mo dito ama mo" (You all animals, you are all strangers here. Bring your
father here), which acts of the accused are prejudicial to the child’s development and which demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of
the said child as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined the
evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in front of the petitioner’s house,
the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner confronted Jayson
and Roldan and called them names like "strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and
slapped Jayson on the face;4 that the petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a
fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police
Station and reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching
Hospital;5 that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following contusions,
to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1x1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular
area, left.6

On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only talked with Jayson and
Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and
about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told
Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters. 7
To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit or slap but only confronted Jayson, asking
why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and why he had burned Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson
and calling him a "sissy." She insisted that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the procession. She described
the petitioner as a loving and protective father. 8

Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged, to wit: 9

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GEORGE BONGALON @
"GI" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Republic Act No. 7610, and is hereby ordered to undergo imprisonment of six (6)
years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor in its minimum period.

SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the petitioner assailed the credibility of the Prosecution witnesses by citing their inconsistencies. He contended that the RTC
overlooked or disregarded material facts and circumstances in the records that would have led to a favorable judgment for him. He
attacked the lack of credibility of the witnesses presented against him, citing the failure of the complaining brothers to react to the
incident, which was unnatural and contrary to human experience.

The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty, 10 viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 20, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9 of Legazpi City is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant George Bongalon is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and 1 day of
prision mayor as the maximum term.

Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Jayson de la Cruz the additional amount of ₱5,000 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

The petitioner has come to the Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 11

The petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of the crime charged; and that even assuming that he was guilty, his liability should be
mitigated because he had merely acted to protect her two minor daughters.

Ruling of the Court

At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has adopted the wrong remedy in assailing the CA’s affirmance of his conviction.
His proper recourse from the affirmance of his conviction was an appeal taken in due course. Hence, he should have filed a petition for
review on certiorari. Instead, he wrongly brought a petition for certiorari. We explained why in People v. Court of Appeals:12

The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
and not errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged
does not deprived it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would
deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice
would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision–not the
jurisdiction of the court to render said decision–the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper
recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in his petition. The allegation of grave
abuse of discretion no more warrants the granting of due course to the petition as one for certiorari if appeal was available as a proper
and adequate remedy. At any rate, a reading of his presentation of the issues in his petition indicates that he thereby imputes to the CA
errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. He mentions instances attendant during the commission of the crime that he claims were
really constitutive of justifying and mitigating circumstances; and specifies reasons why he believes Republic Act No. 7610 favors his
innocence rather than his guilt for the crime charged. 13 The errors he thereby underscores in the petition concerned only the CA’s
appreciation and assessment of the evidence on record, which really are errors of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

Even if we were to treat the petition as one brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, it would still be defective due to its being filed
beyond the period provided by law. Section 2 of Rule 45 requires the filing of the petition within 15 days from the notice of judgment to
be appealed. However, the petitioner received a copy of the CA’s decision on July 15, 2005, 14 but filed the petition only on September
12, 2005,15 or well beyond the period prescribed by the Rules of Court.

The procedural transgressions of the petitioner notwithstanding, we opt to forego quickly dismissing the petition, and instead set
ourselves upon the task of resolving the issues posed by the petition on their merits. We cannot fairly and justly ignore his plea about
the sentence imposed on him not being commensurate to the wrong he committed. His plea is worthy of another long and hard look. If,
on the other hand, we were to outrightly dismiss his plea because of the procedural lapses he has committed, the Court may be seen
as an unfeeling tribunal of last resort willing to sacrifice justice in order to give premium to the rigidity of its rules of procedure. But the
Rules of Court has not been intended to be rigidly enforced at all times. Rather, it has been instituted first and foremost to ensure
justice to every litigant. Indeed, its announced objective has been to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding."16 This objective will be beyond realization here unless the Rules of Court be given liberal construction and application
as the noble ends of justice demand. Thereby, we give primacy to substance over form, which, to a temple of justice and equity like the
Court, now becomes the ideal ingredient in the dispensation of justice in the case now awaiting our consideration.

The petitioner’s right to liberty is in jeopardy. He may be entirely deprived of such birthright without due process of law unless we shunt
aside the rigidity of the rules of procedure and review his case. Hence, we treat this recourse as an appeal timely brought to the Court.
Consonant with the basic rule in criminal procedure that an appeal opens the whole case for review, we should deem it our duty to
correct errors in the appealed judgment, whether assigned or not.17

The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610,
which relevantly states:

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial
to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

xxxx

Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:

Section 3. Definition of terms. –

xxxx

(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

xxxx

Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his
hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the
above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended
to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass
Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his
being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the
hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.

It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor of the petitioner as the
accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor. 18

What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?

Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, 19 the petitioner was liable for slight physical
injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to
nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period.

xxxx

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of imprisonment. 20 In imposing the
correct penalty, however, we have to consider the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised
Penal Code,21 because the petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power. 22 Passion or
obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of the accused.23 It is relevant to mention, too, that in
passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having acted under the belief that Jayson
and Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyn’s hair, the petitioner was entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of passion. Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e., one day to 10 days) in the absence of any
aggravating circumstance that offset the mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being
inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year,24 the petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto
menor.

The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate. Such damages are granted in criminal cases resulting in physical injuries.25 The
amount of ₱5,000.00 fixed by the lower courts as moral damages is consistent with the current jurisprudence.26

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ENTER a new judgment: (a) finding petitioner George
Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the
Revised Penal Code; (b) sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto menor; and (c) ordering him to pay Jayson Dela
Cruz the amount of ₱5,000.00 as moral damages, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act (Approved on June 17,1992).

2
Rollo, pp. 18-31; penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico (retired), with Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine (retired) and
Associate Justice Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok (retired) concurring.

3 Records, pp. 1-2.

4 TSN, June 4, 2001, pp. 9-11.

5 TSN, February 6, 2001, pp. 6-21.

6 TSN, October 19, 2001, pp. 3-12.

7 TSN, March 10, 2003, pp. 6-9.

8 TSN, June 28, 2002, pp. 7-16.

9 Records, pp. 301-304.

10 Supra note 2.

11 Rollo, pp. 3-17.

12 G.R. No. 142051, February 24, 2004, 423 SCRA 605, 612-613.

13
Rollo, pp. 10-14.

14
Id. at 8.

15
Id. at 15.

16 Section 6, Rule 1, Rules of Court, which provides:


Section 6. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (2a)

17 Ferrer v. People, G.R. No. 143487, February 22, 2006, 483 SCRA 31, 54.

18
Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006, 487 SCRA 42, 58.

19 Records, p. 154.

20 Article 27, Revised Penal Code.

21 Article 13. Mitigating circumstances. – The following are mitigating circumstances:

xxx

6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.

xxx

22
United States v. Salandanan, et al., 1 Phil. 464, 465 (1902).

Reyes, Criminal Law, The Revised Penal Code, Book One (15th Edition), p. 286, citing U.S. v. Ferrer, 1 Phil. 56, 62, U.S. v.
23

Macalintal, 2 Phil. 448, 451; and People v. Zapata, 107 Phil. 103, 109.

24 Section 2, Indeterminate Sentence Law.

25 Article 2219 (I) of the Civil Code.

26 People v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 20 II, 657 SCRA 270, 288.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182130 June 19, 2013

IRIS KRISTINE BALOIS ALBERTO and BENJAMIN D. BALOIS, Petitioners,


vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. RODRIGO A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA, GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA,
JESSEBEL CALIANGA, and GRACE EVANGELISTA, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 182132

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF MUNTINLUPA, THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MUNTINLUPA CITY, BENJAMIN D. BALOIS, and IRIS KRISTINE BALOIS ALBERTO, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. RODRIGO A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA, GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, JESSEBEL CALIANGA, and GRACE
EVANGELISTA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari 1 assailing the January 11, 2008 Decision2 and March 13, 2008
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97863 which revoked the December 11, 2006 Resolution 4 and December
22, 2006 Amended Resolution5 (DOJ Resolutions) issued by then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzalez (DOJ
Secretary) directing the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City to file charges of Rape, 6 in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act
No. 76107 (RA 7610), Serious Illegal Detention8 and Forcible Abduction with Rape9 against respondents.

The Facts

As culled from the assailed CA decision, the diametrically-opposed versions of the relevant incidents in this case are as follows:

A. Incidents of December 28, 2001

Petitioners alleged that at around midnight of December 28, 2001, respondent Gil Anthony Calianga (Gil) called petitioner Iris Kristine
Alberto (Iris), then sixteen (16) years old,10 informing her that he was at their garage with some food and drinks. For fear of being
scolded, Iris refused to see Gil. But due to his insistence, Iris finally went out to meet Gil and thereafter, took the food and drinks which
he brought. Eventually, while they were talking, Iris felt weak and dizzy and thus, tried to return to her room. Gil assisted Iris and when
they reached the room, he laid her on the bed. A little later, Gil started kissing Iris which prompted her to scream. Consequently, Gil
covered Iris’ mouth with a pillow and soon after, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Before leaving, Gil warned Iris not
to tell anyone about what happened or else he would kill her.11

By way of rebuttal, respondents averred that Gil and Iris met at the Mormon Church in Muntinlupa City and became sweethearts in
2001. They eventually developed an amorous physical relationship and on the evening of December 28, 2001, secretly slept together
for the first time in Iris’ own bedroom.12

B. Incidents of April 23 to 24, 2002

As for the second set of incidents, petitioners claimed that on April 23, 2002, Gil called Iris, then seventeen (17) years old,13 telling her
that he would pick her up for them to go to church in order to play volleyball. They met at about 5:30 in the afternoon in South Green
Heights and proceeded to Camella to meet Gil’s sister, respondent Jessebel Calianga (Jessebel), and her friend, respondent Grace
Evangelista (Grace). At around 6:30 in the evening, Gil and Iris boarded a tricycle. At the outset, Iris thought they would be going to
church for volleyball practice; but instead, Gil, while poking a knife at Iris’ side, told her that they were headed to a different destination.
Eventually, they reached a McDonald’s restaurant located in San Pedro, Laguna where they transferred to a car driven by Grace’s
common law husband. They then returned to Camella and stayed with a relative of Grace where they had dinner. While having dinner,
Iris overheard respondent Atty. Rodrigo Reyna (Atty. Reyna) giving instructions to Jessebel to take Iris to Marikina City. When they
finished their dinner, Atty. Reyna called again and told Iris not to go out as her relatives were around the area, on board several cars.
Iris pleaded Gil to let her go, but her pleas were ignored. A little later, Jessebel and Grace led Gil and Iris to a tree house where Gil
forced her to enter a room. She tried to resist but he threatened to kill her if she did not accede. Left with no option, Iris entered the
room where Gil, holding her at knifepoint, succeeded in once again having sexual intercourse with her. 14

The following day, or on April 24, 2002, at around 6:00 in the morning, Atty. Reyna arrived and instructed Iris to tell her relatives, who
had been worriedly looking for her, that she voluntarily went with Gil; that she was treated with kindness; and that everything that
happened was to her own liking because of her love for Gil. Atty. Reyna then asked Iris to go home but she refused because she did
not know her way back. Because of Iris’ refusal, Atty. Reyna called up her Auntie Vilma and Uncle Albert and agreed to meet at
Chowking-Poblacion where Iris was finally released to her grandfather, petitioner Benjamin Balois (Benjamin). 15

In defense, respondents maintained that on April 23, 2002, Iris’ brother, Eldon Alberto (Eldon), caught Gil inside Iris’ bedroom where he
had spent the night. Fearing the consequences of having been caught, Gil and Iris eloped and stayed at the house of Grace’s
grandfather. When Benjamin realized that Iris was missing, he sought the help of Atty. Reyna, since he was a family friend from their
church. Iris’ relatives also suspected that she might be with Gil after learning from the entries in her journal that Iris loved Gil very much.
Coincidentally, Gil was the nephew of Atty. Reyna’s wife and so they were hoping that Atty. Reyna would have some information as to
Gil’s whereabouts. Atty. Reyna and the Balois family searched together for Iris that night. In the course thereof, Atty. Reyna called
Jessebel and Grace to ask if they knew where Gil was. Both stated that they were in Marikina but denied having any knowledge about
Gil’s location. Later, the party tried to search Gil’s house as well as Grace’s place (the latter being referred to as the "tree house").
However, both yielded negative results.

In the morning of April 24, 2002, Atty. Reyna proceeded to look for Grace and again asked where Gil and Iris were. Eventually, Grace
admitted that the two were at her grandfather’s house, which was only around 30 minutes away from her place. They proceeded
accordingly and there, found Iris and Gil who were both surprised to see Atty. Reyna. Subsequently, Atty. Reyna asked Iris why she left
home and she answered that it was because of her brother Eldon’s warning that her family knew everything about her relationship with
Gil. Atty. Reyna confirmed the veracity of Eldon’s statement and went on to advise Iris to just tell the truth. Iris heeded Atty. Reyna’s
advice, allowing him to contact the Baloises and arrange for her return. As it turned out, they agreed to meet at Chowking-Poblacion for
such purpose.16

In view of the incidents that transpired on December 28, 2001 and April 23 to 24, 2002, Benjamin filed a criminal complaint for Rape,
Serious Illegal Detention and Child Abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 against Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel and Grace before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa (Muntinlupa Pros. Office), docketed as I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22.17

C. Incidents of June 23 to November 9, 2003

Finally, as for the third set of incidents, petitioners asserted that on June 23, 2003, Iris was abducted in front of Assumption College.
This time, Gil conspired with Atty. Reyna and respondent Arturo Calianga (Arturo), to take Iris in order to prevent her from appearing at
the preliminary investigation in I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22 scheduled on June 25, 2003. In the afternoon of the same day, Iris’ family
brought Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER) agents to Arturo’s house. Upon their arrival, Grace told them that Gil left
with some clothes and that he and Iris eloped and would proceed to Cagayan de Oro City. Soon after the abduction on June 23, 2003,
Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo started their psychological manipulation of Iris. 18

On June 27, 2003, Gil, with the help of two men, brought Iris to Cagayan de Oro City and there, held her captive in a small room with a
small mat, near a pigpen. They controlled her movements, such as when she would eat, sleep, bathe or use the toilet. Gil raped her
almost every day even during her menstrual period and would beat her up whenever she resisted. Also, Gil often told Iris that he would
have her entire family killed by his Moslem relatives.19

Disputing petitioners’ allegations, respondents denied that Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo abducted Iris and instead, claimed that Gil and
Iris eloped for the second time, after visiting the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City where Iris declared that the charges
against respondents were all fabricated by her grandfather, Benjamin, and that she wanted them dismissed. Respondents claimed that
Iris was quite prepared during her second elopement with Gil as she brought with her three bags containing several personal effects
and other relevant documents. Eventually, Iris’ family would discover that the reason for her elopement with Gil was because she was
being maltreated and physically abused by her grandfather, Benjamin. Moreover, Iris could no longer stomach the lies Benjamin wanted
her to say about Gil.20

Subsequently, Benjamin filed a second complaint against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention,
Grave Coercion and Obstruction of Justice before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati (Makati Pros. Office), docketed as I.S. No.
03-G-14072-75.21
On July 9, 2003, the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City dismissed the charges against Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel and Grace for Rape
and Serious Illegal Detention in I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22 for insufficiency of evidence. However, having found that he had sexual
intercourse with a minor, Gil was charged for Child Abuse. Consequently, a warrant of arrest was issued against Gil.22

Determined to face the charges against him, Gil, together with Iris, returned from Cagayan de Oro City to Manila where he posted bail
for the Child Abuse case.23

On August 6, 2003, Iris executed an affidavit (August 6, 2003 affidavit), sworn before Makati Assistant City Prosecutor George de Joya
(Pros. de Joya), denying that she was kidnapped, detained or raped by Gil. She also affirmed that she loved Gil and eloped with him. 24

On August 13, 2003, Iris and Gil appeared together on the GMA-7 television network’s Frontpage news segment "Magkasintahan Pala"
where Iris publicly declared that she loved Gil and that she went with him freely. 25

On August 19, 2003, Iris appeared before the 9th Division of the CA in the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus filed by Benjamin in
view of her second elopement on June 23, 2003. 26 During the said hearing, Iris declared that she was never kidnapped, detained or
raped and that she loved Gil who was her boyfriend since December 2001. She also confirmed that she executed the August 6, 2003
affidavit before Pros. de Joya and that she appeared in "Magkasintahan Pala" on August 13, 2003. She also testified that she visited
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa asking for the dismissal of the erroneous charges filed by Benjamin. When the CA
Justices asked with whom she wanted to go home, she said that she wanted to go with Gil and his family. She added that she did not
want her grandfather to visit her. Hence, in line with her decision during the foregoing proceedings, Iris and Gil freely cohabited
beginning August 19, 2003 and were seen in public, freely roaming around the city. They regularly went to church together, underwent
counseling and even planned to have their relationship bonded by marriage as soon as they got the required parental consent.27

On November 9, 2003, Benjamin forcibly took Iris away from Gil as the two were going to church. He subsequently kept Iris
incommunicado for days and then had her declare through radio, newspaper and television that she was kidnapped and raped by Gil
and his family. While in the company of her relatives, Iris was able to sneak out text messages to Gil using the cellular phone of her
grandfather, expressing her deep love and concern for him and warning his family about Benjamin’s plans against them. 28

On December 15, 2003, Iris, assisted by members of the groups Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption and Gabriela, proceeded to
the DOJ Task Force on Women and Children Protection (DOJ Task Force) and filed a third complaint against Gil for Forcible Abduction
with Rape and Obstruction of Justice, punished under Presidential Decree No. 1829,29 docketed as I.S. No. 2004-127.30

Disposition of the Criminal Complaints

The three (3) criminal complaints filed by Iris and Benjamin against respondents were disposed as follows:

First, in I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22, State Prosecutor II Lilian Doris S. Alejo (Pros. Alejo) of the Muntinlupa Pros. Office issued the
Resolution dated July 9, 2003,31 dismissing the charges for Serious Illegal Detention and Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel and
Grace for insufficiency of evidence. In gist, Pros. Alejo found that the pieces of evidence showed that Gil and Iris were sweethearts and
the sexual intercourse that transpired between them was consensual. Likewise, she observed that the story narrated by Iris was
farfetched and, to a certain degree, unacceptable and unimaginable, intimating that it was unbelievable that Iris would still go to
volleyball practice with Gil after the first rape he allegedly committed against her. 32

Nonetheless, Pros. Alejo recommended the filing of informations for Child Abuse against Gil for having sexual intercourse with Iris on
December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2003 by taking advantage of her minority and his moral influence as a pastor of their
church.33 Accordingly, Gil was charged under the following amended criminal informations,34 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 03-549
and 03-551:

Criminal Case No. 03-551

That on December 28, 2001, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by taking advantage of his influence as Mormon priest of the church of which herein victim, seventeen (17) year[s] old IRIS
KRISTINE ALBERTO y BALOIS is a member, and through moral compulsion, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
engaged in sexual intercourse with said minor.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Muntinlupa City, July 9, 2003.

Criminal Case No. 03-549

That on April 23, 2002, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by taking advantage of his influence as Mormon priest of the church of which herein victim, seventeen (17) year old IRIS
KRISTINE ALBERTO y BALOIS is a member, and through moral compulsion, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
engaged in sexual intercourse with said minor.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Muntinlupa City, July 9, 2003.

Second, in I.S. No. 03-G-14027-75, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Henry M. Salazar (Pros. Salazar) of the Makati Pros. Office issued a
Resolution dated March 5, 2004,35 equally dismissing the charges for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, Grave Coercion and
Obstruction of Justice against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for lack of merit and/or insufficiency of evidence. Anent the Kidnapping
charge, Pros. Salazar found that no evidence was submitted which would prove that Iris was forcibly taken away and deprived of her
liberty.36 Similarly, he observed that there was no evidence or any particular allegation of facts in the complaint-affidavit constituting the
acts which were claimed as coercive.37In the same vein, he found no evidence or any sufficient allegation to support the charge of
Obstruction of Justice.38

Pros. Salazar further noted that aside from the insufficiency of the complainant’s 39 evidence, the affidavit of Iris dated August 5, 2003,
the news package entitled "Magkasintahan Pala," and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing on August 19, 2003 of the
petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 78316 all support the dismissal of the foregoing charges. 40 He also observed that the
complainant moved for the suspension of the preliminary investigation due to the need to have Iris mentally examined, alleging certain
doubts on the voluntariness of her August 6, 2003 affidavit. However, no mental examination report was submitted to verify such
doubts. In addition, Pros. Salazar took cognizance of the fact that while Iris was "rescued" on November 9, 2003, Benjamin only asked
for the revival of the preliminary investigation of the case on January 22, 2004.41

Finally, the counter-charge of Perjury was dismissed, also for lack of merit. 42

Dissatisfied, Benjamin moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated July 30, 2004. 43

Third, in I.S. No. 2004-127, State Prosecutor Zenaida M. Lim (Pros. Lim) of the DOJ Task Force issued a Resolution dated November
8, 2004,44 also dismissing the third case for Forcible Abduction with Rape and Obstruction of Justice against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

In addition to the above-stated incidents, complainant45 averred that Atty. Reyna and Arturo also raped her in the month of August 2003.
She alleged that Atty. Reyna gave her a drink laced with some kind of chemical substance which made her dizzy and weak and
thereafter, succeeded to have sexual intercourse with her. Iris averred that Arturo also did the same thing to her. She likewise claimed
that Atty. Reyna and Arturo sexually molested her every time they went to Taytay, while Gil continually raped her. After the habeas
corpus proceedings in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 78316, Gil brought her to Atty. Reyna’s house in Putatan, Muntinlupa where she was
repeatedly raped by Gil and Atty. Reyna. According to Iris, Atty. Reyna also brought her to an apartment in Camella Homes, Muntinlupa
where Arturo raped her. She stayed at Atty. Reyna’s Putatan residence for three (3) months and the latter would bring her to the
Camella Homes apartment whenever his wife sensed what they were doing to her. 46

Pros. Lim found no probable cause for the crimes charged, holding that Iris was not a credible witness because of her flip-flopping
testimonies and the serious contradictions therein. She observed that the fact that Iris admitted that she went back to school and even
got exemplary grades confirmed that she was of sound mind and acted with volition when she went away with Gil on June 23, 2003.
Her mental condition was also adjudged to be normal by the CA justices who observed her personal demeanor during the August 19,
2003 hearing in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 78316. Further, the fact that Iris was not abducted but acted with free will was attested to by Gemma
Cachuela (Cachuela), a staff of the Muntinlupa Prosecutor’s Office, stating that Iris went to their office on June 23, 2003 to withdraw her
complaint. Pros. Lim added that Cachuela had no reason or motive to fabricate her statement. Likewise, she noted that the fact that the
presentation of the news program "Magkasintahan Pala" and Iris’ text messages to Gil as evidence were suppressed meant that they
were adverse to Iris’ cause. She also found the assertion that Iris was made to undergo a mock trial twice a week to script her
testimony for the first habeas corpus proceedings to be untrue as Iris herself admitted that respondents received the subpoena only on
August 17, 2003, or two (2) days before the August 19, 2003 hearing. Further, she deemed that it was incredible that respondents
would use a color-coding vehicle on the day of Iris’ purported abduction. Complainant’s sweeping statements against Atty. Reyna and
Arturo were also found to be inadequate to establish their guilt, observing that if Iris were indeed drugged for the first time and raped,
she should not have acceded to drink the same substance for a second time. Moreover, if she was indeed molested by Atty. Reyna and
Arturo, she should have declared such fact during the proceedings in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 78316. Yet, on the contrary, Iris even praised
Atty. Reyna and Arturo for being "mabubuting tao" (good people). 47 In closing, Pros. Lim held that no abduction with rape took place but
rather, the rule on two (2) consenting adults giving free reign to their emotions prevailed in this case. 48

Finally, anent the charge of Obstruction of Justice, Pros. Lim dismissed the same, also for lack of sufficient evidence. 49

Aggrieved, Iris and Benjamin appealed the dismissal of all the foregoing charges to the DOJ. 50

Proceedings Before the DOJ

On December 11, 2006, the DOJ Secretary issued the first assailed Resolution of even date 51 which he later modified through an
Amended Resolution dated December 22, 2006 (Amended Resolution). 52 In the Amended Resolution, the DOJ Secretary resolved the
consolidated petitions in I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22, I.S. No. 03-G-14027-75 and I.S. No. 2004-127, finding probable cause to charge: (a)
Gil for Rape, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, on account of the December 28, 2001 incidents; (b) Gil, Jessebel, Atty.
Reyna and Grace for one (1) count each of Serious Illegal Detention and Rape, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, on
account of the April 23 to 24, 2002 incidents; and (c) Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for one (1) count each of Forcible Abduction with Rape
on account of the June 23 to November 9, 2003 incidents. 53

In granting the consolidated petitions, the DOJ Secretary observed, among others, that Gil merely interposed the sweetheart defense,
which in itself was doubtful in view of Iris’ positive identification of him as the culprit of the December 28, 2001 incident. He further held
that it was error to have dismissed the charges against respondents on the basis of the dismissal of the two (2) habeas corpus cases
considering that the causes of action therein were different and that the CA did not make any finding on the criminal liability of the
respondents. Also, he noted that Iris’ family reported to the authorities that she had been abducted. Moreover, he found that
respondents conspired with one another in the abduction and consequent raping of Iris. 54

On January 18, 2007, respondents moved for the reconsideration of the Amended Resolution. 55

Meanwhile, on February 5, 2007, two (2) separate criminal Informations were filed for Forcible Abduction with Rape against Gil, Arturo,
and Atty. Reyna, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-122, and for Serious Illegal Detention with Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel,
and Grace, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-128:

Criminal Case No. 07-12256

The undersigned Acting City Prosecutor upon sworn complaint duly attached and made an integral part hereof and marked as Annex
"A," executed on December 15, 2003 before the Violence Against Women and Children Division (VAWCD) of the National Bureau of
Investigation by the offended party, IRIS KRISTINE ALBERTO Y BALOIS, then eighteen (18) years old, accuses RODRIGO A. REYNA,
GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA and ARTURO S. CALIANGA of FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE pursuant to Article 48 in relation
to Article 342 and Article 266 paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and committed in relation to the incidents that occurred
between June 23, 2003 until November 9, 2003 as follows:

That on June 23, 2003, in Makati City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, all the above-named accused
mutually helping, conspiring and confederating with each other, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abducted the private
complainant, Iris Kristine Alberto y Balois, against her will with the aid of two armed men in front of Assumption College in Makati City
using a Tamaraw FX vehicle with plate number TRP-871, with lewd and unchaste designs and for the purpose of preventing the private
complainant from pursuing her earlier complaint for rape, serious illegal detention and violation of Republic Act No. 7610 in I.S. No. 02-
G-03020-22 before the Muntinlupa City Prosecutor’s Office against accused Gil Anthony M. Calianga, Rodrigo A. Reyna and several
other persons, and that thereafter the private complainant was taken to the house of accused Rodrigo A. Reyna at Unit 17, Dona
Segundina Townhomes, Muntinlupa City, where she was detained against her will for two days, and later transferred to a house in San
Pedro, Laguna where she was also detained against her will until June 27, 2003;

That on or about June 27, 2003, all the above-named accused, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously decided to hide the
private complainant in Mindanao and, with the help of armed men and with threat, force and intimidation, accused Gil Anthony Calianga
brought the private complainant to Cagayan de Oro where she was held captive in a house until about August 5, 2003 and where
accused Gil Anthony M. Calianga had carnal knowledge of her repeatedly against her will, by means of threat, force, violence and
intimidation and by making her take drinks laced with drugs;

That on or about August 5, 2003, accused Gil Anthony M. Calianga, with the aid or several unknown persons, brought the private
complainant back to Metro Manila and thereafter, together with accused Rodrigo A. Reyna and Arturo S. Calianga, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously detain the private complainant in a house in Taytay, Rizal until she was transferred to the house of accused Rodrigo A.
Reyna in Muntinlupa City where the three accused continued to hold her against her will, at which different places the three accused
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of threat, force, violence, intimidation and psychological manipulation, and through the
use of drugs, took turns in repeatedly having carnal knowledge of the private complainant against her will until she was rescued on
November 9, 2003 by her relatives and NBI agents.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Manila, January 30, 2007.

Criminal Case No. 07-12857

The undersigned Acting City Prosecutor, upon sworn complaint duly attached and made an integral part hereof and marked as Annex
"A", executed on July 4, 2002 before the Women’s Desk, Muntinlupa City Police Station by the offended party, IRIS KRISTINE
ALBERTO Y BALOIS, then seventeen (17) years old, assisted by her grandfather Benjamin D. Balois, accuses RODRIGO A. REYNA,
GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, JEZIBEL CALIANGA, GRACE EVANGELISTA confederating and mutually helping each other in the
crime of SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION and Rape of a minor as defined under Article 267, paragraph 1(4) and paragraph 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:

That at about 5:30 [sic] in the afternoon of April 23, 2002, in the City of Muntinlupa and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, through fraudulent misrepresentation, by means of force, threat and intimidation and by taking
advantage of his influence as priest of the Mormon Church of which the private complainant Iris Kristine [Balois Alberto], female, then a
minor, seventeen (17) years of age, was also a member, then and there, and with lewd and unchaste design, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take and carry away Iris Kristine Balois Alberto against her will and without legal cause, from South Green Heights in
Muntinlupa City and brought her to a tree house located at Camella Homes, Muntinlupa City where said accused, by means of threat,
force, violence and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of the private complainant against her will in
the evening of the said date and detained her until the morning of April 24, 2002; that said accused Gil Anthony Calianga would not
have succeeded in detaining her until the morning of April 24, 2002 and in having carnal knowledge of her against her will on the night
of April 23, 2002 without the indispensable cooperation of accused JEZIBEL CALIANGA and GRACE EVANGELISTA who padlocked
the tree house from the outside while the private complainant was detained inside, and the indispensable cooperation of accused Atty.
RODRIGO A. REYNA, a high priest of the Mormon church, a close friend and associate of private complainant’s grandfather and a
member of the legal profession, who, taking advantage of his ascendancy and moral persuasion, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
aided, abetted and cooperated with accused Gil Anthony Calianga, Jezibel Calianga and Grace Evangelista by giving them instructions
through cellular phone and by misleading and actively misrepresenting to the private complainant’s family her whereabouts. Without
such cooperation and unity in effort on the part of the above named accused, Iris Kristine Balois Alberto, a minor at that time, would not
have been detained and raped on April 23 to 24, 2002.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Manila, January 30, 2007.

For alleged reasons of extreme urgency, respondents filed a petition for certiorari 58 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97863,
while the resolution of their January 18, 2007 Joint Motion for Reconsideration was still pending.

In the interim, a warrant of arrest59 was issued on February 23, 2007, by Presiding Judge Philip A. Aguinaldo of the RTC of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 207 against all the accused in Criminal Case No. 07-128. Later, on January 14, 2008, Acting Presiding Judge Romulo SG.
Villanueva of the RTC, Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 issued a warrant of arrest 60 against all the accused in Criminal Case No. 07-122.

The CA Ruling

The CA gave due course to respondents’ petition for certiorari and on January 11, 2008 rendered its Decision 61which revoked the DOJ
Resolutions.

It ruled that the DOJ Secretary gravely abused his discretion in reversing the resolutions of no less than three (3) investigative bodies
which all found lack of probable cause and in disregarding the overwhelming, credible and convincing evidence which negated the
charges filed against respondents.62 Of particular note to the CA were the inconsistent and inherently improbable testimony of Iris, the
existence of love letters and text messages of love and concern between Iris and Gil, and the hiatus of evidence that would s how that
Atty. Reyna, Arturo, Jessebel and Grace conspired to rape or illegally detain Iris. 63

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,64 essentially arguing that the CA erroneously assumed the function of public prosecutor
when it determined the non-existence of probable cause. The said motion was, however, denied in a Resolution dated March 13,
2008.65

Issue Before The Court

The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the CA erred in revoking the DOJ Resolutions based
on grave abuse of discretion.

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions are partly meritorious.

It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non-
existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the general rule rests on the principle of separation of
powers, dictating that the determination of probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an executive function; while
the exception hinges on the limiting principle of checks and balances, 66 whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action of certiorari,
has been tasked by the present Constitution "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 67

In the case of Callo-Caridad v. Esteban,68 citing Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Tobias III,69 the Court held:

In reviewing the findings of the public prosecutor on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially
executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the respondents was committed, and whether there was probable
cause to believe that the respondents were guilty thereof.

On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause only through a special civil
action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive
department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to
demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers. As the
Court has postulated in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Tobias III:

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch,
represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive
determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

In the context of filing criminal charges, grave abuse of discretion exists in cases where the determination of probable cause is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as
"grave" must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in
contemplation of law.70 In this regard, case law states that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or
fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion.71 As held in PCGG v. Jacobi:72

In fact, the prosecutor may err or may even abuse the discretion lodged in him by law. This error or abuse alone, however, does not
render his act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into what is
fundamentally the domain of the Executive, the petitioner must clearly show that the prosecutor gravely abused his discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached. This requires the
petitioner to establish that the prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility; and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, before judicial relief from a discretionary prosecutorial action may be obtained. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

To note, probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not mean "actual and positive cause"
nor does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Accordingly, probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged.73 As pronounced in Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc.:74

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the
suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there
is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In order to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and to determine if the suspect is probably guilty of the
same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that every crime
is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no criminal offense. 75

Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court therefore holds as follows:


First, the DOJ Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion in finding that probable cause exists for the crime of Rape against Gil, Atty.
Reyna and Arturo.

Under Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, the elements of Rape are: (a) that the offender is a man; (b)
that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (c) that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation. 76

In particular, with respect to Gil, Iris averred that on December 28, 2001, Gil drugged her and thereafter, through force and intimidation,
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She also claimed that on April 23, 2002, Gil, again through force and intimidation, had
carnal knowledge of her in the tree house. Likewise, beginning June 27, 2003, Gil raped her almost every day up until her rescue on
November 9 of the same year.

In defense, records show that Gil never denied any of the above-stated sexual encounters, but merely maintained the he and Iris were
sweethearts, as shown by several love letters and text messages between them.

Ruling on the matter, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary, as the elements of rape, more likely
than not, appear to be present.

The first and second elements of the crime are beyond dispute as Gil does not deny having carnal knowledge with Iris. Anent the third
element of force and intimidation, Iris’s version of the facts, as well as Gil’s sole reliance on the sweetheart defense, leads the Court to
believe that the said element, in all reasonable likelihood, appears to be present, considering that: (a) mere denial cannot prevail over
the positive testimony of a witness;77 (b) the sweetheart theory does not, by and of itself, negate the commission of rape; 78 and (c) the
fact that Iris was a minor during the foregoing incidents casts serious doubt on the efficacy of the consent purportedly given by
her,79especially in view of Gil’s esteemed position of being a priest of the same congregation of which Iris belongs to.

Moreover, a perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes of the January 14, 2004 hearing in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 80624 (January 14,
2004 TSN) shows that Iris retracted her previous testimony during the August 19, 2003 hearing in the first habeas corpus case, i.e., CA-
G.R. S.P. No. 78316, to the effect that her statements that Gil never raped her and that she went with him on her own volition were
merely "scripted" and conjured only upon the instruction of Atty. Reyna. 80 While case law holds that recantations do not necessarily
cancel out an earlier declaration, ultimately, it should still be treated like any other testimony and as such, its credibility must be tested
during trial.81

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court finds reasonable bases to sustain the DOJ Secretary’s finding of probable cause for Rape
against Gil in connection with all three (3) incidents of December 28, 2001, April 23, 2002 and June 23 to November 9, 2003. In this
respect, the DOJ Secretary committed no grave abuse of discretion.

Similarly, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in the DOJ Secretary’s finding of probable cause for Rape against Atty. Reyna
and Arturo, but only insofar as the June 23 to November 9, 2003 incidents are concerned.

The January 14, 2004 TSN reveals that Iris categorically declared in open court that she was raped by Atty. Reyna and Arturo during
the aforesaid five month period.82 It is a standing rule that due to the nature of the commission of the crime of rape, the testimony of the
victim may be sufficient to convict the accused, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things.83 Applying the same, the Court deems it prudent to test the credibility of Iris’s testimony during
trial, in which her demeanor and deportment would be properly observable, 84 and likewise be subject to cross-examination.85

On the contrary, there appears to be no ample justification to support the finding of probable cause against Atty. Reyna and Arturo, with
respect to the rape incidents of December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002, as well as against Jessebel and Grace for all three (3)
incidents.

As may be gleaned from the Amended Resolution, the DOJ Secretary indicted Atty. Reyna, Arturo, Jessebel and Grace for these
incidents only by reason of conspiracy. Yet, other than his general imputation thereof, the DOJ Secretary never provided any rational
explanation for his finding of conspiracy against the aforementioned respondents. The rule is that conspiracy must be proved as clearly
and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself. It can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves
when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests. 86 In this case, the Amended
Resolution is bereft of any showing as to how the particular acts of the foregoing respondents figured into the common design of raping
Iris and as such, the Court finds no reason to charge them for the same.

Therefore, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the following respects, the Court upholds the DOJ Secretary’s finding of probable
cause for the crime of Rape against Gil for all three (3) rape incidents and against Atty. Reyna and Arturo for the incidents of June 23 to
November 9, 2003.

At this juncture, the Court observes that the DOJ charged Gil for Rape in relation to Child Abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of RA
761087 on account of the December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002 incidents. Existing jurisprudence, however, proscribes charging an
accused for both crimes, rather, he may be charged only for either. As held in People v. Pangilinan:88

If the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under
Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the
same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a
single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised
Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense
penalized by a special law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this light, while the Court also finds that probable cause exists for the crime of Child Abuse against Gil for the same rape incidents of
December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002 in view of the substantial identity of its elements89with that of Rape, he cannot be charged for
both. Records disclose that there are standing charges against Gil for Child Abuse in Criminal Case Nos. 03-551 and 03-
549,90 respectively on account of the same occurrences. Thus, so as not to violate his right against double jeopardy, the Court finds it
proper to dismiss the charges of Rape against Gil with respect to the December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002 incidents considering the
subsisting charges of Child Abuse as herein discussed.
Notably, Gil, as well as Atty. Reyna and Arturo, cannot be charged for Child Abuse with respect to the June 23 to November 9, 2003
incidents since Iris had ceased to be a minor by that time. 91 Likewise, Atty. Reyna and Arturo cannot be indicted for Child Abuse in
connection with the December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002 incidents as there appears to be no sufficient bases to support the DOJ
Secretary’s finding of conspiracy.

Second, the Court further holds that the DOJ Secretary gravely abused his discretion in finding that probable cause exists for the crime
of Serious Illegal Detention.

The elements of the crime of Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the RPC are: (a) that the offender is a private individual; (b)
that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) that the act of detention is illegal, not being
ordered by any competent authority nor allowed by law; and (d) that any of the following circumstances is present: (1) that the detention
lasts for more than five days; or (2) that it is committed by simulating public authority; or (3) that any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or threats to kill him shall have been made; or (4) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer.92

Based on the Amended Resolution, the DOJ Secretary charges all the respondents for Serious Illegal Detention for the incidents of
April 23 to 24, 2002 and June 23 until November 9, 2003. Related to this, records show that Iris retracted her previous testimony
wherein she stated that she voluntarily went with Gil.93 She also stated that she was abducted on June 23, 2003 and brought to various
places, such as Cagayan De Oro, Taytay and San Pedro, within a period of five (5) months. 94

Aside from Iris’s bare allegations, records are bereft of any evidence to support a finding that Iris was illegally detained or restrained of
her movement. On the contrary, based on Pros. Lim’s Resolution dated November 8, 2004, several disinterested witnesses had
testified to the fact that Iris was seen freely roaming in public with Gil, 95negating the quintessential element of deprivation of liberty. 96

Towards the same end, the Court equally observes that the inherent inconsistencies in Iris’s statements are too dire to ignore even only
at the prosecutor’s level. Anent the April 23, 2002 incidents, the Court finds it contrary to both reason and logic that Gil would stop-over
at a McDonald’s restaurant, a place widely open to the public eye, in the process of kidnapping Iris. Similarly, with respect to the June
23, 2003 incidents, if Iris was indeed abducted and detained during that time, then it is highly incredible that she would be voluntarily let
go by her captors in order to attend a habeas corpus hearing before justices of the CA.

It is well to note that while the Court had given substantial weight to Iris’s uncorroborated testimony to sustain the DOJ Secretary’s
finding of probable cause for the crime of Rape, the same treatment cannot be applied to the crime of Serious Illegal Detention.
Comparing the two, Rape is an offense of secrecy97 which, more often than not, happens in a private setting involving only the accused
and the victim; likewise, the degree of humiliation and disgrace befalling a rape victim who decides to come forward must be taken into
consideration.98 For these reasons, the testimony of the latter, even if uncorroborated, can lead to a conviction. On the other hand, in
Serious Illegal Detention, the victim is usually taken from one place and transferred to another – which is in fact what has been alleged
in this case - making the commission of the offense susceptible to public view. Unfortunately, petitioners never presented any evidence
to show that Iris was restrained of her liberty at any point in time during the period of her alleged captivity.

All told, given the clear absence of probable cause for the crime of Serious Illegal Detention, the Court finds that the DOJ Secretary
gravely abused his discretion in charging respondents for the same.

Third, the DOJ Secretary also committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause for the crime of Forcible Abduction with
Rape.

The elements of Forcible Abduction under Article 342 of the RPC are: (a) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age
or reputation; (b) that the abduction must be against her will; and (c) that the abduction must be with lewd designs. 99 As this crime is
complexed with the crime of Rape pursuant to Article 48 of the RPC, the elements of the latter offense must also concur. Further, owing
to its nature as a complex crime proper,100 the Forcible Abduction must be shown to be a necessary means for committing the crime of
Rape.

As earlier discussed, there lies no evidence to prove that Iris was restrained of her liberty during the period of her captivity from June 23
to November 9, 2003 thus, denying the element of abduction. More importantly, even if it is assumed that there was some form of
abduction, it has not been shown – nor even sufficiently alleged – that the taking was done with lewd designs. Lust or lewd design is an
element that characterizes all crimes against chastity, apart from the felonious or criminal intent of the offender. As such, the said
1âwphi 1

element must be always present in order that they may be so considered as a crime of chastity in contemplation of law. 101

Moreover, the Court observes that even if it is assumed that all of the elements of Forcible Abduction were present, it was not shown
nor sufficiently alleged how the said abduction constituted a necessary means for committing the crime of Rape. As earlier discussed,
records disclose that there lies probable cause to indict Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo only for the component crime of Rape. In this
accord, the charge of the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape was improper and, hence, there was grave abuse of
discretion.

In sum, the Court finds probable cause for Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo in connection with the June 23 to November 9,
2003 Incidents. Consequently, the DOJ Secretary is ordered to direct the City State Prosecutor of Muntinlupa or any of its subordinates
to file such charge. Meanwhile, the charges of Child Abuse against Gil in Criminal Case Nos. 03-551 and 03-549 are deemed to
subsist. Aside from the foregoing, all other charges are hereby nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, in order
to conform with the pronouncements made herein, the DOJ Secretary is directed to drop (a) any subsisting charges against Jessebel
and Grace in connection with this case; (b) the charge of Rape, in relation to Section 5(b ), Article III of RA 7610, for the incidents of
December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002 against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo; and (c) the charges of Serious Illegal Detention and
Forcible Abduction with Rape against all respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 11, 2008 and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97863 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to issue the proper
resolution in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the cases were assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 38-64; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 7-48.

2Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 9-31; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 53-75. Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal,
with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Jose C. Reyes, Jr., concurring.

3 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 33-34; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 77-78.

4 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 202-209; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 273-280.

5 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 210-218; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 281-289.

6 REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 266-A.

7
"SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST ABUSE, EXPOLITATION, AND DISCRIMINATION ACT."

8 REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 267.

9 REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 342 & Art. 266-A.

10 Iris was born on December 30, 1984. See Memorandum dated August 2, 2011, rollo (G.R. No. 182130), p. 533.

11 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), p. 15; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), p. 59.

12 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), p. 10; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), p. 54.

13 Supra note 10.

14 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 15-17; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 59-61.

15 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), p. 17; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), p. 61.

16 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), p. 11; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), p. 55.

17 Id.
18 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 17-18; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 61-62.

19
Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), p. 18; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), p. 62.

20 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 11-12; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 55-56.

21 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), p. 12; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), p. 56.

22
Id.

23 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), p. 13; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), p. 57.

24
Id.

25 Id.

26Two (2) petitions for habeas corpus were filed before the CA. The first one, docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 78316, was filed
by Benjamin in view of the June 23, 2003 incidents. The second one, docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 80624, was filed by Gil
after Iris was purportedly "rescued" by her relatives on November 9, 2003. Both cases were eventually dismissed. See DOJ
Resolution dated December 11, 2006, rollo (G.R. No. 182130), p. 206; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), p. 277.

27 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 13-14; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 57-58.

28 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), p. 14; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), p. 58.

29
"PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS."

30 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), p. 14; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), p. 58.

31 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 122-125; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 122-125.

32 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), p. 124; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), p. 124.

33
Id.

34See Consolidated Comment dated September 26, 2008, rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 276-277; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp.
425-426.

35 Rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 156-167.

36 Id. at 162-163.

37 Id. at 163.

38 Id.

39
The complainant in this case was Benjamin.

40 Rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp.163-165.

41 Id. at 166.

42
Id.

43 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 126-128.

44 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 129-140; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 187-198.

45 The complainant in this case was Iris.

46 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), p. 131; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), p. 189.

47 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 136-138; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 194-196.

48 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), p. 139; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), p. 197.

49 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 139-140; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 197-198.

50
On July 25, 2003, Iris and Benjamin appealed the July 9, 2003 Resolution of Pros. Alejo. On October 7, 2004, they then
appealed the July 30, 2004 Resolution of Pros. Salazar. Finally, on February 10, 2005, they appealed the November 8, 2004
Resolution of Pros. Lim. See Petition for Review on Certiorari dated May, 8, 2008, rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 12 & 14.
51 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 202-209; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 273-280.

52
Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 210-218; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 281-289.

53 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 216-217; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 287-288.

54 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 214-215; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 285-286.

55
See Consolidated Comment dated September 26, 2008, rollo (G.R. No. 182130), p. 268; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), p. 417.

56 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 223-225.

57
Id. at 219-222.

58 Rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 344-384.

59 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), p. 226.

60 Id. at 227.

61 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 9-31; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 53-75.

62 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 24-25; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 68-69.

63 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 25-28; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 69-72.

64 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 228-235.

65
Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 33-34; rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 77-78.

66"The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of
parties affected by its decisions. The review is a part of the system of checks and balances which is a limitation on the
separation of powers and which forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. Judicial review of the decision of an official or
administrative agency exercising quasijudicial functions is proper in cases of lack of jurisdiction, error of law, grave abuse of
discretion, fraud or collusion or in case the administrative decision is corrupt, arbitrary or capricious." [MERALCO v. CBAA,
199 Phil. 453, 459 (1982); emphasis supplied; citations omitted]

67
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1.

