discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.
The existence of negligence in
[ G.R. No. 12219, March 15, 1918 ]
AMADO PICART, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. FRANK SMITH, JR.,
DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
DECISION
STREET, J.:
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the
defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum of P31,100, as damages alleged to
have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant. From a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union
absolving the defendant from liability the plaintiff has appealed.
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place
on December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La
Union. It appears that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was
riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across,
the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles, per hour. As
the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his
horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after
he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it
appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the
warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the
apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up
against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the
left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not
have sufficient time to get over to the other side. The bridge is shown to
have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the
automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the
defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side.
The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign
for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet,
the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance
away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse
without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there
being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the
defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting
the horse alongside of the railing where it was then standing; but in so
doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that
it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head
toward the railing. In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind
leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and
its rider was thrown off with some violence. From the evidence adduced
in the case we believe that when the accident occurred the free space
where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing of the
bridge was probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its
injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several
days.
The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in
maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of
negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage
done; and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant
started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and
rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the
center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not
be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late
for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the
nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile
was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer
within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a
place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed
entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an
immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the
bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the
horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the
defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was,
we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet
exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an
appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with
automobiles, he might get excited and jump under the conditions which
here confronted him. When the defendant exposed the horse and rider
to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation ? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard suppose to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment
of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man
in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular
case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value but this much
can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the
circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not,
and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can
be expected to take care only when there is something before them to
suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If
so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that
harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence
can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct
is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding
against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case
we think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed
in the position of the defendant, would, in our opinion, have recognized
that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would
therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and rider as a reasonable
consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law
imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened
harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for
he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong
side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also
negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which
agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the
negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff
by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to
the prior negligence of the other party.
The decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil.
Rep., 359) should perhaps be mentioned in this connection. This Court
there held that while contributory negligence on the part of the person
injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in
evidence to reduce the damages which would otherwise have been
assessed wholly against the other party. The defendant company had
there employed the plaintiff, a laborer, to assist in transporting iron rails
from a barge in Manila harbor to the company's yards located not far
away. The rails were conveyed upon cars which were hauled along a
narrow track. At a certain spot near the water's edge the track gave way
by reason of the combined effect of the weight of the car and the
insecurity of the road bed. The car was in consequence upset; the rails
slid off; and the plaintiff's leg was caught and broken. It appeared in
evidence that the accident was due to the effects of a typhoon which
had dislodged one of the supports of the track. The court found that the
defendant company was negligent in having failed to repair the bed of
the track and also that the plaintiff was, at the moment of the accident,
guilty of contributory negligence in walking at the side of the car instead
of being in front or behind. It was held that while the defendant was liable
to the plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having failed to keep the
track in proper repair, nevertheless the amount of the damages should
be reduced on account of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
As will be seen the defendant's negligence in that case consisted in an
omission only. The liability of the company arose from its responsibility for
the dangerous condition of its track. In a case like the one now before
us, where the defendant was actually present and operating the
automobile which caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to
attempt to weigh the negligence of the respective parties in order to
apportion the damage according to the degree of their, relative fault. It
is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant was in this case
the immediate and determining cause of the accident and that the
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the
case.
A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special
defense pleaded in the defendant's answer, to the effect that the
subject matter of the action had been previously adjudicated in the
court of a justice of the peace. In this connection it appears that soon
after the accident in question occurred, the plaintiff caused criminal
proceedings to be instituted before a justice of the peace charging the
defendant with the infliction of serious injuries (lesiones graves). At the
preliminary investigation the defendant was discharged by the
magistrate and the proceedings were dismissed. Conceding that the
acquittal of the defendant at a trial upon the merits in a criminal
1
prosecution for the offense mentioned would be res adjudicata, upon
the question of his civil liability arising from negligence a point upon
which it is unnecessary to express an opinion the action of the justice of
the peace in dismissing the criminal proceeding upon the preliminary
hearing can have no such effect. (See U. S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela,
31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court
must be reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the plaintiff
recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with
costs of both instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include
the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or
damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on the
whole to the date of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the
plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such character as not to be
recoverable. So ordered.
[ G.R. No. L-21291, March 28, 1969 ]
PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. THE MANILA RAILROAD
CO., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
Youth, the threshold of life, is invariably accompanied by that euphoric
sense of well-being, and with reason. The future, bright with promise,
looms ahead. One's powers are still to be tested, but one feels ready for
whatever challenge may come his way. There is that heady atmosphere
of self-confidence, at times carried to excess. The temptation to take
risks is there, ever so often, difficult, if not impossible, to resist. There could
be then a lessening of prudence and foresight, qualities usually
associated with age. For death seems so remote and contingent an
event. Such is not always the case though, and a slip may be attended
with consequences at times unfortunate, even fatal.
Some such thought apparently was in the mind of the lower court when
it dismissed the complaint for recovery of damages filed by plaintiff-
appellant, Preciolita V. Corliss, whose husband, the late Ralph W. Corliss,
was, at the tender age of twenty-one, the victim of a grim tragedy, when
the jeep he was driving collided with a locomotive of defendant-
appellee Manila Railroad Company, close to midnight on the evening of
February 21, 1957, at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles,
Pampanga, in front of the Clark Air Force Base. In the decision appealed
from, the lower court, after summarizing the evidence, concluded that
the deceased "in his eagerness to beat, so to speak, the on-coming
locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but
unfortunately he became the victim of his own mis-calculation."[1]
The negligence imputed to defendant-appellee was thus ruled out by
the lower court, satisfactory proof to that effect, in its opinion, being
lacking. Hence this appeal direct to us, the amount sought in the
concept of damages reaching the sum a P282,065.40. An examination
of the evidence of record fails to yield a basis for a reversal of the
decision appealed from. We affirm.
According to the decision appealed from, there is no dispute as to the
following: "In December 1956, plaintiff, 19 years of age, married Ralph W.
Corliss, Jr., 21 years of age, * * *; that Corliss, Jr. was an air police of the
Clark Air Force Base; that at the time of the accident, he was driving the
fatal jeep; that he was then returning in said jeep, together with a P. C.
soldier, to the Base; and that Corliss, Jr. died of serious burns at the Base
Hospital the next day, while the soldier sustained serious physical injuries
and burns."[2]
Then came a summary of the testimony of two of the witnesses for
plaintiff-appellant. Thus: "Ronald J. Ennis, a witness of the plaintiff,
substantially declared in his deposition, * * *, that at the time of the
accident, he was awaiting transportation at the entrance of Clark Field,
which was about 40 to 50 yards away from the tracks and that while
there he saw the jeep coming towards the Base. He said that said jeep
slowed down before reaching the crossing, that it made a brief stop but
that it did not stop dead stop. Elaborating, he declared that while it was
slowing down, Corliss, Jr. shifted into first gear and that was what he
meant by a brief stop. He also testified that he could see the train
coming from the direction of San Fernando and that he heard a warning
but that it was not sufficient enough to avoid the accident."[3] Also:
"Virgilio de la Paz, another witness of the plaintiff, testified that on the
night of February 21, 1957, he was at the Balibago checkpoint and saw
the train coming from Angeles and a jeep going towards the direction of
Clark Field. He stated that he heard the whistle of the locomotive and
saw the collision. The jeep, which caught fire, was pushed forward. He
helped the P. C. soldier. He stated that he saw the jeep running fast and
heard the tooting of the horn. It did not stop at the railroad crossing,
according to him."[4]
After which reference was made to the testimony of the main witness for
defendant-appellee, Teodorico Capin, "who was at the engine at the
time of the mishap," and who "testified that before the locomotive, which
had been previously inspected and found to be in good condition,
approached the crossing, that is, about 300 meters away, he blew the
siren and repeated it in compliance with the regulations until he saw the
jeep suddenly spurt, and that although the locomotive was running
between 20 and 25 kilometers an hour and although he had applied the
brakes, the jeep was caught in the middle of the tracks."[5]
1. The above finding as to the non-existence of negligence attributable
to defendant-appellee Manila Railroad Company comes to us encased
in the armor of what admittedly appears to be a careful judicial
appraisal and scrutiny of the evidence of record. It is thus proof against
any attack unless sustained and overwhelming. Not that it is
invulnerable, but it is likely to stand firth in the face of even the most
formidable barrage.
In the more traditional terminology, the lower court judgment has in its
favor the presumption of correctness. It is entitled to great respect. After
all, the lower court had the opportunity of weighing carefully what was
testified to and apparently did not neglect it. There is no affront to justice
then if its finding be accorded acceptance, subject of course to the
contingency of ulti-mate reversal if error or errors, substantial in
character, be shown in the conclusion thus arrived at. It is a fair
statement of the governing principle to say that the appellate function is
exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the result
reached by the trial court.
As was held in a 1961 decision: "We have already ruled that when the
credibility of witnesses is the one at issue, the trial court's judgment as to
their degree of credence deserves serious consideration by this Court."[6]
An earlier expression of the same view is found in Jai-Alai Corporation v.
Ching Kiat: "After going over the record, we find no reason for rejecting
the findings of the court below. The questions raised hinge on credibility,
and it is well-settled that in the absence of compelling reasons, its
determination is best left to the trial judge who had the advantage of
hearing the parties testify and of observing their demeanor on the witness
stand."[7]
In a 1964 opinion, we adhered to such an approach. Thus: "'Nothing in
the record suggests any arbitrary or abusive conduct on the part of the
trial judge in the formulation of the ruling. His conclusion on the matter is
sufficiently borne out by the evidence presented. We are denied,
therefore, the prerogative to disturb that finding, consonant to the time-
honored tradition of this Tribunal to hold trial judges better situated to
make conclusions on questions of fact.'"[8] On this ground alone we can
rest the affirmance of the judgment appealed from.
2. Nor is the result different even if no such presumption were indulged in
and the matter examined as if we were exercising original and not
appellate jurisdiction. The sad and deplorable situation in which plaintiff-
appellant now finds herself, to the contrary notwithstanding, we find no
reason for reversing the judgment of the lower court.
This action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making clear that
whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage done.[9] Unless it
could be satisfactorily shown, therefore, that defendant-appellee was
guilty of negli-gence then it could riot be held liable. The crucial
question, therefore, is the existence of negligence.
The above Civil Code provision, which is a reiteration of that found in the
Civil Code of Spain, formerly applicable in this jurisdiction,[10] had been
interpreted in earlier decisions. Thus, in Smith v. Cadwallader Gibson
Lumber Co.,[11] Manresa was cited to the following effect: "'Among the
questions most frequently raised and upon which the majority of cases
have been decided with respect to the application of this liability, are
those referring to the determination of the damage or prejudice, and to
the fault or negligence of the person responsible therefor. These are the
two indispensable factors in the obligations under discussion, for without
damage or prejudice there can be no liability, and although this element
is present no indemnity can be awarded unless arising from some
person's fault or negligence."
Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v.
Juanillo[12] and United States v. Barias[13] Cooley's formulation was
quoted with approval in both the Juanillo and Barias decisions. Thus:
"Judge Cooley, in his work on Torts (3d ed.)', Sec. 1324, defines
negligence to be: 'The failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circum-stances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.'" There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon
Telephone Co.[14] Thus: "Negligence is want of the care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and
its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree
of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.
2
Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the
failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances."
To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to
defendant-appellee, and the action of plaintiff-appellant must
necessary fail. The facts, being what they are, compel the conclusion
that the liability sought to be fastened on defendant-appellee had not
arisen.
3. Plaintiff-appellant, in her brief, however, would seek a reversal of the
judgment appealed from on the ground that there was a failure to
appreciate the true situation. Thus the first three assigned errors are
factual in character. The third assigned error could be summarily
disposed of. It would go against the evidence to maintain the view that
the whistle was not sounded and the brakes not applied at a distance of
300 meters before reaching the crossing
The first two assigned errors would make much of the failure of the lower
court to hold that the crossing bars not having been put down and there
being no guard at the gate-house, there still was a duty on the part of
Corliss to stop his jeep to avoid a collision and that Teodorico Capili, who
drove the engine, was not qualified to do so at the time of the accident.
For one cannot just single out a circumstance and then confidently
assign to it decisive weight and signifi-cance. Considered separately,
neither of the two above errors assigned would call for a judgment
different in character. Nor would a combination of acts allegedly
im-pressed with negligence suffice to alter the result. The quantum of
proof required still had not been met. The alleged errors fail of-their
desired effect. The case for plaintiff-appellant, such as it was, had not
been improved. There is no justification for reversing the judgment of the
lower court.
It cannot be stressed too much that the decisive consider-ations are too
variable, too dependent in the last analysis upon a common sense
estimate of the situation as it presented itself to the parties for us to be
able to say that this or that element having been isolated, negligence is
shown. The factors that enter the judgment are too many and diverse
for us 'to imprison them in a formula sufficient of itself to yield the correct
answer to the multi-faceted problems the question of negligence poses.
Every case must be dependent on its facts. The circumstances indicative
of lack of due care must be judged in the light of what could reasonably
be expected of the parties. If the objective standard of prudence be
met, then negligence is ruled out.
In this particular case, it would be to show less than fidelity to the
controlling facts to impute negligence to, defendant-appellee. The first
three errors assigned certainly do not call for that conclusion.
4. The fourth assigned error is deserving of a more extended treatment.
Plaintiff-appellant apparently had in mind this portion of the opinion of
the lower court: "The weight of authorities is to the effect that a railroad
track is in itself a warning or a signal of danger to those who go upon it,
and that those who, for reasons of their own, ignore such warning, do so
at their own risk and responsibility. Corliss, Jr., who un-doubtedly had
crossed the checkpoint frequently, if not daily, must have known that
locomotive engines and trains usually pass at that particular crossing
where the accident had taken place."[15]
Her assignment of error, however, would single out not the above
excerpt from the decision appealed from but what to her is the apparent
reliance of the lower court on Mestres v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light
Co.[16] and United States v. Manabat & Pasibi.[17] In the Manabat case,
the doctrine announced by this Court follows: "A person in control of an
automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and
who does not exercise that pre-caution and that control over it as to be
able to stop the same almost immediately upon the appearance of a
train, is guilty of criminal negligence, providing a collision occurs and
injury results. Considering the purposes and the general methods
adopted for the management of railroads and railroad trains, we think it
is incumbent upon one approaching a railroad crossing to use all of his
faculties of seeing and hearing. He should approach a railroad crossing
cautiously and carefully. He should look and listen and do everything
that a reasonably prudent man would do before he attempts to cross
the track." The Mestres doctrine in a suit arising from a collision between
an automobile and a street car is substantially similar. Thus: "It may be
said, however, that, where a person is nearing a street crossing toward
which a car is approaching, the duty is on the party to stop and avoid a
collision who can most readily adjust himself to the exigencies of the
case, and where such person can do so more readily, the motorman has
a right to presume that such duty will be performed."
It is true, as plaintiff-appellant would now v. Manila Railroad Co.,[18] the
controlling facts of allege, that there has been a drift away from the
apparent rigid and inflexible doctrine thus set forth in the two above
cases as evidenced by Lilius which, however, are easily distinguishable
from what had been correctly ascertained in the present case. Such a
deviation from the earlier principle announced is not only true of this
jurisdiction, but also of the United States.
This is made clear by Prosser. Speaking of a 1927 decision by Justice
Holmes, he had the following to say: "Especially noteworthy in this
respect is the attempt of Mr. Justice Holmes, in Baltimore & Ohio Railway
v. Goodman, to 'lay down a standard once for all, which would require
an automobile driver approach-ing a railroad crossing with an
obstructed view to stop, look and listen, and if he cannot be sure
otherwise that no train is coming, to get out of the car. The basic idea
behind this is sound enough: it is by no means proper care to cross a
railroad track without taking reasonable precautions against a train, and
normally such precautions will require looking, hearing, and a stop, or at
least slow speed, where the view is obstructed."[19]
Then, barely seven years later, in 1934, came Pokora v. Wabash
Railway,[20] where, according to Prosser, it being shown that "the only
effective stop must be made upon the rail-way tracks themselves, in a
position of obvious danger, the court disregarded any such uniform rule,
rejecting the 'get out of the car' requirement as 'an uncommon
precaution, likely to be futile and sometimes even dangerous, and saying
that the driver need not always stop. 'Illustrations such as these, said Mr.
Justice Cardozo, 'bear witness to the need for caution in framing
standards of behavior that amount to rules of law, * * * Extraordinary
situations may not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regu-lations that
are fitting for the commonplace or normal."[21]
What Justice Cardozo announced would merely emphasize what was
set forth earlier that each and every case on questions of negligence is
to be decided in accordance with the peculiar circumstances that
present themselves. There can be no hard and fast rule. There must be
that observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the situation demands. Thus defendant-appellee acted. It is
undeniable, then that no negligence can rightfully be imputed to it.
What commends itself for acceptance is this conclusion arrived at by the
lower court: "Predicated on the testimonies of the plaintiff's witnesses, on
the knowledge of the deceased and his familiarity with the setup of the
checkpoint, the existence of the tracks; and on the further fact that the
locomotive had blown its siren or whistle, which was heard by said
witnesses, it is clear that Corliss, Jr. was so sufficiently warned in ad-vance
of the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible
accident and this consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the
crossing and allowing the train to move on. A prudent man under similar
circumstances would have acted in this manner. This, unfortunately,
Corliss, Jr. failed to do."[22]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of November 29, 1962
dismissing the complaint, is affirmed. Without pro-nouncement as to
costs.
[ G.R. No. 171636, April 07, 2009 ]
NORMAN A. GAID, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the 12
July 2005 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals and its subsequent
Resolution[3] denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Norman A. Gaid was charged with the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide in an information which reads as follow:
That on or about 12:00 high noon of October 25, 2001, infront of the
Laguindingan National High School, Poblacion, Laguindingan, Misamis
Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused mentioned above while driving a passenger's jeepney
color white bearing plate no. KVG-771 owned by barangay captain Levy
Etom has no precautionary measure to preempt the accident, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously ran [sic] over Michael
Dayata resulting of [sic] his untimely death as pronounced by the
attending physician of Northern Mindanao Medical Center Hospital,
Cagayan de Oro City.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
At around 12:00 noon on 25 October 2001, petitioner was driving his
passenger jeepney along a two-lane road where the Laguindingan
National High School is located toward the direction of Moog in Misamis
3
Oriental. His jeepney was filled to seating capacity.[5] At the time several
students were coming out of the school premises.[6] Meanwhile, a
fourteen year-old student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), was seen by
eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a store on the left
side of the road. From where he was at the left side of the road, Dayata
raised his left hand to flag down petitioner's jeepney[7] which was
traveling on the right lane of the road.[8] However, neither did petitioner
nor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging
down the jeepney to ride at that point.[9]
The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayata's feet was pinned to the rear wheel
of the jeepney, after which, he laid flat on the ground behind the
jeepney.[10] Another prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub), who
was also situated on the left side of the street but directly in front of the
school gate, heard "a strong impact coming from the jeep sounding as
if the driver forced to accelerate in order to hurdle an obstacle."[11]
Dayata was then seen lying on the ground[12] and caught in between
the rear tires.[13] Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney had
bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right side.[14]
Mellalos heard a shout that a boy was run over, prompting him to jump
off the jeepney to help the victim. Petitioner stopped and saw Mellalos
carrying the body of the victim.[15] Mellalos loaded the victim on a
motorcycle and brought him to the hospital. Dayata was first brought to
the Laguindingan Health Center, but it was closed. Mellalos then
proceeded to the El Salvador Hospital. Upon advice of its doctors,
however, Dayata was brought to the Northern Mindanao Medical
Center where he was pronounced dead on arrival.[16]
Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating cranio-cerebral injuries as
the cause of death.[17] She testified that the head injuries of Dayata
could have been caused by having run over by the jeepney.[18]
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laguindingan[19] found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The
lower court held petitioner negligent in his driving considering that the
victim was dragged to a distance of 5.70 meters from the point of
impact. He was also scored for "not stopping his vehicle after noticing
that the jeepney's left rear tire jolted causing the vehicle to tilt towards
the right."[20] On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[21] affirmed in
toto the decision of the MCTC.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment with modification
in that it found petitioner guilty only of simple negligence resulting in
homicide.
The Court of Appeals exonerated petitioner from the charge of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide on the ground that he was not driving
recklessly at the time of the accident. However, the appellate court still
found him to be negligent when he failed "to promptly stop his vehicle to
check what caused the sudden jotting of its rear tire."[22]
In its 6 February 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.[23]
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that "there is
(sic) absolutely lack of precaution on the part of the petitioner when he
continued even after he had noticed that the left rear tire and the jeep
tilted to its right side."[24] Petitioner stressed that he, in fact, stopped his
jeep when its left rear tire bounced and upon hearing that somebody
had been ran over.
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a
grave abuse of discretion in convicting him of the offense of simple
negligence resulting in homicide. Assuming arguendo that he failed to
promptly stop his vehicle, petitioner maintains that no prudent man
placed in the same situation could have foreseen the vehicular accident
or could have stopped his vehicle in time when its left rear tire bounced
due to the following reasons: (1) the victim was only a trespasser; (2)
petitioner's attention was focused on the road and the students outside
the school's gate; and (3) the jeepney was fully loaded with passengers
and cargoes and it was impossible for the petitioner to promptly stop his
vehicle.[25]
The Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) maintained that petitioner was
negligent when he continued to run towards the direction of Moog,
Laguindingan, dragging the victim a few meters from the point of
impact, despite hearing that a child had been run over.[26]
The presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is
determined by the operative events leading to the death of Dayata
which actually comprised of two phases or stages. The first stage began
when Dayata flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left side
of the road and ended when he was run over by the jeepney. The
second stage covered the span between the moment immediately after
the victim was run over and the point when petitioner put the jeepney to
a halt.
During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent.
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without
malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act.[27]
In Manzanares v. People,[28] this Court convicted petitioner of the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and serious physical
injuries when he was found driving the Isuzu truck very fast before it
smashed into a jeepney.[29] Likewise, in Pangonorom v. People,[30] a
public utility driver, who was driving very fast, failed to slow down and hit
a swerving car. He was found negligent by this Court.
In the instant case, petitioner was driving slowly at the time of the
accident, as testified to by two eyewitnesses. Prosecution witness Actub
affirmed this fact on cross-examination, thus:
ATTY. MACUA:
(to the witness)
Q
Mr. Witness, when the passenger jeepney passed by the gate of the
Laguindingan National High School, is it running slowly, am I correct?
A
Yes, he was running slowly.[31]
The slow pace of the jeepney was seconded by Mellalos:
Q
You testified that you heard somebody outside from the vehicle shouting
that a boy was ran over, am I correct?
A
Yes, Sir.
Q
Now, before you heard that shouting, did you observe any motion from
the vehicle?
A
The jeep was moving slowly and I noticed that there was something that
[sic] the jeep a little bit bounced up as if a hump that's the time I heard
a shout from outside.[32]
Petitioner stated that he was driving at no more than 15 kilometers per
hour.[33]
It appears from the evidence Dayata came from the left side of the
street. Petitioner, who was driving the jeepney on the right lane, did not
see the victim flag him down. He also failed to see him go near the
jeepney at the left side. Understandably, petitioner was focused on the
road ahead. In Dayata's haste to board the jeep which was then running,
his feet somehow got pinned to the left rear tire, as narrated by Bongolto.
Actub only saw Dayata after he heard a strong impact coming from the
jeep.
With the foregoing facts, petitioner can not be held liable during the first
stage. Specifically, he cannot be held liable for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, as found by the trial court. The proximate cause of
the accident and the death of the victim was definitely his own
negligence in trying to catch up with the moving jeepney to get a ride.
In the instant case, petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he
drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity of the school. He cannot be
faulted for not having seen the victim who came from behind on the left
side.
However, the Court of Appeals found petitioner guilty of simple
negligence resulting in homicide for failing to stop driving at the time
when he noticed the bouncing of his vehicle. Verily, the appellate court
was referring to the second stage of the incident.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection
of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.[34]
The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of
precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly
manifest.[35]
4
The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing
an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of
another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law
imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take
precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do
so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist.[36]
In Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[37]
the petitioner was the franchisee that operates and maintains the toll
facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways. It failed to exercise
the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The
lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were removed even as
flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground. The highway was still
wet from the juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes. The petitioner
should have foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would
endanger motorists passing by at night or in the wee hours of the
morning.[38] Consequently, it was held liable for damages.
In an American case, Hernandez v. Lukas,[39] a motorist traveling within
the speed limit and did all was possible to avoid striking a child who was
then six years old only. The place of the incident was a neighborhood
where children were playing in the parkways on prior occasions. The
court ruled that it must be still proven that the driver did not exercise due
care. The evidence showed that the driver was proceeding in lawful
manner within the speed limit when the child ran into the street and was
struck by the driver's vehicle. Clearly, this was an emergency situation
thrust upon the driver too suddenly to avoid.
In this case, the courts below zeroed in on the fact that petitioner did not
stop the jeepney when he felt the bouncing of his vehicle, a
circumstance which the appellate court equates with negligence.
Petitioner contends that he did not immediately stop because he did not
see anybody go near his vehicle at the time of the incident.[40]
Assuming arguendo that petitioner had been negligent, it must be shown
that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Proximate
cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have
occurred.[41] In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent
operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal
connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages
complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing
factor in the causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an
injury.[42]
The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of impact proved to
be the immediate cause of his death, as indicated in the post-mortem
findings.[43] His skull was crushed as a result of the accident. Had
petitioner immediately stopped the jeepney, it would still not have saved
the life of the victim as the injuries he suffered were fatal.
The evidence on record do not show that the jeepney dragged the
victim after he was hit and run over by the jeepney. Quite the contrary,
the evidence discloses that the victim was not dragged at all. In fact, it
is the other way around. Bongolto narrated that after the impact, he saw
Dayata left behind the jeepney.[44] Actub saw Dayata in a prone
position and bleeding within seconds after impact.[45] Right after the
impact, Mellalos immediately jumped out of the jeepney and saw the
victim lying on the ground.[46] The distance of 5.70 meters is the length
of space between the spot where the victim fell to the ground and the
spot where the jeepney stopped as observed by the trial judge during
the ocular inspection at the scene of the accident.[47]
Moreover, mere suspicions and speculations that the victim could have
lived had petitioner stopped can never be the basis of a conviction in a
criminal case.[48] The Court must be satisfied that the guilt of the
accused had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.[49] Conviction
must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilt of the
accused. The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts
the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains doubt as to his
guilt.[50]
Clearly then, the prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate
cause of the victim's death was petitioner's alleged negligence, if at all,
even during the second stage of the incident.
If at all again, petitioner's failure to render assistance to the victim would
constitute abandonment of one's victim punishable under Article 275 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, the omission is not covered by the
information. Thus, to hold petitioner criminally liable under the provision
would be tantamount to a denial of due process.
Therefore, petitioner must be acquitted at least on reasonable doubt.
The award of damages must also be deleted pursuant to Article 2179 of
the Civil Code which states that when the plaintiff's own negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 12 July 2005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Norman
A. Gaid is ACQUITTED of the crime of Simple Negligence Resulting in
Homicide as found by the Court of Appeals and of the charge of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in Criminal Case No. 1937 of
the MCTC of Laguindingan, Misamis Oriental.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 169467, February 25, 2010 ]
ALFREDO P. PACIS AND CLEOPATRA D. PACIS, PETITIONERS, VS. JEROME
JOVANNE MORALES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review[1] assails the 11 May 2005 Decision[2] and the 19
August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60669.
The Facts
On 17 January 1995, petitioners Alfredo P. Pacis and Cleopatra D. Pacis
(petitioners) filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against
respondent Jerome Jovanne Morales (respondent). Petitioners are the
parents of Alfred Dennis Pacis, Jr. (Alfred), a 17-year old student who died
in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store
(gun store) in Baguio City. Respondent is the owner of the gun store.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
On January 19, 1991, Alfred Dennis Pacis, then 17 years old and a first
year student at the Baguio Colleges Foundation taking up BS Computer
Science, died due to a gunshot wound in the head which he sustained
while he was at the Top Gun Firearm[s] and Ammunition[s] Store located
at Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City. The gun store was owned and
operated by defendant Jerome Jovanne Morales.
With Alfred Pacis at the time of the shooting were Aristedes Matibag and
Jason Herbolario. They were sales agents of the defendant, and at that
particular time, the caretakers of the gun store.
The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Pacis was fired from a gun brought
in by a customer of the gun store for repair.
The gun, an AMT Automag II Cal. 22 Rimfire Magnum with Serial No. SN-
H34194 (Exhibit "Q"), was left by defendant Morales in a drawer of a table
located inside the gun store.
Defendant Morales was in Manila at the time. His employee Armando
Jarnague, who was the regular caretaker of the gun store was also not
around. He left earlier and requested sales agents Matibag and
Herbolario to look after the gun store while he and defendant Morales
were away. Jarnague entrusted to Matibag and Herbolario a bunch of
keys used in the gun store which included the key to the drawer where
the fatal gun was kept.
