RIGHT TO SELF ORGANIZATION
paragraph of Section 3, Article XIII, on Social
Tupas v. NHA, May 4, 1989, Regalado, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines and
Allied Services (TUPAS, for brevity) is a
legitimate labor organization with a chapter in
NHC.
TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a
certification election with Regional Office No.
IV of the Department of Labor in order to
determine the exclusive bargaining
representative of the workers in NHC. It was
claimed that its members comprised the majority
of the employees of the corporation.
Labor-Arbiter dismissed the petition, holding
that NHC "being a GOCC its
employees/workers are prohibited to form, join
or assist any labor organization for purposes of
collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule
II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code."
Bureau of Labor Relations reversed the order of
dismissal and ordered the holding of a
certification election.
Issue:
WON the employees of NHC, a GOCC
organized under the Corporation Code (and
therefore without an original charter), have the
right to unionize – YES
Ratio:
The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly
have the right to form unions or employees'
organizations. The right to unionize or to form
organizations is now explicitly recognized and
granted to employees in both the governmental
and the private sectors. The Bill of Rights
provides that "(t)he right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged"
This guarantee is reiterated in the second
Justice and Human Rights, which mandates that
the State "shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike
in accordance with law
The employees of the public sector comprise the
largest bloc of workers in our national work
force. Governmental bureaucracy is continually
being reorganized to cope with the growing
complexity of the problems and needs of
political and administrative governance. As the
increase in the number of government
employees grows space, the need to enhance
their welfare correspondingly becomes more
imperative. While it may be assumed that the
Government is exerting efforts to advance the
interests of its employees, it is quite
understandable that the employees themselves
should actively seek arrangements where by
they can participate more meaningfully in
management and employment relationships.
There is, thus, a proliferation of unions or
employees' organizations, each seeking
concomitant representational recognition.
SSS v. CA, 28 July 1989, Cortes, J.
Facts:
SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act
on the union's demands.
SSS filed with the RTC a complaint for damages
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
against SSSEA when the officers and members
of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded
the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing
non-striking employees from reporting for work
and SSS members from transacting business
with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council,
which ordered the strikers to return to work; that
the strikers refused to return to work; and that
the SSS suffered damages as a result of the
strike.
RTC declared the strike illegal
Issue:
WON the SSS employees have the right to
strike.—NO
Ratio:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social
Justice and Human Rights, provides that the
State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with
law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
However, in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service
Commission, it only provides that "[t]he right to
self-organization shall not be denied to
government employees"
Further, a reading of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution would show that in recognizing the
right of government employees to organize, the
commissioners intended to limit the right to the
formation of unions or associations only,
without including the right to strike.
Bangalisan v. CA, July 31, 1997, Regalado, J.
Facts:
Petitioners, were among the 800 public
school teachers who staged “mass actions”
on September 17 to 19, 1990 in order o
dramatize their grievances concerning, in the
main, the alleged failure of the public
authorities to implement in a just and correct
manner certain laws and measures intended
for their material benefit.
DECS Secretary issued a Return to Work
Order. They failed to comply with the
Order, so they were charged by the
Secretary with “grave misconduct; gross
neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil
Service law, rules and regulations and
reasonable office regulations; refusal to
perform official duty; gross insubordination;
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service; and absence without official leave
in violation of PD 807 and preventively
suspended
They were found guilty and dismissed. On
MR, the penalty was modified to 9 months
suspension
Issue:
WON gov’t employees have a right to strike -
NO
Ratio:
It bears stressing that suspension of public
services, however temporary, will inevitably
derail services to the public, which is one of the
reasons why the right to strike is denied
government employees. It may be conceded that
the petitioners had valid grievances and noble
intentions in staging the “mass actions,” but that
will not justify their absences to the prejudice of
innocent school children. Their righteous
indignation does not legalize an illegal work
stoppage.
OTHER RIGHTS
Borromeo v. Civil Service Commission, July
31, 1991, Gutierrez, J.
Facts:
Aug. 18, 1988 – Jesus Borromeo, Chairman of
the Civil Service Commission, wrote a letter to
the Commission on Audit Chairman, through the
CSC Chairman, requesting an opinion on w/n
the money value of the terminal leave of retired
Constitutional Commission members should
include the allowances received at the time of
retirement. He said that while retired members
of other Constitutional Commissions received
terminal leave pay computed on the basis of
highest monthly salary including allowances, his
terminal leave was computed solely on the basis
of highest monthly salary i.e. excluding
allowances.
The CSC Chairman recommended to the COA
Chairman the approval of Borromeo’s request
for payment of the money value of his terminal
leave based on salary plus allowances.
However, the DBM denied Borromeo’s request
for the following reasons:
Computation of the money value of
vacation and sick leave is based on
“basic pay” or “basic salary” pursuant to
the provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by
RA 1081.
Under Sec 2(1) of PD 1146, the term
salary refers to the basic pay or salary
received by an employee, excluding per
diems, bonuses, overtime pay and
allowance.
The cases of former COA
Commissioners Pobre and Sarmiento
cannot be validly invoked as precedents
for purposes of DBM Budgetary action
since said claims were processed
without prior involvement of the DBM.
Issue:
Whether the RATA and COLA should be added
to the highest monthly salary in computing
Borromeo’s terminal leave pay – YES
Ratio:
The only provision in Sec. 286 which could
seemingly support the Solicitor General’s view
is the underlined clause which allows the
“commutation of salary” of a government
officer, employee, or laborer.
o “Commutation of salary” as used in Sec.
286 is, however, not the same as
“commutation of leave credits.” The
former is applied for by an employee
during employment when he goes on
ordinary leave. Thus, if his Department
Head allows it, the employee may
receive his salary for the period of the
vacation or sick leave before the
beginning of such leave; otherwise, he
gets his salary only on the paydays
covered by the vacation or sick leave
period or upon returning to work.
o In contrast, commutation of leave
credits, more commonly known as
terminal leave, is applied for by an
officer or employee who retires, resigns
or is separated from the service through
no fault of his own.
In the exercise of sound personnel policy, the
Government encourages unused leaves to be
accumulated. The Government recognizes that
for most public servants, retirement pay is
always less than generous if not meager and
scrimpy. A modest nest egg which the senior
citizen may look forward to is thus provided.
Terminal leave payments are given not only at
the same time but also for the same policy
considerations governing retirement benefits.
Since terminal leave is applied for by an officer
or employee who has already severed his
connection with his employer and who is no
longer working, then it follows that the terminal
leave pay, which is the cash value of his
accumulated leave credits, should not be treated
as compensation for services rendered at that
time. It cannot be viewed as salary for purposes
which would reduce it.
There can be no “commutation of salary” when
a government retiree applies for terminal leave
because he is not receiving it as salary. What he
applies for is a “commutation of leave credits.”
It is an accumulation of credits intended for old
age or separation from the service. Hence, Sec.
286 of the Revised Administrative Code is not
applicable. It cannot be construed as limiting the
basis of the computation of terminal leave pay to
monthly salary only.
In the light of the reasons which impelled the
law to include COLA and RATA in computing
retirement benefits of certain officials, we rule
that terminal leave payments must also be
governed by the same principle.
CA 186 provides for the retirement of
government employees other than members of
the Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions, and
those whose retirement is not covered by special
law. Under the last sentence of Sec. 12(c), CA
186, officials and employees retired under CA
186 shall be entitled to the commutation of the
vacation and sick leave credits based on the
highest rate received.
The same rule of uniformity applied in Paredes
for those retiring under CA 186 as amended
should also apply for those who retire under
R.A. 910 as amended. The rate used in
computing retirement gratuities also applies in
the computation of terminal leave credits. It is
axiomatic that retirement laws are liberally
construed and administered in favor of the
persons intended to be benefited. All doubts as
to the intent of the law should be resolved in
favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian
purposes.
Although terminal leave pay is not synonymous
with, and is not a part of, the five-year lump sum
gratuity provided under RA 910 as amended and
AO 444, the former may, in a broad sense,
partake of the nature of a gratuity rather than
actual salary. A gratuity is that paid to the
beneficiary for past services rendered purely out
of generosity of the giver or grantor. It is a mere
bounty given by the government in
consideration and recognition of meritorious
services and springs rom the appreciation and
graciousness of the government.
Lopez v. CA, December 6, 1992, Feliciano, J.
Facts:
Galicano Manapat retired from the government
service as Chief of the Legal Division of the
Office of the Municipal Board of Manila. He
retired under the provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as
amended, having then rendered twenty (20)
years of service to petitioner City of Manila and
received the amount of P24,479.02 representing
his full retirement benefit.
Manapat was reemployed by the City of Manila,
this time as Secretary of the City of Manila
Board as Tax Assessment Appeals. He occupied
that position until he reached the compulsory
retirement age of sixty-five (65) years. The City
of Manila extended his period of service for six
(6) months.
During this additional period of service, the
Salary Standardization Law (R.A. No. 6758)
took effect and increased Manapat's monthly
salary from P3,993.33 to P11,385.00.
GSIS adjusted Manapat's approved application
for retirement to conform with his last
standardization monthly salary of P11,385.00.
This adjustment resulted in a total collectible
retirement pay or gratuity of P486,634.84.
The approved adjusted claim of Manapat for
retirement benefits was forwarded by the GSIS
to the Board of Tax Assessment Appeals of the
City of Manila. The Assistant Department Head
of that Board in turn transmitted the papers to
the Chairman of the Committee on the
Settlement of Claims for Retirement Gratuity
and Terminal Leave Pay ("Committee").
Chairman of that Committee returned the papers
to the Manila Board of Tax Assessment Appeals
without acting on the retirement gratuity claim
of Manapat, upon the ground that it was existing
policy of the City of Manila that an employee
who has reached the compulsory retirement age
of sixty-five (65) years must retire under R.A.
No. 660 and not under the provisions of R.A.
No. 1626, as amended.
Manapat then commenced in the Regional Trial
Court of the City of Manila, a special civil
action for mandamus of the City of Manila to
allow Manapat to retire under the provisions of
R.A. No. 1616, as amended. The trial court
dismissed the petition.
Issue:
WON Manapat can retire under the provisions of
R.A. No. 1616 – YES
Ratio:
The interpretation urged by petitioners is
conspicuously at war with the basic policy
purpose of CA 186 as amended by RA 1616
which is, of course, to create an added incentive
for qualified government employees to remain in
the service of the government. The basic
principles for the construction of statutes tell us
that a statute must be read in such a way as to
give effect to the purpose projected in the
statute. Under this principle of effectiveness,
retirement statutes, in case of a real as
distinguished from a merely ostensible doubt or
ambiguity, must be so construed as to give
meaning and effect to their humanitarian
purposes and so as reasonably to benefit
employees who had opted to stay in the services
of the government for so many years. Thus, we
read Section 12(c) as applicable in respect of
private respondent Manapat who had complied
with the requirement of that subsection of at
least 20 years of service. The benefits of Section
12(c) are, under its express terms, available to
anyone who shall have rendered at least 20 years
of service, "regardless of [the] age" reached by
the retiree at the time of his retirement.
Cena v. Civil Service Commission, July 3,
1992, Medialdea, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena entered the
government service on November 16, 1978 as
Legal Officer II of the Law Department of
Caloocan City where he stayed for 7 years until
his transfer on November 16, 1986 to the Office
of the Congressman of the First District of
Caloocan City where he worked for only 3
months, or until February 15, 1987, as
Supervising Staff Officer.
The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the
CSC whether or not to allow the extension of
service of Cena as he is covered by Civil Service
Memorandum No. 27, series 1990. The LRA
Administrator observed that if petitioner's
service as of January 22, 1991 of 10 years, 6
months and 6 days (should be 11 years, 9
months and 6 days) would be extended to 15
years, he would have to retire on April 15, 1994
at the age of 68 years.
CSC denied Cena's request for extension,
declaring that Mr. Cena shall be considered
retired from the service on January 22, 1991, the
date when he shall reach the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, unless his retention
for another year is sought by the head of office
under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No.
27, s. 1990.
Issue:
WON a gov’t employee who has reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who
has rendered almost 15 years of service, may be
allowed to continue in the service to complete
the 15-year service requirement to enable him to
retire with the benefits of an old-age pension -
YES
Ratio:
There is thus no justifiable reason in not
allowing ordinary employees in the Executive
Branch on a case to case basis, to continue in the
service to complete the 15-year service
requirement. By limiting the extension of service
to only 1 year would defeat the beneficial
intendment of the retirement provisions of P.D.
1146.
In resolving the issue, there must be present an
essential factor before an application under
Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 may be granted
by the employer or government office
concerned. In the case of officials of the
Judiciary, the Court allows a making up or
compensating for lack of required age or service
only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was
marked by competence, integrity, and dedication
to the public service. It must be so in the instant
case.
