ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS vs. CIELITO M. SALUD, A.M. No.

CA-05-20-P,
September 9, 2005, Callejo, Sr., J.

AS AGAINST RIGHT OF PRIVACY

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS vs. CIELITO M. SALUD, A.M. No. CA-05-20-P,
September 9, 2005, Callejo, Sr., J.

Facts: Respondent now faces several administrative complaints against him due to his material and
financial interest to the case of Lagua, which is now in the office of the Division Clerk of Court of the Court
of Appeals under Atty Madarang for promulgation. It was alleged that respondent served the resolution
and order of release in the National Penitentiary for the release of Lagua. In the meantime, in the office
of Atty. Madarang she received a phone call from a relative of Lagua and was asking for the remaining
balance they have to pay to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through respondent Salud. The caller
also said they sought the help of a certain Valdez from the RTC where the case originated. Atty. Madarang
pretending to be a relative of Lagua then called the RTC and was looking for Valdez.

Later on, Justice Magtolis confronted the respondent in her office but respondent denied that he was
extorting or receiving money for Lagua’s release. Respondent however admitted to the Justice that he
served the copies of resolution and order of release to a person not authorized to receive the documents.
Justice Magtolis then lodged a complaint subjecting the respondent to disciplinary action and
administrative investigation. Justice Magtolis also instructed Atty. Madarang to continue communicating
with respondent via SMS (text messaging) under the name “Arlyn”. It was found out that it was through
this kind of venture or extortion or receiving money from cases which are pending in the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not the admission of the text messages as evidence against respondent Salud
constitutes a violation of his right to privacy

Ruling:

The respondent’s claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him constitutes a
violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as “ephemeral electronic
communication” under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and “shall be proven by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.” Any question
as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as
his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell
phone.

This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao. In that case, the
Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, considered text
messages addressed to the complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in
a case pending before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:

… The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:
“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages … and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.”

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the [said rules], “Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof … .” In this
case, complainant who was the recipient of the said messages and therefore had personal knowledge
thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number
reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt
respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and
her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is
also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in
determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:

On April 13, 2000, the petitioner MCC Industrial Steel Corp., a domestic corporation engaged in the
importation and wholesale of stainless steel in the country, contracted with the herein private
respondent, Ssangyon Corporation, a manufacturer of stainless steel with a head office in Seoul South
Korea. MCC ordered 220 metric ton of stainless steel for $1,860 metric ton. It was arranged that the
respondent will issue the sales invoices through fax, and once the petitioner conforme to such then MCC
through its general manager and president George Chan, the latter has to fax the same with his signature.
On the time the petitioner had a hard time to open the latters of credit, Ssangyong decided to negotiate
with its mother company in korea to grant MCC a discount and to extend for a while the opening of letters
of credit. Such request was accede by respondent. The first $70,000 letter of credit was issued by MCC
but the remaining $170,000 was not. On this note, the respondent was compelled to filed a complaint for
breach of contract and prayer for damages. The lower court acceded with the prayer of the respondent,
that indeed petitioner failed comply with their contract despite discounts given as well as extension for
opening of letter of credit, under the strong protest of the petitioner that the fax copies presented as
document cannot be relied upon as the best evidence.

Issue:

Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and
admissible as such?

Held:

Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 (R.A. No. 8792) vis-à-vis the Rules on Electronic Evidence.

Although the parties did not raise the question whether the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic
data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act (the
petitioner merely assails as inadmissible evidence the photocopies of the said facsimile transmissions),
we deem it appropriate to determine first whether the said fax transmissions are indeed within the
coverage of R.A. No. 8792 before ruling on whether the photocopies thereof are covered by the law. In
any case, this Court has ample authority to go beyond the pleadings when, in the interest of justice or for
the promotion of public policy, there is a need to make its own findings in order to support its conclusions.

Admissibility of Pro Forma

Invoices; Breach of Contract

by Appellants

Turning first to the appellants' argument against the admissibility of the Pro Forma Invoices with
Reference Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F", pp. 215-218,
Records), appellants argue that the said documents are inadmissible (sic) being violative of the best
evidence rule.

The argument is untenable.

The copies of the said pro-forma invoices submitted by the appellee are admissible in evidence, although
they are mere electronic facsimile printouts of appellant's orders. Such facsimile printouts are considered
Electronic Documents under the New Rules on Electronic Evidence, which came into effect on August 1,
2001. (Rule 2, Section 1 [h], A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).

