STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION_LLB401

POST-MIDTERM DISCUSSION

GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

I. Statute as a Whole
 Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not merely of a particular
provision
 A provision or section, which is unclear by itself, must be clarified by reading and construing it in relation to the
whole statute
 The statute must be considered as a whole, just as it is necessary to consider a sentence in its entirety in order to
grasp its true meaning. Consequently, effect and meaning must be given to every part of the statute
 A statute should be construed as a whole because it is not to be presumed that the legislature has used any useless
words, and because it is dangerous practice to base construction upon only a part of it, since one portion may be
qualified by other portions
 Hence the court should when it seeks the legislative intent construe all of the constituent parts of the statute
together and seek to ascertain the legislative intention from the whole act, considering every provision thereof in the
light of the general purpose and object of the act itself and endeavoring to make every part effective, harmonious
and sensible

JMM Promotions and Management Inc vs NLRC (G.R. No. 109835, November 22, 1993)
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from the decision of the POEA to
the NLRC after having posted a total bond of 150000.00 and placed in escrow the amount of 200000 as required by the POEA
rules

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics (or statutory constructions) that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every point be
given effect on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res
magis valeat quam pereat.

Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded
because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do
not see any such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a
construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled
whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.

Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to the mandate of the Constitution. By
sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once again its
commitment to the interests of labor.

Casela vs CA (L-26754, October 16, 1970)

Issue: Whether or not the motion for execution was filed within the five year reglementary period

Conscience and equity should always be considered in the construction of statutes. The courts are not to be hedged in by the literal
meaning of the language of the statute; the spirit and intendment thereof must prevail over its letter. This rule of construction is
especially applicable where adherence to the letter of the statute would result in absurdity and injustice.

From December 17, 1956 when the decision in question became final and executory, to December 11, 1963, the date when Magsaysay's
motion for execution was filed, a period of six years, eleven months and twenty-four days elapsed. From this period must be subtracted
the time during which the writs of execution could not be served, or a period of three years, nine months and twenty-five days.
Consequently, only three years, one month and twenty-nine days can be charged against the five-year reglementary period. Undoubtedly,
therefore, Magsaysay's motion for execution of December 11, 1963 was filed well within the five-year reglementary period.

II. Legislative Intent must be ascertained from the statute as a whole

 the object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain the meaning and the intention of the
legislature, to the end that the same may be enforced
 meaning and intention must first be sought in the language of the statute itself
 the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions but the
whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts
 OPTIMA STATULI INTERPRETATIX EST IPSUM STATUTUM – the best interpreter of the statute is the
statute itself (thus the rule in statutory construction starts with intrinsic aids. Hence in the construction of
statute, what is of prevailing importance is to discover the legislative intent when the law is enacted. This
legislative intent is primarily determined in the language of the statute )
 UT RES MAGIS QUAM PEREAT – It is not enough that the statute should be given effect as a
whole but that effect should be given in each of the provisions in the statute
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Datu Michael Abas Kida vs Senate of the Philippines (G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012)

The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and local elections. While the
Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the intention can be inferred from the
following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which state:

Section 1.The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1987.

The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the
election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the
Metropolitan Manila area.

Section 2.The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this Constitution
shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six
years and the remaining twelve for three years.

MERIDIAN ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, Judge, CFI, Manila, Br.
II, and FIRST WESTERN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, respondents.
Issue: whether the rate of interest properly imposable in relation to a judgment for the payment of money: 6%, as provided by
Article 2209 of the Civil Code, or 12%, conformably with Central Bank Circular No. 416

Supreme Court said that ". . . Any other kind of monetary judgment which has no thing to do with, nor involving loans or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits does not fall within the coverage of the said law (P.D. No. 116) for it is not
within the ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank. The Monetary Board may not tread on forbidden grounds. It
cannot rewrite other laws. That function is vested solely with the legislative authority.

It is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that statutes should be construed as a whole and not as series of disconnected articles and
phrases. In the absence of a clear contrary intention, words and phrases in statutes should not be interpreted in isolation from one
another. A word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may thus be
modified or restricted by the latter."

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondent.
Issue: whether or not petitioner has violated RA 4200 by secretly recording her conversation with the respondent

SECTION 1.It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or however otherwise described

The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any."