It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from
the drawer and placed it on top of the table. Attracted by the sight of
the gun, the young Alfred Dennis Pacis got hold of the same. Matibag
asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to return the gun. The latter followed and
handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young
Alfred in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag before branch
VII of this Court. Matibag, however, was acquitted of the charge against
him because of the exempting circumstance of "accident" under Art. 12,
par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case
for homicide against Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as
part of their evidence in the instant case.[3]
On 8 April 1998, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
5
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiffs [Spouses Alfredo P. Pacis and Cleopatra D. Pacis] and
against the defendant [Jerome Jovanne Morales] ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiffs --
(1) P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Alfred Pacis;
(2) P29,437.65 as actual damages for the hospitalization and burial
expenses incurred by the plaintiffs;
(3) P100,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(4) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(5) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision[5] dated
11 May 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's Decision and
absolved respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.[6]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals
denied in its Resolution dated 19 August 2005.
Hence, this petition.
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court held respondent civilly liable for the death of Alfred under
Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.[7] The trial court
held that the accidental shooting of Alfred which caused his death was
partly due to the negligence of respondent's employee Aristedes
Matibag (Matibag). Matibag and Jason Herbolario (Herbolario) were
employees of respondent even if they were only paid on a commission
basis. Under the Civil Code, respondent is liable for the damages caused
by Matibag on the occasion of the performance of his duties, unless
respondent proved that he observed the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage. The trial court held that respondent
failed to observe the required diligence when he left the key to the
drawer containing the loaded defective gun without instructing his
employees to be careful in handling the loaded gun.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
The Court of Appeals held that respondent cannot be held civilly liable
since there was no employer-employee relationship between
respondent and Matibag. The Court of Appeals found that Matibag was
not under the control of respondent with respect to the means and
methods in the performance of his work. There can be no employer-
employee relationship where the element of control is absent. Thus,
Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case and respondent
cannot be held liable.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that even if respondent is
considered an employer of Matibag, still respondent cannot be held
liable since no negligence can be attributed to him. As explained by the
Court of Appeals:
Granting arguendo that an employer-employee relationship existed
between Aristedes Matibag and the defendant-appellant, we find that
no negligence can be attributed to him.
Negligence is best exemplified in the case of Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. 809).
The test of negligence is this:
"x x x. Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the
law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or take
precaution against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. x x x."
Defendant-appellant maintains that he is not guilty of negligence and
lack of due care as he did not fail to observe the diligence of a good
father of a family. He submits that he kept the firearm in one of his table
drawers, which he locked and such is already an indication that he took
the necessary diligence and care that the said gun would not be
accessible to anyone. He puts [sic] that his store is engaged in selling
firearms and ammunitions. Such items which are per se dangerous are
kept in a place which is properly secured in order that the persons
coming into the gun store would not be able to take hold of it unless it is
done intentionally, such as when a customer is interested to purchase
any of the firearms, ammunitions and other related items, in which case,
he may be allowed to handle the same.
We agree. Much as We sympathize with the family of the deceased,
defendant-appellant is not to be blamed. He exercised due diligence in
keeping his loaded gun while he was on a business trip in Manila. He
placed it inside the drawer and locked it. It was taken away without his
knowledge and authority. Whatever happened to the deceased was
purely accidental.[8]
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE
DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IN DISREGARD OF LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE BY REVERSING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT (BRANCH 59) OF BAGUIO CITY NOTWITHSTANDING CLEAR,
AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND TESTIMONIES PRESENTED DURING THE TRIAL
WHICH NEGATE AND CONTRADICT ITS FINDINGS.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE, REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RENDERING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN QUESTION BY DEPARTING
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
THEREBY IGNORING THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT (BRANCH 59) OF BAGUIO CITY SHOWING PETITIONER'S CLEAR
RIGHTS TO THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.[9]
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition meritorious.
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners'
son. Under Article 1161[10] of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce
their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime
under Article 100[11] of the Revised Penal Code or they may opt to file
an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this
case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case
filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil
action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was
Matibag's employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103[12] of the
Revised Penal Code,[13] the liability of the employer, or any person for
that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct,
based on a person's own negligence. Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun
store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the "Policy on Firearms and
Ammunition Dealership/Repair," a person who is in the business of
purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic
security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License
to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.[14]
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his
possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in
character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in
possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take
exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby.[15]
Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a
business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a
higher degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable
about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded
weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others.
Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not
loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from
ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access
defensive use.[16] With more reason, guns accepted by the store for
repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and
may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this
case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for
repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not
loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in
a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent
should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward
accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from
another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally
checked that the weapon is completely unloaded.[17] For failing to
insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent.
Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a
License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to
restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.[18]
6
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence
required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care
required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would
exempt him from liability in this case.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 11 May 2005
Decision and the 19 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 60669. We REINSTATE the trial court's Decision dated 8
April 1998.
[ G.R. No. 51806, November 08, 1988 ]
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS
AND ERNEST E. SIMKE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CORTES, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming the trial court decision which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff the amount of P15,589.55 as full reimbursement of his actual
medical and hospital expenses, with interest at the legal rate from the
commencement of the suit; the amount of P20,200.00 as consequential
damages; the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages; the amount of
P40,000.00 as exemplary damages; the further amount of P20,000.00 as
attorney's fees and the costs [Rollo, p. 24.]
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondent is a naturalized Filipino citizen and at the time of the
incident was the Honorary Consul General of Israel in the Philippines.
In the afternoon of December 13, 1968, private respondent with several
other persons went to the Manila International Airport to meet his future
son-in-law. In order to get a better view of the incoming passengers, he
and his group proceeded to the viewing deck or terrace of the airport.
While walking on the terrace, then filled with other people, private
respondent slipped over an elevation about four (4) inches high at the
far end of the terrace. As a result, private respondent fell on his back and
broke his thigh bone.
The next day, December 14, 1968, private respondent was operated on
for about three hours.
Private respondent then filed an action for damages based on quasi-
delict with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VII against petitioner
Civil Aeronautics Administration or CAA as the entity empowered "to
administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila
International Airport. . . ." [Sec. 32 (24), R.A. 776.]
Said claim for damages included, aside from the medical and hospital
bills, consequential damages for the expenses of two lawyers who had
to go abroad in private respondent's stead to finalize certain business
transactions and for the publication of notices announcing the
postponement of private respondent's daughter's wedding which had to
be cancelled because of his accident [Record on Appeal, p. 5.]
Judgment was rendered in private respondent's favor prompting
petitioner to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the trial
court's decision. Petitioner then filed with the same court a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was denied.
Petitioner now comes before this Court raising the following assignment
of errors:
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that the present suit
against the CAA is really a suit against the Republic of the Philippines
which cannot be sued without its consent, which was not given in this
case.
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that the injuries of
respondent Ernest E. Simke were due to petitioner's negligence --
although there was no substantial evidence to support such finding; and
that the inference that the hump or elevation in the surface of the floor
area of the terrace of the (old) MIA building is dangerous just because
said respondent tripped over it is manifestly mistaken ---circumstances
that justify a review by this Honorable Court of the said finding of fact of
respondent appellate court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622;
Ramos v. CA, 63 SCRA 331).
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ordering petitioner to pay actual,
consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees
to respondent Simke -- although there was no substantial and competent
proof to support said awards [Rollo, pp. 93-94.]
I.
Invoking the rule that the State cannot be sued without its consent,
petitioner contends that being an agency of the government, it cannot
be made a party-defendant in this case.
This Court has already held otherwise in the case of National Airports
Corporation v. Teodoro, Sr. [91 Phil. 203 (1952).]
Petitioner contends that the said ruling does not apply in this case
because: First, in the Teodoro case, the CAA was sued only in a
substituted capacity, the National Airports Corporation being the original
party. Second, in the Teodoro case, the cause of action was contractual
in nature while here, the cause of action is based on a quasi-delict. Third,
there is no specific provision in Republic Act No. 776, the law governing
the CAA, which would justify the conclusion that petitioner was
organized for business and not for governmental purposes [Rollo, pp. 94-
97.]
Such arguments are untenable.
First, the Teodoro case, far from stressing the point that the CAA was only
substituted for the National Airports Corporation, in fact treated the CAA
as the real party in interest when it stated that:
*** *** ***
. . . To all legal intents and practical purposes, the National Airports
Corporation is dead and the Civil Aeronautics Administration is its heir or
legal representative, acting by the law of its creation upon its own rights
and in its own name. The better practice then should have been to make
the Civil Aeronautics Administration the third party defendant instead of
the National Airports Corporation. [National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro,
supra, p. 208.]
*** *** ***
Second, the Teodoro case did not make any qualification or limitation as
to whether or not the CAA's power to sue and be sued applies only to
contractual obligations. The Court in the Teodoro case ruled that
Sections 3 and 4 of Executive Order 365 confer upon the CAA, without
any qualification, the power to sue and be sued, albeit only by
implication. Accordingly, this Court's pronouncement that where such
power to sue and be sued has been granted without any qualification,
it can include a claim based on tort or quasi-delict [Rayo v. Courts of First
Instance of Bulacan, G.R. Nos. 55273-83, December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA
456] finds relevance and applicability to the present case.
Third, it has already been settled in the Teodoro case that the CAA as an
agency is not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining
to a private entity.
*** *** ***
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a
private entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the
National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of
government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be
not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the
convenience of the travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise
which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than
the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns
[National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, supra, p. 207.]
*** *** ***
True, the law prevailing in 1952 when the Teodoro case was promulgated
was Exec. Order 365 (Reorganizing the Civil Aeronautics Administration
and Abolishing the National Airports Corporation.) Republic Act No. 776
(Civil Aeronautics Act of the Philippines), subsequently enacted on June
20, 1952, did not alter the character of the CAA's objectives under Exec.
Order 365. The pertinent provisions cited in the Teodoro case, particularly
Secs. 3 and 4 of Exec. Order 365, which led the Court to consider the
CAA in the category of a private entity were retained substantially in
Republic Act 776, Sec. 32 (24) and (25). Said Act provides:
Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. - Subject to the general
control and supervision of the Department Head, the Administrator shall
have among others, the following powers and duties:
7
*** *** ***
(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the
Manila International Airport and all government-owned aerodromes
except those controlled or operated by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines including such powers and duties as: (a) to plan, design,
construct, equip, expand, improve, repair or alter aerodromes or such
structures, improvement or air navigation facilities; (b) to enter into, make
and execute contracts of any kind with any person, firm, or public or
private corporation or entity;
(25) To determine, fix, impose, collect and receive landing fees, parking
space fees, royalties on sales or deliveries, direct or indirect, to any
aircraft for its use of aviation gasoline, oil and lubricants, spare parts,
accessories and supplies, tools, other royalties, fees or rentals for the use
of any of the property under its management and control.
*** *** ***
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the CAA is tasked with private or
non-governmental functions which operate to remove it from the
purview of the rule on State immunity from suit. For the correct rule as set
forth in the Teodoro case states:
*** *** ***
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are
immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of
the objects for which the entity was organized. The rule is thus stated in
Corpus Juris:
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have
assumed to act in private or non-governmental capa-city, and various
suits against certain corporations created by the state for public
purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of
ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political
character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The latter is true,
although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation for
by engaging in business operations through a corporation, the state
divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by implication consents
to suits against the corporation. (59 C.J., 313) [National Airports
Corporation v. Teodoro, supra, pp. 206-207; Underscoring supplied.]
This doctrine has been reaffirmed in the recent case of Malong v.
Philippine National Railways [G.R. No. L-49930, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA
63], where it was held that the Philippine National Railways, although
owned and operated by the government, was not immune from suit as
it does not exercise sovereign but purely proprietary and business
functions. Accordingly, as the CAA was created to undertake the
management of airport operations which primarily involve proprietary
functions, it can not avail of the immunity from suit accorded to
government agencies performing strictly governmental functions.
II
Petitioner tries to escape liability on the ground that there was no basis
for a finding of negligence. There can be no negligence on its part, it
alleged, because the elevation in question "had a legitimate purpose for
being on the terrace and was never intended to trip down people and
injure them. It was there for no other purpose but to drain water on the
floor area of the terrace" [Rollo, p. 99.]
To determine whether or not the construction of the elevation was done
in a negligent manner, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of
the premises.
*** *** ***
. . . This Court after its ocular inspection found the elevation shown in Exhs.
A or 6-A where plaintiff slipped to be a step, a dangerous sliding step,
and the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
*** *** ***
This Court during its ocular inspection also observed the dangerous and
defective condition of the open terrace which has remained unrepaired
through the years. It has observed the lack of maintenance and upkeep
of the MIA terrace, typical of many government buildings and offices.
Aside from the litter allowed to accumulate in the terrace, pot holes
caused by missing tiles remained unrepaired and unattended. The
several elevations shown in the exhibits presented were verified by this
Court during the ocular inspection it undertook. Among these elevations
is the one (Exh. A) where plaintiff slipped. This Court also observed the
other hazard, the slanting or sliding step (Exh. B) as one passes the
entrance door leading to the terrace [Record on Appeal, U.S., pp. 56
and 59; Underscoring supplied.]
The Court of Appeals further noted that:
The inclination itself is an architectural anomaly for as stated by the said
witness, it is neither a ramp because a ramp is an inclined surface in such
a way that it will prevent people or pedestrians from sliding. But if, it is a
step then it will not serve its purpose, for pedestrian purposes (tsn, p. 35,
id.) [Rollo, p. 29.]
These factual findings are binding and conclusive upon this Court.
Hence, the CAA cannot disclaim its liability for the negligent construction
of the elevation since under Republic Act No. 776, it was charged with
the duty of planning, designing, constructing, equipping, expanding,
improving, repairing or altering aerodromes or such structures,
improvements or air navigation facilities [Section 32, supra, R.A. 776.] In
the discharge of this obligation, the CAA is duty-bound to exercise due
diligence in overseeing the construction and maintenance of the
viewing deck or terrace of the airport.
It must be borne in mind that pursuant to Article 1173 of the Civil Code,
"(t)he fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the
place." Here, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing deck,
a facility open to the public, requires that CAA insure the safety of the
viewers using it. As these people come to the viewing deck to watch the
planes and passengers, their tendency would be to look to where the
planes and the incoming passengers are and not to look down on the
floor or pavement of the viewing deck. The CAA should have thus made
sure that no dangerous obstructions or elevations exist on the floor of the
deck to prevent any undue harm to the public.
The legal foundation of CAA's liability for quasi--delict can be found in
Article 2176 of the Civil Code which provides that "(w)hoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. . . ." As the CAA knew of the
existence of the dangerous elevation which it claims though, was made
precisely in accordance with the plans and specifications of the building
for proper drainage of the open terrace [See Record on Appeal, pp. 13
and 57; Rollo, p. 39], its failure to have it repaired or altered in order to
eliminate the existing hazard constitutes such negligence as to warrant
a finding of liability based on quasi-delict upon CAA.
The Court finds the contention that private respondent was, at the very
least, guilty of contributory negligence, thus reducing the damages that
plaintiff may recover, unmeritorious. Contributory negligence under
Article 2179 of the Civil Code contemplates a negligent act or omission
on the part of the plaintiff, which although not the proximate cause of
his injury, contributed to his own damage, the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's own injury being the defendant's lack of due care. In the instant
case, no contributory negligence can be imputed to the private
respondent, considering the following test formulated in the early case
of Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918):
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent man would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard suppose to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of the negligence
in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment
of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man
in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular
case. Abstract speculations cannot be here of much value but this much
can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the
circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not,
and are not supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they can
be expected to take care only when there is something before them to
suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If
so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that
harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence
can be held to exist. . . . [Picart v. Smith, supra, p. 813; Underscoring
supplied.]
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the lower
court, could not have reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall
him, considering the attendant factual circumstances. Even if the private
respondent had been looking where he was going, the step in question
could not easily be noticed because of its construction. As the trial court
found:
In connection with the incident testified to, a sketch, Exhibit O, shows a
section of the floorings on which plaintiff had tripped. This sketch reveals
two pavements adjoining each other, one being elevated by four and
one-fourth inches than the other. From the architectural standpoint the
8
higher pavement is a step. However, unlike a step commonly seen
around, the edge of the elevated pavement slanted outward as one
walks to the interior of the terrace. The length of the inclination between
the edges of the two pavements is three inches. Obviously, plaintiff had
stepped on the inclination because had his foot landed on the lower
pavement he would not have lost his balance. The same sketch shows
that both pavements including the inclined portion are tiled in red
cement, and as shown by the photograph Exhibit A, the lines of the tilings
are continuous. It would therefore be difficult for a pedestrian to see the
inclination especially where there are plenty of persons in the terrace as
was the situation when plaintiff fell down. There was no warning sign to
direct one's attention to the change in the elevation of the floorings.
[Rollo, pp. 28-29.]
III
Finally, petitioner appeals to this Court the award of damages to private
respondent. The liability of CAA to answer for damages, whether actual,
moral or exemplary, cannot be seriously doubted in view of the
conferment of the power to sue and be sued upon it, which, as held in
the case of Rayo v. Court of First Instance, supra, includes liability on a
claim for quasi-delict. In the aforestated case, the liability of the National
Power Corporation to answer for damages resulting from its act of
sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of the Angat Dam, which
caused the death of several residents of the area and the destruction of
properties, was upheld since the grant of the power to sue and be sued
upon it necessarily implies that it can be held answerable for its tortious
acts or any wrongful act for that matter.
With respect to actual or compensatory damages, the law mandates
that the same be proven.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to
an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him
as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages [New Civil Code.]
Private respondent claims P15,589.55 representing medical and
hospitalization bills. This Court finds the same to have been duly proven
through the testimony of Dr. Ambrosio Tangco, the physician who
attended to private respondent (Rollo, p. 26) and who identified Exh. "H"
which was his bill for professional services [Rollo, p. 31.]
Concerning the P20,200.00 alleged to have been spent for other
expenses such as the transportation of the two lawyers who had to
represent private respondent abroad and the publication of the
postponement notices of the wedding, the Court holds that the same
had also been duly proven. Private respondent had adequately shown
the existence of such losses and the amount thereof in the testimonies
before the trial court [CA decision, p. 8.] At any rate, the findings of the
Court of Appeals with respect to this are findings of facts [One Heart
Sporting Club, Inc. v. Courts of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 53790-53972, Oct. 23,
1981, 108 SCRA 416] which, as has been held time and again, are, as a
general rule, conclusive before this Court [Sese v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 66186, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 585.]
With respect to the P30,000.00 awarded as moral damages, the Court
holds private respondent entitled thereto because of the physical
suffering and physical injuries caused by the negligence of the CAA [Arts.
2217 and 2219 (2), New Civil Code.]
With respect to the award of exemplary damages, the Civil Code
explicitly states:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence.
Gross negligence which, according to the Court, is equivalent to the
term "notorious negligence" and consists in the failure to exercise even
slight care [Caunan v. Compania General de Tobacos, 56 Phil. 542
(1932)] can be attributed to the CAA for its failure to remedy the
dangerous condition of the questioned elevation or to even post a
warning sign directing the attention of the viewers to the change in the
elevation of the floorings notwithstanding its knowledge of the hazard
posed by such elevation [Rollo, pp. 28-29; Record on Appeal, P. 57.] The
wanton disregard by the CAA of the safety of the people using the
viewing deck, who are charged an admission fee, including the
petitioner who paid the entrance fees to get inside the vantage place
[CA decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 25] and are, therefore, entitled to expect a
facility that is properly and safely maintained -- justifies the award of
exemplary damages against the CAA as a deterrent and by way of
example or correction for the public good. The award of P40,000.00 by
the trial court as exemplary damages appropriately underscores the
point that as an entity charged with providing service to the public, the
CAA, like all other entities serving the public has the obligation to provide
the public with reasonably safe service.
Finally, the award of attorney's fees is also upheld considering that under
Art. 2208 (1) of the Civil Code, the same may be awarded whenever
exemplary damages are awarded, as in this case, and, at any rate,
under Art. 2208 (11), the Court has the discretion to grant the same when
it is just and equitable.
However, since the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) has
taken over the management and operations of the Manila International
Airport [renamed Ninoy Aquino International Airport under Republic Act
No. 6639] pursuant to Executive Order No. 778 as amended by Executive
Orders Nos. 903 (1983), 909 (1983) and 298 (1987) and under Section 24
of the said Exec. Order 778, the MIAA has assumed all the debts, liabilities
and obligations of the now defunct Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA), the liabilities of the CAA have now been transferred to the MIAA.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Petition for review on
Certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 51172-R is AFFIRMED.
[ G.R. No. 189998, August 29, 2012 ]
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., PETITIONER, VS. ELLEN
JOHANNE HARPER, JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER HARPER, AND RIGOBERTO
GILLERA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The hotel owner is liable for civil damages to the surviving heirs of its hotel
guest whom strangers murder inside his hotel room.
The Case
Petitioner, the owner and operator of the 5-star Shangri-La Hotel in
Makati City (Shangri-La Hotel), appeals the decision promulgated on
October 21, 2009,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the judgment rendered on October 25, 2005 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City holding petitioner liable for
damages for the murder of Christian Fredrik Harper, a Norwegian
national.[2] Respondents Ellen Johanne Harper and Jonathan
Christopher Harper are the widow and son of Christian Harper, while
respondent Rigoberto Gillera is their authorized representative in the
Philippines.
Antecedents
In the first week of November 1999, Christian Harper came to Manila on
a business trip as the Business Development Manager for Asia of ALSTOM
Power Norway AS, an engineering firm with worldwide operations. He
checked in at the Shangri-La Hotel and was billeted at Room 1428. He
was due to check out on November 6, 1999. In the early morning of that
date, however, he was murdered inside his hotel room by still unidentified
malefactors. He was then 30 years old.
How the crime was discovered was a story in itself. A routine verification
call from the American Express Card Company to cardholder Harper's
residence in Oslo, Norway (i.e., Bygdoy Terasse 16, 0287 Oslo, Norway)
led to the discovery. It appears that at around 11:00 am of November 6,
1999, a Caucasian male of about 30 32 years in age, 5'4" in height, clad
in maroon long sleeves, black denims and black shoes, entered the Alexis
Jewelry Store in Glorietta, Ayala Center, Makati City and expressed
interest in purchasing a Cartier lady's watch valued at P320,000.00 with
the use of two Mastercard credit cards and an American Express credit
card issued in the name of Harper. But the customer's difficulty in
answering the queries phoned in by a credit card representative
sufficiently aroused the suspicion of saleslady Anna Liza Lumba (Lumba),
who asked for the customer's passport upon suggestion of the credit card
representative to put the credit cards on hold. Probably sensing trouble
for himself, the customer hurriedly left the store, and left the three credit
cards and the passport behind.
In the meanwhile, Harper's family in Norway must have called him at his
hotel room to inform him about the attempt to use his American Express
card. Not getting any response from the room, his family requested
Raymond Alarcon, the Duty Manager of the Shangri-La Hotel, to check
on Harper's room. Alarcon and a security personnel went to Room 1428
at 11:27 a.m., and were shocked to discover Harper's lifeless body on the
bed.
Col. Rodrigo de Guzman (de Guzman), the hotel's Security Manager,
initially investigated the murder. In his incident report, he concluded from
the several empty bottles of wine in the trash can and the number of
cigarette butts in the toilet bowl that Harper and his visitors had drunk
that much and smoked that many cigarettes the night before.[3]
9
The police investigation actually commenced only upon the arrival in the
hotel of the team of PO3 Carmelito Mendoza[4] and SPO4 Roberto Hizon.
Mendoza entered Harper's room in the company of De Guzman,
Alarcon, Gami Holazo (the hotel's Executive Assistant Manager), Norge
Rosales (the hotel's Executive Housekeeper), and Melvin Imperial (a
security personnel of the hotel). They found Harper's body on the bed
covered with a blanket, and only the back of the head could be seen.
Lifting the blanket, Mendoza saw that the victim's eyes and mouth had
been bound with electrical and packaging tapes, and his hands and
feet tied with a white rope. The body was identified to be that of hotel
guest Christian Fredrik Harper.
Mendoza subsequently viewed the closed circuit television (CCTV)
tapes, from which he found that Harper had entered his room at 12:14
a.m. of November 6, 1999, and had been followed into the room at 12:17
a.m. by a woman; that another person, a Caucasian male, had entered
Harper's room at 2:48 a.m.; that the woman had left the room at around
5:33 a.m.; and that the Caucasian male had come out at 5:46 a.m.
On November 10, 1999, SPO1 Ramoncito Ocampo, Jr. interviewed
Lumba about the incident in the Alexis Jewelry Shop. During the
interview, Lumba confirmed that the person who had attempted to
purchase the Cartier lady's watch on November 6, 1999 had been the
person whose picture was on the passport issued under the name of
Christian Fredrik Harper and the Caucasian male seen on the CCTV
tapes entering Harper's hotel room.
Sr. Insp. Danilo Javier of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Makati
City Police reflected in his Progress Report No. 2[5] that the police
investigation showed that Harper's passport, credit cards, laptop and an
undetermined amount of cash had been missing from the crime scene;
and that he had learned during the follow-up investigation about an
unidentified Caucasian male's attempt to purchase a Cartier lady's
watch from the Alexis Jewelry Store in Glorietta, Ayala Center, Makati
City with the use of one of Harper's credit cards.
On August 30, 2002, respondents commenced this suit in the RTC to
recover various damages from petitioner,[6] pertinently alleging:
xxx
7. The deceased was to check out and leave the hotel on November 6,
1999, but in the early morning of said date, while he was in his hotel room,
he was stabbed to death by an (sic) still unidentified male who had
succeeded to intrude into his room. 8. The murderer succeeded to
trespass into the area of the hotel's private rooms area and into the room
of the said deceased on account of the hotel's gross negligence in
providing the most basic security system of its guests, the lack of which
owing to the acts or omissions of its employees was the immediate cause
of the tragic death of said deceased.
xxx
10. Defendant has prided itself to be among the top hotel chains in the
East claiming to provide excellent service, comfort and security for its
guests for which reason ABB Alstom executives and their guests have
invariably chosen this hotel to stay.[7]
xxx
Ruling of the RTC
On October 25, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment after trial,[8] viz:
WHEREFORE, finding the defendant hotel to be remiss in its duties and
thus liable for the death of Christian Harper, this Court orders the
defendant to pay plaintiffs the amount of:
PhP 43,901,055.00 as and by way of actual and compensatory damages;
PhP 739,075.00 representing the expenses of transporting the remains of
Harper to Oslo, Norway;
PhP 250,000.00 attorney's fees;
and to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
Petitioner appealed, assigning to the RTC the following errors, to wit:
I Christian Fredrik Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper;
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS APPELLEES ARE THE
HEIRS OF THE LATE CHRISTIAN HARPER, AS THERE IS NO COMPETENT
EVIDENCE ON RECORD SUPPORTING SUCH RULING.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEFENDANT APPELLANT'S
NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF MR. HARPER,
OR IN NOT RULING THAT IT WAS MR. CHRISTIAN HARPER'S OWN
NEGLIGENCE WHICH WAS THE SOLE, PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS DEATH.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING TO THE PLAINTIFFS APPELLEES THE
AMOUNT OF PHP43,901,055.00, REPRESENTING THE ALLEGED LOST
EARNING OF THE LATE CHRISTIAN HARPER, THERE BEING NO COMPETENT
PROOF OF THE EARNING OF MR. HARPER DURING HIS LIFETIME AND OF THE
ALLEGATION THAT THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES ARE MR. HARPER'S HEIRS.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING TO THE PLAINTIFFS APPELLEES THE
AMOUNT OF PHP739,075.00, REPRESENTING THE ALLEGED COST OF
TRANSPORTING THE REMAINS OF MR. CHRISTIAN HARPER TO OSLO,
NORWAY, THERE BEING NO PROOF ON RECORD THAT IT WAS PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLEES WHO PAID FOR SAID COST.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COST OF
SUIT TO THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, THERE BEING NO PROOF ON RECORD
SUPPORTING SUCH AWARD.
On October 21, 2009, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC with
modification,[9] as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated
October 25, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accordingly,
defendant-appellant is ordered to pay plaintiffs-appellees the amounts
of P52,078,702.50, as actual and compensatory damages; P25,000.00, as
temperate damages; P250,000.00, as attorney's fees; and to pay the
costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Issues
Petitioner still seeks the review of the judgment of the CA, submitting the
following issues for consideration and determination, namely:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES WERE ABLE TO PROVE WITH
COMPETENT EVIDENCE THE AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
THAT THEY ARE THE WIDOW AND SON OF MR. CHRISTIAN HARPER.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLEES WERE ABLE TO PROVE WITH COMPETENT
EVIDENCE THE AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THAT THERE
WAS NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT AND ITS SAID
NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF MR.
CHRISTIAN HARPER.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF MR.
CHRISTIAN HARPER WAS HIS OWN NEGLIGENCE.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
1.
Requirements for authentication of documents establishing
respondents' legal relationship with the victim as his
heirs were complied with
As to the first issue, the CA pertinently held as follows:
The documentary evidence that plaintiffs-appellees offered relative to
their heirship consisted of the following
Exhibit "Q" -Birth Certificate of Jonathan Christopher Harper, son of
Exhibit "Q-1" -Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne Clausen and Christian
Fredrik Harper;
Exhibit "R" -Birth Certificate of Christian Fredrick Harper, son of Christopher
Shaun Harper and Eva Harper; and
10
Exhibit "R-1" -Certificate from the Oslo Probate Court stating that Ellen
Harper was married to the deceased, Christian Fredrick Harper and listed
Ellen Harper and Jonathan Christopher Harper as the heirs of Christian
Fredrik Harper.