G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013, citing Bautista v. CA, 413 Phil. 168 (2001); Sps. Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice, G.R.
68

No. 188056, January 8, 2013.

69 G.R. No. 177780, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 165, 176-177. (Citations omitted)

70 See Chua Huat v. CA, 276 Phil. 1, 18 (1991). (Citations omitted)

71 See Tavera-Luna, Inc. v. Nable, 67 Phil. 340, 344 (1939).

72 PCGG v. Jacobi, G.R. No. 155996, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 20, 57. (Citations omitted)

Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., G.R. No. 172829, July 18, 2012, 677 SCRA 120-121, citing Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc.,
73

G.R. No. 171435, July 30, 2008, 560 SCRA 518, 533-535.

74 Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., G.R. No. 171435, July 30, 2008, 560 SCRA 518, 533-535.

75Ang-Abaya v. Ang, G.R. No. 178511, December 4, 2008, 573 SCRA 129, 143, citing Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 352 Phil.
557 (1998).

76People v. Alfredo, G.R. No. 188560, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 749, 764; citing Luis B. Reyes, Revised Penal Code
525 (16th Ed., 2006).

77"Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness; it is self-serving negative evidence which cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between
the categorical testimony that rings of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other, the former is generally held to
prevail." (People v. Serrano, G.R. No. 179038, May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA 327, 345; citing People v. Dumlao, G.R. No. 181599,
August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 762, 769; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

78"It is well-settled that being sweethearts does not negate the commission of rape because such fact does not give the
accused license to have sexual intercourse against her will, and will not exonerate him from the criminal charge of rape. Being
sweethearts does not prove consent to the sexual act." (People v. Magabanua, G.R. No. 176265, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA
698, 704; emphasis and underscoring supplied; words in brackets supplied; citations omitted)
79 "A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of
fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae,
is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of
themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection. The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual
encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful
consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior." (Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA
643, 662; emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

80 Witness: During the Court of Appeals [hearing,] [i]t was August 19, 2002[,] I was under duress.

Atty. Reyna: You mean to say that the Justices who acceded your decision forced you to love with Gil Anthony…

Witness: No, No, Ikaw! Ikaw!

Atty. Reyna: Your Honor, may I move…

Justice Brawner: Already answered. No, No, ikaw ikaw, witness pointing to Atty. Reyna. Alright any objection to that
answer?

Atty. Pamaran: No. Your Honor, but we would like to reflect it on record that the witness said it in a very loud and
forceful emotional voice.

Justice Brawner: Loud yes, but forceful I do not know. Emotional much less. But emotional well said…

Atty. Reyna: Please clarify that when you said that it was I who forced you on page 103 of the transcript of
stenographic notes, I would like to read this to you –

It is Justice Magpale’s speaking, he said – Q –Ano ba ang gusto mo ngayon pagkatapos ng pag-uusap dito ay mag-
isip ka ng gusto mong mangyari. Sumama sa NBI para ikaw ay maeksamin, o sumama sa lolo at lola mo na pareho
nandito sa korte? O sumama sa boyfriend mo at sa kanyang pamilya? Ikaw and pipili ng gusto mong gawin ngayon.
Your answer was – A – gusto ko pong sumama sa boyfriend ko at sa pamilya niya. Do you confirm having said this
madam witness?

Witness: Yes I have said that pero ikaw and nagturo sakin nyan, scripted yan. x x x

Atty, Reyna: May I ask that question again for the record. Do you confirm having said that madam witness before the
Honorable Court that again, Your Honor, may I read for the records. It says here on page 19 – Q: This is a petition
filed against respondent Gil Anthony Calianga. Do you know him Ms. Alberto? A: Yes, Sir, he is my boyfriend. Next
question, page 20 – Q: He is your boyfriend since when he became your boyfriend? A: Since December 25, 2001. Do
you confirm this?

Witness: Ikaw and nagturo sa akin nyan. x x x x

Atty. Reyna: you have said this in open court. That’s the only question.

A – Yes, Your Honor, pero sya po ang nagturo nyan.

Justice Brawner: Next question.

Atty. Reyna: On page 30 madam witness, there is this question – Q: You said you have difficulty regarding telling xxx
lies in all in the land. Will you be specific on the Honorable Jsutices what do you mean by that Ms. Alberto? A: Kasi
po nag-file po ng kaso ang grandfather ko sa kanila. Hindi naman po kasi totoo na nakidnap ako at hindi rin totoo na
na-rape ako noong December 28, 2001. At isa pa noon April 23, 2002. The same question I will ask you madam
witness, do you confirm having said this under oath? Yes or no?

Witness: Ikaw and nagturo sa akin nyan eh! x x x x (Rollo [G.R. No. 182132], pp. 179-181; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

81"A recantation does not necessarily cancel an earlier declaration. Like any other testimony, it is subject to the test of
credibility based on the relevant circumstances and especially the demeanor of the witness on the stand." (People v.
Dalabajan, G.R. No. 105668, October 16, 1997; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

82Atty. Reyna: You said that when you were with us, as a result of having decided to live with Gil, until you were restrained, will
you please tell the Honorable Court how were you restrained by Anthony?

Witness: Dinala nyo po ako kung saan-saang lugar. Dinala nyo ako ng Cagayan De Oro, dinala nyo ako ng Taytay.
Dinala nyo ako sa san Pedro at kung saan-saan. At doon sa limang buwan na iyon, ni-rape mo ako. Ni-rape niyo
akong lahat!

Atty. Pamaran: May we ask to make it on record [a]gain that the witness answer[s] in a very forceful and loud voice.
And looking sharply at Atty. Reyna with a very serious face. x x x x [Rollo (G.R. No. 182132), pp. 179-181; emphasis
and underscoring supplied]
83People v. Olimba, G.R. No. 185008, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 223, 235; citing People v. Cadap, G.R. No. 190633,
July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 655, 660-661; further citing People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 168101, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 435,
444.

84"Well-settled is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by a trial
court x x x. Matters affecting credibility are best left to the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the elusive
and incommunicable evidence of that witness’ deportment on the stand while testifying, an opportunity denied to the appellate
courts which usually rely on the cold pages of the silent records of the case." (People v. Dahilig, G.R. No. 187083, June 13,
2011, 651 SCRA 778, 786; citing People v. Dimacuha, 467 Phil. 342, 349 (2004); People v. Del Mundo, Sr., 408 Phil. 118, 129
(2001); emphasis and underscoring supplied)

85 "The cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her credibility, expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the
truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in
substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the constitutional
right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him." (People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 139180, July 31, 2001, 362 SCRA
153, 170; emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

86Quidet v. People, G.R. No. 170289, April 8, 2010, 618 SCRA 1, 3 & 11; citing People v. Cadevida, G.R. No. 94528, March 1,
1993, 219 SCRA 218, 228.

87SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: x x
xx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)

88 G.R. No. 183090, November 14, 2011, 660 SCRA 16, 34-35.

89
For the same reasons attendant to the finding of probable cause for Rape, the Court observes that there lies probable cause
for the crime of Child Abuse against Gil in connection with the December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002 incidents. To note, the
elements of Child Abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 are: (a) that the accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) that the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and (c) that the child, whether male or female, is below eighteen (18) years of age. (See Olivarez v. CA, G.R.
No. 163866, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 473, citing Amployo v. People, 496 Phil. 747 (2005).

90 Supra note 34.

91 Supra note 10. Iris would have turned eighteen (18) years old on December 30, 2002.

92People v. Dayon, G.R. No. 94704, January 21, 1993, 217 SCRA 334, 336-337, citing People v. Mercado, 216 Phil. 469, 472-
473 (1984).

93 Supra note 80.

94 Supra note 82.

95 Rollo (G.R. No. 182130), pp. 134-135.

96 "Indeed, for the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victim's liberty, which is the essential element of the
offense, must be duly proved. In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the latter's
liberty needs to be established by indubitable proof." [People v. Fajardo, 373 Phil. 915, 926-927 (1999); emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted]

97 "Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally attempted except in dark or deserted and secluded places away
from prying eyes, and the crime usually commences solely upon the word of the offended woman herself and conviction
invariably turns upon her credibility, as the prosecution’s single witness of the actual occurrence." (People v. Molleda, 462 Phil.
461, 468 (2003); emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

98"Courts usually give credence to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault particularly if it constitutes
incestuous rape because, normally, no person would be willing to undergo the humiliation of a public trial and to testify on the
details of her ordeal were it not to condemn an injustice. Needless to say, it is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child
victims are given full weight and credit, because when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity." [People v. Oliva, 226 Phil. 518, 522 (1986); emphasis and underscoring supplied]

99 People v. Ng, 226 Phil. 518, 522 (1986).


100"Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[w]hen a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period." There are, thus, two kinds of complex crimes. The first is known as
compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. The second is known as complex
crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other." (People v. Rebucan, G.R. No. 182551, July
27, 2011, citing People v. Gaffud, Jr., G.R. No. 168050, September 19, 2008, 566 SCRA 76, 88; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

101 Luansing v. People, 136 Phil. 510, 516 (1969), citing People v. Gilo, 119 Phil. 1030, 1033 (1964).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 213792 June 22, 2015

GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent,

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 213886

JAMES QUIBAC y RAFAEL, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are the Decision dated December 6, 2013 and the Resolution dated
1 2 3

July 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34078, which, inter alia, found petitioners Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol
(Wacoy) and James Quibac Rafael (Quibac) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.

The Facts

In an Information dated June 10, 2004, Wacoy and Quibac were charged with the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), before the Regional Trial Court of Benguet, Branch 10 (RTC), as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of April 2004, at Ambongdolan, Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each other, with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, maul and kick the stomach of one ELNER ARO y LARUAN,
thereby inflicting upon him blunt traumatic injuries which directly caused his death thereafter.

That the offense committed was attended by the aggravating circumstance of superior strength. CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

According to prosecution witness Edward Benito (Benito), at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 2004, he was eating corn at a
sari-sari store located at Bungis Ambongdolan, Tublay, Benguet, when he heard a commotion at a nearby establishment. Upon
checking what the ruckus was all about, he saw his cousin, Elner Aro (Aro), already sprawled on the ground. While in that position, he
saw Wacoy kick Aro's stomach twice, after which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at Aro but was restrained from doing so. As Aro
stood up, Quibac punched him on the stomach, causing him to collapse and cry in pain. Thereafter, Aro was taken to the hospital. 5

At the hospital, Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt abdominal trauma with injury to the jejunum" and was set for operation. It
was then discovered that he sustained a perforation on his ileum, i.e., the point where the small and large intestines meet, that caused
intestinal bleeding, and that his entire abdominal peritoneum was filled with air and fluid contents from the bile. However, Aro suffered
cardiac arrest during the operation, and while he was revived through cardiopulmonary resuscitation, he lapsed into a coma after the
operation.6

Due to financial constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against the doctor's orders and eventually, died the next day. While Aro's
death certificate indicated that the cause of his

death was "cardiopulmonary arrest antecedent to a perforated ileum and generalized peritonitis secondary to mauling," an autopsy
performed on his remains revealed that the cause of his death was "rupture of the aorta secondary to blunt traumatic injuries." 7

In their defense, herein petitioners, Wacoy and Quibac, denied the charge against them. They averred that while playing pool, they saw
Aro drunk and lying down. Suddenly, Aro became unruly and kicked the leg of the pool table, causing Wacoy to shout and pick up a
stone to throw at Aro but Quibac pacified him. They also claimed that Aro almost hit Wacoy with a 2x3 piece of wood if not for Quibac' s
intervention. Wacoy ran but Aro chased him and then tripped and fell to the ground. Quiniquin Carias (Kinikin), Aro's companion,
followed Wacoy to the waiting shed nearby, cornered and kicked the latter, and the two engaged in a fist fight. Quibac came over to
pacify the two and told Wacoy to go home. 8
The RTC Ruling In a Judgment dated February 28, 2011, the RTC found Wacoy and Quibac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
9

crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray under Article 251 of the RPC and, accordingly, sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor , as maximum, and ordered them to pay Aro's heirs the amounts of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages,
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. 10

The RTC found that Benito's testimony on the mauling incident does not firmly establish that Wacoy and Quibac conspired in the killing
of Aro, and that the medical reports were neither categorical in stating that the injuries Aro sustained from the mauling directly
contributed to his death. 11

In this relation, it opined that "[a]s conspiracy was not proven and the prosecution has failed to show the extent and effect of injury [that
Wacoy and Quibac] personally inflicted on [Aro] that led to his death xx x," Wacoy and Quibac should be held criminally liable for the
crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray and not for Homicide. 12

Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac appealed to the CA. 13

The CA Ruling

In a Decision dated December 6, 2013, the CA modified Wacoy and Quibac's conviction to that of Homicide under A1iicle 249 of the
14

RPC with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, and accordingly adjusted their prison term to an
indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one ( 1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Further, the CA also imposed a legal interest of six percent ( 6%) per annum on the damages awarded by the
RTC pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 15

In so ruling, the CA gave credence to Benito's simple, direct, and straightforward testimony. In this relation, it observed that the mere
fact that Benito is Aro's cousin should not militate against his credibility since there was no proof that his testimony was driven by any ill
motive. However, contrary to the RTC's findings, the CA ruled that Wacoy and Quibac should not be convicted of the crime of Death
16

Caused in a Tumultuous Affray since there were only (2) persons who inflicted harm on the victim, and that there was no tumultuous
affray involving several persons. Instead, they were convicted of the crime of Homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong appreciated as it was shown that the purpose of their assault on Aro was only to maltreat or inflict
physical harm on him. 17

Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac separately moved for reconsideration. 18


In a Resolution dated July 21, 2014, the CA denied Quibac's
19

motions for reconsideration; hence, the instant petitions.


20

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly found Wacoy and Quibac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds
other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders
such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law. 21

Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court agrees with the CA's ruling modifying Wacoy and Quibac' s conviction from Death Caused in
a Tumultuous Affray to that of Homicide, as will be explained hereunder.

Article 251 of the RPC defines and penalizes the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray as follows:

Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing groups organized for the common
purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and
in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons
who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished by prision mayor.

If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall have used violence upon the person of the victim.

The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there be several persons; (b) that they did not compose
groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these several persons quarrelled
and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in the course of the affray; (e) that it
cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (j) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who
used violence can be identified. Based on case law, a tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons
22

and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof
cannot be ascertained. 23

On the other hand, the crime of Homicide is defined and penalized under Article 249 of the RPC, which reads:

Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, without the attendance of any of
the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
The elements of Homicide are the following: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance; (c)
the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (d) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of
Murder, or by that of Parricide or Infanticide.24

In the instant case, there was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of which Aro died. On the contrary, the
1âwphi 1

evidence clearly established that there were only two (2) persons, Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one defenseless individual, Aro,
and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the poor victim. There was no confusion and tumultuous
quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression in that fateful incident. Since Wacoy and Quibac were even identified as the
25

ones who assaulted Aro, the latter's death cannot be said to have been caused in a tumultuous affray. Therefore, the CA correctly held
26

that Wacoy and Quibac' s act of mauling Aro was the proximate cause of the latter's death; and as such, they must be held criminally
27

liable therefore, specifically for the crime of Homicide.

On this note, the Court does not find merit in Wacoy's contention that in view of their intent only to inflict slight physical injuries on Aro,
they should only be meted the corresponding penalty therefore in its maximum period, pursuant to Article 49 of the RPC. The said
28

provision reads:

Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended. - In cases in which the
felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be observed.

1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the accused
intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.

2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which the accused intended
to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.

3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall
also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses,
in which case the penalty provided for the attempt or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in the maximum period.

Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply where the crime committed is different from that intended and where the
felony committed befalls a different person (error in personae); and not to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the
offender result from his felonious act (praeter intentionem), 29

as in this case. It is well-settled that if the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed. In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence,
30

the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the
consequences thereof. 31

Be that as it may, the penalty for the crime of Homicide must be imposed in its minimum period due to the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong under Article 13 (3) of the RPC in favor of Wacoy and Quibac, as correctly
appreciated by the CA. In determining the presence of this circumstance, it must be considered that since intention is a mental process
and is an internal state of mind, the accused's intention must be judged by his conduct and external overt acts. In this case, the
32

aforesaid mitigating circumstance is available to Wacoy and Quibac, given the absence of evidence showing that, apart from kicking
and punching Aro on the stomach, something else had been done; thus, evincing the purpose of merely maltreating or inflicting physical
harm, and not to end the life of Aro.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on Wacoy and Quibac, the CA correctly imposed the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six ( 6) years and one ( 1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, taking into consideration the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Finally, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the original amount of ₱50,000.00 each are increased to ₱75,000.00 each
in order to conform with prevailing jurisprudence. All other awards, as well as the imposition of interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%)
33

per annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until the same are fully paid, are retained.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 6, 2013 and the Resolution dated July 21, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34078 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accordingly, petitioners Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol and
James Quibac y Rafael are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong under Article 13 (3) of the
same Code. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six ( 6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay the heirs of
Elner Aro the amounts of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, and ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN


Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo (G.R. No. 213792), pp. 5-13; rollo (G.R. No. 213886),pp. 4-19.

2
Rollo (G.R. No. 213792), pp. 16-30; rollo (G.R. No. 213886), pp. 23-37. Penned by Associate Justice Melchor Q.C. Sadang
with Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Franchito N. Diamante concurring.

3
Rollo (G.R. No. 213792), pp. 37-38

4
Rollo (G.R. No. 213792), pp. 17 and 39; rollo (G.R. No. 213886), p. 24.

5
See Rollo (G.R. No. 213792), p. 18; and rollo (G.R. No. 213886), p. 25.

6
Rollo (G.R. No. 213792), pp. 18-19; rollo (G.R. No. 213886), pp. 25-26.

7
Rollo (G.R. No. 213792), p. 19; rollo (G.R. No. 213886), p. 26.

8
Rollo (G.R. No. 213792), pp. 19-20; rollo (G.R. No. 213886), pp. 26-27.

9
Rollo, (G.R. No. 213792), pp. 39-45. Penned by Presiding Judge Edgardo B. Diaz De Rivera, Jr.

10
Id. at 45.

11
See id. at 42-44.

12
See id. at 44.

13
Not attached to the rollos.

14
Rollo (G.R. No. 213792), pp. 16-30; rollo (G.R. No. 213886), pp. 23-37.

15
See ro!lo (G.R. No. 213792), pp. 29-30; and rollo (G.R. No. 213886), pp. 36-37.

16
See rollo (G .R. No. 213792), pp. 23-26; and rollo (G.R. No. 213886), pp. 30-33.

17
See rollo (G.R. No. 213792), pp. 26-29; and rollo (G.R. No. 213886), pp. 33-36.

18
See Wacoy's motion for reconsideration dated January 6, 2014; rollo (G.R. No. 213792), pp. 31-35. Meanwhile, Quibac filed
a motion for reconsideration dated January 3, 2014 and another motion for reconsideration (with Notice of Entry of
Appearance for the Accused-Appellant) dated January 20, 2014 (both not attached to the rollo ); see rollo (G.R. No. 213792),
p. 3 7.

19
Rollo (G.R. No. 213792), pp. 37-38.

20
The rollo docs not contain any attachment that resolves Wacoy's motion for reconsideration.

People v. Arguta, G.R. No. 213216, April 22, 2015, citing Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012, 667 SCRA
21

421, 428 and Eusebio-Calderon v. People, 484 Phil. 87, 98 (2004).

22
People v. Julianda, Jr., 422 Phil. 28, 51 (2001).

23
Sison v. People, 320 Phil. 112, 134 (1995), citing United States v. Tandoc, 40 Phil. 954, 957 (1920).

24
Villanueva v. Caparas, G.R. No. 190969, January 30, 2013, 689 SCRA 679, 686.

25
See Sison v. People, supra note 23.

26
See People v. Dalabajan, 345 Phil. 944, 961 (1997).
27
"Proximate cause is defined as 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."' (People v. Villacorta, 672 Phil. 712, 722
(2011), citing Calimutan v. People,517 Phil. 272, 284 [2006).)

28
See Wacoy's Petition; rollo (G.R. No. 213792), pp. 9-11.

29
See People v. Tomotorgo, 220 Phil. 617, 623 (1985); citations omitted.

30
Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120744-46, 122677, and 122676, June 25, 2012, 674 SCRA 420, 461, citing People
v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003).

31
Id., citing United States v. Gloria, 3 Phil. 333, 335 (1904).

32
See People v. Regato, 212 Phil. 268, 274 (1984).

33
See People v. Villalba, G.R. No. 207629, October 22, 2014.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 179035 April 16, 2008

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,


vs.
JESUS PAYCANA, JR., appellant.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Appellant Jesus Paycana Jr. was charged1 with the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37. Appellant pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. 2 Pre-trial ensued, in which appellant admitted
that the victim Lilybeth Balandra-Paycana (Lilybeth) is his legitimate wife.3

Appellant sought to exculpate himself from the crime by setting up self-defense, claiming that it was his wife who attacked him first. In
view of the nature of self-defense, it necessarily follows that appellant admits having killed his seven (7)-month pregnant wife, and in
the process put to death their unborn child.

The prosecution presented Tito Balandra (Tito), the father of the victim; Angelina Paycana (Angelina), appellant’s eldest daughter who
personally witnessed the whole gruesome incident; Barangay Tanod Juan Parañal, Jr.; Dr. Stephen Beltran, who conducted the
autopsy; and Santiago Magistrado, Jr., the embalmer who removed the fetus from the deceased’s body.

The evidence for the prosecution established that on 26 November 2002, at around 6:30 in the morning, appellant, who worked as a
butcher, came home from the slaughter house carrying his tools of trade, a knife, a bolo, and a sharpener. 4 His wife was preparing their
children for school and was waiting for him to come home from his work. For reasons known to him alone, appellant stabbed his wife 14
times.5 Tito, whose house is at back of appellant’s house, heard his daughter shouting for help. When he arrived, he saw his daughter
lying prostrate near the door and her feet were trembling. But seeing appellant, who was armed, he stepped back. Angelina told Tito by
the window that appellant had held her mother’s neck and stabbed her. 6

Appellant claimed that he wrested the weapon from Lilybeth after she stabbed him first. According to him, they had an altercation on the
evening of 25 November 2002 because he saw a man coming out from the side of their house and when he confronted his wife about
the man, she did not answer. On the following morning, he told her that they should live separately. As appellant got his things and was
on his way out of the door, Lilybeth stabbed him. But he succeeded in wresting the knife from Lilybeth. And he stabbed her. He added
that he was not aware of the number of times he stabbed his wife because he was then dizzy and lots of blood was coming out of his
wound.7

The trial court found appellant guilty in a decision dated 14 April 2005. 8 The case was automatically appealed to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to Rule 122 Section 3(d) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 9 The appellate court denied appellant’s appeal in a decision
dated 30 May 2007.10 Appellant filed a notice of appeal dated 14 June 2007 before the Court of Appeals.11

The Court is not convinced by appellant’s assertion that the trial court erred in not appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-
defense in his favor.

Self-defense, being essentially a factual matter, is best addressed by the trial court. 12 In the absence of any showing that the trial court
failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion, the court below, having seen
and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies. No compelling reason, therefore, exists for
this Court to disturb the trial court’s finding that appellant did not act in self-defense.

Appellant failed to discharge the burden to prove self-defense. An accused who interposes self-defense admits the commission of the
act complained of. The burden to establish self-defense is on the accused who must show by strong, clear and convincing evidence
that the killing is justified and that, therefore, no criminal liability has attached. The first paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code13 requires, in a plea of self-defense, (1) an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) a reasonable necessity of the means
employed by the accused to prevent or repel it, and (3) the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.14

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be invoked. 15 Appellant’s claim of self-defense was belied by the eyewitness testimony
of his own daughter Angelina, which was corroborated by the testimony of his father-in-law Tito and the medical findings. Angelina’s
testimony was very clear on how her father strangled and stabbed her mother just as she was about to greet him upon arriving home.
She begged her father to stop, and even tried to grab her father’s hand but to no avail. 16 Tito ran to appellant’s house as he heard his
daughter Lilybeth’s screaming for help, and he saw her lying prostate near the door with her feet trembling. He moved back as he saw
appellant armed with a weapon. Angelina told him by the window that appellant had held her mother’s neck and stabbed her. 17

Moreover, Dr. Rey Tanchuling, a defense witness who attended to appellant’s wound, testified on cross-examination that the injuries
suffered by appellant were possibly self-inflicted considering that they were mere superficial wounds. 18

In any event, self-defense on the part of appellant is further negated by the physical evidence in the case. Specifically, the number of
wounds, fourteen (14) in all, indicates that appellant's act was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined effort to kill his
victim.19 The victim died of multiple organ failure secondary to multiple stab wounds. 20

The Court agrees with the trial court’s observation, thus:

Angelina who is 15 years old will not testify against her father were it not for the fact that she personally saw her father to be
the aggressor and stab her mother. Telling her grandfather immediately after the incident that accused stabbed her mother is
part of the res gestae hence, admissible as evidence. Between the testimony of Angelica who positively identified accused to
have initiated the stabbing and continuously stabbed her mother and on the other hand, the testimony of accused that he killed
the victim in self-defense, the testimony of the former prevails.21

The RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly convicted appellant of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion
in the killing of his seven (7)-month pregnant wife.

Bearing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, the crime of parricide22 is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is
killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender
with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be
the marriage certificate. The testimony of the accused of being married to the victim, in itself, may also be taken as an admission
against penal interest.23

As distinguished from infanticide,24 the elements of unintentional abortion25 are as follows: (1) that there is a pregnant woman; (2) that
violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the violence is intentionally exerted; and (4) that as
a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of infanticide, it is
necessary that the child be born alive and be viable, that is, capable of independent existence.26 However, even if the child who was
expelled prematurely and deliberately were alive at birth, the offense is abortion due to the fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6
months is not viable.27 In the present case, the unborn fetus was also killed when the appellant stabbed Lilybeth several times.

The case before us is governed by the first clause of Article 48 28 because by a single act, that of stabbing his wife, appellant committed
the grave felony of parricide as well as the less grave felony of unintentional abortion. A complex crime is committed when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies.

Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances.
Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for the most serious crime (parricide) is death. However, the Court of
Appeals properly commuted the penalty of death imposed on the appellant to reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.29

Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 (consistent with prevailing jurisprudence) is automatically granted to the offended party, or
his/her heirs in case of the former’s death, without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of any of the
aforementioned crimes (murder, homicide, parricide and rape). Moral and exemplary damages may be separately granted in addition to
indemnity. Moral damages can be awarded only upon sufficient proof that the complainant is entitled thereto in accordance with Art.
2217 of the Civil Code, while exemplary damages can be awarded if the crime is committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances duly proved. The amounts thereof shall be at the discretion of the courts.30 Hence, the civil indemnity of P50,000.00
awarded by the trial court to the heirs of Lilybeth is in order. They are also entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 as
awarded by the trial court.31

In addition to the civil liability and moral damages, the trial court correctly made appellant account for P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages on account of relationship, a qualifying circumstance, which was alleged and proved, in the crime of parricide. 32

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 CA rollo, p. 12. The accusatory portion of the information reads:

That on or about the 26th day of November, 2002, at about 6:30 in the morning at Sitio Sogod, Sto. Domingo, Nabua,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, while armed with a
kitchen knife and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
Lilybeth Balandra-Paycana, his legitimate wife, for several times, the latter being seven (7) months pregnant, fatally
hitting the different parts of her body, causing her immediate death and abortion, to the damage and prejudice of the
decease(d)’s deserving heir.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

2 Record, p. 35.

3 Id. at 43-44. See also id. at 117, Certificate of Marriage.

4 TSN, 21 January 2004, p. 6.

5
TSN, 10 June 2004, p.5.

6
TSN, 21 January 2004, p. 6.

7 TSN, 8 November 2004, pp. 5-9.

8 CA rollo, pp.20-27. As penned by Judge Alfredo Agawa, the dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Jesus Paycana, Jr. y Audal guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the complex crime(s) of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion and he is sentenced to suffer the
maximum penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of Lilybeth Balandra-Paycana in the amount of P50,000.00,
moral damages of P50,000.00 and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

9As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Re: Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death
Penalty Cases), to wit: x x x
Rule 122 Sec. 3. How appeal taken.— x x x x (d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial
Court imposed the death penalty. The Court of Appeals shall automatically review the judgment as provided in
Section 10 of this Rule. x x x

Sec. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. — In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the
trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic review and judgment within twenty
days but not earlier than fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten days after the filing thereof by the
stenographic reporter.

10Rollo, pp. 2-10. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido Reyes, and concurred by Associate Justices Aurora Santiago
Lagman and Apolinario Bruselas, Jr. The dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with a MODIFICATION in
that, instead of death, the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.

CA rollo, pp. 109-110. The notice of appeal was filed pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Re: Amendments to the Revised
11

Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases), to wit: x x x x

Sec. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court.—(a) Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the
penalty of death should be imposed, the court shall render judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment
and forthwith certify the case and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for review.

(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose
out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offense for which the penalty of death is imposed, and
the accused appeals, the appeal shall be included in the case certified for review to, the Supreme Court.

(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall
render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice
of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.

12 People v. Maceda, G.R. No. 91106, 27 May 1991, 197 SCRA 499, 510.

13 Art. 11. Justifying circumstances.- The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

14
People v. Rosaria Ignacio, G.R. No. 107801, 26 March 1997, 270 SCRA 445, 450.

15 Id. at 451. See People v. Jotoy, 222 SCRA 801; People v. Sazon, 189 SCRA 700.

16 TSN, 10 June 2004, pp. 4-11.

17
TSN, 21 January 2004, p. 6.

18 TSN, 1 September 2004, pp. 9-10.

19 Cabuslay v. People, G.R. No. 129875, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 241, 262-263.

20 Records, p. 120.

21
CA rollo, p. 26.

22
Art 246. Parricide.—Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.

23
People v. Dominador Velasco, 404 Phil. 369, 379 (2001). Citing People v. Malabago, G.R. No. 115686, 2 December 1996,
265 SCRA 198. See Note 3.

24Art. 255. Infanticide.—The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon
any person who shall kill any child less than three days of age.

If any crime penalized in this article be committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her
dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods, and if said crime be
committed for the same purpose by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be reclusion
remporal.

Art. 257. Unintentional abortion. —The penalty of prision correctional in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed
25

upon any person who shall cause an abortion by violence, but unintentionally.

26 U.S. v. Vedra, 12 Phil. 96 (1909).

27 Regalado, Florenz, Criminal Law Conspectus, p. 460. Citing People v. Detablan, CA, 40 O.G. No. 9, p. 30.

28Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.—When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means of committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period.

29 SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code.

Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.

30 People v. SPO1 Jose Bangcado and PO3 Cesar Banisa, G.R. No. 132330, 28 November 2000, 346 SCRA 189, 210.

31People v. PO3 Armando Dalag y Custodio, G.R. No. 129895, 30 April 2003, 402 SCRA 254, 278. Citing People v. Velasco,
supra.

32
People v. Domingo Arnante y Dacpano, G. R. No. 148724, 15 October 2002, 391 SCRA 155, 161.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 229860, March 21, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. XXX, ALFREDO GILLES, NIÑO G. MONTER AND CONSTANTE M. CASTIL ALIAS JUNJUN,
ALIAS TANSYONG, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

This is an appeal of herein accused-appellants XXX,1 Alfredo Gilles (Gilles), Niño G. Monter (Monter), and Constante M. Castil (Castil), from the
September 27, 2016 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals-Cebu City (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01906. The CA affirmed with modification the April 30,
2014 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 (RTC), in Crim. Case No. 11-03-3508 finding appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

The Antecedents

The accusatory portion of the Information4 against appellants states:

That on October 2, 2010, at about 2:00 o'clock dawn, in [deleted], province of Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with lustful intent and lewd designs, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, threats and intimidation, successfully have sexual intercourse with the victim [AAA], without her
consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the said victim and of social order.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

After the arraignment where the appellants pleaded not guilty,6 trial commenced. The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses: the offended party
AAA, Maria Aina Daclan, records officer of the town's Rural Health Office, FFF, AAA's sister-in-law,7 and Liberty Pinamungahan (Liberty), a female
companion who lived in the same household. On the other hand, the defense presented appellant minor XXX as its sole witness.

Version of the Prosecution

AAA lives with the family of her brother BBB 8 and known to be suffering from mental deficiency and exhibits childish behaviour.9

Offended party AAA testified that on October 1, 2010, her brother BBB, whom she was living with, hosted a party for his grandchild, with appellants
among the visitors. During the party, appellants invited her to go to the seashore and to the karaoke bar owned by a certain Amorin. AAA agreed and
left the house with the appellants at around 2 o'clock in the morning when all the other occupants of the house were already asleep. They brought with
them a watering can full of tuba from BBB, with AAA bringing the glasses they can use for drinking.

Because the karaoke bar was already closed, appellants and AAA went to the seashore, sat in the sand and drank the tuba. After drinking two (2)
glasses of tuba, AAA felt shortness of breath. AAA also noticed that the appellants huddled together "as if they were agreeing to do something."
Sometime during the night, AAA felt like urinating, and she did so in front of the appellants after asking them to turn their backs. After urinating, Castil
took off her pants and underwear, which she asked to be placed beside her. She asked him what he was doing but the latter told her to keep silent. She
did not complain as she felt very sleepy. Castil placed himself on top of her and the next thing she knew, Castil's penis was already in her vagina. After
Castil raped her, she remembered XXX followed next, followed by Monter, and then Gilles. When Monter did the same act, she wa s already awake, but
did not resist and told them she wanted to go home. Castil and XXX apparently raped her again, and while this was happening, she heard some people
looking for her. Gilles and Monter ran away while Castil and XXX continued raping her even when the people looking for her — who turned out to be
Jovita Escobal, Liberty, and a certain Antonio - were approximately 50 meters away. Castil and XXX ran away when they saw Escobal, Liberty, and
Antonio near. AAA then stood up and put on her clothes. AAA and Liberty waited by the seashore for Escobal's husband who then fetched their
motorcycle.

When they arrived home, AAA did not talk to anybody at their house and instead immediately went inside and slept. She slept the whole day and did
not go outside her room until two (2) days later on October 3, 2010. She did not tell anybody about the incident. Her sister-in-law FFF learned of the
rape incident when Elizabeth Gilles told FFF that Gilles was one of those who raped AAA. AAA was first brought to Medicare Hospital and then at the
Rural Health unit where she was examined by Dr. Teodorico Esclamado, Jr. (Dr. Esclamado).

While appellants were in jail, AAA spoke with Castil, who asked for forgiveness and offered to marry her, which she rejected. She also spoke with Gilles'
mother, Monter's sister, and Castil's mother, who all asked for forgiveness and offered to pay her.

On cross-examination, AAA admitted she voluntarily went with appellants when they invited her to go to the karaoke bar and eventually to the
seashore. She admitted to providing them with the tuba. She explained the inconsistencies between her sworn statement, where she claimed being
dragged to the seashore, as against her testimony, by stating that she told appellants she did not want to go with them to a further distance.

Prosecution's second witness, Maria Aina Daclan, presented the certified true copy of the Medical Report for the Alleged Sexual Abuse issued by Dr.
Esclamado. The latter already retired sometime in 2011.

FFF, meanwhile, testified that from the time she married AAA's brother, she already noticed AAA's mental deficiency and childish behavior. She came to
know about the incident when Gilles' mother told her that the former's son was the one who raped AAA. Thereafter, FFF and her husband went to the
police station to have the incident entered in the police blotter. They then brought AAA to the Rural Health Unit.

The prosecution's last witness, Liberty, testified that she lived with FFF and her husband as the spouses sent her to school as she helped in their
vegetable sales business. On October 1, 2010, AAA was drunk during the birthday party. On October 2, 2010, the witness was awoken at around 3
o'clock in the morning to go to the market. Tonio, one of the workers, reported that he saw AAA with some men. FFF asked her and Tonio to look for
AAA. They were sent to the seashore upon information from Jovita Escobal. All three went to the seashore where they saw a man who told them AAA
was along the seashore. The man and Tonio went to the seashore while Liberty stayed with the bicycle. When Liberty followed, she saw Monter, who
walked past her towards his house, and XXX walking in the opposite direction. She saw AAA, sitting on the sand with Tonio and another man and that
AAA had no short pants and her underwear was down to her legs. Liberty asked AAA to go home with them, but AAA insisted she would go home on her
own, so they forced AAA to come with them.

Version of the Defense

XXX presented his birth certificate showing that he was born on December 3, 1994. He testified that on October 1, 2010, he went to the billiard hall
where he met Castil, Montes, and Gilles. There, they were invited by BBB to his house to attend his grandson's party. The appellants stayed at the party
and drank tuba until 11:30 in the evening. They eventually transferred to a bench outside the billiard hall. He laid down the bench and AAA appeared in
front of him and squeezed his thigh and touched his penis. He rolled over towards his friends to avoid her but she called them gay. They saw Tonio
riding a bicycle and they called for him to take AAA away as she was being bothersome. AAA refused but was eventually prevailed upon them.
Appellants continued drinking until Castil suggested they transfer to the seashore, where they continued their drinking spree. AAA rejoined them and
later removed her pajamas and urinated in front of them. Castil ignored her because she was already drunk as he saw her drinking at the birthday
party.

Sometime later, XXX left the group and went 20 meters away to urinate. While he was urinating, AAA embraced and squeezed him from behind. He
pleaded for AAA to stop, but the latter called him gay, forced him to lie down on the sand, and placed herself on top of him. XXX tried to free himself
but AAA instead held his penis and inserted it into her vagina, and made pressing motions of her body against his. When AAA stood up, XXX was able to
get away and he went back to his friends. He did not tell his friends about what happened but told them to go as AAA was being bothersome. He and
his friends went home and did not know what happened to AAA after they parted ways.

The RTC Ruling

In its decision, the RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution. The RTC noted that AAA's unrefuted testimony that all the appellants raped her, started by
Castil who removed her pants and panty, placed himself on top of her and placed his penis inside her vagina, followed by XXX, Monter, and Gilles who
did the same, already established the essential element of sexual congress. To the RTC, XXX's testimony corroborated the fact that there was sexual
congress between him and AAA. In contrast to AAA's testimony, described as candid and unwavering, XXX's version appeared contrived and ineffectual.

The RTC further emphasized that Castil's act of asking for forgiveness and even offering marriage, and the relatives of the other appellants asking for
forgiveness and wanting an out of court settlement, indicated that AAA's statements regarding the incident were truthful.

The RTC likewise observed that AAA, at 48 years old, appeared to be a mental retardate. AAA's "appearance, focus and demeanor while on the witness
stand, and especially her responses to the questions propounded her by the prosecution and the defense counsel, showed that she is a mental
retardate."10 Reinforcing its finding that AAA was deprived of her will to resist the sexual advances of appellants, the RTC pointed to the fact that AAA
was inebriated at the time of the incident.

The RTC found that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellants for simple rape but appreciated the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of XXX. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the court finds each of the four accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of one act of Rape by direct
participation.

Accused Alfredo Gilles, Niño G. Monter and Constante M. Castil are hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Accused [XXX] is hereby sentenced to an Indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Pursuant to Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344 and
Section 48 of Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, [XXX] is hereby placed under suspended sentence. Set the disposition
conference regarding said accused on May 20, 2014 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

All named accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay [AAA] the sum of P200,000.00 as civil indemnity, the further sum of P200,000.00 as
moral damages and the sum of P90,000.00 as exemplary damages plus costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.11

The CA Ruling
In sustaining the conviction of appellants, the CA noted that the victim was a retardate, and therefore the force or intimidation required to overcome
her is of a lesser degree than that used against a normal adult. In this case, considering AAA is feeble-minded, the force required by law is the sexual
act itself. The CA highlighted that appellants were convicted of the crime of simple rape through force and intimidation under paragraph 1(a) of Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code. However, it was established by testimonial evidence of FFF and the medical report of Dr. Esclamado that AAA is
known to have mental deficiency. From these pieces of evidence, the CA determined AAA to be mentally deficient.

The CA ruled that the appellants argument that AAA is a woman of loose morals is bereft of merit as the moral character of the victim is immaterial. It
held that the sexual act could not have been consensual as AAA was mentally deficient and thus did not have the capacity to give her consent. The CA
further stated that resistance is not an element of the crime of rape, AAA's silence cannot be taken against her, and that a delay in reporting the crime
of rape does not necessarily cast doubt on AAA's credibility. Finally, as to the credibility of the witnesses, the CA noted that the RTC considered AAA as
a credible witness. The CA was fully convinced of her sincerity, candor and truthfulness.

On the subject of the penalty, however, the CA specified that the appellants were not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3, Republic Act No.
9346.12 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The April 30, 2014 Decision of the RTC, Branch 25, Maasin City, Southern Leyte, in Criminal Case No. 11-
03-3508 finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that all monetary awards shall be
subject to interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.13

Hence, this appeal.

Issues

Appellants submit to this Court the following issues for resolution:

1. Whether the courts a quo erred in convicting the appellants of the crime charged in giving full weight and credence to the materially
unreliable and uncorroborated testimonies of the prosecution witnesses;

2. Whether the courts a quo erred in convicting the appellants of the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Arguments for the appellants

Appellants stress that AAA is not mentally deficient. The medical certificate purportedly signed by Dr. Escalamado was never testified to by the
physician. Moreover, the examination conducted by the physician was on AAA's vagina, and not on her mental condition. AAA's a ctuations were also
incompatible with human experience and inconsistent with the acts of a person who allegedly went through a traumatic experience of being raped by
four (4) men. Appellants insist that AAA was not deprived of reason at the time of the incident. She fully knew what was going to happen to her. She
was not forced to go with the appellants, on the contrary, she consented and freely went with them. Her testimony is likewise inconsistent with the
testimony of prosecution witness Liberty. Appellants also point out that FFF and her husband took it upon themselves to report the allegation to the
police.

While it is true that the sole testimony of a victim is sufficient to sustain a conviction, appellants argue that the presumption of innocence is not
overcome by mere suspicion, conjecture, or a probability that the defendant committed the crime. Even assuming that there was carnal knowledge
between AAA and appellants, such was done in accord with their own volition.

Arguments for the appellee

Appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, asserts that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that indeed there was sexual
congress between appellants and AAA. It insists that the prosecution was able to prove that appellants committed rape through force and intimidation,
which was sufficient in consummating the purpose which the appellants had in mind. The conviction is not based on the fact that AAA is a mental
retardate, but on the use of force and intimidation. The mental retardation was a circumstance the trial court used to evaluate the degree of the force
and intimidation needed. In this case, the force required is only the sexual act itself. Further, the fact that AAA was apparently drunk at that time
further demonstrates AAA's inability to give consent to having carnal knowledge.

Appellee likewise emphasizes the existence of the mental abnormality or deficiency on the part of AAA. Other evidence may prove mental retardation,
which includes testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court.

The Court's Ruling

From a review of the records, the Court finds the appeal impressed with merit.

Under the information, appellants are accused of committing rape under Sec. 266-A(1), which states:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

xxxx

The information against appellants alleged that they committed the heinous act through force, threat, or intimidation. There was no mention in the
information that AAA was deprived of reason or was unconscious.

Specifically, for the review of rape cases, the Court has consistently adhered to the following established principles: a) an accusation of rape can be
made with facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and c) the evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.14

Following these principles, the Court has also refined how rape is proved. The credibility of the complainant is the single most important issue in the
prosecution of rape cases. The categorical and candid testimony of the complainant suffices, and a culprit may be convicted solely on the basis of her
testimony, provided that it hurdles the test of credibility.15 It should not just come from the mouth of a credible witness, it should likewise be credible
and reasonable in itself, candid, straightforward and in accord with human experience. Where the discrepancies and contradict ory statements on
important details in the testimony seriously impair its probative value, cast serious doubt on its credibility, and erode the integrity of the
testimony,16 the Court should acquit the accused.

It is true that the Court accords great respect to the trial court's findings on witnesses' credibility. This is because trial provides judges with the
opportunity to detect cues and expressions that could suggest sincerity or betray lies and ill will, not reflected in the documentary or object evidence.
The exception, of course, is when the trial court and/or the CA overlooked or misconstrued substantial facts that could have affected the outcome of the
case.17

Ultimately, the prosecution has the primordial duty to present its case with clarity and persuasion that conviction becomes the only logical and
inevitable conclusion. The prosecution is required to justify the conviction of the accused with moral certainty. Failing this test, the Court has the
constitutional duty to acquit the accused lest its mind be tortured with the thought that it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life. 18 The
presumption of innocence is a primordial concern for the Court; thus, resort to inference, or the truth or proposition drawn from another which is
supposed or admitted to be true, is not correct. The fact sought to be established is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts, or a state of
facts, already proved or admitted. 19

A review of the records and the transcripts, however, shows that there are numerous inconsistencies in the accounts of the prosecution witnesses that
would lead any person with a reasonable mind to doubt the story offered against the appellants, which should lead to their acquittal.

This case falls within the exception of giving great respect to the RTC and CA's assessment of the evidence. The transcripts show that there was not
enough evidence to say, and not out of mere inference, that appellants had carnal knowledge of AAA and that force, threat, and intimidation were
employed upon her person to achieve appellants' supposed lecherous desires. Below are the relevant portions of AAA's testimony:

Q: You said that at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning you and the four accused went to
the vicinity of the karaoke bar owned by a certain Amorin. Were you in fact able to
have a sing along party in the karaoke bar?

A: We just passed by at the videoke bar of Amorin because it was already closed.

Q: When you passed by where were you going?

A: Towards the seashore.

Q: Whose idea was it for you to go to the seashore at that time?

A: They. (Witness is referring to the accused).

Q: Who among them if you can remember, all of them or just some of them?

A: Four of them.

Q: Did they tell you what the five of you were going to do at the seashore?
xxx

A: To have a drinking spree.

Q: What will you be drinking?

A: Tuba.

Q: Where did the tuba come from?

A: From [BBB].
Q: Whose idea was it to bring the tuba from the house of [BBB]?

A: They asked again tuba (sic).

Q: Who particularly among the accused?

A: Junjun.

Q: And did you give them the tuba?

A: Yes.

Q: How much if you can estimate the quantity?

A: Half of the watercan.

Q: And who was carrying this watercan where the tuba was placed in going to the
seashore?

A: Niño and Bugoy.

Q: Did you bring anything to use for drinking the tuba?

A: Pitcher and one glass.

Q: And who was carrying the pitcher and one glass?

A: I.

Q: When you got to the seashore of Barangay Sta. Sofia what did you do upon arriving
there at the seashore?

A: We were just sitting.

Q: Then what happened next, if any?

A: They held me.

Q: Who held you?

A: Junjun.

Q: In which part of your body was Junjun holding you?


A: My arm. (Witness is raising her left arm).

Q: Did Junjun say anything when he held your left arm?

A: I asked him why are you holding me.

Q: And what was his reply, if any?

A: He said I'm just holding you.

Q: Since you were at that time according to you the five of you were bringing half a
watercan of tuba, a pitcher and a glass, the five of you not drink of the tuba?

A: We drank a little.