III. Verba Legis (the plain meaning rule)

 If the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite and
sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning which the legislature
intended to convey then the statute must be interpreted literally
 If the lawmakers are convinced that the legislatures have other intentions than that stated in the law still the explicit
declaration of the legislature is the law, and the courts must not depart from it
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SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioners, vs. TERESA G. FAVILA, respondent.
Issue: Is Teresa a primary beneficiary in contemplation of the Social Security Law as to be entitled to death benefits accruing
from the death of Florante?

(k)Beneficiaries — The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries.
In their absence, the dependent parents and, subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the legitimate
descendants and illegitimate children who shall be the secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the foregoing, any
other person designated by the covered employee as secondary beneficiary.

From the above-quoted provisions, it is plain that for a spouse to qualify as a primary beneficiary under paragraph (k) thereof, he/she
must not only be a legitimate spouse but also a dependent as defined under paragraph (e), that is, one who is dependent upon the
member for support.

Hence, we need only apply the law. Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived
from the maxim index animo sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the
words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or, from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the labor tribunal have committed a grave abuse in discretion in holding that the suspension and the
subsequent dismissal of private respondent where illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years' backwages.

Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

"Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement"

In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place, the wording of the Labor Code is clear and
unambiguous: "An employee who is 'unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement . . . and to his full backwages . . . "
Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.

FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON
in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, respondent.
This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which among other things
provides compensation for persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and ordered
released

When the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying
word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The following may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any
person who was accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal.". The fact that his
conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An accused may be
acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside.

IV. Spirit and Purpose of the Law

 The spirit and the purpose of the law should prevail
 When the interpretation of the statute according to the exact and literal import of its words and would lead to absurd
or mischievous consequences, or would thwart or contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature in its
enactment, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding or modifying, so far as
may be necessary, the strict letter of the law

ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND HONORABLE
RAYMUNDO SEVA, JUDGE OF BRANCH 38 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE AND WILLIAM
GUERRA, respondents.
Issue: whether or not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public Land
Act; and assuming the answer to the question is in the affirmative, whether or not their right to repurchase had already
prescribed.
It is explicit that only three classes of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase - the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal
heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private respondent sustained by the respondent appellate court that the petitioners do not
belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because they acquired the property not through inheritance but by sale, has no legal
basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very least,
petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may
therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no
distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
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BGEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, et al, petitioners, vs. BGEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA,et. al respondents.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis,
cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.

V. Statute of later date prevails – expresses the latest intent of the legislature
VI. Generalia Specialibus non derogant
 The provisions of a general statute must yield to those of a special one. However if it is possible to harmonize the
two provisions then do so but in cases where it is impossible, the special law must prevail over the general law
VII. A special law prevails over a general law

FIESTAN vs. CA (G.R. No. 81552)

Issue: Whether the civil code and the Rules of Court is applicable in the case at bar

It is a familiar rule of statutory construction that, as between a specific statute and general statute, the former must prevail since it evinces
the legislative intent more clearly than a general statute does. The Civil Code (R.A. 386) is of general character while Act No. 3135 as
amended is a special enactment and therefore the latter must prevail.
Under Act No. 3135, as amended, a mortgagee-creditor is allowed to participate in the bidding and purchase under the same conditions
as any other bidder, as in the case at bar, thus:
"Section 5.At any sale, the creditor, trustee, or other person authorized to act for the creditor, may participate in the bidding and
purchase under the same conditions as any other bidder, unless the contrary has been expressly provided in the mortgage or trust
deed under which the sale is made."

Exceptions:

HON. RAMON D. BAGATSING, petitioners, vs. HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ, respondents.

Issue: Whether the tax publication requirement to be followed is the revised charter of Manila or the Local Tax Code

There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the
Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. The fact that one is special and the other general
creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the
other as the law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in
general, which the general statute treats in particular. The exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas,
Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. In regard,
therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its
continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There, the Local
Tax Code controls.