Defendant-appellant points out that plaintiffs-appellees committed
several mistakes as regards the above documentary exhibits, resultantly
making them incompetent evidence, to wit, (a) none of the plaintiffs-
appellees or any of the witnesses who testified for the plaintiffs gave
evidence that Ellen Johanne Harper and Jonathan Christopher Harper
are the widow and son of the deceased Christian Fredrik Harper; (b)
Exhibit "Q" was labeled as Certificate of Marriage in plaintiffs-appellees'
Formal Offer of Evidence, when it appears to be the Birth Certificate of
the late Christian Harper; (c) Exhibit "Q-1" is a translation of the Marriage
Certificate of Ellen Johanne Harper and Christian Fredrik Harper, the
original of which was not produced in court, much less, offered in
evidence. Being a mere translation, it cannot be a competent evidence
of the alleged fact that Ellen Johanne Harper is the widow of Christian
Fredrik Harper, pursuant to the Best Evidence Rule. Even assuming that it
is an original Marriage Certificate, it is not a public document that is
admissible without the need of being identified or authenticated on the
witness stand by a witness, as it appears to be a document issued by the
Vicar of the Parish of Ullern and, hence, a private document; (d) Exhibit
"R" was labeled as Probate Court Certificate in plaintiffs-appellees'
Formal Offer of Evidence, when it appears to be the Birth Certificate of
the deceased, Christian Fredrik Harper; and (e) Exhibit "R-1" is a translation
of the supposed Probate Court Certificate, the original of which was not
produced in court, much less, offered in evidence. Being a mere
translation, it is an incompetent evidence of the alleged fact that
plaintiffs- appellees are the heirs of Christian Fredrik Harper, pursuant to
the Best Evidence Rule.
Defendant-appellant further adds that Exhibits "Q-1" and "R-1" were not
duly attested by the legal custodians (by the Vicar of the Parish of Ullern
for Exhibit "Q-1" and by the Judge or Clerk of the Probate Court for Exhibit
"R-1") as required under Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Likewise, the said documents are not accompanied by a
certificate that such officer has the custody as also required under
Section 24 of Rule 132. Consequently, defendant- appellant asseverates
that Exhibits "Q-1" and "R-1" as private documents, which were not duly
authenticated on the witness stand by a competent witness, are
essentially hearsay in nature that have no probative value. Therefore, it is
obvious that plaintiffs-appellees failed to prove that they are the widow
and son of the late Christian Harper.
Plaintiffs-appellees make the following counter arguments, viz, (a) Exhibit
"Q-1", the Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne Harper and Christian
Fredrik Harper, was issued by the Office of the Vicar of Ullern with a
statement that "this certificate is a transcript from the Register of Marriage
of Ullern Church." The contents of Exhibit "Q-1" were translated by the
Government of the Kingdom of Norway, through its authorized translator,
into English and authenticated by the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway, which in turn, was also authenticated by the Consul, Embassy of
the Republic of the Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden; (b) Exhibit "Q", the
Birth Certificate of Jonathan Christopher Harper, was issued and signed
by the Registrar of the Kingdom of Norway, as authenticated by the
Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, whose signature was also
authenticated by the Consul, Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines
in Stockholm, Sweden; and (c) Exhibit "R-1", the Probate Court Certificate
was also authenticated by the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway,
whose signature was also authenticated by the Consul, Embassy of the
Republic of the Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden.
They further argue that since Exhibit "Q-1", Marriage Certificate, was
issued by the vicar or parish priest, the legal custodian of parish records,
it is considered as an exception to the hearsay rule. As for Exhibit "R-1",
the Probate Court Certificate, while the document is indeed a translation
of the certificate, it is an official certification, duly confirmed by the
Government of the Kingdom of Norway; its contents were lifted by the
Government Authorized Translator from the official record and thus, a
written official act of a foreign sovereign country.
WE rule for plaintiffs-appellees.
The Revised Rules of Court provides that public documents may be
evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of
the record. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer,
if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the attested copy must be
accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The documents involved in this case are all kept in Norway. These
documents have been authenticated by the Royal Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs; they bear the official seal of the Ministry and signature
of one, Tanja Sorlie. The documents are accompanied by an
Authentication by the Consul, Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines
in Stockholm, Sweden to the effect that, Tanja Sorlie is duly authorized to
legalize official documents for the Ministry.
Exhibits "Q" and "R" are extracts of the register of births of both Jonathan
Christopher Harper and the late Christian Fredrik Harper, respectively,
wherein the former explicitly declares that Jonathan Christopher is the
son of Christian Fredrik and Ellen Johanne Harper. Said documents bear
the signature of the keeper, Y. Ayse B. Nordal with the official seal of the
Office of the Registrar of Oslo, and the authentication of Tanja Sorlie of
the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, which were further
authenticated by Philippine Consul Marian Jocelyn R. Tirol. In addition,
the latter states that said documents are the birth certificates of
Jonathan Christopher Harper and Christian Fredrik Harper issued by the
Registrar Office of Oslo, Norway on March 23, 2004.
Exhibits "Q-1", on the other hand, is the Marriage Certificate of Christian
Fredrik Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper issued by the vicar of the Parish
of Ullern while Exhibit "R-1" is the Probate Court Certificate from the Oslo
Probate Court, naming Ellen Johanne Harper and Jonathan Christopher
Harper as the heirs of the deceased Christian Fredrik Harper. The
documents are certified true translations into English of the transcript of
the said marriage certificate and the probate court certificate. They
were likewise signed by the authorized government translator of Oslo with
the seal of his office; attested by Tanja Sorlie and further certified by our
own Consul.
In view of the foregoing, WE conclude that plaintiffs-appellees had
substantially complied with the requirements set forth under the rules. WE
would also like to stress that plaintiffs-appellees herein are residing
overseas and are litigating locally through their representative. While
they are not excused from complying with our rules, WE must take into
account the attendant reality that these overseas litigants communicate
with their representative and counsel via long distance communication.
Add to this is the fact that compliance with the requirements on
attestation and authentication or certification is no easy process and
completion thereof may vary depending on different factors such as the
location of the requesting party from the consulate and the office of the
record custodian, the volume of transactions in said offices and even the
mode of sending these documents to the Philippines. With these
circumstances under consideration, to OUR minds, there is every reason
for an equitable and relaxed application of the rules on the issuance of
the required attestation from the custodian of the documents to
plaintiffs- appellees' situation. Besides, these questioned documents
were duly signed by the officers having custody of the same.[11]
Petitioner assails the CA's ruling that respondents substantially complied
with the rules on the authentication of the proofs of marriage and filiation
set by Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court when
they presented Exhibit Q, Exhibit Q-1, Exhibit R and Exhibit R-1, because
the legal custodian did not duly attest that Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1
were the correct copies of the originals on file, and because no
certification accompanied the documents stating that "such officer has
custody of the originals." It contends that respondents did not
competently prove their being Harper's surviving heirs by reason of such
documents being hearsay and incompetent.
Petitioner's challenge against respondents' documentary evidence on
marriage and heirship is not well-taken.
Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 provide:
Section 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
11
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there
be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court.
Although Exhibit Q,[12] Exhibit Q-1,[13] Exhibit R[14] and Exhibit R-1[15]
were not attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record
or by his deputy in the manner required in Section 25 of Rule 132, and
said documents did not comply with the requirement under Section 24
of Rule 132 to the effect that if the record was not kept in the Philippines
a certificate of the person having custody must accompany the copy of
the document that was duly attested stating that such person had
custody of the documents, the deviation was not enough reason to
reject the utility of the documents for the purposes they were intended
to serve.
Exhibit Q and Exhibit R were extracts from the registry of births of Oslo,
Norway issued on March 23, 2004 and signed by Y. Ayse B. Nordal,
Registrar, and corresponded to respondent Jonathan Christopher Harper
and victim Christian Fredrik Harper, respectively.[16] Exhibit Q explicitly
stated that Jonathan was the son of Christian Fredrik Harper and Ellen
Johanne Harper, while Exhibit R attested to the birth of Christian Fredrik
Harper on December 4, 1968. Exhibit Q and Exhibit R were authenticated
on March 29, 2004 by the signatures of Tanja Sorlie of the Royal Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Norway as well as by the official seal of that office. In
turn, Consul Marian Jocelyn R. Tirol of the Philippine Consulate in
Stockholm, Sweden authenticated the signatures of Tanja Sorlie and the
official seal of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway on Exhibit Q
and Exhibit R, explicitly certifying to the authority of Tanja Sorlie "to
legalize official documents for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway."[17]
Exhibit Q-1,[18] the Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne Clausen Harper
and Christian Fredrik Harper, contained the following data, namely: (a)
the parties were married on June 29, 1996 in Ullern Church; and (b) the
certificate was issued by the Office of the Vicar of Ullern on June 29, 1996.
Exhibit Q-1 was similarly authenticated by the signature of Tanja Sorlie of
the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, with the official seal of that
office. Philippine Consul Tirol again expressly certified to the capacity of
Sorlie "to legalize official documents for the Royal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Norway,"[19] and further certified that the document was a true
translation into English of a transcript of a Marriage Certificate issued to
Christian Frederik Harper and Ellen Johanne Clausen by the Vicar of the
Parish of Ullern on June 29, 1996.
Exhibit R-1,[20] a Probate Court certificate issued by the Oslo Probate
Court on February 18, 2000 through Morten Bolstad, its Senior Executive
Officer, was also authenticated by the signature of Tanja Sorlie and with
the official seal of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. As with
the other documents, Philippine Consul Tirol explicitly certified to the
capacity of Sorlie "to legalize official documents for the Royal Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Norway," and further certified that the document was
a true translation into English of the Oslo Probate Court certificate issued
on February 18, 2000 to the effect that Christian Fredrik Harper, born on
December 4, 1968, had reportedly died on November 6, 1999.[21]
The Oslo Probate Court certificate recited that both Ellen Johanne
Harper and Christopher S. Harper were Harper's heirs, to wit:
The above names surviving spouse has accepted responsibility for the
commitments of the deceased in accordance with the provisions of
Section 78 of the Probate Court Act (Norway), and the above substitute
guardian has agreed to the private division of the estate.
The following heir and substitute guardian will undertake the private
division of the estate:
Ellen Johanne Harper
Christopher S. Harper
This probate court certificate relates to the entire estate.
Oslo Probate Court, 18 February 2000.[22]
The official participation in the authentication process of Tanja Sorlie of
the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway and the attachment of the
official seal of that office on each authentication indicated that Exhibit
Q, Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1 were documents of a public
nature in Norway, not merely private documents. It cannot be denied
that based on Philippine Consul Tirol's official authentication, Tanja Sorlie
was "on the date of signing, duly authorized to legalize official
documents for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway." Without a
showing to the contrary by petitioner, Exhibit Q, Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and
Exhibit R-1 should be presumed to be themselves official documents
under Norwegian law, and admissible as prima facie evidence of the
truth of their contents under Philippine law.
At the minimum, Exhibit Q, Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1
substantially met the requirements of Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule
132 as a condition for their admission as evidence in default of a showing
by petitioner that the authentication process was tainted with bad faith.
Consequently, the objective of ensuring the authenticity of the
documents prior to their admission as evidence was substantially
achieved. In Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania,[23] the Court
has said that substantial compliance, by its very nature, is actually
inadequate observance of the requirements of a rule or regulation that
are waived under equitable circumstances in order to facilitate the
administration of justice, there being no damage or injury caused by
such flawed compliance.
The Court has further said in Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania
that the focus in every inquiry on whether or not to accept substantial
compliance is always on the presence of equitable conditions to
administer justice effectively and efficiently without damage or injury to
the spirit of the legal obligation.[24] There are, indeed, such equitable
conditions attendant here, the foremost of which is that respondents had
gone to great lengths to submit the documents. As the CA observed,
respondents' compliance with the requirements on attestation and
authentication of the documents had not been easy; they had to
contend with many difficulties (such as the distance of Oslo, their place
of residence, from Stockholm, Sweden, where the Philippine Consulate
had its office; the volume of transactions in the offices concerned; and
the safe transmission of the documents to the Philippines).[25] Their
submission of the documents should be presumed to be in good faith
because they did so in due course. It would be inequitable if the sincerity
of respondents in obtaining and submitting the documents despite the
difficulties was ignored.
The principle of substantial compliance recognizes that exigencies and
situations do occasionally demand some flexibility in the rigid application
of the rules of procedure and the laws.[26] That rules of procedure may
be mandatory in form and application does not forbid a showing of
substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances,[27] because
substantial compliance does not equate to a disregard of basic rules. For
sure, substantial compliance and strict adherence are not always
incompatible and do not always clash in discord. The power of the Court
to suspend its own rules or to except any particular case from the
operation of the rules whenever the purposes of justice require the
suspension cannot be challenged.[28] In the interest of substantial
justice, even procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms
of compliance are frequently relaxed. Similarly, the procedural rules
should definitely be liberally construed if strict adherence to their letter
will result in absurdity and in manifest injustice, or where the merits of a
party's cause are apparent and outweigh considerations of non-
compliance with certain formal requirements.[29] It is more in accord
with justice that a party-litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of his claim or defense than for him to lose his life, liberty, honor
or property on mere technicalities. Truly, the rules of procedure are
intended to promote substantial justice, not to defeat it, and should not
be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.[30] Petitioner urges the
Court to resolve the apparent conflict between the rulings in Heirs of
Pedro Cabais v. Court of Appeals[31] (Cabais) and in Heirs of Ignacio
Conti v. Court of Appeals[32] (Conti) establishing filiation through a
baptismal certificate.[33]
Petitioner's urging is not warranted, both because there is no conflict
between the rulings in Cabais and Conti, and because neither Cabais
nor Conti is relevant herein.
In Cabais, the main issue was whether or not the CA correctly affirmed
the decision of the RTC that had relied mainly on the baptismal
certificate of Felipa C. Buesa to establish the parentage and filiation of
Pedro Cabais. The Court held that the petition was meritorious, stating:
A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence
of filiation and a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the
presumption of truth contained in such public document. This is pursuant
to the rule that entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. The evidentiary nature of such document must, therefore, be
sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity.
On the contrary, a baptismal certificate is a private document, which,
being hearsay, is not a conclusive proof of filiation. It does not have the
same probative value as a record of birth, an official or public
document. In US v. Evangelista, this Court held that church registers of
births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of
General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer
public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. Thus,
in this jurisdiction, a certificate of baptism such as the one herein
controversy is no longer regarded with the same evidentiary value as
official records of birth. Moreover, on this score, jurisprudence is
consistent and uniform in ruling that the canonical certificate of baptism
is not sufficient to prove recognition.[34]
12

The Court sustained the Cabais petitioners' stance that the RTC had
apparently erred in relying on the baptismal certificate to establish
filiation, stressing the baptismal certificate's limited evidentiary value as
proof of filiation inferior to that of a birth certificate; and declaring that
the baptismal certificate did not attest to the veracity of the statements
regarding the kinsfolk of the one baptized. Nevertheless, the Court
ultimately ruled that it was respondents' failure to present the birth
certificate, more than anything else, that lost them their case, stating
that: "The unjustified failure to present the birth certificate instead of the
baptismal certificate now under consideration or to otherwise prove
filiation by any other means recognized by law weigh heavily against
respondents."[35]
In Conti, the Court affirmed the rulings of the trial court and the CA to the
effect that the Conti respondents were able to prove by preponderance
of evidence their being the collateral heirs of deceased Lourdes
Sampayo. The Conti petitioners disagreed, arguing that baptismal
certificates did not prove the filiation of collateral relatives of the
deceased. Agreeing with the CA, the Court said:
We are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial
evidence submitted xxx are competent and adequate proofs that
private respondents are collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo.
xxx
Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate children shall
be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parent's admission of such
legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the
parent. Such other proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal certificate,
a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. By analogy, this method of proving filiation may
also be utilized in the instant case.
Public documents are the written official acts, or records of the official
act of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or a foreign country. The baptismal
certificates presented in evidence by private respondents are public
documents. Parish priests continue to be the legal custodians of the
parish records and are authorized to issue true copies, in the form of
certificates, of the entries contained therein.
The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes,
absent the testimony of the officiating priest or the official recorder, was
settled in People v. Ritter, citing U.S. v. de Vera (28 Phil. 105 [1914], thus:
…. The entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries
made in the course of business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an
exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church
are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and
recorded in the book of the church during this course of its business.
It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the
administration of the sacrament, but in this case, there were four (4)
baptismal certificates which, when taken together, uniformly show that
Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and Luis had the same set of parents, as
indicated therein. Corroborated by the undisputed testimony of
Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers
Manuel, Luis and sister Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina
Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal certificates have acquired evidentiary
weight to prove filiation.[36]
Obviously, Conti did not treat a baptismal certificate, standing alone, as
sufficient to prove filiation; on the contrary, Conti expressly held that a
baptismal certificate had evidentiary value to prove filiation if
considered alongside other evidence of filiation. As such, a baptismal
certificate alone is not sufficient to resolve a disputed filiation.
Unlike Cabais and Conti, this case has respondents presenting several
documents, like the birth certificates of Harper and respondent Jonathan
Harper, the marriage certificate of Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper,
and the probate court certificate, all of which were presumably
regarded as public documents under the laws of Norway. Such
documentary evidence sufficed to competently establish the
relationship and filiation under the standards of our Rules of Court.
II
Petitioner was liable due to its own negligence
Petitioner argues that respondents failed to prove its negligence; that
Harper's own negligence in allowing the killers into his hotel room was the
proximate cause of his own death; and that hotels were not insurers of
the safety of their guests.
The CA resolved petitioner's arguments thuswise:
Defendant-appellant contends that the pivotal issue is whether or not it
had committed negligence and corollarily, whether its negligence was
the immediate cause of the death of Christian Harper. In its defense,
defendant-appellant mainly avers that it is equipped with adequate
security system as follows: (1) keycards or vingcards for opening the guest
rooms, (2) two CCTV monitoring cameras on each floor of the hotel and
(3) roving guards with handheld radios, the number of which depends
on the occupancy rate of the hotel. Likewise, it reiterates that the
proximate cause of Christian Harper's death was his own negligence in
inviting to his room the two (2) still unidentified suspects.
Plaintiffs-appellees in their Brief refute, in that, the liability of defendant-
appellant is based upon the fact that it was in a better situation than the
injured person, Christian Harper, to foresee and prevent the happening
of the injurious occurrence. They maintain that there is no dispute that
even prior to the untimely demise of Christian Harper, defendant-
appellant was duly forewarned of its security lapses as pointed out by its
Chief Security Officer, Col. Rodrigo De Guzman, who recommended that
one roving guard be assigned on each floor of the hotel considering the
length and shape of the corridors. They posit that defendant-appellant's
inaction constitutes negligence.
This Court finds for plaintiffs-appellees.
As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant law is Article 2176
of the Civil Code, which states that
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there was no preexisting contractual relation between
the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
chapter."
Negligence is defined as the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The
Supreme Court likewise ruled that negligence is want of care required by
the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term
and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the
degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably
require. In determining whether or not there is negligence on the part of
the parties in a given situation, jurisprudence has laid down the following
test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence.
The law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the
imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law.
The test of negligence is objective. WE measure the act or omission of
the tortfeasor with a perspective as that of an ordinary reasonable
person who is similarly situated. The test, as applied to the extant case, is
whether or not defendant-appellant, under the attendant
circumstances, used that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary reasonable person would have used in the same situation.
WE rule in the negative.
In finding defendant-appellant remiss in its duty of exercising the required
reasonable care under the circumstances, the court a quo reasoned-
out, to wit:
"Of the witnesses presented by plaintiffs to prove its (sic) case, the only
one with competence to testify on the issue of adequacy or inadequacy
of security is Col. Rodrigo De Guzman who was then the Chief Security
Officer of defendant hotel for the year 1999. He is a retired police officer
and had vast experience in security jobs. He was likewise a member of
the elite Presidential Security Group.
He testified that upon taking over the job as the chief of the security force
of the hotel, he made an assessment of the security situation. Col. De
Guzman was not satisfied with the security set-up and told the hotel
management of his desire to improve it. In his testimony, De Guzman
testified that at the time he took over, he noticed that there were few
guards in the elevated portion of the hotel where the rooms were
located. The existing security scheme then was one guard for 3 or 4 floors.
He likewise testified that he recommended to the hotel management
that at least one guard must be assigned per floor especially considering
that the hotel has a long "L-shaped" hallway, such that one cannot see
both ends of the hallway. He further opined that "even one guard in that
hallway is not enough because of the blind portion of the hallway."
13

On cross-examination, Col. De Guzman testified that the security of the
hotel was adequate at the time the crime occurred because the hotel
was not fully booked. He qualified his testimony on direct in that his
recommendation of one guard per floor is the "ideal" set-up when the
hotel is fully-booked.
Be that as it may, it must be noted that Col. De Guzman also testified that
the reason why the hotel management disapproved his
recommendation was that the hotel was not doing well. It is for this
reason that the hotel management did not heed the recommendation
of Col. De Guzman, no matter how sound the recommendation was,
and whether the hotel is fully-booked or not. It was a business judgment
call on the part of the defendant.
Plaintiffs anchor its (sic) case on our law on quasidelicts.
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called quasi-delict.
Liability on the part of the defendant is based upon the fact that he was
in a better situation than the injured person to foresee and prevent the
happening of the injurious occurrence.
There is no dispute that even prior to the untimely demise of Mr. Harper,
defendant was duly forewarned of the security lapses in the hotel. Col.
De Guzman was particularly concerned with the security of the private
areas where the guest rooms are. He wanted not just one roving guard
in every three or four floors. He insisted there must be at least one in each
floor considering the length and the shape of the corridors. The trained
eyes of a security officer was (sic) looking at that deadly scenario
resulting from that wide security breach as that which befell Christian
Harper.
The theory of the defense that the malefactor/s was/were known to
Harper or was/were visitors of Harper and that there was a shindig among
[the] three deserves scant consideration.
The NBI Biology Report (Exh. "C" & "D") and the Toxicology Report (Exh. "E")
belie the defense theory of a joyous party between and among Harper
and the unidentified malefactor/s. Based on the Biology Report, Harper
was found negative of prohibited and regulated drugs. The Toxicology
Report likewise revealed that the deceased was negative of the
presence of alcohol in his blood.
The defense even suggests that the malefactor/s gained entry into the
private room of Harper either because Harper allowed them entry by
giving them access to the vingcard or because Harper allowed them
entry by opening the door for them, the usual gesture of a room
occupant to his visitors.
While defendant's theory may be true, it is more likely, under the
circumstances obtaining that the malefactor/s gained entry into his
room by simply knocking at Harper's door and the latter opening it
probably thinking it was hotel personnel, without an inkling that criminal/s
could be in the premises.
The latter theory is more attuned to the dictates of reason. If indeed the
female "visitor" is known to or a visitor of Harper, she should have entered
the the room together with Harper. It is quite unlikely that a supposed
"visitor" would wait three minutes to be with a guest when he/she could
go with the guest directly to the room. The interval of three minutes in
Harper's entry and that of the alleged female visitor belies the "theory of
acquaintanceship". It is most likely that the female "visitor" was the one
who opened the door to the male "visitor", undoubtedly, a co-
conspirator.
In any case, the ghastly incident could have been prevented had there
been adequate security in each of the hotel floors. This, coupled with the
earlier recommendation of Col. De Guzman to the hotel management
to act on the security lapses of the hotel, raises the presumption that the
crime was foreseeable.
Clearly, defendant's inaction constitutes negligence or want of the
reasonable care demanded of it in that particular situation.
In a case, the Supreme Court defined negligence as:
The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance, which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such person suffers injury.
Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative
or comparative, not an absolute term, and its application depends upon
the situation of the parties, and the degree of care and vigilance which
the circumstances reasonably impose. Where the danger is great, a high
degree of care is necessary.
Moreover, in applying the premises liability rule in the instant case as it is
applied in some jurisdiction (sic) in the United States, it is enough that
guests are injured while inside the hotel premises to make the
hotelkeeper liable. With great caution should the liability of the
hotelkeeper be enforced when a guest died inside the hotel premises.
It also bears stressing that there were prior incidents that occurred in the
hotel which should have forewarned the hotel management of the
security lapses of the hotel. As testified to by Col. De Guzman, "there were
'minor' incidents" (loss of items) before the happening of the instant case.
These "minor" incidents may be of little significance to the hotel, yet
relative to the instant case, it speaks volume. This should have served as
a caveat that the hotel security has lapses.
Makati Shangri-La Hotel, to stress, is a five-star hotel. The "reasonable
care" that it must exercise for the safety and comfort of its guests should
be commensurate with the grade and quality of the accommodation it
offers. If there is such a thing as "five-star hotel security", the guests at
Makati Shangri-La surely deserves just that!
When one registers (as) a guest of a hotel, he makes the establishment
the guardian of his life and his personal belongings during his stay. It is a
standard procedure of the management of the hotel to screen visitors
who call on their guests at their rooms. The murder of Harper could have
been avoided had the security guards of the Shangri-La Hotel in Makati
dutifully observed this standard procedure."
WE concur.
Well settled is the doctrine that "the findings of fact by the trial court are
accorded great respect by appellate courts and should not be
disturbed on appeal unless the trial court has overlooked, ignored, or
disregarded some fact or circumstances of sufficient weight or
significance which, if considered, would alter the situation." After a
conscientious sifting of the records, defendant-appellant fails to
convince US to deviate from this doctrine.
It could be gleaned from findings of the trial court that its conclusion of
negligence on the part of defendant-appellant is grounded mainly on
the latter's inadequate hotel security, more particularly on the failure to
deploy sufficient security personnel or roving guards at the time the
ghastly incident happened.
A review of the testimony of Col. De Guzman reveals that on direct
examination he testified that at the time he assumed his position as Chief
Security Officer of defendant-appellant, during the early part of 1999 to
the early part of 2000, he noticed that some of the floors of the hotel were
being guarded by a few guards, for instance, 3 or 4 floors by one guard
only on a roving manner. He then made a recommendation that the
ideal-set up for an effective security should be one guard for every floor,
considering that the hotel is L-shaped and the ends of the hallways
cannot be seen. At the time he made the recommendation, the same
was denied, but it was later on considered and approved on December
1999 because of the Centennial Celebration.
On cross-examination, Col. De Guzman confirmed that after he took
over as Chief Security Officer, the number of security guards was
increased during the first part of December or about the last week of
November, and before the incident happened, the security was
adequate. He also qualified that as to his direct testimony on "ideal-set
up", he was referring to one guard for every floor if the hotel is fully
booked. At the time he made his recommendation in the early part of
1999, it was disapproved as the hotel was not doing well and it was not
fully booked so the existing security was adequate enough. He further
explained that his advice was observed only in the late November 1999
or the early part of December 1999.
It could be inferred from the foregoing declarations of the former Chief
Security Officer of defendant-appellant that the latter was negligent in
providing adequate security due its guests. With confidence, it was
repeatedly claimed by defendant-appellant that it is a five-star hotel.
Unfortunately, the record failed to show that at the time of the death of
Christian Harper, it was exercising reasonable care to protect its guests
from harm and danger by providing sufficient security commensurate to
it being one of the finest hotels in the country. In so concluding, WE are
reminded of the Supreme Court's enunciation that the hotel business like
the common carrier's business is imbued with public interest. Catering to
the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel
guests but also security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty
constitutes the essence of the business.
14
It is clear from the testimony of Col. De Guzman that his recommendation
was initially denied due to the fact that the business was then not doing
well. The "one guard, one floor" recommended policy, although ideal
when the hotel is fully-booked, was observed only later in November 1999
or in the early part of December 1999, or needless to state, after the
murder of Christian Harper. The apparent security lapses of defendant-
appellant were further shown when the male culprit who entered
Christian Harper's room was never checked by any of the guards when
he came inside the hotel. As per interview conducted by the initial
investigator, PO3 Cornelio Valiente to the guards, they admitted that
nobody know that said man entered the hotel and it was only through
the monitor that they became aware of his entry. It was even evidenced
by the CCTV that before he walked to the room of the late Christian
Harper, said male suspect even looked at the monitoring camera. Such
act of the man showing wariness, added to the fact that his entry to the
hotel was unnoticed, at an unholy hour, should have aroused suspicion
on the part of the roving guard in the said floor, had there been any.
Unluckily for Christian Harper, there was none at that time.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces, the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. More comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.
Defendant-appellant's contention that it was Christian Harper's own
negligence in allowing the malefactors to his room that was the
proximate cause of his death, is untenable. To reiterate, defendant-
appellant is engaged in a business imbued with public interest, ergo, it is
bound to provide adequate security to its guests. As previously discussed,
defendant-appellant failed to exercise such reasonable care expected
of it under the circumstances. Such negligence is the proximate cause
which set the chain of events that led to the eventual demise of its guest.
Had there been reasonable security precautions, the same could have
saved Christian Harper from a brutal death.
The Court concurs entirely with the findings and conclusions of the CA,
which the Court regards to be thorough and supported by the records
of the trial. Moreover, the Court cannot now review and pass upon the
uniform findings of negligence by the CA and the RTC because doing so
would require the Court to delve into and revisit the factual bases for the
finding of negligence, something fully contrary to its character as not a
trier of facts. In that regard, the factual findings of the trial court that are
supported by the evidence on record, especially when affirmed by the
CA, are conclusive on the Court.[37] Consequently, the Court will not
review unless there are exceptional circumstances for doing so, such as
the following:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(k) When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.[38]
None of the exceptional circumstances obtains herein. Accordingly, the
Court cannot depart from or disturb the factual findings on negligence
of petitioner made by both the RTC and the CA.[39]
Even so, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioner failed to provide
the basic and adequate security measures expected of a five-star hotel;
and that its omission was the proximate cause of Harper's death.
