REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
, son of the appellant
vs.
JOSE V. BAGTAS, defendant,
FELICIDAD M. BAGTAS, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate left
by the late Jose V. Bagtas, petitioner-appellant.
D. T. Reyes, Liaison and Associates for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
The Court of Appeals certified this case to this Court because only
questions of law are raised.
On 8 May 1948 Jose V. Bagtas borrowed from the Republic of the
Philippines through the Bureau of Animal Industry three bulls: a Red
Sindhi with a book value of P1,176.46, a Bhagnari, of P1,320.56 and a
Sahiniwal, of P744.46, for a period of one year from 8 May 1948 to 7
May 1949 for breeding purposes subject to a government charge of
breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the bulls. Upon the expiration
on 7 May 1949 of the contract, the borrower asked for a renewal for
another period of one year. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources approved a renewal thereof of only one bull for
another year from 8 May 1949 to 7 May 1950 and requested the return
of the other two. On 25 March 1950 Jose V. Bagtas wrote to the
Director of Animal Industry that he would pay the value of the three
bulls. On 17 October 1950 he reiterated his desire to buy them at a
value with a deduction of yearly depreciation to be approved by the
Auditor General. On 19 October 1950 the Director of Animal Industry
advised him that the book value of the three bulls could not be reduced
and that they either be returned or their book value paid not later than
31 October 1950. Jose V. Bagtas failed to pay the book value of the
three bulls or to return them. So, on 20 December 1950 in the Court of
First Instance of Manila the Republic of the Philippines commenced an
action against him praying that he be ordered to return the three bulls
loaned to him or to pay their book value in the total sum of P3,241.45
and the unpaid breeding fee in the sum of P199.62, both with interests,
and costs; and that other just and equitable relief be granted in (civil
No. 12818).
On 5 July 1951 Jose V. Bagtas, through counsel Navarro, Rosete and
Manalo, answered that because of the bad peace and order situation in
Cagayan Valley, particularly in the barrio of Baggao, and of the
pending appeal he had taken to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the President of the Philippines from the refusal
by the Director of Animal Industry to deduct from the book value of the
bulls corresponding yearly depreciation of 8% from the date of
acquisition, to which depreciation the Auditor General did not object, he
could not return the animals nor pay their value and prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.
After hearing, on 30 July 1956 the trial court render judgment —
. . . sentencing the latter (defendant) to pay the sum of
P3,625.09 the total value of the three bulls plus the breeding
fees in the amount of P626.17 with interest on both sums of
(at) the legal rate from the filing of this complaint and costs.
On 9 October 1958 the plaintiff moved ex parte for a writ of execution
which the court granted on 18 October and issued on 11 November
1958. On 2 December 1958 granted an ex-parte motion filed by the
plaintiff on November 1958 for the appointment of a special sheriff to
serve the writ outside Manila. Of this order appointing a special sheriff,
on 6 December 1958, Felicidad M. Bagtas, the surviving spouse of the
defendant Jose Bagtas who died on 23 October 1951 and as
administratrix of his estate, was notified. On 7 January 1959 she file a
motion alleging that on 26 June 1952 the two bull Sindhi and Bhagnari
were returned to the Bureau Animal of Industry and that sometime in
November 1958 the third bull, the Sahiniwal, died from gunshot wound
inflicted during a Huk raid on Hacienda Felicidad Intal, and praying that
the writ of execution be quashed and that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued. On 31 January 1959 the plaintiff objected to her
motion. On 6 February 1959 she filed a reply thereto. On the same
day, 6 February, the Court denied her motion. Hence, this appeal
certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court as stated at the
beginning of this opinion.
It is true that on 26 June 1952 Jose M. Bagtas, Jr.
by the late defendant, returned the Sindhi and Bhagnari bulls to Roman
Remorin, Superintendent of the NVB Station, Bureau of Animal
Industry, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, as evidenced by a
memorandum receipt signed by the latter (Exhibit 2). That is why in its
objection of 31 January 1959 to the appellant's motion to quash the
writ of execution the appellee prays "that another writ of execution in
the sum of P859.53 be issued against the estate of defendant
deceased Jose V. Bagtas." She cannot be held liable for the two bulls
which already had been returned to and received by the appellee.