The phrase "he shall be allowed to continue in
the service to complete the fifteen years" found
in Section 11 (b) is a reproduction of the phrase
in the original text found in Section 12 (e) of CA
186, as amended, otherwise known as the
"Government Service Insurance Act". There is
nothing in the original text as well as in the
revised version which would serve as the basis
for providing the allowable extension period to
only 1 year. There is likewise no indication that
Section 11(b) contemplates a borderline
situation where a compulsory retiree on his 65th
birthday has completed more than 14, but less
than 15 years of government service., i.e. only a
few months short of the 15-year requirement
which would enable him to collect an old-age
pension.
Rabor v. Civil Service Commission, 31 May
1995, Feliciano, J
Facts:
Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the
Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered the
government service as a Utility Worker on 10
April 1978 at the age of 55 years.
Alma D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of
the Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M.
Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that
he had already reached the age of sixty-eight
(68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen
(13) years and one (1) month of government
service.
Mayor Duterte advised Rabor to stop reporting
for work.
Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional
Director, CSRO-XI, a letter asking for extension
of his services in the City Government until he
"shall have completed the fifteen (15) years
service requirement in the Government so that
he could also avail of the benefits of the
retirement laws given to employees of the
Government." This request was denied by
Director Cawad.
Issue:
WON Cena is still good law - NO
Ratio:
Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a
considerably higher degree of detail in the
statute to be implemented, went against
prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the
governing or enabling statute is quite detailed
and specific to begin with, there would be very
little need (or occasion) for implementing
administrative regulations. It is, however,
precisely the inability of legislative bodies to
anticipate all (or many) possible detailed
situations in respect of any relatively complex
subject matter, that makes subordinate,
delegated rule-making by administrative
agencies so important and unavoidable. All that
may be reasonably; demanded is a showing that
the delegated legislation consisting of
administrative regulations are germane to the
general purposes projected by the governing or
enabling statute.
People v. Jalosjos, April 22, 2000, Vital-
Gozon, J.
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a
full-fledged member of Congress who is
confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and
acts of lasciviousness on six count is pending
appeal.
The accused-appellant filed this motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties
of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
Issue:
WON Jalosjos should be allowed to attend
sessionsin Congress – NO
Ratio:
The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a
crime punishable by imprisonment of more than
six months is not merely authorized by law, it
has constitutional foundations.
One rationale behind confinement, whether
pending appeal or after final conviction, is
public self-defense. Society must protect itself.
It also serves as an example and warning to
others.
A person charged with crime is taken into
custody for purposes of the administration of
justice.
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the
electorate which voted him into office cannot be
supplanted by unfounded fears that he might
escape eventual punishment if permitted to
perform congressional duties outside his regular
place of confinement.
What the Jalosjos seeks is not of an emergency
nature. Allowing him to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for five (5)
days or more in a week will virtually make him
a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to
his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates his status to that of a special class, it
also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system.
Neri v. Senate, March 25, 2008, Leonardo-De
Castro, J.
Facts:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project
: Businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that
several high executive officials and power
brokers were using their influence to push the
approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. It
appeared that the Project was initially approved
as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but,
on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to
convert it into a government-to-government
project, to be financed through a loan from the
Chinese Government.
Petitioner testified before respondent
Committees for 11 hours. He disclosed that then
Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, s to the following subjects, he refused
to answer: a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not
she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether
or not she directed him to approve.
Issue:
WON the communications elicited by the
subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege? YES
Ratio:
Using the elements found in three US cases
(Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch),
SC is convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege.
 First, the protected communication must
relate to a quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power. The
communications relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable power
of the President, i.e. the power to enter
into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
 Second, the communication must be
authored or solicited and received by a
close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is
that an advisor must be in operational
proximity with the President.
 Third, the presidential communications
privilege remains a qualified privilege
that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information
sought likely contains important
evidence and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
 A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner
is not an unwilling witness. He manifested
several times his readiness to testify before
respondent Committees. He refused to
answer the three (3) questions because he
was ordered by the President to claim
executive privilege. It behooves respondent
Committees to first rule on the claim of
executive privilege and inform petitioner of
their finding thereon, instead of
peremptorily dismissing his explanation as
unsatisfactory. Undoubtedly,
respondent Committees actions constitute gr
ave abuse of discretion for
being arbitrary and for denying petitioner du
e process of law. The same quality afflicted
their conduct when they (a) disregarded
petitioners motion for reconsideration
alleging that he had filed the present petition
before this Court and (b) ignored petitioners
repeated request for an advance list of
questions, if there be any aside from the
three (3) questions as to which he claimed to
be covered by executive privilege.
Even the courts are repeatedly advised to
exercise the power of contempt judiciously
and sparingly with utmost self-restraint with
the end in view of utilizing the same for
correction and preservation of the dignity of
the court, not for retaliation or vindication.
Respondent Committees should have
exercised the same restraint, after all
petitioner is not even an ordinary witness.
He holds a high position in a co-equal
branch of government.
TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL
RELATIONS
Achacoso v. Macaraig; March 13, 1991; Cruz,
J.
Facts:
Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) on October 16, 1987,
and assumed office on October 27, 1987. On
January 2, 1990, in compliance with a request
addressed by the President of the Philippines to
"all Department Heads, Undersecretaries,
Assistant Secretaries, Bureau Heads," and other
government officials, he filed a courtesy
resignation.
This was accepted by the President on April 3,
1990, "with deep regrets." On April 10, 1990,
the Secretary of Labor requested him to turn
over his office to the Deputy Administrator as
officer in-charge.
In a letter dated April 19, 1990, he protested his
replacement and declared he was not
surrendering his office because his resignation
was not voluntary but filed only in obedience to
the President's directive.
On the same date, respondent Jose N. Sarmiento
was appointed Administrator of the POEA, vice
the petitioner. Achacoso was informed thereof
the following day and was again asked to vacate
his office. He filed a motion for reconsideration
on April 23, 1990, but this was denied on April
30, 1990. He then came to this Court for relief.
Achacoso filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus, this Court is asked to annul the
appointment of Sarmiento and to prohibit the
respondents from preventing the petitioner from
discharging his duties as Administrator of the
POEA.
Achacoso contends: that he is a member of the
Career Service of the Civil Service and so
enjoys security of tenure, which is one of the
characteristics of the Career Service as
distinguished from the Non-Career Service.
Claiming to have the rank of undersecretary, he
says he comes under Article IV, Section 5 of
P.D. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service
Decree, which includes in the Career Service.
3. Positions in the Career Executive
Service; namely, Undersecretary,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional
Director, Assistant Regional Director,
Chief of Department Service and other
 officers of equivalent rank as may be
identified by the Career Executive
Service Board, all of whom are
appointed by the President.
The respondents contend that as the petitioner
was not a career executive service eligible at the
time of his appointment, he came under the
exception to the above rule and so was subject to
the provision that he "shall subsequently take the
required Career Executive Service examination
and that he shall not be promoted to a higher
rank until he qualifies in such examination." Not
having taken that examination, he could not
claim that his appointment was permanent and
guaranteed him security of tenure in his position.
Issue:
WON Petitioner is a career official and is
entitled to security of tenure – No
Ratio:
 It is settled that a permanent appointment
can be issued only "to a person who meets
all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed." Achacoso
did not.
 At best, therefore, his appointment could be
regarded only as temporary. And being so, it
could be withdrawn at will by the appointing
authority and "at a moment's notice,"
conformably to established jurisprudence.
 The mere fact that a position belongs to the
Career Service does not automatically
confer security of tenure on its occupant
even if he does not possess the required
qualifications. Such right will have to
depend on the nature of his appointment,
which in turn depends on his eligibility or
lack of it.
 A person who does not have the requisite
qualifications for the position cannot be
appointed to it in the first place or, only as
an exception to the rule, may be appointed
to it merely in an acting capacity in the
absence of appropriate eligibles.
 The purpose of an acting or temporary
appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the
discharge of official functions by
authorizing a person to discharge the same
pending the selection of a permanent or
another appointee.
 The person named in an acting capacity
accepts the position under the condition that
he shall surrender the office once he is
called upon to do so by the appointing
authority.
 One who holds a temporary appointment has
no fixed tenure of office; his employment
can be terminated at the pleasure of the
appointing power, there being no need the
show that the termination is for cause.
 The petitioner contends that his appointment
was really intended to be permanent because
temporary appointments are not supposed to
exceed twelve months and he was allowed
to serve in his position for more than three
years.
 This is unacceptable. Even if that intention
were assumed, it would not by itself alone
make his appointment permanent. Such an
appointment did not confer on the petitioner
the appropriate civil service eligibility he did
not possess at the time he was appointed,
nor did it vest him with the right to security
of tenure that is available only to permanent
appointees.
 In the case at bar, the petitioner was not
eligible and therefore could be appointed at
best only in a temporary capacity
 It should be obvious from all the above
observations that the petitioner could have
been validly replaced even if he had not
filed his courtesy resignation. We therefore
do not have to rule on its legality. Suffice it
to say that it could have been a graceful way
of withdrawing him from his office with all
the formal amenities and no asperity or
discord if only he had not chosen to contest
it. But it was his right to do so, of course,
although his challenge has not succeeded.
Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan; March 25, 1999;
Bellosilio, J.
Facts: Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the
Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque,
while his son, his co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz,
was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang
Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang,
Municipality of Santa Cruz, and concurrently a
member of its Sangguniang Bayan (SB)
representing the Federation of Kabataang
Barangays.
In the 1985 election for the Kabataang Barangay
Jowil Red won as KB Chairman of Barangay
Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Parenthetically, Lenlie
Lecaroz did not run as candidate in this electoral
exercise as he was no longer qualified for the
position after having already passed the age limit
fixed by law
Red was appointed by then President Ferdinand
Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the
municipality. Imee Marcos-Manotoc, then the
National Chairperson of the organization, sent a
telegram to Red confirming his appointment and
advising him further that copies of his
appointment papers would be sent to him in due
time through the KB Regional Office. Red
received the telegram on 2 January 1986 and
showed it immediately to Mayor Francisco M.
Lecaroz.
Armed with the telegram and intent on assuming
the position of sectoral representative of the KBs
to the SB, Red attended the meeting of the
Sanggunian upon the invitation of one of its
members, Kagawad Rogato Lumawig. In that
meeting, Mayor Francisco M. Lecaroz informed
Red that he could not yet sit as member of the
municipal council until his appointment had
been cleared by the Governor of Marinduque.
Red finally received his appointment papers
sometime in January 1986. But it was only on 23
April 1986, when then President Corazon C.
Aquino was already in power, that he forwarded
these documents to Mayor Lecaroz. This
notwithstanding, Red was still not allowed by
the mayor to sit as sectoral representative in the
Sanggunian.
Meanwhile, Mayor Lecaroz prepared and
approved on different dates the payment to
Lenlie Lecaroz of twenty-six (26) sets of
payrolls for the twenty-six (26) quincenas
covering the period 16 January 1986 to 30
January 1987. Lenlie Lecaroz signed the payroll
for 1-15 January 1986 and then authorized
someone else to sign all the other payrolls for
the succeeding quincenas and claim the
corresponding salaries in his behalf.
On 25 October 1989, or three (3) years and nine
(9) months from the date he received his
appointment papers from President Marcos, Red
was finally able to secure from the Aquino
Administration a confirmation of his
appointment as KB Sectoral Representative to
the Sanggunian Bayan of Santa Cruz.
Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
several criminal complaints against Mayor
Francisco Lecaroz and Lenlie Lecaroz arising
from the refusal of the two officials to let him
assume the position of KB sectoral
representative. After preliminary investigation,
the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan
thirteen (13) Informations for estafa through
falsification of public documents against
petitioners, and one (1) Information for violation
of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against Mayor
Lecaroz alone.
The Sandiganbayan found the 2 accused guilty
on all counts of estafa, however, with respect to
the violation of Sec. 3(e), of RA 3019, SB
acquitted Francisco. It found that Red was
neither authorized to sit as member of the SBay
because he was not properly appointed thereto
nor had he shown to the mayor sufficient basis
for his alleged right to a seat in the municipal
council. Thus, Francisco was legally justified in
not allowing Red to assume the position of
Kagawad.
Issue:
WON Mayor Lecaroz erred in not allowing Red
to assume his position – NO
Ratio:
 The basic propositions upon which the
Sandiganbayan premised its conviction of
the accused are: (a) although Red was duly
elected KB Chairman he could not validly
assume a seat in the Sanggunian as KB
sectoral representative for failure to show a
valid appointment; and, (b) Lenlie who was
the incumbent KB representative could not
hold over after his term expired because
pertinent laws do not provide for holdover.
 Petitioner argument: Red failed to qualify as
KB sectoral representative since he did not
present an authenticated copy of his
appointment papers; neither did he take a
valid oath of office. Resultantly, this enabled
Lenlie to continue as member of the SB
although in a holdover capacity since his
term had already expired.