The testimony of Col. De Guzman revealed that the management
practice prior to the murder of Harper had been to deploy only one
security or roving guard for every three or four floors of the building; that
such ratio had not been enough considering the L-shape configuration
of the hotel that rendered the hallways not visible from one or the other
end; and that he had recommended to management to post a guard
for each floor, but his recommendation had been disapproved because
the hotel "was not doing well" at that particular time.[40]
Probably realizing that his testimony had weakened petitioner's position
in the case, Col. De Guzman soon clarified on cross-examination that
petitioner had seen no need at the time of the incident to augment the
number of guards due to the hotel being then only half-booked. Here is
how his testimony went:
ATTY MOLINA:
I just forgot one more point, Your Honor please. Was there ever a time,
Mr. Witness, that your recommendation to post a guard in every floor
ever considered and approved by the hotel?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: When was this?
A: That was on December 1999 because of the Centennial Celebration
when the hotel accepted so many guests wherein most of the rooms
were fully booked and I recommended that all the hallways should be
guarded by one guard.[41]
xxx
ATTY COSICO:
Q: So at that time that you made your recommendation, the hotel was
half-filled.
A: Maybe.
Q: And even if the hotel is half-filled, your recommendation is that each
floor shall be maintained by one security guard per floors?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Would you agree with me that even if the hotel is half-filled, there is
no need to increase the guards because there were only few customers?
A: I think so.
Q: So you will agree with me that each floor should be maintained by
one security guard if the rooms are filled up or occupied?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Now, you even testified that from January 1999 to November 1999
thereof, only minor incidents were involved?
A: Yes sir.
Q: So it would be correct to say that the security at that time in February
was adequate?
A: I believe so.
Q: Even up to November when the incident happened for that same
reason, security was adequate?
A: Yes, before the incident.
Q: Now, you testified on direct that the hotel posted one guard each
floor?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And it was your own recommendation?
A: Yes, because we are expecting that the hotel will be filled up.
Q: In fact, the hotel was fully booked?
A: Yes sir.[42]
Petitioner would thereby have the Court believe that Col. De Guzman's
initial recommendation had been rebuffed due to the hotel being only
half-booked; that there had been no urgency to adopt a one-guard-
perfloor policy because security had been adequate at that time; and
that he actually meant by his statement that "the hotel was not doing
well" that the hotel was only half-booked.
15

We are not convinced.
The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but
also security to the persons and belongings of their guests. The twin duty
constitutes the essence of the business.[43] Applying by analogy Article
2000,[44] Article 2001[45] and Article 2002[46] of the Civil Code (all of
which concerned the hotelkeepers' degree of care and responsibility as
to the personal effects of their guests), we hold that there is much greater
reason to apply the same if not greater degree of care and responsibility
when the lives and personal safety of their guests are involved.
Otherwise, the hotelkeepers would simply stand idly by as strangers have
unrestricted access to all the hotel rooms on the pretense of being visitors
of the guests, without being held liable should anything untoward· befall
the unwary guests. That would be absurd, something that no good law
would ever envision. In fine, the Court sees no reversible-error on the part
of the CA.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the Court of Appeals;
and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
[ G.R. No. 161803, February 04, 2008 ]
DY TEBAN TRADING, INC., Petitioner, vs. JOSE CHING AND/OR LIBERTY
FOREST, INC. and CRESILITO M. LIMBAGA,Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE vehicular collision resulting in damages and injuries in this case could
have been avoided if the stalled prime mover with trailer were parked
properly and equipped with an early warning device. It is high time We
sounded the call for strict enforcement of the law and regulation on
traffic and vehicle registration. Panahon na para mahigpit na ipatupad
ang batas at regulasyon sa trapiko at pagpapatala ng sasakyan.
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) modifying that[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Butuan City finding private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito
Limbaga liable to petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. for damages.
Facts
On July 4, 1995, at around 4:45 a.m., Rogelio Ortiz, with helper Romeo
Catamora, was driving a Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy Teban
Trading, Inc. along the National Highway in Barangay Sumilihon, Butuan
City, going to Surigao City. They were delivering commercial ice to
nearby barangays and municipalities. A Joana Paula passenger bus was
cruising on the opposite lane towards the van. In between the two
vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by private
respondent Liberty Forest, Inc.[3]
The night before, at around 10:00 p.m., the prime mover with trailer
suffered a tire blowout. The driver, private respondent Cresilito Limbaga,
parked the prime mover askew occupying a substantial portion of the
national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. He parked the prime
mover with trailer at the shoulder of the road with the left wheels still on
the cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel
shoulder of the highway.[4] The prime mover was not equipped with
triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates, the early warning device
required under Letter of Instruction No. 229. As substitute, Limbaga
placed a banana trunk with leaves on the front and the rear portion of
the prime mover to warn incoming motorists. It is alleged that Limbaga
likewise placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the
trailer.[5]
To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming
passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of the approaching
Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring headlights and the
approaching passenger bus. He pumped his break slowly, swerved to the
left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary
prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover.[6]
Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor injuries. The Nissan van, however,
became inoperable as a result of the incident. After the collision, SPO4
Teofilo Pame conducted an investigation and submitted a police traffic
incident investigation report.[7]
On October 31, 1995, petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for
damages[8] against private respondents prime mover owner and driver
with the RTC in Butuan City. The Joana Paula passenger bus was not
impleaded as defendant in the complaint.
RTC Disposition
On August 7, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Dy
Teban Trading, Inc. with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered directing, ordaining and
ordering:
a) That defendants Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito M. Limbaga pay,
jointly and solidarily, plaintiff Dy Teban Trading, Inc. the amounts of
P279,832.00 as actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 as
attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation;
b) That all money claims of plaintiff Rogelio C. Ortiz are dismissed;
c) That defendant Jose Ching is absolved from any civil liability or the
case against him dismissed;
d) That the counterclaim of all the defendants is dismissed; and
e) That defendants Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito M. Limbaga to pay,
jointly and solidarily, the costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The RTC held that the proximate cause of the three-way vehicular
collision was improper parking of the prime mover on the national
highway and the absence of an early warning device on the vehicle,
thus:
The court finds that the proximate cause of the incidents is the
negligence and carelessness attributable to the defendants. When the
trailer being pulled by the prime mover suffered two (2) flat tires at
Sumilihon, the prime mover and trailer were parked haphazardly, as the
right tires of the prime mover were the only ones on the sand and gravel
shoulder of the highway while the left tires and all the tires of the trailer
were on the cemented pavement of the highway, occupying almost the
whole of the right lane on the direction the prime mover and trailer were
traveling. The statement of Limbaga that he could not park the prime
mover and trailer deeper into the sand and gravel shoulder of the
highway to his right because there were banana plants is contradicted
by the picture marked Exhibit "F." The picture shows that there was ample
space on the shoulder. If defendant Limbaga was careful and prudent
enough, he should have the prime mover and trailer traveled more
distance forward so that the bodies of the prime mover and trailer would
be far more on the shoulder rather than on the cemented highway when
they were parked. x x x The court has some doubts on the statement of
witness-driver Limbaga that there were banana trunks with leaves and
lighted tin cans with crude oil placed 3 strides in front of the prime mover
and behind the trailer because the testimonies of witnesses Rogelio C.
Ortiz, driver of the ice van, Romeo D. Catamora, helper of the ice van,
and Police Traffic Investigator SPO3 Teofilo M. Pame show that there were
no banana trunks with leaves and lighted tin cans at the scene of the
incident. But even assuming that there were banana trunks with leaves
but they were placed close to the prime mover and trailer as they were
placed 3 strides away which to the mind of the court is equivalent
approximately to 3 meters and with this distance, approaching vehicles
would have no sufficient time and space to make a complete stop,
especially if the vehicles are heavy and loaded. If there were lighted tin
cans, it was not explained by the defendants why the driver, especially
driver witness Ortiz, did not see them.
xxxx
Defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. did not exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in managing and running its business. The evidence on
record shows that it failed to provide its prime mover and trailer with the
required "early warning devices" with reflectors and it did not keep
proper maintenance and condition of the prime mover and the trailer.
The circumstances show that the trailer were provided with wornout tires
and with only one (1) piece of spare tire. The pictures marked Exhibit "3"
and "4" show that two (2) flat tires suffered by the trailer and these two
(2) tires were attached to one of the two (2) I-beams or axles attached
to the rear of the trailer which axle is very near but behind the other axle
and with the location of the 2 I-beams, it would have the other I-beam
that would have suffered the flat tires as it has to bear the brunt of weight
of the D-8 bulldozer. The bulldozer was not loaded directly above the two
(2) I-beams as 2 I-beams, as a pair, were attached at the far rear end of
the trailer.
16

xxxx
However, defendant Jose Ching should be absolved of any liability as
there is no showing that he is the manager or CEO of defendant Liberty
Forest, Inc. Although in the answer, it is admitted that he is an officer of
the defendant corporation, but it is not clarified what kind of position he
is holding, as he could be an officer as one of the members of the Board
of Directors or a cashier and treasurer of the corporation. Witness
Limbaga in his testimony mentioned a certain Boy Ching as the Manager
but it was never clarified whether or not Boy Ching and defendant Jose
Ching is one and the same person.[10] Private respondents appealed to
the CA.
CA Disposition
On August 28, 2003, the CA reversed the RTC decision, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated August 7, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Butuan City in Civil Case No. 4360 is
hereby PARTLY MODIFIED by absolving the defendants-
appellants/appellees of any liability to plaintiffs-appellants/appellees by
reason of the incident on July 4, 1995.
The dismissal of the case against Jose Ching, the counterclaim of
defendants-appellants/appellees and the money claim of Rogelio Ortiz
STANDS.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In partly reversing or partly modifying the RTC decision, the CA held that
the proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan
van to give way or yield to the right of way of the passenger bus, thus:
It was stated that the Joana Paula bus in trying to avoid a head-on
collision with the truck, sideswept the parked trailer loaded with
bulldozer.
Evidently, the driver of the Joana Paula bus was aware of the presence
on its lane of the parked trailer with bulldozer. For this reason, it
proceeded to occupy what was left of its lane and part of the opposite
lane. The truck occupying the opposite lane failed to give way or yield
the right of way to the oncoming bus by proceeding with the same
speed. The two vehicles were, in effect, trying to beat each other in
occupying a single lane. The bus was the first to occupy the said lane but
upon realizing that the truck refused to give way or yield the right of way,
the bus, as a precaution, geared to its right where the trailer was parked.
Unfortunately, the bus miscalculated its distance from the parked trailer
and its rear right side hit the protruding blade of the bulldozer then on
the top of the parked trailer. The impact of the collision on its right rear
side with the blade of the bulldozer threw the bus further to the opposite
lane, landing its rear portion on the shoulder of the opposite lane.
xxxx
Facts of the case reveal that when Ortiz, the driver of the truck, failed to
give the Joana Paula bus the space on the road it needed, the latter
vehicle scraped its rear right side on the protruded bulldozer blade and
the impact threw the bus directly on the path of the oncoming truck. This
made plaintiffs-appellants/appellees conclude that the Joana Paula bus
occupied its lane which forced Ortiz, the driver of the truck, to swerve to
its left and ram the front of the parked trailer.
xxxx
The trailer was parked because its two (2) rear-left tires were blown out.
With a bulldozer on top of the trailer and two (2) busted tires, it would be
dangerous and quite impossible for the trailer to further park on the
graveled shoulder of the road. To do so will cause the flat car to tilt and
may cause the bulldozer to fall from where it was mounted. In fact, it
appeared that the driver of the trailer tried its best to park on the
graveled shoulder since the right-front tires were on the graveled
shoulder of the road.
The lower court erred in stating that the Joana Paula bus swerved to the
left of the truck because it did not see the parked trailer due to lack of
warning sign of danger of any kind that can be seen from a distance.
The damage suffered by the Joana Paula bus belied this assessment. As
stated before, the Joana Paula bus, with the intention of passing first
which it did, first approached the space beside the parked trailer, veered
too close to the parked trailer thereby hitting its rear right side on the
protruding bulldozer blade. Since the damage was on the rear right most
of the bus, it was clearly on the space which was wide enough for a
single passing vehicle but not sufficient for two (2) passing vehicles. The
bus was thrown right to the path of the truck by the impact of the collision
of its rear right side with the bulldozer blade.[12]
The CA disagreed with the RTC that the prime mover did not have an
early warning device. The appellate court accepted the claim of private
respondent that Limbaga placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front
and rear of the trailer which, in Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[13] may act as substitute early warning device. The CA stated:
Likewise, it was incorrect for the lower court to state that there was no
warning sign of danger of any kind, most probably referring to the
absence of the triangular reflectorized plates. The police sketch clearly
indicated the stack of banana leaves placed at the rear of the parked
trailer. The trailer's driver testified that they placed kerosene lighted tin
can at the back of the parked trailer.
A pair of triangular reflectorized plates is not the only early warning
device allowed by law. The Supreme Court (in Baliwag Transit, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals) held that:
"x x x Col. Dela Cruz and Romano testified that they did not see any early
warning device at the scene of the accident. They were referring to the
triangular reflectorized plates in red and yellow issued by the Land
Transportation Office. However, the evidence shows that Recontique
and Ecala placed a kerosene lamp or torch at the edge of the road,
near the rear portion of the truck to serve as an early warning device.
This substantially complies with Section 34(g) of the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code x x x
Baliwag's argument that the kerosene lamp or torch does not
substantially comply with the law is untenable. The aforequoted law
clearly allows the use not only of an early warning device of the triangular
reflectorized plates' variety but also parking lights or flares visible one
hundred meters away. x x x."
This Court holds that the defendants-appellants/appellees were not
negligent in parking the trailer on the scene of the accident. It would
have been different if there was only one flat tire and defendant-
appellant/appellee Limbaga failed to change the same and left
immediately.
As such, defendants-appellants/appellees are not liable for the
damages suffered by plaintiffs-appellants/appellees. Whatever damage
plaintiffs-appellants/appellees suffered, they alone must bear them.[14]
Issues
Petitioner raises two issues[15] for Our consideration, to wit:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITHOUT ANY AVAILABLE
CONCRETE EVIDENCE, ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WERE
EARLY WARNING DEVICES PLACED IN FRONT OF THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANTS/APPELLEES' TRUCK AND FLAT CAR TO WARN PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT/APPELLEE ROGELIO ORTIZ OF THEIR PRESENCE.
II.
WITH DUE RESPECT, IT IS HIGH TIME TO ENFORCE THE LAW ON EARLY
WARNING DEVICES IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The meat of the petition is whether or not the prime mover is liable for the
damages suffered by the Nissan van. The RTC ruled in the affirmative
holding that the proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the
negligence of Limbaga in parking the prime mover on the national
highway without an early warning device on the vehicle. The CA
reversed the RTC decision, holding that the proximate cause of the
collision was the negligence of Ortiz in not yielding to the right of way of
the passenger bus.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.
To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must
concur: (a) damage suffered by plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of
defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by plaintiff.[16]
There is no dispute that the Nissan van suffered damage. That is borne by
the records and conceded by the parties. The outstanding issues are
17
negligence and proximate cause. Tersely put, the twin issues are: (a)
whether or not prime mover driver Limbaga was negligent in parking the
vehicle; and (b) whether or not his negligence was the proximate cause
of the damage to the Nissan van.
Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national
highway; he failed
to prevent or minimize the risk to oncoming motorists.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.[17] The Supreme Court stated the test of negligence
in the landmark case Picart v. Smith[18] as follows:
The test by which to determine the existence or negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence and determines liability by that. (Underscoring supplied)
The test of negligence is objective. We measure the act or omission of
the tortfeasor with that of an ordinary reasonable person in the same
situation. The test, as applied to this case, is whether Limbaga, in parking
the prime mover, used that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary reasonable person would have used in the same situation.
We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover
askew on the right side of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a
substantial portion of the national road on the lane of the passenger bus.
It was parked at the shoulder of the road with its left wheels still on the
cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel
shoulder of the highway. It is common sense that the skewed parking of
the prime mover on the national road posed a serious risk to oncoming
motorists. It was incumbent upon Limbaga to take some measures to
prevent that risk, or at least minimize it.
We are unable to agree with the CA conclusion "it would have been
dangerous and quite impossible to further park the prime mover on the
graveled shoulder of the road because the prime mover may tilt and the
bulldozer may fall off." The photographs taken after the incident show
that it could have been possible for Limbaga to park the prime mover
completely on the shoulder of the national road without risk to oncoming
motorists. We agree with the RTC observation on this point, thus:
x x x The statement of Limbaga that he could not park the prime mover
and trailer deeper into the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway to
his right because there were banana plants is contradicted by the
picture marked Exhibit "F." The picture shows that there was ample space
on the shoulder. If defendant Limbaga was careful and prudent enough,
he should have the prime mover and trailer traveled more distance
forward so that the bodies of the prime mover and trailer would be far
more on the shoulder rather than on the cemented highway when they
were parked. Although at the time of the incident, it was about 4:45 in
the morning and it was drizzling but there is showing that it was pitch dark
that whoever travels along the highway must be extra careful. If the
Joana Paula bus swerved to the lane on which the "Nissan" ice van was
properly traveling, as prescribed by Traffic Rules and Regulations, it is
because the driver of the bus did not see at a distance the parked prime
mover and trailer on the bus' proper lane because there was no warning
signs of danger of any kind that can be seen from a distance.[19]
Limbaga also failed to take proper steps to minimize the risk posed by the
improperly parked prime mover. He did not immediately inform his
employer, private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc., that the prime mover
suffered two tire blowouts and that he could not have them fixed
because he had only one spare tire. Instead of calling for help, Limbaga
took it upon himself to simply place banana leaves on the front and rear
of the prime mover to serve as warning to oncoming motorists. Worse,
Limbaga slept on the prime mover instead of standing guard beside the
vehicle. By his own account, Limbaga was sleeping on the prime mover
at the time of the collision and that he was only awakened by the impact
of the Nissan van and the passenger bus on the prime mover.[20]
Limbaga also admitted on cross-examination that it was his first time to
drive the prime mover with trailer loaded with a D-8 caterpillar
bulldozer.[21] We find that private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was
utterly negligent in allowing a novice driver, like Limbaga, to operate a
vehicle, such as a truck loaded with a bulldozer, which required highly
specialized driving skills. Respondent employer clearly failed to properly
supervise Limbaga in driving the prime mover.
The RTC noted that private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. also failed to
keep the prime mover in proper condition at the time of the collision. The
prime mover had worn out tires. It was only equipped with one spare tire.
It was for this reason that Limbaga was unable to change the two blown
out tires because he had only one spare. The bulldozer was not even
loaded properly on the prime mover, which caused the tire blowouts.
All told, We agree with the RTC that private respondent Limbaga was
negligent in parking the prime mover on the national highway. Private
respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was also negligent in failing to supervise
Limbaga and in ensuring that the prime mover was in proper condition.
The case of Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals is inapplicable;
Limbaga did not
put lighted kerosene tin cans on the front and rear of the prime mover.
Anent the absence of an early warning device on the prime mover, the
CA erred in accepting the bare testimony of Limbaga that he placed
kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the prime mover. The
evidence on records belies such claim. The CA reliance on Baliwag
Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[22] as authority for the proposition that
kerosene lighted tin cans may act as substitute early warning device is
misplaced.
First, the traffic incident report did not mention any lighted tin cans on
the prime mover or within the immediate vicinity of the accident. Only
banana leaves were placed on the prime mover. The report reads:
VIII RESULT OF INVESTIGATION: A Joana Paula Bus, with Body No. 7788,
with Plate No. LVA-137, driven by one Temestocles Relova v. Antero, of
legal age, married and a resident of San Roque, Kitcharao, Agusan del
Norte, while traveling along the National Highway, coming from the east
going to the west direction, as it moves along the way and upon
reaching Brgy. Sumilihon, Butuan City to evade bumping to the
approaching Nissan Ice Van with Plate No. PNT-247, driven by one
Rogelio Cortez y Ceneza. As the result, the Joana Paula Bus accidentally
busideswept (sic) to the parked Prime Mover with Trailer loaded with
Bulldozer without early warning device, instead placing only dry banana
leaves three (3) meters at the rear portion of the Trailer, while failure to
place at the front portion, and the said vehicle occupied the whole lane.
As the result, the Joana Paula Bus hit to the left edge blade of the
Bulldozer. Thus, causing the said bus swept to the narrow shouldering,
removing the rear four (4) wheels including the differential and injuring
the above-stated twelve (12) passengers and damaged to the right side
fender above the rear wheel. Thus, causing damage on it. While the
Nissan Ice Van in evading, accidentally swerved to the left lane and
accidentally bumped to the front bumper of the parked Prime Mover
with Trailer loaded with Bulldozer. Thus, causing heavy damage to said
Nissan Ice Van including the cargoes of the said van.[23]
Second, SPO4 Pame, who investigated the collision, testified[24] that only
banana leaves were placed on the front and rear of the prime mover.
He did not see any lighted tin cans in the immediate vicinity of the
collision.
Third, the claim of Limbaga that he placed lighted tin cans on the front
and rear of the prime mover belatedly surfaced only during his direct
examination. No allegation to this effect was made by private
respondents in their Answer to the complaint for damages. Petitioner's
counsel promptly objected to the testimony of Limbaga, thus:
ATTY. ROSALES:
Q. Now you mentioned about placing some word signs in front and at
the rear of the prime mover with trailer, will you please describe to us
what this word signs are?
A. We placed a piece of cloth on tin cans and filled them with crude oil.
And these tin cans were lighted and they are like torches. These two lights
or torches were placed in front and at the rear side of the prime mover
with trailer. After each torch, we placed banana trunk. The banana trunk
is placed between the two (2) torches and the prime mover, both on the
rear and on the front portion of the prime mover.
Q. How far was the lighted tin cans with wick placed in front of the prime
mover.
ATTY. ASIS:
At this point, we will be objecting to questions particularly referring to the
alleged tin cans as some of the warning-sign devices, considering that
there is no allegation to that effect in the answer of the defendants. The
18
answer was just limited to the numbers 4 & 5 of the answer. And,
therefore, if we follow the rule of the binding effect of an allegation in
the complaint, then the party will not be allowed to introduce evidence
to attack jointly or rather the same, paragraph 5 states, warning device
consisting of 3 banana trunks, banana items and leaves were filed. He
can be cross-examined in the point, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q. Put that on record that as far as this tin cans are concerned, the
plaintiffs are interposing continuing objections. But the Court will allow
the question.[25]
We thus agree with the RTC that Limbaga did not place lighted tin cans
on the front and rear of the prime mover. We give more credence to the
traffic incident report and the testimony of SPO4 Pame that only banana
leaves were placed on the vehicle. Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals[26] thus finds no application to the case at bar.
The skewed parking of the prime mover was the proximate cause of the
collision.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. More comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.[27]
There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause.
It is based upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy
and precedent.[28] Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient link
between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not
be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage
or injury must be a natural and probable result of the act or omission. In
the precedent-setting Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina,[29] this Court
discussed the necessary link that must be established between the act
or omission and the damage or injury, viz.:
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down
a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event,
unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by
lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire,
and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the
proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the
vehicle. But in the present case and under the circumstances obtaining
in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the
death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that
when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back,
the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most
probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that
because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had
to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area
where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a
torch, the most handy and available; and what was more natural than
that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to
extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other
words, the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and
was natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some
of its passengers' bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call
for outside help.
The ruling in Bataclan has been repeatedly cited in subsequent cases as
authority for the proposition that the damage or injury must be a natural
or probable result of the act or omission. Here, We agree with the RTC
that the damage caused to the Nissan van was a natural and probable
result of the improper parking of the prime mover with trailer. As
discussed, the skewed parking of the prime mover posed a serious risk to
oncoming motorists. Limbaga failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The
skewed parking of the prime mover triggered the series of events that led
to the collision, particularly the swerving of the passenger bus and the
Nissan van.
Private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Limbaga are liable for all
damages that resulted from the skewed parking of the prime mover. Their
liability includes those damages resulting from precautionary measures
taken by other motorist in trying to avoid collision with the parked prime
mover. As We see it, the passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the
lane of the Nissan van, to avoid colliding with the improperly parked
prime mover. The driver of the Nissan van, Ortiz, reacted swiftly by
swerving to the left, onto the lane of the passenger bus, hitting the
parked prime mover. Ortiz obviously would not have swerved if not for
the passenger bus abruptly occupying his van's lane. The passenger bus,
in turn, would not have swerved to the lane of the Nissan van if not for
the prime mover improperly parked on its lane. The skewed parking is the
proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.
In Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[30] this
Court held that a similar vehicular collision was caused by the skewed
parking of a dump truck on the national road, thus:
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above
is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the
accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he
should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did
not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the
road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the
Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the
accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner
in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of
petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between
petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and
respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly
different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a
natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
xxxx
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a
"passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient
cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private
respondent's car would in all probability not have occurred had the
dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or
reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna
Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of
time than the truck driver's negligence and, therefore, closer to the
accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What
the Petitioner describes as an "intervening cause" was no more than a
foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner
in which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the
petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and
others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck
driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent
and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in
fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident,
nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. x x x (Underscoring supplied)
We cannot rule on the proportionate or contributory liability of the
passenger bus, if any, because it was not a party to the case; joint
tortfeasors are solidarily liable.
The CA also faults the passenger bus for the vehicular collision. The
appellate court noted that the passenger bus was "aware" of the
presence of the prime mover on its lane, but it still proceeded to occupy
the lane of the Nissan van. The passenger bus also miscalculated its
distance from the prime mover when it hit the vehicle.
We cannot definitively rule on the proportionate or contributory liability
of the Joana Paula passenger bus vis-à-vis the prime mover because it
was not a party to the complaint for damages. Due process dictates that
the passenger bus must be given an opportunity to present its own
version of events before it can be held liable. Any contributory or
proportionate liability of the passenger bus must be litigated in a
separate action, barring any defense of prescription or laches. Insofar as
petitioner is concerned, the proximate cause of the collision was the
improper parking of the prime mover. It was the improper parking of the
prime mover which set in motion the series of events that led to the
vehicular collision.
Even granting that the passenger bus was at fault, it's fault will not
necessarily absolve private respondents from liability. If at fault, the
passenger bus will be a joint tortfeasor along with private respondents.
19
The liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary. This means that
petitioner may hold either of them liable for damages from the collision.
In Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[31]
this Court held:
According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although
acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and
proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is
responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not
have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted
from the acts of the other tort-feasor x x x.
In Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared
that the liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary, to wit:
It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a
person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that
his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than
plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several
causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability
because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the
negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without
which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that
such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to
one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted
from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of
the other concurrent tortfeasors. Where several causes producing an
injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the
injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or
any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the
responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it
may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty
owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's
negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not
exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible
for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of
the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary
since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent
or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons,
although acting independently, are in combination with the direct and
proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either
of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring
negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become
joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under
Article 2194 of the Civil Code. (Underscoring supplied)
All told, all the elements of quasi delict have been proven by clear and
convincing evidence. The CA erred in absolving private respondents
from liability for the vehicular collision.
Final Note
It is lamentable that the vehicular collision in this case could have been
easily avoided by following basic traffic rules and regulations and road
safety standards. In hindsight, private respondent Limbaga could have
prevented the three-way vehicular collision if he had properly parked the
prime mover on the shoulder of the national road. The improper parking
of vehicles, most especially along the national highways, poses a serious
and unnecessary risk to the lives and limbs of other motorists and
passengers. Drivers owe a duty of care to follow basic traffic rules and
regulations and to observe road safety standards. They owe that duty
not only for their own safety, but also for that of other motorists. We can
prevent most vehicular accidents by simply following basic traffic rules
and regulations.
We also note a failure of implementation of basic safety standards,
particularly the law on early warning devices. This applies even more to
trucks and big vehicles, which are prone to mechanical breakdown on
the national highway. The law, as crafted, requires vehicles to be
equipped with triangular reflectorized plates.[32] Vehicles without the
required early warning devices are ineligible for registration.[33] Vehicle
owners may also be arrested and fined for non-compliance with the
law.[34]
The Land Transportation Office (LTO) owes a duty to the public to ensure
that all vehicles on the road meet basic and minimum safety features,
including that of early warning devices. It is most unfortunate that We still
see dilapidated and rundown vehicles on the road with substandard
safety features. These vehicles not only pose a hazard to the safety of
their occupants but that of other motorists. The prime mover truck in this
case should not have been granted registration because it failed to
comply with the minimum safety features required for vehicles on the
road.
It is, indeed, time for traffic enforcement agencies and the LTO to strictly
enforce all pertinent laws and regulations within their mandate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals decision
dated August 28, 2003 is hereby SET ASIDE. The RTC decision dated
August 7, 2001 is REINSTATED IN FULL.