The appellant contends that the Sahiniwal bull was accidentally killed
during a raid by the Huk in November 1953 upon the surrounding
barrios of Hacienda Felicidad Intal, Baggao, Cagayan, where the
animal was kept, and that as such death was due to force majeure she
is relieved from the duty of returning the bull or paying its value to the
appellee. The contention is without merit. The loan by the appellee to
the late defendant Jose V. Bagtas of the three bulls for breeding
purposes for a period of one year from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949,
later on renewed for another year as regards one bull, was subject to
the payment by the borrower of breeding fee of 10% of the book value
of the bulls. The appellant contends that the contract
was commodatum and that, for that reason, as the appellee retained
ownership or title to the bull it should suffer its loss due to force
majeure. A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous.1 If the
breeding fee be considered a compensation, then the contract would
be a lease of the bull. Under article 1671 of the Civil Code the lessee
would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith,
because she had continued possession of the bull after the expiry of
the contract. And even if the contract be commodatum, still the
appellant is liable, because article 1942 of the Civil Code provides that
a bailee in a contract of commodatum —
. . . is liable for loss of the things, even if it should be through
a fortuitous event:
(2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated . . .
(3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its
value, unless there is a stipulation exempting the bailee from
responsibility in case of a fortuitous event;
The original period of the loan was from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949.
The loan of one bull was renewed for another period of one year to end
on 8 May 1950. But the appellant kept and used the bull until
November 1953 when during a Huk raid it was killed by stray bullets.
Furthermore, when lent and delivered to the deceased husband of the
appellant the bulls had each an appraised book value, to with: the
Sindhi, at P1,176.46, the Bhagnari at P1,320.56 and the Sahiniwal at
P744.46. It was not stipulated that in case of loss of the bull due to
fortuitous event the late husband of the appellant would be exempt
from liability.
The appellant's contention that the demand or prayer by the appellee
for the return of the bull or the payment of its value being a money
claim should be presented or filed in the intestate proceedings of the
defendant who died on 23 October 1951, is not altogether without
merit. However, the claim that his civil personality having ceased to
exist the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case against him, is
untenable, because section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides
that —
After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be
substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30)
days, or within such time as may be granted. . . .
and after the defendant's death on 23 October 1951 his counsel failed
to comply with section 16 of Rule 3 which provides that —
Whenever a party to a pending case dies . . . it shall be the
duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such
death . . . and to give the name and residence of the
executory administrator, guardian, or other legal
representative of the deceased . . . .
The notice by the probate court and its publication in the Voz de
Manila that Felicidad M. Bagtas had been issue letters of
administration of the estate of the late Jose Bagtas and that "all
persons having claims for monopoly against the deceased Jose V.
Bagtas, arising from contract express or implied, whether the same be
due, not due, or contingent, for funeral expenses and expenses of the
last sickness of the said decedent, and judgment for monopoly against
him, to file said claims with the Clerk of this Court at the City Hall Bldg.,
Highway 54, Quezon City, within six (6) months from the date of the
first publication of this order, serving a copy thereof upon the
aforementioned Felicidad M. Bagtas, the appointed administratrix of
the estate of the said deceased," is not a notice to the court and the
appellee who were to be notified of the defendant's death in
accordance with the above-quoted rule, and there was no reason for
such failure to notify, because the attorney who appeared for the
defendant was the same who represented the administratrix in the
special proceedings instituted for the administration and settlement of
his estate. The appellee or its attorney or representative could not be
expected to know of the death of the defendant or of the administration
proceedings of his estate instituted in another court that if the attorney
for the deceased defendant did not notify the plaintiff or its attorney of
such death as required by the rule.
As the appellant already had returned the two bulls to the appellee, the
estate of the late defendant is only liable for the sum of P859.63, the
value of the bull which has not been returned to the appellee, because
it was killed while in the custody of the administratrix of his estate. This
is the amount prayed for by the appellee in its objection on 31 January
1959 to the motion filed on 7 January 1959 by the appellant for the
quashing of the writ of execution.
Special proceedings for the administration and settlement of the estate
of the deceased Jose V. Bagtas having been instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Q-200), the money judgment rendered in favor
of the appellee cannot be enforced by means of a writ of execution but
must be presented to the probate court for payment by the appellant,
the administratrix appointed by the court.
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of execution appealed from is set aside,
without pronouncement as to costs.
MARGARITA QUINTOS and ANGEL A. ANSALDO, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
BECK, defendant-appellee.
Mauricio Carlos for appellants.
Felipe Buencamino, Jr. for appellee.
IMPERIAL, J.:
The plaintiff brought this action to compel the defendant to return her
certain furniture which she lent him for his use. She appealed from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila which ordered that the
defendant return to her the three has heaters and the four electric
lamps found in the possession of the Sheriff of said city, that she call
for the other furniture from the said sheriff of Manila at her own
expense, and that the fees which the Sheriff may charge for the
deposit of the furniture be paid pro rata by both parties, without
pronouncement as to the costs.
The defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff and as such occupied the
latter's house on M. H. del Pilar street, No. 1175. On January 14, 1936,
upon the novation of the contract of lease between the plaintiff and the
defendant, the former gratuitously granted to the latter the use of the
furniture described in the third paragraph of the stipulation of facts,
subject to the condition that the defendant would return them to the
plaintiff upon the latter's demand. The plaintiff sold the property to
Maria Lopez and Rosario Lopez and on September 14, 1936, these
three notified the defendant of the conveyance, giving him sixty days to
vacate the premises under one of the clauses of the contract of lease.
There after the plaintiff required the defendant to return all the furniture
transferred to him for them in the house where they were found.
On November 5, 1936, the defendant, through another person, wrote
to the plaintiff reiterating that she may call for the furniture in the
ground floor of the house. On the 7th of the same month, the
defendant wrote another letter to the plaintiff informing her that he
could not give up the three gas heaters and the four electric lamps
because he would use them until the 15th of the same month when the
lease in due to expire. The plaintiff refused to get the furniture in view
of the fact that the defendant had declined to make delivery of all of
them. On November 15th, before vacating the house, the
defendant deposited with the Sheriff all the furniture belonging to the
plaintiff and they are now on deposit in the warehouse situated at No.
1521, Rizal Avenue, in the custody of the said sheriff.
In their seven assigned errors the plaintiffs contend that the trial court
incorrectly applied the law: in holding that they violated the contract by
not calling for all the furniture on November 5, 1936, when the
defendant placed them at their disposal; in not ordering the defendant
to pay them the value of the furniture in case they are not delivered; in
holding that they should get all the furniture from the Sheriff at their
expenses; in ordering them to pay-half of the expenses claimed by the
Sheriff for the deposit of the furniture; in ruling that both parties should
pay their respective legal expenses or the costs; and in denying pay
their respective legal expenses or the costs; and in denying the
motions for reconsideration and new trial. To dispose of the case, it is
only necessary to decide whether the defendant complied with his
obligation to return the furniture upon the plaintiff's demand; whether
the latter is bound to bear the deposit fees thereof, and whether she is
entitled to the costs of litigation.lawphi1.net
The contract entered into between the parties is one of commadatum,
because under it the plaintiff gratuitously granted the use of the
furniture to the defendant, reserving for herself the ownership thereof;
by this contract the defendant bound himself to return the furniture to
the plaintiff, upon the latters demand (clause 7 of the contract, Exhibit
A; articles 1740, paragraph 1, and 1741 of the Civil Code). The
obligation voluntarily assumed by the defendant to return the furniture
upon the plaintiff's demand, means that he should return all of them to
the plaintiff at the latter's residence or house. The defendant did not
comply with this obligation when he merely placed them at the disposal
of the plaintiff, retaining for his benefit the three gas heaters and the
four eletric lamps. The provisions of article 1169 of the Civil Code cited
by counsel for the parties are not squarely applicable. The trial court,
therefore, erred when it came to the legal conclusion that the plaintiff
failed to comply with her obligation to get the furniture when they were
offered to her.
As the defendant had voluntarily undertaken to return all the furniture
to the plaintiff, upon the latter's demand, the Court could not legally
compel her to bear the expenses occasioned by the deposit of the
furniture at the defendant's behest. The latter, as bailee, was not
entitled to place the furniture on deposit; nor was the plaintiff under a
duty to accept the offer to return the furniture, because the defendant
wanted to retain the three gas heaters and the four electric lamps.
As to the value of the furniture, we do not believe that the plaintiff is
entitled to the payment thereof by the defendant in case of his inability
to return some of the furniture because under paragraph 6 of the
stipulation of facts, the defendant has neither agreed to nor admitted
the correctness of the said value. Should the defendant fail to deliver
some of the furniture, the value thereof should be latter determined by
the trial Court through evidence which the parties may desire to
present.
The costs in both instances should be borne by the defendant because
the plaintiff is the prevailing party (section 487 of the Code of Civil
Procedure). The defendant was the one who breached the contract
of commodatum, and without any reason he refused to return and
deliver all the furniture upon the plaintiff's demand. In these
circumstances, it is just and equitable that he pay the legal expenses
and other judicial costs which the plaintiff would not have otherwise
defrayed.
The appealed judgment is modified and the defendant is ordered to
return and deliver to the plaintiff, in the residence to return and deliver
to the plaintiff, in the residence or house of the latter, all the furniture
described in paragraph 3 of the stipulation of facts Exhibit A. The
expenses which may be occasioned by the delivery to and deposit of
the furniture with the Sheriff shall be for the account of the defendant.
the defendant shall pay the costs in both instances. So ordered.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE BORROWER OR BAILEE
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO RETURN
QUINTOS VS. BECK (SEE PREVIOUS PAGE)
CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN
PROVINCE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF EGMIDIO OCTAVIANO AND
JUAN VALDEZ, respondents.