Q: You how many glasses of tuba were you had a drank? (sic)

A: I did not drink anymore.

Q: You did not drink anymore at that time on October 2, 2010?

A: Maybe two glasses.

Q: Where was it when you drank the two glasses?

A: There at the seashore.

Q: Was it of your own volition that you drank two glasses of tuba?

A: Yes, I drank two glasses.

Q: And with the two glasses of tuba what did you fell (sic) after having drunk the two
glasses of tuba?

A: A shortness of breath.

Q: What did you do since you said you suffered from shortness of breath?

A: I was just sitting on the seashore.

Q: Then because you said that you have shortness of breath what happened next, if
any?

A: They were having an agreement but I did not know what they were agreeing.
Q: So, what happened next after they had the "sabot-sabot"?

A: That they are going to do something on me.

Q: You said earlier that Junjun who held your left arm?

A: Yes.

Q: After he held your left arm what happened next?

A: He took off my pants.

Q: What kind of pants was it, was it a denim pants or not?

A: Not a denim pants.

Q: Who took off your pants?

A: It was already torn.

Q: In which part of your pants was torn?

A: At the buttocks.

Q: Can you indicate precisely please stand up and demonstrate and point out to your
back where was there of your pants?

A: From the back down to the crotch up to the front.

Q: Could you tell the Honorable Court why was it torn?

A: Because when we pass in going to the seashore there was a pumpboat.

Q: So, what cause the tearing of your pants?

A: When I step over at the pumpboat.

Q: Who was it particularly who took off your pants?

A: I was the one who took off my pants up to here only. (Witness is referring to her
knees).

Q: Why did you take off your pants?


A: Because it was already torn.

Q: What was your intention when you brought down your pants up to your knees?

A: Because I wanted to urinate.

Q: When you brought down your pants up to your knees where were the four accused
at that time?

A: They were just near me, in front of me.

Q: And you did not mind that they were there when you urinate?

A: I let them turned their back.

Q: And did they in fact turned their back?

A: Yes.

Q: Did you in fact urinate?

A: Yes.

Q: Before urinating did you also bring down your panty?

A: Yes.

Q: After urinating did you bring up back your panty and pants?
xxx

A: Yes, including the pants.

Q: You said that you drank two glasses of tuba.What about the accused did they also
partake the drinking of tuba?

A: They drank plenty.

Q: Now, after urinating and brought up your panty and your pants what happened
next?

A: They already started to do something on me.

Q: What was the particular act that they started something?

A: They raped me.


Q: Who was the one who raped you first?

A: Junjun.

Q: What did Junjun do?

A: He took off my pants and my panty.


xxx

Q: When you said that Junjun took off your pants and your panty what did he do with
them the pants and the panty?

A: I told him you just placed it there. (Witness is indicating by pointing the left side of
her body).

Q: When he was taking off your pants and your panty what was your reaction to that
act?

A: I asked him what is this Jun.

Q: What was his reply, if any?

A: You just keep silent.

Q: Did you say anything after he said "saba na"?

A: Not anymore because I was sleeping.

Q: And then what happened next?

A: I cannot recall anymore when they took turns in raping me.

Q: You said it was Junjun who first raped you. Do you remember that?

A: Yes.

Q: When you said he raped you what exactly did he do?

A: As I have already said they took turns in raping me.

Q: And after Junjun took off your pants and your panty what was his position when he
raped you?

A: He placed himself on top of me.


Q: What did you feel when he placed himself on top of you?

A: I did not do anything anymore.

xxx

Q: Why was it that you said you did not do anything anymore?

A: As I have already said I felt very sleepy.

Q: After he inserted his penis into your vagina what did Junjun do with his penis?

A: (Witness is demonstrating by using her left forefinger in pumping manner towards


her vagina).

Q: How long if you can estimate was Junjun doing that?

A: I cannot recall anymore.

Q: Then you said that the four accused took turns in raping you. After Junjun who
followed next?

A: [XXX].

Q: What did [XXX] do to you, if any?

A: The same.

Q: The same as what?

A: He inserted his penis.

Q: To where?

A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.

xxxx

Q: What was your reaction, if any?

A: I have already said I did not move.

Q: Now this time when [XXX] was raping you why was it that you do not anymore react
or move?
A: I did not move anymore because I slept for a while.

Q: And then who followed next after [XXX]?

A: Niño.

Q: When Niño was raping you after [XXX] what did Niño do?

A: The same.

Q: And after Niño who followed next, if any?

A: The last was Bugoy.

Q: After Bugoy what if anything happened next?

A: They rested.

Q: What about you what were you doing after?

A: I slept because I have already slept.

Q: When you said that Niño raped you were you also asleep at that time when he was
raping you?

A: I was already awakened.

Q: What about when Bugoy was raping you were you still sleeping also?

A: Not anymore.

Q: After Bugoy who was the last one who raped you what did you do again please?

A: Not anymore I was just sitting.

Q: Why were you sitting?

A: I told them I am already sleepy we will go now.

Q: And then what did they say to your suggestion?

A: I heard that somebody was looking.


Q: Looking for whom?

A: It was looking for me.

Q: What did you hear that made you think that somebody was looking for you?

A: Jovita, Lalang and Tonio and Tonio said as they were bringing with them the
flashlight he said there she is.

Q: When you heard Tonio said "naa ra" to what direction was the flashlight pointed?

A: To the place where we were staying.

Q: And what was the reaction of the four accused at that time that the flashlight that
Tonio was shown [sic] towards them?

A: Bugoy and Niño ran away.

Q: What about Junjun and [XXX]?

A: Bugoy and Niño were seen that they brought with them tuba.

Q: No. What I am asking is what about Junjun and [XXX]. You said that only Bugoy and
Niño ran away. What about Junjun and [XXX] what were they doing when the
flashlight was shown [sic] towards all of you?

A: They again raped me.

Q: Who was the first one who raped you again between Junjun and [XXX]?

A: Junjun.

Q: And then after him?

A: [XXX].

Q: You said that Junjun and [XXX] raped you again because Tonio, Lalang and Jovita
were still far away?

A: Yes.

Q: How far, if this is the place where you were being raped by Junjun and [XXX]. If you
can remember which place were indicate the distance of Tonio, Lalang and Jovita at
that time (sic)?

A: There in the house of Jovita.


Q: Can you indicate the distance of the house of Jovita from the place where you were
being raped for the second time. For example, that where you are sitting is the
place where you were being raped for the second time, where is the house of Jovita
can you point to anything inside the courtroom or outside the courtroom to indicate
the distance?

A: Maybe 50 meters.

xxxx

Q: When Junjun raped you for the second time what was your reaction?

A: I told them to stop now you go away, go away.

Q: And did Junjun say anything in reply?

A: They already ran away because they were already approaching near.

Q: You said that [XXX] raped you also for the second time. Do you remember that?

A: Yes.

Q: When did Junjun and [XXX] ran away before or after [XXX] raped you for the
second time?

A: After.

Q: When [XXX] was raping you for the second time what was your reaction, if any, to
[XXX]?

A: When [XXX] saw that they were already approaching the two of them ran away?

Q: Who were already approaching?

A: Jovita, Lalang and Tonio.


xxx

Q: Now, after you said that Junjun and [XXX] raped you for the second time and then
they ran away what did you do after the four of them ran away?

A: I just stood up and I was just standing.

Q: What about your pants and your panty where were they?

A: I put them back on.


Q: After you had put back your panty and your pants on what happened next, if any?

A: No more I just waited for them when they were fetching the motorcycle.20

On cross-examination, AAA stated:

Q: You voluntarily accompanied the accused in going to Karaoke Bar of certain Amorin,
am I correct on that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when you found out that the Karaoke Bar was already closed, you decided to go
with the accused to the sea shore, am I correct on that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you went there you also provided 'tuba' for the accused you took that 'tuba'
from the house of [BBB]. Am I correct on that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You were the only woman in the group why you did not going there? (sic)

A: I just respected them.

Q: Why did you respect them?

A: Because we are friends.

xxx

Q: Why you did not go home after you pants were torn off when you pass the pump
boat? (sic)

A: Because the four of us were together.

Q: Why you did not return home? (sic)

A: Only four o'clock dawn.

Q: You did not go home, because you wanted to be in company (sic) of the accused?

A: Because we respected them and we were drinking.


Q: I see. You want to be in company of the accused and in fact you were the one who
provided them 'tuba' (sic)?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: So, whatever may have happened to you you allow it to happen because you
wanted to be with them, am I correct on that? (sic)

A: Yes.

xxx

Q: Paragraph 4 of your affidavit, you testified to that effect that you were cleaning the
house of Castil alias JunJun and approached you "Day adto sa" and you were asked
"what happened next if any?" you declared to the effect that together with [XXX],
was holding my hand firmly and simultaneously dragged me to the sea shore. You
remember having made that declaration in your sworn statement?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: The declaration in your sworn statement particularly in paragraph 4 to 6 gives the


impression that when you cleaning (sic) the house you were dragged by the accused
towards the sea shore, now that is different from your testimony last May 17, 2012
to the effect that you accompany them to the Karaoke Bar later to the sea shore,
you even provided them with a 'tuba' now, which statement is correct, once (sic)
your statement marked as Exhibit "A" or your previous testimony on May 7, 2012 to
the effect that you voluntarily accompany to the Karaoke Bar and later on the sea
shore?

A: I asked them 'what will we do there at a farther distance, I do not want to go with
them.21

The other prosecution witness, Liberty, offered a different version of the events of the following morning, to wit:

Q: So, when you followed them towards the sea shore, were you able to in fact find or
see Tonio and that other man there at the sea shore?

A: When I arrived, I only saw Antonio and the man who told us the whereabouts of
[AAA]. I did not catch anymore the others who were with [AAA] because they were
already leaving at that time.

Q: When you said that the others were with [AAA] were already leaving, what do you
mean by that?

A: I only saw Ate [AAA] there, she was sitting.

Q: Can you describe her condition, her appearance?

A: She was just sitting on the sand.


Q: And what was her physical appearance when (sic) you described it?

A: She was no longer wearing short pants.

Q: And did she have anything, what about an underwear for example?

A: There is. The underwear was already on the lower portion of the leg (witness is
pointing to her lower leg).

Q: Can you again point where was the underwear of [AAA]?

A: In the middle of her leg.

Q: Now, you said that the others were already leaving, who were these others that
were already leaving if you can tell?

A: Niño and [XXX].

Q: And what was Niño doing when you said that he was leaving?

A: He was hiking towards home.

Q: And when you said he was hiking or walking towards home, was he going to the
direction where you were or farther from you?

A: Farther, ma'am.

Q: What about [XXX]?

A: Towards there, they separated ways.

Q: Now, for example, you are where you were there, that I am [AAA], okay, now,
where was Niño going in relation to me as [AAA], if you can tell the Honorable
Court? (sic)

A: Actually I did not see Niño together with [AAA].

xxx

Q: They were the only two people that you saw?

A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: They were the only two other people aside from Tonio and that other man whom
you said that you do not know, and yourself as well as [AAA], they were the only
two persons at the seashore at that time, [XXX] and Niño?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: So, what happened when you arrived there at the sea shore because you were told
to look for [AAA]?

A: We called [AAA] to stand up from where she was seated for her to go home.

Q: What did you do considering her reply that she will just go home by herself?

A: We forced her to go home because [BBB] will scold her because he was previously
drunk.

Q: Why do you say that he was previously drunk?

A: On October 1, that was the first birthday of the grand child of [BBB].

Q: So, why do you say that [AAA] was previously drunk?

A: During that time, I slept very late because I was the one who cleaned and washed
the dishes and [AAA] was still drinking outside and so I told her to come in as she
was already drunk.

Q: And who was she drinking with?

A: I did not know ma'am because I did not go outside I was just up to the gate.

Q: And you did not at any time that evening of October 1, see who [AAA] was drinking
with?

A: No, ma'am.

Q: When you asked her to come in and she was already drunk, did she comply?

A: She just said, just let me be.

Q: And then what did you do?

A: I did not call her anymore, I went inside the house because I was already tired.22

A careful dissection of the above testimonies reveals inconsistencies, not merely on the inconsequential details but to the very existence of the crime
itself, that are far too big to simply ignore.

It was never fully established whether sexual congress took place, especially as to some of the appellants. AAA asserted that Castil placed his penis
inside her vagina, followed by XXX. But then as to Gilles and Monter, the story is confusing and unclear. The chronology of events is also hazily
narrated. AAA claimed she fell asleep, but in the same testimony, said she was aware of Gilles and Monter raping her. The Court cannot take this as a
positive allegation of Gilles and Monter's participation in the defilement. The participation of these appellants is tenuous at best, and based only on
conjecture.
More importantly, there was also no clear showing of force, threat, or intimidation from AAA's story. She narrated that only Castil held her arm, without
even saying how he held it or describing the force, if any, that was inflicted upon her. This hardly comprises the force, threat, or intimidation
contemplated by law.

The allegation of conspiracy to consummate the illegal act was likewise insufficiently proven. The elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself. Evidence of actual cooperation, not only mere cognizance, approval, or mere
presence, must be shown.23 In this case, the mere statement that appellants appeared to talk about "doing something to her" should not suffice.

Further, prosecution witness Liberty cannot even say that she saw the appellants with AAA, to which AAA positively testified. The four (4) appellants
were never seen together with AAA at any point of the night. Instead of corroborating AAA's account that she was with the appellants throughout the
night until the following morning, Liberty offered a contrary story. Also, Liberty even had a conflicting version as to who was seen last in the beach -
was it Castil with XXX or Monter and XXX?

AAA's claim of being raped even when Liberty and her companions were already present at the place where the crime allegedly took place not only goes
against human experience but likewise not consistent with Liberty's testimony. Another questionable factor in the whole story is the fact that given the
family's assertion and recognition of her feeble-mindedness, BBB and FFF would still apparently allow AAA to get drunk and go out even at odd hours of
the night. This does not reflect the normal concern and protection towards family members with mental deficiency. On the other hand, it shows that
even AAA's family knows that she is a functioning member of their family, who makes and is allowed to make her own autonomous choices based on
her own rational decision-making.

As noted earlier, the testimony of the victim should be scrutinized with extreme caution. With AAA's statements taken with Liberty's and the overall
evidence presented by the prosecution, the Court is convinced that the burden of proving the occurrence of the crime of rape made in conspiracy among
all the appellants, through force, threat, and intimidation, was not met. Serious doubts exist as to the credibility of the statements of the prosecution
witnesses. Unlike the candid and straightforward characterization of the RTC of AAA's testimony, the Court finds that the occurrence of rape was not the
only conclusion to be had here. All of these factors create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court, for which reason the appellants' acquittal is in
order.

It appears from the RTC and CA decisions that appellants were convicted of rape because AAA was feeble-minded, and not because of the existence of
force, threat, or intimidation. As emphasized in the CA decision:

Just like in this case, while there may have been no physical force employed on the victim but considering that she is feeble-minded, there is authority
to the effect that the force required by law is the sexual act itself. 24

This is not alleged in the information. The Court had previously ruled that an accused cannot be convicted of rape if the information charged him with
rape through force, threat, or intimidation when what was proven was sexual congress with a woman deprived of reason, unconscious, or under twelve
years of age. The conviction would be a deprivation of the constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. 25 Nonetheless, in a more
recent case, the Court held that even if the information lacked the allegation of any mental disability on the part of the victim, such allegation was
unnecessary to convict the accused provided that sexual congress and mental incapacity, i.e. the incapacity to give consent, are proven by clear and
convincing evidence.26

The state of being feeble-minded has been explained as the incapacity of thinking and reasoning like any normal human being, not being able to think
and reason from birth, and devoid or deficient in those instincts and other mental faculties that characterize the average and normal mortal. When a
woman is feeble-minded, she has no free and voluntary will. She is incapable of freely and voluntarily giving consent which is necessary and essential
from lifting coitus from the place of criminality.27 In People of the Philippines v. Dalandas,28 the Court had the opportunity to distinguish between the
various degrees of mental retardation, and where "feeble-mindedness" fell within the spectrum. The Court held:

Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early childhood and characterized by impaired intellectual functioning measured by
standardized tests. It manifests itself in impaired adaptation to the daily demands of the individual's own social environment. Commonly, a mental
retardate exhibits a slow rate of maturation, physical and/or psychological, as well as impaired learning capacity.

Although mental retardation is often used interchangeably with mental deficiency, the latter term is usually reserved for those without recognizable
brain pathology. xxx

xxxx

A normal mind is one which in strength and capacity ranks reasonably well with the average of the great body of men and women who make up
organized human society in general, and are by common consent recognized as sane and competent to perform the ordinary duties and assume the
ordinary responsibilities of life.

The traditional but now obsolescent terms applied to those degrees of mental retardation were (a) idiot, having an IQ of 0 to 19, and a
maximum intellectual factor in adult life equivalent to that of the average two-year old child; (b) imbecile by an IQ of 20 to 49 and a
maximum intellectual function in adult life equivalent to that of the average seven-year old child; moron or feebleminded, having an IQ
of 50 to 69 and a maximum intellectual function in adult life equivalent to that of the average twelve-year old child. Psychiatrists and
psychologists apply the term borderline intelligence to those with IQ between 70 to 89. xxx.29 (emphasis supplied)

All elements of the crime of rape must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, including the victim's mental condition. Although it is true that mental
abnormality or deficiency is enough for a woman to be considered "deprived of reason," thus dispensing with the proof of force, threat, or intimidation,
abnormality or deficiency of whatever state or degree should be sufficiently and adequately established by orthodox and reasonably available methods
and procedures. It is possible that complainant could well have been merely on the lower end of the acceptable mean for her age group, a condition
which would have been aggravated by her lack of education, but this, by any medical or psychological yardstick, does not itself negate autonomous
choice or decision-making based on reasoning.30

Indeed, the Court has previously decided that other evidence aside from psychiatric evaluation can prove mental retardation or abnormality. The
personal observation of the judge would suffice as a measure of determining the impact on her of the force, threat, and intimidation foisted upon the
victim.31 This is the rule relied upon by the RTC. However, the cases cited anent this issue, People of the Philippines v. Almacin (Almacin)32 and People
of the Philippines v. Dumanon (Dumanon),33 have different factual settings from the instant case. In Almacin, the victim could only read and write her
own name, and did not even finish Grade 1 in school. Being illiterate and unschooled, she was considered mentally incapable of intelligently assenting or
dissenting to sexual intercourse. In Dumanon, the trial court noted numerous pieces of evidence showing the victim's condition, including the mere
appearance of the victim and the victim's difficulty in answering the questions while on trial. The trial court, upheld by the Court, remarked on her
appearance as mongoloid and that she was suffering from Down's Syndrome.

Here, however, the Court only has the RTC's assessment of AAA to go by and determine that AAA was feeble-minded and therefore sexual congress
with her equates to rape. The medical certificate stated that "patient is known to have mental deficiency." 34 However, this was not even testified to by
the doctor who signed the same. FFF, AAA's sister-in-law, also testified that AAA appeared "childish." Thus, the conclusion by the RTC was made absent
Dr. Esclamado's testimony as well as medical proof of AAA's mental state, instead only made upon FFF's statement. It should also be emphasized that
FFF's testimony was initially objected to by the counsel for the appellants as she was not included in the initial list of witnesses, and was even presented
without the presence of the appellants' counsel. With only testimonial evidence from a partial witness, there is not enough proof of AAA's mental state
that would justify the finding of appellants' guilt.
In People of the Philippines v. Cartuano, Jr. (Cartuano),35 where it was held that the deficiency of whatever state or degree should be sufficiently and
adequately established by orthodox and reasonably available methods and procedures, there was a dearth of medical records to sustain a finding of
mental retardation. In the recent case of People of the Philippines v. Rodriguez (Rodriguez),36 where Cartuanowas invoked, the prosecution presented a
neuro-psychiatric examination and evaluation conducted by a psychologist, which included the administration of the Standford Binnet Intelligence Test.
The latter case shows that the doctrine in Cartuano, that there should be clear and convincing proof as to the mental state of the victim, is still good
law.

Unlike the cases of Almacin, Dumanon, and Rodriguez, the instant case shows an obvious lack of clear and convincing evidence of the victim's mental
deficiency upon which the conviction of the appellants is based. Without any showing of force, threat, or intimidation as alleged in the information, it is
necessary to show that AAA was deprived of reason for the successful prosecution of the appellants for the crime of rape. The prosecution was unable to
show this deprivation of reason.

To reiterate, the force, threat, and intimidation, and conspiracy among the appellants as alleged in the information, as well as AAA's mental deficiency,
were not proven with moral certainty. The case presented by the prosecution was insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence accorded by
the law to appellants.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 27, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01906 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. XXX, ALFREDO GILLES, NIÑO G. MONTER and CONSTANTE M. CASTIL alias JUNJUN, alias TANSYONG
are ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt. The director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants, unless
they are being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of appellants' release, or the reasons for their continued
confinement, within ten days from notice.

XXX is hereby ordered released from the Department of Social Welfare and Development Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Tanauan, Leyte.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, and Martires, JJ., concur.


Leonen, J., on official leave.

May 23, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on March 21, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the
original of which was received by this Office on May 23, 2018 at 10:58 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN


Division Clerk of Court

ORDER OF RELEASE

TO: Director General Ronald Dela Rosa


BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS
1770 Muntinlupa City

PIS Geraldo I. Aro


Superintendent
LEYTE REGIONAL PRISON
Abuyog, 6510 Leyte

Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth


DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT
Brgy. Sto. Niño, 6502 Tanauan, Leyte
GREETINGS:

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court on March 21, 2018 promulgated a Decision in the above-entitled case, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 27, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01906 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. XXX, ALFREDO GILLES, NIÑO G. MONTER and CONSTANTE M. CASTIL alias JUNJUN, alias TANSYONG
are ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release on appellants, unless
they are being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of appellants' release, or the reasons for their continued
confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.

XXX is hereby ordered released from the Department of Social Welfare and Development Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Tanauan, Leyte.

SO ORDERED."

NOW, THEREFORE, You are hereby ordered to immediately release XXX, ALFREDO GILLES, NIÑO G. MONTER and CONSTANTE M. CASTIL alias
JUNJUN, alias TANSYONG unless there are other lawful causes for which they should be further detained, and to return this Order with the certificate
of your proceedings within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

GIVEN by the Honorable PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR., Chairperson of the Third Division of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 21 st day of
March 2018.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN


Division Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

1
Pursuant to Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-15 on the use of fictitious initials and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the
Law. The court shall employ measures to protect the confidentiality of proceedings against the minor accused and requiring the adoption of a system of
coding to conceal material information leading to the child's identity.

2
CA rollo, pp. 100-114; penned by Associate Justice Edward B. Contreras with Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos and Geraldine C. Fiel-
Macaraig, concurring.

3
Id. at 36-54; penned by Judge Ma. Daisy Paler Gonzalez.

4
The Court notes that there is only one information for a sole count of rape in the instant case. The victim alleged, in her narration, that several sexual
acts were committed by all of the appellants.

5
Records, p. 1.

6
Id. at 29.

7
Pursuant to People of the Philippines v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006), and Resolution dated September 19, 2006 in A.M. No. 04-11-09-SC,
mandating that the Court use fictitious initials in lieu of the real names of the victim/s and immediate family members other than the accused, and
delete the exact addressed of the victim.

8
RTC decision, p. 2; TSN, May 7, 2012, p. 16.

9
Id. at 6; TSN, October 8, 2012, pp. 6-7, 9; Medical Report for Alleged Sexual Abuse, October 5, 2010 (prosecution's Exhibit "C").

10
Rollo, p. 46.

11
Id. at 53-54.

12
An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.

13
Rollo, pp. 17 and 113.

14
People of the Philippines v. Saldivia, 280 Phil. 501, 511 (1991).

15
See People of the Philippines v. Cabingas, et al., 385 Phil. 653, 662 (2000).

16
See People of the Philippines v. Torion, 366 Phil. 624, 632 (1999).

17
See People of the Philippines v. Quintos, 746 Phil. 809, 820 (2014).

18
People of the Philippines v. Aballe, 410 Phil. 131, 141-142 (2001).

19
People of the Philippines v. Masalihit, 360 Phil. 332, 344 (1998).

20
TSN, May 7, 2012, pp. 17-32.

21
Id. at 99-101.
22
TSN, December 3, 2012, pp. 112-116.

23
People of the Philippines v. Comadre, et al., 475 Phil. 293, 306 (2004).

24
Rollo, pp. 13 and 109.

25
People of the Philippines v. Capinpin, 398 Phil. 333, 344 (2000).

26
People of the Philippines v. Quintos, 746 Phil. 809, 834 (2014).

27
People of the Philippines v. De Jesus, 214 Phil. 4, 8-9 (1984).

28
442 Phil. 688, 695 (2002).

29
Id. at 695-696.

30
People of the Philippines v. Cartuano, Jr., 325 Phil. 718, 751 (1996).

31
People of the Philippines v. Dumanon, 401 Phil. 658, 669-670 (2000).

32
363 Phil. 18 (1999).

33
Supra note 31.

34
Exh. "C."

35
Supra note 30.

36
781 Phil. 826, 837 (2016).

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 218584, April 25, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENNIS MANALIGOD Y SANTOS, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is an appeal from the 26 June 2014 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05260 which affirmed with modification the 5 July
2011 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Isabela (RTC), in Criminal Case No. Br. 20-6024 finding Dennis Manaligod y Santos (accused-appellant)
guilty of statutory rape.

THE FACTS

In an Information, dated 25 September 2007, accused-appellant was charged with statutory rape. The Information reads:

That on or about the 24th day of September 2007, in the City of [XXX],3 Province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with eight (8) year old minor, AAA, a child under
twelve (12) years of age, to her damage and prejudice.4

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

On 24 September 2007, BBB asked her daughter, AAA,5 to borrow a cellphone charger at the videoke bar where she worked. When AAA came back,
BBB saw that AAA had P20.00 in her possession. She asked AAA where it came from and the latter answered that accused-appellant a.k.a. "Kulot" gave
it to her. BBB asked why Kulot would give her P20.00 but AAA refused to answer because Kulot told her not to tell anyone. 6 Upon further questioning by
her mother, AAA narrated that accused-appellant brought her to a room at the videoke bar where he removed her clothes and underwear, and then
undressed himself. Afterwards, he repeatedly inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. Accused-appellant then told AAA not to tell her mother what had
happened and gave her P20.00.7

BBB called her employer and informed him of what accused-appellant did to AAA. Accompanied by her employer's wife, BBB reported the incident to the
police and was advised to request a medical examination of AAA and to file a complaint against accused-appellant. BBB then brought AAA to the
hospital for examination.8 Dr. Vilma G. Lorenzo (Dr. Lorenzo) performed the examination and found lacerations in AAA's vagina. 9

Version of the Defense

Accused-appellant, through his counsel, manifested that he would not present evidence for his defense. 10

The Regional Trial Court's Ruling

In its decision, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of statutory rape. It reasoned that the penetration of the penis through the labia of the vagina,
even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction of rape. The trial court ruled that medical findings of injuries or
hymenal laceration in the victim's genitalia are not essential elements of rape, what is indispensable is that there was penetration by the penis, however
slight, through the labia of the female organ. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused DENNIS MANALIGOD y SANTOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as defined and penalized under
Article 266-A paragraph (D) in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 8353 he is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the victim minor [AAA] and her mother [BBB] in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)
PESOS.

Costs to be paid by the accused.11

Aggrieved, accused-appellant elevated an appeal before the CA.

The Court of Appeals' Ruling

In its decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant for statutory rape but modified the award of damages. It opined that AAA recounted
her tragic experience, unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points and unshaken by the tedious and gruelling cross-examination.
The appellate court noted that AAA's declaration revealed each and every detail of the incident and gave no impression whatsoever that her testimony
was a mere fabrication. It held that contrary to accused-appellant's contention that the medical findings did not prove sexual intercourse, Dr. Lorenzo
found an old laceration at 7 o'clock position which she said may have been caused by the insertion of a blunt object that may not be too hard or too
soft, and can possibly be caused by the insertion of a penis. Finally, the CA declared that even without the medical findings, AAA's testimony was
sufficient to justify accused-appellant's conviction for the crime of statutory rape. It disposed the case thus:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, 2nd Judicial Region [XXX], Isabela, in Criminal Case No. Br. 20-6024, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00, the accused-appellant is also ORDERED to pay the victim
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for the crime of statutory rape committed and that interests at
the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the finality of the judgment until fully paid. The assailed decision is affirmed
in all other respects.12

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Accused-appellant asserts that there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of BBB and Dr. Lorenzo as to the time of the alleged rape; that BBB
testified that the incident happened at around 11:00 A.M., while Dr. Lorenzo testified that she examined AAA at around 8:30A.M.; that the medical
findings contradicted AAA's claim that she was raped because the latter underwent medical examination on the same day that she was raped but the
medical findings revealed that she had an old hymenal laceration; and that his act of not leaving the place where the alleged rape was committed
bolsters his innocence.13

THE COURT'S RULING

The appeal is without merit.

Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act.
Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is
conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. At that age, the law presumes that the victim does not possess discernment and is
incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of
proving: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant. 14

As evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth, 15 AAA was only eight (8) years old at the time she was sexually molested on 24 September 2007. Inside
the courtroom, AAA identified accused-appellant as her rapist.16 Thus, the remaining element of statutory rape which needed to be established is carnal
knowledge between accused-appellant and AAA. The Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the RTC's assessment of AAA's credibility, which was
affirmed by the CA. Absent any evidence that the trial court's assessment was tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of a fact of consequence or
influence – especially so when affirmed by the CA – it is entitled to great weight, if not conclusive and binding on the Court. 17AAA narrated her tragic
ordeal in the hands of accused-appellant in a clear, straightforward, and convincing manner:

[Prosecutor Laygo]: What did he do to you if any?


[AAA]: He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q: So where did he do that, at what place?

A: At the V.I.P. room, sir.

Q: Of the [XXX] Videoke Bar?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What first did he do to you?

A: He let me to undress, sir.

Q: You remove your dress?


A: He let me to undress, sir.

Q: He ask you to do that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You complied with his command?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: After you removed your dress, what happened next if any?

A: He also undressed, sir.

Q: What happened if any?

A: He inserted it, sir.

Q: What did he insert?

A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina, sir.

Q: And how did it feel?

A: It hurts, sir.

Q: How many times did he do that?

A: I cannot count it, sir.

Q: More than ten times?

A: I do not know, sir.

Q: After he inserted his penis to your vagina what happened next?

A: He told me not to tell about what happened to my mother, sir.

Q: After he told you not to tell to your mother about what happened, what did he tell
you if any?

A: He gave me Twenty Pesos (P20.00), sir. x x x18

AAA's narration was likewise corroborated by Dr. Lorenzo's medical findings as to the existence of hymenal laceration. When the testimony of a rape
victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge. 19 Laceration, whether healed or
fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration. 20
Moreover, even if the Court disregards the medico-legal certificate, the same would still not be sufficient to acquit accused-appellant. It has been
repeatedly held that the medical report is by no means controlling. A medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution for rape,
and no law requires a medical examination for the successful prosecution thereof. The medical examination of the victim or the presentation of the
medical certificate is not essential to prove the commission of rape, as the testimony of the victim alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused
of the crime. The medical examination of the victim as well as the medical certificate is merely corroborative in character. 21

Accused-appellant further contends that he should be acquitted on the flimsy reason that BBB and Dr. Lorenzo contradicted each other as regards the
time when the rape incident took place. However, it is already well-settled that it is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was
committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential element.22 In addition, the time of the
commission of the crime assumes importance only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape or the sufficiency of the evidence for
purposes of conviction.23 In this case, accused-appellant failed to impeach the credible and straightforward testimony of AAA considering that he did not
even bother to present any evidence in his defense.

Lastly, accused-appellant's claim that his non-flight after the incident proves his innocence has no probative value so as to exculpate him from liability.
While it is true that the Court has ruled in several cases that flight is evidence of guilt, "there is no law or dictum holding that staying put is proof of
innocence, for the Court is not blind to the cunning ways of a wolf which, after a kill, may feign innocence and choose not to flee." 24

All told, the prosecution has successfully established the elements of statutory rape. As regards the awards of damages, in line with the Court's ruling
in People v. Jugueta,25 accused-appellant should pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The 26 June 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05260
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Dennis Manaligod y Santosis found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole. He is ordered to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

May 24, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on April 25, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the
original of which was received by this Office on May 24, 2018 at 10:10 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN


Division Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

1
CA rollo, pp. 113-124; penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez with Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao and Associate Justice Carmelita S.
Manahan, concurring.

2
Id. at 17-23; penned by Presiding Judge Reymundo L. Aumentado.

3
The city where the crime was committed is blotted to protect the identity of the rape victim pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 issued on
27 July 2015.

4
Records, p. 1.

5
The true name of the victim has been replaced with fictitious initials in conformity with Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 (Subject: Protocols and
Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious
Names/Personal Circumstances). The confidentiality of the identity of the victim is mandated by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act); R.A. No. 8505 (Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act of 1998); R.A. No. 9208 (Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003); R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004); and R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006).

6
TSN, 11 November 2009, pp. 5-8.

7
TSN, 16 November 2009, pp. 6-7.

8
TSN, 11 November 2009, pp. 8-10.

9
Records, p. 22.

10
Id. at 96.

11
CA rollo, p. 23.
12
Id. at 123-124.

13
Id. at 58-61.

14
People v. Cadano, Jr., 729 Phil. 577, 584-585 (2014).

15
Records, p. 80.

16
TSN, 16 November 2009, p. 4.

17
People v. Garcia, 695 Phil. 576, 588 (2012).

18
TSN, 16 November 2009, pp. 6-7.

19
People v. Mercado, 664 Phil. 747, 751 (2011).

20
People v. Clores, Jr., 475 Phil. 99, 107 (2004).

21
People v. Ferrer, 415 Phil. 188, 199 (2001).

22
People v. Escultor, 473 Phil. 717, 727 (2004).

23
People v. Cantomayor, 441 Phil. 840, 847 (2002).

24
People v. Diaz, 443 Phil. 67, 90 (2013).

25
People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016).

FIRST DIVISION

APRIL 18, 2018

G.R. No. 220146

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee


vs
GLEN ABINA y LATORRE and JESUS LATORRE y DERAYA, Accused-Appellants

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On appeal is the December 10, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. CR HC No. 01302, which affirmed the
1

December 29, 2010 Joint Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33 finding Glen Abina y Latorre
2

(Glen) and Jesus Latorre y Deraya (Jesus) guilty of murder in Criminal Case No. CC-2008-1695, and homicide in Criminal Case No.
CC-2008-1696. 3

Factual Antecedents

Glen and Jesus were charged with murder for the killing of Anthony Asadon (Anthony) and Rodolfo Mabag (Rodolfo). The Informations
read:

[Criminal Case No. CC-2008-1695]

That on or about the 1st day of February, 2008, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less, in Barangay Concord,
Municipality of Hinabangan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill and with treachery, thereby
qualifying the offense to murder, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shoot, stab and hack several
times one ANTHONY ASADON with the use of a long bladed weapon locally known as ‘sundang' and unlicensed homemade hand gun
with which the accused provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal wounds, which resulted to his
death.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

[Criminal Case No. CC-2008-1696]

That on or about the 1st day of February, 2008, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less, in Barangay Concord,
Municipality of Hinabangan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill and with treachery, thereby
qualifying the offense to murder, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shoot, stab and hack several
times one RODOLFO MABAG with the use of a long bladed weapon locally known as "sundang' with which the accused provided
themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal wounds, which resulted to his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

Glen and Jesus pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charges against them. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
6

Version of the Prosecution

At about 1:00 p.m. on February 1, 2008, Anthony Asadon (Anthony) and his wife, Jonalyn Asadon (Jonalyn), were at Glen's house for
his birthday celebration. During that time, Glen, Jesus, Pio Jongaya, and victims Anthony and Rodolfo Mabag (Rodolfo) were having a
drinking spree. 7

At about 5:00 p.m., Jonalyn and Anthony asked permission to leave the party; however, Glen disapproved of it because they would still
buy liquor. 8

When Jonalyn and Anthony proceeded to leave, Glen suddenly took his gun and shot Anthony, hitting his right eye. 9

When Anthony fell on the ground, Jesus stabbed him with a bolo. Seeing his cousin Anthony being assaulted, Rodolfo drew his bolo
and hit Glen at his chin. In turn, Glen and Jesus hacked and stabbed Rodolfo on his arms, forehead and face. 10

Both Anthony and Rodolfo died. 11

Version of the Defense

As summarized by the CA, the version of the defense is as follows:

JESUS LATORRE Y DERAYA averred that on February 1, 2008, particularly at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was in his house; by
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon he went to his farm located about 300 meters away. After a while, he went home. On his way home, he
noticed a birthday party in the house of Glen Abina. When he was already in his house, he saw Roberto Jongaya alias Dondon with a
gun directed at Anthony Asadon and Rodolfo Mabag. Hence, he admonished Dondon to stop because the two were drunk. Dondon at
that time was four meters away from Anthony and Rodolfo while he was about 10 meters when he first saw Dondon aiming the gun.
Unfortunately, Dondon did not heed his advice and eventually shot Anthony on the forehead while Rodolfo was hit at the right side of
his head, just below his right ear. When the two fell down, Glen and Dondon immediately stabbed the two. Glen used a 22 inches bolo
while Dondon used a 26 inches, left handed bolo. After grabbing the bolos from the hands of Glen and Dondon, he placed it inside the
sack. He also picked up the gun thrown by Dondon in the cogonal area and kept it in the same sack. Thereafter, he delivered the
weapons to Eddie, the Brgy. Captain of Concord. He informed Eddie about the incident. Thereafter, he went home. Glen, who was
injured in his right ankle just stayed in his house while Dondon went to the barangay proper.

He was arrested that evening by some barangay tanod and members of the Philippine Army. The military men warned him that if he will
not surrender his house will be strafed. He did explain to them that he was not the principal of the crime; that he only helped by carrying
the weapons to the Brgy. Captain. However, the military men handcuffed him and brought him to the barangay proper. At the barangay
plaza, he was interrogated; they wanted him to admit the commission of the crime. Glen was also arrested. On the other hand, Dondon
and Roberto Jongaya escaped. 12

However, during his cross-examination, Jesus admitted that he and Glen killed Anthony and Rodolfo but only to defend themselves. 13

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its December 29, 2010 Joint Judgment, the RTC convicted Glen and Jesus of murder, for the death of Anthony, and homicide, for the
death of Rodolfo. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the two (2) accused GLEN ABINA y LATORRE and JESUS LATORRE y
DERAYA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principals of the crime[s] of:

A. MURDER x x x in Criminal Case No. CC-2008-1695 and x x x hereby sentences them to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA; to indemnify jointly and solidarily the [h]eirs of Anthony Asadon Php 75,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death;
Php50,000.00 as moral damages and Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs of this suit.

xxxx

B. HOMICIDE x x x in Criminal Case No. CC-2008-1696 and x x x hereby sentences them to suffer imprisonment of an indeterminate
penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1)
DAY of Reclusion Temporal as maximum; to indemnify jointly and solidarily the [h]eirs of Rodolfo Mabag Php50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for his death and to pay the costs of this suit.

xxxx 14

The RTC did not consider the defense's claim of self-defense. It held that their denial of their involvement in the killing was inconsistent
with their claim of self-defense; they in turn failed to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victims which is an essential element
of self-defense. Instead, the RTC gave weight to the positive, credible, and logical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who
positively identified Glen and Jesus as the persons who killed Anthony and Rodolfo.

The RTC further ruled that the killing of Anthony was attended by treachery, which qualified the crime to murder. It explained that
Anthony was attacked in a sudden and unexpected manner that afforded him no opportunity to defend himself. It also found conspiracy
between Glen and Jesus in killing Anthony as their concerted acts showed unity of purpose and design.
On the other hand, the RTC held that the killing of Rodolfo only amounted to homicide. It explained that Rodolfo was hacked and
stabbed only after he joined the melee. According to the RTC, in the absence of treachery, appellants were only liable for homicide for
the killing Rodolfo.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA concurred with the finding of the RTC that appellants failed to establish the elements of self-defense, especially the presence of
unlawful aggression. Like the RTC, it noted that Jesus' denial was inconsistent with their claim of self-defense. The CA ratiocinated that
a person who invokes self-defense necessarily admits authorship of the crime which is completely inconsistent with their defense of
denial.

The CA also stressed that aside from failing to support their defense of denial, Jesus even admitted, during cross-examination, that he
and Glen killed the victims. Necessarily, such admission would work against them.

The CA similarly ruled that the killing of Anthony was treacherous which qualified the crime to murder. It held that Glen and Jesus
deprived Anthony of means to repel the sudden and unexpected attack against him. It pointed out that Glen suddenly shot Anthony
when the latter was about to leave, which rendered him (Anthony) defenseless; and subsequently, Jesus joined the fray by stabbing
him. Taken together, the means employed by Glen and Jesus assured them of no risk from any defense that Anthony might have
adopted against them.

With regard to the killing of Rodolfo, the CA agreed with the RTC that the same only amounted to homicide because of the absence of
treachery. It ruled that Rodolfo was attacked only after he came to the aid of Anthony. Given these circumstances, the CA concluded
1avv phi 1

that treachery did not attend the killing of Rodolfo.

Hence, this appeal.

In our Resolution dated December 5, 2016, the Court already dismissed the case against Jesus in view of his death. Hence, we will
15

only resolve the issue of Glen's culpability.

Issue

Whether the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Glen for the crimes of murder and homicide.

Ruling

In criminal cases, the prosecution has the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, when
the accused invokes self-defense, he or she has the burden to prove such justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.
Here, the defense miserably failed to discharge its burden to prove self-defense. Its defenses of denial and self-defense were
diametrically opposed to each other. In denial, one disavows any involvement in the crime. In contrast, in claiming self-defense, one
admits of his/her participation in the crime only that it was done in self-defense. Moreover, no specific details on the claim of self-
defense was advanced which, incidentally, was belatedly asserted only during the cross-examination of Jesus. Absent any clear and
convincing evidence to establish self-defense, the same cannot be appreciated in favor of Glen. 16

In view of the admission on the part of the defense of having killed the victims and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
categorically and positively identifying Glen as the author of the crime, we entertain no doubt as to his culpability.

However, we find that Glen should only be held liable for homicide for the killing of Anthony instead of murder, there being no proof that
treachery attended the commission of the crime, contrary to the findings of both the RTC and the CA.

Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery in this manner:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.

There are two requirements in order that treachery may be appreciated: (1) the victim was in no position to defend himself or herself
when attacked; and, (2) the assailant consciously and deliberately adopted the methods, means, or form of one's attack against the
victim.
17

In People v. Vilbar, the Court held that there is no treachery when the attack against the victim was impulsive, even if the same was
18

sudden and unexpected. It added that treachery cannot be appreciated where the accused did not make any preparation to kill the
victim in such a way that he or she insures the commission of the crime, or that it was impossible, or at the least, difficult for the victim
to retaliate or defend himself or herself.

Similarly, in Rustia, Jr. v. People, the Court elucidated that in order for treachery to be appreciated, it should not be based on the sole
19

fact that the victim was unable to defend himself or herself. The prosecution must establish the conscious adoption on the part of the
accused of such mode of attack that would result to the killing without any risk to the accused.

In People v. Calinawan, the Court again stressed that mere suddenness or unexpectedness of the attack is not sufficient to establish
20

treachery. It ruled that "treachery could not be presumed and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as
the killing itself." The prosecution must describe the whole scenario especially the manner of the killing in order to deduce the
21

presence (or absence) of treachery.

In this case, while Glen suddenly and unexpectedly attacked Anthony, there was no showing that he deliberately and consciously
adopted such mode of attack in order to facilitate the killing without any risk to himself arising from any defense that Anthony might
have adopted.
Glen suddenly shot Anthony in the presence of the latter's wife and the other guests at the party. If Glen deliberately intended that no
1âwphi1

risk would come to him, he could have chosen another time and place to attack Anthony. As it is, the location and time of the attack did
not discount the possibility of retaliation coming from the other guests. In addition, the shooting and stabbing incident transpired at
around 5:00 p.m. or during such time that Glen could still be easily seen and recognized as the perpetrator of the crime. From all
indications, it thus appeared that Glen did not consciously intend to employ a particular mode of attack to kill Anthony. The attack was a
spur of the moment decision caused by sheer annoyance when Anthony and his wife left while the party was still ongoing.

As such, in the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed was only homicide.

Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal, which ranges from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term to be imposed shall be
based on the attending circumstances, and the minimum term of the sentence shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, which is prision mayor which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
22

There being no modifying circumstance which attended the killing of both Anthony and Rodolfo, we hereby impose on Glen the
indeterminate penalty of seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum on each count of homicide.

Finally, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the Court hereby orders Glen to pay the heirs of Anthony and Rodolfo civil indemnity,
moral damages, and temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 each. The legal interest of 6% per annum shall be imposed on
all these awards from the finality of this Decision until paid in full.
23

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed December 10, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No.
01302 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) Accused-appellant Glen Abina y Latorre is found GUILTY of two counts of homicide for the killing Anthony Asadon and
Rodolfo Mabag. He is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count of homicide;
and,

(2) Accused-appellant Glen Abina y Latorre is ORDERED to pay the respective heirs of Anthony Asadon and Rodolfo Mabag
moral damages, temperate damages, and civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00 each. All these damages awarded shall
earn interest of 6% per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(On leave)
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO *

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE


Associate Justice Associate Justice

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM


Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO


Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes
On leave. Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2540 dated February 28, 2018. Designated as additional member per
* **

November 29, 2017 raffle vice J. Jardeleza who recused due to prior action as Solicitor General.

In the Resolution dated December 5, 2016, the Court dismissed the criminal cases against Jesus Latorre y Deraya in view of
***

his demise. (See rollo, unpaginated)

1
CA rollo, pp. 106-120; penned by Associate Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and concurred in by Associate Justices
Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla.

2
Records in Crim. Case No. C-2008-1695, pp. 146-159; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Yolanda U. Dagandan.

3
Also referred to as Criminal Case Nos. C-2008-1695 and C-2008-1696, respectively.

4
Records in Crim. Case No. CC-2008-1695, p. 1.

5
Records in Crim. Case No. CC-2008-1696, p. 1.

6
Records in Crim. Case No. CC-2008-1695, pp. 22-23.

7
TSN, June 4, 2009, pp. 7-8; September 10, 2009, p. 5.

8
Id. at 12: Id. at 6-7.

9
TSN, June 4, 2009, pp. 13-16.

10
TSN, June 4, 2009; pp. 18-23; November 19, 2009, pp. 19-22.

11
TSN, June 4, 2009, pp. 6, 26.

12
CA rollo, pp. 109-110.

13
TSN, May 7, 2009, p. 20.

14
Records in Crim. Case No. CC-2008-1695, pp. 158-159.

15
Rollo, unpaginated.

16
People v. Tuardon, G.R. No. 225644, March 1, 2017.

17
People v. Calinawan, G.R. No. 226145, February 13, 2017.

18
680 Phil. 767, 785-786 (2012).