[ G.R. No. 156940, December 14, 2004 ]
ASSOCIATED BANK (NOW WESTMONT BANK), PETITIONER, VS. VICENTE
HENRY TAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
While banks are granted by law the right to debit the value of a
dishonored check from a depositor's account, they must do so with the
highest degree of care, so as not to prejudice the depositor unduly.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the January 27, 2003 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR CV No. 56292. The CA disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated December 3,
1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Third Judicial
Region, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 892-AF is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against the [petitioner]."[3]
The Facts
The CA narrated the antecedents as follows:
"Vicente Henry Tan (hereafter TAN) is a businessman and a regular
depositor-creditor of the Associated Bank (hereinafter referred to as the
BANK). Sometime in September 1990, he deposited a postdated UCPB
check with the said BANK in the amount of P101,000.00 issued to him by
a certain Willy Cheng from Tarlac. The check was duly entered in his bank
record thereby making his balance in the amount of P297,000.00, as of
October 1, 1990, from his original deposit of P196,000.00. Allegedly, upon
advice and instruction of the BANK that the P101,000.00 check was
already cleared and backed up by sufficient funds, TAN, on the same
date, withdrew the sum of P240,000.00, leaving a balance of P57,793.45.
A day after, TAN deposited the amount of P50,000.00 making his existing
balance in the amount of P107,793.45, because he has issued several
checks to his business partners, to wit:
CHECK NUMBERS DATE AMOUNT
a. 138814 Sept. 29, 1990 P9,000.00
b. 138804 Oct. 8, 1990 9,350.00
c. 138787 Sept. 30, 1990 6,360.00
d. 138847 Sept. 29, 1990 21,850.00
e. 167054 Sept. 29, 1990 4,093.40
f. 138792 Sept. 29, 1990 3,546.00
g. 138774 Oct. 2, 1990 6,600.00
h. 167072 Oct. 10, 1990 9,908.00
i. 168802 Oct. 10, 1990 3,650.00
"However, his suppliers and business partners went back to him alleging
that the checks he issued bounced for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter,
TAN, thru his lawyer, informed the BANK to take positive steps regarding
the matter for he has adequate and sufficient funds to pay the amount
of the subject checks. Nonetheless, the BANK did not bother nor offer any
apology regarding the incident. Consequently, TAN, as plaintiff, filed a
Complaint for Damages on December 19, 1990, with the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City, Third Judicial Region, docketed as Civil Case
No. 892-AF, against the BANK, as defendant.
"In his [C]omplaint, [respondent] maintained that he ha[d] sufficient
funds to pay the subject checks and alleged that his suppliers decreased
in number for lack of trust. As he has been in the business community for
quite a time and has established a good record of reputation and
probity, plaintiff claimed that he suffered embarrassment, humiliation,
besmirched reputation, mental anxieties and sleepless nights because of
the said unfortunate incident. [Respondent] further averred that he
continuously lost profits in the amount of P250,000.00. [Respondent]
therefore prayed for exemplary damages and that [petitioner] be
ordered to pay him the sum of P1,000,000.00 by way of moral damages,
20
P250,000.00 as lost profits, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees plus 25% of the
amount claimed including P1,000.00 per court appearance.
"Meanwhile, [petitioner] filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 7, 1991, but
the same was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated March 7, 1991.
Thereafter, [petitioner] BANK on March 20, 1991 filed its Answer denying,
among others, the allegations of [respondent] and alleged that no
banking institution would give an assurance to any of its client/depositor
that the check deposited by him had already been cleared and backed
up by sufficient funds but it could only presume that the same has been
honored by the drawee bank in view of the lapse of time that ordinarily
takes for a check to be cleared. For its part, [petitioner] alleged that on
October 2, 1990, it gave notice to the [respondent] as to the return of his
UCPB check deposit in the amount of P101,000.00, hence, on even date,
[respondent] deposited the amount of P50,000.00 to cover the returned
check.
"By way of affirmative defense, [petitioner] averred that [respondent]
had no cause of action against it and argued that it has all the right to
debit the account of the [respondent] by reason of the dishonor of the
check deposited by the [respondent] which was withdrawn by him prior
to its clearing. [Petitioner] further averred that it has no liability with
respect to the clearing of deposited checks as the clearing is being
undertaken by the Central Bank and in accepting [the] check deposit,
it merely obligates itself as depositor's collecting agent subject to actual
payment by the drawee bank. [Petitioner] therefore prayed that
[respondent] be ordered to pay it the amount of P1,000,000.00 by way
of loss of goodwill, P7,000.00 as acceptance fee plus P500.00 per
appearance and by way of attorney's fees.
"Considering that Westmont Bank has taken over the management of
the affairs/properties of the BANK, [respondent] on October 10, 1996,
filed an Amended Complaint reiterating substantially his allegations in
the original complaint, except that the name of the previous defendant
ASSOCIATED BANK is now WESTMONT BANK.
"Trial ensured and thereafter, the court rendered its Decision dated
December 3, 1996 in favor of the [respondent] and against the
[petitioner], ordering the latter to pay the [respondent] the sum of
P100,000.00 by way of moral damages, P75,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P25,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of this suit. In
making said ruling, it was shown that [respondent] was not officially
informed about the debiting of the P101,000.00 [from] his existing
balance and that the BANK merely allowed the [respondent] to use the
fund prior to clearing merely for accommodation because the BANK
considered him as one of its valued clients. The trial court ruled that the
bank manager was negligent in handling the particular checking
account of the [respondent] stating that such lapses caused all the
inconveniences to the [respondent]. The trial court also took into
consideration that [respondent's] mother was originally maintaining with
the x x x BANK [a] current account as well as [a] time deposit, but [o]n
one occasion, although his mother made a deposit, the same was not
credited in her favor but in the name of another."[4]
Petitioner appealed to the CA on the issues of whether it was within its
rights, as collecting bank, to debit the account of its client for a
dishonored check; and whether it had informed respondent about the
dishonor prior to debiting his account.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the trial court, the CA ruled that the bank should not have
authorized the withdrawal of the value of the deposited check prior to
its clearing. Having done so, contrary to its obligation to treat
respondent's account with meticulous care, the bank violated its own
policy. It thereby took upon itself the obligation to officially inform
respondent of the status of his account before unilaterally debiting the
amount of P101,000. Without such notice, it is estopped from blaming him
for failing to fund his account.
The CA opined that, had the P101,000 not been debited, respondent
would have had sufficient funds for the postdated checks he had issued.
Thus, the supposed accommodation accorded by petitioner to him is the
proximate cause of his business woes and shame, for which it is liable for
damages.
Because of the bank's negligence, the CA awarded respondent moral
damages of P100,000. It also granted him exemplary damages of P75,000
and attorney's fees of P25,000.
Hence this Petition.[5]
Issue
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the sole issue of "whether or not the
petitioner, which is acting as a collecting bank, has the right to debit the
account of its client for a check deposit which was dishonored by the
drawee bank."[6]
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Sole Issue:
Debit of Depositor's Account
Petitioner-bank contends that its rights and obligations under the present
set of facts were misappreciated by the CA. It insists that its right to debit
the amount of the dishonored check from the account of respondent is
clear and unmistakable. Even assuming that it did not give him notice
that the check had been dishonored, such right remains immediately
enforceable.
In particular, petitioner argues that the check deposit slip accomplished
by respondent on September 17, 1990, expressly stipulated that the bank
was obligating itself merely as the depositor's collecting agent and -- until
such time as actual payment would be made to it -- it was reserving the
right to charge against the depositor's account any amount previously
credited. Respondent was allowed to withdraw the amount of the check
prior to clearing, merely as an act of accommodation, it added.
At the outset, we stress that the trial court's factual findings that were
affirmed by the CA are not subject to review by this Court.[7] As petitioner
itself takes no issue with those findings, we need only to determine the
legal consequence, based on the established facts.
Right of Setoff
A bank generally has a right of setoff over the deposits therein for the
payment of any withdrawals on the part of a depositor.[8] The right of a
collecting bank to debit a client's account for the value of a dishonored
check that has previously been credited has fairly been established by
jurisprudence. To begin with, Article 1980 of the Civil Code provides that
"[f]ixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar
institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan."
Hence, the relationship between banks and depositors has been held to
be that of creditor and debtor.[9] Thus, legal compensation under Article
1278[10] of the Civil Code may take place "when all the requisites
mentioned in Article 1279 are present,"[11] as follows:
"(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be
at the same time a principal creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are
consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if
the latter has been stated;
(3) That the two debts be due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy,
commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the
debtor."[12]
Nonetheless, the real issue here is not so much the right of petitioner to
debit respondent's account but, rather, the manner in which it exercised
such right. The Court has held that even while the right of setoff is
conceded, separate is the question of whether that remedy has properly
been exercised.[13]
The liability of petitioner in this case ultimately revolves around the issue
of whether it properly exercised its right of setoff. The determination
thereof hinges, in turn, on the bank's role and obligations, first, as
respondent's depositary bank; and second, as collecting agent for the
check in question.
Obligation as
Depositary Bank
In BPI v. Casa Montessori,[14] the Court has emphasized that the banking
business is impressed with public interest. "Consequently, the highest
21
degree of diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity and
performance are even required of it. By the nature of its functions, a bank
is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous
care."[15]
Also affirming this long standing doctrine, Philippine Bank of Commerce
v. Court of Appeals[16] has held that "the degree of diligence required
of banks is more than that of a good father of a family where the fiduciary
nature of their relationship with their depositors is concerned."[17]
Indeed, the banking business is vested with the trust and confidence of
the public; hence the "appropriate standard of diligence must be very
high, if not the highest, degree of diligence."[18] The standard applies,
regardless of whether the account consists of only a few hundred pesos
or of millions.[19]
The fiduciary nature of banking, previously imposed by case law,[20] is
now enshrined in Republic Act No. 8791 or the General Banking Law of
2000. Section 2 of the law specifically says that the State recognizes the
"fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and
performance."
Did petitioner treat respondent's account with the highest degree of
care? From all indications, it did not.
It is undisputed -- nay, even admitted -- that purportedly as an act of
accommodation to a valued client, petitioner allowed the withdrawal of
the face value of the deposited check prior to its clearing. That act
certainly disregarded the clearance requirement of the banking system.
Such a practice is unusual, because a check is not legal tender or
money;[21] and its value can properly be transferred to a depositor's
account only after the check has been cleared by the drawee bank.[22]
Under ordinary banking practice, after receiving a check deposit, a
bank either immediately credit the amount to a depositor's account; or
infuse value to that account only after the drawee bank shall have paid
such amount.[23] Before the check shall have been cleared for deposit,
the collecting bank can only "assume" at its own risk -- as herein petitioner
did -- that the check would be cleared and paid out.
Reasonable business practice and prudence, moreover, dictated that
petitioner should not have authorized the withdrawal by respondent of
P240,000 on October 1, 1990, as this amount was over and above his
outstanding cleared balance of P196,793.45.[24] Hence, the lower courts
correctly appreciated the evidence in his favor.
Obligation as
Collecting Agent
Indeed, the bank deposit slip expressed this reservation:
"In receiving items on deposit, this Bank obligates itself only as the
Depositor's Collecting agent, assuming no responsibility beyond
carefulness in selecting correspondents, and until such time as actual
payments shall have come to its possession, this Bank reserves the right
to charge back to the Depositor's account any amounts previously
credited whether or not the deposited item is returned. x x x."[25]
However, this reservation is not enough to insulate the bank from any
liability. In the past, we have expressed doubt about the binding force of
such conditions unilaterally imposed by a bank without the consent of
the depositor.[26] It is indeed arguable that "in signing the deposit slip,
the depositor does so only to identify himself and not to agree to the
conditions set forth at the back of the deposit slip."[27]
Further, by the express terms of the stipulation, petitioner took upon itself
certain obligations as respondent's agent, consonant with the well-
settled rule that the relationship between the payee or holder of a
commercial paper and the collecting bank is that of principal and
agent.[28] Under Article 1909[29] of the Civil Code, such bank could be
held liable not only for fraud, but also for negligence.
As a general rule, a bank is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and
declarations of its officers or agents within the course and scope of their
employment.[30] Due to the very nature of their business, banks are
expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection
and supervision of their employees.[31] Jurisprudence has established
that the lack of diligence of a servant is imputed to the negligence of
the employer, when the negligent or wrongful act of the former
proximately results in an injury to a third person;[32] in this case, the
depositor.
The manager of the bank's Cabanatuan branch, Consorcia Santiago,
categorically admitted that she and the employees under her control
had breached bank policies. They admittedly breached those policies
when, without clearance from the drawee bank in Baguio, they allowed
respondent to withdraw on October 1, 1990, the amount of the check
deposited. Santiago testified that respondent "was not officially informed
about the debiting of the P101,000 from his existing balance of P170,000
on October 2, 1990 x x x."[33]
Being the branch manager, Santiago clearly acted within the scope of
her authority in authorizing the withdrawal and the subsequent debiting
without notice. Accordingly, what remains to be determined is whether
her actions proximately caused respondent's injury. Proximate cause is
that which -- in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause --produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.[34]
Let us go back to the facts as they unfolded. It is undeniable that the
bank's premature authorization of the withdrawal by respondent on
October 1, 1990, triggered --in rapid succession and in a natural
sequence -- the debiting of his account, the fall of his account balance
to insufficient levels, and the subsequent dishonor of his own checks for
lack of funds. The CA correctly noted thus:
"x x x [T]he depositor x x x withdrew his money upon the advice by
[petitioner] that his money was already cleared. Without such advice,
[respondent] would not have withdrawn the sum of P240,000.00.
Therefore, it cannot be denied that it was [petitioner's] fault which
allowed [respondent] to withdraw a huge sum which he believed was
already his.
"To emphasize, it is beyond cavil that [respondent] had sufficient funds
for the check. Had the P101,000.00 not [been] debited, the subject
checks would not have been dishonored. Hence, we can say that
[respondent's] injury arose from the dishonor of his well-funded checks. x
x x."[35]
Aggravating matters, petitioner failed to show that it had immediately
and duly informed respondent of the debiting of his account.
Nonetheless, it argues that the giving of notice was discernible from his
act of depositing P50,000 on October 2, 1990, to augment his account
and allow the debiting. This argument deserves short shrift.
First, notice was proper and ought to be expected. By the bank
manager's account, respondent was considered a "valued client" whose
checks had always been sufficiently funded from 1987 to 1990,[36] until
the October imbroglio. Thus, he deserved nothing less than an official
notice of the precarious condition of his account.
Second, under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law
regarding the liability of a general indorser[37] and the procedure for a
notice of dishonor,[38] it was incumbent on the bank to give proper
notice to respondent. In Gullas v. National Bank,[39] the Court
emphasized:
"x x x [A] general indorser of a negotiable instrument engages that if the
instrument the check in this case is dishonored and the necessary
proceedings for its dishonor are duly taken, he will pay the amount
thereof to the holder (Sec. 66) It has been held by a long line of
authorities that notice of dishonor is necessary to charge an indorser and
that the right of action against him does not accrue until the notice is
given.
"x x x. The fact we believe is undeniable that prior to the mailing of notice
of dishonor, and without waiting for any action by Gullas, the bank made
use of the money standing in his account to make good for the treasury
warrant. At this point recall that Gullas was merely an indorser and had
issued checks in good faith. As to a depositor who has funds sufficient to
meet payment of a check drawn by him in favor of a third party, it has
been held that he has a right of action against the bank for its refusal to
pay such a check in the absence of notice to him that the bank has
applied the funds so deposited in extinguishment of past due claims held
against him. (Callahan vs. Bank of Anderson [1904], 2 Ann. Cas., 203.)
However this may be, as to an indorser the situation is different, and
notice should actually have been given him in order that he might
protect his interests."[40]
Third, regarding the deposit of P50,000 made by respondent on October
2, 1990, we fully subscribe to the CA's observations that it was not unusual
for a well-reputed businessman like him, who "ordinarily takes note of the
amount of money he takes and releases," to immediately deposit money
in his current account to answer for the postdated checks he had
issued.[41]
22
Damages
Inasmuch as petitioner does not contest the basis for the award of
damages and attorney's fees, we will no longer address these matters.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
[ G.R. No. 193577, September 07, 2011 ]
ANTONIO FRANCISCO, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS: NELIA E.S. FRANCISCO,
EMILIA F. BERTIZ, REBECCA E.S. FRANCISCO, ANTONIO E.S. FRANCISCO,
JR., SOCORRO F. FONTANILLA, AND JOVITO E.S. FRANCISCO, PETITIONERS,
VS. CHEMICAL BULK CARRIERS, INCORPORATED, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the 31 May 2010 Decision[2] and 31
August 2010 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
63591. In its 31 May 2010 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 21
August 1998 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial of Pasig City, Branch 71 (trial
court), and ordered petitioner Antonio Francisco (Francisco) to pay
respondent Chemical Bulk Carriers, Incorporated (CBCI) P1,119,905 as
actual damages. In its 31 August 2010 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied Francisco's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Since 1965, Francisco was the owner and manager of a Caltex station in
Teresa, Rizal. Sometime in March 1993, four persons, including Gregorio
Bacsa (Bacsa), came to Francisco's Caltex station and introduced
themselves as employees of CBCI. Bacsa offered to sell to Francisco a
certain quantity of CBCI's diesel fuel.
After checking Bacsa's identification card, Francisco agreed to purchase
CBCI's diesel fuel. Francisco imposed the following conditions for the
purchase: (1) that Petron Corporation (Petron) should deliver the diesel
fuel to Francisco at his business address which should be properly
indicated in Petron's invoice; (2) that the delivery tank is sealed; and (3)
that Bacsa should issue a separate receipt to Francisco.
The deliveries started on 5 April 1993 and lasted for ten months, or up to
25 January 1994.[5] There were 17 deliveries to Francisco and all his
conditions were complied with.
In February 1996, CBCI sent a demand letter to Francisco regarding the
diesel fuel delivered to him but which had been paid for by CBCI.[6] CBCI
demanded that Francisco pay CBCI P1,053,527 for the diesel fuel or CBCI
would file a complaint against him in court. Francisco rejected CBCI's
demand.
On 16 April 1996, CBCI filed a complaint for sum of money and damages
against Francisco and other unnamed defendants.[7] According to
CBCI, Petron, on various dates, sold diesel fuel to CBCI but these were
delivered to and received by Francisco. Francisco then sold the diesel
fuel to third persons from whom he received payment. CBCI alleged that
Francisco acquired possession of the diesel fuel without authority from
CBCI and deprived CBCI of the use of the diesel fuel it had paid for. CBCI
demanded payment from Francisco but he refused to pay. CBCI argued
that Francisco should have known that since only Petron, Shell and
Caltex are authorized to sell and distribute petroleum products in the
Philippines, the diesel fuel came from illegitimate, if not illegal or criminal,
acts. CBCI asserted that Francisco violated Articles 19,[8] 20,[9] 21,[10]
and 22[11] of the Civil Code and that he should be held liable. In the
alternative, CBCI claimed that Francisco, in receiving CBCI's diesel fuel,
entered into an innominate contract of do ut des (I give and you give)
with CBCI for which Francisco is obligated to pay CBCI P1,119,905, the
value of the diesel fuel. CBCI also prayed for exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation.
On 20 May 1996, Francisco filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
forum shopping.[12] CBCI filed its Opposition.[13] In an Order dated 15
November 1996, the trial court denied Francisco's motion.[14]
Thereafter, Francisco filed his Answer.[15] Francisco explained that he
operates the Caltex station with the help of his family because, in
February 1978, he completely lost his eyesight due to sickness. Francisco
claimed that he asked Jovito, his son, to look into and verify the identity
of Bacsa, who introduced himself as a radio operator and confidential
secretary of a certain Mr. Inawat (Inawat), CBCI's manager for
operations. Francisco said he was satisfied with the proof presented by
Bacsa. When asked to explain why CBCI was selling its fuel, Bacsa
allegedly replied that CBCI was in immediate need of cash for the salary
of its daily paid workers and for petty cash. Francisco maintained that
Bacsa assured him that the diesel fuel was not stolen property and that
CBCI enjoyed a big credit line with Petron. Francisco agreed to purchase
the diesel fuel offered by Bacsa on the following conditions:
1) Defendant [Francisco] will not accept any delivery if it is not company
(Petron) delivered, with his name and address as shipping point properly
printed and indicated in the invoice of Petron, and that the product on
the delivery tank is sealed; [and]
2) Although the original invoice is sufficient evidence of delivery and
payment, under ordinary course of business, defendant still required Mr.
Bacsa to issue a separate receipt duly signed by him acknowledging
receipt of the amount stated in the invoice, for and in behalf of CBCI.[16]
During the first delivery on 5 April 1993, Francisco asked one of his sons to
verify whether the delivery truck's tank was properly sealed and whether
Petron issued the invoice. Francisco said all his conditions were complied
with. There were 17 deliveries made from 5 April 1993 to 25 January 1994
and each delivery was for 10,000 liters of diesel fuel at P65,865.[17]
Francisco maintained that he acquired the diesel fuel in good faith and
for value. Francisco also filed a counterclaim for exemplary damages,
moral damages and attorney's fees.
In its 21 August 1998 Decision, the trial court ruled in Francisco's favor and
dismissed CBCI's complaint. The dispositive portion of the trial court's 21
August 1998 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint dated March 13, 1996 with costs.
2. Ordering plaintiff (CBCI), on the counterclaim, to pay defendant the
amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as and by way
of attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.[18]
CBCI appealed to the Court of Appeals.[19] CBCI argued that Francisco
acquired the diesel fuel from Petron without legal ground because Bacsa
was not authorized to deliver and sell CBCI's diesel fuel. CBCI added that
Francisco acted in bad faith because he should have inquired further
whether Bacsa's sale of CBCI's diesel fuel was legitimate.
In its 31 May 2010 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the trial court's
21 August 1998 Decision and ruled in CBCI's favor. The dispositive portion
of the Court of Appeals' 31 May 2010 Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Antonio Francisco is ordered to pay Chemical Bulk
Carriers, Incorporated the amount of P1,119,905.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.[20]
On 15 January 2001, Francisco died.[21] Francisco's heirs, namely: Nelia
E.S. Francisco, Emilia F. Bertiz, Rebecca E.S. Francisco, Antonio E.S.
Francisco, Jr., Socorro F. Fontanilla, and Jovito E.S. Francisco (heirs of
Francisco) filed a motion for substitution.[22] The heirs of Francisco also
filed a motion for reconsideration.[23] In its 31 August 2010 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals granted the motion for substitution but denied the
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that Francisco was not liable for damages in favor of
CBCI because the 17 deliveries were covered by original and genuine
invoices. The trial court declared that Bacsa, as confidential secretary of
Inawat, was CBCI's authorized representative who received Francisco's
full payment for the diesel fuel. The trial court stated that if Bacsa was not
authorized, CBCI should have sued Bacsa and not Francisco. The trial
court also considered Francisco a buyer in good faith who paid in full for
the merchandise without notice that some other person had a right to or
interest in such diesel fuel. The trial court pointed out that good faith
23
affords protection to a purchaser for value. Finally, since CBCI was bound
by the acts of Bacsa, the trial court ruled that CBCI is liable to pay
damages to Francisco.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals set aside the trial court's 21 August 1998 Decision
and ruled that Bacsa's act of selling the diesel fuel to Francisco was his
personal act and, even if Bacsa connived with Inawat, the sale does not
bind CBCI.
The Court of Appeals declared that since Francisco had been in the
business of selling petroleum products for a considerable number of
years, his blindness was not a hindrance for him to transact business with
other people. With his condition and experience, Francisco should have
verified whether CBCI was indeed selling diesel fuel and if it had given
Bacsa authority to do so. Moreover, the Court of Appeals stated that
Francisco cannot feign good faith since he had doubts as to the
authority of Bacsa yet he did not seek confirmation from CBCI and
contented himself with an improvised receipt. Francisco's failure to verify
Bacsa's authority showed that he had an ulterior motive. The receipts
issued by Bacsa also showed his lack of authority because it was on a
plain sheet of bond paper with no letterhead or any indication that it
came from CBCI. The Court of Appeals ruled that Francisco cannot
invoke estoppel because he was at fault for choosing to ignore the tell-
tale signs of petroleum diversion and for not exercising prudence.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that CBCI was unlawfully deprived of the
diesel fuel which, as indicated in the invoices, CBCI had already paid for.
Therefore, CBCI had the right to recover the diesel fuel or its value from
Francisco. Since the diesel fuel can no longer be returned, the Court of
Appeals ordered Francisco to give back the actual amount paid by
CBCI for the diesel fuel.
The Issues
The heirs of Francisco raise the following issues:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT ANTONIO FRANCISCO EXERCISED THE REQUIRED DILIGENCE
OF A BLIND PERSON IN THE CONDUCT OF HIS BUSINESS; and
WHETHER ON THE BASIS OF THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT AND ADMITTED FACTS, IT CAN BE
CONCLUDED THAT THE PLAINTIFF APPROVED EXPRESSLY OR TACITLY THE
TRANSACTIONS.[24]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Required Diligence of a Blind Person
The heirs of Francisco argue that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled
that Francisco was liable to CBCI because he failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family when he bought the diesel fuel.
They argue that since Francisco was blind, the standard of conduct that
was required of him was that of a reasonable person under like disability.
Moreover, they insist that Francisco exercised due care in purchasing the
diesel fuel by doing the following: (1) Francisco asked his son to check
the identity of Bacsa; (2) Francisco required direct delivery from Petron;
(3) Francisco required that he be named as the consignee in the invoice;
and (4) Francisco required separate receipts from Bacsa to evidence
actual payment.
Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct that is required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of
the person, time and place.[25] The most common standard of conduct
is that of a good father of a family or that of a reasonably prudent
person.[26] To determine the diligence which must be required of all
persons, we use as basis the abstract average standard corresponding
to a normal orderly person.[27]
However, one who is physically disabled is required to use the same
degree of care that a reasonably careful person who has the same
physical disability would use.[28] Physical handicaps and infirmities, such
as blindness or deafness, are treated as part of the circumstances under
which a reasonable person must act. Thus, the standard of conduct for
a blind person becomes that of a reasonable person who is blind.
We note that Francisco, despite being blind, had been managing and
operating the Caltex station for 15 years and this was not a hindrance for
him to transact business until this time. In this instance, however, we rule
that Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a
reasonable person who is blind. First, Francisco merely relied on the
identification card of Bacsa to determine if he was authorized by CBCI.
Francisco did not do any other background check on the identity and
authority of Bacsa. Second, Francisco already expressed his misgivings
about the diesel fuel, fearing that they might be stolen property,[29] yet
he did not verify with CBCI the authority of Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel.
Third, Francisco relied on the receipts issued by Bacsa which were
typewritten on a half sheet of plain bond paper.[30] If Francisco
exercised reasonable diligence, he should have asked for an official
receipt issued by CBCI. Fourth, the delivery to Francisco, as indicated in
Petron's invoice, does not show that CBCI authorized Bacsa to sell the
diesel fuel to Francisco. Clearly, Francisco failed to exercise the standard
of conduct expected of a reasonable person who is blind.
Express or Tacit Approval of the Transaction
The heirs of Francisco argue that CBCI approved expressly or tacitly the
transactions. According to them, there was apparent authority for Bacsa
to enter into the transactions. They argue that even if the agent has
exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if
the former allowed the later to act as though he had full powers.[31] They
insist CBCI was not unlawfully deprived of its property because Inawat
gave Bacsa the authority to sell the diesel fuel and that CBCI is bound by
such action. Lastly, they argue that CBCI should be considered in
estoppel for failure to act during the ten month period that deliveries
were being made to Francisco.
The general principle is that a seller without title cannot transfer a better
title than he has.[32] Only the owner of the goods or one authorized by
the owner to sell can transfer title to the buyer.[33] Therefore, a person
can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell and the buyer can, as
a consequence, acquire no more than what the seller can legally
transfer.[34]
Moreover, the owner of the goods who has been unlawfully deprived of
it may recover it even from a purchaser in good faith.[35] Thus, the
purchaser of property which has been stolen from the owner has been
held to acquire no title to it even though he purchased for value and in
good faith.
The exception from the general principle is the doctrine of estoppel
where the owner of the goods is precluded from denying the seller's
authority to sell.[36] But in order that there may be estoppel, the owner
must, by word or conduct, have caused or allowed it to appear that title
or authority to sell is with the seller and the buyer must have been misled
to his damage.[37]
In this case, it is clear that Bacsa was not the owner of the diesel fuel.
Francisco was aware of this but he claimed that Bacsa was authorized
by CBCI to sell the diesel fuel. However, Francisco's claim that Bacsa was
authorized is not supported by any evidence except his self-serving
testimony. First, Francisco did not even confirm with CBCI if it was indeed
selling its diesel fuel since it is not one of the oil companies known in the
market to be selling petroleum products. This fact alone should have put
Francisco on guard. Second, it does not appear that CBCI, by some
direct and equivocal act, has clothed Bacsa with the indicia of
ownership or apparent authority to sell CBCI's diesel fuel. Francisco did
not state if the identification card presented by Bacsa indicated that he
was CBCI's agent or a mere employee. Third, the receipt issued by Bacsa
was typewritten on a half sheet of plain bond paper. There was no
letterhead or any indication that it came from CBCI. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that this was a personal receipt issued by Bacsa and
not an official receipt issued by CBCI. Consequently, CBCI is not
precluded by its conduct from denying Bacsa's authority to sell. CBCI did
not hold out Bacsa or allow Bacsa to appear as the owner or one with
apparent authority to dispose of the diesel fuel.
Clearly, Bacsa cannot transfer title to Francisco as Bacsa was not the
owner of the diesel fuel nor was he authorized by CBCI to sell its diesel
fuel. CBCI did not commit any act to clothe Bacsa with apparent
authority to sell the diesel fuel that would have misled Francisco.
Francisco, therefore, did not acquire any title over the diesel fuel. Since
CBCI was unlawfully deprived of its property, it may recover from
Francisco, even if Francisco pleads good faith.