 The concept of holdover when applied to a
public officer implies that the office has a
fixed term and the incumbent is holding
onto the succeeding term. It is usually
provided by law that officers elected or
appointed for a fixed term shall remain in
office not only for that term but until their
successors have been elected and qualified
 The law abhors a vacuum in public offices,
and courts generally indulge in the strong
presumption against a legislative intent to
create, by statute, a condition which may
result in an executive or administrative
office becoming, for any period of time,
wholly vacant or unoccupied by one
lawfully authorized to exercise its functions.
This is founded on obvious considerations of
public policy, for the principle of holdover is
specifically intended to prevent public
convenience from suffering because of a
vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the
performance of government functions.
 Sandiganbayan: by taking his oath of office
before Reyes in 1985, Red validly assumed
the KB presidency upon the expiration of
the term of Lenlie.
 However, under the provisions of the
Administrative Code then in force,
specifically Sec. 21, Art. VI, members of the
then Batasang Pambansa were not
authorized to administer oaths. It was only
after the approval of RA No. 6733 on 25
July 1989 and its subsequent publication in a
newspaper of general circulation that
members of both Houses of Congress were
vested for the first time with the general
authority to administer oaths. Clearly, the
oath taken by Red before a member of the
Batasang Pambansa who had no authority to
administer oaths, was invalid and amounted
to no oath at all.
 To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying
requirement for a public office; a
prerequisite to the full investiture with the
office. Only when the public officer has
satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his
right to enter into the position becomes
plenary and complete. Until then, he has
none at all. And for as long as he has not
qualified, the holdover officer is the rightful
occupant.
 Thus, since Red never qualified for the post,
Lenlie remained KB representative, albeit in
a holdover capacity, and was in every aspect
a de jure officer, or at least a de facto officer
entitled to receive the salaries and all the
emoluments appertaining to the position. As
such, he could not be considered an intruder
and liable for encroachment of public office.
WON Petitioners should be held liable for estafa
– NO
 When Red showed up at the Sanggunuan
meeting, what he presented to Mayor
Francisco was a mere telegram sent by Imee
informing him of his supposed appointment,
together with a photocopy of a "Mass
Appointment." Without authenticated copies
of the appointment papers, Red had no right
to assume office, and Francisco had every
right to withhold recognition.
 Although Red received his appointment
papers signed by Pres. Marcos in January
1986, he forwarded the same to Mayor
Francisco only on 23 April 1986 during
which time Marcos had already been
deposed and Aquino had already taken over.
On 25 March 1986 the Freedom
 Constitution came into being providing in
Sec. 2 of Art. III thereof that –
o Sec. 2. All elective and
appointive officials and
employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in
office until otherwise provided
by proclamation or executive
order or upon the designation of
their successors if such
appointment is made within a
period of one (1) year from
February 26, 1986.
 Duty bound to observe the constitutional
mandate, Francisco through the provincial
governor forwarded the papers of Red to
then Minister of Interior and Local
Government Pimentel, Jr., requesting advice
on the validity of the appointment signed by
Marcos.
 In ascribing malice and bad faith, SB cited 2
circumstances which purportedly indicated
criminal intent. It pointed out that Lenlie
was not in the municipal payroll for the first
quincena of 1986 which meant that his term
had finally ended, and that the reinstatement
of Lenlie by Francisco in the payroll periods
from 15 January 1986 and thereafter for the
next 12 -1/2 months was for no other
purpose than to enable him to draw salaries
from the municipality.
 There is however no evidence, documentary
or otherwise, that Francisco himself caused
the name of Lenlie to be dropped from the
payroll for the first quincena of January
1986. On the contrary, it is significant that
while Lenlie’s name did not appear in the
payroll for the first quincena, yet, in the
payroll for the next quincena Lenlie was
paid for both the first and second quincenas,
and not merely for the second half of the
month which would have been the case if he
was actually "dropped" from the payroll for
the first 15 days and then "reinstated" in the
succeeding payroll period, as held by the
court a quo.
 From all indications, it is possible that the
omission was due to the inadequate
documentation of Red's appointment to and
assumption of office, or the result of a mere
clerical error which was later rectified in the
succeeding payroll. This however cannot be
confirmed by the evidence at hand. But
since a doubt is now created about the
import of such omission, the principle of
equipoise should properly apply. This rule
demands that all reasonable doubt intended
to demonstrate error and not a crime should
be resolved in favor of the accused. If the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction
 For the offense to be established, the
following elements must concur: (a) the
offender makes in a document
statements in a narration of facts; (b) the
offender has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated;
(c) the facts narrated by the offender are
absolutely false; and, (d) the perversion
of truth in the narration of facts was
made with the wrongful intent of
injuring a third person.
 The 1st and 3rd elements of the offense
have not been established in this case. In
approving the payment of salaries to
Lenlie, Francisco signed uniformly-
worded certifications thus –
o I hereby certify on my official
oath that the above payroll is
correct, and that the services
above stated have been duly
rendered. Payment for such
services is also hereby approved
from the appropriations
indicated.
 When Francisco certified to the
correctness of the payroll, he was
making not a narration of facts but a
conclusion of law expressing his belief
that Lenlie was legally holding over as
member of the Sanggunian and thus
entitled to the emoluments attached to
the position. This is an opinion
undoubtedly involving a legal matter,
and any "misrepresentation" of this kind
 cannot constitute the crime of false
pretenses.
 These are not legally acceptable indicia,
for they are the very same acts alleged
in the Informations as constituting the
crime of estafa through falsification.
They cannot qualify as proof of
complicity or unity of criminal intent.
Conspiracy must be established
separately from the crime itself and
must meet the same degree of proof, i.e.,
proof beyond reasonable doubt. While
conspiracy need not be established by
direct evidence, for it may be inferred
from the conduct of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the
crime, all taken together however, the
evidence must reasonably be strong
enough to show community of criminal
design.
 Perhaps subliminally aware of the
paucity of evidence to support it, and if
only to buttress its finding of
conspiracy, the Sandiganbayan stressed
that the two accused are father and son.
Granting that this is not even ad
hominem, we are unaware of any
presumption in law that a conspiracy
exists simply because the conspirators
are father and son or related by blood.
Gloria v. De Guzman; October 6, 1995;
Hermosisima, Jr.,J.
Facts:
Private respondents were employees of the
Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics
(PAFCA) which was created by virtue of PD
1078. Under the said decree, the Board of
Trustees is vested with authority, among others,
to appoint, as it did appoint, officials and
employees of the college, except the members of
the Board of Trustees themselves and the
President of the college.
In line with this authority, the PAFCA Board of
Trustees issued Resolution No. 91-026, which
declared that "All faculty/administrative
employees are also subject to the required civil
service eligibilities", in accordance with
pertinent civil service law, rules and regulations.
Thus, private respondents were issued only
temporary appointments because at the time of
their appointment, they lacked appropriate civil
service eligibilities or otherwise failed to meet
the necessary qualification standards for their
respective positions.
Private respondent Ms. Cerillo, specifically, was
issued a one-year temporary appointment to the
position of Board Secretary II of PAFCA, that
is, from Jan 1, 1992 to Dec 31, 1992. This
appointment went along the line enunciated by
the CSC in a letter, which emphasized that
temporary appointments were good and
renewable only up to 1992, to wit:
o Please note that temporary appointments
last only for a maximum of one (1) year
and all personnel appointed in a
temporary capacity can be replaced any
time by a civil service eligible. Since
you have just been recently covered by
the Civil Service Law and rules, this
Field Office approved all your
temporary appointments subject to
yearly renewal up to 1992 only.
Subsequent appointments should strictly
conform with civil service policies. You
may, therefore, advise all your
temporary personnel to take civil service
examinations in order to be eligible for
appointment
Mar 24, 1992, Cerillo was relieved as Board
Secretary in accordance with Board Resolution
No. 92-017 by reason of loss of confidence.
Subsequently, however, she was designated as
"Coordinator for Extension Services".
Then, RA 7605 was enacted into law which
converted PAFCA into a state college to be
known as the Philippine State College of
Aeronautics (PSCA). The Board of Trustees
likewise was the governing body of the PSCA.
The power to make appointments was retained
by the Board. Petitioner Col. Loleng, remained
as Officer-in-Charge by virtue of a designation
made anew by then DECS Secretary Isidro
Cariño on June 8, 1992.
Only on December 7, 1992 did Col. Loleng
inform private respondents that they shall be
deemed separated from the service upon the
expiration of their temporary appointments. Had
Cerillo not been summarily dismissed as Board
Secretary, her temporary appointment as such
was supposed to have lasted until Dec 31, 1992.
Barely five months after the lapse of the terms of
their temporary appointments as determined by
the PSCA administration, the private
respondents filed with the RTC, a petition for
Mandamus and Reinstatement, with Back
Wages and Damages". The complaint prayed
that then DECS Secretary Fabella complete the
filling up of positions for Board of Trustees and
order the Board of Trustees to reinstate the
respondents in the case at bench to their
respective positions.
Petitioners opposed the petition upon the ground
that mandamus will not lie to compel
reinstatement because the reappointment prayed
for is discretionary on the part of the appointing
power. Besides, it was the claim of Secretary
Fabella that a writ of mandamus should be
unavailing to private respondents because of
their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
RTC ruled in favor of Cerillo.
Issue:
WON Cerillo is entitled to reinstatement the
position of "Coordinator for Extension
Services"– NO
Ratio:
 The RTC decision is patently improper
because it finds no support as to facts and
the law. Cerillo, although temporarily
extended an appointment as Board Secretary
II, was dismissed therefrom because of loss
of confidence. This dismissal was neither
contested nor appealed from by her. There is
no question, therefore, that her dismissal as
Board Secretary II could not have been the
subject of the petition for mandamus and
reinstatement filed before respondent Judge.
The fact is that private respondent's
assignment as "Coordinator for Extension
Services" was a mere designation. Not being
a permanent appointment, the designation to
the position cannot be the subject of a case
for reinstatement.
 Furthermore, even granting that Cerillo
could be validly reinstated as "Coordinator
for Extension Services", her reinstatement
thereto would not be possible because the
position is not provided for in the PSCA
plantilla. The PSCA could not have made
any valid appointment for this inexistent
position. This could very well be the reason
why she was merely designated as
Coordinator. As a mere designee, she could
not have acquired any right to the position
even if the position existed.
 A mere "designation" does not confer upon
the designee security of tenure in the
position or office which he occupies in an
acting capacity only.
 Should the object of Cerillo be her
reinstatement to the position of Board
Secretary II, the reinstatement prayed for
appears to be impermissible. In the first
place, Cerillo had already been dismissed
from this position for loss of confidence.
She did not contest this dismissal possibly
because the position of Board Secretary II is
primarily confidential and the Board of
Trustees, when finding her, the incumbent to
the position, to be wanting in faithfulness
and integrity dismissed her for that reason
alone. She accepted the dismissal without
any ripple and when designated as
Coordinator for Extension Services, she
indicated acceptance by performing the acts
called for by the designation.
 The quarrel between the private respondents,
on the one hand, and the PSCA
administration, on the other, came about in
this manner: The Civil Service Commission,
mandating a policy, wrote petitioner Col.
Loleng a letter mandating that temporary
appointments of officers/employees of the
PSCA were to last only up to December 31,
1992.
 The CSC letter was implemented by Col.
Loleng. Objecting thereto, private
respondents pointed out to the PSCA
administration that, in Resolution No. 91-
026, the Board of Trustees declared that all
faculty/administrative employees of the
college, while required to acquire civil
service eligibilities under pertinent civil
service law, rules and regulations, must
exert effort to acquire civil service
eligibilities within a period of 3 years from
their temporary appointments. This, they
believe should be taken to mean that, should
they acquire civil service eligibilities within
that period of 3 years, they can’t be
terminated from the service.
 The fact that Cerillo passed the requisite
Civil Service Examination after the
termination of her temporary appointment is
no reason to compel petitioners to reappoint
her. Acquisition of civil service eligibility is
not the sole factor for reappointment. Still to
be considered by the appointing authority
are: performance, degree of education, work
experience, training, seniority, and, more
importantly, as in this case, whether or not
the applicant enjoys the confidence and trust
of the appointing power.
 The position of Board Secretary II, by its
nature, is primarily confidential, requiring as
it does "not only confidence in the aptitude
of the appointee for the duties of the office
but primarily close intimacy which ensures
freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of
state." In other words, the choice of an
appointee from among those who possessed
the required qualifications is a political and
administrative decision calling for
considerations of wisdom, convenience,
utility and the interests of the service which
can best be made by the Head of the office
concerned.
 It cannot be overemphasized that the PSCA
Board Resolution No. 91-026 must yield to
the CSC policies on the issuance of
temporary appointments. When the CSC
directed that temporary appointments were
to be effective only up to 1992, it did so in
pursuance of the general purpose of the civil
service law, as stated under Section 2 of RA
2260, as amended, which is "to ensure and
promote the constitutional mandate
regarding appointments only according to
merit and fitness and to provide within the
public service a progressive system of
personal administration to ensure the
maintenance of an honest and efficient
progressive and courteous civil service in
the Philippines.