19
G.R. No. 208351, October 5, 2016, 805 SCRA 311.

20
Supra.

21
Id., citing People v. Silva, 378 Phil. 1267 (1999).

22
People v. Calinawan, supra note 17.

23
People v. Calinawan, G.R. No. 226145, February 13, 2017.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 219113, April 25, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROLAND MIRAÑA Y ALCARAZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

On automatic review before this Court is the 7 August 2014 Decision 1 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 06183, which
affirmed the 11 April 2013 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30 (RTC), of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case No. T-3231 finding
accused-appellant Roland Miraña y Alcaraz (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and thereby sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant was charged in an Information3 which reads as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of June 2008 at around 6:30 o'clock in the morning in Barangay San Ramon, Municipality of Lagonoy, Province of
Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a bolo, with intent to kill and
with abuse of superior strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and hack one Dominga Agnas Vda. De
Globo, a seventy-three year old woman, on the different parts of her body, resulting [in] her death to the prejudice of her heirs.

The crime is committed with the attendant qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

When arraigned on 21 January 2009, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. In view of accused-appellant's admission that he caused the
victim's death, a reverse trial ensued.4

Version of the Prosecution

Dominga Agnas Vda. de Globo (the victim) was a 73-year-old widow and resident of Barangay San Ramon, Lagonoy, Camarines Sur. She was also
known as "May Inggay" by her relatives and neighbors. She lived on her own but prior to her death, she frequently slept at the house of Alberto Miraña
(Alberto), her first cousin, because accused-appellant had been harassing her, such as by throwing stones at her. The victim believed that accused-
appellant was threatening her because she once reprimanded him after she caught him stealing fruits from her property. 5

On 16 June 2008, when Alberto returned home from attending a fiesta, he found the victim in his house, trembling while praying. She told Alberto that
she was scared because accused-appellant had chased her with a bolo. Alberto invited her to sleep in his house and advised her to report the incident to
the barangay. The victim, however, rejected the idea because accused-appellant was her relative. Thereafter, the victim left Alberto's house and
proceeded to her brother's house. After relating the incident to her brother, she was once again advised not to go back to her house and to report the
incident to the barangay. Unfortunately, the victim did not heed the advice. She then returned to her house to await the call of her son, who was
working abroad.6

Between 6 o'clock to 6:30 in the morning of 17 June 2008, Armando Orce (Armando), the victim's neighbor, was at the coconut plantation near his
house when he heard a woman cry out followed by a loud cry of a man. Believing that the sounds emanated from his house, Armando immediately ran
in that direction. As he came near his house, he saw a woman lying on her side on the ground in front of the door to his house. Armando recognized the
woman as the victim. He also saw accused-appellant's father crying at the back of their house facing the accused-appellant.7

PO3 Bobby Corono (PO3 Corono), together with two (2) other police officers, responded to a call about the incident. Upon arrival at the place of the
incident, PO3 Corono saw the body of the victim lying on the ground. Accused-appellant approached PO3 Corono and admitted he was responsible for
the victim's death. He then pointed to a bolo and said that he used it to hack the victim and washed it afterward. PO3 Corono thereafter arrested
accused-appellant and brought him to the police station along with the bolo as evidence. 8

Ramiro9 Globo10 (Ramiro), the victim's son, flew back to the Philippines when he found out about his mother's death. He visited the mental hospital
where accused-appellant was committed. When asked what he did to Ramiro's mother, accused-appellant replied that he killed her.

Accused-appellant was initially charged with homicide but, upon a Motion to Remand Case to Prosecution Office for Reinvestigation, the information for
homicide was withdrawn. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur issued a resolution which ordered that a new information for murder
be filed against accused-appellant.

On 20 June 2008, an order for the immediate transfer of the accused to the Bicol Medical Center Mental Hospital was issued based on the report that he
was being violent to himself and to others at the jail.

Version of the Defense

In the morning of 17 June 2008, Imelda Miraña (Imelda) found out that her son, accused-appellant, had killed the victim.

Imelda did not know of any personal enmity between accused-appellant and the victim prior to the incident. She noticed, however, that her son started
exhibiting odd behavior after the latter's nose was bitten by a cousin. Accused-appellant would smile without anyone in front of him; he would call a
chicken late at night; and would keep on saying to himself that the victim was a witch. After the incident, she observed that accused-appellant just sat
inside their house, staring blankly. 11

A few nights before the incident, Mercy Delfino (Mercy), accused-appellant's sister, noticed that her brother kept smiling and could not sleep, and kept
on saying that the victim was a witch. He even claimed that he saw the witch in their own backyard.12

During trial, accused-appellant claimed not to know or recal1 the events surrounding the incident, the identity of the victim, and his confinement and
treatment at the mental hospital.13

The RTC Ruling

The RTC ruled that accused-appellant was not able to prove his defense of insanity, holding that "while the purported behavior of accused-appellant
would suggest an abnormal mental condition, it cannot however be equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern, to
accept insanity." It thereafter appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength to qualify the crime to murder, in consideration of
the fact that the victim was a 73-year-old unarmed woman as against a male assailant in his early twenties. The dispositive portion of its decision reads
as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused Roland Miraña y Alcaraz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment [sic] of Reclusion Perpetua. Likewise,
accused is hereby ordered to pay the surviving heir of the victim the amount of P75,000.00 for the civil indemnity, P75,000.00 for moral damages,
P73,397.95 as actual damages as evidenced by the receipts, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In addition, pursuant to prevailing circumstances, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the
date of the finality of the judgment until fully paid (People vs. Cabungan, G.R. No. 189355, January 23, 2013).

The accused having been under preventive imprisonment he is entitled to the full credit of his confinement if he abide of [sic] the rules and regulations
imposed therein otherwise he shall only be entitled to four-fifth [sic] while serving under preventive detention pending trial of this case.

Accused-appellant appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

The CA affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant, with modification as to the award of damages. The dispositive portion of its decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the 11 April 2013 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30 in Criminal Case No. T-3231 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. In addition to other damages awarded by the trial court. Accused-Appellant is ordered to pay moral
damages in the reduced amount of P50,000.00.

The CA agreed with the RTC that accused-appellant failed to overcome the presumption of sanity; and his bizarre acts prior to the incident cannot be
considered insanity for the purpose of exonerating him because not every aberration of the mind constitutes insanity.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT INSANITY COULD BE APPRECIATED IN ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S FAVOR IN ORDER TO EXCULPATE HIM FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY.

THE COURT'S RULING

The Court finds no reason to disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the matter of accused-appellant's insanity, but finds that he should only be
liable for homicide.

The defense failed to prove accused-appellant's insanity at the time of the


commission of the crime.

The defense of insanity is in the nature of a confession or avoidance because an accused invoking it admits to have committed the crime but claims that
he should not be criminally liable therefor because of insanity, which is an exempting circumstance.14 Consequently, the accused is tried on the issue of
sanity alone, and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt. 15

However, an accused invoking the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence 16 because
every person is presumed sane.17

For the defense of insanity to prosper, it must be proven that the accused was completely deprived of intelligence,18 which must relate to the time
immediately preceding or simultaneous to the commission of the offense with which he is charged. 19

Since the state of a person's mind can only be judged by his behaviour, establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be
given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, or who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the
witness' own perception of the accused, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.20

Taken against the standard of clear and convincing evidence, the proof proffered by the defense fails to pass muster.

The defense argues that the exempting circumstance of insanity has been sufficiently proven through the testimonies of Imelda and Mercy, accused-
appellant's mother and sister, respectively, as well as the testimony of Dr. Imelda C. Escuadera (Dr. Escuadera), a psychiatrist.

Imelda and Mercy testified that accused-appellant believed that the victim was a witch and that in the days prior to the incident, accused-appellant was
behaving oddly, such as smiling to himself and calling a chicken late at night. Their testimonies, however, fail to shed light on accused-appellant's
mental condition immediately before, during, and immediately after he committed the crime.

Moreover, unusual behaviors such as smiling to oneself and calling a chicken late at night are not proof of a complete absence of intelligence, because
not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity.21 The Court has held that "the prevalent meaning of the word 'crazy' is not
synonymous with the legal terms 'insane,' 'non compos mentis,' 'unsound mind,' 'idiot,' or 'lunatic.' The popular conception of the word 'crazy' is being
used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may behave in a crazy manner but it does not necessarily and conclusively
prove that he is legally so."22 In order to be exempt from criminal liability, the accused must be so insane as to be incapable of criminal intent.23

The defense also argues that Dr. Escuadera's testimony during the hearing to determine accused-appellant's fitness to stand trial sufficiently points to
his insanity at the time he committed the crime. Dr. Escuadera testified she conducted a psychiatric interview with accused-appellant on 21 July 2009,
and that her findings, embodied in a Mental Status Examination Report, showed she deemed accused-appellant fit for trial; and that accused appellant
had a history of mental illness, which she identified as schizophrenia. 24

At the outset, it must be pointed out that Dr. Escuadera's testimony was presented primarily to prove that accused-appellant was already fit to stand
trial. In fact, she was not the one who conducted the initial examination on accused-appellant upon the latter's commitment to a mental hospital. The
one who did so, a Dr. Chona Belmonte (Dr. Belmonte), was not presented as witness. More importantly, Dr. Escuadera's testimony on accused-
appellant's previous mental illness does not specifically pertain to the time of the commission of the crime. Even her medical report on accused-
appellant's mental status, for the purpose of determining his fitness to stand trial, is bereft of any indication that he was completely deprived of
intelligence or discernment at the time he mortally hacked the victim.

Vague references to his history of mental illness and subsequent diagnosis of schizophrenia do not satisfy the quantum of proof required to exempt
accused-appellant from criminal liability, especially since the defense failed to establish that accused-appellant's mental ailments, if such was the case,
related to the time of the commission of the crime.

Accused-appellant's actuations immediately after the incident also negate a complete absence of intelligence or discernment when he killed the victim.
As testified to by PO3 Corono, accused-appellant approached the police officers when they arrived at the crime scene, told them that he was responsible
for hacking the victim, pointed to the bolo he used, and indicated that he had already washed the weapon. 25 That accused-appellant had the foresight to
wash the bolo after killing the victim and, thereafter, the consciousness to decide to confess to the authorities what he had done upon their arrival,
suggest that accused-appellant was capable of discernment during the time of the incident.

It is clear from the foregoing circumstances that the defense failed to prove accused-appellant's insanity at the time of the commission of the crime with
the requisite quantum of proof. Consequently, accused-appellant's conviction must be upheld.

Abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated, such that accused-appellant


can only be held liable for homicide, not murder.
This Court finds that the conviction of the accused-appellant for murder is flawed because of the erroneous appreciation of abuse of superior strength as
a qualifying circumstance. The Court finds that the presence of this circumstance in the commission of the crime was not sufficiently proven.

In concluding that such circumstance existed, both the RTC and the CA primarily took into account the gender and age of the victim, a 73-year old
female, and the accused-appellant, a male in his early twenties. The Court finds that this is insufficient to conclude the presence of abuse of superior
strength.

It has been stressed that for abuse of superior strength to be properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, it must be shown that the advantage of
superior strength was purposely and consciously sought by the assailant, viz:

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that
there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no
proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victims. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the
advantage, or that thev had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of the aggravating
circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. 26(emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the prosecution failed to proffer evidence that accused-appellant purposely sought such advantage. The testimonies of the
witnesses, on the whole, do not establish that accused-appellant made any conscious effort to use his age, size, or strength to facilitate the commission
of the crime, as in fact the notorious disparity of these factors between the victim and the accused-appellant was not even clearly shown.

What is only certain herein is that the accused-appellant killed the victim, and the exempting circumstance of insanity cannot be appreciated in his
favor.

In the light of the foregoing, this Court is obliged to rule out abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance. There being no other circumstance
alleged and proven to qualify the crime to murder, accused-appellant can only be liable for homicide.

As to the award of damages, there is also a need to modify the same, in conformity with People v. Jugueta,27 where the Court laid down the rule that in
crimes where the death of the victim resulted and the penalty is divisible, such as in homicide, the damages awarded should be P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. This is apart from the proven actual damages, which the trial court found to amount to P73,397.95
undisputed by accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, the 7 August 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 06183 isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-
appellant Roland Miraña y Alcaraz is found GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended; and is hereby sentenced to serve the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the following amounts: P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P73,397.95 as actual
damages. The award of damages shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

May 23, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on April 25, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the
original of which was received by this Office on May 23, 2018 at 10:58 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN


Division Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 2-13; penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino, with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring.

2
CA rollo, pp. 49-57; penned by Presiding Judge Noel D. Paulite.

3
Records, p. 1.

4
Records, pp. 124-125.

5
TSN, 24 April 2012, pp. 2-5.

6
Id.

7
TSN, 15 February 2012, pp. 4-10.
8
TSN, 25 July 2012, pp. 2-5.

9
Appears as "Ramero" in some portions of the Records.

10
Appears as "Glovo" in some portions of the Records.

11
TSN, 9 December 2009, pp. 3-6.

12
TSN, 10 November 2009, pp. 2-5.

13
TSN, 17 August 2010, pp. 2-5.

14
People v. Tibon, 636 Phil. 521, 530-531 (2010).

15
People v. Roa, G.R. No. 225599, 22 March 2017.

16
Id.

17
Article 800, Civil Code of the Philippines.

18
People v. Madarang, 387 Phil. 846, 859 (2000), where the Court held that "In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion
for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is
deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total
deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability."

19
Id.

20
Id.

21
People v. Florendo, 459 Phil. 470, 479 (2003).

22
Id.

23
People v. Antonio, Jr., 441 Phil. 425, 429 (2002).

24
TSN, 4 August 2009, pp. 4-7.

25
TSN, 25July 2012, p. 4.

26
People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 226475, 13 March 2017.

27
783 Phil. 806 (2016).

FIRST DIVISION

March 13, 2017

G.R. No. 225608

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee


vs
ALBERTO ALEJANDRO y RIGOR and JOEL ANGELES y DE JESUS, Accused-Appellants

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellants Alberto Alejandro y Rigor (Alejandro) and Joel Angeles y de Jesus
1

(Angeles; collectively, accused-appellants) assailing the Decision dated June 3, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
2

No. 06495, which affirmed with modification the Joint Decision dated August 20, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Baloc, Sto.
3

Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 88 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96), 73-SD(96), and 74-SD(96) convicting accused-appellants of
the crimes of Simple Rape and Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles 335 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
4

respectively.

The Facts

On March 28, 1996, a total of three (3) separate Informations were filed before the R TC, each charging accused-appellants of one (1)
count of Simple Rape and one (1) count of Homicide, viz.: 5

Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96)


That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at around 2:30 o'clock [sic] in the morning, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of [Talavera],
Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Alejandro], with
lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge
of one [AAA ]gainst her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
6

Contrary to law.

Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96)

That on or about the 5111 day of January 1996, at around 2:30 o'clock [sic] in the morning, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of [Talavera],
Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Angeles], with lewd
design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one
AAA against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

Contrary to law.

Crim Case No. 74-SD(96)

That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of [Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Alejandro and Angeles], together with two (2) other persons
whose identities are still unknown (John Doe and Peter Doe), conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to
kill did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, box, beat and stab one [BBB] on the different parts of her body with the
use of a pointed instrument, thereby causing her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the said victim.

Contrary to law.

Upon Alejandro's arrest, he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him as stated in Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96) and 74-SD(96). 7

While Angeles was still at large, the prosecution sought for the amendment of the Informations in Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96) and 73-
SD(96) to convey a conspiracy between accused-appellants in the rape cases against AAA. The R TC allowed the amendment of the
Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) to include Alejandro therein as a conspirator; however, it disallowed the proposed amendment
in Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96) to include Angeles therein as conspirator on the ground that Alejandro had already been arraigned in the
latter case. The amended Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) reads:
8

That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at around 2:30 o'clock in the morning, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of [Talavera],
Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Angeles], with lewd
design, and in conspiracy with one ALBERTO ALEJANDRO Y RIGOR @ "JESUS'', by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one [AAA] against her will and consent, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party.

Contrary to law. 9

Eventually, Angeles was arrested and arraigned in connection with Crim. Case Nos. 73-SD(96) and 74-SD(96), to which he pleaded not
guilty. Alejandro was likewise arraigned in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) and pleaded not guilty as well. 10

The prosecution alleged that on December 12, 1995, AAA joined her co-worker for a vacation in the province of Nueva Ecija as they
were both laid off from work, and they stayed at the one-storey house of the latter's 62- year old mother, BBB. Thereat, AAA would
sleep at the papag while BBB slept on a mattress on the floor. At around 2:30 in the morning of January 5, 1996, AAA awoke to the
sound of BBB's pleas for mercy. Aided by the kerosene lamp placed on the floor, AAA saw BBB being mauled and stabbed to death by
Alejandro and Angeles. Thereafter, Angeles approached AAA and restrained her arms, while Alejandro pulled AAA's pants and
underwear down and started having carnal knowledge of her. After Alejandro was done, he switched places with Angeles and the latter
took his turn ravishing AAA. As AAA was able to fight back by scratching Angeles' s back, Angeles punched her on the left side of her
face while Alejandro hit her left jaw with a piece of wood. AAA then lost consciousness and woke up in a hospital, while BBB
succumbed to her injuries. 11

At the hospital, the police officers interviewed AAA and showed her several mugshots in order for her to identify her assailants. AAA
was then able to recognize Alejandro and Angeles from said mugshots and positively identified them as the perpetrators of the crime.
Medical records also revealed that AAA was indeed sexually assaulted, while BBB died due to "neurogenic shock" or severe pain
secondary to "multiple blunt injury and fracture of the mandibular and facio-maxillary bones." 12

In his defense, Angeles denied the charges against him and presented an alibi. He averred that on the night before the incident, he was
at home with his wife and slept as early as eight (8) o'clock in the evening. Upon waking up at seven (7) o'clock in the morning of the
next day, he was informed by his brother-in-law of BBB's death. He further averred that his relationship with BBB was like that of a
mother and son. 13

Similarly, Alejandro invoked the defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed that at around nine (9) o'clock in the evening prior to the
incident, he went home and slept. As testified by Noel Mendoza (Mendoza), Alejandro's relative by affinity, he asked Alejandro to help
him irrigate the rice field, but the latter declined. At around midnight, Mendoza went to Alejandro's house to personally fetch Alejandro,
but considering that the house was closed, Mendoza peeped through a hole and there he saw Alejandro soundly asleep. Alejandro
further claimed that he does not know both AAA and Angeles until the filing of the charges against him. 14

The RTC Ruling

In a Joint Decision dated August 20, 2013, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty as charged and, accordingly, sentenced them as
15

follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96), Alejandro was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA
the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (b) in Crim.
Case No. 73-SD(96), accused-appellants were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and each ordered to pay
AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (c) in
Crim. Case No. 7 4-SD(96), accused-appellants were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
ordered to pay BBB's heirs the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latter's death. 16

In so ruling, the RTC gave credence to AAA's positive identification of accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crimes charged,
expressly noting that AAA had no ill motive to falsely testify against them. In this light, the RTC found untenable accused-appellants'
1âwphi 1

defenses of denial and alibi, considering too that they have failed to show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime
scene when the crimes against AAA and BBB were committed. 17

Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed to the CA.


18

The CA Ruling

In a Decision dated June 3, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with the following modifications: (a) in Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96),
19

Alejandro was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Rape and, accordingly, was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages; (b) in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), Alejandro was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Simple
Rape, while Angeles was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the same crime, and accordingly, were separately
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of Simple Rape; and (c) in Crim. Case No. 74-
SD(96), accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide and, accordingly, were each sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to solidarily pay BBB's heirs the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and P525,000.00 as temperate damages. In addition, accused-
appellants are likewise ordered to pay legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from date of finality of
judgment until fully paid.
20

It held that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellants' complicity to the crimes charged, as they were
positively identified by AAA who had an unobstructed view of their appearance when said crimes were being committed. It likewise
found the existence of conspiracy in the commission of said crimes, considering that accused-appellants: (a) cooperated in stabbing
and mauling BBB, resulting in her death; and (b) took turns in having carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent, while the other
restrained her arms to prevent her from resisting. 21

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the aforesaid
crimes.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, the Court notes that during the pendency of the instant appeal, Alejandro filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated
22

January 19, 2017, stating that despite knowing the full consequences of the filing of said motion, he still desires to have his appeal
withdrawn. In view thereof, the Court hereby grants said motion, and accordingly, deems the case closed and terminated as to him.
Thus, what is left before the Court is the resolution of Angeles's appeal.

In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties
raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine
records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law." 23

Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to modify accused-appellants' convictions, as will be explained hereunder.

Article 249 of the RPC states:

Article 249 of the RPC states:

Article 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any
of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceeding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and punished by reclusion
temporal.

"To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person
was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the intention to kill, which
is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or
infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and
could cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance." 24

On the other hand, pertinent portions of Article 335 of the RPC (the controlling provision as the rapes were committed prior to the
enactment of Republic Act No. [RA] 8353 in 1997) read:
25

Article 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;


2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.

xxxx

"Under this provision, the elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (b) said carnal knowledge was
accomplished through the use of force or intimidation; or the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the
victim was under twelve (12) years of age or demented. The provision also states that if the act is committed either with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher penalty." 26

In this case, both the RTC and the CA were one in giving credence to AAA's positive identification that accused-appellants conspired in
stabbing and mauling BBB, resulting in the latter's death; and that thereafter, Angeles proceeded to rape her while Alejandro restrained
her arms to prevent her from resisting. Absent any cogent reason to the contrary, the Court defer to the findings of fact of both courts
and, thereby, upholds Angeles's conviction for Rape in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) and Homicide in Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), given
that the elements of said crimes square with the established incidents. In People v. Antonio: 27

It is a fundamental rule that the trial court's factual findings, especially its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great
weight and respect and binding upon this Court, particularly when affirmed by the [CA]. This Court has repeatedly recognized that the
trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique position of having
observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is
denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or
sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath. These are significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of
witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth. The appellate courts will generally not disturb such findings unless it plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 28

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court deems it appropriate to modify Angeles's conviction in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), as ruled by
the CA. As adverted to earlier, the CA convicted Angeles for two (2) counts of Simple Rape in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) alone,
ratiocinating that "Angeles must be held liable for two (2) counts of simple rape in Crim. Case No. 73- SD(96) for raping AAA and for
aiding (or conspiring with) Alejandro in raping her."29

The CA erred on this matter.

The accusatory portion of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) states that "[Angeles], with lewd designs, and in
conspiracy with one [Alejandro], by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had
carnal knowledge of one [AAA] against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party." Plainly, the
30

wording of the amended Information reveals that it charged accused-appellants with only one (1) count of Rape. As such, it was error
for the CA to convict Angeles with two (2) counts. Thus, Angeles must be convicted with one (1) count of Rape in relation to Crim. Case
No. 73-SD(96).

On a related matter, since the Information in Crim. Case No. 73- SD(96) was allowed to be amended to include Alejandro as a co-
accused and that accused-appellants were convicted of such charge, the Court deems it proper to upgrade the conviction in said case
from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape. As adverted to earlier, Article 335 of the RPC states that if the rape is committed under certain
circumstances, such as when it was committed by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, as in this instance.
Notably, this will no longer affect Alejandro as he had already withdrawn his appeal prior to the promulgation of this decision.

In sum, Angeles should be convicted of one (1) count of Qualified Rape and one (1) count of Homicide.

Anent the proper penalties to be imposed on Angeles, the CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in connection with
Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), and the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, as regards Crim.
Case No. 74-SD(96).

Finally, in line with existing jurisprudence, the Court deems it proper to adjust the award of damages as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No.
73-SD(96), Angeles is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (b) in Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), Angeles is ordered to pay the heirs of BBB the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, all with legal interest at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annumfrom the finality of judgment until fully paid. 31

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Alberto Alejandro y Rigor's Motion to Withdraw Appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the instant
case CLOSED and TERMINATED as to him.

On the other hand, the appeal of accused-appellant Joel Angeles y de Jesus (Angeles) is DENIED. The Decision dated June 3, 2015 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06495 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to him, as follows:

(a) In Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), accused-appellant Angeles is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as
exemplary damages, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from the date of finality of
judgment until fully paid; and
(b) In Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), accused-appellant Angeles is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is sentenced to each suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay the heirs of BBB the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, with legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum on all monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
See Notice of Appeal dated June 29, 2015; rollo, pp. 20-21.

2
Id. at 2-19. Penned by Associate Justice Fiorito S. Macalino with Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and
Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles concurring.

3
CA Rollo, pp. 46-66. Penned by Presiding Judge Anarica J. Castillo-Reyes.

4
The rape was committed prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997."

5
See rollo, pp. 3-4. See also CA rollo, pp. 46-47.

6
The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her
immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, entitled "AN ACT
PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION
AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 17, 1992; RA 9262, entitled "AN ACT
DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR
VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENAL TIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 8, 2004; and
Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, otherwise known as the "Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children"
(November 15, 2004). (See footnote 4 in People v. Cadano, Jr., 729 Phil. 576, 578 [2014], citing People v. Lomaque, 710 Phil.
338, 342 [2013].)

7
Rollo, pp. 4-5.

8
Id. at 5.

9
Id. See also CA rollo, p. 47.

10
Id.

11
See id. at 5-6.

12
See id. at 7-8.

13
See id. at 8. See also CA rollo, pp. 55-56.
14
See id. at 9. See also CA rollo, pp. 56-58.

15
CA rollo, pp. 46-66.

16
Id. at 65.

17
See id. at 58-65.

18
See Brief for the Accused-Appellants dated July 3, 2014; id. at 23-44.

19
Rollo, pp. 2-19.

20
Id. at 18-19.

21
See id. at 13-16.

22
Id. at 25-27.

See People v. Comboy, G.R. No. 218399, March 2, 2016, citing Manansala v. People, G.R. No. 215424, December 9, 2015,
23

777 SCRA 563, 569.

24
Abella v. People, 719 Phil. 53, 66 (2013).

Entitled "AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE, RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS CRIME
25

AGAINST PERSONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" approved on September 30, 1997.

26
People v. Arguta, G.R. No. 213216, April 20, 2015, 756 SCRA 376, 384-385.

27
G.R. No. 208623, July 23, 2014, 731 SCRA 83.

28
Id. at 94-95, citing People v. De/en, 733 Phil. 321, 332 (2014).

29
Rollo, p. 16.

30
See id. at 5. See also CA rollo, p. 47.

31
See People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 89684 September 18, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
GERARDO SAZON, alias "INSIK," accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Benjamin P. Sorongon for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

For the death of Wilfredo Longno, alias, "Inday," on September 17, 1983 at Barangay Progreso, Lapuz, La Paz, Iloilo City, herein accused-appellant Gerardo
Sazon, alias "Insik," and Cornelio Altejos, alias "Toto," were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, 1 in an amended information dated
October 18, 1983.2 However, only herein accused was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty, since Cornelio Altejos was not apprehended and has since remained at
large.

After trial, appellant was found guilty and sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was further ordered to pay the heirs
of the deceased the amount of P16,628.40 representing hospital bills, expenses for the coffin, tomb, wake and attorney's fees, and
P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim.

The antecedental facts which led to the filing of the criminal action below are herein under set forth as synthesized by the court a
quo from the testimonies of the witnesses, and as clarified and amplified by us from the transcripts of the notes of the hearings.
3

On September 15, 1983, in the barangay aforementioned, a certain Ernesto Romualdez was accosted by appellant near the barangay
hall for allegedly circulating the rumor that appellant and his companions were engaged in stealing. Upon confrontation, appellant
boxed Romualdez which caused the latter to fall. Wilfredo Longo, who was then present at the scene, approached and helped the fallen
Romualdez and pushed appellant away. This apparently angered appellant who, in his native dialect said "Andam ka lang Inday kay
patyon ta guid," ("Watch out Inday for I will kill you") to which Longno retorted, "Just do it."

Two days later, or on September 17, 1983, at about 8:00 o'clock P.M., appellant and his cousin, Cornelio Altejos, were drinking
softdrinks at the shire of Gloria Aposaga when Longno passed by. Thereupon, appellant and Altejos left their softdrinks half-assumed
and followed Longno.

Longno eventually reached the bench near the public faucet where the group of Massulini Dullete, Samuel Canoso and Nathaniel
Ramos were sitting. He joined the group in their conversation by saying, "Upon ako dira." ("I'll go with what you say."). Shortly
thereafter, appellant and Altejos arrived and appellant accosted and pointed a gun at Longno, saying, "Maano ka?" ("What are you
going to do?"). Longno then faced appellant and said, "Brod, tiruha lang." ("Brod, just shoot.")

Apparently irked by the response, appellant fired the gun, hitting Longno in the left forearm. Dullete, Canoso and Ramos then
scampered for safety as appellant and the wounded Longno grappled for the gun. It was while the two were thus struggling that Altejos
stabbed Longno in the chest, after which both appellant and Altejos ran away.

Longno then came out of the footwalk shouting, "Tay tiniro ako ni Insik, binuno ako ni Toto." ("Father, I was shot by Insik and stabbed
by Toto."). He was able to run about thirty (30) meters before he fell. His father, Julio Longno, ran to his son who was then lying
sprawled on the ground. Rushed to the St. Paul's Hospital, Wilfredo Longno died. Later, it was established that the cause of death was
hemorrhage, secondary to stab wound.

Appellant's version of the incident, however, differs. He admits having shot Longno but pleads self-defense. He claims that on
September 17, 1983, he left the house of his father-in-law at about 8:00 o'clock P.M. with his cousin, Altejos. The latter had asked for
help to have a .22 caliber revolver repaired and appellant was taking the revolver to a policeman friend of his. On their way, appellant
saw Longno from a distance. Upon his approach, Longno allegedly said, "Insik, I heard that you are not afraid of me. Maybe you want
to be taught a lesson." 4

Appellant claims that the deceased had a revolver tucked in his waist and was about to draw the same. He, therefore, parried the gun
but it fired hitting one of appellant's left fingers which was later amputated. It was then that appellant pulled out his gun and shot Longno
in the forearm. Appellant and Longno afterwards grappled for the gun. Altejos allegedly tried to separate appellant and Longno but he
was brushed aside by the latter. In the course of their struggle, Altejos then shouted to appellant, "I stabbed Inday, run," and so he and
Altejos ran away. 5

Appellant, in his brief, makes the following assignment of errors:

1. The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant for having acted in complete self-defense.

2. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of murder and in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua when the prosecution has not established by competent evidence the existence of conspiracy
and the presence of the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. 6

Appellant's version does not inspire credence. Well-entrenched is the rule that where the accused invokes self-defense, it is incumbent
upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. For, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it could not be disbelieved after
the accused himself had admitted the killing. 7

It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the presence of unlawful aggression is a
condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression
against the person defending himself. 8

In the present case, the burden of evidence having been shifted, we hold that the defense failed to establish the primary element of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and, therefore, the plea of self-defense must fail. The narrations of the sequence of events
by the accused, and by the lone alleged eyewitness for the defense, Jose Randera, are unconvincing primarily on account of their
inherent inconsistency and conflict with each other.

Appellant on cross-examination testified as follows:

Q How far were you from Inday Longno when he allegedly fired a shot at you?

A One (1) meter.

Q At one (1) meter distance did (sic) you not able to recognize what kind of a gun was that
allegedly used by Inday Longno?

A No, sir, at first I only saw the handle of the gun and I did not see the body of the gun.

Q But you can recognize between a pistol and a revolver?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was that allegedly used by Inday Longno, was that a pistol or a revolver?

A Because immediately after he said those words 'Maybe you want to learn a lesson he
immediately drew his gun and I was able to parry.
xxx xxx xxx

Q When you fired at Inday Longno hitting him on his left arm near the elbow, was he still holding
that gun he used in shooting you hitting you at the left palm?

A No, sir, because of too much force the gun fell.

Q Did you not pick up the gun?

A No, sir. 9

On the other hand, defense eyewitness Jose Randera stated in his testimony:

ATTY. SORONGON: (To the witness)

Q While Wilfredo Longno alias Inday was pointing a gun at Gerardo Sazon alias Insik, what was
Gerardo Sazon doing?

WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:

A When Inday said something, Insik Sazon brushed aside the gun and the gun fired.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said, that Wilfredo Longno alias Inday pointed a gun at Gerardo Sazon alias Insik, with what
hand was he holding that gun when he was pointing that gun to Gerardo Sazon?

WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:

A His right hand.

ATTY. SORONGON (To the witness)

Q You said that Gerardo Sazon brushed aside the gun which was being pointed to him, what hand
did Gerardo Sazon used (sic) in brushing that gun?

A His left hand.

Q When Gerardo Sazon brushed aside the gun pointed to him, what else if any did he do?

A Insik also drew a gun and shot Inday,

COURT: (To the witness)

Q What hand?

A Right hand. He drew a gun with his right hand and shot Inday.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. SORONGON (To the witness)

Q You said that there was a brushing, who was brushing aside and who was brushed aside?

WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:

Q Inday parried Cornelio Artejos (sic).

COURT: (To the witness)

Q And, what happened next?

Cornelio Artejos (sic) pulled out a knife and stabbed Inday.

Q This happened when Inday was already hit by Sazon?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. SORONGON (To the witness)


Q When Cornelio Artejos (sic) stabbed Wilfredo Longno alias Inday, what was Gerardo Sazon and
Wilfredo Longno doing if they were doing anything.?

A They were graffling of (sic) the weapon.

Q You are referring to whose weapon they were graffling (sic) at that time?

A Inday's weapon. 10

The testimonies aforequoted reveal an inconsistency on the matter of the gun for which appellant and the victim supposedly grappled.
While appellant claimed that the victim's weapon fell to the ground, witness Randera stated that appellant and the victim still grappled
for the latter's gun. The latter statement is itself difficult to imagine since appellant at that precise moment was also allegedly holding
with his right hand the gun which he used in shooting Longno.

It is necessary to stress that such inconsistency cannot be considered a minor detail since the homogeneity of the answers to the
inquiry could very well have established the existence of not only a single gun. Had this prevarication not been exposed, said
testimonies could have bolstered the defense theory that the victim himself carried a gun which he used to assault the appellant and
thus establish the element of unlawful aggression contrived by the defense.

Furthermore, the credibility of witness Randera is shattered by this finding of the trial court which is sustained by the evidence:

The testimony of security guard Jose Randera deserves scant consideration not only because he admitted that he
was one of those threatened by the deceased Wilfredo Longno but also because he wilfully falsified the truth when he
testified that the deceased was shot and hit by the accused on the body and that he saw blood come out just below
the right breast of the deceased. The physical evidence in this case showed that there was no wound on the right
breast of the deceased nor on any part of his body. The gunshot wound sustained by the deceased was only on his
left forearm. Considering that he testified that there were no other persons there during the incident except the
accused, the deceased and Cornelio Altejos when the overwhelming weight of evidence is that there were a lot of
other people during the incident (this) showed that this witness had small regard for the truth. 11

Coming back to appellant's representations in court, his vacillation as to what he allegedly did after Altejos stabbed the victim is another
instance which renders his version highly suspect. While stating on direct examination that he ran to the main road, he claimed on
12

cross-examination that he only walked a short distance and then went to the hospital upon seeing that his hand was wounded. The 13

latter statement is itself inconsistent with his earlier declaration during the same proceeding that he was brought by a policeman to the
hospital. This irresolution on the part of the appellant was obviously to avoid any imputation of guilt against him arising from his
14

flight.
15

At any rate, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is further negated by the physical evidence in the case. Again, we quote the
trial court with approval:

The testimony of the accused Gerardo Sazon that the deceased was armed with a gun and fired at him is not borne
out by the physical evidence in this case. The paraffin test conducted on the cadaver of the deceased showed that
the hands of the deceased were negative for gunpowder residues indicating that he did not fire a gun during the
incident. The other parts of his body like his forearm and his abdomen bore strong traces of gunpowder residues
because of the burst of the gun of the accused. The court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that there was only
one gun during the incident and that the gun belonged to and/or was used by the accused Gerardo Sazon. That a
part of one of his fingers was blown off at very close range, according to Dr. Ely Canja strongly indicated that the
accused accidentally hit his finger when he and the deceased grappled for the possession of the gun. 16

In contrast, appellant was found positive for the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates). While the presence or absence of nitrates
cannot indeed be considered conclusive proof that one has or has not fired a gun, the following testimony on direct examination by
prosecution witness Zenaida Sinfuego a forensic chemist whose expertise on the matter was sufficiently established, yields this
verification:

Atty. E. Original:

Q Now, have you conducted also a paraffin examination on the person of Wilfredo Longno?

COURT:

Q On the cadaver?

Atty. E. Original:

Q On the cadaver?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Have you brought with you the result of that examination?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Now I have here a carbon original of Chemistry Report No. C-200-83, result of the paraffin test
on the cadaver of Wilfredo Longno, please compare this carbon original to the original copy in your
possession whether it is the same?
A The same.

xxx xxx xxx

Q This report says specimen submitted, one pair of paraffin casts taken from the left and right
hands of the cadaver of one Wilfredo Longno, one piece of paraffin cast taken from left forearm of
same subject and one piece paraffin last taken from the left side of the abdomen. Purpose of
laboratory examination: to determine the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) on the above-
mentioned specimens. Findings, cast from hands-negative for the presence of gunpowder residues
(nitrates). Cast from forearm-positive for the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) in the 1 1/2
in, 2 1/2 in, 3 in, and 4 in radius. Cast from the left side of the abdomen-positive for the presence of
gunpowder residues (nitrates) in the center and in the 1 and 2 in radius. In the layman's language
Mrs. Sinfuego, will you please explain to the Honorable Court these findings 1, 2 and 3?

A Casts from the hands, negative for the presence of gunpowder residues that means that, no blue
specks were found in the hands of the cadaver.

COURT:

Q Before we go on, what is the implication when the finding is negative?

A Probably, the subject never fired a gun.

Q Within what time-span?

A The gunpowder will stay only within three days.

Q When was this examination conducted?

A Last September 18,1983.

Q Now before we go on, on that Chemistry Report which has been marked as Exhibit 'D' regarding
the paraffin test conducted on the right hand of the accused Gerardo Sazon, your finding there
states, positive for gunpowder residues, what is the implication?

A The implication states positive, that Sazon have (sic) fired a gun.

Q Within what time-span?

A Within three days.

Q Within three days?

A Within three days.

Q From the examination?

A Three days from the subject firing of a gun.

Q And when was the examination conducted?

A Last September 19,1983, Your Honor.

Q September?

A Nineteen.

Q So he could have fired a gun on September 17,1983?

A I think that depends, Your Honor on the requesting party.

Q I am asking you if it was possible that he fired a gun which left the powder burns, was it possible
that he fired a gun on September 17?

A Yes, Your Honor. 17

On cross-examination, Sinfuego further testified as follows:

Q Is it possible for a person who has not fired a firearm and could be (sic) positive for nitrates?

A Yes, Sir.
Q In what instance?

A For example, if he is near to the person firing a gun it is possible that it was carried by the wind.

Q So that is the only case wherein you find nitrates on the person who has not fired a gun?

A Also from the fertilizer.

Q You mean, a person handling fertilizers could also be positive for nitrates?

A Yes, Sir but we have to consider also the time of reaction, from contaminance (sic) for the
nitrates will take effect between two to three minutes.

COURT:

Q Can you determine on your examination whether the nitrates found was (sic) the nitrates left by
gunpowder residues or by fertilizer can you distinguish that?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And this (sic) nitrates found on the hands of the accused, could you determine where did it (sic)
come from?

A Gunpowder residues. 18

Parenthetically, it is true that the bad moral character of the offended party may be proven in evidence to establish in any reasonable
degree the probability of the offense charged, e.g., the quarrelsome nature of the victim may tend to establish that he started the
19

unlawful aggression. Nonetheless, such evidence, seeking to establish as it does only a probability, cannot prevail over facts sufficiently
proven by the prosecution during the trial belying such aggression. These observations find application in the instant case where the
defense presented and now argue on character evidence consisting of criminal charges involving minor offenses which had been filed
against the deceased, but not one of which resulted in conviction and were in fact dismissed except for one case which was sent to the
archives. 20

Obviously, whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact. Being so and in the absence of any showing
that the Court a quo failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion, the
court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies. No compelling
reason, therefore, lies for this Court to disturb the trial court's finding that appellant did not act in self-defense.
21

The Court, however, holds that appellant, albeit guilty, can only be convicted of homicide and not murder. The trial court correctly held
that the killing was not accompanied by treachery. It, however, ruled that there was evident premeditation on the part of appellant. We
find the records sorely wanting in evidence to support the latter conclusion.

The fact that appellant told the deceased that he would kill him and that two days later, after the deceased passed by the store where
appellant and Altejos were drinking softdrinks the latter followed the former and inflicted the fatal blows, cannot adequately sustain a
conclusion of premeditated killing.

To justify its attendance, the prosecution must prove (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the
execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 22

In the case at bar, the first and second elements are lacking. The angry outburst of appellant in that incident of September 15, 1983,
warning the victim that the former would kill him, does not convince us that, under the circumstances therein, appellant as of that time
had already decided to kill the victim. A homicidal premeditation is studiedly conceived and not impulsively adopted just like that and,
worse, publicly announced. It was more of a spontaneous expression of resentment or bravado on the part of appellant.

Again, the circumstance that appellant and Altejos were by chance at the store when the victim passed by cannot be taken as
manifestly indicating that appellant had clung to his determination to kill the victim. No evidence was presented to show that appellant
purposely waited there for the deceased. Nor was there any showing that the deceased frequently passed by the same route as to
warrant and explain appellant's waiting for the former at that place. Indeed, that the meeting may have been purely accidental is not a
remote possibility. We are more inclined to believe that it was the belligerent and defiant demeanor of the victim when confronted by
appellant near the public faucet that precipitated assault.

Under such considerations and there being no other evidence to prove that the death of the victim was the result of meditation,
calculation or reflection, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder. The circumstances qualifying or
23

aggravating the act must be proved in an evident and incontestable manner. They must be proved as conclusively as the acts
constituting the offense. Thus, for the same reason, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated
24

in this case. Superior strength may aggravate or qualify a crime, only if it is clearly shown that there was deliberate intent to take
advantage of it. In the absence of any evidence to show that the accused purposely sought to use their superior strength to their
25

advantage in the present case, a finding to that effect by the trial court cannot be sustained.

Finally, the fact that appellant did not inflict the mortal wound upon the deceased is of no moment, since the existence of conspiracy
was satisfactorily shown by the evidence. The coordinated acts of appellant and Altejos of immediately following the victim and jointly
confronting him thereafter reveal a concordance and unity of thought which resulted in the encounter. The circumstances that after the
accused shot the victim in the forearm and, while he and the victim were grappling for appellant's gun, Altejos stabbed the victim to
death, indicate closeness and coordination of their action geared towards a common purpose, that is, to kill the victim. Proof of a
26
previous agreement to commit the crime is not absolutely essential to establish a conspiracy. It is sufficient that the accused be shown
to have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective, as such circumstance is invariably indicative of a conspiratorial agreement.
27

It bears mention, at this point, that while we have ruled out evident premeditation in the case, this does not negate the existence of a
conspiracy. True, conspiracy generally involves evident premeditation, but this circumstance requires for its raison d' etre a sufficient
time in a juridical sense for the accused to meditate and reflect on the consequences of his intended action. Such time element is not
an indispensable requirement for a conspiracy to exist. Consequently, we find that there was a conspiracy between appellant and
28

Altejos although, for lack of conclusive showing, we cannot consider evident premeditation against appellant.

The rule is that where a conspiracy is proven, a showing as to who inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a conviction. The
29

act of one in killing the victim becomes the act of all the accused. Insofar as Cornelio Altejos is concerned, however, the trial court
never acquired jurisdiction over him and he can neither be convicted nor exculpated herein. References in this judgment to him are,
therefore, obiter and with no binding effect on him.30

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Gerardo Sazon is declared GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal.

The award by the lower court of the items of civil liability to be paid by accused-appellant to the heirs of the deceased is hereby
MODIFIED by disallowing the grant of attorney's fees for lack of basis, and increasing the death indemnity to P50,000.00 in accordance
with the policy adopted by the Court en banc on August 30,1990.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Judge Sixto R. Guanzon, presiding.

2 Original record, 15.

3 Rollo, 32-35.

4 Ibid., 38-39.

5 Ibid., 39.

6 Ibid., 56.

7 People vs. Bayocot, G.R. No. 55285, June 28, 1989.

8 People vs. Batas, et al., G.R. Nos. 84277-78, August 2, 1989.

9 TSN, March 1, 1988,16-17.

10 TSN, September 17,1985,10-14.

11 Rollo, 40.

12 TSN, October 12, 1987, 244.

13 TSN, March 1, 1988, 270.

14 Ibid., 264.

15 See U.S. vs. Alegado, 25 Phil. 510 (1913).

16 Rollo, 41-42.

17 TSN, February 8, 1984, 30-32.

18 Ibid., 34-35.

19 Section 51, Rule 130, Rules of Court.

20 TSN, February 26, 1988, 231-233.


21 People vs. Alvarez, etc., 163 SCRA 745 (1988).

22 People vs. Talla, et al., G.R. No. L-44414, January 18, 1990.

23 U.S. Vs. Balagtas, et al., 19 Phil. 164 (1911).

24 People vs. Tiongson, 130 SCRA 614 (1984); People vs. Atienza, 148 SCRA 147 (1987).

25 People vs. Salcedo, et al., 172 SCRA 78 (1989).

26 People vs. Kindo, et al., 95 SCRA 553 (1980).

27 People vs. Abueg, 145 SCRA 622 (1986); People vs. Cantre, et al., G.R. No. 70743, June 4,1990.

28 People vs. Custodia, et al., 97 Phil. 698 (1955); People vs. Arcamo, etc., et al., 105 SCRA 707 (1981).

29 People vs. Tala, et al., 141 SCRA 240 (1986).

30 People vs. Eswan, et al., G.R. No. 84713, June 4, 1990.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 207949 July 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. y RAMOS, and RODOLFO
LARIDO y EBRON, Accused-Appellants.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
1

02888 finding accused-appellants Armando Dionaldo y Ebron (Armando), Renato Dionaldo y Ebron (Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y
Ramos (Mariano), and Rodolfo Larido y Ebron (Rodolfo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention.