Valdez, Ereso, Polido & Associates for petitioner.
Claustro, Claustro, Claustro Law Office collaborating counsel for
petitioner.
Jaime G. de Leon for the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano.
Cotabato Law Office for the Heirs of Juan Valdez.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The principal issue in this case is whether or not a decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated a long time ago can properly be
considered res judicata by respondent Court of Appeals in the present
two cases between petitioner and two private respondents.
Petitioner questions as allegedly erroneous the Decision dated August
31, 1987 of the Ninth Division of Respondent Court of Appeals 1 in CA-
G.R. No. 05148 [Civil Case No. 3607 (419)] and CA-G.R. No. 05149
[Civil Case No. 3655 (429)], both for Recovery of Possession, which
affirmed the Decision of the Honorable Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet in Civil Case No. 3607
(419) and Civil Case No. 3655 (429), with the dispositive portion as
follows:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant, Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province
to return and surrender Lot 2 of Plan Psu-194357 to the
plaintiffs. Heirs of Juan Valdez, and Lot 3 of the same Plan
to the other set of plaintiffs, the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano
(Leonardo Valdez, et al.). For lack or insufficiency of
evidence, the plaintiffs' claim or damages is hereby denied.
Said defendant is ordered to pay costs. (p. 36, Rollo)
Respondent Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial court's decision,
sustained the trial court's conclusions that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated May 4,1977 in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, in the two cases
affirmed by the Supreme Court, touched on the ownership of lots 2 and
3 in question; that the two lots were possessed by the predecessors-in-
interest of private respondents under claim of ownership in good faith
from 1906 to 1951; that petitioner had been in possession of the same
lots as bailee in commodatum up to 1951, when petitioner repudiated
the trust and when it applied for registration in 1962; that petitioner had
just been in possession as owner for eleven years, hence there is no
possibility of acquisitive prescription which requires 10 years
possession with just title and 30 years of possession without; that the
principle of res judicata on these findings by the Court of Appeals will
bar a reopening of these questions of facts; and that those facts may
no longer be altered.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideation of the respondent appellate
court's Decision in the two aforementioned cases (CA G.R. No. CV-
05418 and 05419) was denied.
The facts and background of these cases as narrated by the trail court
are as follows —
... The documents and records presented reveal
that the whole controversy started when the
defendant Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain
Province (VICAR for brevity) filed with the Court of
First Instance of Baguio Benguet on September 5,
1962 an application for registration of title over
Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Psu-194357, situated at
Poblacion Central, La Trinidad, Benguet, docketed
as LRC N-91, said Lots being the sites of the
Catholic Church building, convents, high school
building, school gymnasium, school dormitories,
social hall, stonewalls, etc. On March 22, 1963 the
Heirs of Juan Valdez and the Heirs of Egmidio
Octaviano filed their Answer/Opposition on Lots
Nos. 2 and 3, respectively, asserting ownership
and title thereto. After trial on the merits, the land
registration court promulgated its Decision, dated
November 17, 1965, confirming the registrable title
of VICAR to Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4.
The Heirs of Juan Valdez (plaintiffs in the herein
Civil Case No. 3655) and the Heirs of Egmidio
Octaviano (plaintiffs in the herein Civil Case No.
3607) appealed the decision of the land
registration court to the then Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 38830-R. The Court of
Appeals rendered its decision, dated May 9, 1977,
reversing the decision of the land registration court
and dismissing the VICAR's application as to Lots
2 and 3, the lots claimed by the two sets of
oppositors in the land registration case (and two
sets of plaintiffs in the two cases now at bar), the
first lot being presently occupied by the convent
and the second by the women's dormitory and the
sister's convent.
On May 9, 1977, the Heirs of Octaviano filed a
motion for reconsideration praying the Court of
Appeals to order the registration of Lot 3 in the
names of the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano, and on
May 17, 1977, the Heirs of Juan Valdez and Pacita
Valdez filed their motion for reconsideration
praying that both Lots 2 and 3 be ordered
registered in the names of the Heirs of Juan
Valdez and Pacita Valdez. On August 12,1977, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the Heirs of Juan Valdez
on the ground that there was "no sufficient merit to
justify reconsideration one way or the other ...,"
and likewise denied that of the Heirs of Egmidio
Octaviano.
Thereupon, the VICAR filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing his
(its) application for registration of Lots 2 and 3,
docketed as G.R. No. L-46832, entitled 'Catholic
Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province vs. Court
of Appeals and Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano.'
From the denial by the Court of Appeals of their
motion for reconsideration the Heirs of Juan
Valdez and Pacita Valdez, on September 8, 1977,
filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review,
docketed as G.R. No. L-46872, entitled, Heirs of
Juan Valdez and Pacita Valdez vs. Court of
Appeals, Vicar, Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano and
Annable O. Valdez.