 For that matter, CSC is vested with the
function, among others, to promulgate
policies, standards and guidelines for the
civil service and adopt plans and programs
to promote economical, efficient and
effective personnel administration in the
government.
 We hold that reappointment to the position
of Board Secretary II is an act which is
discretionary on the part of the appointing
power. Consequently, it cannot be the
subject of an application for a writ of
mandamus.
 Reinstatement is technically issuance of a
new appointment which is essentially
discretionary, to be performed by the officer
in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. Such exercise of the
discretionary power of appointment cannot
be controlled, not even by the Court as long
as it is exercised properly by the appointing
authority.
 The order of reinstatement amounts to an
undue interference by the Court in the
exercise of the discretionary power of
appointment vested in the PSCA Board
Issue:
WON the termination of the services of private
respondents was proper and legal – YES
Ratio:
 It is the consequence of the Board of
Trustees' power to appoint. The view of
respondent Judge, however, is that there was
no termination ordered. Either the
employees' contracts lapsed or their
temporary appointments were abrogated by
 circulars from the CSC. This, as a necessary
consequence of the transition from the
Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics
(PAFCA) to the Philippine State College of
Aeronautics (PSCA).
 We agree with respondent Judge's
disquisition that there was no termination to
speak of. Termination presupposes an overt
act committed by a superior officer. There
was none whatsoever in the case at bar. At
most, Col. Loleng gave notice to the
petitioners of the expiration of their
respective contracts. Petitioners appointment
or employment simply expired either by its
very own terms, or because it may not
exceed one year, but most importantly
because the PAFCA was dissolved and
replaced by the PSCA. The notice given by
Col. Loleng to the petitioners seem to have
been misunderstood by them as an act of
dismissal which as they correctly state,
belongs to the Board of Trustees alone.
RESIGNATION
Ortiz v. Comelec, May 4, 1989, Regalado, J.
Facts:
Petitioner (Mario Ortiz) was appointed
Commissioner of COMELEC by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos “for a term expiring May
17, 1992.” He took his oath of office on July 30,
1985.
Petitioner sent President Corazon C. Aquino a
letter which reads as follows: “Following the
example of Honorable Justices of the Supreme
Court, on the premise that we have now a
revolutionary government, we hereby place our
position at your disposal.”
The Freedom Constitution was promulgated
through Proclamation No. 3, Artide III thereof
provides:
o SEC. 1. In the reorganization of the
government, priority shall be given
to measures to promote economy,
efficiency, and the eradication of
graft and corruption.
o SEC. 2. All elective and appointive
officials and employees under the
1973 Constitution shall continue in
office until otherwise provided by
proclamation or executive order or
upon the designation or appointment
and qualification of their successors,
if such is made within a period of
one year from February 25, 1986.
o SEC. 3. Any public officer or
employee separated from the service
as a result of the reorganization
effected under this Proclamation
shall, if entitled under the laws then
in force, receive the retirement and
other benefits accruing thereunder
Issue:
WON a constitutional official whose "courtesy
resignation" was accepted by the President of
the Philippines during the effectivity of the
Freedom Constitution may be entitled to
retirement benefits under Republic Act No.
1568, as amended—YES
Ratio:
Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or
the act of an officer by which he declines his
office and renounces the further right to use it.
Requisites a complete and operative act of
resignation:
o The officer or employee must show a
clear intention to relinquish or surrender
his position accompanied by the act of
relinquishment.
o Resignation implies an expression of the
incumbent in some form, express or
implied, of the intention to surrender,
renounce and relinquish the office, and
its acceptance by competent and lawful
authority.
From the foregoing it is evident that petitioner's
"resignation" lacks the element of clear intention
to surrender his position.
We cannot presume such intention from his
statement in his letter of March 5, 1986 that he
was placing his position at the disposal of the
President. He did not categorically state therein
that he was unconditionally giving up his
position. It should be remembered that said letter
was actually a response to Proclamation No. 1
which President Aquino issued on February
25,1986 when she called on all appointive public
officials to tender their "courtesy resignation" as
a "first step to restore confidence in public
administration.
Estrada v. Arroyo, March 2, 2001, Puno, J.
Facts:
January 20 2001: The day of surrender. At 12:20
a.m., the first round of negotiations for the
peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at
Malacañang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the
Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara,
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon
Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo,
Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty.
Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential
Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner.
Respondent Arroyo was represented by now
Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now
Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now
Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.27 Outside
the palace, there was a brief encounter at
Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada
protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and
caused minor injuries. The negotiations
consumed all morning until the news broke out
that Chief Justice Davide would administer the
oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the
EDSA Shrine.
o At about 12:00 noon, Chief
Justice Davide administered the
oath to respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines.
o At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his
family hurriedly left
Malacañang Palace. He issued
the following press statement:
“x x x While along with many other
legal minds of our country, I have
strong and serious doubts about the
legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not
wish to be a factor that will prevent
the restoration of unity and order in
our civil society. It is for this reason
that I now leave Malacañang Palace,
the seat of the presidency of this
country, for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of
our nation. I leave the Palace of our
people with gratitude for the
opportunities given to me for
service to our people. I will not
shirk from any future challenges
that may come ahead in the same
service of our country.”
On the same day: He signed the following letter:
“Sir: By virtue of the provisions of Section 11,
Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to
exercise the powers and duties of my office. By
operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-
President shall be the Acting President.”
o 8:30 a.m. on January 20: A copy
of the letter was sent to Speaker
Fuentebella.
o Same day but 9:00 PM: The
same letter was sent to Senator
Pimentel
January 22: The Monday after taking her oath,
respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the
powers the duties of the Presidency. On the
same day, this Court issued the following
Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-
05-SC: Acting on the urgent request of Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn
in as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and
confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January
20, 2001, which request was treated as an
administrative matter, the court Resolve
unanimously to confirm the authority given by
the twelve (12) members of the Court then
present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001
to administer the oath of office of Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001. x x x
without prejudice to the disposition of any
justiciable case that may be filed by a proper
party.”
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her
Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special
envoys. Recognition of respondent Arroyo's
government by foreign governments swiftly
followed.
Issue:
WON Estrada is a President on leave - NO
Ratio:
As events approached January 20, we can have
an authoritative window on the state of mind of
the petitioner. The window is provided in the
"Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the
diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized
in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.
The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of
January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were
worried about the swelling of the crowd at
EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc
committee to handle it. Their worry would
worsen.
o 1:20 p.m.: Petitioner pulled
Secretary Angara into his small
office at the presidential
residence and exclaimed: "Ed,
seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si
Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is
serious. Angelo has defected.)"
o 2:30 p.m.: Petitioner decided to
call for a snap presidential
election and stressed he would
not be a candidate. The proposal
for a snap election for president
in May where he would not be a
candidate is an indicium that
petitioner had intended to give
up the presidency even at that
time.
o 3:00 p.m.: General Reyes joined
the sea of EDSA demonstrators
demanding the resignation of
the petitioner and dramatically
announced the AFP's
withdrawal of support from the
petitioner and their pledge of
support to respondent Arroyo.
The seismic shift of support left
petitioner weak as a president.
According to Secretary Angara,
he asked Senator Pimentel to
advise petitioner to consider the
option of "dignified exit or
resignation." Petitioner did not
disagree but listened intently.
The sky was falling fast on the
petitioner.
o 9:30 p.m.: Senator Pimentel
repeated to the petitioner the
urgency of making a graceful
and dignified exit. He gave the
proposal a sweetener by saying
that petitioner would be allowed
to go abroad with enough funds
to support him and his family.
Significantly, the petitioner
expressed no objection to the
suggestion for a graceful and
dignified exit but said he would
never leave the country.
o 10:00 p.m.: Petitioner revealed
to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie
(Reyes) guaranteed that I would
have five days to a week in the
palace." This is proof that
petitioner had reconciled
himself to the reality that he had
to resign. His mind was already
concerned with the five-day
grace period he could stay in the
palace. It was a matter of time.
o The pressure continued piling
up.
o 1:00 p.m.: Former President
Ramos called up Secretary
Angara and requested, "Ed,
magtulungan tayo para
magkaroon tayo ng (let's
cooperate to ensure a) peaceful
and orderly transfer of power."
 There was no defiance to the
request. Secretary Angara
readily agreed. Again, we note
that at this stage, the problem
was already about a peaceful
and orderly transfer of power.
The resignation of the petitioner
was implied.
The resignation of the petitioner cannot be
doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing
his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the
oath-taking of the respondent as President of
the Republic albeit with reservation about its
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving
the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. He did not say
he was leaving the Palace due to any kind
inability and that he was going to re-assume
the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to
the people for the opportunity to serve them.
Without doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the people as
President (4) he assured that he will not
shirk from any future challenge that may
come ahead in the same service of our
country. Petitioner's reference is to a future
challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he
called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity could not be attained if he did not
give up the presidency. The press release
was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of
farewell. His presidency is now in the past
tense.
Republic v. Singun, March 14, 2008, Carpio,
J Resignation implies an expression of the
Facts:
Respondent Singun wrote Director Hipolito
signifying his intention to apply for an 8 month
LOA starting 16 November 1999 until 31 July
2000 (first letter). Respondent also signified his
intention to retire from the service on 1 August
2000.
On 4 November 1999, respondent filed his
application for LOA and early retirement.
Director Hipolito denied the request.
4 days later, respondent again filed an
application for LOA and resignation. Director
Hipolito endorsed the application to Assistant
Secretary Maglaya.
Without waiting for Maglaya’s comment,
respondent again filed an application for LOA
but for a shorter period from 16 November 1999
until 14 January 2000 (2nd letter). He also
signified his intention to resign effective at the
close of office hours on 14 January 2000.
According to Hipolito, he immediately approved
respondents two-fold application and also
notified CSC Regional Director Jose T. Soria
(Atty. Soria) (CSC-RO2) of his acceptance of
respondents resignation.
14 January 2000: the DTI-RO2 received
Memorandum Order No. 20 issued by
Undersecretary Ordoez detailing respondent to
the Office of the Undersecretary for Regional
Operations effective 17 January 2000.
17 January 2000, the DTI-RO2 received
respondents 2nd letter informing Director
Hipolito that he was reconsidering his earlier
letter of resignation and that he decided to wait
until he could qualify for early retirement.
Issue:
WON Singun’s resignation was effective on
January 14- - NO
Ratio:
incumbent in some form, express or implied, of
the intention to surrender, renounce, and
relinquish the office and the acceptance by
competent and lawful authority. To constitute a
complete and operative resignation from public
office, there must be: (a) an intention to
relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of
relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the
proper authority.
In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for
resignation of a public officer to be operative
and effective. Without acceptance, resignation is
nothing and the officer remains in office.
Resignation to be effective must be accepted by
competent authority, either in terms or by
something tantamount to an acceptance, such as
the appointment of the successor. A public
officer cannot abandon his office before his
resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is
subject to the penal provisions of Article 238 of
the Revised Penal Code. The final or conclusive
act of a resignations acceptance is the notice of
acceptance. The incumbent official would not be
in a position to determine the acceptance of his
resignation unless he had been duly notified
therefor.
There was nothing in the records to show that
respondent was duly informed of the acceptance
of his resignation. There was no indication that
he received a copy of his 12 November 1999
application for LOA and resignation as accepted
by Hipolito. Neither was there any indication
that he received Hipolito’s Memo informing him
of the acceptance of his resignation. His
resignation was incomplete and inoperative
because he wasn’t notified of the acceptance
REMOVAL
Aquino v. CSC and Dela Paz; April 22, 1992;
Medialdea, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Victor A. Aquino, then holding the
position of Clerk II, Division of City Schools of
San Pablo City, was designated as Officer-in-
Charge of the Division Supply Office by the
DECS Regional Director Saturnino R. Magturo
in view of the retirement of the Supply Officer I,
Mr. Jose I. Aviquivil.
Prior to such designation, petitioner was
designated as Property Inspector and In-Charge
of the Supply Office performing the duties and
responsibilities of the Supply Officer I
Two years thereafter, the Division
Superintendent of City Schools of San Pablo
City, Milagros Tagle, issued a promotional
appointment to private respondent Leonarda D.
de la Paz as Supply Officer I in the DECS
Division of San Pablo City. compensation and
benefits therefor.
At the time of her appointment, private
respondent was then holding the position of
Clerk II, Division of City Schools of San Pablo
City. From August 25, 1976 to September 1983,
she was designated as Assistant to the Supply
Officer. The Civil Service Regional Office IV
approved her appointment as permanent
"provided that there is no pending administrative
case against the appointee, no pending protest
against the appointment, nor any decision by
competent authority that will adversely affect
the approval of (the) appointment"
One month after, petitioner filed a protest with
the DECS Secretary questioning the
qualification and competence of private
respondent for the position of Supply Officer I.
