GUALBERTO DE LA LLANA VS MANUEL ALBA

FACTS:
In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in
Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that
would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would
contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the
courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature
by such statute (BP 129).

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline
judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it
possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who
was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination
by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office.
After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with
an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not
arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No
fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this
Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the
case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has
been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it
properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior
courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one
not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a
construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives
between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be
preferred.”