VIII. Pari materia rule

 All statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose should be read and
construed together
i. If two or more statutes of the same subject are enacted at different times and under different conditions
and circumstances, their interpretation should be in accordance with the circumstances or situations peculiar
to each
ii. A statute will not be construed to repeal a prior act having the same subject unless the new law is intended
to repeal the former
iii. In case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against implied repeal and in favor of continuation
 The phrase used in connection with two laws relating to the same subject matter that must be analyzed with each
other
IX. Reenacted statutes (Philippine Laws)
 The way to interpret a reenacted statute must be the same as to the interpretation given to the statute from where it
was originally taken
X. Adopted statutes
 Statutes which are patterned from or copied from a statute of another country
 For purposes of construing adopted statute, courts will necessarily be guided by the interpretation of the courts of
the country from where it is taken
 Eg Civil Code and RPC – Spanish, Tax Code and Constitution - American
XI. Common law principle vs Statutory Provision
 In case of conflict between a Common Law and a Statutory Provision, the Statutory Provision shall prevail
XII. Doctrine of necessary implications
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 What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed
XIII. Casus omissus
 When a statute makes specific provisions in regard to several enumerated cases or objects, but omits to make any
provision for a case or object which is analogous to those enumerated, or which stands upon the same reason, and is
therefore within the general scope of the statute, and it appears that such case or object was omitted by
inadvertence or because it is overlooked or unforeseen
 The rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been
clearly established
XIV. Stare decisis
 Policy of the court to stand by precedent and not disturb settled point
 When court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere
to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same, regardless of
whether the parties and property are the same

CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES

Rules:
a. When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish
 Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. 13 The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that
general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. 14 The
rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the
other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. 15 In other words, there should be no distinction in
the application of a statute where none is indicated. 16 For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law
makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and
without regard to consequences.
b. Exception
 Where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to
justify it
c. General and Special Terms
 Construe a term based on its use in a given provision, whether as a general term or a special term. Ex. Sell as used
in the Civil Code and the Dangerous Drugs Act
d. Ejusdem Generis
 where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular, and specific meaning,
such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or
things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned
 tool in statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain
e. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius (Express mention and implied exclusion)
 The express mention of one person, thing, or consequences is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others
 Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is
intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein. The rule proceeds from the
premise that the legislature would not have made specific enumeration in a statute if it had the intention not to
restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned
f. Associated Words (Nosciturus a sociis)
 Associated words explain and limit each other. When a word used in a statute is ambiguous or vague, its meaning
may be made clear and specific by considering the companyin which it is found or with which it is associated
g. Use of Negative Words
 Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are made directory
h. When the word used has no meaning in the harmony of the legislative intent
i. When the word or phrase is repeatedly used in a statute
 words and phrases repeatedly used in a statute must be used in the same manner
j. Use of Particular Words and Phrase
 Or is a disjunctive particle used to express as alternative or two give a choice among one or two things
 And means conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing union or as joinder of ideas
 And/or provides an option where and and or can be used interchangeably
 Must and shall is imperative
 May generally connotes a permissible thing. It is directory in nature and not mandatory
 All, every, any – universal or comprehensive
 And so forth, and the like – refers to what is similar to or what is enumerated
 Cannot, shall not, no – imperative or mandatory (prohibitive)

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES

a. Penal Statutes should be interpreted against the state and liberally in favor of the accused
b. Remedial statutes or procedure should be liberally construed because they are enacted by the legislature precisely to improve
the law so that they will be in harmony with new ideas
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c. Substantive statutes (eg Revised Penal code, Family Code) in case of doubt, the judge should presume that the law making
body intended right and justice to prevail (Art 10 Civil Code)
d. Labor statutes are interpreted liberally in favor of laborers/labor
e. Tax statutes
a. Tax provisions imposing the imposition of tax should be construed strictly against the taxing power and liberally in
favor of the taxpayer
b. Provisions in the Tax Code exempting taxation should be construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the
state (taxes are the lifeblood of the state and without it the state could not exist)
f. Mandatory Statutes - negative
g. Permanent Statutes remain effective unless repealed
h. Temporary statutes are statutes with fixed duration
i. General statutes refers to all
j. Special statutes relates to a specific class
k. Local statutes refers to those that are local in application
LATIN MAXIMS (principles)
 Laws should be prospective not retroactive
 The law provides for the future, the judge for the past
 When the law is clear, the courts have no room for interpretation but application
 The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself
 It is the spirit of the law that giveth life and not the letter that killeth
 The reason of the law is its soul
 When the reason for the law ceases, the law also ceases to exist
 What is not included is deemed excluded
 Express mention is implied exclusion
 Special provisions prevail over general provisions
 A general law does not nullify a special law
 While the law may be hard, it is the law that must be followed
 The law may be harsh but it is the law
 Without intent there can be no crime
 Ignorance of the law excuses no one
 When the law does not distinguish,we should not distinguish