On January 13, 1978, the Supreme Court denied
in a minute resolution both petitions (of VICAR on
the one hand and the Heirs of Juan Valdez and
Pacita Valdez on the other) for lack of merit. Upon
the finality of both Supreme Court resolutions in
G.R. No. L-46832 and G.R. No. L- 46872, the
Heirs of Octaviano filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Baguio, Branch II, a Motion For
Execution of Judgment praying that the Heirs of
Octaviano be placed in possession of Lot 3. The
 Court, presided over by Hon. Salvador J. Valdez,
on December 7, 1978, denied the motion on the
ground that the Court of Appeals decision in CA-
G.R. No. 38870 did not grant the Heirs of
Octaviano any affirmative relief.
On February 7, 1979, the Heirs of Octaviano filed
with the Court of Appeals a petitioner for certiorari
and mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 08890-
R, entitled Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano vs. Hon.
Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Vicar. In its decision
dated May 16, 1979, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition.
It was at that stage that the instant cases were
filed. The Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed Civil
Case No. 3607 (419) on July 24, 1979, for
recovery of possession of Lot 3; and the Heirs of
Juan Valdez filed Civil Case No. 3655 (429) on
September 24, 1979, likewise for recovery of
possession of Lot 2 (Decision, pp. 199-201, Orig.
Rec.).
In Civil Case No. 3607 (419) trial was held. The plaintiffs
Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano presented one (1) witness,
Fructuoso Valdez, who testified on the alleged ownership of
the land in question (Lot 3) by their predecessor-in-interest,
Egmidio Octaviano (Exh. C ); his written demand (Exh. B—
B-4 ) to defendant Vicar for the return of the land to them;
and the reasonable rentals for the use of the land at
P10,000.00 per month. On the other hand, defendant Vicar
presented the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Benguet, Atty. Nicanor Sison, who testified that the land in
question is not covered by any title in the name of Egmidio
Octaviano or any of the plaintiffs (Exh. 8). The defendant
dispensed with the testimony of Mons.William Brasseur
when the plaintiffs admitted that the witness if called to the
witness stand, would testify that defendant Vicar has been in
possession of Lot 3, for seventy-five (75) years continuously
and peacefully and has constructed permanent structures
thereon.
In Civil Case No. 3655, the parties admitting that the material
facts are not in dispute, submitted the case on the sole issue
of whether or not the decisions of the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court touching on the ownership of Lot 2,
which in effect declared the plaintiffs the owners of the land
constitute res judicata.
In these two cases , the plaintiffs arque that the defendant
Vicar is barred from setting up the defense of ownership
and/or long and continuous possession of the two lots in
question since this is barred by prior judgment of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 038830-R under the principle of res
judicata. Plaintiffs contend that the question of possession
and ownership have already been determined by the Court
of Appeals (Exh. C, Decision, CA-G.R. No. 038830-R) and
affirmed by the Supreme Court (Exh. 1, Minute Resolution of
the Supreme Court). On his part, defendant Vicar maintains
that the principle of res judicata would not prevent them from
litigating the issues of long possession and ownership
because the dispositive portion of the prior judgment in CA-
G.R. No. 038830-R merely dismissed their application for
registration and titling of lots 2 and 3. Defendant Vicar
contends that only the dispositive portion of the decision, and
not its body, is the controlling pronouncement of the Court of
Appeals. 2
The alleged errors committed by respondent Court of Appeals
according to petitioner are as follows:
1. ERROR IN APPLYING LAW OF THE CASE AND RES JUDICATA;
2. ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT RULED THAT
LOTS 2 AND 3 WERE ACQUIRED BY PURCHASE BUT WITHOUT
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED;
3. ERROR IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS' CLAIM IT PURCHASED
LOTS 2 AND 3 FROM VALDEZ AND OCTAVIANO WAS AN IMPLIED
ADMISSION THAT THE FORMER OWNERS WERE VALDEZ AND
OCTAVIANO;
4. ERROR IN FINDING THAT IT WAS PREDECESSORS OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO WERE IN POSSESSION OF LOTS
2 AND 3 AT LEAST FROM 1906, AND NOT PETITIONER;
5. ERROR IN FINDING THAT VALDEZ AND OCTAVIANO HAD FREE
PATENT APPLICATIONS AND THE PREDECESSORS OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS ALREADY HAD FREE PATENT APPLICATIONS
SINCE 1906;
6. ERROR IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER DECLARED LOTS 2 AND
3 ONLY IN 1951 AND JUST TITLE IS A PRIME NECESSITY UNDER
ARTICLE 1134 IN RELATION TO ART. 1129 OF THE CIVIL CODE
FOR ORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION OF 10 YEARS;
7. ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CA G.R. NO. 038830 WAS AFFIRMED BY THE
SUPREME COURT;
8. ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN CA G.R. NO.