"(h) 'Electronic document' refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures,
symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes
digitally signed documents and any printout or output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately
reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the term
'electronic document' may be used interchangeably with 'electronic data message'.

An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect
the data accurately. (Rule 4, Section 1, A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC)

The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent
of a written document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic
document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules
of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic
document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout
or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.

Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional

equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an
"electronic data message" or an "electronic document."
The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 defines electronic data message and electronic document as
follows:

Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act, the following terms are defined, as follows:

xxx

c. "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means.

xxx

f. "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols
or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established
or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.

The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, its IRR and the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
at first glance, convey the impression that facsimile transmissions are electronic data messages or
electronic documents because they are sent by electronic means. The expanded definition of an
"electronic data message" under the IRR, consistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law, further supports this
theory considering that the enumeration "xxx [is] not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI),
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." And to telecopy isto send a document from one place to
another via a fax machine.

Indeed the court proved that it was within the intention of the framers of the law to consider that original
printout or the electronic data store in computer or electronic gadget reduced in a readable form, will be
considered as written instrument provided that proper authentication be made and proved, to which the
respondent managed to do so. The high court ruled in favor of the respondent.

G.R. No. 170491 April 4, 2007

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and
WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED, Respondents.

Facts:

On april 20, 1996, M/V DibenaWinm being operated and owned by the herein private respondent Bangpai
shipping company under its hip agent Wallen shipping Inc., accidentally bumped the power barge of the
herein petitioner, NAPOCOR. The latter filed a complaint for damages on april 26, 1996 before the sala of
the herein public respondent judge. During the presentation of evidence, the petitioner presented as
pieces of evidence Xerox copies, to which such was admitted by the court. Hoever, a motion to strike out
the evidence was filed before the court to which the court ordered that such pieces of evidence be stricken
out of the records but has to be attached to the documents for proper disposition by the appellate in case
of appeal before the latter. The petitioner aver that such documents be admitted for the basic reason that
such is within the purview of the electronic evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not thepeices of evidence submitted by the petitioner be regarded within the purview of the
electronic evidence for the court be compelled to admit?

Held:

No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following?

Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence as follows:

"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures,
symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes
digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects
the electronic data message or electronic document. For the purpose of these Rules, the term "electronic
document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message".

On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information,
data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which
a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which
is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.It includes
digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects
the electronic data message or electronic document.

The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document
is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is
presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document from
a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information
contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all
of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents,
may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature
affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts
were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as
defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation
of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic
documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their
original as decreed in the law.

Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no evidence of a writing the
contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following
cases:

(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;

(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public officer;

(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made evidence
by law;

(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole."

When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon
proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may
prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the
predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of
documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable
inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona
fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or places. However, in
the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed
to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the
abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility of
the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.
Indeed the documents presented by the petitioner as evidence before the court were not within the
purview electronic document or electronic data message. It will be highly unacceptable to regard an
information manually written down to be regarded as electronic message. The petitioner cannot aver
now to submit the original copies of the documents since they were given enough time to submit such
but they refused to do so and insist that the photocopies be admitted instead. The high court denied such
petition.

A.M. No. CA-05-18-P April 12, 2005

ZALDY NUEZ, Complainant,

vs.

ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, respondent.

Facts:

Zaldy Nuez, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAGCOR when the latter accused him of using
illegal drugs. The lower acceded with the prayer and contention of Zaldy but eventually the appellate
court reversed the initial favorable decision of the court a quo. In this regard, Zaldy was in desperate need
of help that can spped up his case before the CA. He contacted, Elvira Cruz-Apao, an Executive Assistant
II of the acting Division Clerk of Court of CA, whom he learned from his sister-in-law. Elvira texted Zaldy,
that a favorable decision can be made provided P1Million be given to her. Zaldy bargained for a lower
amount but Elvira refused, mentioning that it is the flat rate the person who will make the favorable
decision. Elvira texted Zaldy that they have to meet at times Plaza Un Avenue. Zaldy and Elvira met and
negotiated for a lower price, but to no avail. They arranged for a nother meeing, but now, Zaldy
coordinated to matter with GMA 7 Imbestigador, where assistance from PAOCTF was sought for an
entrapment operation. During the meeting, marked money was prepared. Agents of PAOCTF were in
position to execute the entrapement. When Elvira arrived, she was anxious that an entrapment will be
made. Eventually the PAOCTF operators executed the entrapment and investigated the respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not ephemeral communications can be used as evidence before the court?