The Facts

At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro (Roderick) dropped his brother Edwin Navarro (Edwin) off at the
Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he received a text message from another brother who told him that Edwin
had been kidnapped. Records show that three (3) men, later identified as Armando, Renato, and Mariano, forcibly dragged a bloodied
2

Edwin down the stairway of the gym and pushed him inside a dark green Toyota car with plate number UKF 194. Upon receiving the
3

message, Roderick immediately reported the incident to the police. At around 10 o’clock in the morning of the same day, he received a
phone call from Edwin‟s kidnappers who threatened to kill Edwin if he should report the matter to the police. 4

The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who demanded the payment of ransom money in the amount of
₱15,000,000.00. Roderick told them he had no such money, as he only had ₱50,000.00. On May 19, 2003, after negotiations over the
telephone, the kidnappers agreed to release Edwin in exchange for the amount of ₱110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to bring
the money to Batangas and wait for their next call. 5

At around 7:30 in the evening of the same day, as Roderick was on his way to Batangas to deliver the ransom money, the kidnappers
called and instructed him to open all the windows of the car he was driving and to turn on the hazard light when he reaches the
designated place. After a while, Roderick received another call directing him to exit in Bicutan instead and proceed to C-5 until he
arrives at the Centennial Village. He was told to park beside the Libingan ng mga Bayani. After several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car
with plate number DEH 498 pulled up in front of his vehicle where four (4) men alighted. Roderick saw one of the men take a mobile
phone and upon uttering the word "alat," the men returned to their car and drove away. 6

Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin, headed by SPO3 Romeo Caballero (SPO3 Caballero)
and PO3 Nestor Acebuche (PO3 Acebuche) of the Camp Crame Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER). During the course
of the investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym, confessed to PO3 Acebuche that he was part of the plan to
kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the one who tipped off Mariano, Renato, Armando and a certain Virgilio Varona (Virgilio) on the
7 8

condition that he will be given a share in the ransom money. Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to
their arrest on June 12, 2003. In the early morning of the following day or on June 13, 2003, the PACER team found the dead body of
Edwin at Sitio Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas, which Roderick identified. 9

Thus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were charged in an Information which reads:


10

That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then private persons, did then and there by force
and intimidation willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of motor vehicle and superior strength take, carry and deprive EDWIN
NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his will, for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand of ₱15,000,000.00 was made
as a condition of the victim’s release and on the occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted.

Contrary to law.

During arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty and interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. Except for Rodolfo, they
11

individually claimed that on said date and time, they were in their respective houses when they were taken by men in police uniforms,
then subsequently brought to Camp Crame, and there allegedly tortured and detained. On the other hand, Rodolfo, for himself, averred
that at around 8 o’clock in the evening of June 12, 2003, while walking on his way home, he noticed that a van had been following him.
Suddenly, four (4) persons alighted from the vehicle, boarded him inside, blindfolded him, and eventually tortured him. He likewise
claimed that he was made to sign an extrajudicial confession, purporting too that while a certain Atty. Nepomuceno had been
summoned to assist him, the latter failed to do so. 12

During trial, the death of the victim, Edwin, was established through a Certificate of Death with Registry No. 2003-050 (subject
13

certificate of death) showing that he died on May 19, 2003 from a gunshot wound on the head.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision dated June 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129 (RTC), in Crim. Case No. C-68329,
14

convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

It gave credence to the positive and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which clearly established that it was the
accusedappellants who forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin into a car and, consequently, deprived him of his liberty. In light thereof, it
15

rejected accused-appellants‟ respective alibis and claims of torture, which were not substantiated. It also held that the crime of
Kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, which is punishable by death. However, in view of the suspended
imposition of the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 9346, only the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed. Further,
16 17

the RTC found that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, as the accused-appellants’ individual participation was geared
toward a joint purpose and criminal design. 18

Notably, while the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prove that the victim Edwin was abducted, deprived of
liberty, and eventually killed, a fact which is supported by the subject certificate of death, it did not consider said death in its judgment.
19

The CA Ruling

In a Decision dated February 15, 2013, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC’s conviction of accused-appellants, finding that the prosecution
20

was able to clearly establish all the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, namely: (a) the offender is a
private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or
kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, except when
the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer. It likewise sustained the finding that the kidnapping was committed for the
21

purpose of extorting ransom, as sufficiently proven by the testimony of the brother of the victim. Moreover, the CA affirmed that
22

conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, as the acts of accused-appellants emanated from the same purpose or common
design, and they were united in its execution. 23

Separately, the CA found that accused-appellants’ claims of torture were never supported, and that Rodolfo voluntarily signed the
extrajudicial confession and was afforded competent and independent counsel in its execution. 24

Aggrieved by their conviction, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not accusedappellants are guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is devoid of merit.

Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. Its assessment of the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, and it is conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or
unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered. Absent any showing that the
trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or
that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by the appellate court. 25

In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which they
found to be straightforward and consistent. Through these testimonies, it was clearly established that accused-appellants, who were all
private individuals, took the victim Edwin and deprived him of his liberty, which acts were illegal, and for the purpose of extorting
ransom. Thus, seeing no semblance of arbitrariness or misapprehension on the part of the court a quo, the Court finds no compelling
26

reason to disturb its factual findings on this score. 1âwphi1

Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, the Court likewise finds the conclusion of the RTC in this
regard, as affirmed by the CA, to be well-taken. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and when conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective,
not individual, rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations. In this relation, direct proof
27

is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be presumed from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose,
design, concerted action, and community of interests. Hence, as the factual circumstances in this case clearly show that accused-
28
appellants acted in concert at the time of the commission of the crime and that their acts emanated from the same purpose or common
design, showing unity in its execution, the CA, affirming the trial court, correctly ruled that there was conspiracy among them.
29

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is, however, constrained to modify the ruling of the RTC and the CA, as the crime the
accusedappellants have committed does not, as the records obviously bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention, but that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the victim’s (i.e., Edwin’s)
death, which was (a) specifically charged in the Information, and (b) clearly established during the trial of this case. Notably, while this
30

matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, the same should nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled
rule that in a criminal case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can
correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment. 31

After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article 267 of the same Code now provides:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall
have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public
officer;

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any
other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed. (Emphases supplied)

The Court further elucidated in People v. Mercado: 32

In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping for ransom and murder committed on
July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found the accused guilty of the "special complex
crime" of kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court
said:

x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of „special complex crime‟ of kidnapping with murder or homicide.
It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely
sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought.
Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor
be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by
RA No. 7659. (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
33

Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, accused-appellants’
conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide, which carries the penalty of death. As earlier intimated, the enactment of RA 9346 had suspended the imposition of the
death penalty. This means that the accused-appellants could, as the CA and trial court properly ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. To this, the Court adds that the accused-appellants are not eligible for parole. 34

On a final note, the Court observes that the RTC and the CA failed to award civil indemnity as well as damages to the family of the
kidnap victim. In People v. Quiachon, the Court explained that even if the death penalty was not to be imposed on accused-appellants
35

in view of the prohibition in RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity was nonetheless proper, not being dependent on the actual imposition
of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the crime. In the present case, considering that both the qualifying circumstances of ransom and the death of the victim
36

during captivity were duly alleged in the information and proven during trial, civil indemnity in the amount of ₱100,000.00 must therefore
be awarded to the family of the victim, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence. 37

Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral damages is warranted in this case. Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral
damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury, while
Article 2219 of the same Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. It cannot be denied, in this
case, that the kidnap victim‟s family suffered mental anguish, fright, and serious anxiety over the detention and eventually, the death of
Edwin. As such, and in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 must perforce be
38

awarded to the family of the victim.

Finally, exemplary damages must be awarded in this case, in view of the confluence of the aforesaid qualifying circumstances and in
order to deter others from committing the same atrocious acts. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, therefore, the Court
39

awards exemplary damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to the family of the kidnap victim.

In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of
judgment until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 40

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02888 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that all the accusedappellants herein are equally found GUILTY of the special
complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, and are sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, and to pay, jointly and severally, the family of the kidnap victim Edwin Navarro the following amounts: (1)
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum ·from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 2-25. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring.

2
Id. at 6-7.

3
See id. at 4-5.

4
Id. at 7.

5
Id.

6
Id. at 7-8.

7
"Virginio" in some parts of the records.

8
One of the original five (5) accused who died during trial, resulting in the dismissal of the case against him. (See CA rollo, p.
37.)

9
See rollo, pp. 6 and 8-9.

10
Id. at 3.

11
Id. at 3 and 20.

12
See id. at 9-12.

13
Records, p. 300, including the dorsal portion thereof.
14
CA rollo, pp. 36-99. Penned by Presiding Judge Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre.

15
See id. at 93-95.

16
Entitled "AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES."

17
CA rollo, pp. 98-99.

18
Id. at 97.

19
Id. at 60.

20
Rollo, pp. 2-25.

21
Id. at 15-16.

22
Id. at 18-19.

23
See id. at 23-24.

24
See id. at 22-24.

People v. Mercado, 400 Phil. 37, 71 (2000). See also People v. Lamsen, G.R. No. 198338, February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA
25

498, 505-506.

26
See CA Decision; rollo, pp. 16-19.

27
People v. Castro, 434 Phil. 206, 221 (2002).

28
People v. Buntag, 471 Phil. 82, 93 (2004).

29
Rollo, p. 23.

30
"[T]he above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then private persons, did then
and there by force and intimidation willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of motor vehicle and superior strength take,
carry and deprive EDWIN NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his will, for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a
demand of ₱15,000,000.00 was made as a condition of the victim’s release and on the occasion thereof, the death of the
victim resulted." (Id. at 3; emphasis and underscoring supplied).

31
People v. Quimzon, G.R. No. 133541, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 261, 281, citing People v. Feliciano, 418 Phil. 88, 106
(2001).

32
Supra note 25.

33
Id. at 82-83.

34
Pursuant to Section 3 of RA 9346 which states that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended." (See People v. Tadah, G.R. No. 186226, February
1, 2012, 664 SCRA 744, 747; see also People v. Lalog, G.R. No. 196753, April 21, 2014.)

35
532 Phil. 414 (2006).

36
Id. at 428.

37
See People v. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013.

38
See People v. Reyes, 600 Phil. 738, 788 (2009).

39
See id. at 787.

Peop e v. Dumadag, G.R. No. 176740, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA 535, 550, citing People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 181827,
40

February 2, 2011, 641SCRA472, 485.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 201443 April 10, 2013


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BETTY SALVADOR y TABIOS, MONICO SALVADOR, MARCELO LLANORA, JR. y BAYLON, ROBERT GONZALES y MANZANO,
RICKY PEÑA y BORRES @ RICK, ROGER PESADO y PESADO @ GER, JOSE ADELANTAR y CAURTE, LOWHEN ALMONTE y
PACETE, JUBERT BANATAO y AGGULIN @ KOBET, and MOREY DADAAN, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is an appeal1 from the Decision2 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) on February 25, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03279
affirming, albeit with modifications, the conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 219 of Betty Salvador y
Tabios (Betty), Monico Salvador (Monico), Marcelo Llanora, Jr. y Baylon (Marcelo), Robert Gonzales y Manzano (Robert), Ricky Peña y
Borres @ Rick (Ricky), Roger Pesado y Pesado @ Ger (Roger), Jose Adelantar y Caurte (Jose), Lowhen Almonte y Pacete (Lowhen),
Jubert Banatao y Aggulin @ Kobet (Jubert), and Morey Dadaan (Morey) (herein accused-appellants) for having conspired in kidnapping
Albert Yam y Lee (Albert) for the purpose of extorting ransom. The RTC sentenced the accused-appellants to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and ordered them to solidarily pay Albert the amount of PhP 100,000.00 as moral damages. 3The CA Decision dated
February 25, 2011 concurred with the RTC’s factual findings but expressly stated in its dispositive portion the accused-appellants’ non-
eligibility for parole. The CA further ordered the accused-appellants to solidarily pay Albert PhP 50,000.00 as civil indemnity and PhP
100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The RTC and the CA, however, acquitted accused-appellants of kidnapping a certain Pinky
Gonzales (Pinky), who, from the account of some of the prosecution witnesses, was likewise taken with Albert during the same
abduction incident.

The charges against the accused-appellants stemmed from the following Informations dated April 15, 2002:

(a) In Criminal Case No. Q-02-108834 against Betty, Monico, Marcelo, Robert, Ricky, Roger and nine other John Does for the
kidnapping and serious illegal detention of Pinky allegedly lasting for six days, the Information, in part, reads:

That on or about April 7, 2002 at around 7:30 in the evening, in the vicinity of the Cainta Cockpit Arena, Cainta, Rizal, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with the use of firearms, threats and intimidation did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take away PINKY GONZALES y TABORA against her will; That in the process,
she was forced to board a Toyota Hi-Ace van which transported her, until finally she was brought to an undisclosed location in
Caloocan City where she was kept for six (6) days; That she was finally rescued on April 12, 2002 by police operatives from the
Philippine National Police.4

(b) In Criminal Case No. Q-02-108835 against Jose, Lowhen, Betty, Monico, Morey, Jubert, Marcelo, Robert, Ricky, Roger and nine
other John Does for the kidnapping of and demanding from Albert USD 1,000,000.00 as ransom money, the Information states:

That on or about April 7, 2002 at around 7:30 in the evening, in the vicinity of the Cainta Cockpit Arena, Cainta, Rizal, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with the use of firearms, threats and intimidation did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take away ALBERT YAM y LEE; That in the process, he was forced to board a
Toyota Hi-Ace van which transported him, passing through the areas of U.P. Balara and Fairview in Quezon City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, until finally he was brought to an undisclosed location in Caloocan City where he was kept for six
(6) days; That ransom in the amount of $1,000,000.00 was demanded in exchange for his safe release until he was finally rescued on
April 12, 2002 by police operatives from the Philippine National Police.5

During arraignment, the accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges.

On June 14, 2002, pre-trial was terminated without the parties having entered into stipulations.

The Case for the Prosecution

During the trial, the prosecution witnesses, with their corresponding testimonies, were:

(a) Albert, married to Evangeline Lim-Yam (Evangeline), holds a Marketing degree from De La Salle University. He also took some
units under the Ateneo de Manila University’s Masters in Business Administration program. He is engaged in printing and financing
business. He is also a breeder of fighting cocks and race horses. On February 2002, he took over, with a partner, the operations of the
New Cainta Coliseum (Coliseum), a cockpit arena.

Albert testified6 that the lens grade of his eye glasses is 275. With eye glasses on, his vision is normal. Without the glasses, he can
clearly see objects one to two meters away from him, but beyond that, his vision becomes blurry. 7

On April 7, 2002, at around 7:30 p.m., Albert rode his Toyota Prado (Prado) with Plate No. UTJ-112 and drove out of the Coliseum’s
parking lot. Ahead was a white Honda Civic car (Civic), while behind was a Toyota Hi-Ace van (Hi-Ace). Upon reaching Imelda Avenue,
the Hi-Ace overtook the Civic. Albert was about to follow suit, but the Hi-Ace suddenly stopped and blocked the Civic. Six men with long
firearms alighted from the Hi-Ace. Jubert and Morey approached the Civic, which was just about two to two and a half meters away
from Albert,8 pointed their guns at the driver, who turned out to be Pinky, 9 and motioned for her to step out of the car and ride the Hi-
Ace. Two men ran after the "watch-your-car" boy in a nearby parking lot, but Albert no longer noticed if the two still returned to the Hi-
Ace.10 Roger and Robert came near the Prado and gestured for Albert to likewise alight from the vehicle and ride the Hi-Ace.

When Albert rode the Hi-Ace, he saw Marcelo in the driver’s seat and beside him was Ricky. Morey was behind the driver. So too were
Jubert. Roger and Robert rode the Hi-Ace after Albert did.

Albert and Pinky were handcuffed together and made to wear dark sunglasses. The men took Albert’s wallet containing PhP 9,000.00,
his driver’s license and other documents. They also took his Patek Philippe watch which costs PhP 400,000.00.
While inside the Hi-Ace, Albert and Pinky were ordered to duck their heads. Notwithstanding the position, Albert saw the lights
emanating from the blue eagle figure at the Ateneo gym. He also heard one of the men telling the driver to pass by Balara. After around
20 minutes, Albert also noticed having passed by the vicinity of SM Fairview. They arrived in their destination 10 to 15 minutes after and
were handcuffed separately. Albert and Pinky stayed in the house and were fed food mostly bought from Jollibee until they were
rescued on April 12, 2002.

Albert described the house as "half constructed". 11 They were made to stay in the basement around three and a half by four meters in
size, with a stairway, small sofa, bed, table and four chairs. Behind the table was a sink and a comfort room. There was a large window
about three by five feet in size, but it was covered with a blanket and a plastic sack. Albert identified Monico as the person who was
beside him, pulling him up when he fell while descending the basement stairs. 12 Albert claimed that he was still handcuffed then and
was made to wear dark eye glasses. The kidnappers allowed him to remove the dark eye glasses when he laid down in bed on the first
night of their detention.13 On April 8, 2002, his own eye glasses were returned to him upon his request. 14

Albert told the men that he was the only person they should talk to if they wanted ransom money. The men inquired how much he can
give. Albert replied that he can shell out PhP 500,000.00. The men asked for Albert’s phone and pin number to be able to call the
latter’s wife. He was ordered to write a letter to his wife informing her that he was abducted and indicating therein the names of persons
from whom she could borrow money to be paid to the accused-appellants as ransom. Albert also claimed that he got to talk, through the
telephone, to the person, whom the accused-appellants seemed to consider as their boss. The boss demanded USD 1,000,000.00 for
Albert’s release. One of the persons posted as guards in the safehouse threatened Albert that the latter would be killed unless ransom
money be paid by Friday, April 12, 2002.15

Albert had seen Jose a few times in the Coliseum. Albert also recalled that immediately prior to his abduction, Jose accompanied him to
his Prado and had asked for "balato".16 Albert identified Jose as the "tipster" who acted as a look-out during the abduction
incident.17 Albert likewise stated that he had seen Ricky in the Coliseum on April 7, 2002 and on several other instances as the latter
worked as a "kristo" or bet taker.18 Albert recognized Marcelo as a bettor.

Albert identified Betty as the person who brought them food and who, in one occasion, had inquired from the guard how Albert and
Pinky were faring in the basement.19

On April 11, 2002, at around 6:00 a.m.,20 seven persons came down to the basement to threaten Albert and Pinky. 21 Albert later
identified them as Jubert and Morey,22 Marcelo, Ricky, Lowhen and Jose,23 and Nelson Ocampo y Ruiz @ Joselito Estigoy24 (Nelson).
Thereafter, the men left behind Nelson and Lowhen to remain as guards, who took their posts in the stairway.25 At around lunch time,
Betty gave food to one of the guards, who in turn handed the same to Albert and Pinky. Albert was then sitting in the sofa, which was
just a little over a meter away from the stairway. 26

Albert remembered having stayed in the basement until the early hours of April 12, 2002. On that day, he heard the ferocious barking of
a dog, footsteps in the second floor, and then a gun shot. Albert and Pinky stayed inside the comfort room until a uniformed man
brought them out. One person, who acted as among those guarding Albert and Pinky while they were detained, was killed in the rescue
operations. He was subsequently identified as Nelson. Another guard left in the evening of April 10, 2002 and he never went
back.27 Albert did not see Betty and Monico in the premises of the safehouse on the day the rescue operations were conducted by the
police. He only saw the couple in Camp Crame around 5:00 p.m. while the former was making a statement.28

Albert and Pinky were brought to Camp Crame between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. of April 12, 2002. Some time after lunch, a police line-
up with about 15 men was presented.29 Albert identified seven persons, to wit, Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Morey, Jose, Robert and Roger,
as among his abductors. At that time, he was not yet able to pinpoint the rest of the accused-appellants because they were not
presented to him in the police line-up.30

(b) Senior Inspector Arnold Palomo (S/Insp. Palomo), who is assigned at the Anti-Organized Crime for Businessmen’s Concern Division
of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Camp Crame, testified that on April 12, 2002, at around 6:30 a.m., he was in
the vicinity of No. 3, Lumbang Street, Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City, where they had just rescued Pinky, a victim of kidnapping.
Around an hour later, Betty arrived and introduced herself as the owner of the house. She inquired why the police officers were
shooting at her house. She was invited by the police to Camp Crame to answer queries anent why a crime was committed in her house.
While in Camp Crame, Albert and Pinky identified her as the person who brought them food while they were detained in the safehouse.
Betty was thus arrested.31

(c) Police Inspector Marites Bugnay (P/Insp. Bugnay), Assistant Chief of the Firearms Identification Division of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, testified that at around 9:30 a.m. of April 12, 2002, she and her team, with six members, went to
Amparo Subdivision where a rescue operation had just taken place. They recovered a 5.56 mm Elisco rifle without serial number, a 9
mm Chinese made pistol, two long and three short magazines for a caliber 5.56 mm rifle, 188 live ammunitions, 24 pieces of cartridges
fired from four different caliber 5.56 mm rifles, two lifted latent prints, among others. She made a Spot Report of the physical evidence
recovered by her team. P/Insp. Bugnay, however, stated that some of the police officers, who participated in the rescue operations, also
carried caliber 5.56 mm firearms.32

(d) Evangeline, Albert’s wife, testified33 having received seven phone calls34 between April 7, 2002 and April 11, 2002 from the
kidnappers informing her that they took Albert and demanding USD 1,000,000.00 as ransom money. 35 On April 11, 2002, she was
instructed by the kidnappers to go to Jollibee along EDSA Guadalupe. The kidnappers were supposed to hand to her a letter from her
husband. A police operative acted as her driver. She and the police operative got to the place between 11:30 and 11:45 in the
morning.36 The kidnappers called her and ordered her driver to go to the restrooms to retrieve a letter taped in one of the toilet bowls.
Evangeline went back to her car. While she was inside, three men tried to forcibly open her car. She panicked, bowed down and
screamed. She was, however, only able to see the suspects from theirs chests down.37 Thereafter, P/Insp. Ferdinand Vero (Major Vero)
approached the car and informed her that they were able to apprehend three suspects. She went home. The next morning, she
received a call, got to talk to Albert, and thereafter proceeded to Camp Crame.

(e) PO1 Paul Pacris (PO1 Pacris) stated that he and four other police officers from the CIDG were the ones who assisted Evangeline
when she met with Albert’s kidnappers in Jollibee along EDSA Guadalupe. They arrived in the area at around 11:00 a.m. and after
about two hours, they arrested Ricky, Jose and Marcelo who tried to forcibly open Evangeline’s car. They recovered from Jose a .38
caliber Armscor with six live ammunitions. The policemen frisked the three without opposition from the latter. 38
(f) PO3 Manuel Cube (PO3 Cube) corroborated39 PO1 Pacris’ testimony relative to the arrest of Ricky, Jose and Marcelo. PO3 Cube
further stated that while it was not his team which arrested the suspects, after Jose and Ricky were turned over to them, they brought
the two to Camp Crame.40 While in the investigation room, he heard Jose and Ricky admit knowledge of Albert’s abduction.41 Jose and
Ricky were then not assisted by counsel.42 Chief Police Superintendent Zolio M. Lachica (Col. Lachica) briefed PO3 Cube and the other
policemen that the arrested suspects divulged an information that the Hi-Ace with Plate No. WNW-180 used in

Albert’s abduction was going to pass by Road C-5, Commonwealth Avenue on April 12, 2002.43 PO3 Cube, Major Vero and other police
officers riding four to five vehicles went to the place. At around 5:45 a.m., they spotted the Hi-Ace, chased it and blocked it with a police
car.44 Robert and Roger were inside the Hi-Ace, and the former had a shotgun. After the policemen drew their guns, the suspects
surrendered.

(g) PO2 Arvin Garces (PO2 Garces), a field operative and an in-house bomb technician assigned at the CIDG’s Anti-Organized Crime
and Businessmen’s Concern Division, testified45 that on April 12, 2002, between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m., he and 20 policemen went to
Sitio GSIS, Barangay San Martin de Porres, Parañaque to arrest Lowhen, Jubert and Morey. Their team leader knocked on the door of
the target house, which was partially open. Lowhen came out. Jubert and Morey were in the adjacent room, which was about five
meters away from where Lowhen was.46 PO2 Garces was uncertain though if the said adjacent room was part of the same house where
Lowhen was found.47 The three suspects were informed that they were being implicated for Albert’s kidnapping and would thus be taken
for investigation.

Following were among the object evidence likewise offered by the prosecution: (a) sketches prepared by Albert depicting the (1) exact
location where the kidnapping took place,48 (2) positions of Albert and Pinky relative to the kidnappers while inside the Hi-Ace,49 and (3)
interior of the basement room where Albert and Pinky were detained; 50 (b) dark glasses wrapped with black tape and handcuffs worn by
Albert and Pinky while they were detained;51 (c) Albert’s handwritten note dated April 10, 2002 addressed to "Vangie" and signed by
"Boogs";52 and (d) Sinumpaang Salaysay53 and Supplemental Affidavit54 executed by Albert on April 13, 2002 and April 15, 2002,
respectively.

The Case for the Defense

The defense witnesses with their testimonies were:

(a) Marcelo, resident of Sta. Ana Compound, Manila East Road, Taytay, Rizal, testified that he owns a beer house and a billiard hall.
He also renders mechanical services. He claimed that from 12:00 noon until 9:00 p.m. of April 7, 2002, he was repairing a motor bike at
home. Marcelo was with a certain Bogs, the owner of the motor bike, and Jober, the former’s helper. 55

From April 8 to 9, 2002, Marcelo just stayed home with his daughter.56

On April 10, 2002, at around 7:00 a.m., Marcelo was in his bedroom making an accounting of the earnings of his beer house. He heard
knocks at the door of his billiard hall. Thereafter, around six unidentified men entered, punched, tied him up, and threw him at the back
of a white Revo without a plate. Even when Rosario, Marcelo’s daughter, was slapped and kicked by the unidentified men after she
inquired about their identities, she insisted that she be taken with her father. Marcelo and Rosario were brought to Camp Crame. They
were made to sit down in a room with a hazy glass window. Rosario was thereafter ordered to leave the room and when she refused,
she was dragged out. The men started showing Marcelo photographs and asking him questions. When he denied knowing any of the
persons in the photographs, he was blindfolded with a packing tape and got kicked every time he refused to answer the men’s queries.
A plastic bag was likewise placed over his head making it difficult for him to breathe. His ordeal lasted for an hour, after which
somebody told him that if he had PhP 100,000.00, he would be released. 57

At around 5:00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m., Marcelo asked Rosario to go home and look for a lawyer. At around 10:00 a.m. of the following day,
April 11, 2002, Rosario came back with a certain Atty. Platon. Marcelo narrated to Atty. Platon the circumstances surrounding his
arrest.58 Atty. Platon informed Marcelo that the latter was being charged of kidnapping.59 Not long after, at around 10:30 a.m. to 11:00
a.m., a certain Dr. Arnold de Vera (Dr. de Vera) arrived and conducted an examination of Marcelo’s injuries and bruises.60 Marcelo
asked Atty. Platon if he can file a complaint against the men who mauled him. Atty. Platon replied in the affirmative, but as of even date,
no complaint had been filed yet as Marcelo had to attend to other pressing matters relative to the kidnapping case. 61 Atty. Platon and
Dr. de Vera left while Marcelo and Rosario stayed in Camp Crame for two nights. 62

On April 12, 2002, at around 3:00 p.m. or 4:00 p.m., Marcelo was brought to a building in Camp Crame and was made to stand up
alongside nine people with whom he was not acquainted. There were cameras around and a Chinese man and a woman started
pointing at them.63

Marcelo denied personal acquaintance with Albert,64 PO1 Pacris,65 Jubert, Monico and Betty.66 He admitted having been to the
Coliseum as he was into cock fighting. The Coliseum, located in Cainta, is only about two kilometers away from Taytay.67

Marcelo offered the testimony of Dr. de Vera,68 a plastic surgeon from St. Luke’s Medical Center, Quezon City, to prove that in the
morning of April 11, 2002, the former was already under the CIDG’s custody. The foregoing is contrary to the prosecution’s claim that
between 11:30 a.m. and 12:00 noon of the said date, Marcelo was arrested in Jollibee along EDSA Guadalupe while trying to forcibly
open Evangeline’s car. Dr. de Vera stated that in the afternoon of April 10, 2002, Marcelo’s daughter called asking for his help as her
father was allegedly being manhandled. Dr. de Vera went to the CIDG office in the morning of April 11, 2002. He made a visual
examination of Marcelo’s body and saw hematoma in the sternum and fresh abrasions in both hands of the latter, but he did not reduce
his observations into writing.69 To stop Marcelo’s manhandling, Dr. de Vera sought audience with the PNP Chief, but the latter was not
around.70

During cross-examination, Dr. de Vera stated that once in a while, he sings and drinks in Marcelo’s beer house in Taytay. 71

SPO2 Eduardo Peñales’ testimony was dispensed with since the parties stipulated that he was the officer who, on April 10, 2002, at
around 8:35 a.m., received and recorded in the logbook of the Taytay Police Station a report from a certain Jover Porras y Perla that
Marcelo was abducted by unidentified men earlier at 7:20 a.m. 72

(b) Ricky is a "kristo" or bet taker in Araneta Coliseum and U-Cap Cockpit in Mandaluyong, and "mananari" or gaffer residing in San
Luis Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.73 He was still asleep in bed with his wife on April 10, 2002, at around 9:45 a.m.74 when he heard
somebody knocking on the door. When he opened it, a man pointed a gun at him and told him not to ask any questions but just to go
with them. There were two men and they brought him to a white Revo where he saw three other people. The owner of the house saw
Ricky being taken.75

Ricky was brought to Camp Crame, was asked if he knew certain persons from the photographs shown to him, and was mauled when
he replied in the negative.76

In the morning of April 12, 2002 while still detained in Camp Crame, one of the men, who forcibly took Ricky from his rented room on
April 10, 2002, informed the latter that if he had PhP 20,000.00, he would be released. In the afternoon of April 12, 2002, Ricky was
handcuffed and placed in a police line-up without being informed of the reason for his inclusion therein. 77

Ricky denied being among those who abducted Albert on April 7, 2002 and being present in the safehouse in Amparo Subdivision,
Caloocan at 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002.78 He did not know Albert personally and had not seen him before. However, Ricky admitted
having been to the Coliseum and knowing that Albert was renting the same. 79Ricky was unaware of any grudge Albert, PO1 Pacris or
PO3 Cube may have against him.80 Ricky did not have any document to prove that he was detained in Camp Crame on April 10, 2002
and his Booking and Arrest Sheet were both dated April 12, 2002. 81

Ricky’s wife, May, testified82 that after the former was taken by the unidentified men, she went to Valenzuela Police Station and an
officer opined that her husband may be in Camp Crame. 83 She went as suggested and found her husband, who assured her that he
would be released.84 She went home but got back to Camp Crame at 12:00 noon of April 11, 2002, during which time she was not
anymore allowed to talk to Ricky.85 She stayed in Camp Crame until past 10:00 p.m. and saw from TV Patrol that Ricky was involved in
a kidnapping incident. She got to talk to her husband only on April 13, 2002. 86

During cross-examination, May stated that Ricky was with her at around 7:00 p.m. of April 7, 2002. 87

Ritchelda Tugbo (Tugbo), a 63-year old widow and Ricky’s landlady, testified88 that at around 9:30 a.m. of April 10, 2002, while she was
eating breakfast, three unidentified men entered her house and took Ricky from his rented room.89

Sabina Poliquit (Poliquit), an unemployed 50-year old widow, and Rodolfo Buado (Buado), a 60-year old retired employee, who were
both Ricky’s neighbors, corroborated Tugbo’s statements.90

(c) Jose is a trainer gaffer, breeder of fighting cocks, part-time private martial during derbies, and a resident of San Isidro, Fairview,
Quezon City. During the trial, he stated91 that in the evening of April 9, 2002, he went to U-Cap Cockpit in Mandaluyong, where a derby
sponsored by a certain Pol Estrellado was being held, to find prospective buyers of fighting cocks and to place bets. 92 He left the place
at around 1:00 a.m. of April 10, 2002. While waiting for a cab, a white Revo stopped in front of him, and three gun-toting men alighted
therefrom.93 He was shoved in the front seat in between the driver and another man. While inside the Revo, Jose’s eyes were covered
with packing tape. His wallet, money, watch, necklace and ring were taken, and the men stepped on his head to keep him down. A
plastic bag was placed over his head making it difficult for him to breathe, and he was repeatedly punched when he denied involvement
in Albert’s kidnapping.94

When Jose regained consciousness, he did not know where he was but there was a boy of around 16 years of age removing the
packing tape from his eyes. Adelantar only learned that he was in Camp Crame when he was brought to a room with a police line-up at
around 6:00 p.m. of April 12, 2002.95 He insisted that from April 10, 2002 onwards, he was held by the police in Camp Crame, hence, he
could not have been present at 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002 in the safehouse where Albert was detained, and at 11:00 a.m. of the same
day in Jollibee along EDSA Guadalupe.96The boy who removed the packing tape from his eyes could attest to the foregoing, but Jose
did not know his name and had not seen him anymore. 97 Further, Jose had never been to the Coliseum and had not personally met
Albert and Pinky.98 Jose alleged that he and the rest of the accused-appellants were mere fall guys.99 Jose claimed that he only met
Marcelo after they were both placed in the police line-up and in the same detention cell.100 Jose admitted that he was acquainted with
Ricky, whom he had recommended to be a

"kristo" in Araneta Cockpit.101 Out of fear, Jose had neither informed his lawyer that he was mauled by the policemen nor filed any
action against them.102

(d) Betty and her husband Monico have been residing for about 33 years in 224 Malanting Street, Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City.
Betty, an elementary school graduate, is a housewife tending a sari-sari store and a piggery. Monico is a drilling contractor and
plumber. Betty and Monico own the house in Lumbang Street, Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City, where Albert and Pinky were
detained from April 7 to 12, 2002.

Betty testified103 that due to her busy schedule, she had not visited their house in Lumbang Street during the alleged period of Albert
and Pinky’s detention. Betty and Monico had rented out for PhP 3,000.00 per month the said house to Roger since the late afternoon of
April 7, 2002.

Roger was recommended to the spouses by a certain Pidok Igat (Igat), their acquaintance. Betty saw Roger once but the latter was
wearing sunglasses.104

Betty stated that from April 7 to 12, 2002, Monico was contracted to build a deep well in Narra Street, Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan
City. In the morning of April 12, 2002, Igat told her that the house in Lumbang Street was being fired at by the policemen. She first
instructed Monico to report the incident to the police, then, she ran towards the said house. She was still at a certain distance from the
house when the policemen held her by the arms after finding out that she owned it. She denied knowledge of the kidnapping incident,
but she was still invited by the police officers to go with them to Camp Crame. 105

Betty was not allowed to go home but was detained by the police in Camp Crame. At around 6:00 p.m. of April 12, 2002, after Albert
and Pinky arrived, Betty, Roger, Jose, Marcelo, Ricky and other suspects were placed in a police line-up composed of ten people.
Monico, Jubert and Morey were not among those in the line-up yet. Albert and Pinky did not pinpoint Betty from the line-up, but a police
officer insisted that she be included because she owned the safehouse. Betty identified the officer as SPO1 Polero, but she was
uncertain of the name, albeit describing the latter as the one who took Albert and Pinky’s statements. 106 Betty did not see Albert and
Pinky being brought out of the house during the rescue operations on April 7, 2002. Betty did not personally know Albert, but first saw
him in Camp Crame in the evening of April 12, 2002. 107
During cross-examination, Betty stated that Monico and Jubert were included in the police line-up.108

(e) Monico stated109 that he received PhP 3,000.00 from Roger and handed it to Betty as rental for their house in Lumbang Street,
Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City. The said house is about four streets away from Betty’s sari-sari store and piggery in Malanting
Street. The amount was a mere deposit and he was promised that before the end of the month, PhP 6,000.00 would be paid as
rental.110 Monico did not visit the house from April 7 to 11, 2002, hence, he did not know if Roger actually occupied it. Within the same
period, Monico was not able to talk to Igat, who was the person who referred Roger to him and Betty.111

Monico testified that he was in Betty’s store in the night of April 7, 2002 and denied having assisted Albert in descending to the
basement of the safehouse.112

When their house in Lumbang Street was fired at by the police in the early morning of April 11, 2002, he was instructed by Betty to
report the matter to the authorities. He went to the Novaliches Police, but was informed that Amparo Subdivision is not within the said
station’s jurisdiction. Monico got to Bagong Silang Police Station at around 9:00 a.m., and an officer took notes while talking to him, but
the former was not sure if it was a blotter. Monico was instructed to wait. At around 3:00 p.m., a superior officer arrived, asked Monico
questions and informed the latter that he knew about the shooting incident. He stayed in the police station until 6:00 p.m. The officer
told Monico that the latter would be brought to Camp Crame to be interviewed and will be allowed to go home after. 113 In Camp Crame,
Monico was informed that he was being implicated in Albert and Pinky’s kidnapping. Although he and Betty denied any involvement in
the charges against them, to date, for lack of opportunity on their part as they are both detained, no complaints had been filed against
the officers who implicated them.114

(f) Jubert, a carpenter and a college undergraduate from Asibanglan, Pinukpok, Kalinga Province, testified115 that he came to Manila to
look for a job on January 2002.116 For two months, from February to March 2002, he was among those who worked in constructing the
Globe Telecommunications tower in Sucat. He resided in the house of his uncle, Daniel Balanay (Balanay), in Bicutan, Taguig. 117

Jubert met Lowhen, a resident of Parañaque, while applying for a job to make cabinets for Perma Wood Industries on March 27,
2002.118

At around 4:00 p.m. of April 11, 2002, Jubert went to Lowhen’s house to inquire about the requirements in applying as a security guard,
but the latter was not home yet. Lowhen arrived at around 5:00 p.m. Morey, whom Jubert met for the first time, was also there. Lowhen
bought drinks for the three of them and Jubert stayed overnight in the house of Morey, which was just about 50 meters away. W hile
they were sleeping, men barged in, ordered them to lay face down, and handcuffed them. Jubert and Morey were taken out of the
house where they saw Lowhen, who was likewise boarded into a car. Out of fear of the men who seemed angry, Lowhen, Jubert and
Morey were no longer able to ask why they were being taken. They were brought to Camp Crame. Jubert denied being among those
who abducted Albert and Pinky on April 7, 2002, and guarding the latter two who were detained in the basement of Betty and Monico’s
house in Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City.119 Jubert insisted that on April 7, 2002, he was fixing the house of his uncle, Balanay, in
Bicutan, Taguig, and with him were the latter’s brother and two ladies. 120 However, none of the mentioned persons executed affidavits
to corroborate Jubert’s claim as to his whereabouts on April 7, 2002. 121 Jubert vehemently denied having seen Albert prior to April 12,
2002, the day the former was arrested.122

(g) Robert, a farmer from Isabela, a driver since 1986, and resident of Western Bicutan, Taguig since 1990, alleged 123 that on April 7,
2002, he was in Bontoc, Mountain Province.124 From March 4 to April 8, 2002, he was driving for Engineer Raymundo Vargas, Sr.
(Engr. Vargas), a contractor engineer.125 Robert offered as evidence a certification, dated November 6, 2003, issued by the Pines
Community Developers and General Services Corporation, signed by Engr. Vargas, stating that he was employed from February 10,
1987 to April 8, 2002, and five cash vouchers showing that he was paid for his services. 126 The cash voucher for the payment of PhP
2,500.00, dated April 8, 2002, which was allegedly received by Robert himself, 127 contained erasures. Engr. Vargas justified the
erasures by stating that the typewriter, which was initially used, did not yield very clear impressions on paper. 128Copies of the cash
vouchers were, however, secured by his wife only much later upon his lawyer’s instructions.129

On April 11, 2002, Robert was arrested in his house in Bicutan by CIDG officers contrary to the prosecution’s claim that he was riding
the Hi-Ace with Roger and carrying a shotgun when seized by the police in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City on April 12,
2002.130 Robert is not engaged in cockfighting.

Angelita Alto (Alto), a member of the Barangay Auxiliary Force of Western Bicutan, Taguig, testified 131 that at around 7:45 a.m. of April
11, 2002, a van parked in the corner of Sunflower and Calantas Streets, Western Bicutan, Taguig, and persons clad in dark suits
alighted therefrom.132 They proceeded to Robert’s house where Alto’s cousin stays as a boarder. The men kicked and broke the door,
handcuffed, blindfolded and took Robert to the van. Alto was about three meters away from where the events transpired. When the van
left, Alto took two pictures of the broken door, called up Robert’s wife and recorded the events in page 1056 of the barangay’s
logbook.133

Engr. Vargas from Baguio City corroborated134 Robert’s claim that they were together in Bontoc, Mountain Province from February 10 to
April 8, 2002. It takes 12 to 14 hours to reach Manila from Bontoc.135 Robert was with Engr. Vargas on April 7, 2002, but the former
went to Baguio at 10:00 a.m. of the following day supposedly to collect rentals. Robert said he would be back in two days, but no longer
showed up after. Engr. Vargas only found out in October 2003 that Robert was being implicated in a kidnapping incident after being
informed by the latter’s wife.136

(h) Roger, a businessman residing in Signal Village, Bicutan, Taguig, claimed 137 that on April 11, 2002, at around 6:00 a.m., he was
walking along Bravo Street in Signal Village.138 He was on his way to his brother’s wake when he was taken by four armed men wearing
civilian clothes, whom he later found out were police officers from the CIDG. 139 He only met his co-accused-appellants in Camp Crame
on April 11, 2002.140 He saw Albert for the first time on April 12, 2002 when the police line-up was presented to the latter.141

(i) Morey, a warehouse care taker from Barangay Sinakbat, Bacong, Benguet, stated 142 that he was in Burnham, Baguio City tending
coconuts on April 7, 2002. The warehouse closed at 6:00 p.m., after which he went to his uncle’s house in Trinidad, Benguet. 143

At 1:00 p.m. of April 8, 2002, Morey and a certain Harris Batawang (Batawang) left Baguio for Manila. Morey was contracted to watch
over a house bought by Batawang in GSIS Village, Parañaque. They got to Manila at around 9:00 p.m., spent the night in Parañaque,
and the following morning, Batawang called Lowhen and introduced him to Morey. 144
On April 10, 2002, Morey and Batawang bought materials for the repair of the latter’s house. At 2:00 p.m. of the following day,
Batawang returned to Baguio to recruit workers to help Morey in repairing the former’s house. 145

In the evening of April 11, 2002, Lowhen called Morey and informed him that the latter has a province mate who was staying in the
former’s house. Lowhen was referring to Jubert. Morey went to Lowhen’s house. The three drunk the gin bought by Lowhen. Lowhen
slept at 11:00 p.m., leaving Morey and Jubert behind. Morey and Jubert slept in Batawang’s house. The following day, men barged into
Batawang’s house and handcuffed Morey and Jubert. The men asked if the two knew a certain Lito, ordered them to surrender their
guns, and ransacked Batawang’s house. Lowhen, Morey and Batawang were boarded into a Revo and brought to Camp Crame. 146

Morey denied being acquainted with the other accused-appellants apart from Lowhen and Morey. Morey initially saw Albert during the
first day of hearing of the kidnapping case.147

(j) Lowhen, a resident of Parañaque City, stated 148 that he had been employed by Regioner Security and Investigation Agency
(Regioner) as a guard since 1993. He was posted in Perma Wood Industries Corporation in Marian Road 2, Parañaque from March 4 to
April 11, 2002. He worked on a 24-hour shift, usually starting at 7:00 a.m.149

On April 10, 2002, Lowhen reported for work in Perma Wood Industries at 7:30 a.m. 150 He offered an uncertified photocopy of his daily
time record (DTR) from March 16 to 31, 2002 with his signature on it. 151 Anent the DTR from April 1 to 15, 2002, it was unsigned by
Lowhen because at that time, he was already arrested by CIDG officers.152Logbook entries signed by Lowhen and a certain "S/G
Pacete RA," the outgoing guard, indicating that the former assumed his posts at 7:00 a.m. of April 4, 6, 8 and 10, 2002 were likewise
presented.153 Lowhen got off from work at 7:45 a.m. of April 11, 2002, 154 but was no longer able to assume duties the next day because
he was already taken by the CIDG officers.155 He just walked and got home at 8:00 a.m., ate breakfast and went to visit a certain Roger
Batersal (Batersal) in Malugay Street, Parañaque to have a picture frame repaired. Batersal, Lowhen’s brother-in-law, was then having
coffee, so Lowhen went inside the house, laid down in the sofa, turned on the television and slept till 4:00 p.m. The picture frame was
already assembled and Lowhen went home where he saw Jubert waiting for him. 156 Jubert asked Lowhen about the requirements in
applying for a security guard position. Lowhen bought gin and while the two were drinking, he found out that Jubert speaks Kalinga and
Ilocano. Lowhen called Morey, who hailed from Baguio and who was then a boarder in the house of the former’s brother. Morey joined
the drinking session but Lowhen left at around 11:00 p.m. as the latter was already dizzy and still had to assume his post at 7:00 a.m. of
the following day.157

At 6:30 a.m. of April 12, 2002, Lowhen’s wife woke him up, but he went back to sleep. Thereafter, Lowhen heard noises from the gate
of the house, then somebody shouted ordering for men to get out. When Lowhen opened his eyes, a man wearing black was pointing a
long firearm at him. Lowhen went out of the house and was directed to place his hands behind his head and lie face down on the floor.
The men searched Lowhen’s house. Lowhen, Morey and Jubert were taken to the nearby United Parañaque Subdivision and after
about 15 to 20 minutes, they were boarded into a green Revo without a plate. Lowhen’s wife wanted to tag along but she was informed
that she could no longer be accommodated in the Revo, but she could just proceed on her own to Camp Crame. 158

When they reached Camp Crame, Lowhen, Jubert and Morey were separated from each other. 159 Lowhen was brought into a room and
a police officer asked him if he knew a certain Lito. Lowhen replied in the negative, then he was questioned if he knew that a man and a
woman had been kidnapped. The officer stepped out of the room, but he came back later with a bald Chinese man. 160 The Chinese man
stood near the door, looked at the officer, shook his head, then left. The officer tapped Lowhen’s shoulder and asked the latter to
cooperate with the police by being a star witness, for which he would be paid PhP 10,000.00 a month, or be hanged. The officer typed
an affidavit, but Lowhen refused to receive it. Lowhen told the officer that he could not do what was demanded of him, then the latter
left. Lowhen remained in the room until 6:30 p.m. of April 12, 2002 when he was put alongside more than 10 other persons in a police
line-up.161 Albert did not point at Lowhen in the line-up.162 Prior to April 11, 2002, Lowhen did not personally know Albert. 163

During cross-examination, Lowhen stated that he was on duty in the early morning of April 11, 2002, hence, he could not have been in
the basement of the safehouse where Albert was detained at around the same time. 164

Redentor Pacete (Pacete), a construction worker who used to work as a reliever guard at Regioner, testified 165 that he met Lowhen
when they were both assigned in Perma Wood Industries. 166 Pacete’s signatures were affixed in Regioner’s logbook indicating the times
he assumed his posts before or after Lowhen.

Domingo De Guzman (De Guzman), Lowhen’s supervisor in Regioner, was called by the defense to the witness stand to point out to
the court that he was the one who photocopied the logbook entries and the DTR referred to by Lowhen and Pacete in their
testimonies.167 However, the originals cannot anymore be presented to the court because Regioner had ceased its operations in 2004
and the records were no longer available.168 De Guzman brought two index cards, prepared by Regioner’s secretary, indicating
Lowhen’s assignments from April 27, 1993 to April 11, 2002,169 and 27 payroll sheets likewise including Lowhen’s name covering the
period from February 1, 2000 to April 15, 2002.170

The testimony171 of Elsie Batersal (Elsie), Lowhen’s sister, to the effect that her brother went to her house at around 8:30 a.m. of April
11, 2002 and slept there until 4:00 p.m., was dispensed with after the prosecution agreed to stipulate and admit the same.