038830 TOUCHED ON OWNERSHIP OF LOTS 2 AND 3 AND THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS WERE IN
POSSESSION OF LOTS 2 AND 3 UNDER A CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP
IN GOOD FAITH FROM 1906 TO 1951;
9. ERROR IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAD BEEN IN
POSSESSION OF LOTS 2 AND 3 MERELY AS BAILEE BOR
ROWER) IN COMMODATUM, A GRATUITOUS LOAN FOR USE;
10. ERROR IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS A POSSESSOR AND
BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH WITHOUT RIGHTS OF RETENTION AND
REIMBURSEMENT AND IS BARRED BY THE FINALITY AND
CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE DECISION IN CA G.R. NO. 038830. 3
The petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioner questions the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. Nos. 05148 and 05149, when it clearly held that it was in
agreement with the findings of the trial court that the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated May 4,1977 in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, on the
question of ownership of Lots 2 and 3, declared that the said Court of
Appeals Decision CA-G.R. No. 38830-R) did not positively declare
private respondents as owners of the land, neither was it declared that
they were not owners of the land, but it held that the predecessors of
private respondents were possessors of Lots 2 and 3, with claim of
ownership in good faith from 1906 to 1951. Petitioner was in
possession as borrower in commodatum up to 1951, when it
repudiated the trust by declaring the properties in its name for taxation
purposes. When petitioner applied for registration of Lots 2 and 3 in
1962, it had been in possession in concept of owner only for eleven
years. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession for ten
years, but always with just title. Extraordinary acquisitive prescription
requires 30 years. 4
On the above findings of facts supported by evidence and evaluated by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, affirmed by this Court,
We see no error in respondent appellate court's ruling that said
findings are res judicatabetween the parties. They can no longer be
altered by presentation of evidence because those issues were
resolved with finality a long time ago. To ignore the principle of res
judicata would be to open the door to endless litigations by continuous
determination of issues without end.
An examination of the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 4, 1977,
First Division 5 in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, shows that it reversed the trial
court's Decision 6 finding petitioner to be entitled to register the lands in
question under its ownership, on its evaluation of evidence and
conclusion of facts.
The Court of Appeals found that petitioner did not meet the
requirement of 30 years possession for acquisitive prescription over
Lots 2 and 3. Neither did it satisfy the requirement of 10 years
possession for ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the
absence of just title. The appellate court did not believe the findings of
the trial court that Lot 2 was acquired from Juan Valdez by purchase
and Lot 3 was acquired also by purchase from Egmidio Octaviano by
petitioner Vicar because there was absolutely no documentary
evidence to support the same and the alleged purchases were never
mentioned in the application for registration.
By the very admission of petitioner Vicar, Lots 2 and 3 were owned by
Valdez and Octaviano. Both Valdez and Octaviano had Free Patent
Application for those lots since 1906. The predecessors of private
respondents, not petitioner Vicar, were in possession of the questioned
lots since 1906.
There is evidence that petitioner Vicar occupied Lots 1 and 4, which
are not in question, but not Lots 2 and 3, because the buildings
standing thereon were only constructed after liberation in 1945.
Petitioner Vicar only declared Lots 2 and 3 for taxation purposes in
1951. The improvements oil Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 were paid for by the Bishop
but said Bishop was appointed only in 1947, the church was
constructed only in 1951 and the new convent only 2 years before the
trial in 1963.
When petitioner Vicar was notified of the oppositor's claims, the parish
priest offered to buy the lot from Fructuoso Valdez. Lots 2 and 3 were
surveyed by request of petitioner Vicar only in 1962.
Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house
was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent
were destroyed. They never asked for the return of the house, but
when they allowed its free use, they became bailors
in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee. The bailees' failure to
return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean
adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in
trust the property subject matter of commodatum. The adverse claim of
petitioner came only in 1951 when it declared the lots for taxation
purposes. The action of petitioner Vicar by such adverse claim could
not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because
of the absence of just title.
The Court of Appeals found that the predecessors-in-interest and
private respondents were possessors under claim of ownership in good
faith from 1906; that petitioner Vicar was only a bailee in commodatum;
and that the adverse claim and repudiation of trust came only in 1951.
We find no reason to disregard or reverse the ruling of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R. Its findings of fact have become
incontestible. This Court declined to review said decision, thereby in
effect, affirming it. It has become final and executory a long time ago.
Respondent appellate court did not commit any reversible error, much
less grave abuse of discretion, when it held that the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R is governing, under the
principle of res judicata, hence the rule, in the present cases CA-G.R.