24
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 31 May 2010 Decision
and 31 August 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
[ G.R. No. 166869, February 16, 2010 ]
PHILIPPINE HAWK CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. VIVIAN TAN LEE,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70860, promulgated on August 17, 2004,
affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 102, dated March 16, 2001, in Civil Case No. Q-
91-9191, ordering petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito
Avila to jointly and severally pay respondent Vivian Tan Lee damages as
a result of a vehicular accident.
The facts are as follows:
On March 15, 2005, respondent Vivian Tan Lee filed before the RTC of
Quezon City a Complaint[2] against petitioner Philippine Hawk
Corporation and defendant Margarito Avila for damages based on
quasi-delict, arising from a vehicular accident that occurred on March
17, 1991 in Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon. The accident
resulted in the death of respondent's husband, Silvino Tan, and caused
respondent physical injuries.
On June 18, 1992, respondent filed an Amended Complaint,[3] in her
own behalf and in behalf of her children, in the civil case for damages
against petitioner. Respondent sought the payment of indemnity for the
death of Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary damages, funeral and
interment expenses, medical and hospitalization expenses, the cost of
the motorcycle's repair, attorney's fees, and other just and equitable
reliefs.
The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus with
Body No. 119. The bus was owned by petitioner Philippine Hawk
Corporation, and was then being driven by Margarito Avila.
In its Answer,[4] petitioner denied liability for the vehicular accident,
alleging that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was
the recklessness or lack of caution of Silvino Tan. Petitioner asserted that
it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of its employees, including Margarito Avila.
On March 25, 1993, the trial court issued a Pre-trial Order[5] stating that
the parties manifested that there was no possibility of amicable
settlement between them. However, they agreed to stipulate on the
following facts:
On March 17, 1991, in Bgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, plaintiff
Vivian Lee Tan and her husband Silvino Tan, while on board a motorcycle
with [P]late No. DA-5480 driven by the latter, and a Metro Bus with [P]late
No. NXR-262 driven by Margarito Avila, were involved in an accident;
As a result of the accident, Silvino Tan died on the spot while plaintiff
Vivian Lee Tan suffered physical injuries which necessitated medical
attention and hospitalization;
The deceased Silvino Tan is survived by his wife, plaintiff Vivian Lee Tan
and four children, three of whom are now residents of the United States;
and
Defendant Margarito Avila is an employee of defendant Philippine
Hawk.[6]
The parties also agreed on the following issues:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident causing physical
injuries upon the plaintiff Vivian Lee Tan and resulting in the death of the
latter's husband was the recklessness and negligence of Margarito Avila
or the deceased Silvino Tan; and
Whether or not defendant Philippine Hawk Transport Corporation
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of its driver Margarito Avila.[7]
Respondent testified that on March 17, 1991, she was riding on their
motorcycle in tandem with her husband, who was on the wheel, at a
place after a Caltex gasoline station in Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca,
Quezon on the way to Lopez, Quezon. They came from the Pasumbal
Machine Shop, where they inquired about the repair of their tanker. They
were on a stop position at the side of the highway; and when they were
about to make a turn, she saw a bus running at fast speed coming
toward them, and then the bus hit a jeep parked on the roadside, and
their motorcycle as well. She lost consciousness and was brought to the
hospital in Gumaca, Quezon, where she was confined for a week. She
was later transferred to St. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City, Manila. She
suffered a fracture on her left chest, her left arm became swollen, she felt
pain in her bones, and had high blood pressure.[8]
Respondent's husband died due to the vehicular accident. The
immediate cause of his death was massive cerebral hemorrhage.[9]
Respondent further testified that her husband was leasing[10] and
operating a Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon that yielded one
million pesos a year in revenue. They also had a copra business, which
gave them an income of P3,000.00 a month or P36,000.00 a year.[11]
Ernest Ovial, the driver of the passenger jeep involved in the accident,
testified that in the afternoon of March 17, 1991, his jeep was parked on
the left side of the highway near the Pasumbal Machine Shop. He did not
notice the motorcycle before the accident. But he saw the bus dragging
the motorcycle along the highway, and then the bus bumped his jeep
and sped away.[12]
For the defense, Margarito Avila, the driver of petitioner's bus, testified
that on March 17, 1999, at about 4:30 p.m., he was driving his bus at 60
kilometers per hour on the Maharlika Highway. When they were at
Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, a motorcycle ran from his left
side of the highway, and as the bus came near, the motorcycle crossed
the path of the bus, and so he turned the bus to the right. He heard a
loud banging sound. From his side mirror, he saw that the motorcycle
turned turtle ("bumaliktad"). He did not stop to help out of fear for his life,
but drove on and surrendered to the police. He denied that he bumped
the motorcycle.[13]
Avila further testified that he had previously been involved in sideswiping
incidents, but he forgot how many times.[14]
Rodolfo Ilagan, the bus conductor, testified that the motorcycle bumped
the left side of the bus that was running at 40 kilometers per hour.[15]
Domingo S. Sisperes, operations officer of petitioner, testified that, like
their other drivers, Avila was subjected to and passed the following
requirements:
(1) Submission of NBI clearance;
(2) Certification from his previous employer that he had no bad record;
(3) Physical examination to determine his fitness to drive;
(4) Test of his driving ability, particularly his defensive skill; and
(5) Review of his driving skill every six months.[16]
Efren Delantar, a Barangay Kagawad in Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon,
testified that the bus was running on the highway on a straight path when
a motorcycle, with a woman behind its driver, suddenly emerged from
the left side of the road from a machine shop. The motorcycle crossed
the highway in a zigzag manner and bumped the side of the bus.[17]
In its Decision dated March 16, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment
against petitioner and defendant Margarito Avila, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, MARGARITO AVILA is adjudged guilty of simple
negligence, and judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
Vivian Lee Tan and h[er] husband's heirs ordering the defendants
Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito Avila to pay them jointly and
solidarily the sum of P745,575.00 representing loss of earnings and actual
damages plus P50,000.00 as moral damages.[18]
The trial court found that before the collision, the motorcycle was on the
left side of the road, just as the passenger jeep was. Prior to the accident,
the motorcycle was in a running position moving toward the right side of
the highway. The trial court agreed with the bus driver that the
motorcycle was moving ahead of the bus from the left side of the road
toward the right side of the road, but disagreed that the motorcycle
crossed the path of the bus while the bus was running on the right side of
the road.[19]
25
The trial court held that if the bus were on the right side of the highway,
and Margarito Avila turned his bus to the right in an attempt to avoid
hitting the motorcyle, then the bus would not have hit the passenger
jeep, which was then parked on the left side of the road. The fact that
the bus also hit the passenger jeep showed that the bus must have been
running from the right lane to the left lane of the highway, which caused
the collision with the motorcycle and the passenger jeep parked on the
left side of the road. The trial court stated that since Avila saw the
motorcycle before the collision, he should have stepped on the brakes
and slowed down, but he just maintained his speed and veered to the
left.[20] The trial court found Margarito Avila guilty of simple negligence.
The trial court held petitioner bus company liable for failing to exercise
the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of Avila, having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline
and correct behavior on the road.[21]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
with modification in the award of damages. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The
assailed decision dated March 16, 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellants Philippine Hawk and Avila are hereby
ordered to pay jointly and severally appellee the following amount: (a)
P168,019.55 as actual damages; (b) P10,000.00 as temperate damages;
(c) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (d) P590,000.00 as unearned income;
and (e) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.[22]
Petitioner filed this petition, raising the following issues:
1)
The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in passing upon an issue, which had not been raised
on appeal, and which had, therefore, attained finality, in total disregard
of the doctrine laid down by this Court in Abubakar v. Abubakar, G.R.
No. 134622, October 22, 1999.
2)
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its finding that the
petitioner's bus driver saw the motorcycle of private respondent
executing a U-turn on the highway "about fifteen (15) meters away" and
thereafter held that the Doctrine of Last Clear was applicable to the
instant case. This was a palpable error for the simple reason that the
aforesaid distance was the distance of the witness to the bus and not the
distance of the bus to the respondent's motorcycle, as clearly borne out
by the records.
3)
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in awarding damages
in total disregard of the established doctrine laid down in Danao v. Court
of Appeals, 154 SCRA 447 and Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos
Santos, G.R. No. 138296, November 22, 2000.[23]
In short, the issues raised by petitioner are: (1) whether or not negligence
may be attributed to petitioner's driver, and whether negligence on his
part was the proximate cause of the accident, resulting in the death of
Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to respondent; (2) whether or not
petitioner is liable to respondent for damages; and (3) whether or not the
damages awarded by respondent Court of Appeals are proper.
Petitioner seeks a review of the factual findings of the trial court, which
were sustained by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner's driver was
negligent in driving the bus, which caused physical injuries to respondent
and the death of respondent's husband.
The rule is settled that the findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when
supported by the evidence on record.[24] The Court has carefully
reviewed the records of this case, and found no cogent reason to disturb
the findings of the trial court, thus:
The Court agree[s] with the bus driver Margarito that the motorcycle was
moving ahead of the bus towards the right side from the left side of the
road, but disagrees with him that it crossed the path of the bus while the
bus was running on the right side of the highway.
If the bus were on the right side of the highway and Margarito turned his
bus to the right in an attempt to avoid hitting it, then the bus would not
have hit the passenger jeep vehicle which was then parked on the left
side of the road. The fact that the bus hit the jeep too, shows that the bus
must have been running to the left lane of the highway from right to the
left, that the collision between it and the parked jeep and the moving
rightways cycle became inevitable. Besides, Margarito said he saw the
motorcycle before the collision ahead of the bus; that being so, an extra-
cautious public utility driver should have stepped on his brakes and
slowed down. Here, the bus never slowed down, it simply maintained its
highway speed and veered to the left. This is negligence indeed.[25]
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals was mistaken in stating
that the bus driver saw respondent's motorcycle "about 15 meters away"
before the collision, because the said distance, as testified to by its
witness Efren Delantar Ong, was Ong's distance from the bus, and not
the distance of the bus from the motorcycle. Petitioner asserts that this
mistaken assumption of the Court of Appeals made it conclude that the
bus driver, Margarito Avila, had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident, which was the basis for the conclusion that Avila was guilty of
simple negligence.
A review of the records showed that it was petitioner's witness, Efren
Delantar Ong, who was about 15 meters away from the bus when he
saw the vehicular accident.[26] Nevertheless, this fact does not affect
the finding of the trial court that petitioner's bus driver, Margarito Avila,
was guilty of simple negligence as affirmed by the appellate court.
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence.[27] To be negligent,
a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an
ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of
certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite
class of risks.[28]
In this case, the bus driver, who was driving on the right side of the road,
already saw the motorcycle on the left side of the road before the
collision. However, he did not take the necessary precaution to slow
down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle, and also the
passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road, showing that the bus
was negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the motorcycle
and the passenger jeep.
Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to
another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to
exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
or supervision of its employees.[29] To avoid liability for a quasi-delict
committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee.[30]
The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that petitioner is liable to respondent, since it failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision
of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently inculcate
in him discipline and correct behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioner's
tests were concentrated on the ability to drive and physical fitness to do
so. It also did not know that Avila had been previously involved in
sideswiping incidents.
As regards the issue on the damages awarded, petitioner contends that
it was the only one that appealed the decision of the trial court with
respect to the award of actual and moral damages; hence, the Court
of Appeals erred in awarding other kinds of damages in favor of
respondent, who did not appeal from the trial court's decision.
Petitioner's contention is unmeritorious.
Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. -- No error which does not affect
the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment
appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless
stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on
an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court pass
upon plain errors and clerical errors.
Philippine National Bank v. Rabat[31] cited the book[32] of Justice Florenz
D. Regalado to explain the section above, thus:
26
In his book, Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado commented on this section,
thus:
Sec. 8, which is an amendment of the former Sec. 7 of this Rule, now
includes some substantial changes in the rules on assignment of errors.
The basic procedural rule is that only errors claimed and assigned by a
party will be considered by the court, except errors affecting its
jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this exception has now been
added errors affecting the validity of the judgment appealed from or the
proceedings therein.
Also, even if the error complained of by a party is not expressly stated in
his assignment of errors but the same is closely related to or dependent
on an assigned error and properly argued in his brief, such error may now
be considered by the court. These changes are of jurisprudential origin.
The procedure in the Supreme Court being generally the same as that in
the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise indicated (see Secs. 2 and 4, Rule
56), it has been held that the latter is clothed with ample authority to
review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds
that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the
case. Also, an unassigned error closely related to an error properly
assigned (PCIB vs. CA, et al., L-34931, Mar. 18, 1988), or upon which the
determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is
dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding
the failure to assign it as error (Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines,
L-28773, June 30, 1975; Soco vs. Militante, et al., G.R. No. 58961, June 28,
1983).
It may also be observed that under Sec. 8 of this Rule, the appellate court
is authorized to consider a plain error, although it was not specifically
assigned by the appellant (Dilag vs. Heirs of Resurreccion, 76 Phil. 649),
otherwise it would be sacrificing substance for technicalities.[33]
In this case for damages based on quasi-delict, the trial court awarded
respondent the sum of P745,575.00, representing loss of earning capacity
(P590,000.00) and actual damages (P155,575.00 for funeral expenses),
plus P50,000.00 as moral damages. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
petitioner assigned as error the award of damages by the trial court on
the ground that it was based merely on suppositions and surmises, not
the admissions made by respondent during the trial.
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the award by the trial court
for loss of earning capacity of the deceased Silvino Tan, moral damages
for his death, and actual damages, although the amount of the latter
award was modified.
The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided
for by Article 2206 of the Civil Code.[34] Compensation of this nature is
awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn
money.[35]
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate
the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity.[36] By way of
exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased
is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that
in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or
(2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws.[37]
In this case, the records show that respondent's husband was leasing and
operating a Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon. Respondent
testified that her husband earned an annual income of one million pesos.
Respondent presented in evidence a Certificate of Creditable Income
Tax Withheld at Source for the Year 1990,[38] which showed that
respondent's husband earned a gross income of P950,988.43 in 1990. It is
reasonable to use the Certificate and respondent's testimony as bases
for fixing the gross annual income of the deceased at one million pesos
before respondent's husband died on March 17, 1999. However, no
documentary evidence was presented regarding the income derived
from their copra business; hence, the testimony of respondent as regards
such income cannot be considered.
In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not
gross earnings, are to be considered; that is, the total of the earnings less
expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings or income, less
living and other incidental expenses.[39] In the absence of documentary
evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary expenses for the lease and
operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent of the gross income, and
peg living expenses at 50 percent of the net income (gross income less
necessary expenses).
The Court of Appeals also awarded actual damages for the expenses
incurred in connection with the death, wake, and interment of
respondent's husband in the amount of P154,575.30, and the medical
expenses of respondent in the amount of P168,019.55.
Actual damages must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such
as receipts, in order to prove expenses incurred as a result of the death
of the victim[40] or the physical injuries sustained by the victim. A review
of the valid receipts submitted in evidence showed that the funeral and
related expenses amounted only to P114,948.60, while the medical
expenses of respondent amounted only to P12,244.25, yielding a total of
P127,192.85 in actual damages.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of respondent's
husband. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the
expense of the defendant.[41] They are awarded to allow the plaintiff to
obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he/she has undergone due to the defendant's culpable
action and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted.[42]
In addition, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded temperate
damages in the amount of P10,000.00 for the damage caused on
respondent's motorcycle. Under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate
damages "may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be proved with certainty." The cost of the repair of the motorcycle
was prayed for by respondent in her Complaint. However, the evidence
presented was merely a job estimate[43] of the cost of the motorcycle's
repair amounting to P17, 829.00. The Court of Appeals aptly held that
there was no doubt that the damage caused on the motorcycle was
due to the negligence of petitioner's driver. In the absence of competent
proof of the actual damage caused on the motorcycle or the actual
cost of its repair, the award of temperate damages by the appellate
court in the amount of P10,000.00 was reasonable under the
circumstances.[44]
The Court of Appeals also correctly awarded respondent moral
damages for the physical injuries she sustained due to the vehicular
accident. Under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code,[45] moral damages may be
recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. However, the award
of P50,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00 in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence.[46]
Further, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondent civil
indemnity for the death of her husband, which has been fixed by current
jurisprudence at P50,000.00.[47] The award is proper under Art. 2206 of
the Civil Code.[48]
In fine, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded civil indemnity for the
death of respondent's husband, temperate damages, and moral
damages for the physical injuries sustained by respondent in addition to
the damages granted by the trial court to respondent. The trial court
overlooked awarding the additional damages, which were prayed for
by respondent in her Amended Complaint. The appellate court is
clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not
assigned as errors in the appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case.[49]
27
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated August 17, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 70860 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito
Avila are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally respondent Vivian
Lee Tan: (a) civil indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00); (b) actual damages in the amount of One Hundred Twenty-
Seven Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos and Eighty-Five
Centavos ( P127,192.85); (c) moral damages in the amount of Eighty
Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00); (d) indemnity for loss of earning capacity in
the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00); and (e) temperate
damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
[ G.R. No. 165279, June 07, 2011 ]
DR. RUBI LI, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES REYNALDO AND LINA SOLIMAN, AS
PARENTS/HEIRS OF DECEASED ANGELICA SOLIMAN, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated
June 15, 2004 as well as the Resolution[2] dated September 1, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 58013 which modified the
Decision[3] dated September 5, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 8 in Civil Case No. 8904.
The factual antecedents:
On July 7, 1993, respondents' 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman,
underwent a biopsy of the mass located in her lower extremity at the St.
Luke's Medical Center (SLMC). Results showed that Angelica was
suffering from osteosarcoma, osteoblastic type,[4] a high-grade (highly
malignant) cancer of the bone which usually afflicts teenage children.
Following this diagnosis and as primary intervention, Angelica's right leg
was amputated by Dr. Jaime Tamayo in order to remove the tumor. As
adjuvant treatment to eliminate any remaining cancer cells, and hence
minimize the chances of recurrence and prevent the disease from
spreading to other parts of the patient's body (metastasis),
chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo. Dr. Tamayo referred
Angelica to another doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a
medical oncologist.
On August 18, 1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC. However, she died
on September 1, 1993, just eleven (11) days after the (intravenous)
administration of the first cycle of the chemotherapy regimen. Because
SLMC refused to release a death certificate without full payment of their
hospital bill, respondents brought the cadaver of Angelica to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for
post-mortem examination. The Medico-Legal Report issued by said
institution indicated the cause of death as "Hypovolemic shock
secondary to multiple organ hemorrhages and Disseminated
Intravascular Coagulation."[5]
On the other hand, the Certificate of Death[6] issued by SLMC stated the
cause of death as follows:
Immediate cause : a. Osteosarcoma, Status Post AKA
Antecedent cause : b. (above knee amputation)
Underlying cause : c. Status Post Chemotherapy
On February 21, 1994, respondents filed a damage suit[7] against
petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella, Mr. Jose Ledesma, a certain Dr. Arriete and
SLMC. Respondents charged them with negligence and disregard of
Angelica's safety, health and welfare by their careless administration of
the chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe the essential
precautions in detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood platelet
decrease and stopping early on the chemotherapy, which bleeding led
to hypovolemic shock that caused Angelica's untimely demise. Further,
it was specifically averred that petitioner assured the respondents that
Angelica would recover in view of 95% chance of healing with
chemotherapy ("Magiging normal na ang anak nyo basta ma-chemo.
95% ang healing") and when asked regarding the side effects, petitioner
mentioned only slight vomiting, hair loss and weakness ("Magsusuka ng
kaunti. Malulugas ang buhok. Manghihina"). Respondents thus claimed
that they would not have given their consent to chemotherapy had
petitioner not falsely assured them of its side effects.
In her answer,[8] petitioner denied having been negligent in
administering the chemotherapy drugs to Angelica and asserted that
she had fully explained to respondents how the chemotherapy will affect
not only the cancer cells but also the patient's normal body parts,
including the lowering of white and red blood cells and platelets. She
claimed that what happened to Angelica can be attributed to
malignant tumor cells possibly left behind after surgery. Few as they may
be, these have the capacity to compete for nutrients such that the body
becomes so weak structurally (cachexia) and functionally in the form of
lower resistance of the body to combat infection. Such infection
becomes uncontrollable and triggers a chain of events (sepsis or
septicemia) that may lead to bleeding in the form of Disseminated
Intravascular Coagulation (DIC), as what the autopsy report showed in
the case of Angelica.
Since the medical records of Angelica were not produced in court, the
trial and appellate courts had to rely on testimonial evidence, principally
the declarations of petitioner and respondents themselves. The following
chronology of events was gathered:
On July 23, 1993, petitioner saw the respondents at the hospital after
Angelica's surgery and discussed with them Angelica's condition.
Petitioner told respondents that Angelica should be given two to three
weeks to recover from the operation before starting chemotherapy.
Respondents were apprehensive due to financial constraints as
Reynaldo earns only from P70,000.00 to P150,000.00 a year from his
jewelry and watch repairing business.[9] Petitioner, however, assured
them not to worry about her professional fee and told them to just save
up for the medicines to be used.
Petitioner claimed that she explained to respondents that even when a
tumor is removed, there are still small lesions undetectable to the naked
eye, and that adjuvant chemotherapy is needed to clean out the small
lesions in order to lessen the chance of the cancer to recur. She did not
give the respondents any assurance that chemotherapy will cure
Angelica's cancer. During these consultations with respondents, she
explained the following side effects of chemotherapy treatment to
respondents: (1) falling hair; (2) nausea and vomiting; (3) loss of appetite;
(4) low count of white blood cells [WBC], red blood cells [RBC] and
platelets; (5) possible sterility due to the effects on Angelica's ovary; (6)
damage to the heart and kidneys; and (7) darkening of the skin
especially when exposed to sunlight. She actually talked with
respondents four times, once at the hospital after the surgery, twice at
her clinic and the fourth time when Angelica's mother called her through
long distance.[10] This was disputed by respondents who countered that
petitioner gave them assurance that there is 95% chance of healing for
Angelica if she undergoes chemotherapy and that the only side effects
were nausea, vomiting and hair loss.[11] Those were the only side-effects
of chemotherapy treatment mentioned by petitioner.[12]
On July 27, 1993, SLMC discharged Angelica, with instruction from
petitioner that she be readmitted after two or three weeks for the
chemotherapy.
On August 18, 1993, respondents brought Angelica to SLMC for
chemotherapy, bringing with them the results of the laboratory tests
requested by petitioner: Angelica's chest x-ray, ultrasound of the liver,
creatinine and complete liver function tests.[13] Petitioner proceeded
with the chemotherapy by first administering hydration fluids to
Angelica.[14]
The following day, August 19, petitioner began administering three
chemotherapy drugs - Cisplatin,[15] Doxorubicin[16] and Cosmegen[17]
- intravenously. Petitioner was supposedly assisted by her trainees Dr. Leo
Marbella[18] and Dr. Grace Arriete.[19] In his testimony, Dr. Marbella
denied having any participation in administering the said chemotherapy
drugs.[20]
On the second day of chemotherapy, August 20, respondents noticed
reddish discoloration on Angelica's face.[21] They asked petitioner
about it, but she merely quipped, "Wala yan. Epekto ng gamot."[22]
Petitioner recalled noticing the skin rashes on the nose and cheek area
of Angelica. At that moment, she entertained the possibility that
Angelica also had systemic lupus and consulted Dr. Victoria Abesamis on
the matter.[23]
On the third day of chemotherapy, August 21, Angelica had difficulty
breathing and was thus provided with oxygen inhalation apparatus. This
time, the reddish discoloration on Angelica's face had extended to her
neck, but petitioner dismissed it again as merely the effect of
medicines.[24] Petitioner testified that she did not see any discoloration
on Angelica's face, nor did she notice any difficulty in the child's
breathing. She claimed that Angelica merely complained of nausea
and was given ice chips.[25]
28

On August 22, 1993, at around ten o'clock in the morning, upon seeing
that their child could not anymore bear the pain, respondents pleaded
with petitioner to stop the chemotherapy. Petitioner supposedly replied:
"Dapat 15 Cosmegen pa iyan. Okay, let's observe. If pwede na, bigyan
uli ng chemo." At this point, respondents asked petitioner's permission to
bring their child home. Later in the evening, Angelica passed black stool
and reddish urine.[26] Petitioner countered that there was no record of
blackening of stools but only an episode of loose bowel movement
(LBM). Petitioner also testified that what Angelica complained of was
carpo-pedal spasm, not convulsion or epileptic attack, as respondents
call it (petitioner described it in the vernacular as "naninigas ang kamay
at paa"). She then requested for a serum calcium determination and
stopped the chemotherapy. When Angelica was given calcium
gluconate, the spasm and numbness subsided.[27]
The following day, August 23, petitioner yielded to respondents' request
to take Angelica home. But prior to discharging Angelica, petitioner
requested for a repeat serum calcium determination and explained to
respondents that the chemotherapy will be temporarily stopped while
she observes Angelica's muscle twitching and serum calcium level. Take-
home medicines were also prescribed for Angelica, with instructions to
respondents that the serum calcium test will have to be repeated after
seven days. Petitioner told respondents that she will see Angelica again
after two weeks, but respondents can see her anytime if any immediate
problem arises.[28]
However, Angelica remained in confinement because while still in the
premises of SLMC, her "convulsions" returned and she also had LBM.
Angelica was given oxygen and administration of calcium
continued.[29]
The next day, August 24, respondents claimed that Angelica still suffered
from convulsions. They also noticed that she had a fever and had
difficulty breathing.[30] Petitioner insisted it was carpo-pedal spasm, not
convulsions. She verified that at around 4:50 that afternoon, Angelica
developed difficulty in breathing and had fever. She then requested for
an electrocardiogram analysis, and infused calcium gluconate on the
patient at a "stat dose." She further ordered that Angelica be given
Bactrim,[31] a synthetic antibacterial combination drug,[32] to combat
any infection on the child's body.[33]
By August 26, Angelica was bleeding through the mouth. Respondents
also saw blood on her anus and urine. When Lina asked petitioner what
was happening to her daughter, petitioner replied, "Bagsak ang platelets
ng anak mo." Four units of platelet concentrates were then transfused to
Angelica. Petitioner prescribed Solucortef. Considering that Angelica's
fever was high and her white blood cell count was low, petitioner
prescribed Leucomax. About four to eight bags of blood, consisting of
packed red blood cells, fresh whole blood, or platelet concentrate, were
transfused to Angelica. For two days (August 27 to 28), Angelica
continued bleeding, but petitioner claimed it was lesser in amount and
in frequency. Petitioner also denied that there were gadgets attached
to Angelica at that time.[34]
On August 29, Angelica developed ulcers in her mouth, which petitioner
said were blood clots that should not be removed. Respondents claimed
that Angelica passed about half a liter of blood through her anus at
around seven o'clock that evening, which petitioner likewise denied.
On August 30, Angelica continued bleeding. She was restless as
endotracheal and nasogastric tubes were inserted into her weakened
body. An aspiration of the nasogastric tube inserted to Angelica also
revealed a bloody content. Angelica was given more platelet
concentrate and fresh whole blood, which petitioner claimed improved
her condition. Petitioner told Angelica not to remove the endotracheal
tube because this may induce further bleeding.[35] She was also
transferred to the intensive care unit to avoid infection.
The next day, respondents claimed that Angelica became hysterical,
vomited blood and her body turned black. Part of Angelica's skin was
also noted to be shredding by just rubbing cotton on it. Angelica was so
restless she removed those gadgets attached to her, saying "Ayaw ko
na"; there were tears in her eyes and she kept turning her head.
Observing her daughter to be at the point of death, Lina asked for a
doctor but the latter could not answer her anymore.[36] At this time, the
attending physician was Dr. Marbella who was shaking his head saying
that Angelica's platelets were down and respondents should pray for
their daughter. Reynaldo claimed that he was introduced to a
pediatrician who took over his daughter's case, Dr. Abesamis who also
told him to pray for his daughter. Angelica continued to have difficulty in
her breathing and blood was being suctioned from her stomach. A nurse
was posted inside Angelica's room to assist her breathing and at one
point they had to revive Angelica by pumping her chest. Thereafter,
Reynaldo claimed that Angelica already experienced difficulty in
urinating and her bowel consisted of blood-like fluid. Angelica requested
for an electric fan as she was in pain. Hospital staff attempted to take
blood samples from Angelica but were unsuccessful because they could
not even locate her vein. Angelica asked for a fruit but when it was given
to her, she only smelled it. At this time, Reynaldo claimed he could not
find either petitioner or Dr. Marbella. That night, Angelica became
hysterical and started removing those gadgets attached to her. At three
o'clock in the morning of September 1, a priest came and they prayed
before Angelica expired. Petitioner finally came back and supposedly
told respondents that there was "malfunction" or bogged-down
machine.[37]
By petitioner's own account, Angelica was merely irritable that day
(August 31). Petitioner noted though that Angelica's skin was indeed
sloughing off.[38] She stressed that at 9:30 in the evening, Angelica pulled
out her endotracheal tube.[39] On September 1, exactly two weeks
after being admitted at SLMC for chemotherapy, Angelica died.[40] The
cause of death, according to petitioner, was septicemia, or
overwhelming infection, which caused Angelica's other organs to
fail.[41] Petitioner attributed this to the patient's poor defense
mechanism brought about by the cancer itself.[42]
While he was seeking the release of Angelica's cadaver from SLMC,
Reynaldo claimed that petitioner acted arrogantly and called him
names. He was asked to sign a promissory note as he did not have cash
to pay the hospital bill.[43]
Respondents also presented as witnesses Dr. Jesusa Nieves-Vergara,
Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP-Crime Laboratory who conducted the
autopsy on Angelica's cadaver, and Dr. Melinda Vergara Balmaceda
who is a Medical Specialist employed at the Department of Health (DOH)
Operations and Management Services.