DECS Sec: Revoked appointment of Resp. Dela
Paz. MR Denied
Aquino was thus issued a permanent
appointment as Supply Officer I by the DECS
Regional Director Pedro San Vicente effective
October 26, 1987. On the date of effectivity of
his appointment, petitioner assumed the duties
and functions of the position. The said
appointment was approved by the Civil Service
Regional Office IV
Private respondent appealed to public
respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC).
CSC: Revoked the appointment of petitioner
Aquino and restoring private respondent de la
Paz to her position as Supply Officer I, DECS,
Division of San Pablo City under her previously
approved appointment
Issue:
WON public respondent Civil Service
Commission committed grave abuse of
discretion in revoking the appointment of
petitioner Victor A. Aquino as Supply Officer I
in the DECS Division of San Pablo City as it
found private respondent Leonarda de la Paz
better qualified. - NO
Ratio:
 We have consistently applied the doctrine in
Luego v. CSC in many cases with similar
factual circumstances, but we see no
compelling reason to apply the same in the
instant case. In the cases cited above, We
ruled that the CSC has no authority to
revoke an appointment simply because it
(CSC) believed that another person is better
qualified than the appointee for it would
constitute an encroachment on the discretion
solely vested on the appointing authority.
 The situation is different as in the instant
case, where the CSC revoked the
appointment of the successful protestant,
petitioner herein, principally because the
right to security of tenure of the prior
appointee, private respondent herein, to the
contested position had already attached
 It must be noted that public respondent CSC
did not direct the appointment of a substitute
of its choice. It merely restored the
appointment of private respondent who was
first appointed to the contested position.
 The records show that private respondent
was issued a permanent appointment on
September 19, 1986 as Supply Officer I in
the DECS Division of San Pablo City
effective September 30, 1986.
o On the basis of the of said
appointment which was approved by
the Civil Service Regional Office
No. IV, private respondent assumed
and performed the duties and
functions of the position as Supply
Officer I and received the
compensation and benefits of the
said position in accordance with the
mandate of Section 9 par.(h) of the
Civil Service Law.
o In consonance with the doctrine laid
down in Villanueva v. Balallo, that
an appointment is complete when
the last act required of the
appointing power has been
performed, but later qualified in
Favis v. Rupisan, that the acts of the
head of a department or office
making the appointment and the
Commissioner of Civil Service
acting together, though not
concurrently, but consecutively, are
necessary to make an appointment
complete, the permanent
appointment extended to private
respondent, under the circumstances
of the case, is deemed complete. As
such, she is entitled to the protection
of the law against unjust removal.
 The conclusion of respondent Commission
in the questioned decision that private
respondent is more qualified than petitioner
merely supports the validity of the
restoration of private respondent to her
previously approved appointment
considering that she meets the prescribed
qualification standards required of the
position of Supply Officer I and the
appropriate civil service eligibility, to wit:
o EDUCATION: Bachelor's degree
with training in Supply Management
o EXPERIENCE: None required
o ELIGIBILITY: Supply Officer;
Career Service (Professional)
 It is well-settled that once an appointment is
issued and the moment the appointee
assumes a position in the civil service under
a completed appointment, he acquires a
legal, not merely equitable right (to the
position), which is protected not only by
statute, but also by the Constitution, and
cannot be taken away from him either by
revocation of the appointment, or by
removal, except for cause, and with previous
notice and hearing
 There is thus reasonable ground for the rule
that the moment the discretionary power of
appointment has been exercised and the
appointee assumed the duties and functions
of the position, the said appointment cannot
be revoked by the appointing authority on
the ground merely that the protestant is more
qualified than the first appointee, subject
however to the condition that the first
appointee should possess the minimum
qualifications required by law.
 Otherwise, the security of tenure guaranteed
by Article IX-B, Section 2 par. (3) of the
1987 Constitution would be rendered
meaningless if the appointing authority is
allowed to flip-flop in exercising its
discretionary power of appointment.
 We have defined the concept of "for cause"
in connection with removal of public
officers in the case of De los Santos v.
Mallare, as follows: "It means for reasons
which the law and sound public policy
recognized as sufficient warrant for removal,
that is legal cause, and not merely causes
which the appointing power in the exercise
of discretion may deem sufficient.
 It is implied that officers may not be
removed at the mere will of those vested
with the power of removal, or without any
cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to
and affect the administration of the office,
and must be restricted to something of a
substantial nature directly affecting the
rights and interests of the public."
 The ground relied upon by petitioner in his
protest that he is more qualified than private
respondent in terms of education, experience
and training does not fall within the meaning
of "for cause" contemplated by Article IX-
B, Section 2 par. (3) of the 1987
Constitution which would warrant the
revocation, if not removal, of the
appointment of private respondent. Neither
does it fall under the grounds of appeal
contemplated under Section 19 par. (6) of
the Civil Service Law (P.D. 807). Therefore,
the protest of petitioner did not adversely
affect the approval of the appointment of
private respondent
 Even on the assumption that the revocation
of private respondent's appointment was
validly exercised by DECS Secretary
Quisumbing, still the appointment extended
to petitioner was tainted with irregularity as
it was issued before the finality of the
decision on the protest in violation of CSC
Resolution No. 83-343 which prohibits the
issuance of an appointment to protestant
(petitioner) if the protest case is not yet
finally resolved, since there is no vacancy in
the position pending resolution of the protest
case.
 There can be no appointment to a non-
vacant position.
 The incumbent must first be legally
removed or his appointment validly
terminated. An appointment to an office
which is not vacant is null and void ab initio.
Fabella v. CA, November 27 1997,
Panganiban, J.
Facts:
Secretary Cariño filed administrative cases
against herein petitioner-appellees, who are
teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. At
the same time, Secretary Cariño ordered
petitioner-appellee to be placed under preventive
suspension.
Administrative hearings started. Petitioner-
appellees' counsel objected to the procedure
adopted by the committee and demanded that he
be furnished a copy of the guidelines adopted by
the committee for the investigation and
imposition of penalties. As he received no
response from the committee, counsel walked
out. Later, however, counsel, was able to obtain
a copy of the guidelines.
The teachers filed a an injunctive suit with the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, charging
the committee appointed by Secretary Cariño
with fraud and deceit and praying that it be
stopped from further investigating them and
from rendering any decision in the
administrative case. However, the trial court
denied them a restraining order.
They then amended their complaint and made it
one for certiorari and mandamus. They alleged
that the investigating committee was acting with
grave abuse of discretion because its guidelines
for investigation place the burden of proof on
them by requiring them to prove their innocence
instead of requiring Secretary Cariño and his
staff to adduce evidence to prove the charges
against the teachers.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring that
the dismissal of the teachers is not justified, it
being arbitrary and violative of the teacher's
right to due process. Due process must be
observed in dismissing the teachers because it
affects not only their position but also their
means of livelihood.
Issue:
WON teachers were denied due process of law -
YES
Ratio:
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670
known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, which specifically covers
administrative proceedings involving public
school teachers. Section 9 of said law expressly
provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be
composed of the school superintendent of the
division as chairman, a representative of the
local or any existing provincial or national
teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the
division.
 Sec. 9. Administrative Charges.
– Administrative charges
against a teacher shall be heard
initially by a committee
composed of the corresponding
School Superintendent of the
Division or a duly authorized
representative who would at
least have the rank of a division
supervisor, where the teacher
belongs, as chairman, a
representative of the local or, in
its absence, any existing
provincial or national teacher’s
organization and a supervisor of
the Division, the last two to be
designated by the Director of
Public Schools. The committee
shall submit its findings, and
recommendations to the
Director of Public Schools
within thirty days from the
termination of the hearings:
Provided, however, That where
the school superintendent is the
complainant or an interested
party, all the members of the
committee shall be appointed by
the Secretary of Education.”
The foregoing provisions implement the
Declaration of Policy of the statute; that is, to
promote the “terms of employment and career
prospects” of schoolteachers.
In the present case, the various committees
formed by DECS to hear the administrative
charges against private respondents did not
include “a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national
teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9
of RA 4670.
Accordingly, these committees were deemed to
have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all
proceedings undertaken by them were
necessarily void. They could not provide any
basis for the suspension or dismissal of private
respondents. The inclusion of a representative
of a teachers’ organization in these committees
was indispensable to ensure an impartial
tribunal. It was this requirement that would
have given substance and meaning to the right to
be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence
of procedural due process is embodied in the
basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard. Petitioners’ say: DECS
complied with Section 9 of RA 4670, because
“all the teachers who were members of the
various committees are members of either the
Quezon City Secondary Teachers Federation or
the Quezon City Elementary Teachers
Federation” and are deemed to be the
representatives of a teachers’ organization as
required by Section 9 of RA 4670.
Aguinaldo v. Santos, August 21, 1992, Nocon,
J.
Facts:
Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the
province of Cagayan, having been elected to
said position during the local elections held on
January 17, 1988
After the December 1989 coup d'etat was
crushed, respondent Secretary of Local
Government (SILG) Santos sent a telegram and
a letter, both dated December 4, 1989, to
petitioner requiring him to show cause why he
should not be suspended or removed from office
Mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao
and Lasam, all in Cagayan, filed complaints for
against petitioner for disloyalty to the Republic
and culpable violation of the Constitution, for
acts the latter committed during the coup
Petitioner denied being privy to the planning of
the coup or actively participating in its
execution, though he admitted that he was
sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers
Secretary suspended petitioner from office for
sixty (60) days Secretary rendered the
questioned decision finding petitioner guilty as
charged and ordering his removal from office.
Aguinaldo filed this petition for certiorari and
prohibition
While this case was pending before this Court,
petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of Governor of Cagayan for the
1992 Elections
Three Petitions for DQ were filed against him on
the ground that he had been removed from office
As petitioner won by a landslide margin in the
elections, the resolution paved the way for his
eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
Issue:
WON the condonation doctrine is still in effect -
YES
Ratio:
 Considering the facts narrated, the
expiration of petitioner's term of office
during which the acts charged were
allegedly committed, and his subsequent
reelection, the petition must be dismissed for
the reason that the issue has become
academic.
 The rule is that a public official can not be
removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation
of the officer's previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds
no application to criminal cases pending
against petitioner for acts he may have
committed during the failed coup.
Carpio-Morales v. CA and Binay, November
15, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts:
Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas “Ching”
Enciso VI filed a complaint against Junjun and
other Makati City employees for Plunder and
Graft and Corruption in connection with the five
(5) phases of the procurement and construction
of the Makati City Hall Parking Building
(Makati Parking Building).
Ombudsman eventually charged them with six
(6) administrative cases for Grave Misconduct,
Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6)
criminal cases 18 for violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and
Falsification of Public Documents.
Junjun filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA seeking to nullify the preventive suspension
order. He contends that could not be held
administratively liable for any anomalous
activity attending any of the five (5) phases of
the Makati Parking Building project since:
(a) Phases I and II were undertaken
before he was elected Mayor of
Makati in 2010; and
(b) Phases III to V transpired during
his first term and that his reelection
as City Mayor of Makati for a
second term effectively condoned
his administrative liability therefor,
if any, thus rendering the
administrative cases against him
moot and academic.
Issue:
WON the condonation doctrine is applicable -
NO
Ratio:
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the
approach in dealing with public officers
underwent a significant change. The new charter
introduced an entire article on accountability of
public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1
thereof positively recognized, acknowledged,
and declared that public office is a public trust.
Enter the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
in Article II that “the State shall maintain
honesty and integrity in the public service and
take positive and effective measures against
graft and corruption.”
The 1987 Constitution strengthened and
solidified what has been first proclaimed in the
1973 Constitution by commanding public
officers to be accountable to the people at all
times:
o Section 1. Public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency and act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.
o This is reiterated in the Revised
Admin Code and in the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.
In contrast, Section 66(b) of the LGC states that
the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the
unexpired term of the elective local official nor
constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as
he meets the qualifications
o Nothing therein states that the
administrative liability therefor is
extinguished by the fact of
reelection
Therefore, the condonation doctrine is
abandoned. Nut it will not apply to Binay
because abandonment is prospective in nature.
Gloria v. Court of Appeals, April 21, 1999,
Mendoza, J.
Facts:
Private respondents (public school teachers)
did not report for work during the teachers’
strikes. They were administratively charged
with grave misconduct, gross neglect of
duty, etc. The investigation was concluded
before the lapse of their 90-day suspension.
They were found guilty as charged. Nicanor
Margallo (Respondent) was ordered
dismissed, while 3 others were suspended
for 6 months.
Issue:
WON compensation was due for the period of
the preventive suspension pending investigation
– NO
WON compensation was due for the period of
preventive suspension pending appeal – YES.
Ratio:
Preventive suspension pending investigation is
not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable
the disciplining authority to investigate charges
against respondent by preventing the latter from
intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses
against him. If the investigation is not finished
and a decision is not rendered within that period,
the suspension will be lifted and the respondent
will automatically be reinstated. If after
investigation respondent is found innocent of the
charges and is exonerated, he should be
reinstated.