No. 05148 and CA-G.R. No. 05149. The facts as supported by
evidence established in that decision may no longer be altered.
WHEREFORE AND BY REASON OF THE FOREGOING, this petition
is DENIED for lack of merit, the Decision dated Aug. 31, 1987 in CA-
G.R. Nos. 05148 and 05149, by respondent Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FELIX DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
AGUSTINA JARRA, administratrix of the estate of Magdaleno
Jimenea, deceased, defendant-appellant.
Matias Hilado, for appellant.
Jose Felix Martinez, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the 1st of September, 1906, Felix de los Santos brought suit
against Agustina Jarra, the administratrix of the estate of Magdaleno
Jimenea, alleging that in the latter part of 1901 Jimenea borrowed and
obtained from the plaintiff ten first-class carabaos, to be used at the
animal-power mill of his hacienda during the season of 1901-2, without
recompense or remuneration whatever for the use thereof, under the
sole condition that they should be returned to the owner as soon as the
work at the mill was terminated; that Magdaleno Jimenea, however, did
not return the carabaos, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff
claimed their return after the work at the mill was finished; that
Magdaleno Jimenea died on the 28th of October, 1904, and the
defendant herein was appointed by the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros administratrix of his estate and she took over the
administration of the same and is still performing her duties as such
administratrix; that the plaintiff presented his claim to the
commissioners of the estate of Jimenea, within the legal term, for the
return of the said ten carabaos, but the said commissioners rejected
his claim as appears in their report; therefore, the plaintiff prayed that
judgment be entered against the defendant as administratrix of the
estate of the deceased, ordering her to return the ten first-class
carabaos loaned to the late Jimenea, or their present value, and to pay
the costs.
The defendant was duly summoned, and on the 25th of September,
1906, she demurred in writing to the complaint on the ground that it
was vague; but on the 2d of October of the same year, in answer to the
complaint, she said that it was true that the late Magdaleno Jimenea
asked the plaintiff to loan him ten carabaos, but that he only obtained
three second-class animals, which were afterwards transferred by sale
by the plaintiff to the said Jimenea; that she denied the allegations
contained in paragraph 3 of the complaint; for all of which she asked
the court to absolve her of the complaint with the cost against the
plaintiff.
By a writing dated the 11th of December, 1906, Attorney Jose Felix
Martinez notified the defendant and her counsel, Matias Hilado, that he
had made an agreement with the plaintiff to the effect that the latter
would not compromise the controversy without his consent, and that as
fees for his professional services he was to receive one half of the
amount allowed in the judgment if the same were entered in favor of
the plaintiff.
The case came up for trial, evidence was adduced by both parties, and
either exhibits were made of record. On the 10th of January, 1907, the
court below entered judgment sentencing Agustina Jarra, as
administratrix of the estate of Magdaleno Jimenea, to return to the
plaintiff, Felix de los Santos, the remaining six second and third class
carabaos, or the value thereof at the rate of P120 each, or a total of
P720 with the costs.
Counsel for the defendant excepted to the foregoing judgment, and, by
a writing dated January 19, moved for anew trial on the ground that the
findings of fact were openly and manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence. The motion was overruled, the defendant duly excepted, and
in due course submitted the corresponding bill of exceptions, which
was approved and submitted to this court.
The defendant has admitted that Magdaleno Jimenea asked the
plaintiff for the loan of ten carabaos which are now claimed by the
latter, as shown by two letters addressed by the said Jimenea to Felix
de los Santos; but in her answer the said defendant alleged that the
late Jimenea only obtained three second-class carabaos, which were
subsequently sold to him by the owner, Santos; therefore, in order to
decide this litigation it is indispensable that proof be forthcoming that
Jimenea only received three carabaos from his son-in-law Santos, and
that they were sold by the latter to him.
The record discloses that it has been fully proven from the testimony of
a sufficient number of witnesses that the plaintiff, Santos, sent in
charge of various persons the ten carabaos requested by his father-in-
law, Magdaleno Jimenea, in the two letters produced at the trial by the
plaintiff, and that Jimenea received them in the presence of some of
said persons, one being a brother of said Jimenea, who saw the
animals arrive at the hacienda where it was proposed to employ them.
Four died of rinderpest, and it is for this reason that the judgment
appealed from only deals with six surviving carabaos.
The alleged purchase of three carabaos by Jimenea from his son-in-
law Santos is not evidenced by any trustworthy documents such as
those of transfer, nor were the declarations of the witnesses presented
by the defendant affirming it satisfactory; for said reason it can not be
considered that Jimenea only received three carabaos on loan from his
son-in-law, and that he afterwards kept them definitely by virtue of the
purchase.