Testifying on the findings stated in her medico-legal report, Dr. Vergara
noted the following: (1) there were fluids recovered from the abdominal
cavity, which is not normal, and was due to hemorrhagic shock
secondary to bleeding; (2) there was hemorrhage at the left side of the
heart; (3) bleeding at the upper portion of and areas adjacent to, the
esophagus; (4) lungs were heavy with bleeding at the back and lower
portion, due to accumulation of fluids; (4) yellowish discoloration of the
liver; (5) kidneys showed appearance of facial shock on account of
hemorrhages; and (6) reddishness on external surface of the spleen. All
these were the end result of "hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple
organ hemorrhages and disseminated intravascular coagulation." Dr.
Vergara opined that this can be attributed to the chemical agents in the
drugs given to the victim, which caused platelet reduction resulting to
bleeding sufficient to cause the victim's death. The time lapse for the
production of DIC in the case of Angelica (from the time of diagnosis of
sarcoma) was too short, considering the survival rate of about 3 years.
The witness conceded that the victim will also die of osteosarcoma even
with amputation or chemotherapy, but in this case Angelica's death was
not caused by osteosarcoma. Dr. Vergara admitted that she is not a
pathologist but her statements were based on the opinion of an
oncologist whom she had interviewed. This oncologist supposedly said
that if the victim already had DIC prior to the chemotherapy, the hospital
staff could have detected it.[44]
On her part, Dr. Balmaceda declared that it is the physician's duty to
inform and explain to the patient or his relatives every known side effect
of the procedure or therapeutic agents to be administered, before
securing the consent of the patient or his relatives to such procedure or
therapy. The physician thus bases his assurance to the patient on his
personal assessment of the patient's condition and his knowledge of the
general effects of the agents or procedure that will be allowed on the
patient. Dr. Balmaceda stressed that the patient or relatives must be
informed of all known side effects based on studies and observations,
even if such will aggravate the patient's condition.[45]
Dr. Jaime Tamayo, the orthopaedic surgeon who operated on
Angelica's lower extremity, testified for the defendants. He explained
that in case of malignant tumors, there is no guarantee that the ablation
or removal of the amputated part will completely cure the cancer. Thus,
surgery is not enough. The mortality rate of osteosarcoma at the time of
modern chemotherapy and early diagnosis still remains at 80% to 90%.
Usually, deaths occur from metastasis, or spread of the cancer to other
29
vital organs like the liver, causing systemic complications. The modes of
therapy available are the removal of the primary source of the
cancerous growth and then the residual cancer cells or metastasis
should be treated with chemotherapy. Dr. Tamayo further explained that
patients with osteosarcoma have poor defense mechanism due to the
cancer cells in the blood stream. In the case of Angelica, he had
previously explained to her parents that after the surgical procedure,
chemotherapy is imperative so that metastasis of these cancer cells will
hopefully be addressed. He referred the patient to petitioner because
he felt that petitioner is a competent oncologist. Considering that this
type of cancer is very aggressive and will metastasize early, it will cause
the demise of the patient should there be no early intervention (in this
case, the patient developed sepsis which caused her death). Cancer
cells in the blood cannot be seen by the naked eye nor detected
through bone scan. On cross-examination, Dr. Tamayo stated that of the
more than 50 child patients who had osteogenic sarcoma he had
handled, he thought that probably all of them died within six months from
amputation because he did not see them anymore after follow-up; it is
either they died or had seen another doctor.[46]
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that petitioner was not
liable for damages as she observed the best known procedures and
employed her highest skill and knowledge in the administration of
chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all efforts said patient
died. It cited the testimony of Dr. Tamayo who testified that he
considered petitioner one of the most proficient in the treatment of
cancer and that the patient in this case was afflicted with a very
aggressive type of cancer necessitating chemotherapy as adjuvant
treatment. Using the standard of negligence laid down in Picart v.
Smith,[47] the trial court declared that petitioner has taken the necessary
precaution against the adverse effect of chemotherapy on the patient,
adding that a wrong decision is not by itself negligence. Respondents
were ordered to pay their unpaid hospital bill in the amount of
P139,064.43.[48]
Respondents appealed to the CA which, while concurring with the trial
court's finding that there was no negligence committed by the petitioner
in the administration of chemotherapy treatment to Angelica, found that
petitioner as her attending physician failed to fully explain to the
respondents all the known side effects of chemotherapy. The appellate
court stressed that since the respondents have been told of only three
side effects of chemotherapy, they readily consented thereto. Had
petitioner made known to respondents those other side effects which
gravely affected their child -- such as carpo-pedal spasm, sepsis,
decrease in the blood platelet count, bleeding, infections and eventual
death -- respondents could have decided differently or adopted a
different course of action which could have delayed or prevented the
early death of their child.
The CA thus declared:
Plaintiffs-appellants' child was suffering from a malignant disease. The
attending physician recommended that she undergo chemotherapy
treatment after surgery in order to increase her chances of survival.
Appellants consented to the chemotherapy treatment because they
believed in Dr. Rubi Li's representation that the deceased would have a
strong chance of survival after chemotherapy and also because of the
representation of appellee Dr. Rubi Li that there were only three possible
side-effects of the treatment. However, all sorts of painful side-effects
resulted from the treatment including the premature death of Angelica.
The appellants were clearly and totally unaware of these other side-
effects which manifested only during the chemotherapy treatment. This
was shown by the fact that every time a problem would take place
regarding Angelica's condition (like an unexpected side-effect
manifesting itself), they would immediately seek explanation from Dr.
Rubi Li. Surely, those unexpected side-effects culminating in the loss of a
love[d] one caused the appellants so much trouble, pain and suffering.
On this point therefore, [w]e find defendant-appellee Dr. Rubi Li
negligent which would entitle plaintiffs-appellants to their claim for
damages.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
assailed decision is hereby modified to the extent that defendant-
appellee Dr. Rubi Li is ordered to pay the plaintiffs-appellants the
following amounts:
Actual damages of P139,064.43, plus P9,828.00 for funeral expenses;
Moral damages of P200,000.00;
Exemplary damages of P50,000.00;
Attorney's fee of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[49] (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration which the appellate
court denied.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner assails the CA in finding her guilty of negligence in not
explaining to the respondents all the possible side effects of the
chemotherapy on their child, and in holding her liable for actual, moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Petitioner emphasized that
she was not negligent in the pre-chemotherapy procedures and in the
administration of chemotherapy treatment to Angelica.
On her supposed non-disclosure of all possible side effects of
chemotherapy, including death, petitioner argues that it was foolhardy
to imagine her to be all-knowing/omnipotent. While the theoretical side
effects of chemotherapy were explained by her to the respondents, as
these should be known to a competent doctor, petitioner cannot
possibly predict how a particular patient's genetic make-up, state of
mind, general health and body constitution would respond to the
treatment. These are obviously dependent on too many known,
unknown and immeasurable variables, thus requiring that Angelica be,
as she was, constantly and closely monitored during the treatment.
Petitioner asserts that she did everything within her professional
competence to attend to the medical needs of Angelica.
Citing numerous trainings, distinctions and achievements in her field and
her current position as co-director for clinical affairs of the Medical
Oncology, Department of Medicine of SLMC, petitioner contends that in
the absence of any clear showing or proof, she cannot be charged with
negligence in not informing the respondents all the side effects of
chemotherapy or in the pre-treatment procedures done on Angelica.
As to the cause of death, petitioner insists that Angelica did not die of
platelet depletion but of sepsis which is a complication of the cancer
itself. Sepsis itself leads to bleeding and death. She explains that the
response rate to chemotherapy of patients with osteosarcoma is high, so
much so that survival rate is favorable to the patient. Petitioner then
points to some probable consequences if Angelica had not undergone
chemotherapy. Thus, without chemotherapy, other medicines and
supportive treatment, the patient might have died the next day because
of massive infection, or the cancer cells might have spread to the brain
and brought the patient into a coma, or into the lungs that the patient
could have been hooked to a respirator, or into her kidneys that she
would have to undergo dialysis. Indeed, respondents could have spent
as much because of these complications. The patient would have been
deprived of the chance to survive the ailment, of any hope for life and
her "quality of life" surely compromised. Since she had not been shown to
be at fault, petitioner maintains that the CA erred in holding her liable for
the damages suffered by the respondents.[50]
The issue to be resolved is whether the petitioner can be held liable for
failure to fully disclose serious side effects to the parents of the child
patient who died while undergoing chemotherapy, despite the absence
of finding that petitioner was negligent in administering the said
treatment.
The petition is meritorious.
The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more
appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim
has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical
professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully
pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider, in
most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did
something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done;
and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient.[51]
This Court has recognized that medical negligence cases are best
proved by opinions of expert witnesses belonging in the same general
neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant
physician or surgeon. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of
qualified physicians stems from the former's realization that the latter
possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are
incapable of intelligently evaluating, hence the indispensability of expert
testimonies.[52]
30

In this case, both the trial and appellate courts concurred in finding that
the alleged negligence of petitioner in the administration of
chemotherapy drugs to respondents' child was not proven considering
that Drs. Vergara and Balmaceda, not being oncologists or cancer
specialists, were not qualified to give expert opinion as to whether
petitioner's lack of skill, knowledge and professional competence in
failing to observe the standard of care in her line of practice was the
proximate cause of the patient's death. Furthermore, respondents' case
was not at all helped by the non-production of medical records by the
hospital (only the biopsy result and medical bills were submitted to the
court). Nevertheless, the CA found petitioner liable for her failure to
inform the respondents on all possible side effects of chemotherapy
before securing their consent to the said treatment.
The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient
relationships goes far back into English common law. As early as 1767,
doctors were charged with the tort of "battery" (i.e., an unauthorized
physical contact with a patient) if they had not gained the consent of
their patients prior to performing a surgery or procedure. In the United
States, the seminal case was Schoendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital[53] which involved unwanted treatment performed by a doctor.
Justice Benjamin Cardozo's oft-quoted opinion upheld the basic right of
a patient to give consent to any medical procedure or treatment: "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient's consent, commits an assault, for which he
is liable in damages."[54] From a purely ethical norm, informed consent
evolved into a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to
disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community
in the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to
whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a proposed course
of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own
welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed
treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently
exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against
the probable benefits.[55]
Subsequently, in Canterbury v. Spence[56] the court observed that the
duty to disclose should not be limited to medical usage as to arrogate
the decision on revelation to the physician alone. Thus, respect for the
patient's right of self-determination on particular therapy demands a
standard set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians may
or may not impose upon themselves.[57] The scope of disclosure is
premised on the fact that patients ordinarily are persons unlearned in the
medical sciences. Proficiency in diagnosis and therapy is not the full
measure of a physician's responsibility. It is also his duty to warn of the
dangers lurking in the proposed treatment and to impart information
which the patient has every right to expect. Indeed, the patient's
reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has
exacted obligations beyond those associated with armslength
transactions.[58] The physician is not expected to give the patient a short
medical education, the disclosure rule only requires of him a reasonable
explanation, which means generally informing the patient in
nontechnical terms as to what is at stake; the therapy alternatives open
to him, the goals expectably to be achieved, and the risks that may
ensue from particular treatment or no treatment.[59] As to the issue of
demonstrating what risks are considered material necessitating
disclosure, it was held that experts are unnecessary to a showing of the
materiality of a risk to a patient's decision on treatment, or to the
reasonably, expectable effect of risk disclosure on the decision. Such
unrevealed risk that should have been made known must further
materialize, for otherwise the omission, however unpardonable, is without
legal consequence. And, as in malpractice actions generally, there must
be a causal relationship between the physician's failure to divulge and
damage to the patient.[60]
Reiterating the foregoing considerations, Cobbs v. Grant[61] deemed it
as integral part of physician's overall obligation to patient, the duty of
reasonable disclosure of available choices with respect to proposed
therapy and of dangers inherently and potentially involved in each.
However, the physician is not obliged to discuss relatively minor risks
inherent in common procedures when it is common knowledge that such
risks inherent in procedure of very low incidence. Cited as exceptions to
the rule that the patient should not be denied the opportunity to weigh
the risks of surgery or treatment are emergency cases where it is evident
he cannot evaluate data, and where the patient is a child or
incompetent.[62] The court thus concluded that the patient's right of
self-decision can only be effectively exercised if the patient possesses
adequate information to enable him in making an intelligent choice. The
scope of the physician's communications to the patient, then must be
measured by the patient's need, and that need is whatever information
is material to the decision. The test therefore for determining whether a
potential peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient's
decision.[63]
Cobbs v. Grant further reiterated the pronouncement in Canterbury v.
Spence that for liability of the physician for failure to inform patient, there
must be causal relationship between physician's failure to inform and the
injury to patient and such connection arises only if it is established that,
had revelation been made, consent to treatment would not have been
given.
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice
action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician
had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or
inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of
the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise
would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the
proposed treatment." The gravamen in an informed consent case
requires the plaintiff to "point to significant undisclosed information
relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to
undergo it.[64]
Examining the evidence on record, we hold that there was adequate
disclosure of material risks inherent in the chemotherapy procedure
performed with the consent of Angelica's parents. Respondents could
not have been unaware in the course of initial treatment and
amputation of Angelica's lower extremity, that her immune system was
already weak on account of the malignant tumor in her knee. When
petitioner informed the respondents beforehand of the side effects of
chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and red blood
cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart damage and
skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor
that the respondents understood very well that the severity of these side
effects will not be the same for all patients undergoing the procedure. In
other words, by the nature of the disease itself, each patient's reaction
to the chemical agents even with pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot
be precisely determined by the physician. That death can possibly result
from complications of the treatment or the underlying cancer itself,
immediately or sometime after the administration of chemotherapy
drugs, is a risk that cannot be ruled out, as with most other major medical
procedures, but such conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the
general side effects of chemotherapy already disclosed.
As a physician, petitioner can reasonably expect the respondents to
have considered the variables in the recommended treatment for their
daughter afflicted with a life-threatening illness. On the other hand, it is
difficult to give credence to respondents' claim that petitioner told them
of 95% chance of recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely for doctors
like petitioner who were dealing with grave conditions such as cancer to
have falsely assured patients of chemotherapy's success rate. Besides,
informed consent laws in other countries generally require only a
reasonable explanation of potential harms, so specific disclosures such
as statistical data, may not be legally necessary.[65]
The element of ethical duty to disclose material risks in the proposed
medical treatment cannot thus be reduced to one simplistic formula
applicable in all instances. Further, in a medical malpractice action
based on lack of informed consent, "the plaintiff must prove both the
duty and the breach of that duty through expert testimony.[66] Such
expert testimony must show the customary standard of care of physicians
in the same practice as that of the defendant doctor.[67]
In this case, the testimony of Dr. Balmaceda who is not an oncologist but
a Medical Specialist of the DOH's Operational and Management
Services charged with receiving complaints against hospitals, does not
qualify as expert testimony to establish the standard of care in obtaining
consent for chemotherapy treatment. In the absence of expert
testimony in this regard, the Court feels hesitant in defining the scope of
mandatory disclosure in cases of malpractice based on lack of informed
consent, much less set a standard of disclosure that, even in foreign
jurisdictions, has been noted to be an evolving one.
As society has grappled with the juxtaposition between personal
autonomy and the medical profession's intrinsic impetus to cure, the law
defining "adequate" disclosure has undergone a dynamic evolution. A
standard once guided solely by the ruminations of physicians is now
dependent on what a reasonable person in the patient's position regards
as significant. This change in perspective is especially important as
31
medical breakthroughs move practitioners to the cutting edge of
technology, ever encountering new and heretofore unimagined
treatments for currently incurable diseases or ailments. An adaptable
standard is needed to account for this constant progression.
Reasonableness analyses permeate our legal system for the very reason
that they are determined by social norms, expanding and contracting
with the ebb and flow of societal evolution.
As we progress toward the twenty-first century, we now realize that the
legal standard of disclosure is not subject to construction as a
categorical imperative. Whatever formulae or processes we adopt are
only useful as a foundational starting point; the particular quality or
quantity of disclosure will remain inextricably bound by the facts of each
case. Nevertheless, juries that ultimately determine whether a physician
properly informed a patient are inevitably guided by what they perceive
as the common expectation of the medical consumer--"a reasonable
person in the patient's position when deciding to accept or reject a
recommended medical procedure."[68] (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
Decision dated June 15, 2004 and the Resolution dated September 1,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58013 are SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated September 5, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 8904 is REINSTATED and UPHELD.
[ G.R. No. 148496, March 19, 2002 ]
VIRGINES CALVO DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE
TRANSORIENT CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. UCPB
GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. (FORMERLY ALLIED GUARANTEE INS. CO.,
INC.) RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision,[1] dated May 31, 2001, of the
Court of Appeals, affirming the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, Branch 148, which ordered petitioner to pay respondent, as
subrogee, the amount of P93,112.00 with legal interest, representing the
value of damaged cargo handled by petitioner, 25% thereof as
attorney's fees, and the cost of the suit.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Virgines Calvo is the owner of Transorient Container Terminal
Services, Inc. (TCTSI), a sole proprietorship customs broker. At the time
material to this case, petitioner entered into a contract with San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) for the transfer of 114 reels of semi-chemical fluting
paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the Port Area in Manila to
SMC's warehouse at the Tabacalera Compound, Romualdez St., Ermita,
Manila. The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General Insurance
Co., Inc.
On July 14, 1990, the shipment in question, contained in 30 metal vans,
arrived in Manila on board "M/V Hayakawa Maru" and, after 24 hours,
were unloaded from the vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator,
Manila Port Services, Inc. From July 23 to July 25, 1990, petitioner,
pursuant to her contract with SMC, withdrew the cargo from the arrastre
operator and delivered it to SMC's warehouse in Ermita, Manila. On July
25, 1990, the goods were inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors, who
found that 15 reels of the semi-chemical fluting paper were
"wet/stained/torn" and 3 reels of kraft liner board were likewise torn. The
damage was placed at P93,112.00.
SMC collected payment from respondent UCPB under its insurance
contract for the aforementioned amount. In turn, respondent, as
subrogee of SMC, brought suit against petitioner in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 148, Makati City, which, on December 20, 1995, rendered
judgment finding petitioner liable to respondent for the damage to the
shipment.
The trial court held:
It cannot be denied . . . that the subject cargoes sustained damage
while in the custody of defendants. Evidence such as the Warehouse
Entry Slip (Exh. "E"); the Damage Report (Exh. "F") with entries appearing
therein, classified as "TED" and "TSN", which the claims processor, Ms.
Agrifina De Luna, claimed to be tearrage at the end and tearrage at the
middle of the subject damaged cargoes respectively, coupled with the
Marine Cargo Survey Report (Exh. "H" - "H-4-A") confirms the fact of the
damaged condition of the subject cargoes. The surveyor[s'] report (Exh.
"H-4-A") in particular, which provides among others that:
" . . . we opine that damages sustained by shipment is attributable to
improper handling in transit presumably whilst in the custody of the broker
. . . ."
is a finding which cannot be traversed and overturned.
The evidence adduced by the defendants is not enough to sustain [her]
defense that [she is] are not liable. Defendant by reason of the nature
of [her] business should have devised ways and means in order to
prevent the damage to the cargoes which it is under obligation to take
custody of and to forthwith deliver to the consignee. Defendant did not
present any evidence on what precaution [she] performed to prevent
[the] said incident, hence the presumption is that the moment the
defendant accepts the cargo [she] shall perform such extraordinary
diligence because of the nature of the cargo.
. . . .
Generally speaking under Article 1735 of the Civil Code, if the goods are
proved to have been lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
they prove that they have observed the extraordinary diligence required
by law. The burden of the plaintiff, therefore, is to prove merely that the
goods he transported have been lost, destroyed or deteriorated.
Thereafter, the burden is shifted to the carrier to prove that he has
exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. Thus, it has been
held that the mere proof of delivery of goods in good order to a carrier,
and of their arrival at the place of destination in bad order, makes out a
prima facie case against the carrier, so that if no explanation is given as
to how the injury occurred, the carrier must be held responsible. It is
incumbent upon the carrier to prove that the loss was due to accident
or some other circumstances inconsistent with its liability." (cited in
Commercial Laws of the Philippines by Agbayani, p. 31, Vol. IV, 1989 Ed.)
Defendant, being a customs brother, warehouseman and at the same
time a common carrier is supposed [to] exercise [the] extraordinary
diligence required by law, hence the extraordinary responsibility lasts
from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of
and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are
delivered actually or constructively by the carrier to the consignee or to
the person who has the right to receive the same.[3]
Accordingly, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay the following
amounts
The sum of P93,112.00 plus interest;
25% thereof as lawyer's fee;
Costs of suit.[4]
The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on appeal. Hence
this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner contends that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR [IN]
DECIDING THE CASE NOT ON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BUT ON PURE
SURMISES, SPECULATIONS AND MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN INFERENCE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
CLASSIFYING THE PETITIONER AS A COMMON CARRIER AND NOT AS
PRIVATE OR SPECIAL CARRIER WHO DID NOT HOLD ITS SERVICES TO THE
PUBLIC.[5]
It will be convenient to deal with these contentions in the inverse order,
for if petitioner is not a common carrier, although both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals held otherwise, then she is indeed not liable beyond
what ordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by
her, would require.[6] Consequently, any damage to the cargo she
agrees to transport cannot be presumed to have been due to her fault
or negligence.
Petitioner contends that contrary to the findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, she is not a common carrier but a private carrier
because, as a customs broker and warehouseman, she does not
indiscriminately hold her services out to the public but only offers the
same to select parties with whom she may contract in the conduct of
her business.
The contention has no merit. In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals,[7] the
Court dismissed a similar contention and held the party to be a common
carrier, thus
The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms:
32

"Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation,
offering their services to the public."
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who
does such carrying only as an ancillary activity . . . Article 1732 also
carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one
offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services
to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and
one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of
the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained
from making such distinctions.
So understood, the concept of "common carrier" under Article 1732 may
be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of "public service," under the
Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which
at least partially supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the
Civil Code. Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act,
"public service" includes:
" x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage,
or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or
limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and
done for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street
railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or
passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and whatever may be its
classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service,
steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged
in the transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine
repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal,
irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and
power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless communications
systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public
services. x x x" [8]
There is greater reason for holding petitioner to be a common carrier
because the transportation of goods is an integral part of her business.
To uphold petitioner's contention would be to deprive those with whom
she contracts the protection which the law affords them
notwithstanding the fact that the obligation to carry goods for her
customers, as already noted, is part and parcel of petitioner's business.
Now, as to petitioner's liability, Art. 1733 of the Civil Code provides:
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
. . .
In Compania Maritima v. Court of Appeals,[9] the meaning of
"extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods" was explained thus:
The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for
shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required
precaution for avoiding damage to, or destruction of the goods
entrusted to it for sale, carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers
to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and "to use all
reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods
tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and
stowage, including such methods as their nature requires."
In the case at bar, petitioner denies liability for the damage to the cargo.
She claims that the "spoilage or wettage" took place while the goods
were in the custody of either the carrying vessel "M/V Hayakawa Maru,"
which transported the cargo to Manila, or the arrastre operator, to whom
the goods were unloaded and who allegedly kept them in open air for
nine days from July 14 to July 23, 1998 notwithstanding the fact that some
of the containers were deformed, cracked, or otherwise damaged, as
noted in the Marine Survey Report (Exh. H), to wit:
MAXU-2062880 - Nor is there basis to exempt petitioner from liability under Art. 1734(4),
rain gutter deformed/cracked
ICSU-363461-3 - Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration
left side rubber gasket on door distorted/partly loose
PERU-204209-4 -
with pinholes on roof panel right portion
TOLU-213674-3 -
wood flooring we[t] and/or with signs of water soaked
MAXU-201406-0 - containers.
with dent/crack on roof panel
ICSU-412105-0 - . . . .
rubber gasket on left side/door panel partly detached loosened.[10]
In addition, petitioner claims that Marine Cargo Surveyor Ernesto
Tolentino testified that he has no personal knowledge on whether the
container vans were first stored in petitioner's warehouse prior to their
delivery to the consignee. She likewise claims that after withdrawing the
container vans from the arrastre operator, her driver, Ricardo Nazarro,
immediately delivered the cargo to SMC's warehouse in Ermita, Manila,
which is a mere thirty-minute drive from the Port Area where the cargo
came from. Thus, the damage to the cargo could not have taken place
while these were in her custody.[11]
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Survey Report (Exh. H) of the Marine
Cargo Surveyors indicates that when the shipper transferred the cargo in
question to the arrastre operator, these were covered by clean
Equipment Interchange Report (EIR) and, when petitioner's employees
withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator, they did so without
exception or protest either with regard to the condition of container vans
or their contents. The Survey Report pertinently reads
Details of Discharge:
Shipment, provided with our protective supervision was noted
discharged ex vessel to dock of Pier #13 South Harbor, Manila on 14 July
1990, containerized onto 30' x 20' secure metal vans, covered by clean
EIRs. Except for slight dents and paint scratches on side and roof panels,
these containers were deemed to have [been] received in good
condition.
. . . .
Transfer/Delivery:
On July 23, 1990, shipment housed onto 30' x 20' cargo containers was
[withdrawn] by Transorient Container Services, Inc. . . . without exception.
[The cargo] was finally delivered to the consignee's storage warehouse
located at Tabacalera Compound, Romualdez Street, Ermita, Manila
from July 23/25, 1990.[12]
As found by the Court of Appeals:
From the [Survey Report], it [is] clear that the shipment was discharged
from the vessel to the arrastre, Marina Port Services Inc., in good order
and condition as evidenced by clean Equipment Interchange Reports
(EIRs). Had there been any damage to the shipment, there would have
been a report to that effect made by the arrastre operator. The cargoes
were withdrawn by the defendant-appellant from the arrastre still in
good order and condition as the same were received by the former
without exception, that is, without any report of damage or loss. Surely,
if the container vans were deformed, cracked, distorted or dented, the
defendant-appellant would report it immediately to the consignee or
make an exception on the delivery receipt or note the same in the
Warehouse Entry Slip (WES). None of these took place. To put it simply,
the defendant-appellant received the shipment in good order and
condition and delivered the same to the consignee damaged. We can
only conclude that the damages to the cargo occurred while it was in
the possession of the defendant-appellant. Whenever the thing is lost (or
damaged) in the possession of the debtor (or obligor), it shall be
presumed that the loss (or damage) was due to his fault, unless there is
proof to the contrary. No proof was proffered to rebut this legal
presumption and the presumption of negligence attached to a common
carrier in case of loss or damage to the goods.[13]
Anent petitioner's insistence that the cargo could not have been
damaged while in her custody as she immediately delivered the
containers to SMC's compound, suffice it to say that to prove the exercise
of extraordinary diligence, petitioner must do more than merely show the
possibility that some other party could be responsible for the damage. It
must prove that it used "all reasonable means to ascertain the nature
and characteristic of goods tendered for [transport] and that [it]
exercise[d] due care in the handling [thereof]." Petitioner failed to do
this.
which provides
of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
. . . .
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
33
For this provision to apply, the rule is that if the improper packing or, in this
case, the defect/s in the container, is/are known to the carrier or his
employees or apparent upon ordinary observation, but he nevertheless
accepts the same without protest or exception notwithstanding such
condition, he is not relieved of liability for damage resulting
therefrom.[14] In this case, petitioner accepted the cargo without
exception despite the apparent defects in some of the container vans.
Hence, for failure of petitioner to prove that she exercised extraordinary
diligence in the carriage of goods in this case or that she is exempt from
liability, the presumption of negligence as provided under Art. 1735[15]
holds.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 31, 2001,
is AFFIRMED.
[ G.R. No. 126074, February 24, 1998 ]
RIDJO TAPE & CHEMICAL CORP. AND RIDJO PAPER CORPORATION,
PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA ELECTRIC CO., HON.
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 104-REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition to review the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
which reversed that of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
104 in Civil Case Nos. Q-92-13845 and Q-92-13879 ordering petitioners to
pay private respondent Manila Electric Co. (MERALCO) the amount of
P415,317.66 and P89,710.58 plus the costs of suit. This petition involves the
two cases filed by petitioners which were eventually consolidated.
Civil Case No. Q-92-13845:
On November 16, 1990, petitioners applied for and was granted electric
service by MERALCO. Ten months later, however, or on September 4,
1991, petitioners received a letter from MERALCO demanding payment
of P415,317.66, allegedly representing unregistered electric consumption
for the period November 7, 1990, to February 13, 1991. MERALCO justified
its demand on the ground that the unregistered electric consumption
was due to the defects of the electric meter located in the premises of
petitioners.
Since petitioners refused to pay the amount, MERALCO notified them
that in the event the overdue account remained unpaid, it would be
forced to disconnect their electricity. Alarmed by this development,
petitioners, instead of settling the amount, filed on October 29, 1992 a
case before Branch 98 of the Quezon City RTC for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order to forestall
any planned disconnection by MERALCO.
On November 19, 1992, the trial court granted the prayer for preliminary
injunction.
Civil Case No. 13879:
On July 30, 1992, petitioners received another demand letter from
MERALCO, this time requiring them to pay the amount of P89,710.58
representing the unregistered electric consumption for the period July 15,
1991 to April 13, 1992, the deficiency again due to the defective meter
installed in petitioners' compound.
MERALCO's demand having remained unheeded, petitioners were
advised that their electric service would be disconnected without further
notice. Hence, on November 5, 1992, petitioners filed a case before
Branch 104 of the Quezon City RTC, seeking to enjoin MERALCO from
implementing the suspension of electric service.
Thereafter, on November 9, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for the
consolidation of the two cases, which was granted, resulting in the joint
trial of said cases before Branch 104 of the Quezon City RTC.
On November 27, 1992, the trial court issued the corresponding
preliminary injunction.
After due trial, the lower court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in this case in favor of the
plaintiff(s) and against the defendants:
1. Making the Injunction permanent, enjoining the defendants in both
cases, and all their subordinates, legal representatives, electric meter
readers and technicians from committing acts of dispossession/disruption
of electric power on the subject premises located at the compound of
Ridjo Tape and Chemical Corporation and Ridjo Paper Corporation
located at 64 and 68 Judge Juan Luna St., San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City.
2. Ordering defendants to pay the cost of suit.
Defendants' counterclaim on (the) two cases are (sic) denied for lack of
merit."
MERALCO appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 22, 1996,
reversed the trial court's finding, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED; and appellees Ridjo
Tape and Chemical Corporation and Ridjo Paper Corporation are
hereby ordered to pay subject differential billings of P415,317.66 and
P89,710.58, respectively. Costs against the appellees."[2]
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated August 14, 1996.[3]
Hence, this petition.
From the pleadings filed by the parties, it can be deduced that the only
issue to be resolved is whether petitioners, despite the absence of
evidence of tampering, are liable to pay for the unregistered electrical
service.
For a better understanding of the two cases, the terms and conditions of
the Service Agreement regarding payments are reproduced:
"PAYMENTS
Bills will be rendered by the Company to the Customer monthly in
accordance with the applicable rate schedule. Said Bills are payable to
collectors or at the main or branch offices of the Company or at its
authorized banks within ten (10) days after the regular reading date of
the electric meters. The word 'month' as used herein and in the rate
schedule is hereby defined to be the elapsed time between two
succeeding meter readings approximately thirty (30) days apart. In the
event of the stoppage or the failure by any meter to register the full
amount of energy consumed, the Customer shall be billed for such
period on an estimated consumption based upon his use of energy in a
similar period of like use." (Italics supplied)
In disclaiming any liability, petitioners assert that the phrase "stoppage or
failure by any meter to register the full amount of energy consumed" can
only refer to tampering on the part of the customer and not mechanical
failure or defects.[4] MERALCO, on the other hand, argues that to follow
the interpretation advanced by petitioners would constitute an unjust
enrichment in favor of its customers.[5]
Evidently, the Service Contract between petitioners and MERALCO
partakes of the nature of a contract of adhesion as it was prepared solely
by the latter, the only participation of the former being that they affixed
or "adhered" their signature thereto,[6] thus, leaving no room for
negotiation and depriving petitioners of the opportunity to bargain on
equal footing.[7] Nevertheless, these types of contracts have been
declared to be binding as ordinary contracts because the party
adhering thereto is free to reject it in its entirety.[8]
Being an ordinary contract, therefore, the principle that contracting
parties can make stipulations in their contract provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy,
stands strong and true.[9] To be sure, contracts are respected as laws
between the contracting parties, and they may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may want to
include.[10] Since both parties offered conflicting interpretations of the
stipulation, however, then judicial determination of the parties' intention
is mandated.[11] In this regard, it must be stressed that in construing a
written contract, the reason behind and the circumstances surrounding
its execution are of paramount importance to place the interpreter in the
situation occupied by the parties concerned at the time the writing was
executed.[12]
With these pronouncement as parameters, and considering the
circumstances of the parties, we are constrained to uphold MERALCO's
interpretation.
34
At this juncture, we hasten to point out that the production and
distribution of electricity is a highly technical business undertaking,[13]
and in conducting its operation, it is only logical for public utilities, such
as MERALCO, to employ mechanical devices and equipment for the
orderly pursuit of its business.
It is to be expected that the parties were consciously aware that these
devices or equipment are susceptible to defects and mechanical failure.
Hence, we are not prepared to believe that petitioners were ignorant of
the fact that stoppages in electric meters can also result from inherent
defects or flaws and not only from tampering or intentional mishandling.
Clearly, therefore, the rationale of the provision in the Service Agreement
was primarily to cover situations similar to the instant case, for there are
instances when electric meters do fail to record the quantity of the
current used for whatever reason.[14] It is precisely this kind of
predicament that MERALCO seeks to protect itself from so as to avert
business losses or reverses. It must be borne in mind that construction of
the terms of a contract which would amount to impairment or loss of right
is not favored; conservation and preservation, not waiver, abandonment
or forfeiture of a right, is the rule.[15] Since MERALCO supplied electricity
to petitioners for a fee, no intent to donate the same can be gleaned
from the terms of the Agreement. Hence, the stipulation must be upheld.
Corollarily, it must be underscored that MERALCO has the imperative
duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus and
equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction,[16] and the due
diligence to discover and repair defects therein. Failure to perform such
duties constitutes negligence.[17]
A review of the records, however, discloses that the unpaid charges
covered the periods from November 7, 1990 to February 13, 1991 for Civil
Case No. Q-92-13045 and from July 15, 1991 to April 13, 1992 for Civil Case
No. 13879, approximately three months and nine months, respectively.
On such basis, we take judicial notice that during those periods,
personnel representing MERALCO inspected and examined the electric
meters of petitioners regularly for the purpose of determining the monthly
dues payable. So, why were these defects not detected and reported
on time?
It has been held that notice of a defect need not be direct and express;
it is enough that the same had existed for such a length of time that it is
reasonable to presume that it had been detected,[18] and the presence
of a conspicuous defect which has existed for a considerable length of
time will create a presumption of constructive notice thereof.[19] Hence,
MERALCO's failure to discover the defect, if any, considering the length
of time, amounts to inexcusable negligence. Furthermore, we need not
belabor the point that as a public utility, MERALCO has the obligation to
discharge its functions with utmost care and diligence.
Accordingly, we are left with no recourse but to conclude that this is a
case of negligence on the part of MERALCO for which it must bear the
consequences. Its failure to make the necessary repairs and
replacement of the defective electric meter installed within the premises
of petitioners was obviously the proximate cause of the instant dispute
between the parties.
Indeed, if an unusual electric consumption was not reflected in the
statements of account of petitioners, MERALCO, considering its technical
knowledge and vast experience in providing electric service, could have
easily verified any possible error in the meter reading. In the absence of
such a mistake, the electric meters themselves should be inspected for
possible defects or breakdowns and forthwith repaired and, if necessary,
replaced. Furthermore, if MERALCO discovered that contraptions or
illegal devices were installed which would alter the result of the meter
reading, then it should have filed the appropriate criminal complaint
against petitioners under Presidential Decree No. 401.[20]
The rationale behind this ruling is that public utilities should be put on
notice, as a deterrent, that if they completely disregard their duty of
keeping their electric meters in serviceable condition, they run the risk of
forfeiting, by reason of their negligence, amounts originally due from their
customers. Certainly, we cannot sanction a situation wherein the defects
in the electric meter are allowed to continue indefinitely until suddenly
the public utilities concerned demand payment for the unrecorded
electricity utilized when, in the first place, they should have remedied the
situation immediately. If we turn a blind eye on MERALCO's omission, it
may encourage negligence on the part of public utilities, to the
detriment of the consuming public.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the liability of petitioners for
consumed but unrecorded electricity must be limited by reason of
MERALCO's negligence. Hence, an equitable solution would be for
petitioners to pay only the estimated consumption on a three-month
average before the period in controversy. To hold otherwise would
unjustly enrich petitioners who would be allowed to utilize additional
electricity, albeit unrecorded, at no extra cost.
To summarize, it is worth emphasizing that it is not our intention to impede
or diminish the business viability of MERALCO, or any public utility
company for that matter. On the contrary, we would like to stress that,
being a public utility vested with vital public interest, MERALCO is
impressed with certain obligations towards its customers and any
omission on its part to perform such duties would be prejudicial to its
interest. For in the final analysis, the bottom line is that those who do not
exercise such prudence in the discharge of their duties shall be made to
bear the consequences of such oversight.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44010 is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioners are
ordered to pay MERALCO the amount P168,342.75, representing its
average electric consumption three months prior to the period in
controversy.[21] No costs.
[ G.R. No. 172200, July 06, 2010 ]
THE HEIRS OF REDENTOR COMPLETO AND ELPIDIO ABIAD, PETITIONERS, VS.
SGT. AMANDO C. ALBAYDA, JR., RESPONDENT.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated January 2, 2006 and the
Resolution[2] dated March 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68405.
The Facts
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent Amando C. Albayda, Jr. (Albayda) is a Master Sergeant of
the Philippine Air Force, 527th Base Security Squadron, 520th Airbase,
Philippine Air Force, located at Villamor Air Base (VAB), Pasay City.
Petitioner Redentor Completo (Completo), now represented by his heirs,
was the taxi driver of a Toyota Corolla, bearing Plate No. PYD-128, owned
and operated by co-petitioner Elpidio Abiad (Abiad).[3] Albayda and
Completo figured in an accident along the intersection of 8th and 11th
Streets, VAB. Albayda filed a complaint for damages before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
98-1333.[4]
The amended complaint alleged that, on August 27, 1997, while Albayda
was on his way to the office to report for duty, riding a bicycle along 11th
Street, the taxi driven by Completo bumped and sideswiped him,
causing serious physical injuries. Albayda was brought to the Philippine
Air Force General Hospital (PAFGH) inside VAB. However, he was
immediately transferred to the Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical
Center (AFPMC) on V. Luna Road, Quezon City, because there was a
fracture in his left knee and there was no orthopedic doctor available at
PAFGH. From August 27, 1997 until February 11, 1998, he was confined
therein. He was again hospitalized at PAFGH from February 23, 1998 until
March 22, 1998.[5]
Conciliation between the parties before the barangay failed. Thus,
Albayda filed a complaint for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence against Completo before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Pasay City. On the other hand, Completo filed a counter-charge of
damage to property through reckless imprudence against Albayda. On
January 13, 1998, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution,[6]
recommending the filing of an information for reckless imprudence
resulting in physical injuries against Completo. The counter-charge of
damage to property was recommended dismissed.[7]
The case was raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
45, where Albayda manifested his reservation to file a separate civil
action for damages against petitioners Completo and Abiad.[8]
Albayda alleged that the proximate cause of the incident which
necessitated his stay in the hospital for approximately seven (7) months
35
was the negligence of Completo who, at the time of the accident, was
in the employ of Abiad. The pain he suffered required him to undergo
medical physiotherapy for a number of years to regain normality of his
left knee joint, and he claimed that he incurred actual damages totaling
Two Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P276,550.00), inclusive of his anticipated operations.[9]
He further stated that aggravating the physical sufferings, mental
anguish, frights, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation resulting from his injuries, his
wife abandoned him in May 1998, and left their children in his custody.
He thus demanded the amount of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P600,000.00) as moral damages. He likewise asked for exemplary
damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00)
and attorney's fees of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00), plus One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per court appearance.[10]
In his answer to the amended complaint, Completo alleged that, on
August 27, 1997, he was carefully driving the taxicab along 8th Street,
VAB, when suddenly he heard a strange sound from the rear right side of
the taxicab. When he stopped to investigate, he found Albayda lying on
the road and holding his left leg. He immediately rendered assistance
and brought Albayda to PAFGH for emergency treatment.[11]
Completo also asserted that he was an experienced driver who, in
accordance with traffic rules and regulations and common courtesy to
his fellow motorists, had already reduced his speed to twenty (20)
kilometers per hour even before reaching the intersection of 8th and 11th
Streets. In contrast, Albayda rode his bicycle at a very high speed,
causing him to suddenly lose control of the bicycle and hit the rear door
on the right side of the taxicab.[12]
The deep indentation on the rear right door of the taxicab was caused
by the impact of Albayda's body that hit the taxicab after he had lost
control of the bicycle; while the slight indentation on the right front door
of the taxicab was caused by the impact of the bike that hit the taxicab
after Albayda let go of its handles when he had lost control of it.[13]
Completo maintained that Albayda had no cause of action. The
accident and the physical injuries suffered by Albayda were caused by
his own negligence, and his purpose in filing the complaint was to harass
petitioners and unjustly enrich himself at their expense.[14]
After submission of the parties' respective pleadings, a pretrial
conference was held. On December 8, 1998, the RTC issued a pretrial
order. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.[15]
Albayda presented himself, Michael Navarro (Navarro), Dr. Rito Barrosa,
Jr. (Dr. Barrosa), Dr. Armando Sta. Ana, Jr., Dr. Ranny Santiago, (Dr.
Santiago), and Dr. Manuel Fidel Magtira (Dr. Magtira) as witnesses in
open court.[16]
On direct examination, Navarro testified that, on August 27, 1997, at
around 1:45 p.m., he saw a taxicab, with Plate No. PYD-128, coming from
11th Street, running at an unusual speed. The normal speed should have
been twenty-five (25) kilometers per hour. He was at the corner of 9th
and 8th Streets when the taxicab passed by him. The side of the bicycle
was hit by the taxicab at the intersection of 11th and 8th Streets. He saw
Albayda fall to the ground, grimacing in pain. The taxicab at that
moment was about ten (10) meters away from Albayda. On cross-
examination, Navarro reiterated that the taxicab was running quite fast.
The bicycle ridden by Albayda reached the intersection of 8th and 11th
Streets before the taxicab hit it.[17]
Dr. Santiago, the orthopedic surgeon who treated Albayda when the
latter was admitted at AFPMC, testified that the cause of the injury was
"hard impact," and recommended an operation to alleviate the
suffering. On cross-examination, he said that there was a separation of
the fragments of the proximal leg, the injured extremity, called levia. They
placed the victim on knee traction or calcaneal traction,[18] in order to
avoid further swelling. They bore the calcanean bone with a stainless
steel pin so that they could put five percent (5%) of the body weight of
the patient to cool down the leg. He treated Albayda for three (3)
months. He recommended surgery, but the victim had other medical
problems, like an increase in sugar level, and they were waiting for the
availability of the implant. The implant was supposed to be placed on
the lateral aspect of the proximal leg or the levia, the part with the
separation. It was a long implant with screws.[19]
Dr. Magtira testified that Albayda was readmitted at AFPMC on January
25, 1999 because of complaints of pain and limitation of motion on the
knee joint. Upon evaluation, the pain was caused by traumatic arthritis
brought about by malunion of the lateral trivial condial. An operation of
the soft tissue release was conducted for him to mobilize his knee joint
and attain proper range of motion. After the operation, Albayda
attained functional range of motion, but because of subsisting pain, they
had to do osteoplasty[20] of the malunion, which was another operation.
On cross-examination, Dr. Magtira testified that he rendered free
medical service at AFPMC.[21]
Albayda testified that he was thirty-six (36) years old and a soldier of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. On August 27, 1997, at around 1:40 p.m.,
he was riding his bike on his way to the office, located on 916 Street, VAB.
He had to stop at the corner of 11th and 8th Streets because an
oncoming taxicab was moving fast. However, the taxicab still bumped
the front tire of his bike, hit his left knee and threw him off until he fell down
on the road. The taxicab stopped about ten meters away, and then
moved backwards. Its driver, Completo, just stared at him. When
somebody shouted to bring him to the hospital, two (2) persons, one of
whom was Dr. Barrosa, helped him and carried him into the taxicab
driven by Completo, who brought him to PAFGH.[22]
Upon examination, it was found that Albayda suffered fracture in his left
knee and that it required an operation. No orthopedic doctor was
available at PAFGH. Thus, he was transferred that same afternoon to
AFPMC, where he was confined until February 11, 1998.[23]
At AFPMC, Albayda's left leg was drilled on and attached to traction.
When his leg was drilled, it was so painful that he had to shout. After his
release from the hospital, he continued to suffer pain in his leg. He
underwent reflexology and therapy which offered temporary relief from
pain. But after some time, he had to undergo therapy and reflexology
again.[24]
On January 25, 1999, Albayda was readmitted at AFPMC and operated
on. On June 24, 1999, he was operated on again. Wire and screw were
installed so that he could bend his knee. Nonetheless, he continued to
suffer pain. As of the date of his testimony in court, he was scheduled for
another operation in January 2000, when the steel that would be
installed in his leg arrives.[25]
For his food, Albayda spent Thirty Pesos (P30.00) each day during his six
(6) months of confinement; for his bed pan, One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00); for his twice weekly reflexology, Three Hundred Pesos
(P300.00) every session since April 1997; for his caretaker, P300.00 per day
for six months. He also asked for P600,000.00 in moral damages because
Completo did not lend him a helping hand, and he would be suffering
deformity for the rest of his life. He demanded P25,000.00 as attorney's
fees and P1,000.00 for every court appearance of his lawyer.[26]
On cross-examination, Albayda testified that, on the date of the incident,
he was the base guard at VAB, and his duty was from 2 p.m. to 8 p.m.
That afternoon, he was not in a hurry to go to his place of work because
it was only about 1:45 p.m., and his place of work was only six (6) meters
away. After the accident, he was brought to PAFGH, and at 3:00 p.m.,
he was brought to the AFPMC. When he was discharged from the
hospital, he could no longer walk.[27]
Dr. Barrosa's testimony during cross-examination emphasized that he was
with 2 other persons when he carried Albayda into the taxicab driven by
Completo. He was certain that it was not Completo who carried the
victim into the taxicab. It was only a matter of seconds when he rushed
to the scene of the accident. The taxicab backed up fifteen (15) seconds
later. Albayda lay 2 meters away from the corner of 8th and 11th
Streets.[28]
Completo, Abiad, and Benjamin Panican (Panican) testified for the
defense.[29]
Completo alleged that he had been employed as taxi driver of FOJS
Transport, owned by Abiad, since February 1997. On August 27, 1997, he
was driving the taxicab, with Plate No. PYD-128, from 10:00 a.m. At
around 1:45 p.m., he was on his way home when a bicycle bumped his
taxicab at the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets, VAB. The bicycle was
travelling from south to north, and he was going east coming from the
west. The bicycle was coming from 11th Street, while he was travelling
along 8th Street.[30]
36
On cross-examination, Completo testified that when Albayda hit the rear
right door of the taxicab, the latter fell to the ground. When he heard a
noise, he immediately alighted from the taxicab. He denied that he
stopped about 10 meters away from the place where Albayda fell. He
carried Albayda and drove him to the hospital.[31]
Panican testified that he worked as an airconditioner technician in a
shop located on 8th Street corner 11th Street. On the date and time of
the incident, he was working in front of the shop near the roadside. He
saw a bicycle bump the rear right side of the taxicab. Then, the driver of
the taxicab alighted, carried Albayda, and brought him to the
hospital.[32]
When questioned by the trial court, Panican testified that the bicycle was
running fast and that he saw it bump the taxicab. The taxicab already
passed the intersection of 11th and 8th Streets when the bicycle
arrived.[33]
Abiad testified that, aside from being a soldier, he was also a franchise
holder of taxicabs and passenger jeepneys. When Completo applied as
a driver of the taxicab, Abiad required the former to show his bio-data,
NBI clearance, and driver's license. Completo never figured in a
vehicular accident since the time he was employed in February 1997.
Abiad averred that Completo was a good driver and a good man. Being
the operator of taxicab, Abiad would wake up early and personally
check all the taxicabs.[34]
On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision,[35] the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
[Albayda] and against the defendants [Completo and Abiad].
Accordingly, the defendants [Completo and Abiad] are hereby ordered
to pay the plaintiff [Albayda] the following sum:
P46,000.00 as actual damages;
P400,000.00 as moral damages; [and]
P25,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Costs against the defendants [Completo and Abiad].
SO ORDERED.[36]
Completo and Abiad filed an appeal. The CA affirmed the trial court with
modification in a Decision[37] dated January 2, 2006, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed Decision dated 31 July 2000 rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, in Civil Case No. 98-1333 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
the award of Php 46,000.00 as actual damages is DELETED;
temperate damages in the amount of Php 40,000.00 is awarded in favor
of appellee;
moral damages in favor of appellee is REDUCED to Php 200,000.00;
appellants Redentor Completo and Elpidio Abiad are solidarily liable to
pay appellee Amando C. Albayda, Jr. said temperate and moral
damages, as well as the attorney's fees in the amount of Php 25,000.00
awarded by the trial court;
the temperate and moral damages shall earn legal interest at 6% per
annum computed from the date of promulgation of Our Decision;
upon finality of Our Decision, said moral and temperate damages shall
earn legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum, in lieu of 6% per annum,
until full payment. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.[38]
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners presented the following issues for resolution: (1) whether the
CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who caused the collision;
(2) whether Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a
good father of the family; and (3) whether the award of moral and
temperate damages and attorney's fees to Albayda had no basis.[39]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is bereft of merit.
I. On Negligence
The issues raised by petitioners essentially delve into factual matters
which were already passed upon by the RTC and the CA. Conclusions
and findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on
appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent
reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to examine real
evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying in the case. The fact that the CA adopted the findings of fact
of the trial court makes the same binding upon this Court.Well-settled is
the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.[40] To be sure,
findings of fact of lower courts are deemed conclusive and binding upon
the Supreme Court, save only for clear and exceptional reasons,[41]
none of which is present in the case at bar.
The instant case involved a collision between a taxicab and a bicycle
which resulted in serious physical injuries to the bicycle rider, Albayda. It
is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by
a preponderance of evidence the motorist's breach in his duty of care
owed to the plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise
the diligence required to avoid injury to the plaintiff, and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered.[42]
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict. In this regard, the question of the motorist's negligence is a
question of fact.
It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to
exercise reasonable diligence in driving the taxicab because he was
over-speeding at the time he hit the bicycle ridden by Albayda. Such
negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the serious physical
injuries sustained by Albayda. Completo did not slow down even when
he approached the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets of VAB. It was
also proven that Albayda had the right of way, considering that he
reached the intersection ahead of Completo.
The bicycle occupies a legal position that is at least equal to that of other
vehicles lawfully on the highway, and it is fortified by the fact that usually
more will be required of a motorist than a bicyclist in discharging his duty
of care to the other because of the physical advantages the automobile
has over the bicycle.[43]
At the slow speed of ten miles per hour, a bicyclist travels almost fifteen
feet per second, while a car traveling at only twenty-five miles per hour
covers almost thirty-seven feet per second, and split-second action may
be insufficient to avoid an accident. It is obvious that a motor vehicle
poses a greater danger of harm to a bicyclist than vice versa.
Accordingly, while the duty of using reasonable care falls alike on a
motorist and a bicyclist, due to the inherent differences in the two
vehicles, more care is required from the motorist to fully discharge the
duty than from the bicyclist.[44] Simply stated, the physical advantages
that the motor vehicle has over the bicycle make it more dangerous to
the bicyclist than vice versa.[45]
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their employees, but the employers'
responsibility shall cease upon proof that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, a legal
presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent. This
presumption may be rebutted only by a clear showing on the part of the
employer that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his employee. If the employer
successfully overcomes the legal presumption of negligence, he is
relieved of liability. In other words, the burden of proof is on the
employer.[46]
37
The trial court's finding that Completo failed to exercise reasonable care
to avoid collision with Albayda at the intersection of 11th and 8th Streets
of VAB gives rise to liability on the part of Completo, as driver, and his
employer Abiad. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable
for quasi-delict is solidary.[47] The civil liability of the employer for the
negligent acts of his employee is also primary and direct, owing to his
own negligence in selecting and supervising his employee.[48] The civil
liability of the employer attaches even if the employer is not inside the
vehicle at the time of the collision.[49]
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records.
On the other hand, with respect to the supervision of employees,
employers should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor
their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches
thereof. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.[50]
Abiad testified that before he hired Completo, he required the latter to
show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver's license. Abiad likewise
stressed that Completo was never involved in a vehicular accident prior
to the instant case, and that, as operator of the taxicab, he would wake
up early to personally check the condition of the vehicle before it is used.
The protestation of Abiad to escape liability is short of the diligence
required under the law. Abiad's evidence consisted entirely of testimonial
evidence, and the unsubstantiated and self-serving testimony of Abiad
was insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that he was
negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver.
II. On Damages
The CA rightfully deleted the award of actual damages by the RTC
because Albayda failed to present documentary evidence to establish
with certainty the amount that he incurred during his hospitalization and
treatment for the injuries he suffered. In the absence of stipulation, actual
damages are awarded only for such pecuniary loss suffered that was
duly proved.[51]
While the amount of actual damages was not duly established with
certainty, the Court recognizes the fact that, indeed, Albayda incurred
a considerable amount for the necessary and reasonable medical
expenses, loss of salary and wages, loss of capacity to earn increased
wages, cost of occupational therapy, and harm from conditions caused
by prolonged immobilization. Temperate damages, more than nominal
but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.[52]
Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances.[53]
Thus, the Court finds the award of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) as temperate damages reasonable under the
circumstances.
Doubtless, Albayda suffered immeasurable pain because of the incident
caused by petitioners' negligence. The CA explained:
The court vicariously feels the pain the plaintiff [Albayda] suffered a
number of times. After he was bumped by defendants' cab, he cried in
pain. When the doctors bore holes into his left knee, he cried in pain.
When he was tractioned, when he was subjected to an operation after
operation he suffered pain. When he took the witness stand to testify, he
walked with crutches, his left knee in bandage, stiff and unfuctional. Pain
was written [on] his face. He does deserve moral damages.[54]
Moral damages are awarded in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.
The permanent deformity and the scar left by the wounds suffered by
Albayba will forever be a reminder of the pain and suffering that he had
endured and continues to endure because of petitioners' negligence.
Thus, the award of moral damages in the amount of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) is proper.
Finally, an interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum is due on the
amount of P100,000.00, as temperate damages, and P500,000.00, as
moral damages, which we have awarded. The 6% per annum interest
rate on the temperate and moral damages shall commence to run from
the date of the promulgation of this Decision. Upon finality of the
Decision, an interest rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum shall be
imposed on the amount of the temperate and moral damages until full
payment thereof.[55]
The award of attorney's fees is hereby deleted for failure to prove that
petitioners acted in bad faith in refusing to satisfy respondent's just and
valid claim.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated January 2, 2006
and the Resolution dated March 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68405 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, viz.:
(1) The estate of the late Redentor Completo and Elpidio Abiad are
solidarily liable to pay One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), as
temperate damages, and Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00),
as moral damages;
(2) The temperate and moral damages hereby awarded shall earn legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the
promulgation of this Decision. Upon finality of this Decision, an interest
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum shall be imposed on the amount
of the temperate and moral damages until full payment thereof.
[ G.R. No. L-3422, June 13, 1952 ]
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. GUILLERMO BALANDAN,
ANSELMA ANILA AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari, from a decision of the Court of Appeals
requiring Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. to pay Guillermo Balandan and his wife,
damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their son Mario.
It appears that the petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. "was the owner of
an ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises
were installed two tanks full of vatar, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes
of its engine. While the factory compound was surrounded with fence,
the tanks themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or top
covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface
of the ground. Through the wide gate entrance, which was continually
open, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity
passed, and any one could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased.
There was no guard assigned on the gate. At about noon of April 16,
1943, plaintiffs' son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 6 years old, while
playing with and in company of other boys of his age, entered the
factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks;
and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be
fished out later, already a cadaver, having died of 'asphyxia secondary
to drowning'."
The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the
view that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks),
and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accident
to persons entering its premises. It applied the doctrine of attractive
nuisance, of American origin, recognized in this jurisdiction in Taylor vs.
Manila Electric 16 Phil., 8.
The doctrine may be stated, in short, as follows: One who maintains on
his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character
likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care
to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to
a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is
technically a trespasser in the premises. (See 65 C. J. S., p. 455).
The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in
question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or
alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get
on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children
(65 C. J. S., p. 458).
Now, is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or appliance
likely to attract little children in play? In other words is the body of water
an attractive nuisance? The great majority of American decisions say no.
"The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of
water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual
condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location."
"There are numerous cases in which the attractive nuisance doctrine has
been held not to be applicable to ponds or reservoirs, pools of water,
streams, canals, dams, ditches, culverts, drains, cesspools or sewer pools,
* * *." (65 C. J. S. p. 476 et seg. citing decisions of California, Georgia,
38
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Miss., Missouri, Montana,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Nebraska, Wisconsin.)
In fairness to the Court of Appeals it should be staged that the above
volume of Corpus Juris Secundurn was published in 1950, whereas its
decision was promulgated on September 30, 1949.

The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not

considered an attractive nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana
Appellate Court as follows:
"Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children.
Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this
danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently
presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property
creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the
work of nature without adding any new danger, * * * (he) is not liable
because of having created an 'attractive nuisance.' Anderson vs. Reith-
Riley Const. Co., N. E., 2nd 184, 185; 112 Ind. App. 170.
Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance,
the question whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions
becomes immaterial, and the other issue submitted by petitioner that the
parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding
recovery, because they left for Manila on that unlucky day leaving their
son under the care of no responsible individual needs no further
discussion.

The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. is

absolved from liability. No costs.

39