Held:

Yes, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:

Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent
duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in
exchange for a favorable decision of the former’s pending case with the CA. The text messages were
properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence which provides:
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic communications shall
be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge
thereof . . . ." In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal
knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the
cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers.
Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid
to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her
and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as
evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.

Indeed the text messages of Elvira can be used as an evidence before court proceeding and even in
administrative proceedings as in the case at hand. Zaldy is one of the recipient of th txt messages, to
which he has personal knowledge of the communication.

Moreover, the person to whom the respondent confessed made a written report before Justice Villarama
as to the actuations made by Elvira. The high court reiterated that being an employee, she has a burden
of presenting before the public, honesty and probity as en employee of the department that confer
judgment and justice. The high court dismissed the employee for grave abuse of discretion.

EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, Petitioner,

vs.

CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), Respondent.

Facts:

The herein petitioner, Emmanuel B. Aznar, is a prominent businessman and entrepreneur in Cebu. He
decided to treat his wife together with their grandchildren for an Asian Tour using his Citibank credit card.
He deposited P485,000 to his account to increase his ordinary credit limit from P150,000 to P635,000. He
bought tickets to Kuala Lumpur amounting to P235,000. When they were in Kuala Lumpur, they decided
to purchases things to which the credit card was dishonoured for over the limit. Eventually the agency
further dishonoured the card and even mentioned that the petitioner be a swindler. In that note, they
decided to go back Philippines and instantly filed a complaint for damages. The lower court initially
dismissed the complaint on the ground that their was no proper authentication as to the print out of the
computer generated document presented as evidence before the court. The petitioner filed a motion for
the re-raffle of the case, raising the contention that the judge was also a holder of Citibank credit card.
The judge later acceded with the contention of petitioner and ordered for the company to pay enormous
amount of damages to the plaintiff. When the case was elevated before the CA the latter denied such.
Issue:

Whether or not the print out of the computer generated document was properly authenticated to be
admissible before the court?

Held:

No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:

Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be excluded as it qualifies as electronic evidence
following the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides that print-outs are also originals for purposes
of the Best Evidence Rule;

Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone
who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.

Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:

Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in
any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.

Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:

(a) By evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;

(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the
Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or

(c) By other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

Indeed there was no proper authentication of the electronic evidence presented by the petitioner before
the court which is the print out of the computer generated document where on it printed that the card
was over the limit. During the trial the petitioner mentioned that desk officer phoned someone and
eventually the hard copy was given to him signed by one named Nubi, however such was not witnessed
by the petitioner or he does not have personal knowledge of such authentication.

The high court denied the petition.

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

Facts:

The herein petitioner, Rustan Ang and the private respondent, Irish Sagud were lovers during their college
days in Wesleyan University in Maria Aurora Province of Aurora. Eventually, Irish heard that Rustan has
a live-in-partner whom Rustan got pregnant. Because of this, Irish decided to broke up with Rustan. The
latter asked Irish to elope with him, since he does not love the other girl, to which Irish refused. To
pressure Irish to get back with him he send multimedia messages to Irish, bearing a picture of a naked
woman, who spread her legs with a face of Irish superimposed on it. Rustan even added in the text
message that it is easy for him to spread those pictures in the internet. Because of this scenario, Irish,
asked help from the Vic-Mayor of the municipality, to which coordination with the local police was made.
Entrapment operation was conducted and arrested Rustan.

Issue:

Whether or not Rustan’s contention that the multimedia messages should not be made admissible for
the basic reason that such was not properly authenticated as provided by the Rules on Electronic
Documents?

Held:

No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:

Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the
first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of
the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already
waived such ground for objection.

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence
applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.

Indeed the assertion of Rustan will not be given merit for the basic reason that such contention was only
raised before this court to which the latter had a presumption that Rustan has waived his right to question
the authenticity of the pictures. Moreover, the court avers that such assertion of Rustan cannot be made
possible in criminal case; such can only be made before, civil and administrative actions.

The high court denied the petition.

ANG vs. CA
Facts: Rustan was charged and convicted of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children Act, otherwise known as RA 9262 for sending malicious text messages and a picture via multi-
media message service (mms) showing a picture of a naked woman with the spread legs and with Irish’s
face superimposed on the figure. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic
signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

Issue: Whether or not the Rules on Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC) is applicable in Criminal Action.

Held: Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first
time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the
picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already
waived such ground for objection.

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence
applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.