Preventive suspension pending investigation is
not a penalty but only a means of enabling the
disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered
investigation.
On the other hand, preventive suspension
pending appeal is actually punitive although it is
in effect subsequently considered illegal if
respondent is exonerated and the administrative
decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence,
he should be reinstated with full pay for the
period of suspension.
Sec.47(4) states that respondent “shall be
considered as under preventive suspension
during the pendency of the appeal in the event
he wins.” On the other hand, if his conviction is
affirmed, i.e., if he is not exonerated, the period
of his suspension becomes part of the final
penalty of suspension or dismissal.
It is precisely because respondent is penalized
before his sentence is confirmed that he should
be paid his salaries in the event he is exonerated.
It would be unjust to deprive him of his pay as a
result of the immediate execution of the decision
against him and continue to do so even after it is
shown that he is innocent of the charges for
which he was suspended.
Secretary of Education v. Court of Appeals,
October 4, 2000,Purisima, J.
Facts:
Petitioners are public school teachers from
various schools in the National Capital Region
who incurred unauthorized absences in
connection with or in furtherance of their then
on-going "mass action" held sometime in
September 1990.
Confronted with the strike which threatened to
disrupt classes in public schools, former
Secretary Isidro Cariño of DECS issueda
Memorandum ordering them (subject public
school teachers) to return to work under pain of
dismissal.
o This (the memo) was ignored,
prompting the DECS Secretary to
lodge administrative complaints
against them.
Petitioners were given five (5) days from receipt
of the formal charge to answer the same.
They were also given an option to elect a formal
investigation and were informed of their right to
avail of the assistance of a lawyer of their
choice, but despite the time, aforesaid option and
right afforded them, they failed to answer the
charges.
Issue:
WON backwages should be deleted – YES
Ratio:
Evidently, the ruling of the Court of Appeals
that the public school teachers involved are
"entitled to back salaries for the period they
were not allowed to teach, except for the six (6)
months period during which they were
suspended for cause", does not accord with
prevailing jurisprudence. Stare decisis et non
quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled.
It is a salutary and necessary judicial practice
that when a court has laid down a principle of
law applicable to a certain state of facts, it must
adhere to such principle and apply it to all future
cases in which the facts sued upon are WON Ombudsman has jurisdiction – YES
substantially the same.
Ratio:
It is beyond cavil that the public school teachers
There is nothing in the Local Government Code
before the Court participated in the September
to indicate that it has repealed, whether
1990 mass actions and refused to obey the return
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions
to work order of the DECS Secretary.
of the Ombudsman Act.
It is equally undisputed that they were not
The two statutes on the specific matter in
completely exculpated of the charges against
question are not so inconsistent, let alone
them, as they were adjudged guilty of
irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold
committing acts prejudicial to the best interest of
one and strike down the other.
the service. Consequently, with the ground for
their suspension duly stated, the denial of their o Well settled is the rule that
prayer for exoneration and payment of back repeals of laws by
wages is in order. implication are not favored,
and that courts must
generally assume their
Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, December 12, 1995, congruent application. The
two laws must be absolutely
Vitug, J.
incompatible, and a clear
Facts: finding thereof must
surface, before the inference
Criminal and administrative complaints against of implied repeal may be
respondents (Mandaue Mayor Alfredo Ouano, drawn.
Mandaue Vice-Mayor Paterno Cañete and o The rule is expressed in the
Mandaue City Councilors Rafael Mayol) were maxim, interpretare et
filed by complainants (Mandaue City concordare leqibus est
Councilors Magno Dionson and Gaudiosa optimus interpretendi, i.e.,
Bercede) with the petitioner Office of the every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.
accord with other laws as to
Respondents were charged with having violated form a uniform system of
RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), jurisprudence. The
RPC 170 (falsification of legislative documents), fundament is that the
RPC 171 (falsification by public officer), and legislature should be
presumed to have known
RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
the existing laws on the
Standards of Public Officials and Employees). subject and not to have
The respondents argue that the Ombudsman is enacted conflicting statutes.
bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the Hence, all doubts must be
administrative case filed against them since, resolved against any
implied repeal, and all
under Section 63 of the Local Government Code
efforts should be exerted in
of 1991, the power to investigate and impose order to harmonize and give
administrative sanctions against said local effect to all laws on the
officials, as well as to effect their preventive subject.
suspension, had now been vested with the Office o Certainly, Congress would
of the President. not have intended to do
injustice to the very reason
Issue:
 that underlies the creation of
the Ombudsman in the 1987
Constitution which is to
insulate said office from the
long tentacles of
officialdom.
Quite interestingly, Sections 61 and 63 of the
present Local Government Code run almost
parallel with the provisions then existing under
the old code. The authority to conduct
administrative investigation and to impose
preventive suspension over elective provincial or
city officials was at that time entrusted to the
Minister of Local Government until it became
concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the
enactment of RA 6770, specifically under
Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the
common grant. The Local Government Code of
1991, in fine, did not effect a change from what
already prevailed, the modification being only in
the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of
Local Government by the Office of the
President.
The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Don
Mariano Marcos v. Martinez, March 3, 2008,
Chico-Nazario, J.
Facts:
Respondent Martinez is the incumbent Punong
Barangay of the said local government unit.
Martinez was administratively charged with
Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by
petitioner through the filing of a verified
complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan as the
disciplining authority over
elective barangay officials pursuant to Section
61 of LGC.
The Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision
which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of
removal from office. This was conveyed to the
Municipal Mayor of Bayombong, Nueva Ecija,
Severino Bagasao, for its implementation.
Issue:
WON respondent may be removed from office
by the SB – NO
Ratio:
Section 60 of LGC: “Grounds for Disciplinary
Actions. An elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office
on any of the following grounds
An elective local official may be removed
from office on the grounds enumerated
above by order of the proper court.”
The rule which confers to the proper courts the
power to remove an elective local official from
office is intended as a check against any
capriciousness or partisan activity by the
disciplining authority. Vesting the local
legislative body with the power to decide
whether or not a local chief executive may be
removed from office, and only relegating to the
courts a mandatory duty to implement the
decision, would still not free the resolution of
the case from the capriciousness or partisanship
of the disciplining authority.
Congress clearly meant that the removal of an
elective local official be done only after a trial
before the appropriate court, where court rules
of procedure and evidence can ensure
impartiality and fairness and protect against
political maneuverings. Elevating the removal of
an elective local official from office from an
administrative case to a court case may be
justified by the fact that such removal not only
punishes the official concerned but also, in
effect, deprives the electorate of the services of
the official for whom they voted.
IMPEACHMENT
FRANCISCO, JR. v. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, November 10, 2003,
EN BANC
Facts:
HOR adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Rep.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."
2003, Pres Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint (the 1st one) against CJ Davide and 7
Associate Justices for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed
by Reps. Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen, and
was referred to the House Committee on Justice
(HCOJ) on in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for
impeachment may be filed by any Member
of the HOR or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority
vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution
shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.
The 1st impeachment complaint was "sufficient
in form,” but insufficient in substance. To date,
the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance
with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Since the filing of the first complaint or the day
after HCOJ voted to dismiss it, the 2nd
impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Fuentebella
founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
1/3 of all the HOR Members
Thus arose the instant petitions against the HOR,
et. al., most of which petitions contend that the
filing of the 2nd impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that
"no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within
a period of one year
Issue:
WON the Rules of Procedure for Impeachment
Proceedings adopted by 12th Congress is
constitutional. – NO
Ratio:
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the
interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to
statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary
men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to
commence, or set going. As Webster's Third
New International Dictionary of the English
Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform
or facilitate the first action
With respect to the intent of the law, the
deliberations (led by Mr. Maambong) provide
that the framers intended "initiation" to start
with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus
curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong
explained that "the obvious reason in deleting
the phrase "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" as contained in the text of the
provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make
it understood once and for all that the initiation
of impeachment proceedings starts with the
filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third
of the House in a resolution of impeachment
does not initiate the impeachment proceedings
which was already initiated by the filing of a
verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph
(2), Article XI of the Constitution."
Having concluded that the initiation takes place
by the act of filing and referral or endorsement
of the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least
one-third of the members of the HOR with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once
an impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be
filed against the same official within a one year
period.
RECALL
Garcia v. COMELEC, October 5, 1993, Puno,
J.
Facts:
Enrique T. Garcia (Petitioner) was elected
governor of Bataan in the May 1992 elections.
In the early evening of July 1, 1993, some
mayors, vice-mayors, and members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of 12 municipalities (144
members, majority is 73) of the province met at
the NAPOCOR Compound. At about 12:30 am
of July 2, they proceeded to the Bagac town
plaza where they constituted themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the
recall election of Garcia.
They passed Resolution No. 1 for the recall of
Garcia on the ground of “loss of confidence,”
concurred in by the majority of the members.
146 names appeared in the resolution, but only
80 carried the signatures of the members of the
PRA. Of the 80, only 74 were found genuine.
Issue:
WON the second type of recall is constitutional
– YES
Ratio:
Petitioners cannot point to any specific provision
of the Constitution that will sustain this
submission. To be sure, there is nothing in the
Constitution that will remotely suggest that the
people have the “sole and exclusive right to
decide on whether to initiate a recall
proceeding.” The Constitution did not provide
for any mode, let alone a single mode, of
initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit
the adoption of multiple modes of initiating
recall elections.
Sec. 3, Art. X mandated the Congress to enact a
local govern code xxx with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum.
Congress was clearly given the power to choose
the effective mechanisms of recall as its
discernment dictates. The power given was to
select which among the means and method of
initiating recall elections are effective to carry
out the judgment of the electorate. What it
simply required is that the mechanisms of recall,
whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress
should be effective.
Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative
mode of initiating recall elections to supplement
the former mode of initiation by direct action of
the people. The choice may be erroneous but
even then, the remedy against a bad law is to
seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative.
Angobung v. COMELEC, March 5, 1997,
Hermosisima Jr., J
Facts:
Petitioner Angobung won as duly elected mayor
of the municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the
1995 local elections (55% of votes cast). Private
respondent, Alban, was also a candidate in that
election.
In early Sept 1996, Alban filed w/the Local
Election Registrar of Tumauini, Isabela, a
petition for recall against petitioner. Petitioner
received copy of petition on Sept 12, 1996.
Petition was then forwarded to Regional Office
in Tuguegarao, Cagayan and then to the main
office of COMELEC in Manila, for approval.
Acting on the petition, Deputy Executive
Director for Operations Pio Jose Joson
submitted to the Comelec en banc, a
memorandum recommending the approval of the
petition for recall filed by private respondent and
its signing by other qualified coters in order to
grant at least 25% of the total no. of registered
voters as required by Sec 69(d),LGC. In turn, the
en banc issued Resolution 96-2951 (Resolution).
Petitioner argues that Resolution is
unconstitutional on 2 grounds:
(1) it approved the Petition for Recall albeit
the same was signed by just 1 person in
violation of the statutory 25% min.
requirement as to the number of signatures
supporting any petition for recall; and
(2) it scheduled the recall election within 1
year from the May 12, 1997 Barangay
Elections.
Issue:
WON recall was valid - NO
Ratio:
Section 69(d), LGC of 1991 expressly provides
that recall of any elective municipal official may
also be validly initiated upon petition of at least
twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit
concerned during the election in which the local
official sought to be recalled was elected. The
law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates
recall proceedings: only a petition of at least
25% of the total number of registered voters,
may validly initiate recall proceedings.
Law does not state that the petition must be
signed by at least 25% of the registered voters;
rather, the petition must be of or by, at least 25%
of the registered voters, i.e., the petition must be
filed, not by one person only, but by at least
25% of the total number of registered voters.
This is understandable, since the signing of the
petition is statutorily required to be undertaken
before the election registrar or his representative,
and in the presence of a represetantive of the
official sought to be recalled, and in public place
in the municipality. Hence, while the initiatory
recall petition may not yet contain the signatures
of at least 25% of the total number of registered
voters, the petition must contain the names of at
least 25% of the total number of registered
voters in whose behalf only one person may sign
the petition in the meantime.
Recall must be pursued by the people, not just
by one disgruntled loser in the elections or a
small percentage of disenchanted electors.
Otherwise, its purposes as a direct remedy of the
people shall be defeated by the ill motives of a
few among them whose selfish resort to recall
would destabilize the community and seriously
disrupt the running of government.
DISCIPLINARY CASES
Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, July 17,
2007, Carpio, J
Facts:
Respondent Melly Magbanua was the Local
Treasury Operations Assistant of the City
Treasurers Office in Bacolod City.
COA conducted an examination of
respondent’s cash and account. The
examination disclosed a shortage of
P265,450. Upon demand, respondent failed
to produce the missing amount.
Respondent alleged that the shortage was
due to the machinations and dishonest acts
of Cash Clerk I Monina Baja (Baja).
Respondent alleged that Baja, acting as
Paymaster, received payroll funds for
distribution to specific offices. In her
liquidation report, Baja reflected twice the
missing amount of P265,450 representing
certain cash advances.
Baja was impleaded in the case before the
Ombudsman Visayas. Baja denied the
allegations of respondent.
Issue:
WON the Office of the Ombudsman has the
power to impose directly administrative
penalties on public officials or employees – YES
Ratio:
The powers of the Ombudsman are found in
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states
in part that the Ombudsman shall exercise such
other powers or performs such functions or
duties as may be provided by law. Sections 15,
21, and 25 of RA 6770 (the Ombudsman Act of
1989), provide:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.
― The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions ad
duties
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public
officer or employee at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a
duty required by law, and recommend
his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith; or enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in
Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That
the refusal by any officer without just
cause to comply with an order of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an
officer or employee who is at fault or
who neglects to perform an act or
discharge a duty required by law shall
be a ground for disciplinary action
against said officer.
SEC. 21. Officials Subject to
Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. ―
The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local
government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who
may be removed only by impeachment
or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.
SEC. 25. Penalties. ― (1) In
administrative proceedings under
Presidential Decree No. 807, the
penalties and rules provided therein
shall be applied.
(2) In other administrative proceedings,
the penalty ranging from suspension
without pay for one year to dismissal
with forfeiture of benefits or a fine
ranging from five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) to twice the amount
malversed, illegally taken or lost, or
both at the discretion of the
Ombudsman, taking into consideration
circumstances that mitigate or aggravate
the liability of the officer or employee
found guilty of the complaint or charges.
Section 21 of RA 6770 vests in the Ombudsman
disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government, except
impeachable officers, members of Congress, and
the Judiciary. And under Section 25 of RA 6770,
the Ombudsman may impose in administrative
proceedings the penalty ranging from suspension
without pay for one year to dismissal with
forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount
malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the
discretion of the Ombudsman x x x.
Clearly, under RA 6770 the Ombudsman has the
power to impose directly administrative penalty
on public officials or employees. Hence, the CA
erred in ruling that petitioner has no power to
impose directly administrative penalties on
public officials or employees.
Marohomsalic v. Cole, February 27, 2008,
Corona, J.
Facts:
Romulo J. Marohomsalic was a Special Land
Investigator I of the Provincial Environment
Resources Office of the DENR (PENRO-
DENR) in Koronadal City.
According to Reynaldo Cole, Marohomsalic
demanded P15,000 to secure the reversal of the
PENRO-DENR decision against him. Cole
sought the assistance of the NBI to entrap
Marohomsalic. Marohomsalic was caught in
flagrante delicto receiving bribe money of
P2,700 from Cole.
An administrative complaint for grave
misconduct was filed and after evaluating the
allegations, the Ombudsman found
Marohomsalic guilty and dismissed him from
the service. An order for the immediate
implementation of his dismissal was also issued.
CA dismissed Marohomsalic’s petition
Issue:
WON the Ombudsman has the power to order
the dismissal of a public officer – YES
Ratio:
The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over
disciplinary cases against government
employees is vested by Section 12, Article XI of
the Constitution. Part of such disciplinary
authority in administrative cases is the power to
investigate and prosecute, in accordance with the
requirements laid down by law. One such
requirement is that substantial evidence must
always support any finding.
One of the grounds for an administrative
complaint cognizable by the Ombudsman is an
act or omission contrary to law or regulations
like grave misconduct. It is characterized by the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law or flagrant disregard of an established rule.
Corruption as an element of grave misconduct
includes the act of an official who unlawfully or
wrongfully uses his station or character to
procure some benefit for himself, contrary to the
rights of others.
Corollary to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary
authority is his authority to dismiss. RA 6770
which provides for the functional and structural
organization of the Office of the Ombudsman,
was passed by Congress to deliberately endow
the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute
offenses committed by public officers and
employees to make him a more active and
effective agent of the people in ensuring
accountability in public office. Moreover,
Congress granted the Ombudsman broad powers
to implement his own actions.
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, February 20,
1996, Regalado, J.
Facts:
Petitioner who is the incumbent governor
of Palawan, was first elected governor of the
said province in 1968 and was again reelected in
both the 1971 and 1980 elections, until he was
replaced by private complainant Victoriano
Rodriguez as Officer-In-Charge Governor after
the EDSA Revolution in February 1986
Both petitioner and Rodriguez ran for governor
in the 1988 elections where the latter emerged
victorious. In the 1992 synchronized national
and local elections, the two again contested the
gubernatorial post; and this time, it was
petitioner who won
At the time Rodriguez was still the OIC
Governor of the province, the Provincial
Government of Palawan, as represented by
Rodriguez and the Provincial Board Members of
Palawan, filed before the Office of the
Tanodbayan two (2) complaints both
dated December 5, 1986. The first complaint
charged petitioner with violation of Section 3(b)
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
the second charged petitioner, together with
several other provincial officers, with violation
of Section 3(a) and (g) of the same law.
Issue:
WON Sec. 9 of R.A. No. 3019 is an invalid
delegation of executive power – NO
Ratio:
Three theories have been advanced on the
court’s power of suspension.
 (1) The power of suspension - where a
criminal case has already been filed in
court - still is with the Provincial
Governor, relying on Section 2188 of
the Revised Administrative Code.
(2) Following the ruling in Sarcos vs.
Castillo x x x, because the main
respondents are elective municipal
officials, that power of suspension must
be held to repose in the Provincial
Board, under Section 5 of the
Decentralization Act of 1967 (Republic
Act 5185).
(3) By Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, solely the court in
which the criminal case has been filed
shall wield the power of suspension.
Since removal from office then is within the
power of the court, no amount of judicial
legerdemain would deprive the court of the
power to suspend. Reason for this is that
suspension necessarily is included in the greater
power of removal. It is without doubt that
Congress has power to authorize courts to
suspend public officers pending court
proceedings for removal and that the
congressional grant is not violative of the
separation of powers. For, our Constitution
being silent, we are not to say that from
Congress is withheld the power to decide the
mode or procedure of suspension and removal of
public officers.
Castro v. Gloria, August 20, 2001, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, J.
Facts:
Porfirio Gutang, Jr. filed with DECS a complaint
for disgraceful and immoral conduct against
petitioner Gualberto Castro, a teacher in
Guibuangan Central School, Barili, Cebu. It was
alleged that he has an illicit affair with Gutang’s
wife, petitioners co-teacher at the same school.
DECS declared petitioner guilty of the offense
charged and meted the penalty of dismissal from
the service.
Issue:
WON mandamus lies to compel reduction of
penalty from dismissal to 1 year. – YES
Ratio:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a
controversy falling under their jurisdiction
before the same may be elevated to the courts of
justice for review. Non-observance of the
doctrine results in lack of a cause of action,
which is one of the grounds allowed by the
Rules of Court for the dismissal of the
complaint.
The doctrine is not absolute. There are instances
when it may be dispensed with and judicial
action may be validly resorted to immediately.
Among these exceptions are: 1) When the
question raised is purely legal; 2) when the
administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the
act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when
there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5)
when the claim involved is small; 6) when
irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; 8) when strong public interest is
involved; and 10) in quo warranto proceedings.
Truly, a petition for mandamus is premature if
there are administrative remedies available to
petitioner. But where the case involves only
legal questions, the litigant need not exhaust all
administrative remedies before such judicial
relief can be sought.
Caniete v. Secretary of Education, June 19,
2000, Kapunan, J.
Facts:
Herman Caniete and Wilfredo Rosario are
public school teachers at the Juan Sumulong
High School in Quezon City. For being absent
on 20 and 21 September 1990, they were
charged by Secretary Isidro Cariño, then
Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, with alleged participation in
the mass actions/strikes on said dates. Petitioners
were placed under preventive suspension.
Secretary Cariño found petitioners "guilty as
charged" and dismissed them from the service
"effective immediately." The said decisions of
Secretary Cariño, however, were set aside by the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) when
the case was brought to it on appeal. The MSPB
found that petitioners were guilty only of Gross
Violation of Existing Civil Service Law and
Rules and suspended them for three (3) months
without pay.
Issue:
WON petitioners, who were earlier dismissed
for allegedly participating in mass
actions/strikes, are entitled to their back
salaries upon their reinstatement – YES
Ratio:
The employee who is placed under preventive
suspension pending investigation is not entitled
to compensation because such suspension “is not
a penalty but only a means of enabling the
disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered
investigation.” Upon the other hand, there is
right to compensation for preventive suspension
pending appeal if the employee is eventually
exonerated. This is because "preventive
suspension pending appeal is actually punitive
although it is in effect subsequently considered
illegal if respondent is exonerated and the
administrative decision finding him guilty is
reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with
full pay for the period of the suspension.
Nalupta, Jr. v. Tapec, March 30, 1993, Nocon,
J.
Facts:
Complainant Mariano R. Nalupta Jr.
(Congressman of 2nd District, Ilocos Norte)
accuses respondent Honesto G. Tapec
(Deputy Sheriff) of immorality by
cohabiting with his paramour Consolacion
Inocencio, with whom he had two children,
and of discharging the duties of Barangay
Captain of Masintoc, Paoay, Ilocos Norte
despite holding his present position.
Respondent Tapec vehemently denied the
charges of immorality, claiming that these
were "malicious and fabricated."
Issue:
WON Respondent is guilty of immorality–
YES
Ratio:
Complainant had sufficiently established the
charge of immorality against respondent.
o Noel Rosario, a neighbor of
respondent's paramour
Consolacion Inocencio at
Barangay Ablan, Batac, Ilocos
Norte, testified that he had often
seen respondent leaving the
house of Inocencio in the
morning and returning to the
same in the afternoon, and that
this had gone on for quite some
time.
o Moreover, it was well-known in
the neighborhood that
respondent was married and that
Inocencio was merely his
paramour.
Similarly established is the fact that the illicit
union of respondent and Inocencio had produced
two children, Marc Henry Tapec and Joseph
Marlou I. Tapec, as shown by the certified true
copies of the children's respective birth
certificates
Respondent's claim that the Marc Henry and
Joseph Marlou are actually his grandchildren,
being the children of his son Honesto Tapec, Jr.,
is unbelievable. The entries in the birth
certificates point to respondent as the father of
these two children.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Librada,
August 22, 1996, Per Curiam
Facts:
Respondent Vicente P. Librado is deputy sheriff
of the MTCCin Iligan City. He was charged with
violation of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act) in an information filed with the RTC of
Lanao Del Norte for selling and having in his
possession certain quantities of prohibited drugs
(shabu and marijuana). He was subsequently
found guilty and sentenced to six years of
imprisonment.
Pursuant to its authority under the Resolution of
the Court En Banc, the OCA filed this
administrative complaint against him and he was
suspended from office.
Respondent admits that he had been convicted of
violation of R.A. No. 6425 and claims that he is
now on probation.
Issue:
WON respondent should be dismissed – YES
Ratio:
There is no doubt that drug-pushing is a crime
which involves moral turpitude and implies
everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals including acts
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
and social duties which a man owes to his
fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted rule of right and duty between man
and man. Indeed, nothing is more depraved than
for anyone to be a merchant of death by selling
prohibited drugs, an act which, as this Court said
in one case:
“often breeds other crimes. It is not what
we might call a contained crime whose
consequences are limited to that crime
alone, like swindling and bigamy. Court
and police records show that a
significant number of murders, rapes,
and similar offenses have been
committed by persons under the
influence of dangerous drugs, or while
they are high. While spreading such
drugs, the drug-pusher is also abetting,
through his greed and irresponsibility,
the commission of other crimes.”
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Veneracion, June 21, 2000, Martinez, J.
Facts:
Merlinia Santos filed with the Court
Administrator a sworn letter-complaint against
Rogelio Tria, the “Acting Sheriff IV, Branch 47,
RTC Manila.
The investigation revealed that Tria was not an
employee of the judiciary at the time he acted as
“sheriff.” The record showed that Tria was
appointed in 1988 as process server of the RTC,
Branch 47, Manila. However, he was transferred
to the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB), Department of Finance, as an
Intelligence Officer. He was not thereafter re-
employed in the judiciary.
Issue:
WON Tria may be assigned by that agency on
detail with the judiciary, upon the request of the
presiding judge of the court without the
authority of the Supreme Court – NO
Ratio:
Judge Veneracion failed to observe the
Constitutional and regulatory prescriptions. He
has no power to assign on temporary detail his
duly appointed sheriff to the office of the clerk
of court. The authority to detail employees of his
branch to the office of the clerk of court is
vested in the executive judge. Hence, there was
no vacancy even temporarily in the office of
branch sheriff of Branch 47, and the judge can
not appoint or designate any person of his choice
to act as sheriff. His action showed persistent
disregard of the rule in the designation of acting
sheriffs.
This act constitutes usurpation of the appointing
authority of the SC amounting to grave
misconduct in office. As a member of the bench,
Judge Veneracion is conclusively presumed to
know the law and is “expected to keep abreast of
all laws and prevailing jurisprudence” which he
clearly failed to do in this instance. It was not a
matter of negligence, but a deliberate act of
defiance of the SC’s authority by a lower court
judge.
He persistently disregarded well-known legal
rules in the designation of acting sheriffs. By
such action, he repeatedly usurped the
appointing authority of the Supreme Court.
Thus, it amounts to grave misconduct in office.
RTC Makati Movement Against Graft and
Cornuption v. Dumlao, October 4, 1998,
Puno, J.
Facts:
Respondent Atty. Inocencio E. Dumlao, then
Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 134, was charged by
the RTC Makati Movement against Graft &
Corruption for allegedly engaging in usurious
activities, immorality and violation of the Anti-
Graft & Corrupt Practices Act.
The Office of the Chief Justice received another
letter-complaint against Respondent signed by
Susan B. Quinto for: Corruption and dereliction
of duty for exacting money from court litigants
in the pretext that the amounts exacted are his
commissioner's fees, yet, he does not prepare his
reports; For operating a lending agency with the
use of the facilities of the court and for exacting
from court employees usurious interest; and for
criminal negligence in the performance of his
duties as Branch Clerk of Court.
Executive Judge Abad Santos recommended the
dismissal of Respondent from service on
grounds of grave misconduct and dishonesty
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
acts unbecoming a court officer.
Issue:
WON respondent should be dismissed – YES
Ratio:
 Public service requires utmost integrity and
strictest discipline. A public servant must
exhibit at all times the highest sense of
honesty and integrity. The administration of
justice is a sacred task. The conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility. Their
conduct, at all times, must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but,
above all else, must be above suspicion.
Indeed, every employee of the judiciary
should be an example of integrity,
uprightness and honesty.
 In the case at bench, the particular public
officer concerned is a Branch Clerk of a
court of justice who is described as an
essential officer in any judicial system,
whose office is the hub of activities, both
adjudicative and administrative and who
occupy a position of great importance and
responsibility in the framework of judicial
administration.
 Clerks of Court are, thus, required to be
individuals of competence, honesty and
probity specifically mandated to safeguard
the integrity of the court and its proceedings,
to earn respect therefor, to maintain loyalty
thereto and to the judge as the superior
officer, to maintain the authenticity and
correctness of court records and to uphold
the confidence of the public in the
administration of justice.
 No Branch Clerk of Court shall demand
and/or receive commissioner's fees for
reception of evidence ex-parte…The court
shall allow the commissioner, other than an
employee of the court, such reasonable
compensation as the circumstances of the
case warrant
 Courts are not lending institutions. By
engaging in lending activities, Respondent
has caused dishonor to courts of justice.
Nieva v. Alvarez-Edad, January 31, 2005,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Facts:
Saturnina Alvarez-Edad, Branch Clerk of Court,
was charged by a coworker with several
administrative offenses.
1) Falsification of daily time records
2) Dishonesty
3) Demanding or receiving commissioners fee
for reception of evidence ex-parte
4) Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service
5) Issuing certified true copies of warrant of
arrest without payment of the corresponding fees
6) Discourtesy in the conduct of official business
Executive Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit exonerated
respondent from all the charges, except for
dishonesty. He found that respondent demanded
from the representative of Unifunds P1,500.00
as commissioner’s fee and received P500.00 in
the guise of payment for stenographic notes. She
kept P300.00 for herself without the consent of
Judith Cueto, a stenographer. Judge Dayrit then
recommended that respondent be found guilty of
two (2) counts of dishonesty and be suspended
from the service for one (1) year without pay
and be disqualified for promotion or from
receiving any increase in salary during the
pendency of the suspension
Issue:
WON a stricter penalty should be imposed -
YES
Ratio:
The administration of justice, by its very nature,
is a sacred task, circumscribed with a heavy
burden of responsibility. All those involved in
its dispensation from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk should live up to the strictest
standards of competence, honesty and integrity
in the public service. Their conduct, at all times,
must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum but, above all else, must be above
suspicion. No other office in the government
service exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness from an employee
than in the Judiciary.
Clerks of court, like the respondent herein, are
important officers in the judicial system. Their
administrative functions are vital to the prompt
and sound administration of justice. They cannot
be allowed to overstep their powers and
responsibilities. Their office is the hub of
adjudicative and administrative orders, processes
and judicial concerns. They perform a very
delicate function as custodian of the courts
funds, revenues, records, property and
premises. They are specifically imbued with the
mandate to safeguard the integrity of the court as
well as the efficiency of its proceedings, and to
uphold the confidence of the public in the
administration of justice. Thus, they are required
to be persons of competence, honesty and
probity.
Respondent overstepped her powers and
responsibilities. The records convincingly show
that she demanded and received a
commissioner’s fee from a litigant in an ex-
parte proceeding. Such act violates Section B,
Chapter II of the Manual for Clerks of Court
which provides: No Branch Clerk of Court shall
demand and/or receive commissioner’s fees for
the reception of evidence ex-parte.
This rule has been restated in Circular No. 50-
2001 dated August 17, 2001 issued by the Office
of the Court Administrator, which partly states:
For the guidance and information of all
concerned, x x x Clerks of Court are not
authorized to collect compensation for services
rendered as commissioners in ex parte
proceedings
CSC v. Dacoycoy; April 29, 1999; Pardo, J.
Facts:
A complaint with the CSC against Pedro O.
Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct
and nepotism. Upon investigation, a prima facie
case was found thus a formal charge was issued
against Dacoycoy
Upon formal investigation of the CSC, no
substantial evidence was found to support the
allegations of habitual drunkenness and
misconduct, however, the CSC found respondent
Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two
counts as a result of the appointment of his two
sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and
utility worker, respectively, and their assignment
under his immediate supervision and control as
the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro
College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him
the penalty of dismissal from the service. MR
denied
65 to CA. CA reversed CSC. Respondent did not
appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and
Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of nepotism.
Issue:
WON Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism – Yes
Ratio:
 EO 292, Sec. 59. Nepotism. (1) All
appointments to the national, provincial, city
and municipal governments or in any branch
or instrumentality thereof, including
government owned or controlled
corporations, made in favor of a relative of
the appointing or recommending authority,
or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of
the persons exercising immediate
supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.
o The word relative and members of
the family referred to are those
related within the third degree either
of consanguinity or of affinity.
o Under the definition of nepotism,
one is guilty of nepotism if an
appointment is issued in favor of a
relative within the third civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity of any
of the following: a) appointing
authority; b) recommending
authority; c) chief of the bureau or
office, and d) person exercising
immediate supervision over the
appointee.
 It is immaterial who the appointing or
recommending authority is. To constitute a
violation of the law, it suffices that an
appointment is extended or issued in favor
of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the
bureau or office, or the person exercising
immediate supervision over the appointee.
o In fact, it was Mr. Jaime Daclag,
Head of the Vocational Department
of the BCAT, who recommended
the appointment of Rito.
o Atty. Victorino B. Tirol II, Director
III, DECS Regional Office VIII,
Palo, Leyte, appointed Rito
Dacoycoy driver of the school.
o Mr. Daclag also appointed Ped
Dacoycoy casual utility worker.
 However, it was respondent Dacoycoy who
certified that funds are available for the
proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy and
even rated his performance as very
satisfactory.
 On the other hand, his son Ped stated in his
position description form that his father was
his next higher supervisor.
 Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a
subordinate of respondent Pedro O.
Dacoycoy, who was the school
administrator. He authorized Mr. Daclag to
recommend the appointment of first level
employees under his immediate supervision.
Then Mr. Daclag recommended the
appointment of respondents two sons and
placed them under respondents immediate
supervision serving as driver and utility
worker of the school.
Santos v. Macaraig, April 10, 1992, Griño-
Aquino, J.
Facts:
Rosalinda de Perio-Santos, a career service
officer with the rank of Chief of Mission II and
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,
was appointed on July 24, 1986, by P. Aquino,
to the position of Permanent Representative of
the Philippines to the Philippine Mission to the
United Nations and other International
Organizations with station in Geneva,
Switzerland
Santos sought a LOA from the DFA to spend the
Easter Holidays in New York, with her family at
no expense to the Government. She bought 2
non-transferable, non-refundable discounted
tickets costing SFr. 1,597 for herself and her
adopted daughter Pia.
Before they could leave Geneva, petitioner
received instructions from the home office
directing her to proceed to Havana as a member
of the Philippine delegation to the UNCTAD G-
77 Preparatory Conference from April 20-26,
1987.
Instead of buying an economy roundtrip ticket,
she used for the Geneva-New York-Geneva
portion of her trip the two (2) discounted tickets
costing only SFr. 1,597 for herself and her
daughter Pia. They left Geneva for New York en
route to Havana. On the same day, the DFA
approved her application for LOA with pay from
April 27 to May 1, 1987.
After the Havana Conference, she and her
daughter spent her vacation leave in New York
before returning to Geneva.
Instead of claiming reimbursement for SFr.
2,996, she requested, and received,
reimbursement of only SFr. 1,597 which she
spent for the Geneva to New York, and New
York to Geneva portion of her trip, thereby
effecting savings of SFr.1,399 for the
Government
The DFA sent her a cable (GE-202/87)
requesting clarification on "why Mission paid
for plane ticket of infant Pia de Perio-Santos
(petitioner's daughter) Geneva-New York-
Geneva per CV 216/87 when she was not
authorized to accompany her adopting mother at
government expense.
Petitioner replied that the air fare tickets were
for her only and did not include her daughter
whose trip was paid from her personal funds
DFA required her to refund the amount
representing her daughter's round-trip ticket
since DFA received a copy of the "facture" from
the travel agency.
Instead of refunding only the sum of Sfr. 673 to
the Government, petitioner returned the full
amount of SFr. 1,597. She thereafter claimed
payment for one round-trip economy plane
ticket (Geneva-New York-Geneva) in the
amount of SFr. 2,996 to which she was entitled.
Deputy Armando Maglaque, and some
MISUNPHIL employees filed administrative
charges against her for "incompetence;
inefficient; corrupt and dishonest activities; rude
and uncouth manners; abusive and high-handed
behavior; irregular and highly illegal
transactions involving funds of the mission."
Issue:
WON Santos was guilty of dishonesty or
misconduct. – NO
Ratio:
There is no evidence of dishonesty on the part of
the petitioner, or an intent to cheat and defraud
the government. Her failure to disclose the fact
that her discounted tickets included the fare for
her child, was harmless and inconsequential as
the 2 discounted Geneva-New York-Geneva
tickets for herself and her daughter were in fact
inseparable, intransferable, non-cancellable and
non-refundable, in effect one whole fare only,
for purposes of the discount. The mother and
daughter tickets were, in the words of the
petitioner, "married to each other". One without
the other would not have been entitled to the
discount. And if she left her daughter behind, it
would have made no difference in the fare
because the ticket was not refundable.
Using the discounted tickets was beneficial to
the Government for they cost 50% less than an
economy roundtrip ticket that the petitioner was
entitled to purchase for the same trip if she
travelled alone. She obviously saved money
(SFr.1,399) for the government by using her
discounted tickets even if her daughter's fare comply with just contractual obligation, act
was included. fairly and adhere to high ethical standards to
preserve the court's integrity. Although an
Since petitioner was moved by the best of
ordinary court employee, should not, like judges,
motives in using the discounted tickets which
incur obligations which will in any way
she had purchased before she received the order
interfere, directly or indirectly, with his function
to attend the UNCTAD conference in Havana,
as such. He should be scrupulously careful to
her action should be commended instead of
avoid such action as may reasonably tend to
condemned
generate the suspicion that his relations with
others constitute an element in the determination
of the course of action that the court to which he
Garciano v. Oyao, January 27, 1981, belongs, will take in a pending case.
Makasiar, J.
Facts:
Wilfredo Oyao was originally Docket Clerk
turned Clerk of Court of CFI Cebu. Garciano, a
debtor, wanted to collect the P300 due him.
Oyao initially signed a promissory note with
special power of attorney authorizing respondent
to collect his first quincena salary until his
indebtedness is fully paid but, instead, the Oyao
collected in advance his salary checks so
Garciano was unable to collect a single check by
way of payment of the indebtedness.
Issue:
WON Oyao's act in wilfully refusing to settle
his obligation is a violation of the Civil
Service Rules and Regulations – YES
Ratio:
Oyao executed a promissory note in favor of the
Garciano and also a special power of attorney
authorizing herein complainant to collect
respondent's first quincena salary until the
indebtedness was fully paid. But Garciano could
not collect the first 15-day salary of respondent,
for the latter always collected it ahead of
complainant. Oyao’s execution of the aforesaid
documents in favor of the complainant induced
the latter to grant the said loan. Hence, it is
clearly unfair to the complainant as well as
unethical for Oyao to welch on his promise.
His improper conduct unavoidably stains the
image of the judiciary. Court personnel must