The Ruling of the RTC

The RTC rendered a Decision172 on September 27, 2007. In Criminal Case No. Q-02-108834, the accused-appellants were acquitted
from the charges of kidnapping and serious illegal detention of Pinky. The accused-appellants were, however, convicted of conspiring
the kidnapping of, and demanding of ransom from Albert in Criminal Case No. Q-02-108835. The RTC imposed upon the accused-
appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a solidary obligation to pay Albert the amount of PhP 100,000.00 as moral damages.
The RTC ratiocinated that:

Very critical in this case is the testimony of Albert Yam. He testified about how the kidnapping was perpetrated; he testified that a
Toyota Hi-Ace van with eight (8) occupants blocked the path of the Honda Civic car colored white driven by Pinky Gonzales; he (Albert
Yam) was driving a Toyota Prado vehicle that was behind the Honda Civic car of Pinky Gonzales; Albert Yam identified and named
before this court four (4) of those who alighted from the van; he testified that accused Morey Dadaan and accused Jubert Banatao after
going down from their van, approached the Honda Civic car of Pinky Gonzales; he also identified and named Roger Pesado
accompanied by Robert Gonzales who went down from their van and approached his car; he testified that it was Roger Pesado who
told him (Albert Yam) to come out of his vehicle; he further testified about he and Pinky Gonzales being boarded in the Toyota Hi-Ace
van and identified accused Marcelo Llanora as the driver of the van, Ricky Peña who is seated beside the driver x x x. Albert Yam also
testified that after their kidnapping ordeal, he learned that accused Jose Adelantar acted as look out when they were being kidnapped
along the road coming from the Cainta cockpit; x x x he also testified that when the ransom was being demanded, seven (7) of their
kidnappers went down to talk to him and in court gave the name[s] of six (6) of the accused, namely: Jubert Banatao, Morey Dadaan,
Marcelo Llanora, Ricky Peña, Jose Adelantar and Lowhen Almonte; Albert also testified that at the instance when he fell down the
steps of the stairs, it was the accused Monico Salvador who was escorting him and held him; in his testimony, he stated that accused
Betty Salvador brought the food that they ate and on one occasion, saw her asking another accused about their condition; x x x Albert
Yam testified that the ransom demanded by the accused is in the amount of One Million Dollars and there were possibly fifteen (15)
people who were involved in the kidnapping; he further testified about the rescue operation and was able to identify seven (7) of the
accused in the police line-up but mentioned in his testimony the names of eight (8) accused as among those whom he identified in the
police line-up; x x x Albert Yam explained in his testimony that he also identified the accused Lowhen Almonte after the police line-up
because said accused was not among those included during the police line-up and this is in accordance with a Supplemental Affidavit
which Albert Yam identified in court. x x x The Court was able to deduce from the testimony of Albert Yam that Monico Salvador and
Betty Salvador who are admittedly the owners of the place where Albert Yam and Pinky Gonzales were kept during the kidnapping
ordeal, were not present at the precise time that the rescue was conducted by the police.

xxxx

Where there is no evidence, as in this case, to indicate that the prosecution witness was actuated by improper motive, the presumption
is that he is not so actuated and that his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. Also jurisprudence holds that if an accused had
really nothing to do with a crime, it would be against the natural order of events and human nature and against the presumption of good
faith that a prosecution witness would falsely testify against him. x x x

xxxx

Direct Proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy. It may be deduced from the mode,
method and manner in which the offense is perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action and community of interest. x x x

xxxx

Here, we find a closeness of personal association and a concurrence towards a common unlawful purpose. x x x

x x x There were very minor loose ends in the chain of events and the testimony of these other witnesses besides Albert Yam
completed the narration of facts for the prosecution. These other witnesses, most of whom are police officers, provided the proofs for
the prosecution as to how the kidnapping case was solved and why the accused were apprehended.

xxxx

Denial is a self-serving negative defense that cannot be given greater weight than the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on
affirmative matters. x x x

Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who
testified on affirmative matters. x x x

xxxx

Among the documentary evidence presented which gives credence to the testimony of Albert Yam are the three (3) sketches which he
prepared x x x for the prosecution. x x x Two (2) pieces of dark glasses wrapped with black tape x x x, the two sets of handcuffs x x x,
and the handwritten note of Albert Yam addressed to his wife x x x. Elisco 5.56 mm rifle, 9mm pistol, Armscor cal. 38 revolver, a
shotgun, magazines for the firearms, live cartridges/ammunition and spent shells x x x.

x x x It must be emphasized that Pinky Gonzales never testified in court so how could the prosecution establish that she is indeed a
kidnap victim. x x x173 (Citations omitted and underscoring ours)

The Appeals Filed Against the RTC Decision and the Office of the Solicitor General’s (OSG) Opposition Thereto

The accused-appellants interposed separate appeals174 essentially reiterating their respective factual claims, which were in turn
refuted175 by the OSG.

The OSG argued that the supposed eye defect ascribed to Albert was not severe as to hinder his ability to identify his kidnappers. The
dark eye glasses, which the kidnappers had ordered Albert to put on, were loose and even slipped as he descended the basement
stairs, giving him the chance to see Monico. Besides, Albert’s eye glasses were returned to him on April 8, 2002. Further, it is settled
that when thrust into exceptional circumstances, victims of crimes strive to remember the important details and to see the faces of their
assailants. Anent Betty and Monico’s claim that it was unnatural for a person involved in the commission of an offense to proceed to the
scene and report the matter to the police, the OSG interpreted the foregoing as defensive acts intended to mislead the authorities in the
conduct of the investigation.

Jubert offered no corroborative testimonies regarding his whereabouts from April 7 to 11, 2002.

Robert’s alibi that he was in Bontoc, Mountain Province driving for Engr. Vargas should be supported by clear and convincing evidence.
The said alibi weighs weaker vis-á-vis Albert’s positive testimony relative to Robert’s participation in the abduction. Engr. Vargas only
testified on Robert’s employment. Alto merely witnessed the circumstances of Robert’s arrest on April 11, 2002.

Lowhen’s post in Perma Wood Industries was not that far from the locations where the acts of kidnapping were committed, hence, no
physical impossibility to get from one place to the other. The logbook, index cards and payroll sheets offered by Lowhen had no
evidentiary value for being mere photocopies. Lowhen claimed that Albert did not identify him from the police line-up. However, Albert
testified that he did not see Lowhen from the line-up. Besides, even if Lowhen was indeed included in the line-up, Albert, at that time,
had just been rescued, thus, stressed and confused. Albert had modified his initial lapse by categorically stating in his amended
affidavit that Lowhen was among those who went to the basement in the early morning of April 11, 2002.

The OSG emphasized that Albert remained unfazed and unwavering in his testimony and so were the rest of the prosecution
witnesses. The OSG likewise stressed that the RTC’s evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to the highest respect and
should be upheld in the absence of proof that the said court had overlooked facts which if duly regarded, may alter the result of the
case.

The Ruling of the CA

On February 25, 2011, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision denying the appeal of the accused-appellants. However, the CA
modified the RTC ruling by expressly stating the accused-appellants’ non-eligibility for parole. Further, the accused-appellants were
ordered to solidarily pay Albert PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity and PhP 100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The CA declared that:

The crucial issue in this case involves the assessment of credibility of witnesses. Could the version succinctly narrated by the victim, his
wife and the police officers who participated in the operation for the rescue of the kidnap victims possibly be concocted as so alleged by
the appellants?

x x x Unless otherwise specifically required, the testimony of a single eyewitness if credible and trustworthy is sufficient to support a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. And since the determination of credibility is within the province of the trial court which has the
opportunity to examine and observe the demeanor of witnesses, appellate courts will not generally interfere in this jurisdiction. x x x

xxxx

The most crucial evidence submitted in this case was the positive testimony of kidnap victim Albert Yam recognizing appellants as his
abductors. Common experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances take place, it is natural for persons to remember many
of the important details. x x x The most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their
assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is committed.

Yam positively identified appellants as his captors. x x x

xxxx

The evidence also shows that the accused-appellants acted in concert in perpetrating the kidnapping. x x x

xxxx

x x x The fact that accused Betty Salvador’s role was limited to giving victims their food is immaterial whether she acted as a principal
or as an accomplice because the conspiracy and her participation therein have been established. In fact, she was the owner of the
safehouse where the victims were kept. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and the conspirators shall be held equally liable for
the crime.

xxxx

x x x Police officers are presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions in the absence of clear and
convincing proof to the contrary or proof that they were moved by ill will. x x x.176 Citations omitted and underscoring ours)

Incidents after the Rendition of the CA Decision

The records of this case were elevated to us pursuant to the Resolution177 issued by the CA on February 9, 2012 giving due course to
the notices of appeal filed by the accused-appellants, except Betty and Monico.

In compliance with our Resolution178 dated July 2, 2012, a Supplemental Brief179 was filed by the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) in behalf
of the accused-appellants, except Betty and Monico. In lieu of a supplemental brief, the OSG filed a Manifestation 180 stating that it is
adopting the arguments it had previously raised in the Consolidated Brief 181filed with the CA.

The Issue

Whether or not the CA gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom despite the prosecution’s failure to overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in their favor.182

The Supplemental Brief filed by the PAO once again presented the accused-appellants’ factual claims in the proceedings below relative
to the alleged mauling, irregular arrests and extortion attempts committed by CIDG officers against Marcelo and Ricky. The PAO
stressed anew the alibis that on April 7, 2002, Morey was in his uncle’s warehouse in Baguio, Robert was in Bontoc, Mountain Province
driving for Engr. Vargas, while Lowhen assumed his security guard duties in Perma Wood Industries in Parañaque. The PAO also
maintained that Roger was arrested at 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002 in Bicutan, and not on April 12, 2002 in Commonwealth Avenue.

Our Ruling

The instant appeal lacks merit.

The CA correctly found that the


essential elements comprising the

crime of kidnapping for ransom

were present and that the accused-

appellants conspired in its commission.

People v. Uyboco,183 enumerated the elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom, viz:

In order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the
prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private individual;
(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be
illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for
more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the duration of his
detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his
detention is immaterial.184

In the case at bar, the accused-appellants, who were indicted for forcibly abducting Albert, are all private individuals. Albert was taken
on April 7, 2002 and his detention lasted for six days, during which period, threats to kill him and demand for ransom were made.

In affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, we are guided by four-settled doctrines enunciated in People v. Martinez,185 viz:186

(a) The trial court[‘]s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses must be accorded great respect owing to its opportunity to observe and
examine the witnesses conduct and demeanor on the witness stand;

(b) When there is no evidence to show that the prosecution witness is actuated by an improper motive, identification of the accused-
appellants as the offenders should be given full faith and credit; 187

(c) Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof of prior agreement by the parties to commit a crime but that it may be inferred
from the acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to a joint purpose,
concerted action and community of interest; and

(d) The respective alibis proffered by the accused-appellants cannot prevail over the unequivocal testimony of the victim categorically
and positively pointing to them as his abductors, and for the defense of alibis, to be given full credit, they must be clearly established
and must not leave room for doubt.188

The accused-appellants all denied being personally acquainted with Albert or having knowledge of any grudge which the latter may
harbour against them. The RTC and the CA found Albert’s testimony on the participation of the accused-appellants as conspirators in
the kidnapping incident, and the manner by which he had subsequently identified them, as clear and categorical.

Albert testified:

PROS. FADULLON:

Q: Mr. Witness, will you please tell this Honorable Court where you were on April 7, 2002 between the hours of 7:00 and 7:30 in the
evening?

A: I was at the New Cainta Coliseum.

xxxx

Q: Will you please tell us, Sir, if you recall if there was anything unusual that happened that evening as you were leaving the New
Cainta Coliseum on your way home?

A: I was kidnapped that evening.

xxxx

Q: Now, Sir, will you please tell this Honorable Court what happened when you notice that the Toyota Hi-Ace van stopped abruptly the
path of the Honda Civic car?

A: I saw six (6) men coming down from the Hi-Ace with long firearms.

xxxx

Q: Now tell us, Sir, what happened when six (6) men armed with long firearms alighted from the vehicle, Toyota Hi-Ace van?

A: I saw two (2) of those people went to the white car and motioned the driver with a gun pointed motioning the driver of the white
vehicle to go down.

Q: You mentioned earlier that there were six (6) armed men who alighted. You accounted for, two (2) went to the driver side of the
white Honda Civic car, what about the others, do you know what happened?
A: They were there and two (2) of them I think ran after the watch-your-car boy and two of them went to my car, Sir.189

When asked to identify the two men who approached the Civic, Albert pointed to Jubert and Morey. Albert named those who
approached his Prado as Roger and Robert. Roger and Robert gestured for him to alight from the Prado and brought him to the Hi-Ace,
where he saw Marcelo in the driver’s seat and Ricky in the front passenger’s seat.190

At around 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002, seven men went to the basement of the safehouse where Albert and Pinky were detained. They
threatened Albert with bodily harm should he not accede to their demand for ransom. Albert identified them as Jubert, Morey, Marcelo,
Ricky, Lowhen, Jose and Nelson. Five of the men left but Nelson and Lowhen were left behind to guard Albert and Pinky.191

The overt acts of the accused-appellants Jubert, Morey, Marcelo, Ricky, Robert, Roger, Lowhen and Jose were undoubtedly geared
towards unlawfully depriving Albert of his liberty and extorting ransom in exchange for his release.

Albert was able to identify Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Morey, Jose, Lowhen, Robert and Roger from a police line-up of around 15 persons
presented to him in Camp Crame on April 12, 2002.192 During cross-examination, Albert clarified that Lowhen was not among the seven
persons he had identified as among his captors from the initial police line-up of 15 persons presented to him. Albert justified the
omission by stating that he saw Lowhen only after the line-up was presented and after he had already executed his April 12, 2002
affidavit.193

In their defense, Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Robert, Morey, Lowhen, Jose and Roger offered their respective alibis, which fail to persuade.

Marcelo claimed that from 12:00 noon to 9:00 p.m. of April 7, 2002, he was at home repairing a motor bike. On his part, Jubert insisted
that he was fixing his uncle’s house in Bicutan, Taguig on the same day. Morey averred that he was in a coconut warehouse in
Burnham, Baguio City, and he left the place at around 6:00 p.m. to go to his uncle’s house in Trinidad, Benguet. Noticeably, Marcelo,
Jubert and Morey offered no corroborative evidence to support their bare allegations.

Ricky and his wife, May, alleged that they were likewise at home on April 7, 2002. However, May’s testimony does not carry much
weight in view of her relation to Ricky.

Robert posited that he was in Bontoc, Mountain Province driving for Engr. Vargas from February 10, 2002 to April 8, 2002. Robert left at
10:00 a.m. of April 8, 2002 on the pretext that he would just collect rentals in Baguio. He informed Engr. Vargas that he would be back
in two days. Robert testified and Alto corroborated his statement that the former was arrested by CIDG officers in Bicutan, Taguig on
April 11, 2002.

The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the
experience of mankind; whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance. 194 It defies
logic to figure out why Engr. Vargas was informed that Robert was implicated in Albert’s kidnapping only on October 2003, or around
one and a half years after the latter’s indictment. If Robert’s alibi were true, it would have been more in accord with human experience if
he promptly told Engr. Vargas about his predicament for the latter was then in the best position to corroborate the former’s allegations.
It is likewise perplexing why Robert, who had been driving for Engr. Vargas for five years, was in Taguig on April 11, 2002 and so lightly
regarded his commitment to the latter that he would be back in two days. No explanations were offered to justify Robert’s unreasonable
omissions.

Lowhen insisted that he assumed his 24-hour duty in Perma Wood Industries in Parañaque from 7:00 a.m. of April 10, 2002 to 7:45
a.m. of April 11, 2002. He got home at 8:00 a.m., ate breakfast, and thereafter proceeded to his sister Elsie’s house where he slept in
the sofa until 4:00 p.m. The testimonies of Pacete, De Guzman and Elsie were offered to support Lowhen’s claims. However, we find
more credence in the positive and categorical statements of Albert, against whom no ill motive was ascribed by the defense, on one
hand, than in the testimonies of persons, who are in one way or another are related to Lowhen. Further, there is no proof of absolute
physical impossibility for Lowhen to be in Amparo Subdivision in the morning of April 11, 2002, considering that Parañaque is not very
far off. In Albert’s testimony, he merely made an estimate of the time in the morning of April 11, 2002, when Lowhen, along with six
other men, went to the basement. Although Albert testified that it was around 6:00 a.m., he could have miscalculated the time
considering that he no longer had a watch and they were in a basement. Besides, Lowhen was the link between Jubert and Morey,
whose participations in the kidnapping incident on April 7, 2002 were clearly established. This renders dubious Lowhen’s claim of
having introduced Jubert and Morey to each other only on April 11, 2002, or four days after the latter two had taken part in the
abduction of Pinky and Albert near the Coliseum.

Jose and Roger proffered nary an explanation anent where they were on April 7, 2002. Jose anchored his defense upon his presence
at U-Cap Cockpit in Mandaluyong from the night of April 9, 2002 until 1:00 a.m. of April 10, 2002. While waiting for a cab going home,
Jose claimed that CIDG officers arrested him and brought him to Camp Crame where he remained under the police’s custody. He thus
claimed that contrary to Albert’s claim, he could not have been in the basement of the safehouse at 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002. On the
other hand, Roger alleged that at around 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002, while he was walking along Bravo Street, Signal Village,Bicutan,
Taguig on his way to his brother’s wake, he was arrested by CIDG officers. However, like in the cases of Marcelo, Jubert and Robert,
Jose and Roger’s averments were bare and unsupported by any corroborative evidence.

All told, we find that the RTC and the CA did not overlook essential facts or circumstances which may otherwise justify the acquittal of
Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Robert, Morey, Lowhen, Jose and Roger for having conspired in kidnapping Albert for the purpose of extorting
ransom. That no ransom was actually paid does not negate the fact of the commission of the crime, it being sufficient that a demand for
it was made.195

We note Marcelo, Ricky, Jose and Lowhen’s claims of having been subjected to mauling, illegal arrest, intimidation and extortion
attempts committed by the police authorities.

It is settled that irregularities attending the arrest of the accused-appellants should have been timely raised in their respective motions
to quash the Informations at any time before their arraignment, failing at which they are deemed to have waived their rights to assail the
same.196 No such motions were filed by the accused-appellants.

Further, without meaning to downplay or take the allegations of the accused-appellants lightly, we, however, note that these were
unsubstantiated as to the identities of the offenders and uncorroborated by other pieces of evidence. To date, no complaints against the
supposed abusive police officers had yet been filed by the accused-appellants. If the abuses were indeed committed, we exhort the
accused-appellants to initiate the proper administrative and criminal proceedings to make the erring police officers liable. We stress that
while the criminal justice system is devised to punish the offenders, it is no less the State’s duty to ensure that those who administer it
do so with clean hands.

Betty and Monico are to be held as

co-conspirators because they

knowingly provided the venue for

Albert’s detention.

In implicating Monico, Albert testified:

PROS. FADULLON:

Q: And you said you were first handcuffed according to you, you were handcuffed with Miss Gonzales and removed it and a new set of
handcuffs were placed on you. Will you please tell us what happened after that?

A: So with my both hands handcuffed, this time I was asked to get out of the vehicle and I was led to a sort of like underground house
something like that, I had to go down a couple of steps.

Q: What happened, Sir, as you were going down, as you were led inside, what you claimed to be an underground house and as you
were going down several steps?

A: Because I was handcuffed and I didn’t know where to go to pass at that time, I fell and a person held on my arm.

Q: What happened to your glasses as you claimed you fell as you were going downstairs?

A: My glasses went down also, Sir.

Q: And you said that there was a person who held on to you, how close or how far that person from you, Sir?

A: He was just beside me, Sir.

Q: And this person can you give us his description?

A: About 50s, about 5’9" and has a [sic] very coarse hands, Sir.

Q: This person whom according to you held on to you as you slipped you were being led downstairs, if you will see him again, will you
be able to recognize him, Sir?

xxxx

Witness pointed to Monico in the courtroom.

xxxx

Q: What happened, Sir, when you slipped and this person now identified as accused Monico Salvador held on to you, what happened
after that?

A: He held me up and led me to the stairway proceeding down to the house, Sir.197 (Underscoring ours)

When asked during cross examination about what transpired while he was descending the basement stairs, Albert stated:

ATTY. MALLABO:

Q: Now, immediately after you catch [sic] the glasses, what exactly did you do?

A: I told him, "Pare, alalayan mo naman ako ng maayos pababa pala tayo nun."

Q: You told him that you should be carefully assisted. You told him that because you were not in a position to see where you were
walking?

A: Yes, Sir.

xxxx

Q: Now, did you try to get hold of the hands of Monico Salvador after the incident?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you found out that the hands were "magaspang"?

A; Yes, Sir.

Q: And that would make you very sure that he was the one who assisted you?

A: Even more sure because I saw him also.

Q: Now, after you get [sic] hold of that [sic] glasses you said to him, "Alalayan mo naman ako."?

A: Because I fell already. So, I said, "Pare alalayan mo naman ako ng maayos." That was when he was here beside me.

Q: Besides [sic] you?

A: Yes.

Q: I thought that he was at your back holding your armpit?

A: He was here beside me. How do you carry somebody?

Q: If he was beside you, you were only able to recognize the left portion of his face?

A: I was able to see his face, Sir.

Q: The whole face?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: I thought that he was beside you?

A: He was beside me.

Q: Did you go in front of him and tried to look at the features of his face?

xxxx

A: I can see him even on my side.

Q: My question is, did you go in front of the person who assisted you?

A: No, I did not face him.198 (Underscoring ours)

When asked who handed him the food that he ate while in detention, Albert answered:

PROS. FADULLON:

Q: Now Mr. Witness, on that day, April 11, 2002, right after in the early morning, do you remember if there was any other incident that
happened in that place where you and Miss Gonzales were being kept?

A: At lunch time, I saw a woman who brought down some foods,

Sir.

Q: Lunch time of what date?

A: April 11, 2002, Sir.

Q: April 11 at around lunch time a woman brought down your food?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Where were you at that time, Mr. Witness, when this woman according to you came down and brought down your food?

A: At the sofa, Sir.

Q: Tell us, Mr. Witness, what happened when this woman brought down your food?

A: She gave the food to the guard and the guard gave the food to us, Sir.

Q: How far away from this woman Sir when you saw her handing the foods to one of the guards?
A: The stairway was just beside the sofa so you can see her, Sir.

Q: That would be again approximately 2 meters or little over a meter?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Can you give us the description of this woman Sir who according to you came down and brought down handed over your food in
[sic] one of the guards?

A: She was in her 50’s, Sir.

xxxx

[Yam pointed to Betty in the courtroom.]

PROS. CHUA CHENG:

Q: Do you know, Mr. Witness, what kind of food that this accused you identified as Betty Salvador served that lunch time?

A: Jollibee, Sir.

Q: Tell us, Sir when for the first time you see accused Betty Salvador?

A: The night before, Sir.

Q: The night before referring to what date, Sir?

A: April 10, Sir.

Q: Could you tell us under what circumstances did you see the accused Betty Salvador?

A; I was having a conversation with the guard who was at the stairway at that time when I heard a woman asking questions to the
guard, Sir.

Q: What question did she ask to the guard if you remember, Sir?

A: "Kumusta sila?".

Q: After that, what happened?

A: She gave the food to the guard, Sir.

Q: What food was this given to you that evening?

A: That was the only time Jollibbe was not served, it was corned beef, Sir.

PROS. FADULLON:

Q: That would be dinner time of April 10, 2002?

A: Yes, Sir.199 (Underscoring ours)

During cross examination, Albert testified having seen Betty, thus:

ATTY. MALLABO:

Q: Now, how did you see her at the time that she uttered the words, "Kumusta na sila?"

A: She was in front of me.

Q: Right in front of you?

A: I mean, she was going up the stairway. I can see her.

Q: So you want to tell us that she went down?

A: I did not say she went down. She was up there in the stairway coming down and she was about to talk to the guard who was
guarding us. So, when she saw the guard and said, "Kumusta sila?", I was right there at the edge of the, at the foot of the stairway. So,
I saw her.

Q: So you saw her?


A: Yes, sir.200

Albert categorically stated that on the night of April 7, 2002, Monico assisted him in descending the stairs leading to the basement of
the safehouse. Albert likewise named Betty as the woman who brought him and Pinky corned beef for dinner on April 10, 2002, and
food items from Jollibee for lunch on April 11, 2002.

This Court has held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their
assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is committed. 201 It is also settled that the victim’s in-court identification is more
than sufficient to establish the identities of accused-appellants as among the malefactors,202 and previously executed affidavits are
generally considered inferior to statements that the victim gives in open court. 203 Hence, we hold that notwithstanding Albert’s failure to
identify Betty and Monico from the police line-up presented on April 12, 2002, in which the spouses were allegedly included,

no reasonable doubt is cast upon the complicity of the latter two in the kidnapping. Further, Betty and Monico’s postulation that if they
were indeed involved, they should not have proceeded to the scene of the rescue operations and to the police station, likewise
deserves scant consideration. There is no established doctrine to the effect that, in every instance, non-flight is an indication of
innocence.204 It is possible for the culprits to pursue unfamiliar schemes or strategies to confuse the police authorities. 205

We stress though that conspiracy transcends companionship. 206 Mere presence at the locus criminis cannot by itself be a valid basis for
conviction, and mere knowledge, acquiescence to or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a
conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime. 207

In the case at bar, Monico’s assistance extended to Albert when the latter descended the basement stairs and Betty’s visit to the
safehouse to bring food could not automatically be interpreted as the acts of principals and conspirators in the crime of kidnapping for
ransom.

People of the Philippines v. Garcia208 is instructive anent the distinctions between a conspirator and an accomplice, viz:

In People v. De Vera, we distinguished a conspirator from an accomplice in this manner –

Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know
the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the
principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime
should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely
assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their
instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.

xxxx

x x x As we have held in Garcia v. CA, "in some exceptional situations, having community of design with the principal does not prevent
a malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of
a minor character." x x x.209 (Citations omitted)

Monico’s assistance to Albert when the latter descended the basement stairs and Betty’s visit to the safehouse to bring Jollibee food
items were not indispensable acts in the commission of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. If to be solely considered, these acts, being
of minor importance, pertain to those committed by mere accomplices. Betty and Monico were not among those persons who forcibly
abducted Albert while the latter was in the vicinity of the Coliseum. Neither did the spouses perform positive acts to actively detain
Albert. What spells the difference on why we still find the Betty and Monico as principals and co-conspirators in the kidnapping is the
circumstance that their acts coincide with their ownership of the safehouse.

Absent his knowledge, consent or concurrence in the criminal design, the owner of a place, which was used to detain kidnapped
victims, cannot necessarily be considered as either a conspirator or an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. However, in
the case of Betty and Monico, their claim of ignorance relative to Albert’s detention in the basement of the safehouse is belied by their
presence therein. Albert positively and repeatedly testified on the matter.

In a conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the place where the victim is to be detained is logically a primary
consideration. In the case of Betty and Monico, their house in Lumbang Street, Amparo Subdivision has a basement. It can be
reasonably inferred that the house fitted the purpose of the kidnappers. Albert's detention was accomplished not solely by reason of the
restraint exerted upon him by the presence of guards in the safehouse, but by the circumstance of being put in a place where escape
became highly improbable. In other words, Betty and Monico were indispensable in the kidnapping of Albert because they knowingly
and purposely provided the venue to detain Albert. The spouses' ownership of the safehouse, Monico's presence therein during Albert's
arrival on the evening of April 7, 2002 and Betty's visits to bring food reasonably indicate that they were among those who at the outset
planned, and thereafter concurred with and participated in the execution of the criminal design.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February 25, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03279 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar as the amount of civil
indemnity awarded to Albert Yam y Lee, to be solidarily paid by the accused-appellants, is increased from PhP 50,000.00 to PhP
75,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence 210

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

1The Regional Trial Court, then presided by Judge Bayani V. Vargas, and the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals
convicted ten of the accused. Seven of them filed notices of appeal (rollo, pp. 29.-31, 87-89; CA rollo, pp. 897-899). On the
other hand, Jose Adelantar y Caurte, intending to seek executive clemency, filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal (rollo, pp. 90-
92). No notices of appeal were filed by Betty Salvador and Monico Salvador.

2
Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante, with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Mariflor P.
Punzalan Castillo, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-28.

3 CA rollo, p. 291.

4
Id. at 20-21.

5 Id. at 24.

6
Id. at 220-234.

7
Id. at 233-234.

8 Id. at 228.

9Yam testified that he knew Pinky as the cousin of a certain Ana, one of his staff in the Coliseum. He had seen Pinky around
15 times and had talked to her in some occasions. However, he was not aware that at the time he was about to be abducted,
Pinky was the driver of the Civic, which was in between his Prado and the Hi-Ace in which some of the accused-appellants
were then riding. (Id. at 227-228.)

10 Id. at 228.

11 Id. at 222.

12 Id. at 233; TSN, Vol. I, June 28, 2002, pp. 35-37; TSN, Vol. I, September 13, 2002, p. 35.

13 TSN, Vol. I, June 28, 2002, p. 40; TSN, Vol. I, July 26, 2002, p. 24.

14 TSN, Vol. I, June 28, 2002, p. 41.

15
CA rollo, p. 225.

16 Id.; TSN, Vol. I, July 5, 2002, p. 75.

17 Id. at 230.

18 Id. at 227.

19 Id. at 232-233; TSN, Vol. I, August 30, 2002, p. 59; TSN, Vol. I, September 13, 2002, pp. 36-37.

20 TSN, Vol. I, July 5, 2002, p. 53.

21 Id. at 42-45.
22 Id. at 47.

23
Id. at 50

24 Id. at 51.

25 Id. at 54.

26
Id. at 55-58.

27 CA rollo, p. 231.

28
Id. at 232; TSN, Vol. I, August 30, 2002, pp. 64-67.

29 TSN, Vol. I, July 26, 2002, pp. 69-70.

30 CA rollo, pp. 224-225, 230; TSN, Vol. I, July 5, 2002, pp. 71-73, 76; TSN Vol. I, August 30, 2002, pp. 26, 30, 67.

31 Id. at 235-237; TSN, Vol. I, September 27, 2002, pp. 8-47.

32 Id. at 237-238; TSN, Vol. I, October 11, 2002, pp. 6-36.

33 Id. at 238-242; TSN, Vol. I, November 8, 2002, pp. 6-93.

34 TSN, Vol. I, November 8, 2002, p. 60.

35 Id. at 18.

36
Id. at 63.

37 Id. at 40, 69-70.

38
CA rollo, pp. 242-243; TSN, Vol. I, November 22, 2002, pp. 14-38; TSN, Vol. I, December 13, 2002, pp. 6-25.

39Id. at 243-247; TSN, Vol. I, January 17, 2003, pp. 3-16; TSN, Vol. I, January 24, 2003, pp. 3-15; TSN, Vol. I, February 7,
2003, pp. 8-62.

40 TSN, Vol. I, January 17, 2003, p. 15; TSN, Vol. I, February 7, 2003, pp. 37-38.

41 TSN, Vol. I, January 17, 2003, p. 16.

42 CA rollo, p. 246.

43 TSN, Vol. I, January 24, 2003, pp. 5-6.

44 Id. at 7-8.

45 CA rollo, pp. 247-248; TSN, Vol. I, February 14, 2003, pp. 4-33; TSN, Vol. I, March 28, 2003, pp. 3-32.

46
TSN, Vol. I, February 14, 2003, p. 13.

47 Id. at 29.

48 Records, p. 192.

49 Id. at 193.

50 Id. at 194.

51 Id. at 186-187.

52 Id. at 195.

53 Here, Albert identified nine of the accused-appellants, except Lowhen, as involved in his kidnapping; id. at 196-199.

54Here, Albert identified Lowhen as one of the two guards who watched over him on April 11, 2002, the fifth day of the former’s
detention; id. at 200. Albert did not see Lowhen yet in the CIDG office when the former executed his first affidavit, hence, the
latter was not promptly pinpointed; CA rollo, p. 233.

55 TSN, Vol. I, June 20, 2003, pp. 11-57; TSN, Vol. I, September 3, 2003, pp. 3-31.
56 Id. at 42-43.

57
Id. at 14-26.

58 Id. at 28-30.

59 Id. at 32.

60
Id. at 31; CA rollo, pp. 252-253.

61 Id. at 46-48.

62
Id. at 33.

63 Id. at 34-35.

64 TSN, Vol. I, September 3, 2003, pp. 9-10.

65 Id. at 16-17.

66 Id. at 27.

67 Id. at 15.

68 TSN, Vol. I, October 1, 2003, pp. 5-28.

69 Id. at 7-10.

70
Id. at 12.

71 Id. at 14.

72
Id. at 29-41.

73
TSN, Vol. II, November 5, 2003, p. 3.

74 Id. at 7, 14.

75 Id. at 9-14.

76 Id. at 15-17.

77
Id. at 21-22.

78 Id. at 23.

79 Id. at 28.

80 Id. at 40-43.

81 Id. at 45.

82 TSN, Vol. II, December 3, 2003, pp. 5-49.

83 Id. at 17.

84
Id. at 19-20.

85 Id. at 22.

86 Id. at 25-27.

87 Id. at 29, 33.

88 Id. at 50-66.

89 Id. at 53-55.

90 TSN, Vol. II, December 10, 2003, pp. 5-37.

91 TSN, Vol. II, February 11, 2004, pp. 8-67.


92 Id. at 11-12.

93
Id. at 15-17, 34.

94 Id. at 17-21.

95 Id. at 21-23.

96
Id. at 27-29.

97 Id. at 56-57.

98
Id. at 30-31, 61, 64.

99 Id. at 52-53.

100 Id. at 39.

101 Id. at 63.

102 Id. at 41-43.

103 TSN, Vol. II, February 18, 2004, pp. 17-40; TSN, Vol. II, March 3, 2004, pp. 3-36.

104 TSN, Vol. II, February 18, 2004, pp. 30-34.

105 Id. at 35-40.

106TSN, Vol. II, March 3, 2004, pp. 4-9; In a Counter-Affidavit executed by Monico, the police officer taking Albert’s sworn
statements was identified as PO1 Arturo M. Fallero, TSN, Vol. II, June 16, 2004, p. 28.

107 Id. at 17.

108 Id. at 25.

109 TSN, Vol. II, June 16, 2004, pp. 3-30.

110 Id. at 7.

111 Id. at 13.

112 Id. at 8-9.

113 Id. at 9-12.

114 Id. at 26-27.

115 TSN, Vol. II, March 17, 2004. pp. 12-43.

116
Id. at 15.

117 Id. at 17-18.

118 Id. at 20, 38.

119 Id. at 20-25.

120 Id. at 30, 35-37.

121 Id. at 37.

122 Id. at 32-34.

123 TSN, Vol. II, September 15, 2004, pp. 7-38.

124 Id. at 15.

125 Id. at 16, 24.

126 Id. at 17-20, 29.


127 Id. at 36.

128
TSN, Vol. II, October 13, 2004, p. 60.

129 TSN, Vol. II, September 15, 2004, p. 37.

130 Id. at 21, 33.

131
Id. at 41-76; TSN, Vol. II, October 13, 2004, pp. 4-35.

132 TSN, Vol. II, September 15, 2004, pp. 46-47, 67.

133
Id. at 47-52.

134 TSN, Vol. II, October 13, 2004, pp. 40-66.

135 Id. at 65.

136 Id. at 49-54.

137 TSN, Vol. II, November 17, 2004, pp. 5-26.

138 Id. at 7, 12.

139 Id. at 7, 13, 25.

140 Id. at 13.

141
Id. at 18.

142 TSN, Vol. II, February 23, 2005, pp. 7-46.

143
Id. at 12-13.

144
Id. at 14-16.

145 Id. at 17-18.

146 Id. at 18-24.

147 Id. at 34.

148 TSN, Vol. II, April 6, 2005, pp. 5-127; TSN, Vol. II, April 20, 2005, pp. 2-16; TSN, Vol. II, April 27, 2005, pp. 5-39; TSN, Vol.
II, May 11, 2005, pp. 5-9.

149 TSN, Vol. II, April 6, 2005, pp. 9-11.

150 Id. at 11-12.

151
Id. at 12-13, 18.

152 Id. at 21-24.

153 Id. at 34-52.

154 Id. at 54, 59.

155 Id. at 54-55.

156 Id. at 59-60.

157 Id. at 68-74.

158 Id. at 76-82.

159 Id. at 84.

160 Id. at 93-95.

161 Id. at 97-104.


162 Id. at 110.

163
Id. at 125.

164 TSN, Vol. II, April 27, 2005, p. 33.

165 TSN, Vol. II, May 11, 2005, pp. 10-29.

166
Id. at 18, 22.

167 TSN, Vol. II, July 13, 2005, pp. 38, 40-41.

168
Id. at 32.

169 Id. at 32-33, 47-50.

170 Id. at 35.

171 Id. at 68-71.

172 CA rollo, pp. 218-291.

173 Id. at 283-290.

174 Id. at 197-215; 292-305; 392-430; 530-561; 667-691.

175 Please see the Consolidated Brief for the Appellee; id. at 723-765.

176
Rollo, pp. 22-25.

177 CA rollo, pp. 912-913.

178
Rollo, p. 39.

179
Id. at 70-80.

180 Id. at 83-86.

181 CA rollo, pp. 723-772.

182 Rollo, p. 71.

183
G.R. No. 178039, January 19, 2011, 640 SCRA 146.

184 Id. at 161-162.

185 469 Phil. 558 (2004).

186 Id. at 572-574.

187 See also People of the Philippines v. Garcia, 424 Phil. 158, 184 (2002). (Citations omitted)

188 See also People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 188601, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 524, 545.

189 TSN, Vol. I, June 28, 2002, pp. 4-11.

190
Id. at 11-23.

191 TSN, Vol. I, July 5, 2002, pp. 42, 45-54.

192 Id. at 71-74.

193 TSN, Vol. I, August 30, 2002, pp. 26, 29-30.

194 People v. Patano, 447 Phil. 168, 186 (2003), citing People v. San Juan, 383 Phil. 689, 703 (2000).

195 Supra note 187, at 177-178, citing People v. Salimbago, 373 Phil. 56, 75 (1999).

196 See People v. Pepino, G.R. No. 183479, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 293, 303.

197 TSN, Vol. I, June 28, 2002, pp. 34-37.


198 TSN, Vol. I, September 20, 2002, pp. 15-19.

199
TSN, Vol. I, July 5, 2002, pp. 54-60.

200 TSN, Vol. I, September 20, 2002, p. 21.

201 Supra note 185, at 570.

202
See People v. Jalosjos, 421 Phil. 43, 73-74 (2001); supra note 196, at 302.

203 Supra note 196, at 302.

204
People v. Garalde, 401 Phil. 174, 211 (2000). (Citation omitted)

205 Supra note 194.

206 Id. at 191.

207 See People v. Montenegro, 479 Phil. 663, 674 (2004).

208 424 Phil. 158 (2002).

209 Id. at 188-189.

210 Supra note 188.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 128106-07 January 24, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
GONZALO BALDOGO, accused-appellant.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an automatic review of the Joint Judgment,[i] dated October 18, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Puerto Princesa
City, finding accused-appellant Gonzalo Baldogo alias "Baguio" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case
No. 12900 and Kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 12903. The trial court imposed on accused-appellant the supreme penalty of death in
Criminal Case No. 12900 and reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 12903.

I. The Indictments

Two Informations were filed against accused-appellant and Edgar Bermas alias "Bunso" which read:

"That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1996 in the evening at the residence of Mr. Julio Camacho of Iwahig Prison and
Penal Farm, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused who were
both convicted by final judgment of the offense of Homicide and while already serving sentence, committed the above name
offense by conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation and while armed with a bolo, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
hack one JORGE CAMACHO, hitting him and inflicting upon him mortal wounds at the different parts of his body, which was
the direct and immediate cause of his death shortly thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident[,] premeditation and recidivism. Puerto
Princesa City, Philippines, March 5, 1996."1

x x x

"That on Thursday, February 22, 1996 at more or less 8:15 in the evening at the Victim's residence, Iwahig Prison and Penal
Farm, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused while serving
sentence at the Central Sub-Colony both for the offense of Homicide, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, commits (sic) another offense, kidnapping one JULIE E. CAMACHO, a girl 12 years of age, and brought
her to the mountains, where said Julie E. Camacho was detained and deprived of her liberty fro [sic] more than five days.

CONTRARY TO LAW and attended by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism."2

Accused-appellant was arraigned on June 28, 1996 and entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. 3 Edgardo Bermas died before he
could be arraigned.4 The two cases were ordered consolidated and a joint trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, Julie Camacho, Dr. Edilberto Joaquin, Esteban Mamites and Julio Camacho, Sr.,
and offered documentary and object evidence on its evidence-in-chief.

II. The Antecedent Facts

Julio Camacho, Sr. and his wife, Heather Esteban, had four children, namely: Julio, Jr., a student of the Palawan State University in
Puerto Princesa City and who stayed in Guaygo, Puerto Princesa City; Jorge, who was fourteen years old; 5 Julie, who was 12 years old
and a grade six elementary pupil at the Iwahig Elementary School and Jasper, who was eight years old. Julio Sr. was employed as a
security guard in the Iwahig Prison and Penal Colony. He and his family lived in a compound inside the sub-colony. Edgardo Bermas
alias "Bunso," an inmate of the penal colony, was assigned as a domestic helper of the Camacho spouses. Accused-appellant alias
"Baguio," also an inmate of the colony, was assigned in January 1996 as a domestic helper of the Camacho family. Both helpers
resided in a hut located about ten meters away from the house of the Camacho family.

In the evening of February 22, 1996, accused-appellant and Bermas served dinner to Julio Sr., Jorge and Julie in the house of the
Camachos. At about 7:30 p.m., Julio Sr. left the house to attend a bible study at the dormitory in the Agronomy Section of the Penal
Farm. Heather and her son, Jasper, were in Aborlan town. Only Jorge and his sister Julie were left in the house.

After Julio Sr. had left the house, Julie went to the sala to study her assignment. Momentarily, Bermas called Julie from the kitchen
saying: "Jul, tawag ka ng kuya mo." Julie ignored him. After five minutes, Bermas called her again but Julie again ignored him. Julie
was perturbed when she heard a loud sound, akin to a yell, "Aahh! Ahh!" coming from the kitchen located ten meters from the house.
This prompted Julie to stand up and run to the kitchen. She was appalled to see Jorge sprawled on the ground near the kitchen, face
down and bloodied. The vicinity was lighted by a fluorescent lamp. Standing over Jorge were accused-appellant and Bermas, each
armed with a bolo.6 The shirt of Bermas was bloodied.7 Julie was horrified and so petrified that although she wanted to shout, she could
not. She ran back to the sala with accused-appellant and Bermas in pursuit. Accused-appellant overtook Julie, tied her hands at her
back with a torn t-shirt and placed a piece of cloth in her mouth to prevent her from shouting for help from their neighbors. Bermas went
to the room of Julie's brothers. Accused-appellant dragged Julie outside the house and towards the mountain. Bermas tarried in the
house.

With the aid of a flashlight, accused-appellant, with Julie in tow, walked for hours towards the direction of the mountain. About a
kilometer away from the house of the Camachos, accused-appellant and Julie stopped under a big tamarind tree at the foot of the
mountain. After about thirty minutes, Bermas arrived with a kettle and raw rice. Accused-appellant and Bermas retrieved a bag
containing their clothing and belongings from the trunk of the tamarind tree. They untied Julie and removed the gag from her mouth.
The three then proceeded to climb the mountain and after walking for six hours or so, stopped under a big tree where they spent the
night. When the three woke up in the morning of the following day, February 23, 1996, they continued their ascent of the mountain.
Seven hours thereafter, they started to follow a descending route. Accused-appellant and Bermas told Julie that they would later
release her. At about 3:00 p.m., Bermas left accused-appellant and Julie. However, accused-appellant did not let go of Julie. The two
survived on sugar and rice cooked by accused-appellant. Once, they saw uniformed men looking for Julie. However, accused-appellant
hid Julie behind the tree. She wanted to shout but he covered her mouth.

In the early morning of February 28, 1996, accused-appellant told Julie that he was leaving her as he was going to Puerto Princesa
City. He told her to fend for herself and return to the lowland the next day. After their breakfast, accused-appellant left Julie alone to
fend for herself. A few hours after accused-appellant had left, Julie decided to return to the lowlands. She found a river and followed its
course toward Balsaham until she saw a hut. She called upon its occupant who introduced himself as Nicodemus. Julie sought help
from him. When asked by Nicodemus if she was the girl whom the police authorities were looking for, she replied in the affirmative.
Nicodemus brought Julie to Balsaham where they met some personnel of the penal colony and police officers, and Nicodemus turned
Julie over for custody to them.

Meanwhile, Julio, Sr. arrived home after his bible study at about 9:00 p.m. on February 22, 1996. He noticed that the television set was
switched on but no one was watching it. He looked for his children but they were nowhere to be found. He then proceeded to the hut
occupied by accused-appellant and Bermas but he also failed to find them. Julio Sr. then rushed to the house of his older brother,
Augusto Camacho, to look for his children, but Augusto told him that Jorge and Julie were not there. Julio Sr. then sought the help of
Romualdo Esparagoza, a trustee of the penal farm. The two rushed back to the Camacho residence and proceeded to the kitchen
where they noticed blood on the floor. The two proceeded to the dirty kitchen and saw the bloodied body of Jorge dumped about three
meters away from the dirty kitchen. Julio Sr. and Esparagoza then brought Jorge to the Iwahig Hospital where he was pronounced dead
on arrival at 12:40 a.m. of February 23, 1996. Dr. Edilberto Joaquin examined the cadaver and found that the victim was stabbed on the
breast once and at the back seven times. He sustained a lacerated wound on the neck. The layers of the neck, trachea and esophagus
of Jorge had been cut. Jorge did not sustain any defensive wound. Dr. Joaquin performed an autopsy of the cadaver and signed a
medical certificate with his findings, thus:

"MEDICAL CERTIFICATE

GENERAL DATA:

JORGE CAMACHO y ESTEBAN, 14 years old, student, resident of Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, approximately 5'3 inches
in-height, was brought to the hospital, (DOA) dead on arrival at 12:40 AM, 23 February 1996, approximate time of death 8:00
P.M. February 22, 1996.

FINDINGS

1. Stab wound, deep, penetrating, approximately 1 inch in length, at the level of the xyphoid process, anteriorly.

2. Stab wound, chest, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, level of the 3rd rib.

3. Stab wound, back, right midclavicular line, level of the 5th rib.

4. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length level of the 5th rib, left midclavicular line.
5. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, 6th rib.

6. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, level of the 4th lumbar region.

7. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch in length, right third lumbar region, deep, penetrating involving the liver.

8. Stab wound, back, approximately 3/4 inch, at the level of the 2nd lumbar region.

9. Lacerated wound, neck, anteriorly, deep, penetrating, cutting the layers of the neck and the trachea and
esophagus.

CAUSE OF DEATH

Hypovolemia due to severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and laceration of the neck."8

Wounds numbers 7 and 9 were fatal. It was possible that two sharp-edged and sharp pointed weapons were used in stabbing Jorge
and that two assailants stabbed the victim.9

On February 29, 1996, Julie gave her sworn statement and a supplemental sworn statement to the police investigators. 10 Julio Sr.
suffered mental anguish and sleepless nights because of the death of Jorge.

The prosecution adduced in evidence excerpts of the personal file of accused-appellant kept in the penal colony showing that he had
been convicted of homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and that he commenced serving sentence on November 19,
1992 and that the minimum term of his penalty was to expire on August 16, 1997. 11

III. The Defenses and Evidence of Accused-Appellant

Accused-appellant denied killing Jorge and kidnapping Julie. Accused-appellant asserted that Julie implicated him because she was
coached and rehearsed. He testified that he was assigned as a helper in the house of Augusto Camacho, the Chief of the Industrial
Section of the colony and the older brother of Julio Sr. Augusto told accused-appellant that his brother, Julio Sr., wanted to have
accused-appellant transferred as his domestic helper. However, accused-appellant balked because he had heard from Edgardo
Bermas, the helper of Julio Sr., that the latter was cruel and had been maltreating Bermas. Nonetheless, in December 1995, accused-
appellant was transferred as a domestic helper of Julio Sr. Accused-appellant confirmed that indeed Julio Sr. was cruel because
whenever the latter was angry, he maltreated accused-appellant by spanking and boxing him. These would occur about two times a
week.

On February 22, 1996, at about 6:30 p.m., accused-appellant took his dinner in the kitchen. At about 7:00 p.m., while he was already in
his quarters and preparing to sleep, Bermas arrived, armed with a bloodied bolo measuring about 1½ feet long and told accused-
appellant that he (Bermas) had just killed Jorge to avenge the maltreatment he received from Julio Sr. Bermas warned accused-
appellant not to shout, otherwise he will also kill him. Petrified, accused-appellant kept silent. Bermas then brought accused-appellant to
the kitchen in the house of the Camachos where accused-appellant saw the bloodied body of Jorge sprawled near the kitchen. Bermas
called Julie three times, telling her that her brother was calling for her but Julie at first ignored Bermas. Julie later relented and went to
the kitchen where Bermas grabbed her and threatened to kill her if she shouted. Bermas tied the hands of Julie with a piece of cloth
and placed a piece of cloth around her face to prevent her from shouting.

Bermas, still armed with his bolo tucked on his waist and a knife on his hand, brought accused-appellant and Julie outside the house.
The three then trekked towards the mountain. On the way, Bermas picked a bag containing food provisions and his and accused-
appellant's clothings. Accused-appellant thought of escaping but could not because Bermas was watching him. With the help of a
flashlight brought by Bermas, the three walked towards the mountain, with Julie walking ahead of accused-appellant and Bermas. After
walking for hours, they stopped by a tree to which Bermas tied Julie. At one time, while Bermas and accused-appellant were scouring
for water, Bermas kicked accused-appellant and pushed him into a ten feet deep ravine. The right hand and foot of accused-appellant
sustained bruises. He likewise sustained a sprain on his foot. Bermas left accused-appellant and Julie after 1½ days.

In the meantime, accused-appellant managed to climb out of the ravine and heard Julie calling his name. Julie later told accused-
appellant that before Bermas left, the latter told her that he was going to kill accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant and Julie remained in the mountain after Bermas had left. At one time, accused-appellant and Julie saw soldiers
who were looking for her. Accused-appellant did not reveal his and Julie's location to the soldiers because he was afraid that he might
be killed. On February 25, 1996, accused-appellant untied Julie. He told her that he will set her free as soon as his foot shall have
healed.

On February 27, 1996, accused-appellant told Julie that she can go home already. He ordered her to go down the mountain and
proceed to Balsaham on her way back home. Although his foot was still aching, accused-appellant went down from the mountain ahead
of Julie and proceeded to Balsaham. He then walked to Irawan where he took a tricycle to the public market in the poblacion in Puerto
Princesa City. He then took a passenger jeepney and alighted at Brooke's Point where he was arrested after one week for the killing of
Jorge and the kidnapping of Julie.

Accused-appellant maintained that he did not intend to hurt Julie or deprive her of her liberty. He averred that during the entire period
that he and Julie were in the mountain before Bermas left him, he tried to protect her from Bermas. Accused-appellant asserted that he
wanted to bring Julie back to her parents after Bermas had left them and to surrender but accused-appellant was afraid that Julio Sr.
might kill him.

IV. The Verdict of the Trial Court

After due proceedings, the trial court rendered its decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, a Joint Judgment is hereby rendered in:

A. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12900 – finding the accused Gonzalo Baldogo, alias Baguio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime of murder as defined and penalized in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6
of Republic Act No. 7659, and appreciating against him the specific aggravating circumstance of taking advantage and use of
superior strength, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and pursuant to the provisions of the second
paragraph, No. 1, of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to death in the manner prescribed by law;
to pay the heirs of the deceased Jorge Camacho;

1. Actual and compensatory damages:


For expenses incurred for funeral and other
expenses incident to his death --- P45,000.00
2. Moral damages ---------------------------- 100,000.00
3. Civil indemnity for the death of the
victim, Jorge Camacho ------------------- 50,000.00
or the aggregate amount of ------------- 195,000.00

B. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12903 – finding the accused GONZALO BALDOGO, alias, 'Baguio,' guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principal of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, and there being no modifying circumstance appreciated and
pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph, No. 2, of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, and not being entitled to
the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of
civil interdiction for life, and of perpetual absolute disqualification; to pay the offended party, Julie Camacho for physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and moral shock, moral damages of P100,000; and to pay the costs.

The case as against co-accused Edgar Bermas is ordered dismissed by reason of extinction of criminal liability occasioned by
his death pending conclusion of the proceedings as against him.

SO ORDERED."12

V. Assignment of Error

In his appeal brief, accused-appellant avers that:

"I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER AND KIDNAPPING.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF DENIAL.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION AND GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR
STRENGTH DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE SAME.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN THE (SIC)
CRIMINAL CASE #12900."13

VI. Resolution of this Court

The first two assignments of errors being interrelated, the Court will delve into and resolve the same simultaneously.

Accused-appellant avers that he had nothing to do with, and hence should not be claimed for, the death of Jorge and the kidnapping
and detention of Julie. Accused-appellant claims that he was acting under duress because he was threatened by Bermas with death
unless he did what Bermas ordered him to do. Accused-appellant was even protective of Julie. He insists that the latter was not a
credible witness and her testimony is not entitled to probative weight because she was merely coached into implicating him for the
death of Jorge and her kidnapping and detention by Bermas.

We find the contention of accused-appellant farcical. At the heart of the submission of accused-appellant is the credibility of Julie, the
12-year old principal witness of the prosecution and the probative weight of her testimony.

This Court has held in a catena of cases that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the
parties, its assessment of the probative weight of the collective evidence of the parties and its conclusions anchored on its findings are
accorded by the appellate court great respect, if not conclusive effect. The raison d'etre of this principle is that this Court has to contend
itself with the mute pages of the original records in resolving the issues posed by the parties:
"x x x The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of
an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright
tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed
steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame,
or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his
observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict." 14

In contrast, the trial court has the unique advantage of monitoring and observing at close range the attitude, conduct and deportment of
witnesses as they narrate their respective testimonies before said court. Echoing a foreign court's observation, this Court declared:

"Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked, but modest withal, in a printed abstract in a court of last resort. She oft hides in
nooks and crannies visible only to the mind's eye of the judge who tries the case. To him appears the furtive glance, the blush
of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the
candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. The brazen face of the liar,
the glibness of the schooled witness in reciting a lesson, or the itching overeagerness of the swift witness, as well as the
honest face of the truthful one, are alone seen by him."15

The rule, however, is not iron clad. This Court has enumerated exceptions thereto, namely: (a) when patent inconsistencies in the
statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court; (b) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence; (c)
when the trial court ignored, misunderstood, misinterpreted and/or misconstrued facts and circumstances of substance which, if
considered, will alter the outcome of the case. 16 In this case, the trial court found the youthful Julie credible and her testimony entitled to
full probative weight. Accused-appellant has not sufficiently demonstrated to this Court the application of any of the aforestated
exceptions.

The Court agrees with accused-appellant that the prosecution was burdened to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the felonies
for which he is charged. This Court has held that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove
the corpus delicti, more specifically, that the crimes charged had been committed and that accused-appellant precisely committed the
same. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the accused. 17 The
reasonable standard rule which was adopted by the United States way back in 1978 is a requirement and a safeguard, in the words of
Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court, "of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of due
process." The United States Supreme Court emphasized in Re: Winship18 that in a criminal prosecution, the accused has at stake
interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty or even his life upon conviction and
because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.

In the cases at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to prove that accused-appellant killed Jorge. However, the
prosecution adduced indubitable proof that accused-appellant conspired with Bermas not only in killing Jorge but also in kidnapping and
detaining Julie.

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy if two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused, before, during and after the commission of a felony pointing to a joint purpose and design and community of intent. 19 It is not
required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the commission of a felony; rather, it is sufficient that at the time
of the commission of the offense, all the conspira`tors had the same purpose and were united in its execution. 20 In a conspiracy, the act
of one is the act of all.21 All the accused are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation. 22 For a
conspirator to be criminally liable of murder or homicide, it is not necessary that he actually attacks or kills the victim. As long as all the
conspirators performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design in
bringing about the death of the victim, all the conspirators are criminally liable for the death of said victim. 23

In these cases, the prosecution adduced conclusive proof that accused-appellant indeed conspired with Bermas to kill Jorge and kidnap
Julie as shown by the following cogent facts and circumstances:

1. When Julie responded to the repeated calls of Bermas for her to go to the kitchen on his pretext that Jorge wanted to talk to her, Julie
saw accused-appellant and Bermas, each armed with a bolo, about half a meter from Jorge who was sprawled on the ground, bloodied
all over.24

2. Even as Julie fled from the kitchen for dear life to the sala of their house, accused-appellant and Bermas ran after her. Accused-
appellant tied the hands of Julie with a piece of cloth and inserted a piece of cloth into her mouth to prevent her from shouting for help
from their neighbors.25

3. With a flashlight on hand, accused-appellant then exited from the house, dragged Julie towards the direction of the mountain while
Bermas remained in the house to rummage through the things in the bedroom of her brothers. Accused-appellant stopped for a while
for Bermas to join him.26

4. Before the killing of Jorge, accused-appellant and Bermas placed their clothing and personal belongings in a bag and buried the bag
under a tree, and when accused-appellant and Bermas were on their way to the mountain after killing Jorge, they excavated and
retrieved the bag from under the tree.27

5. Accused-appellant and Bermas brought with them to the mountain a kettle filled with raw rice which they cooked in the forest. 28

6. When Julie saw uniformed men who were looking for her and wanted to shout for help, accused-appellant covered her mouth to
prevent her from shouting for help.29

7. Even after Bermas had left accused-appellant and Julie in the forest in the afternoon of February 23, 1991, accused-appellant
continued detaining Julie in the forest until February 27, 1996, when he abandoned Julie in the forest to fend for herself.

The evidence of the prosecution was even buttressed by the judicial admissions of accused-appellant, thus:
1. After releasing Julie on February 27, 1996, accused-appellant proceeded to Puerto Princesa City and on to Brooke's Point where he
was arrested a week after said date.30

2. Both accused-appellant and Bermas had a motive to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie, that is, to avenge the repeated maltreatment and
physical abuse on them by Julio Sr., the father of Jorge and Julie. 31

The flight of both accused-appellant and Bermas from the house of Julio Sr. to the mountain where they found refuge after killing Jorge,
and their motive to kill Jorge Jr. and kidnap and detain Julie in conjunto constitute potent evidence of their confabulation and of their
guilt for the death of Jorge and kidnapping and detention of Julie. 32

The bare denial by accused-appellant of criminal liability for the crimes charged is inherently weak. Accused-appellant's claims that he
even protected Julie from harm and that he was forced by Bermas to kidnap Julie are of the same genre. 33 The bare denial by accused-
appellant of the crimes charged constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot prevail over the categorical and positive
testimony of Julie and her unequivocal identification of accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes charged. 34

Accused-appellant's insistence that he was forced by Bermas, under pain of death, to cooperate with him in killing Jorge and
kidnapping and detaining Julie is merely an afterthought. For duress to exempt accused-appellant of the crimes charged, "the fear must
be well-founded, and immediate and actual damages of death or great bodily harm must be present and the compulsion must be of
such a character as to leave no opportunity to accused for escape or interpose self-defense in equal combat."35 Accused-appellant is
burdened to prove by clear and convincing evidence his defense of duress. He should not be shielded from prosecution for crime by
merely setting up a fear from, or because of, a threat of a third person." 36 As Lord Dennan declared in Reg. Vs. Tyler,37 "No man from
fear of circumstances to himself has the right to make himself a party to committing mischief on mankind." In these cases, in light of the
testimony of Julie and the inculpatory acts of accused-appellant no less, there is no doubt that the latter acted in concert with Bermas
and is himself a principal by direct participation. That accused-appellant abandoned Julie after six days of captivity does not lessen his
criminal culpability much less exempt him from criminal liability for the killing of Jorge and the kidnapping and detention of Julie.

Accused-appellant failed to prove his claim that Julie was coached on how and what to testify on. Indeed, when asked to identify the
person or persons who coached Julie, accused-appellant failed to mention any person:

"Q You heard the testimony of Julie Camacho that she is pointing to you to have kidnapped her and participated in the
killing of her brother Jorge, what can you say to that?

A That is not true.

Q You donot (sic) know the reason why? In fact you treated her well, why she pointed you as one of the authors of the
crime?

A Maybe somebody coached her.

Q Who do you think coached her?

A I cannot mention the name but I am sure that somebody coached her." 38

It bears stressing that when she testified, Julie was merely 12 years old. The Court has repeatedly held that the testimony of a minor of
tender age and of sound mind is likewise to be more correct and truthful than that of an older person so that once it is established that
they have fully understood the character and nature of an oath, their testimony should be given full credence and probative
weight.39 Julie had no ill motive to tergiversate the truth and falsely testify against accused-appellant. Hence, her testimony must be
accorded full probative weight.40

VII. Crimes Committed by Accused-Appellant

The Court shall now delve into and resolve the issue of what crime or crimes accused-appellant is guilty of. The trial court convicted
accused-appellant of two separate crimes and not the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder or homicide under the last
paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659. 41 The trial court is correct. There is no evidence
that Jorge was kidnapped or detained first by accused-appellant and Bermas before he was killed. The last paragraph of Article 267 of
the Code is applicable only if kidnapping or serious illegal detention is committed and the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of
the kidnapping or serious illegal detention.

Re: Criminal Case No. 12900

(For Murder)

The trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, based on
the following findings and ratiocination:

"The slaying of Jorge Camacho took place about 8:30 o'clock in the evening of February 22, 1996. It was carried out after the
accused have been through tidying-up the kitchen, the dining room and the kitchen wares the family of the Camachos used in
their early dinner before 7:00 o'clock that evening. But even before dinner, the accused have already made preparations for
their flight, shown by the fact that they already had their clothes, other personal belongings and food provisions stacked in their
respective travelling bags then placed in a spot where they can just pick them up as they take to flight." 42

The trial court also appreciated against accused-appellant the qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength with
the following disquisition:
"The victim, Jorge Camacho, is a lad only 14 years of age and unarmed when brutally slain. On the contrary, both accused are
of age and confirmed convicted felons. Any one of them would already be superior in strength and disposition to their hapless
and innocent victim. How much more with the combined strength and force of the two of them.

Their choice of the object of their brutality is indicative of their unmistakable intent of taking advantage of their superior
strength. The likely object of their resentment, for purported cruelty to them, is Prison Guard Julio Camacho, father of the
victim. They could have directed their criminal intent on Julio Camacho himself. But Julio Camacho could be a match in
strength and agility to any of them or even to the combined force of both of them. So, to insure execution of their criminal intent
without risk to them for the defense which the offended party might put up, they directed their criminal acts against the
deceased who is very much inferior in physical combat even only to any one of them." 43

While the Court agrees that accused-appellant is guilty of murder, it does not agree with the rulings of the trial court that the crime was
qualified by evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must
establish the confluence of the following requisites:

"x x x (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to
his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. x x x"44

The qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, like any other qualifying circumstance, must be proved with certainty
as the crime itself. A finding of evident premeditation cannot be based solely on mere lapse of time from the time the malefactor has
decided to commit a felony up to the time that he actually commits it. 45 The prosecution must adduce clear and convincing evidence as
to when and how the felony was planned and prepared before it was effected. 46 The prosecution is burdened to prove overt acts that
after deciding to commit the felony, the felon clung to his determination to commit the crime. The law does not prescribe a time frame
that must elapse from the time the felon has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he commits it. Each case must be resolved
on the basis of the extant factual milieu.

In this case, the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation. The barefaced fact that accused-appellant and Bermas hid the bag
containing their clothing under a tree located about a kilometer or so from the house of Julio Sr. does not constitute clear evidence that
they decided to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie. It is possible that they hid their clothing therein preparatory to escaping from the colony.
There is no evidence establishing when accused-appellant and Bermas hid the bag under the tree. The prosecution even failed to
adduce any evidence of overt acts on the part of accused-appellant, nor did it present evidence as to when and how he and Bermas
planned and prepared to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie and to prove that the two felons since then clung to their determination to commit
the said crimes. Although accused-appellant and Bermas were armed with bolos, there is no evidence that they took advantage of their
numerical superiority and weapons to kill Jorge. Hence, abuse of superior strength cannot be deemed to have attended the killing of
Jorge.47 Nighttime cannot likewise be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because there is no evidence that accused-appellant
and Bermas purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the killing or to insure its execution or accomplishment or to evade their
arrest.48 Neither is dwelling aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge was killed in their house or taken from their house and
killed outside the said house.

In light of the evidence on record, it is clear that the killing of Jorge was qualified by treachery. When Jorge was killed by accused-
appellant and Bermas, he was barely 14 years old. The Court has previously held that the killing of minor children who by reason of
their tender years could not be expected to put up a defense is attended by treachery.49 Since treachery attended the killing, abuse of
superior strength is absorbed by said circumstance. 50

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the commission of the crime, accused-appellant should be meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.51 Conformably with current jurisprudence, accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim
civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages. Although Julio Sr. testified that he
spent P45,000.00 during the wake and burial of the victim, the prosecution failed to adduce any receipts to prove the same. Hence, the
award of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages has no factual basis and should thus be deleted.

Re: Criminal Case No. 12903

(For Kidnapping)

The trial court convicted accused-appellant of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court is correct.

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code was taken from Article 267 of the Spanish Penal Code, which reads:

"Art. 267—Detención ilegal grave.—Será castigado con la pena de reclusión temporal el particular que secuestrare o
encerrare a otro o en cualquier forma le privare de libertad."

"Secuestrare" means sequestration.52 To sequester is to separate for a special purpose, remove or set apart, withdraw from
circulation.53 It also means to lock-up or imprison. "Encerrare" is a broader concept than secuestrare.54 Encerrare includes not only the
imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. As explained by
Groizard, "encerrar" es meter á una persona ó cosa en parte de donde no pueda salir"; detener o arrestar, poner en prisión, privar de la
libertad á alguno." He continued that "la detención, la prisión, la privación de la libertad de una persona, en cualquier forma y por
cualquier medio ó por cualquier tiempo en virtud de la cual resulte interrumpido el libre ejercicio de su actividad."55 On his commentary
on the Spanish Penal Code, Cuello Calon says that the law "preve dos modalidades de privacion de libertad, el encierro y la detencion.
Encerrar significa recluir a una persona en un lugar de donde no puede salir, detener a una persona equivale a impedirle o restringirle
la libertad de movimiento. Para que el sujeto pasivo no quiera permanecer en el sitio donde esta recluido, pues no es posible llamar
encierro ni detencion a la estancia de un a persona en lugar del que no quiere salir."56

In this case, Julie, a minor, was not locked up. However, she was seized and taken from her house through force and dragged to the
mountain. Since then, she was restrained of her liberty by and kept under the control of accused-appellant and Bermas. She was
prevented from going back home for a period of about six days. Patently then, accused-appellant is guilty of kidnapping and illegally
detaining Julie. The crime was aggravated by dwelling because Julie was taken from their house by accused-appellant and Bermas.
However, dwelling was not alleged in the Information as an aggravating circumstance as required by Section 9, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which reads:

"SEC. 9. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is
no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it."57

Even if dwelling is proven but is not alleged in the Information as an aggravating circumstance, the same will not serve to aggravate the
penalty.58

Quasi-recidivism as defined in Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code59 is alleged in both Informations. Accused-appellant is alleged to
have committed murder and kidnapping while serving sentence in the penal colony by final judgment for the crime of homicide. Quasi-
recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance.60 The prosecution is burdened to prove the said circumstance by the same quantum
of evidence as the crime itself. In the present case, to prove quasi-recidivism, the prosecution was burdened to adduce in evidence a
certified copy of the judgment convicting accused-appellant of homicide and to prove that the said judgment had become final and
executory.61The raison d'etre is that:

"x x x Since the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to such information, there was a joinder of issues not only as to
his guilt or innocence, but also as to the presence or absence of the modifying circumstances so alleged. The prosecution was
thus burdened to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the existence of the modifying
circumstances. It was then grave error for the trial court to appreciate against the accused-appellant the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism simply because of his failure to object to the prosecution's omission as mentioned earlier." 62

In this case, the prosecution adduced in evidence merely the excerpt of the prison record of accused-appellant showing that he was
convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 10357-R by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6) with a penalty of from six years
and one day as minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one day as maximum and that the sentence of accused-appellant
commenced on November 19, 1992 and that the minimum term of the penalty was to expire on August 16, 1997. 63 The excerpt of the
prison record of accused-appellant is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court 64 to prove the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and to prove that said judgment had become final and executory. Said excerpt is
merely secondary or substitutionary evidence which is inadmissible absent proof that the original of the judgment had been lost or
destroyed or that the same cannot be produced without the fault of the prosecution. The barefaced fact that accused-appellant was
detained in the penal colony does prove the fact that final judgment for homicide has been rendered against him. 65 There being no
modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, accused-appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua
conformably with Article 63 of the Revised penal Code.66

VIII. Civil Liability of Accused-Appellant for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention

The trial court awarded the amount of P100,000.00 to Julie by way of moral damages for the felony of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention, predicated on her having suffered serious anxiety and fright when she was kidnapped and dragged to the mountain where
she was detained for several days. The trial court is correct. Julie is entitled to moral damages. 67 In light of the factual milieu in this
case, the amount is reasonable. Julie is also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. 68

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION:

1. In Criminal Case No. 12900, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder defined in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, there being no modifying circumstances
attendant to the commission of the felony. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the amount of P50,000.00 as of moral damages. The award of P45,000.00 as of actual damages is
deleted.

2. In Criminal Case No. 12903, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping with serious illegal detention
defined in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, and there being no modifying circumstances
attendant to the commission of the felony is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to
pay moral damages to the victim, Julie Camacho, in the amount of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on leave.

Footnotes

1
Original records, p. 1.

2
Id. at 15.

3 Id. at 21.

4 Id. at 65.

5 Exhibit "E."
6 Exhibit "A."

7 Ibid.

8 Exhibit "B."

9 TSN, Joaquin, August 20, 1996, pp. 13-14.

10
Exhibit "A."

11 Exhibit "D."

12
Records, pp. 74-76.

13 Rollo, pp. 44-45.

14
People v. Delovino, 247 SCRA 637, 647 (1995).

15 Ibid.

16 People v. Garcia, et al., 361 SCRA 598 (2001); People v. De los Santos, 314 SCRA 303 (1999).

17
People v. Dramayo, et al., 42 SCRA 59 (1971).

18 25 L.Ed. 368.

19 People v. Landicho, et al., 258 SCRA 1 (1996).

20 People v. Sequino, 264 SCRA 79 (1996).

21 People v. Lopez, et al., 249 SCRA 610 (1995).

22 People v. Cogonon, 262 SCRA 693 (1996).

23 People v. Abendan, 360 SCRA 106 (2001).

24 TSN, Camacho, pp. 8-13, July 25, 1996.

25 Id. at 13-14.

26 Id. at 15-17.

27 Id. at 45-46.

28
Id. at 20-21.

29 Id. at 25-26.

30 TSN, Baldogo, September 17, 1996, pp. 19-20.

31 TSN, Baldogo, September 19, 1996, pp. 17-19.

32
People v. De Mesa, 354 SCRA 397 (2001).

33 People v. Salvatierra, 257 SCRA 489 (1996).

34 People v. Garcia, 361 SCRA 598 (2001).

35 Wharton, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, pp. 514-515.

36
State v. Nargashian, 106 American State Reports, 715, 58 Atl. 953.

37 8 Car. & P. (Eng) 616 (1838).

38 TSN, Baldogo, September 19, 1996, p. 15.

39 Marco v. Court of Appeals, et al., 273 SCRA 276 (1997).

40 People v. Sulplito, 314 SCRA 493 (2001).

41 The crimes were committed after the effectivity of Republic Act 7659:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in
any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if
threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents,
female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

42 Rollo, pp. 70-71.

43 Id. at 71-72.

44 People v. Sison, 312 SCRA 792, 804 (1999).

45
People v. Piamonte, 303 SCRA 577 (1999); People v. Deopante, 263 SCRA 691 (1996).

46 People v. Patrolla, Jr., 254 SCRA 467 (1996).

47
People v. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655 (1999).

48 People v. Lumacang, et al., 324 SCRA 254 (2000).

49
People v. Abuyen, 213 SCRA 569 (1992).

50 People v. Cabarrubias, 223 SCRA 363 (1993).

51 Article 63, Revised Penal Code.

52 Velasquez, Revised Spanish-English Dictionary (Revised, 1959).

53 Third New International Dictionary, p. 2071.

54 People v. Santos, 283 SCRA 443 (1997).

55 Groizard, El Codigo Penal de 1870, Tomo V, pp. 639-640, cited in People vs. Marasigan, et al., 55 O.G. 8297 (1959).

56 Derecho Penal, Novena Edicion, Tomo II, pp. 700-701.

57 People v. Caber, Sr., 346 SCRA 166 (2000); People v. Berzuela, 341 SCRA 46 (2000).

58 People v. Gallego, 338 SCRA 21 (2000).

59
ART. 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous offense.—Penalty.—
Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final
judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of
the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.

Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of seventy years
if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching said age, unless by
reason of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency.

60Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance and cannot be offset by a generic mitigating circumstance. (People
v. Pereto, 111 Phil. 943).

61
People v. Gaorana, 289 SCRA 665 (1998).

62
People v. Compendio, Jr., 258 SCRA 254, 268 (1996).

63 Exhibit "D."
64Original document must be produced; exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office.

65 People v. Gaorana, supra.

66
Vide note 70 infra.

67 Article 2219, paragraph 5, New Civil Code; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 133489 and 143970, January 15, 2002.

68
People v. Catubig, 363 SCRA 621 (2000).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 138033 February 22, 2006

RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. assails and seeks the reversal of the January 13, 1999 decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 17271 as reiterated in its March 31, 1999 resolution2 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 91-
101642 finding petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (CHITO) guilty of attempted rape. 3

The accusatory portion of the information4 dated December 17, 1991 charging petitioner with attempted rape reads as follow:

That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical
with dizzying effects, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced the commission of rape by lying on top of her
with the intention to have carnal knowledge with her but was unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against her will and consent to her damage and
prejudice.

Upon arraignment on February 5, 1992, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty." 5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13) witnesses. Among them were private complainant Martina Lourdes Albano
(Malou), and her classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa, Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala. Their testimonies, as
narrated in some detail in the decision of the CA, established the following facts:

Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie Building (hereafter "Building", …) along A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila, MALOU,
occupying Room 307 with her maid, Marvilou Bebania (Marvilou), was a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas [UST] in 1991.

In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired at around 10:30. Outside, right in front of her bedroom door, her maid,
Marvilou, slept on a folding bed.

Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by the smell of chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her face. She
struggled but could not move. Somebody was pinning her down on the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the
hands covering her mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 33). Still, MALOU continued fighting off
her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got free. With this …the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab
hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed.

The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and roused Marvilou. xxx. Over the intercom, MALOU told S/G
Ferolin that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako" (Ibid., p. 8). Who it was she did not, however, know. The only thing she
had made out during their struggle was the feel of her attacker’s clothes and weight. His upper garment was of cotton material while
that at the lower portion felt smooth and satin-like (Ibid, p. 17). He … was wearing a t-shirt and shorts … Original Records, p. 355).

To Room 310 of the Building where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes were
staying, MALOU then proceeded to seek help. xxx.

It was then when MALOU saw her bed … topsy-turvy. Her nightdress was stained with blue … (TSN, July 5, 1993, pp. 13-14). Aside
from the window with grills which she had originally left opened, another window inside her bedroom was now open. Her attacker had
fled from her room going through the left bedroom window (Ibid, Answers to Question number 5; Id), the one without iron grills which
leads to Room 306 of the Building (TSN, July 5, 1993, p.6).

xxx xxx xxx

Further, MALOU testified that her relation with CHITO, who was her classmate …, was friendly until a week prior to the attack. CHITO
confided his feelings for her, telling her: "Gusto kita, mahal kita" (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22) and she rejected him. …. (TSN, July 5, 1993,
p. 22).

Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at the Building at 1:30 in the early morning of December 13,
1991, wearing a white t-shirt with “‘…a marking on the front of the T-shirt T M and a Greek letter (sic) ΣΦ’ and below the quoted letters
the word ‘1946’ ‘UST Medicine and Surgery’” (TSN, October 9, 1992, p. 9) and black shorts with the brand name “Adidas” (TSN,
October 16, 1992, p.7) and requested permission to go up to Room 306. This Unit was being leased by Ansbert Co and at that time
when CHITO was asking permission to enter, only Joseph Bernard Africa was in the room.

He asked CHITO to produce the required written authorization and when CHITO could not, S/G Ferolin initially refused [but later,
relented] …. S/G Ferolin made the following entry in the security guard’s logbook …:

"0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert Co who has not have (sic) a Request letter from our tenant of Unit #-306 Ansbert, but
still I let him inter (sic) for the reason that he will be our tenant this coming summer break as he said so I let him sign it here

(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."

(Exhibit "A-2")

That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, 1991 was corroborated by Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph), ….

xxx xxx xxx

Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 o’clock in the evening of December 12, 1991. xxx by the time CHITO’s knocking on the door
woke him up, …. He was able to fix the time of CHITO’s arrival at 1:30 A.M. because he glanced at the alarm clock beside the bed
when he was awakened by the knock at the door ….

Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt (Ibid., p. 23) when he let the latter in. …. It was at around
3 o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991 when he woke up again later to the sound of knocking at the door, this time, by Bernard
Baptista (Bernard), ….

xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOU’s room and thereat was shown by Bernard the open window through which the intruder
supposedly passed.

xxx xxx xxx

Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991, Joseph was finally able to talk to CHITO …. He mentioned to the latter
that something had happened and that they were not being allowed to get out of the building. Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to
Room 310.

CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to Unit 310, carrying his gray bag. xxx. None was in Room 310 so Joseph went to their
yet another classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room 401 to see if the others were there. xxx.

People from the CIS came by before 8 o’clock that same morning …. They likewise invited CHITO and Joseph to go with them to Camp
Crame where the two (2) were questioned ….

An occupant of Room 310 … Christian Alcala (Christian) recalled in Court that in the afternoon of December 13, 1991, after their 3:30
class, he and his roommates, Bernard Baptista and Lutgardo Acosta (Gary) were called to the Building and were asked by the CIS
people to look for anything not belonging to them in their Unit. While they were outside Room 310 talking with the authorities, Rommel
Montes (Loyloy), another roommate of his, went inside to search the Unit. Loyloy found (TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 6) a gray
"Khumbella" bag cloth type (Ibid, pp. 44-45) from inside their unit which they did not know was there and surrender the same to the
investigators. When he saw the gray bag, Christian knew right away that it belonged to CHITO (Ibid, p. 55) as he had seen the latter
usually bringing it to school inside the classroom (Ibid, p. 45).

In their presence, the CIS opened the bag and pulled out its contents, among others, a white t-shirt with a Taunu (sic) Sigma Phi sign
(Ibid, p. 7), a Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief , three (3) white T-shirts, an underwear, and socks (Ibid).

Christian recognized the t-shirt (Exhibit "D-4"), the Adidas short pants (Exhibit "D-5"), and the handkerchief (Exhibit "D-3) to be CHITO’s
because CHITO had lent the very same one to him …. The t-shirt with CHITO’s fraternity symbol, CHITO used to wear on weekends,
and the handkerchief he saw CHITO used at least once in December.
That CHITO left his bag inside Room 310 in the morning of December 13, 1991, was what consisted mainly of Renato R. Alagadan’s
testimony.

xxx xxx xxx.

The colored gray bag had a handle and a strap, was elongated to about 11/4 feet and appeared to be full but was closed with a zipper
when Renato saw it then (Ibid, pp. 19-20). At that time Christian, Gary, Bernard, and Renato went back to Room 310 at around 3 to 4
o’clock that afternoon along with some CIS agents, they saw the bag at the same place inside the bedroom where Renato had seen
CHITO leave it. Not until later that night at past 9 o’clock in Camp Crame, however, did Renato know what the contents of the bag
were.

xxx xxx xxx.

The forensic Chemist, Leslie Chambers, of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, having acted in response
to the written request of PNP Superintendent Lucas M. Managuelod dated December 13, 1991, (Exhibit "C"; Original Records, p. 109.)
conducted laboratory examination on the specimen collated and submitted…. Her Chemistry Report No. C-487-91 (Exhibit "E"; Ibid., p.
112) reads in part, thus:

"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

xxx xxx xxx:

1) One (1) small white plastic bag marked ‘UNIMART’ with the following:

xxx xxx xxx

Exh ‘C’ – One (1) night dress colored salmon pink.

2) One (1) small white pl astic bag marked ‘JONAS’ with the following:

Exh. ‘D’ – One (1) printed handkerchief.

Exh. ‘E’ – One (1) white T-shirt marked ‘TMZI’.

Exh. ‘F’ – One (1) black short (sic) marked ‘ADIDAS’.

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of volatime (sic), non-volatile and/or metallic poison on the above stated specimens.

FINDINGS:

Toxicological examination conducted on the above stated specimens gave the following results:

Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ – POSITIVE to the test for chloroform, a volatile poison.

Exhs. ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘E’ and ‘F’ are insufficient for further analysis.

CONCLUSION:

Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ contain chloroform, a volatile poison."6 (Words in bracket added)

For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner himself. He denied committing the crime imputed to him or
making at any time amorous advances on Malou. Unfolding a different version of the incident, the defense sought to establish the
following, as culled from the same decision of the appellate court:

In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical student of … (UST). With Robert Chan and Alberto Leonardo, he was likewise a member
of the Tau Sigma Phi Fraternity …. MALOU, …, was known to him being also a medical student at the UST at the time.

From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building …, CHITO, wearing the prescribed barong tagalog over dark pants and leather shoes,
arrived at their Fraternity house located at … Dos Castillas, Sampaloc, Manila at about 7 o’clock in the evening of December 12, 1991.
He was included in the entourage of some fifty (50) fraternity members scheduled for a Christmas gathering at the house of their senior
fraternity brother, Dr. Jose Duran, at No. 3 John Street, North Greenhills, San Juan. xxx.

The party was conducted at the garden beside [the] swimming pool …. Soon after, … the four (4) presidential nominees of the
Fraternity, CHITO included, were being dunked one by one into the pool. xxx.

xxx CHITO had anticipated his turn … and was thus wearing his t-shirt and long pants when he was dunked. Perla Duran, …, offered
each … dry clothes to change into and CHITO put on the white t-shirt with the Fraternity’s symbol and a pair of black shorts with stripes.
xxx .

Again riding on Alberto’s car and wearing "barong tagalog over a white t-shirt with the symbol TAU Sigma Phi, black short pants with
stripe, socks and shoes" (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 15), CHITO left the party with Robert Chan and Alberto at more or less past 1 A.M. of
December 13, 1991 and proceeded to the Building which they reached at about 1:30 A.M. (Ibid., p. 19). He had left his gray traveling
bag containing "white t-shirt, sando, underwear, socks, and toothbrush (Ibid., pp. 17-18) at room 306 in the afternoon of the previous
day ….

At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and …, S/G Ferolin, looking at his watch, approached. Because of this, CHITO also looked
at his own watch and saw that the time was 1:30 (Ibid., p. 26). S/G Ferolin initially refused CHITO entry …. xxx.

S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 …. xxx. When S/G Ferolin finally let him in, already about ten (10) minutes had lapsed since CHITO first
arrived (Ibid., p. 25).

CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph behind the opened jalousie window and for five (5) minutes vainly tried to
open the door until Rommel Montes, … approached him and even commented: "Okey ang suot mo ha, di mo mabuksan ang pinto
(Ibid., pp. 26-29). Rommel tried to open the door of Unit 306 … but was likewise unsuccessful. CHITO then decided to just call out to
Joseph while knocking at the door.

It took another (5) minutes of calling out and knocking before Joseph, …, at last answered the door. Telling him, "Ikaw na ang bahala
diyan" Joseph immediately turned his back on CHITO and went inside the bedroom. CHITO , …changed to a thinner shirt and went to
bed. He still had on the same short pants given by Perla Duran from the fraternity party (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 20).

At 6 o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991, CHITO woke up …. He was already in his school uniform when, around 6:30 A.M,
Joseph came to the room not yet dressed up. He asked the latter why this was so and, without elaborating on it, Joseph told him that
something had happened and to just go to Room 310 which CHITO did.

At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel Montes that somebody, whom MALOU was not able to identify, went to the room of MALOU
and tried to rape her (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 36). xxx.

Joseph told him that the security guard was not letting anybody out of the Building …. When two (2) CIS men came to the unit asking
for Renato Baleros, CHITO presented himself. Congressman Rodolfo B. Albano, father of MALOU, then asked him for the key to Room
306….

xxx xxx xxx

The CIS men looked inside the bedroom and on the windows. Joseph was told to dress up and the two (2) of them, CHITO and Joseph,
were brought to Camp Crame.

When they arrived at Camp Crame …, Col. Managuelod asked Joseph inside his room and talked to him for 30 minutes. xxx. No one
interviewed CHITO to ask his side.

xxx xxx xxx

Both CHITO and Joseph were taken to Prosecutor Abesamis who later instructed them to undergo physical examination at the Camp
Crame Hospital ….. At the hospital, … CHITO and Joseph were physically examined by a certain Dr. de Guzman who told them to strip
….

xxx xxx xxx

CHITO had left his gray bag containing, among others, the black striped short pants lent to him by Perla Duran (Exhibit "8-A", Original
Records, p. 345), inside Room 310 at more/less 6:30 to 7 o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991. The next time that he saw it
was between 8 to 9 P.M. when he and Joseph were brought before Fiscal Abesamis for inquest. One of the CIS agents had taken it
there and it was not opened up in his presence but the contents of the bag were already laid out on the table of Fiscal Abesamis who,
however, made no effort to ask CHITO if the items thereat were his.

The black Adidas short pants purportedly found in the bag, CHITO denied putting in his gray bag which he had left at Room 306 in the
early evening of December 12, 1991 before going to the fraternity house. He likewise disavowed placing said black Adidas short pants
in his gray bag when he returned to the apartment at past 1:00 o’clock in the early morning of December 13, 1991 (TSN, June 16, 1994,
p. 24), nor when he dressed up at about 6 o’clock in the morning to go to school and brought his gray bag to Room 310 (Ibid. 25). In
fact, at any time on December 13, 1991, he was not aware that his gray bag ever contained any black short Adidas pants (Ibid). He only
found out for the first time that the black Adidas short pants was alluded to be among the items inside his gray bag late in the afternoon,
when he was in Camp Crame.

Also taking the witness stand for the defense were petitioner’s fraternity brothers, Alberto Leonardo and Robert Chan, who both testified
being with CHITO in the December 12, 1991 party held in Dr. Duran’s place at Greenhills, riding on the same car going to and coming
from the party and dropping the petitioner off the Celestial Marie building after the party. Both were one in saying that CHITO was
wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short pants and leather shoes at the time they parted after the party. 7 Rommel
Montes, a tenant of Room 310 of the said building, also testified seeing CHITO between the hours of 1:30 and 2:00 A.M. of December
13, 1991 trying to open the door of Room 306 while clad in dark short pants and white barong tagalog.

On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed lending the petitioner the pair of short pants with stripes after the dunking party held in her
father’s house.8 Presented as defense expert witness was Carmelita Vargas, a forensic chemistry instructor whose actual
demonstration in open court showed that chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty (30) seconds without tearing nor staining the
cloth on which it is applied.9

On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision 10 convicting petitioner of attempted rape and accordingly sentencing him,
thus:
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Renato D. Baleros, Jr., alias
"Chito", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape as principal and as charged in the information and hereby
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Correctional, as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor as Maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and for
the accused to pay the offended party Martina Lourdes T. Albano, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of Moral and exemplary damages,
plus reasonable Attorney’s fees of P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17271.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed Decision dated January 13, 1999, affirmed the trial court’s judgment of
conviction, to wit:

WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from the findings of the court a quo, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.11

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its equally assailed resolution of March 31, 1999.12

Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA erred -

1. In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have committed the attempted rape imputed to him, absent sufficient,
competent and convincing evidence to prove the offense charged.

2. In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on the basis merely of circumstantial evidence since the prosecution failed to
satisfy all the requisites for conviction based thereon.

3. In not finding that the circumstances it relied on to convict the petitioner are unreliable, inconclusive and contradictory.

4. In not finding that proof of motive is miserably wanting in his case.

5. In awarding damages in favor of the complainant despite the fact that the award was improper and unjustified absent any
evidence to prove the same.

6. In failing to appreciate in his favor the constitutional presumption of innocence and that moral certainty has not been met,
hence, he should be acquitted on the ground that the offense charged against him has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.

Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case turns on the question on whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape.

After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of applicable jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to rule for
petitioner’s acquittal, but not necessarily because there is no direct evidence pointing to him as the intruder holding a chemical-soaked
cloth who pinned Malou down on the bed in the early morning of December 13, 1991.

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission
of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused as the offender as an
eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where,
although a witness may not have actually witnessed the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a
suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the
victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part
of circumstantial evidence.13 In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition where concealment is highly probable. If direct
evidence is insisted under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or secluded
places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.14

Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions when circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for conviction. The
provision reads:

Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if –

a) There is more than one circumstance;

b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with
the other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that petitioner was
the intruder in question.

We quote with approval the CA’s finding of the circumstantial evidence that led to the identity of the petitioner as such intruder:
Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place. He had access to the room of MALOU as Room 307 where he slept
the night over had a window which allowed ingress and egress to Room 306 where MALOU stayed. Not only the Building security
guard, S/G Ferolin, but Joseph Bernard Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was wearing a black "Adidas" shorts and fraternity T-shirt
when he arrived at the Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991. Though it was dark during their struggle,
MALOU had made out the feel of her intruder’s apparel to be something made of cotton material on top and shorts that felt satin-
smooth on the bottom.

From CHITO’s bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very spot where witness Renato Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were
discovered the most incriminating evidence: the handkerchief stained with blue and wet with some kind of chemicals; a black "Adidas"
satin short pants; and a white fraternity T-shirt, also stained with blue. A different witness, this time, Christian Alcala, identified these
garments as belonging to CHITO. As it turned out, laboratory examination on these items and on the beddings and clothes worn by
MALOU during the incident revealed that the handkerchief and MALOU’s night dress both contained chloroform, a volatile poison which
causes first degree burn exactly like what MALOU sustained on that part of her face where the chemical-soaked cloth had been
pressed.

This brings the Court to the issue on whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of the petitioner for the crime of attempted rape.

The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on Malou’s face the piece of cloth soaked in chemical while holding her
body tightly under the weight of his own, had commenced the performance of an act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim.
It is argued that petitioner’s actuation thus described is an overt act contemplated under the law, for there can not be any other logical
conclusion other than that the petitioner intended to ravish Malou after he attempted to put her to an induced sleep. The Solicitor
General, echoing what the CA said, adds that if petitioner’s intention was otherwise, he would not have lain on top of the victim.15

Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman
under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned
article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.16

Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru Justice Claro M. Recto in People vs. Lamahang, 17 stated
that "the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is
the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation."
Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender
in performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an
attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. 18

There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in the present case. The next question that
thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou,
constitutes an overt act of rape.
1avv phil.net

Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more
than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated
by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.19

Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-
soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As
it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be
overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private
part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody’s guess.
The CA maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not have lain on top of the complainant. Plodding on, the
appellate court even anticipated the next step that the petitioner would have taken if the victim had been rendered unconscious. Wrote
the CA:

The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will have to come later. His sexual organ is not yet exposed because
his intended victim is still struggling. Where the intended victim is an educated woman already mature in age, it is very unlikely that a
rapist would be in his naked glory before even starting his attack on her. He has to make her lose her guard first, or as in this case, her
unconsciousness.20

At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice disfavored under the rule on evidence in criminal cases. For,
mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. 21

In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,22 the Court acquitted therein petitioner of the crime of attempted rape, pointing out that:

xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the
accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not completed.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner’s act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty
and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing
that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainant’s sexual organ. xxx.

Likewise in People vs. Pancho,23 the Court held:


xxx, appellant was merely holding complainant’s feet when his Tito Onio arrived at the alleged locus criminis. Thus, it would be
stretching to the extreme our credulity if we were to conclude that mere holding of the feet is attempted rape.

Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the premises, of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The
information filed against petitioner contained an allegation that he forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in
chemical. And during the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth and having struggled
after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down. Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine
attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article
287 of the Revised Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional provision assuring an accused of a crime the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation,24 it cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the inculpatory acts for which he was
proceeded against. To be sure, the information against petitioner contains sufficient details to enable him to make his defense. As aptly
observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to allege malice, restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust
vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad
enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or
irritate an innocent person.25 The paramount question is whether the offender’s act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or
disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. 26 That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her
classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she
was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner.

The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto menor or a fine ranging
from ₱5.00 to ₱200.00 or both.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for attempted rape. Petitioner,
however, is adjudged GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of ₱200.00,
with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

( On Leave )
RENATO C. CORONA
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ*
Asscociate Justice
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S .PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On Leave.

1Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner (ret.) and
Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (ret.); Rollo, pp. 198-237.

2 Id., p. 273.

3 Id., pp. 120-155.


4 Original Records, pp. 1-3.

5
Id., p. 42.

6 Rollo, pp. 201-212.

7 TSN, December 15, 1993, pp. 18-19; TSN, December 20, 1993, pp. 23-24.

8
TSN, January 17, 1994, pp. 7-10.

9 TSN, January 17, 1994, p. 24.

10
Rollo, pp. 120-155.

11 See Note #1, supra.

12 See Note #2, supra.

13 People vs. Cubcubin, Jr., 413 Phil. 249 (2001), citing People vs. Gallarde, 382 Phil. 718 (2000).

14 People vs. Sevileno, 425 SCRA 247 (2004), citing People vs. Navarro, 407 SCRA 221 (2003).

15 Comment, pp. 20-21; Rollo, pp. 302-303.

16 People vs. Campuhan, 385 Phil. 912 (2000).

17 61 Phil. 703, 705 (1935).

18
Ibid.

19 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 1998 Edition, p. 91.

20
Rollo, pp. 222-223.

21
People vs. Canlas, et al., 423 Phil. 665 (2001).

22 431 Phil. 786 (2002).

23 416 SCRA 506 (2003).

24 Sec. 14(2), Art. III.

25
Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1997 ed., Vol. III, p. 81.

26 Ibid., citing People vs. Lilian Gozum, CA 54 O.G. 7409; People vs. Reyes, 60 Phil. 369 [1934].

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 110097 December 22, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
ARNULFO ASTORGA, accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Actual detention or "locking up" is the primary element of kidnapping. If the evidence does not adequately prove this element, the
accused cannot be held liable for kidnapping. In the present case, the prosecution merely proved that appellant forcibly dragged the
victim toward a place only he knew. There being no actual detention or confinement, the appellant may be convicted only of grave
coercion.

The Case
The foregoing principle is used by this Court in resolving the appeal of Arnulfo Astorga challenging the March 31, 1993 Decision of the
1

Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao convicting him of kidnapping.

In an Information dated March 24, 1992 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8243, Appellant Arnulfo Astorga was charged with
2

violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about December 29, 1991 in the Municipality of Tagum, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Yvonne Traya, a minor, 8 years of age, thereby depriving her of her liberty against her will, to
the damage and prejudice of said offended party.

Arraigned on February 24, 1993, Appellant Astorga, duly assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits
3

ensued. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:


4 5

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the guilt of accused ARNULFO ASTORGA having been proven beyond reasonable
doubt, pursuant to Article 267 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, [he] is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua to be
served at the National Penitentiary, [Muntinlupa].

This appeal was filed directly with this Court in view of the penalty imposed. 6

The Facts

Evidence for the Prosecution

The evidence for the prosecution was narrated in the Decision of the trial court, as follows: 7

Prosecution witnesses extant from their testimonies categorically assert that around 6:30 P.M. children of neighbors were near
the store of the grandparents of Yvonne Traya.

Incidentally, there was a brown out that evening hence candle was used. The daughter and nephew of her aunt Bebeth were
quarelling [sic] about the possession of a flashlight until the glass got lost. Accused or "Boy" Astorga, went near and asked her
daughter Jane what happened. Glenda or Bebeth grabbed her baby and went home.

Accused told Yvonne to go with him to buy candy. She did not answer and accused immediately grabbed and hold [sic] her
hand. Accused placed his hand on her shoulder and covered his [sic] mouth.

Yvonne was only eight (8) years old on 29 December 1991 when she was brought by the accused allegedly to buy candy.
Some stores were closed; others were opened. Accused never went inside the store to buy candy. Instead she [sic] held and
dragged Yvonne until they went inside the compound of Maco Elementary School. They were walking inside the perimeter
fence, [while the accused was] holding closely the child. Later, there being no person around the gate, accused brought her
out to the highway and walked towards the direction of Tagum.

Yvonne stays with her grandparents and so with her parents at Sitio Binuangan, Maco. She asked him where they were going
and accused answered that they were going home. She told him that they were already on the opposite direction because her
grandparent's house is at Binuangan, while their route was going towards Tagum. Indeed, it was an opposite direction.
Notwithstanding the assertion of Yvonne that they were on the wrong direction, accused placed his hands on her shoulder and
dragged her. She cried and protested that she must go home. Accused did not heed her plea and while she was forced to walk
she continued crying.

While accused and Yvonne were walking in the situation as described, somewhere near the Luponlupon bridge they met some
group of men. Having met on their opposite direction, the two, were noticed by the group of youngsters. The group were bound
to Maco Catholic Church to see a drama. Having met the two and as noticed by the group accused keep [sic] on looking back
at them. The group were suspicious about the man who was bringing a child. The group decided to follow them. Accused
hurriedly walked fast with Yvonne, and to prevent from being overtaken, he carried the victim and ran. They were chased.
After a distance of half a kilometer they were overtaken.

Edwin Fabila declared that Jonathan, one of his companions with others in chasing, asked the accused where they were
bound. He answered towards Binuangan. The group noticed something suspicious because their destination was already
towards Tagum which is an opposite direction to Binuangan.

When asked who is the child, accused answered Traya. Jonathan one of those who chased knew the family. He got from the
accused Yvonne who showed some resistance. Nevertheless, the group brought her home at Binuangan. Likewise, accused
was also brought by them to Yvonne's home. The house of accused and Yvonne were five (5) meters away. Accused wanted
to talk to the parents of the victim, but he was driven by her aunt and adviced [sic] to leave otherwise he will be stabbed by
Yvonne's father. He left and never talked with the family.

Evidence for the Defense

The facts as viewed by the defense are presented in the Appellant's Brief, dated December 10, 1993:
8

The defense consisted of the testimonies of Arbeth Nalcot and the accused-appellant himself.

Arbeth Nalcot, a resident of Tagum, Davao, testified tht [sic] in the afternoon of December 29, 1991, she was at the Municipal
Hall of Maco, Davao. She saw Astorga with two (2) companions. They were drinking Red Horse and were already drunk.
When they finished drinking, she went with Astorga to the latter's house. (TSN, pp. 7-8 and 18, March 23, 1993). The house of
Astorga is about 5 meters away from the house of the complainant[.] Yvonne came and asked money from the accused to buy
candy. The two went together and she was left behind. She told them to hurry up. When they failed to return, she looked for
them, but because it was already dark. She did not find them. She went back to the house of the accused. (Ibid., pp. 10-11).

Arnulfo Astorga, a resident of Maco, Davao and a gold panner testified that "at around 1:00 P.M. of December 29, 1991, he
arrived at Maco from Tagum. Upon arrival his two friends, Vicvic and Anding were already at his home. They decided to drink,
hence they proceeded to Adecor Cottage and drank two gallons of Tuba. At around 2:00 P.M., they were at the market place
and drink beer grande. At 5:00 P.M. on the same day, the three proceeded near the municipal hall and with some persons,
they again continued their drinking spree taking up Red Horse wine". (Decision, p. 3).

At about 6:00 P.M., he was already drunk and he went home. Yvonne approached him and asked him money to buy candy.
He told her that they will buy. They were not able to buy because the two stores where they went were already closed. (TSN,
pp. 12 and 13, March 24, 1993). He took her for a stroll for his drunkeness [sic] to subside. They walked inside the school
premises which was about 20 meters away from the second store. They went out of the school compound going towards
Lupon-lupon because due to his drunkneness [sic], he thought it was the way towards their house. (Ibid, pp. 14-15) They
reached Lupon-lupon bridge, crossed it twice thinking that it was the bridge near the municipal hall. After reaching Purok, they
met several persons, he was asked were (sic) they were heading, and he answered to Tagumpay, but he was told that they
[sic] way was already going to Tagum. He requested those persons to guide them to Tagumpay. They asked him who was the
child he was carrying. He answered that it was Traya's child, (Ibid, pp. 16-17). He was carrying the child because he was
already crying she already wanted to go home. The group of persons, men and women, guided them. Yvonne was being held
by the women. They arrived at Yvonne's house. He talked to the auntie of the child and told her that he would converse with
her but he was advised to go away because the father of Yvonne might hack him. So he went home. (Ibid, pp. 18-19)

The Trial Court's Ruling

The trial court justified its finding of guilt with the following discussion: 9

Accused insisted [that] he was already drunk hence when he took Yvonne to buy candy, he strolled with her so that
his drunkenness be subsided.

All these defense version was rebutted by Yvonne when she categorically declared that she did not smell liquor on
the accused.

His defense of intoxication has no leg to stand [on].

Consider these facts.

Never did he present Vicvic and Anding to corroborate that he was intoxicated that afternoon and at dusk because of
their drinking spree from 1:00 P.M. until 5:00 P.M.

He did not rebut the testimonies of Fabila that when they noticed his actions suspicious bringing with him a child, he
walked fast dragging Yvonne. When he noticed that the group of youngsters were chasing him, he carried Yvonne
and ran until they covered a distance of half a kilometer in chasing them, until they had overtaken him.

If he was that intoxicated, being under stupor and weakened by liquor, he could not ran that fast carrying Yvonne for
half a kilometer.

Moreover, Yvonne categorically in straight forward testimony asserted that she did not smell liquor on the accused.

Accused, naivety [sic], that because of his intoxication, he got lost and was not able to proceed with Yvonne to
Binuangan was a shallow afterthought.

It must be recalled that Yvonne told him they were already going at opposite direction from home. Instead they were
heeding towards Tagum. Accused did not change course.

xxx xxx xxx

Again, not only force was employed in having Yvonne as captive by dragging, slapping her mouth and was holding
her tight, but accused also used psychological means of scaring her about a red eyed ghost.

Through this means and efforts, Yvonne was deprived of her liberty and was by force prevented to go home to her
parents.

On rebuttal, Yvonne denied that she asked money from accused to buy candy. She also denied as testified by
defense witness Arbeth Nalcot that she went to the house of the accused on 29 December 1991 or on any other
dates to ask money from Astorga for candy.

Defense evidence are [sic] punctured with unbelievability in his off tangent and incredible theory of drunkardness. His
alleged being lost in the direction of Binuangan in spite of Yvonne's insistence and that of the person they met that he
was on the wrong way considering that there are no criss crossing roads except the highway is preposterous.

The Issues

Appellant imputes the following errors to the trial court: 10

I
The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses which were replete with
inconsistencies and contradictions.

II

The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that Yvonne Traya was not detained, locked-up or
deprived of her liberty.

III

The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that appellant had no motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya.

In the main, appellant challenges the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the legal characterization of the acts imputed
to him.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only of grave coercion, not kidnapping.

First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Appellant contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are not worthy of credence because they were
inconsistent and improbable. He cites the following:

Glenda Chavez testified that she was present when the accused told Yvonne that they will buy candy. She sensed
that the accused was drunk. (TSN, pp. 10-11, March 10, 1993). These testimonies were contradicted by Yvonne
Traya when she declared that Glenda Chavez had already went [sic] inside their house when [the] accused told her
that they will buy candy (TSN, pp. 10, March 16, 1993). She testified that she did not smell liquor on the accused.
(Decision, pp. 3-4)

Edwin Fabila testified that their group was able to overtake the accused at a distance of 2 fathoms and they [sic] him
about 15 to 20 meters (TSN, p. 35, March 10, 1993) Arnel Fabila, on the other hand, testified that they overtook the
accused after chasing him at a distance of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11, 1993).

Yvonne Traya testified that the accused could not ran fast carrying her because she was heavy. (TSN, p. 19, March
16, 1993). However, Arnel Fabila declared that they were able to overtake the accused only after chasing him at a
distance of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11, 1993) meaning accused was running fast. 11

We hold, however, that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses concerning minor details and collateral matters, like the
examples cited by appellant, do not affect the substance, veracity or weight of their declarations. These inconsistencies
reinforce, rather than weaken, their credibility, for different witnesses of startling events usually perceive things
differently. Indeed, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cannot be expected to be uniform to the last detail.
12

The testimony of Glenda Chavez that the accused was drunk at that time allegedly contradicted Yvonne's statement that the
accused did not smell of liquor. This does not detract from the credibility of either witness. Yvonne, then an eight-year-old
child, and her Aunt Glenda, then twenty-seven years old, do not have the same experiences or level of maturity; hence, their
13 14

perceptions of events differ. More important, whether the accused was drunk or not is an insignificant detail that does not
substantially affect the testimonies of these witnesses.

Further, the discrepancy in the witnesses' estimate of the distance covered by the men who chased appellant does not render
their testimonies incredible. Quite the contrary, such discrepancy shows their candor and sincerity, demonstrating that their
15

testimonies were unrehearsed. Yvonne testified that when appellant noticed the group of men following them, he carried her
16

and ran. Yvonne's testimony is in accord with that of Arnel Fabila — a member of the group who chased appellant — that they
were able to overtake appellant after chasing him half a kilometer. 17

Appellant's challenge to the credibility of the prosecution account is also premised on the alleged failure of the trial court to
consider the following
points: 18

a) that the alleged victim admitted that she and the accused casually moved around the school premises, as if they
were strolling; That when they were already in the highway, they were also walking openly and casually until they
were met by a group of youngster[s].

Edwin Fabila, one of the prosecution's witnesses, corroborated the fact that the two were walking casually along the
highway when he first saw them;

b) That it is highly incredible that accused and the alleged victim will not be seen or noticed by the people travelling or
those persons residing along the highway if it was true that the accused was dragging her and she was continuously
crying from her residence up to a distance of more than one kilometer;

c) That the accused and the alleged victim were travelling at a very slow pace; a distance of barely a kilometer for a
period of more than two hours;

d) That the accused was very drunk, having been drinking different kinds of intoxicating liquors from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00
p.m., causing him to be confused on which way they should take in going home.
e) That the accused was not hurt by the group of youngsters who allegedly rescued the child, nor was immediately
brought to the municipal hall which was just near the house of the victim for the filing of the necessary charge; this
[sic] actuations only confirm the fact that the accused merely sought their help in guiding them home, and

f) That it took more than one week for the complainant and her parents to file the case at the Fiscal's Office.

We cannot sustain these contentions. The charge is not belied by the one-week delay in the filing of the complaint. It has been
held that delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily weaken the credibility of a witness where
such delay is satisfactorily explained. In the present case, one week was reasonable, considering that the victim was a
19

resident of Binuangan and that the case was filed in Tagum, Davao.

Furthermore, the group whom appellant met did not hurt or bring him to the municipal hall, because they deemed it more
urgent at the time to rescue Yvonne and to bring her home, which they actually did. There is no settled rule on how a group of
20

young men should react upon seeing a young girl snatched by an older man. Verily, violence is not the only normal reaction of
young men who see a girl being forcibly taken.

Appellant's claim that he and Yvonne were merely strolling and walking casually does not negate the fact that Yvonne was
deprived of her will. As noted by the trial court, appellant used physical force and psychological means in restraining
her. Despite her young age, Yvonne was able to clearly recount the events that transpired on that fateful night.
21

Moreover, there is no merit in the argument that the people travelling or living along the highway should have noticed appellant
and Yvonne. The fact is that a group of men actually noticed and ultimately chased them.

All in all, appellant utterly fails to justify a departure from the long settled rule that the trial court's assessment of the credibility
of witnesses should be accorded great respect on appeal. 22

Second Issue: No Motive to "Kidnap"

Petitioner contends that "[t]here was no evidence presented to prove why the accused should kidnap Yvonne Traya." He
submits that "the prosecution had failed to prove [any] motive to support the alleged kidnapping incident, thus, making the
theory of the defense more credible and believable." 23

The contention is insignificant. Motive is not an element of the crime. Furthermore, motive becomes material only when the
evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the
accused has committed it. Indeed, motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the identity of appellant is not in question. He himself admitted having taken
24

Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School.

Third Issue: Kidnapping or Coercion?

Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove one essential element of kidnapping — the fact of detention or the
deprivation of liberty. The solicitor general counters that deprivation of liberty is not limited to imprisoning or placing the victim
in an enclosure. Citing People vs. Crisostomo, he argues:
25

(T)he act proven in the record constitutes (kidnapping). It is no argument against this conclusion that the accused
deprived the offended party of her liberty without placing her in an inclosure; because illegal detention, as defined and
punished in our Code, may consist not only in imprisoning a person but also in detaining her or depriving her in any
manner of her liberty. 26

We agree with appellant's contention this time.

Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of kidnapping are as follows:
27

1. That the offender is a private individual.

2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty.

3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.

4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:

5. That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five (5) days; or

6. That it committed simulating public authority; or

7. That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are
made; or

8. That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.

The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code uses the terms "lockup" (encerrar) rather than "kidnap"
(secuestrar or raptar). Lockup is included in the broader term of "detention," which refers not only to the placing of a person in
an enclosure which he cannot leave, but also to any other deprivation of liberty which does not necessarily involve locking
up. Likewise, the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish text is
28

controlling in cases of conflict with the English version, as provided in Section 15 of the Revised Administrative Code. 29
A review of the events as narrated by the prosecution witnesses ineluctably shows the absence of "locking up." Victim Yvonne
Traya testified:
30

Q And after that what happened next?

A When Auntie Bebeth went inside her house she was already bringing her child and bringing with
her candle. And Arnulfo Astorga told me that we will buy candy, sir.

Q And after that?

A And while I was not answering the question he immediately grabbed me.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And after that, after he held your hand, what did he do next?

A He placed his hands on my shoulder and also covering [sic] my mouth.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And after that what did he do next?

A He brought me to the school.

Q What school did Boy Astorga bring you? What is the name of the school?

A Maco Central Elementary School.

Q How far is Maco Central Elementary School from your house?

A A little bit near.

Q When Boy Astorga brought you to school, was it dark?

A Yes, sir.

Q Exactly where in Maco Elementary School did Boy Astorga bring you?

A Inside the gate, sir.

Q And once inside the gate what did he do to you?

A We were going around the school?

xxx xxx xxx

Q Do you know why you were going around the school?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why, what did he do?

A We were going around and when he saw that there is no person in the gate we passed at that
gate.

Q And where did he go after passing that gate?

A Towards Lupon-lupon, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q What about you, did you talk to him?

A I asked him where we were going and he told me that we are going home and I told him that this
is not the way to our house, and we did not pass this way. (Witness gesturing a certain direction).

Q And so when you said that that is not the way, when you said that is not the way because our
house is towards Binuangan. . .

By the way, you said you were going to Lupon-lupon, do you know to what direction is going to
Lupon-lupon, to what place is Lupon-lupon going to?
A Yes, sir.

Q Where?

A Going to my place.

Q Do you know the place where it was going? What is that place?

A On the road going to Tagum.

Q Now, what, about your house, where is it going?

A To Binuangan.

Q And so when you . . . what did he do next when you said that is not the place going to your
house?

A We continued walking and he also placed his hands on my shoulder and dragged me, sir.

Q What about you, what did you do when he was dragging you?

A I was crying, sir.

Q Did you say any word to him when you were crying?

A Yes, I told him that we are going home.

Q And what did Boy Astorga say?

A He told me that we will be going home, and told me not to make any noise because if I will make
any noise we will be lost on our way.

Q And so, what did you do?

A I continued crying, sir.

Q And after that, what happened?

A We continued walking and we met a person and he asked Boy Astorga where we are going, sir.

Q What did that man ask Boy Astorga?

A The man asked Boy Astorga where are you going, and Boy Astorga answered, to Binuangan, but
the man continued to say that this way is going to Tagum and not to Binuangan any more.

Q What else did the man ask, if any?

A I further said that we will already leave, and we will be the ones to go to Binuangan, and after
that, Boy Astorga put me down because he urinated. So, at that instance, I ran, but, after he
urinated, he already took hold of me not to run any more because there is a ghost.

Q When you said you ran away after Boy Astorga left you when he urinated, where did you run?

A Towards Binuangan, sir.

Q Towards the direction of your house?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you were overtaken again by Boy Astorga?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did he do to you when you were overtaken by Boy Astorga?

A He took hold of me again and he told me, he threatened me that there is [sic] a red eyes but I
answered him that is [sic] not a red eyes of the ghost but that is a light coming from the vehicle.

Q Now, what happened next?

A He placed a necklace on me, sir.


xxx xxx xxx

A He was dragging me and I was crying when he was dragging me.

Q While you were being dragged did you make any plea to him?

A Yes, I told him that I will go home.

Q And what did he say?

A He said that we will go home but I know [sic] that place we are [sic] heading to is [sic] not a way
to our home but it is [sic] the opposite.

Q So, what happened next?

A He continued dragging me and after that we met plenty of persons and I shouted for help and at
that instance, he slapped my mouth and after a few steps he already carried me.

xxx xxx xxx

A He continued walking and I also continued crying and I told him that I want to go home and he
told me that we are heading towards home, but I told him that the way we are going to is not the
way to our house.

Q By the way, when you shouted [for] help, was it loud?

A Yes, sir.

Q So, what happened next?

A He continued running and he stopped several vehicles but they did not stop, so, we just
continued walking.

Q After that, what happened next?

A He moved closer to the banana plants. He looked back and he saw that persons were already
chasing him and after that he carried me and ran.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant and the victim were constantly on the move. They went to Maco Elementary
School and strolled on the school grounds. When nobody was at the Luponlupon bridge, appellant took the victim to the
highway leading to Tagum, Davao. At that time, Yvonne pleaded with appellant that she really wanted to go home to
Binuangan, but appellant ignored her pleas and continued walking her toward the wrong direction. Later on, the group of
Witness Arnel Fabila spotted them. Appellant Astorga carried the victim and ran, but Fabila's group chased and caught up with
them.

This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the victim, which is the primary element of
kidnapping. Appellant's apparent intention was to take Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's
31

plan did not materialize, however, because Fabila's group chanced upon them. The evidence does not show that appellant
wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant's forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he
knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no "lockup." Accordingly,
appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code. Grave coercion or coaccion
grave has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by
violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will
of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other
words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right. When appellant forcibly
32

dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan. Appellant presented no justification for
preventing Yvonne from going home, and we cannot find any.

The present case should be distinguished from People vs. Rosemarie de la Cruz. Here, Appellant Astorga tricked Yvonne to
33

go with him by telling her that they were going to buy candy. When Yvonne recognized the deception, she demanded that she
be brought home, but appellant refused and instead dragged her toward the opposite direction against her will. While it is
unclear whether Appellant Astorga intended to detain or "lock up" Yvonne, there is no question that he forced her to go with
him against her will. In Rosemarie de la Cruz, Victim Whiazel voluntarily went with accused. Furthermore, the accused in that
case failed to consummate the crime of kidnapping because of the timely intervention of the victim's neighbor. Thus, the Court
held in that case:34

In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the latter's liberty, in any manner,
needs to be established by indubitable proof (People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 [1993]). The acts held by the trial court,
and maintained by the People, as consummating the crime of kidnapping in this case are those when accused-
appellant held the victim's hand and refused to let go when the victim asked to go over to her neighbor, who by then
already saw what was happening. This happened for only a very brief span of time and the evidentiary record shows
that there were a good number of people present at that time, that a guard was stationed at the gate, and that there
was at least a teacher nearby. The child could have just as easily shouted for help. While it does not take much to
scare the wits out of a small child like Whiazel, under the attendant circumstances, we cannot say with certainty that
she was indeed deprived of her liberty. It must further be noted that up to that brief moment when Cecilia saw them,
and the child asked to be let go, the victim had gone with accused-appellant voluntarily. Without any further act
reinforcing the inference that the victim may have been denied her liberty, even taking cognizance of her minority, the
Court hesitates to find that kidnapping in the case at bar was consummated. While it is a well-entrenched rule that
factual findings of trial courts, especially when they concern the appreciation of testimony of witnesses, are accorded
great respect, by exception, when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, as we perceive in the case
at bar, the Court may choose to substitute its own findings (People vs. Padua, 215 SCRA 266 [1992]).

The Information, dated March 24, 1992, filed against Astorga contains sufficient allegations constituting grave coercion, the
elements of which were sufficiently proved by the prosecution. Hence, a conviction for said crime is appropriate under Section
4, Rule 120 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure:

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof — When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offenses as charged
is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved.

At the time the felony was committed on December 29, 1991, the penalty imposed by law for grave coercion was arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos. The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply here because the
35

maximum penalty does not exceed one year. However, appellant has been imprisoned for more than six (6) months. He has
36

more than served the penalty imposable for such an offense. 37

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Appellant is CONVICTED only of grave coercion and is
sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor. Unless he is being detained for any other valid cause, his IMMEDIATE
RELEASE is herewith ordered, considering that he has more than served the maximum penalty imposable upon him. That
director of prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five days from receipt of this Decision, of the actual date the
appellant is released. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Judge Marcial L. Fernandez.

2 Original Records, p. 1; rollo, p. 5.

3 Atty. Fortunato M. Maranian; records, p. 34. The Public Attorney's Office, however, filed Appellant's Brief before this
Court.

4 Records, pp. 60-66; rollo, pp. 13-19.

5 Ibid., p. 66; rollo, p. 19.

6 The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by the Court on January 16, 1996 of the letter of the
Bureau of Corrections dated January 11, 1996 confirming the confinement of the appellant at the New Bilibid Prisons.

7 Decision, pp. 1-3; rollo, pp. 13-15.

8 At pp. 5-7; rollo, pp. 40-42.

9 Decision, pp. 3-7; rollo, pp. 15-19.

10 Appellant's Brief, p. 1; rollo, p. 36; original text in upper case.

11 Ibid., pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 43-44.

12 People v. De Leon, 248 SCRA 609, 619, September 28, 1995; People vs. Buka, 205 SCRA 567, 583, January 30,
1992.

13 TSN, March 16, 1993, p. 5.

14 TSN, March 10, 1993, p. 5.

15 People vs. Nicolas, 241 SCRA 67, 74, February 1, 1995 citing People vs. Payumo, G.R. No. 81761, July 2, 1990,
187 SCRA 64; People vs. Irenea, 164 SCRA 121; August 5, 1988; People vs. Cariño, 165 SCRA 664, September 26,
1988; People vs. De Gracia, 18 SCRA 197, September 29, 1966; People vs. Muñoz, 166 SCRA 730, July 29, 1988;
Cordial vs. People, 166 SCRA 17, September 27, 1988.

16 People vs. Padilla, 242 SCRA 629, 642, March 23, 1995 citing People vs. Lase, 219 SCRA 584 [1993]; People vs.
Jumamoy, 221 SCRA 333, April 7, 1993; People vs. Ducay, 225 SCRA 1, August 2, 1993; People vs. De Guzman,
188 SCRA 407, 411 August 7, 1990; People vs. Gadiana, 195 SCRA 211, March 13, 1991; People vs. Madriaga, 211
SCRA 698, 712, July 23, 1992; People vs. Custodio, 197 SCRA 538, May 27, 1991; People vs. Cabato, 160 SCRA
98, 107, April 15, 1988; People vs. Salufrania, 159 SCRA 401, 416, March 30, 1988.

17 TSN, March 11, 1993, p. 10.

18 Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12; rollo, pp. 46-47.

19 People vs. Dabon, 216 SCRA 656, 667, December 16, 1992; People vs. Banayo, 195 SCRA 543, March 22, 1991;
People vs. Yambao, 193 SCRA 571, February 6, 1991; People vs. Santiago, 197 SCRA 556, May 28, 1991; People
vs. Canciller, 206 SCRA 827, 831, March 4, 1992; People vs. Baysa, 172 SCRA 706, April 25, 1989.

20 TSN, March 16, 1993, pp. 20-21.

21 Decision, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 18-19.

22 People vs. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191, 201, January 18, 1995; People vs. Dolar, et al., 231 SCRA 414, 422-423,
March 24, 1994; People vs. De Guzman, 216 SCRA 754, 759-760, December 21, 1992.

23 Appellant's Brief, p. 13; rollo, p. 48.

24 People vs. Sta. Agata, 244 SCRA 677, 684, June 1, 1995 citing People vs. Cayetano, 223 SCRA 770; People vs.
Magpayo, 226 SCRA 13; People vs. Joya, 227 SCRA 9.

25 46 Phil. 775 (1923).

26 Appellee's Brief, p. 13; rollo, p. 18.

27 Prior to its amendment by Section 8, RA No. 7659, effective December 31, 1993. The crime happened in 1991.

28 Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1988 ed., Vol. III, pp. 1-2 citing Groizard and Cuello Calon.

29 Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1988 ed., Vol. I, pp. 3-4 citing People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil. 665; People vs.
Mesias, 65 Phil. 267; People vs. Yabut, 58 Phil. 479; People vs. Balubar, 60 Phil. 698; People vs. Abilong, 82 Phil.
172; Cadiz, 1 ACR and other cases; Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Twelfth Edition, 1981, Book
One, pp. 17-18.

30 TSN, March 16, 1993, pp. 10-18.

31 People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676, 728, December 6, 1995; People vs. Cua, 232 SCRA 507, 516, May 25, 1994;
People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85, 93-94; February 17, 1993; United States vs. Ancheta, 1 Phil. 165 (1902); United
States vs. De Leon, 1 Phil. 163 (1902); People vs. Remalate, 92 Phil. 48 (1952); People vs. Guerrero, 103 Phil. 1136
(1958); People vs. Ong, et al., 62 SCRA 174, January 30, 1975; People vs. Ty Sui Wong, et al., 83 SCRA 125, May
12, 1978; People vs. Jimenez, et al., 105 SCRA 721, July 24, 1981.

32 Aquino, supra, pp. 66-67.

33 G.R. No. 120988, August 11, 1997, per Melo, J.

34 At pp. 7-8.

35 Article 286 was amended by R.A. No. 7890 on February 20, 1995.

36 Section 2 of Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225).

37 Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:

Art. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. — Offenders or accused who have
undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of
liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees
voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following
cases:

1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and

2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.

xxx xxx xxx

Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released
immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review.
In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days
of preventive imprisonment. (As amended by RA No. 6127, and further amended by EO No. 214, prom. July 10, 1987).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 152997 November 10, 2004

SALVADOR MARZALADO,* JR., petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated November 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 22645,
1

which affirmed the Decision dated November 5, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 79, in Criminal Case
2

No. Q-98-74695. The RTC upheld the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 35, convicting herein petitioner Salvador
Marzalado, Jr., for violation of Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code on Qualified Trespass to Dwelling, and sentencing him to suffer
3

the penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P500 and to pay the costs. This petition likewise
4

assails the Resolution dated April 23, 2002, of the Court of Appeals, denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
5

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Cristina N. Albano was the lessee of a unit in the house owned by Luz Marzalado, the mother of herein petitioner, Salvador Marzalado,
Jr. Sometime in February 1993, Luz Marzalado filed an ejectment case against Albano. Judgment was rendered against Albano, who
was ordered to vacate the leased premises and to pay the unpaid rentals. Albano appealed to the RTC.

In September 1993, during the pendency of the appeal, the electricity supply of the unit was cut off due to non-payment of bills. As a
result, Albano transferred her children to her father's house, four houses away, leaving a maid to sleep in the unit.

Albano claims that on November 2, 1993, at around 1:00 p.m., she went to her unit. She noticed that the lead pipe she used to hang
clothes to dry was missing. When she returned at about 8:00 a.m. the following day, November 3, 1993, she discovered the padlock of
the main door changed, preventing her from entering the premises. She went to see petitioner but he was not around.

On November 4, 1993, Albano again returned to her unit. She peeked through the window jalousies and saw that the place was already
empty. She immediately reported the matter to the barangay officials, who in turn, advised her to go to the police. Thereafter, she filed a
complaint for grave coercion, qualified trespass to dwelling and theft against petitioner.

On November 14, 1993, Albano tried to see the accused, but again failed. This time she noticed that the roofing of her unit had been
removed and the main door locked from the inside. She was informed that on November 1, 1993, Marzalado, Jr., and his female
companion took her lead pipe and on November 2, 1993, Marzalado, Jr., took her personal belongings and brought them inside his
house.

Accordingly, Albano filed a suit for trespass to dwelling with the MeTC of Quezon City against Marzalado, Jr., thus:

The undersigned accuses SALVADOR MAR[Z]ALADO, JR., of the crime of Trespass to Dwelling, committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of November, 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused without any
justifiable cause, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the dwelling place of CRISTINA N. ALBANO
located at No. 241 Road 1, Pag-Asa, this City, against the latter's will and without her consent or any members of the
household, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Quezon City, Philippines, March 16, 1994. 6

On May 12, 1994, the accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge. A summary hearing followed, with Albano and her
witness, Narciso Raniedo, testifying for the prosecution.

Raniedo, the owner of the house fronting Albano's unit, testified that at around 5:00 p.m., on November 1, 1993, he was about to enter
his house, when he glanced at the unit leased by Albano. He saw Marzalado, Jr., take a lead pipe and hand it to a woman waiting at the
terrace of Marzalado, Jr.'s house. Raniedo further said that on November 2, 1993, sometime between 4:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. he was
relaxing in front of his house, when he heard noises coming from Albano's apartment. There he saw Marzalado, Jr., forcibly open the
door of the unit, bring out the belongings of Albano, and take these to his own house.
For his defense, Marzalado, Jr., testified that after the MeTC ruled against Albano in the MeTC ejectment case filed by his mother and
because of the disconnection of the electricity, Albano already vacated the leased unit and moved to her father's place. According to
petitioner, on November 3, 1993, he was on his way home when he saw water in a continuous stream flowing out of Albano's unit. He
then searched for Albano but to no avail. He reported the matter to the barangay officers and asked for two barangay tanods to
accompany him to the vacated unit. They went inside the unit where they found an open faucet, with water flooding the floor. He
accused Albano of deliberately leaving the faucet open. He claimed Albano filed the criminal case of trespass to dwelling to harass him
and to retaliate against him and his family.

On October 28, 1997, the MeTC handed down the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Salvador Mar[z]alado, Jr. "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trespass
To Dwelling under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced the penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of Arresto Mayor and to pay a fine of P 500.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. 7

The trial court observed that the defense would have been "a good defense" had the alleged entry been made on November 2, 1993,
the date stated in the Information, instead of November 3, 1993, the date the accused said he entered the premises because Albano
deliberately left the faucet open.

Marzalado, Jr., appealed to the RTC, which ruled the matter in this wise:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision dated October 28, 1997, the same is hereby affirmed in
toto.

SO ORDERED. 8

Undaunted, Marzalado, Jr., elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22645. The Court of Appeals found no error
in the challenged RTC decision and held:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the lower court's decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the instant petition is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 9

Hence, petitioner comes to this Court assigning as errors of the court a quo the following:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISIONS OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BOTH OF QUEZON CITY BECAUSE THE INCIDENT HAPPENED ON
NOVEMBER 3, 1993, AND NOT NOVEMBER 2, 1993, AND THE PETITIONER'S ENTRY IN THE PREMISES IS FULLY
JUSTIFIED BECAUSE HE WAS ASSISTED BY THEIR BARANGAY SECRETARY AND TWO BARANGAY TANOD[S] AND
THE ENTRY IS FOR A VALID PURPOSE. HENCE, THERE IS NO TRESPASS TO DWELLING.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE INFORMATION THAT THE ALLEGED TRESPASS
TO DWELLING HAPPENED ON NOVEMBER 2, 1993. THUS, WITH DUE RESPECT TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THERE WAS A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, AND IT SHOULD NOT HAVE ADOPTED THE FINDINGS OF
FACTS OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. 10

The foregoing may be reduced to one issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the conviction of Marzalado, Jr., for qualified
trespass to dwelling?

The petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in sustaining the lower court, since in the proceedings
below, there was a grave misapprehension of facts by both the MeTC and RTC in finding that he committed trespass to dwelling
despite the glaring proof that his entry was justifiable under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code - to prevent an imminent
11

danger to property. He stresses that while he did enter the unit, he did so with the aid of barangay officers and for the sole purpose of
turning off the faucet that was causing the flooding of the unit. He adds that the Information filed against him should be considered
fatally defective for having stated that his entry was on November 2, 1993, when in fact it was on November 3, 1993.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that petitioner's entry cannot be justified since the flooding of the floor was not a
danger to life nor property. Rather, the OSG claims that the flooding of the unit could have been averted had the petitioner resorted to
merely turning off the inlet valve of the water source. The OSG also stresses petitioner's failure to refute the charge that he entered the
complainant's unit on November 2, 1993. Moreover, the OSG asserts that the exact time of the commission of the crime in the
Information need not be so accurate to preclude other dates near the actual date. It is sufficient that the Information states a time as
near to the actual date, more so, where the time is not an essential element of the offense, as in this case.

Anent the Information, the contention of petitioner that the Information is defective is untenable. Admittedly, there is a discrepancy on
the precise date of the alleged trespass - the Information charges petitioner Marzalado, Jr., with trespass to dwelling allegedly
committed on November 2, 1993, while petitioner's defense relate to an entry made the following day. The discrepancy however, does
not make the information defective. Facts and circumstances necessary for inclusion in the information are determined by reference to
the definition and elements of the specific crime. In trespass to dwelling, the elements are: (1) the offender is a private person; (2) that
12

he enters the dwelling of another; and (3) such entrance is against the latter's will.
The exact date when the alleged trespass occurred is not an essential element of the offense of trespass. It is sufficient that the
Complaint or Information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual
commission. Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the
13

precise time the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have
been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit. A
variance between the time set out in the indictment and that established by the evidence during trial does not constitute an error so
serious as to warrant reversal of a conviction solely on that score. Thus, the error invoked by the petitioner in the date of the alleged
14

trespass in the Information is of no grave import, for it is far from being the decisive issue in this case.

However, still incumbent upon the prosecution is to establish the criminal intent and the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Criminal cases rise and fall on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not the weakness of the evidence of the defense or
the lack of it. In the prosecution for trespass, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the trespass. The
15

gravamen of the crime is violation of possession or the fact of having caused injury to the right of the possession.
16 17

To prove trespass, the prosecution presented as witness Narciso Raniedo who testified that he saw petitioner enter the unit at around
4:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on November 2 and take out Albano's belongings. No other eyewitness corroborated Raniedo's testimony.
However, by her own account, Albano declared that she discovered the trespass in the evening of November 3, the same day the
18

barangay certified Marzalado, Jr.'s entry. This obviously does not discount the fact that although the exact date of entry varied as
between petitioner and respondent, they both were referring to the same entry.

What remains now is the issue of whether the entry of petitioner Marzalado, Jr., was legally justified. We rule that it is, based on the
circumstances of this case.

As certified by Barangay Lupon Secretary Romulo E. Ragaya, the unit rented by Albano was "forcibly opened by the owner because of
the strong water pressure coming out of the faucet…" As Albano herself admitted, she and her children already left the unit when the
19

electricity supply was cut off in the month of September. Hence, nobody was left to attend to the unit, except during some nights when
Albano's maid slept in the unit. Clearly, Marzalado, Jr., acted for the justified purpose of avoiding further flooding and damage to his
mother's property caused by the open faucet. No criminal intent could be clearly imputed to petitioner for the remedial action he had
taken. There was an exigency that had to be addressed to avoid damage to the leased unit. There is nothing culpable concerning
Marzalado, Jr.'s judgment call to enter the unit and turn off the faucet instead of closing the inlet valve as suggested by the OSG.

Thus, we find the evidence on record insufficient to hold petitioner guilty of the offense charged. Palpable doubt exists in our mind as to
the guilt of petitioner. In our view, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court and of the
Metropolitan Trial Court when it found petitioner guilty of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling. In a situation of ambiguity, where the act of the
accused permits of two possible signification, one culpable and another innocent, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the
accused. The evidence in this case simply fails to convince us of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22645,
and its Resolution dated April 23, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
SALVADOR MARZALADO, JR., is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge against him for lack of evidence to sustain a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Also Spelled as "Marsalado" in some parts of the records.

Rollo, pp. 51-59. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona, with Associate Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis, and
1

Perlita J. Tria Tirona concurring.

2
Id. at 46-50.

3
ART. 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. – Any private person who shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter's will,
shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

If the offense be committed by means of violence or intimidation, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any person who shall enter another's dwelling for the purpose
of preventing some serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling, or a third person, nor shall it be applicable
to any person who shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of rendering some service to humanity or justice, nor to
anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inn and other public houses, while the same are open.

4
Rollo, p. 52.

Id. at 60. Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona, with Associate Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis, and Rebecca de
5

Guia-Salvador concurring.

6
Id. at 61.
7
Rollo, p. 45.

8
Id. at 50.

9
Id. at 58.

10
Id. at 18.

11
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:

...

4. Any person who, in order to avoid any evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another, provided that
the following requisites are present:

First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;

Third. That there be not other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

...

12
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 148468, 148769 & 149116, 28 January 2003, 396 SCRA 443, 460.

13
People v. Mauro, G.R. Nos. 140786-88, 14 March 2003, 399 SCRA 126 citing People v. Salalima G.R. Nos. 137969-71, 15
August 2001, 363 SCRA 192. See also Rule 110, Rules of Criminal Procedure, SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense.–
It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a
material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the
actual date of its commission.

14
People v. Alvero, G.R. Nos. 134536-38, 5 April 2000, 329 SCRA 737, 748.

15
People v. Gomez, G.R. No. 101817, 26 March 1997, 270 SCRA 432, 444.

16
Munsey v. Hanly 67 A 217 (1907).

17
Austin v. Hallstrom 86 A.2d 549 (1952).

18
Rollo, pp. 19, 37.

19
Id at 27.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529 March 28, 1969

ROSAURO REYES, petitioner,


vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Jose F. Mañacop for petitioner.


Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for
respondent.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This case is before us on appeal by certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that a the municipal court of Cavite
City, convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of grave threats and grave oral defamation, and sentencing him, in the first case (Criminal
Case No. 2594), to four (4) months and ten (10) days of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency; and in the second case (Criminal Case No. 2595), to an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months of arresto mayor to
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prison correccional and to pay Agustin Hallare the sum of P800 as moral damages, with costs in
both cases.

The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose
services were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a
demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing
statements such as, "Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin";
"Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin, dillega, el dia di quida rin bo chiquiting;" and others. The base
commander, Capt. McAllister, called up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in charge
of preserving harmonious relations between personnel of the naval station and the civilian population of Cavite City. Capt. McAllister
requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main gate of the base to meet the demonstrators. Col. Monzon went to the place and talked to
Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura upon learning that the demonstration was not directed against the naval station but against
Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly caused the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange,
Col. Monzon suggested to them to demonstrate in front of Hallare's residence, but they told him that they would like the people in the
station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They assured him, however, that they did not intend to use violence, as "they
just wanted to blow off steam."

At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval station. When he learned about the demonstration he became
apprehensive about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection. The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, and
another person in going out of the station, using his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once outside, Col. Monzon purpose slowed down
to accommodate the request of Reyes. He told Hallare to take a good look at the demonstrators and at the placards they were carrying.
When the demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted, "Mabuhay si Agustin." Then they boarded their jeeps and followed the car. One
jeep overtook passed the car while the other to led behind. After Hallare and his companions had alighted in front of his residence at
967 Burgos St., Cavite City, Col. Monzon sped away.

The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off
his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted
repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and
the motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside
the house. lâwphi 1.ñet

On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged on July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave threats and grave oral
defamation, respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and 2595, Municipal Court of Cavite City), as follows;

The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Threats, as defined
by Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by paragraph 2 of the same Article, committed as follows:

That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, orally threaten to
kill, one Agustin Hallare.

Contrary to law.

Cavite City, July 24, 1961.

DEOGRACIAS S. SOLIS
City Fiscal

BY: (SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ


Special Counsel

The undersigned complainant, after being duly sworn to an oath in accordance with law, accuses Rosauro Reyes of
the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, as defined and penalized by Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, committed
as follows:

That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, without any justifiable motive but with the intention to cause dishonor,
discredit and contempt to the undersigned complainant, in the presence of and within hearing of several persons, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously utter to the undersigned complainant the following insulting and
serious defamatory remarks, to wit: "AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO". which if translated into English are as follows:
"Agustin, Your mother is a whore."

Contrary to law.

Cavite City, July 25, 1961.

(SGD.) AGUSTIN HALLARE


Complainant

Subscribed and sworn to before me this. 25th day of July, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Philippines.

(SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ


Special Counsel

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges and the cases were set for joint trial. On the day of the hearing the
prosecution moved to amend the information in Criminal Case No. 2594 for grave threats by deleting therefrom the word "orally". The
defense counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the accused had already been arraigned on the original information and that
the amendment "would affect materially the interest of the accused." Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed and the joint trial
proceeded.

From the judgment of conviction the accused appeal to the Court of Appeals, which returned a verdict of affirmance. A motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the accused brought this appeal by certiorari.

Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the proceedings in the lower court allowing the substantial amendment
of the information for grave threats after petitioner had been arraigned on the original information; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the
case of grave threats without first requiring petitioner to enter his plea on the amended information; (3) in convicting petitioner of both
offenses when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, thereby putting him in jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same
offense; (4) in convicting petitioner of grave threats when the evidence adduced and considered by the court tend to establish the
offense of light threats only; and (5) in convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation when the evidence tend to establish that of simple
slander only.

On the first error assigned, the rule is that after the accused has pleaded the information may be amended as to all matters of form by
leave and at the discretion of the court when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant (Section 13, Rule
110, New Rules of Court). Amendments that touch upon matters of substance cannot be permitted after the plea is entered.

After a careful consideration of the original information, we find that all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article
282 1 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender threatened
another person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not
subject to a condition. Hence, petitioner could have been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that under the aforementioned
provision the particular manner in which the threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of the word
"orally" did not affect the nature and essence of the crime as charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the
prosecution that the accused threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the petitioner to undergo any material change or
modification in his defense. Contrary to his claim, made with the concurrence of the Solicitor General, petitioner was not exposed after
the amendment to the danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282, which provides for a different penalty, since there was no
allegation in the amended information that the threat was made subject to a condition. In our view the deletion of the word "orally" was
effected in order to make the information conformable to the evidence to be presented during the trial. It was merely a formal
amendment which in no way prejudiced petitioner's rights.

Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the amendment was properly allowed, the trial court committed a reversible error in
proceeding with the trial on the merits without first requiring him to enter his plea to the amended information. Considering, however,
that the amendment was not substantial, no second plea was necessary at all.

The third and fourth issues are related and will be discussed together. Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court erred in affirming him of grave threats and of grave oral defamation when he could legally be convicted of only
one offense, and in convicting him of grave threats at all when the evidence adduced and considered by the court indicates the
commission of light threats only.

The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with threatening
statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the
demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one
conclusion: that the threats were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the
threat would be carried into effect." 2Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon,
who had to escort him home, wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be denied that the threats were made
deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the
incident. We, therefore, hold that the appellate court was correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats.

The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough
expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever,
taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part
of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-
14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:

The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the principal
aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely preparatory
remarks culminating in the final threat. In other words, the libelous remarks express the beat of passion which engulfs the
writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is the more important and
serious offense committed by the accused. Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the study of the whole letter, that
the offense committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats and that the statements therein derogatory to the person
named do not constitute an independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from the threats and
which should be considered as part of the more important offense of threats.

The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of the present case.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio, insofar as Criminal
Case No. 2595 of the Court a quo (for oral defamation) is concerned; and affirmed with respect to Criminal Case No. 2594, for grave
threats, with costs against petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Santos, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Castro and Capistrano, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes

1ART. 282. Grave threats. — Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of
the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:

1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he threatened to commit, if the offender
shall have made the threat demanding money or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and said
offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have attained his purpose, the penalty lower by two
degrees shall be imposed.

If the threat made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat shall not have been made subject to
a condition.

2U.S. vs. Sevilla, 1 Phil. 143; U.S. vs. Paguirigan, 14 Phil. 450.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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