By the laws in force the transfer of large cattle was and is still made by
means of official documents issued by the local authorities; these
documents constitute the title of ownership of the carabao or horse so
acquired. Furthermore, not only should the purchaser be provided with
a new certificate or credential, a document which has not been
produced in evidence by the defendant, nor has the loss of the same
been shown in the case, but the old documents ought to be on file in
the municipality, or they should have been delivered to the new
purchaser, and in the case at bar neither did the defendant present the
old credential on which should be stated the name of the previous
owner of each of the three carabaos said to have been sold by the
plaintiff.
From the foregoing it may be logically inferred that the carabaos
loaned or given on commodatum to the now deceased Magdaleno
Jimenea were ten in number; that they, or at any rate the six surviving
ones, have not been returned to the owner thereof, Felix de los Santos,
and that it is not true that the latter sold to the former three carabaos
that the purchaser was already using; therefore, as the said six
carabaos were not the property of the deceased nor of any of his
descendants, it is the duty of the administratrix of the estate to return
them or indemnify the owner for their value.
The Civil Code, in dealing with loans in general, from which generic
denomination the specific one of commodatum is derived, establishes
prescriptions in relation to the last-mentioned contract by the following
articles:
ART. 1740. By the contract of loan, one of the parties
delivers to the other, either anything not perishable, in order
that the latter may use it during a certain period and return it
to the former, in which case it is called commodatum, or
money or any other perishable thing, under the condition to
return an equal amount of the same kind and quality, in
which case it is merely called a loan.
Commodatum is essentially gratuitous.
Although it is true that in a contract of commodatum the
bailor retains the ownership of the thing loaned, and at the
expiration of the period, or after the use for which it was
loaned has been accomplished, it is the imperative duty of
the bailee to return the thing itself to its owner, or to pay him
damages if through the fault of the bailee the thing should
have been lost or injured, it is clear that where public
securities are involved, the trial court, in deferring to the
claim of the bailor that the amount loaned be returned him by
the bailee in bonds of the same class as those which
constituted the contract, thereby properly applies law 9 of
title 11 of partida 5.
With regard to the third assignment of error, based on the fact that the
plaintiff Santos had not appealed from the decision of the
commissioners rejecting his claim for the recovery of his carabaos, it is
sufficient to estate that we are not dealing with a claim for the payment
of a certain sum, the collection of a debt from the estate, or payment
for losses and damages (sec. 119, Code of Civil Procedure), but with
the exclusion from the inventory of the property of the late Jimenea, or
from his capital, of six carabaos which did not belong to him, and which
formed no part of the inheritance.
The demand for the exclusion of the said carabaos belonging to a third
party and which did not form part of the property of the deceased, must
be the subject of a direct decision of the court in an ordinary action,
wherein the right of the third party to the property which he seeks to
have excluded from the inheritance and the right of the deceased has
been discussed, and rendered in view of the result of the evidence
adduced by the administrator of the estate and of the claimant, since it
is so provided by the second part of section 699 and by section 703 of
the Code of Civil Procedure; the refusal of the commissioners before
whom the plaintiff unnecessarily appeared can not affect nor reduce
the unquestionable right of ownership of the latter, inasmuch as there
is no law nor principle of justice authorizing the successors of the late
Jimenea to enrich themselves at the cost and to the prejudice of Felix
de los Santos.
For the reasons above set forth, by which the errors assigned to the
judgment appealed from have been refuted, and considering that the
same is in accordance with the law and the merits of the case, it is our
opinion that it should be affirmed and we do hereby affirm it with the
costs against the appellant. So ordered.

A simple loan may be gratuitous, or made under a stipulation

to pay interest.

ART. 1741. The bailee acquires retains the ownership of the

thing loaned. The bailee acquires the use thereof, but not its
fruits; if any compensation is involved, to be paid by the
person requiring the use, the agreement ceases to be a
commodatum.

ART. 1742. The obligations and rights which arise from the
commodatum pass to the heirs of both contracting parties,
unless the loan has been in consideration for the person of
the bailee, in which case his heirs shall not have the right to
continue using the thing loaned.

The carabaos delivered to be used not being returned by the defendant

upon demand, there is no doubt that she is under obligation to
indemnify the owner thereof by paying him their value.

Article 1101 of said code reads:

Those who in fulfilling their obligations are guilty of fraud,

negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner
whatsoever act in contravention of the stipulations of the
same, shall be subjected to indemnify for the losses and
damages caused thereby.

The obligation of the bailee or of his successors to return either the

thing loaned or its value, is sustained by the supreme tribunal of Sapin.
In its decision of March 21, 1895, it sets out with precision the legal
doctrine touching commodatum as follows: