March, Andrew - Rethinking Religious Reasons in Public Justification

Rethinking Religious Reasons in Public Justification
Author(s): ANDREW F. MARCH

Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 107, No. 3 (August 2013), pp. 523-539
Published by: American Political Science Association
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American Political Science Review Vol. 107, No. 3 August 2013
doi:10.1017/S0003055413000269 © American Political Science Association 2013

ANDREW F. MARCH Yale University
the debate not by asking whether something called " religious reasons " ought to be invoked in
r'his the the articlethejustification
justification debate intervenes
of coercive lawsf butnotbybycreating
of askinga typology
coerciveofin(a)thedifferent
whetherkinds
debateandlawsf
formsbutof on something the by place creating called of religious a typology " religious arguments of reasons (a) different in " public ought kinds reason. to be and invoked I forms advance of in
religious arguments and, more importantly ; (b) different areas of political and social life which coercive
laws regulate or about which human political communities deliberate. Religious arguments are of many
different kinds f are offered to others in a variety of ways, and the spheres of life about which communities
deliberate pose distinct moral questions. Turning back to the public reason debate , I argue then that
political liberals ought to be concerned primarily about the invocation of a certain subset of religious
reasons in a certain subset of areas of human activity , but also that inclusivist arguments on behalf of
religious contributions to public deliberation fail to justify the use of religious arguments in all areas of
public deliberation.
INTRODUCTION: THE INCLUSIVIST to public reason as an ideal of citizenship in conditions

CHALLENGE TO LIBERAL PUBLIC REASON of pluralism and also to progressive and cosmopolitan
ideals of social justice. Forming Consciences for Faithful
Citizenship draws on the tradition of Catholic social
Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a com- doctrine to argue on grounds of scripture, tradition,
Before prehensiveprehensive
Conference"teaching
the lastdocument
"teachingonofthetwopolitical
Catholic presidential document Bishops elections, on issued the political the a com- U.S. authority, and reason for bans on abortion, euthanasia,
responsibility of Catholics." Forming Consciences for stem cell research, and same-sex marriage, but also
Faithful Citizenship : A Call to Political Responsibility against torture, capital punishment, cruel immigration
from the Catholic Bishops of the United States (United policies, union busting, and cuts to social services. Can
States Conference of Catholic Bishops 2011; hereafter a public-reason left liberal criticize some of these re-
USCCB) reads as a paradigmatic example of a religious ligious arguments as inappropriate or uncivil uses of
contribution to public deliberation that takes square revelation or authority in public while at the same
aim at some of the assumptions most commonly associ- time welcoming other equally religious interventions as
ated with the doctrine of political liberalism. The docu- both respectful and justice promoting? Or is accepting
ment begins with an enunciation of "the Church's right, public religious argumentation on all political issues,
obligation, and opportunities to participate in society from sexual equality to health care, simply the price of
without being forced to abandon or ignore its central living in a pluralist and democratic society?
moral convictions" and avers that "our nation's tra-
In recent years, a number of prominent political and
dition of pluralism is enhanced, not threatened, when legal theorists have challenged the common political
religious groups and people of faith bring their con- liberal view that religious arguments are prima facie
victions and concerns into public life" (USCCB 2011, inadmissible in public deliberation over coercive laws.
4). However, in addition to directly challenging These one thinkers have tried to show that many of the
strand of liberal theory, the politics of this document arguments offered by liberal theorists in favor of a
raises a more interesting moral quandary for political principle of religious self-restraint in reason-giving fail
theorists and citizens who are broadly attracted both to justify that principle, and that many positive argu-
ments can be given in favor of welcoming religious con-
Andrew F. March is Associate Professor, Department of Political tributions in public deliberation. The thinkers in con-
Science, Yale University (andrew.march@yale.edu). sideration here are neither (theocratic) perfectionists
I am grateful to Steven P. Forde and the anonymous reviewers
of the American Political Science Review for their constructive criL nor radical skeptics of liberal legitimacy. Rather, they
icisms and suggestions for improvement. Previous versions of this defend one version or other of "inclusivism," which
article were presented at the Yale European Studies Council's con- holds that a "citizen is morally permitted to support
ference on "Pluralism, Conflict and Co-Existence: Religion, Politics (or oppose) a coercive law even if she enjoys [only] a
and Society in Western Europe from the Confessional Age to the religious rationale for that law" (Eberle 2002, 10).
Present," the University of Wisconsin's Political Theory Workshop,
the University of Troms0's conference on "Secularism, Tolerance and
Jeremy Waldron, for example, offers the following al-
Religious Minorities," and the Cornell Government Department's ternative to Rawls's famous proviso:1 "So long as there
"PSAC" speaker series. I benefitted from the comments and criti- is due recognition of the multi-faith and secular aspects
cisms of Richard Avramenko, Christopher Eberle, Jonas Jakobsen, of our society and due recognition of the constitutional
Catriona McKinnon, Alexander Moon, Anna Marie Smith, and Se-
structure that responds to that, there is no particular
Hyoung Yi on these occasions. Simone Chambers, Bryan Garsten,
Benjamin Hertzberg, Bonnie Honig, Murad Idris, Hélène Lande-
more, Karuna Mantena, Paulina Ochoa, and Kevin Vallier all gave
invaluable feedback and suggestions for improvement on revised 1 On Rawls's later view, public reason "allows us to introduce into
drafts of the article. Naz Modirzadeh helped with a particularly, and political discussion at any time our comprehensive doctrine, religious
characteristically, incisive close reading, without which an adequate or nonreligious, provided that, in due course, we give properly public
revision would not have been possible. Finally, I am grateful to Devin reasons to support the principles and policies our comprehensive
Gouré for crucial research and editorial assistance at multiple stages. doctrine is said to support" (Rawls 1997, 776).
523
Rethinking Religious Reasons in Public Justification August 2013
reason for church people to refrain from thatparticipation

even public-reason left liberals are likely to ap-
preciate
in public life on the basis of their values, (for example,
provided this the role of religious citizens
in opposing
is accompanied by a willingness 'to grant slavery (Zerilli 2012), torture (Waldron
all citizens
2012), orthe
of every worldview and moral conviction cuts to social services (Wolterstorff 1997b)),
legiti-
by warning
macy of their own faith-based participation inabout
Amer-the dangers of excluding religious
energies (Waldron
ican public life' [quoting David Gushee]" from politics (Coles 2005; Connolly 1999;
Waldron
2012, 849). Waldron and Eberle are joined by 2006; Walzer 1999), and thus concluding that
Nicholas
Wolterstorff (1997a; 1997b), Jeffrey Stout
religious (2004),
arguments are prima facie acceptable or even
Michael McConnell (1999; 2007), Michael Perry
desirable (1987;
in political argument.
1996; 2001; 2003), Paul Weithman (2002) Steven
I am moved by many of the examples given by schol-
Shiffrin (1999), Philip Quinn (1995), ars such asBohman
James Waldron, Perry, Eberle, Wolterstorff, and
(2003), Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier Zerilli,(Gaus
and agreeand that religious arguments or appeals
Vallier 2009; Vallier 2012), Simone Chambers
in the public(2010),
sphere are often nontheocratic, respect-
and many others in challenging the view ful, and
thatjustice promoting. However, I think that the
respect
between fellow citizens in conditions ofquestion
moralof religious
and epis-arguments in public justification
temic diversity requires withholding remains
arguments more complicated
from and interesting than the
emerging consensus that religious arguments should
religious and other comprehensive doctrines.
not be
Inclusivists devote most of their energies to excluded
demon- from public life. I also believe it is
strating the defects of exclusivism in possible
its own to improve
terms. upon the most common hybrid or
Common criticisms are that public reasonqualified is incom-
positions that the morality of using religion
plete (Frohock 1997, 1999; Horton 2003; in political
Reidyargument
2000; in depends on the political roles or
response: Schwartzman 2004; Williams 2000),
offices that
citizens may theoccupy, the different arenas or sites
of political (Campos
liberal terms of public reason are arbitrary argument, or the various moral-affective
1994; Coles 2005; Fish 1997; McConnell 1999; Quinn
dispositions citizens cultivate towards reasoning and
1995), and thus that demands of self-restraint
disagreeing with in othera citizens.
society with many religious citizens are The both
alternative
unfairapproach advanced in this essay is
to begin life.
to believers and unduly diminish political by breaking
(For down "religious arguments" and
comprehensive lists of objections to "political
liberal issues"
ideals into
ofcomponent parts. Whether we
public reason see Quong (2011, 259-60) and Vallier
accept deliberative, convergence, or agonistic concep-
and D'Agostino (2012).) Given thesetions charges, inclu-
of democratic engagement, the morality of the
inclusion of a religious
sivists usually argue (directly or by implication) for a argument in public delibera-
different understanding of democracy, tionaover
less a political
deliber- decision differs, often radically,
ative, consensus-seeking one and a more depending on the specific properties of each, namely
competitive
or agonistic one (Bader 2008; Coles the
2005; Connolly
form and content of the religious argument and the
1999; Dyzenhaus 1996; Honig 1993, 2009; subject matter 1999;
Mouffe of the political decision. This essay is
Zerilli 2012). an effort to think more systematically, analytically, and
The problem of religious reasons in public justifica- schematically about different kinds of religious argu-
tion is one of the most exhaustively treated questions ments and different kinds of political problems, and to
in recent political philosophy, and the dispute between demonstrate how this gives us a subtler perspective on
exclusivist views and inclusivist ones is well known the problem of religious reasons in political argument
(Clanton 2009a; Macedo 1999; Rosenblum 2000;
than the main inclusivist alternatives to (or interpreta-
Weithman 1997). Nonetheless, I argue here that tions the of) liberal public reason.
debate has been hampered by a tendency for advocates The typologies of religious reasons and political is-
of both exclusivist and inclusivist views to treat the sues that I propose below are not ends in themselves,
two central concepts at stake- "religious arguments" but help us focus attention on the core questions that
and "political issues"- in unitary terms. The standard should motivate inquiries into the morality and politics
public reason argument proceeds from a characteriza- of public argument. Rather than reducing the morality
tion of the moral requirements of democratic deliber- of political argument to one master value (e.g., respect
ation (respect, recognition of moral pluralism, a com- or consensus), we can acknowledge many factors as
mitment to democratic legitimacy) to the conclusion bearing on our judgment of contributions to public
that arguments derived solely from a particular reli- debate. On my view, the most important considera-
tions at stake in formulating judgments about political
gious doctrine are prima facie uncivil and inappropriate
(Ackerman 1994; Audi 2000; Benhabib 1994; arguments are (1) the moral attitude towards others
Cohen 1989; Greenawalt 1988, 1995; Gutmann and expressed in our public speech, (2) the democratic le-
Thompson 1990, 1996; Habermas 2006; Larmore 1990, gitimacy of public decisions, (3) the justice of public
1999; Macedo 1997; Moon 1993; Nussbaum 2011; Rawls
1996; Rorty 1994; Solum 19932). Inclusivist critiques
will often proceed by presenting a religious argument to religious concerns in the broader public sphere than public rea-
son liberalism. However, on my reading, the shared concerns with
reciprocity, reason giving, and the ideal of consensus mean that
2 I cannot do justice to all of the important differences betweendiscourse-theoretic approaches to religion and public reason have
more in common with political liberalism than with any of the
these various positions. Discourse theorists like Habermas and Ben-
habib in particular have claimed that their view is more hospitable
strongly inclusivist positions.
524
American Political Science Review Vol. 107, No. 3
In the
decisions, (4) social solidarity,3 two
and (5)sections followin
the ability of a
democratic society to respondtwo typologies andproblems.
to collective discuss wh
religious
Importantly, I would suggest arguments
that these in about
concerns public ju
the morality and politics the existing argument
of political models. I argue
can beth
helps us to theorists,
shared by a wide range of democratic clarify both
and exact
not
itive examples
only political liberals or deliberative of religious co
democrats.
Rather than focusing on argument
the narrow are question
persuasive of and
whether an argument issued plausible grounds
in public has a for criticizi
"religious"
ventions
or "comprehensive" character, as violating certain
is immediately accessi-no
fellow citizens. These
ble to or shareable with others, or proceeds from and two sec
builds on an existing moral more detailed discussion
consensus, of a fe
we can explore
how religious arguments can religious argument
take different in which
forms that I
why a democratic
affect the above five considerations in quite citizen
differentcan
ways in that they involve certain
greater modes of using
or lesser religio
degrees of
areasauthority,
appeals to revelatory or clerical of political decision
strictly un- ma
and for
derstood. Similarly, the stakes marriage)
the abovewhile
goodsnot obje
dif-
fer with different kinds of social justice).
political My
issues. Toconclusions
anticipate
much of what I will argue with inclusivist
below, what oftenand agonistic
matters is ap
alternative
whether so-called "religious way of
arguments" arethinking
advocat-a
in generally
ing (a) for interests that are public life
andthat is more pr
appropriately
recognized as interests in inclusivist consensus
a political that "ther
community, (b)
of agents or entities thatfor
are[religious]
generally people to refra
recognized as
public life
legitimate objects of politically on the basis
enforced moralofcon-
their
cern, (c) in ways that do not require unintelligible or
unreasonable self-sacrifice of fellow
INCLUSIVISM citizens. Focusing
TRIUMPHANT?
on these variables often gives us a clearer
DISASSEMBLING view of why
"RELIGIOUS
some religious argumentsARGUMENTS"
do violate norms of respect,
AND "POLITICAL
civility, and fairness, while others
ISSUES" do not.
AS CONCEPTS
Obviously, no one regards all religious arguments
and all political decisionsIt as identical,
is acknowledged and
by almost most
everyone thatthe-
there ar
orists have qualified in some way
many ways their
of using arguments
religion in public argument.for
Not al
the inclusion or exclusionreligious
of religious
arguments take reasons.
the same formI do not
or are deliv
anticipate that merely claiming
ered in thethat there
same way. In fact,are different
demonstrating the variet
kinds of religious arguments, different
of religious argumentationmodes of
in public is giving
a crucial compo-
them, and different subjectnent of matters
some inclusivist of political
arguments againstdeci-
a narrowl
sions will be regarded as construed
controversial duty of civility, orincluding
interesting. those advance
However, I will try to show that there
by theorists of liberalis a tendency
public reason (e.g., Solum to1993
Vallier 2011).
treat religious arguments and political life in a unitary
manner and that moving For theexample,debate in largely
in an article devoted a pluralizing
to. a dis-
cussion of the 2007 "Evangelical
direction can advance it substantially. Thus, Declaration
inagainst
the fol-
lowing section I briefly discuss the
Torture," Jeremy approaches
Waldron writes that of two of
the most prominent inclusivists (Jeremy Waldron and
Christopher Eberle) in order to interventions
most religious establish on abortion that
are not of thethere is
indeed a common failure to systematically
kind [of saying that abortion should be made disassemble
illegal once
"religious arguments" andagain "political issues"
because the Pope has denounced into
it]. They say abor- more
basic concepts and that this tion should be prohibited because
detracts from it is wrong. the
They drawpersua-
on the teachings of the church to understand and ex-
siveness of the inclusivist position.
plain its wrongness, but they draw on that as theoretical
authority; i.e., as a heritage of deep thinking about the
matter than can inform their own thinking and their own
3 I do not explore the idea of solidarity in depth in this article, except
conclusions
to note here that both including and excludingabout

itly theocratic religious arguments
drawing on theoreti
in public can be said to adversely affect
[I] can feelings
draw on of
thesolidarity
arguments amongst
I find in
citizens. The ideal of public reasonsupplement,
is partially enrich,
motivated by a concern
and deepen my own
about the impact on social solidarity when citizens feel no obligation
tice, human dignity and the issues surr
to justify laws to fellow citizens affected by them. However, insofar as
without committing myself to the view t
religious citizens feel alienated from the public sphere or inhibited
from sharing views derived fromauthored the
religious encyclical has
traditions, the
this canright to r
also
be said to inhibit bonds of civic (Waldron 2012,
solidarity. 853-4). a concern for
Whether
solidarity as one political good amongst many calls for more or less
religious argumentation in public,In however, depends
this passage on a makes
Waldron more nu-a num
anced contextual analysis of the kind of religious reasons in question
tions: between looking to religion
and the subject matter of political argument about which they are
for p
ity and
given. A concern for solidarity does notlooking to unambiguously
militate it for theoretical aut
for
or against either view. theocratic and democratic religious i
525
Despite the positive

politics, and between looking to religious traditions for (if incomplete) example pro-
help or inspiration and looking to them vided for decisive
by Waldron, some of the most influential contrib-
answers. As Waldron argued in an important
utors to thisearlier
debate fail to make appropriate distinc-
article, traditional religious metaphysicaltions between different kinds of religious argument.
or philosoph-
ical statements are often not invoked as Forauthority
some inclusivists,
but the distinction is between vari-
as "rich sources of intimation for the ous development
moral-affective of
dispositions with which any kind of
our theories of man and society, justice and economy,
"religious argument" is presented as part of an overall
equality, freedom, and dignity" (Waldron process1993, 847).
of reason-giving or conscientious engagement.
He observes further that Just as Rawls qualifies the acceptability on arguing
from religious reasons by requiring that nonreligious,
public reasons be given in due course, inclusivists of-
many of the religious interventions that people are con-
cerned about are not scripturally based at all, or at least ten argue that the primary requirement for religious
not directly. . . . The argument against abortion, such as itcitizens is to cultivate a certain attitude of goodwill for
is, is mainly a natural law argument based on the apparentcitizens of other moral persuasions (George 1997a), to
continuity of fetal development and it is perfectly intelli-make some conscientious attempt to search for shared
gible to a secular moral sensibility. The religious aspect isreasons (Eberle 2002) or to be willing to subject one's
just the disciplined insistence on taking the continuity of own religious arguments to critical scrutiny and pos-
human life (both in and outside the womb) seriously in sible defeat (Clanton 2009b). For Christopher Eberle,
light of what biblical faith tells us about the preciousness for example, what determines the moral acceptability
of human life generally (Waldron 2012, 855).
of presenting religious arguments in public is primarily
whether the citizen has first gone through a process of
This passage adds a further distinction pertainingrationally justifying the law in her own mind, searching
to the form and content of the religious argument.for secular or other reasons for the law and trying to
Waldron distinguishes here between arguments thatpersuade other citizens that the law is right, all things
are "scripturally based" and arguments from "natural considered. If she has engaged conscientiously in this
law." Even this has to be further narrowed (as I will do way and still failed to persuade enough of her fellow
below) to distinguish between different ways of basing citizens, Eberle believes that she is not under an obli-
religious arguments on scripture. Citizens can use a lit- gation to refrain from further campaigning for the law
eral reading of a scriptural passage directly as a premiseon a purely "religious" basis.
in an argument. This very narrow "divine command" Eberle thus distinguishes between a citizen who ar-
form of drawing on religion needs to be distinguished gues for a religiously supported law without consci-
from positions in applied ethics which refer to and are entiously engaging with others and one who does so
based on scriptural messages but require multiple steps after going through such a process. He gives us two
of human deductive, analogical, and interpretive rea-citizens- the real-life Bill McCartney, University of
soning to get to the final position. Colorado football coach and founder of the Promise
My position builds on Waldron's, as I think that more Keepers who campaigned against equal rights for ho-
can be derived from these distinctions between various mosexuals in Colorado by referring to Leviticus and
modes of forming, articulating, and offering religious calling homosexuality an "abomination of Almighty
reasons. The real lacuna in Waldron's analysis, how-God," and an imaginary "Elijah" who endorses a rad-
ever, is in not considering whether different kinds of ical redistribution of wealth by using arguments from
political problems give us a different understanding of Liberation Theology, but only after exhausting the pos-
the moral stakes in arguing from religious traditions. sibilities of conscientious engagement on secular terms.
Waldron invokes religious views on policy areas- tor-Eberle supposes that most public reason liberals will
ture and social justice- that largely appeal to secularcondemn McCartney on the grounds that he failed to
liberals. But does the positive influence of religious ad- exercise self-restraint and was willing to impose his
vocacy in these specific areas justify the conclusion thatreligious views on others. He wants the example of Eli-
"so long as there is due recognition of the multifaith andjah to demonstrate to public reason liberals (who are
secular aspects of our society and due recognition of thepresumably less alienated by Elijah's politics than by
constitutional structure that responds to that, there is McCartney's) that it is not the failure of self-restraint
no particular reason for church people to refrain from per se on McCartney's part that constitutes disrespect.
participation in public life on the basis of their values" He offers three possible alternatives to seeing the
(Waldron 2012, 849, emphasis added)? Just as there failure of religious self-restráint as what we might ob-
is a world of difference between a religious argument ject to in McCartney's activism: (1) that it was the
taking the form of "a crude prescription from God,unjustness of the law that merits our anger, not Mc-
backed up with a threat of hellfire, derived from gen- Cartney's lack of religious restraint in arguing for it;
eral or particular revelation" (Waldron 2002, 20) and(2) that we should not confuse our distaste for the
one taking the form of an appeal to the absolute value types of people who refuse to exercise restraint with
of the human person, so are there crucial differencesdistaste for the refusal to exercise restraint; (3) that
between torture, welfare rights, abortion, racial justice,McCartney combined a failure to exercise restraint
parental leave, homosexuality, birth control, and thewith a failure to conscientiously engage. Eberle thinks
HPV vaccine as subject matters and areas of collectivewe should endorse (3) and then notes that refus-
political action. ing to conscientiously engage and self-restraint after
526
WHAT IS A "RELIGIOUS
engagement are two separate things. REASONIt "?is possible
honor conscientious engagement while not applying
What isshould
duty of self-restraint. We relevant, on my
thusview, isnot
not so much the overall a
confuse
moral-affective disposition
use of religious argument with the kind of advocac with which religious rea-
represented by McCartneysons are offered,
(Eberle but rather
2002, the form that religious
109-115).
There are a number of arguments
problems take, thewith
claims to Eberle's
authority embedded
argu in
how they are structured.
ment. First, when Eberle distinguishes between liberI would suggest as a working
typology four
anger at McCartney's refusal toforms that religious
give secularcontributions
or often
publ
take:
reasons and anger at the unjustness of the law, he over
looks a possible connection between the two. Many
persons oppose sexually 1. A command extracted from a
discriminatory revealedas
laws text,unju
reli-
gious authority, or
partially because one requires a controversial religiou personal mystical or revelatory
doctrine to justify them experience.
since there are no legitima
2. A theological
public interests or other individual or moral doctrine that is not clearly at-
rights threaten
by sexual equality. Similarly, tributed when
to a specific claim from a revealed
Eberle text, but
distinguishes
is derived from certain theistic claims and revealed
between distaste for the "types of people who refuse to
exercise restraint" with our distaste for the refusal to knowledge.
exercise restraint, he does not consider whether the re- 3. An appeal or reference to traditional religious com-
fusal to exercise restraint is why some have distaste for mitments or practices.
certain right-wing evangelicals. He assumes that refusal 4. An appeal to practical wisdom or moral insight
to exercise self-restraint is never a reason for distaste. found in traditions of religious thought.
However, my larger concern with Eberle's argument
is his failure to distinguish between (1) different ways This is not necessarily a final or conclusive typology
of deriving religious arguments and presenting them and, importantly, I am not offering these categories
in public debate and (2) different areas of political as exclusive vis-à-vis one another. Religious contribu-
action. The greatest sources of distaste for McCartney- tions to political discourse need not belong to one and
style political interventions are precisely (1) the form only one of the above categories, and religious citizens
of religious justifications given (citing Leviticus, giv- need not be the kinds of persons who think in one and
ing "abomination to Almighty God" as a justificatory only one of the above modes. My purpose here is to
reason) and (2) the area of activity being legislated on make religious argument seem both less strange and
(human sexual and intimate relationships). Eberle's ex- less monolithic, not more so.
ample of Elijah the Christian socialist may indeed show But the distinctions do some work for us. For ex-
that liberals ought not to view religious activists as their ample, the "Evangelical Declaration Against Torture:
political enemies merely because they are religious and Protecting Human Rights in an Age of Terror" (Na-
often give religious reasons in public, but this example tional Association of Evangelicals 2007), which Wal-
does not show that in the case of McCartney a lack of dron draws from heavily in "Two- Way Translation"
religious self-restraint Was not in fact the problem. In (2012) contains all four of these forms of religious ar-
order to even begin to do this, Eberle would have to gument, in addition to references to secular legal and
give an example that kept everything the same except moral traditions.
for the failure/willingness to conscientiously engage.
That is, we need an example of a religious opponent 1. The Declaration first states that "we are Christians
of equal rights for homosexuals who previously consci- who are commanded by our Lord Jesus Christ to
entiously engaged on a wider or secular basis. But by love God with all of our being and to love our
changing two crucial variables (Elijah's precise form neighbors as ourselves (Mt. 22:36-40)."
of religious argumentation (which we are actually not 2. The text then invokes Genesis 1:26-27 ("And God
given) and the political subject matter), we are left with said, 'Let us make human beings in our image, in our
the possibility that these are the crucial variables, and likeness.'") to declare that "we ground our commit-
not a prior history of conscientious engagement. ment to human rights, including the rights of sus-
Rather than assuming that the crucial factors in the pected terrorists, in the core Christian belief that
above cases are that liberals support bans on torture human life is sacred." This basic view, which "is a
and the expansion of social justice provisions and op- moral norm that both summarizes and transcends all
pose bans on same-sex marriage (Fish 1999), or the other particular norms in Christian moral thought,"
spirit and disposition with which religious arguments is linked to torture not through clear Scriptural com-
are given, I think it is worth examining whether a finer mand but through an analogy with the torture of
understanding of the morality of religious arguments Jesus (after the incarnation "the cries of the tor-
in political debate can be achieved by first trying to tured are in a very real sense the cries of the Spirit")
generalize about the different kinds of "religious rea- and through the claim that "human life is expressed
sons" and the various broad areas about which political through physicality, and the well-being of persons is
communities deliberate. What would it mean to treat tied to their physical existence."
the concepts of "religious reasons" and "political prob-3. Later, the Declaration argues that "commitment to
lems" not as simple concepts but as ones that bundle human rights can be seen as a systematic way to
together a number of quite distinct ones? look out for the interests of others, and thus as an
527
expression of Christian love. This is now theof

as a way over-
inviting fellow citizens into an imaginative
whelming consensus of the Christian community."
space through the dramatic use of religious imagery.4
4. Finally, the Declaration states that "when The torture
pluralistic, isfragmented nature of large societies
employed by a state, that act communicates to us
thus forces the to interpret certain religious interven-
world and to one's own people that human lives
tions in are from a rhetorical standpoint. Not all
politics
not sacred, that they are not reflectionscontributions
of the Cre- to public life are meant as general justifi-
ator, that they are expendable, exploitable,
cations and dis- laws, strictly construed. What kind
of coercive
of be
posable, and that their intrinsic value can political message is being issued when evangelicals
overrid-
den by utilitarian arguments that trump say "when
that torture is employed by a state, that act
value";
"a commitment to life's sacredness and to human communicates to the world that human lives are not
rights is a seamless garment. It cannot be torn any-
sacred . . . [which] no one who confesses Christ as Lord
where without compromising its integrity every-can accept"? Is it necessarily "because no one who
where"; and "human rights place a shield aroundconfesses Christ as Lord can accept torture it is forbid-
people, even when (especially when) our hearts den
cry for the US to practice it, and we think that most
out for vengeance." political issues can be resolved in this way"? Or can
we, without undue interpretative generosity, interpret
such an intervention as conveying any of the follow-
We can immediately see what happens to the debate ing messages: "Not in our name". . . "Don't count on
over "religious reasons in public justification." Thereour support as evangelicals" . . . "Many officials who
is no such debate, for there is no single such thing aspublicly
a identify as Christians are now doing this and
religious argument. Not only is "religious" too under- it falls on us to push back" . . . "We regard ourselves as
inclusive a category (which is why Rawls always spoke under this kind of authority and in issues where human
of "comprehensive" doctrines, a category that includes life is at stake cannot remain silent"? The Evangelical
Declaration against Torture obviously does not hide
both religious and secular doctrines), but it is too over-
inclusive a category as well. When a citizen quotesits the theistic and theological foundation, but nor does
Bible or a Papal encyclical to prove in an authorita- it preclude any doctrine of restraint, discrimination,
tive and determinate manner that homosexuality oror judgment in public reason giving. The authors do
divorce ought to be forbidden, she is simply not doing not only present the Declaration as one more area on
the same thing morally, politically, and discursivelywhich
as religious integralists like evangelicals must have
when she claims that human life is inherently valuable a Biblically rooted position, but also as an emergency
("sacred"), that Christian just war doctrine contains intervention: "As evangelicals, we are first obligated to
enduringly wise lessons for the conduct of war or thatbe faithful to Christ and his teaching. We are to be King-
human sinfulness cautions us against overconfidence domin people, disciples who think biblically about all
our own moral intentions. It is not only that for the things.
lat- In this particular situation , discipleship requires
a clear word from us to our nation and its leaders."
ter issues "in due course, we [can] give properly public
(Emphasis added.)
reasons to support the principles and policies our com-
prehensive doctrine is said to support" (Rawls 1997, But there is a familiar, more narrowly philosophical,
lesson here for a certain kind of inclusivist defender
776), it is that the first form of argument is an undemo-
cratic approach to knowledge, politics and authority, of religious argument in public. Does the successful
while the other, equally "comprehensive," reasonsdemonstration
are that religious arguments are quite of-
less so from the very outset. The moral and epistemic ten both respectful and beneficial to public discourse
humility of the citizen willing to subject her argumentsjustify any general conclusions about "religious" argu-
to evaluation and debate in public is measuredments less as such? If there are certain kinds of religious
by some inscrutable interior state of affect, or by her arguments that are morally acceptable in public de-
willingness to argue and engage with others, than bate
by precisely because they are translated relatively
the form and structure that her public arguments take. easily into other moral languages (Habermas 2006),
The most obvious lesson here is for liberals who feel this might merely show that they have more in com-
the pull of a strict form of exclusivism (Audi 2000; mon with certain secular moral views than with certain
Macedo 1997). What is different across these various other religious arguments. Furthermore, this simply
modes of religious argument or persuasion is the serves as- to isolate those religious arguments that are
sumption about what kinds of authority humans should genuinely authoritarian in the sense of implying the
be subject to in democratic societies. Not all theis- premise that clear statements from revelation (or cler-
tic contributions to public discourse are offered with ical authority) can decisively settle a political question
an implicit authoritarian or theocratic premise. When for all affected without a requirement of translation
Martin Luther King, Jr. invoked Augustine to argue into or convergence with other doctrines. Showing that
that "an unjust law is no law at all" (King 1991, 293), there are important counterexamples that disprove the
claim "Religious arguments are never (or even usually)
he was not invoking him as the final word, as a literally
authoritative figure to be obeyed by Americans. He was
inviting others, and not only Christians, to ask whether
4 From the Evangelical Declaration: "However remote to us may be
they are really committed to a hollow form of legalthe victim.of torture, abuse, or mistreatment, Christians must seek to
positivism without regard for justice or morality, develop
just the moral imagination to enter into the suffering of all who
as the Evangelical Declaration on Torture is presented
are victimized."
528
be a Catholic to appreciate
permissible in public justification" and learn
does notfrom success
Catholic
fully defend the counterclaim
writings on dignity"Religious argument
(Rosen 2012) or believe in a divine
are always unproblematic Creator
in topublic
be swayed by the claim that human life as
justification."
This is, in fact, a necessary implication
such is sacred, or at least ought to beof some
treated as if it isin-
sacred (Dworkin
clusivist views. What, after all, 1993,
is the 71-84). case for givin
religious arguments wider latitude
But the implication of this isin debates
that the religious author- ov
beginning of life issues ity(abortion),
or origin of a particularend of islife
argument issu
unnecessary,
(euthanasia, capital punishment,
not- to be sure- to thewar)believingand
citizenlivability
herself but to
of life issues (torture)?theFirst, it of
moral validity is theargued
claim in questionthat the
for public
are unresolved questionspurposes.
to which While the believer may very well believe
freestanding publ
that it is God, anddeterminate
reason does not give a complete, only God, who has madeanswe human
At this point, there are lifetwo
valuable options.
and sacred (if not One is what
always inviolable) from I
have been calling the (agonistic)
conception, or that democratic
the Passion of the Christresponsteaches
which holds that since such issues
us that torture must be
is an abomination, she maylegislate
also believe
on but will never be resolved by
that one need not some
believe in God orshared publ
Christ to appreciate
reason, we have no choicethese
but claims
tofor practical purposes,
resolve them and thus that the
through
open democratic competition
religious premise isand
not whatpersuasion,
is doing the public, polit- in
spirit open to rupture and novelty.
ical work. The
Without denigrating other of
the importance is
theth
"wide" or "inclusivist" response,
divine origin ofwhich calls
her knowledge for her for the
, what the ex-
cases of
tension of public deliberation
abortion, torture
but (of by
noncitizens),
including
war, and euthanasia
deep
teach
religious or philosophical us is that religious arguments are most potent
views.
and enduring
The latter is the position we are precisely in those cases where here.
considering revealed I
want to briefly raise tworeligion is not a source ofThe
possibilities. exclusive moral knowledge
first is that
the wide public reason orand not invoked as authority.
inclusivist positionWhere oneis does need to
actually
none other than the agonistic democratic
accept particular revelatory claims, orposition.
the authority of F
certain
if a thinner form of public clerical figures,
reason does as arguably
not lead with opposition
to deter to
minate outcomes on deeplymarriage equality (pace issues
contested Girgis, Anderson, and George
of political
morality, how can thicker2012), the religious
forms of arguments
moralare far less compelling,
reasoning tha
bring in controversial epistemic commitments do so
troubling, and enduring.
I do not reason
The call to "complete" public intend to trivialize
throughreligious thought by
includin
reducing
more metaphysics, rhetoric, or all valuable and
affect mayacceptable
be religious argu-
justifiable
but only as a plea for democratic
ments to generic statements
persuasion
of universal morality
and ma or
joritarian outcomes (see, e.g., Garsten
particularly 2006).
effective rhetorical tools. But I do intend
But I don't think that this is what all inclusivists to suggest that there is a limited set of moral claims (as
opposed
mean, or want. Some suggest that certain religious ar- to isolated premises in arguments) that are
guments can be offered in good (civic) faith as both
part genuinely inaccessible to outsiders and entirely
of a process of conscientious mutual engagementdependent
with on their original theistic foundations.6 Many
other citizens deliberating over questions like abor-
religious arguments are put into the public sphere in a
tion, the welfare state, and killing through law or form
war.5 (not just a spirit) that does not require their orig-
But why! If the argument is not that the indetermi-
inal revealed or theistic premises in order to be publi-
nacy of public reason forces us to view (and celebrate)
cally intelligible. I also intend to suggest that there are
democracy as the struggle for coalitions and majori-
widely accepted (if contestable) limits on the kinds of
tarian outcomes, then it must be that inclusivists think
interests and the kinds of entities that are appropriate
that there may be something persuasive in one's to re-
advocate for in a pluralist, post-traditional society
ligious arguments to fellow citizens who are not co-takes the freedom and equality of its members
that
religionists. Presumably inclusivists do not meanseriously.
here I discuss this in more detail below.
wholesale conversion to the religion from which spe- What should be clear from the preceding is that
public reason liberals ought to be concerned not with
cific arguments are derived. They mean that difference
in religion is not an impediment to mutual learning,
"religious" arguments as such in public reason, but with
a particular kind of religious argument, namely argu-
to being moved in particular areas of policy by others'
comprehensive religious views. One does not need mentsto of the first category. Those are arguments that
tend to be justified by reference to a clear scriptural,
revealed, or clerical command. More importantly, they
5 I do not take a strong position in this article on the conflict be-
tween agonistic or deliberative conceptions of democracy. My goal
is to present an analysis that speaks to partisans of both. I merely
note that a number of important advocates of religious arguments 6 Pace Nietzsche in The Twilight of the Idols : "When we renounce
the Christian faith, we abandon all right to Christian morality. . . .
in political debate do see inclusi vism as compatible with justificatory
and deliberative aspirations. Gaus and Vallier have tried to elaborate
Christianity is a system, a complete outlook on the world, conceived
as a whole. If its leading concept, the belief in God, is wrenched
an alternative position that allows for the use of religious reasons,
provided that the law advocated for does not preclude a convergence
from it, the whole is destroyed; nothing vital remains in our grasp.... .
of distinct reasons. My position shares with theirs a focus Christian
on the morality is a command; its origin is transcendental. It is
moral content of the proposed political outcome, namely whether beyond all criticism, all right to criticism; it is true only on condition
the law or policy is reasonably demanded of all affected by it. that God is truth" (Nietzsche 1990, 80).
529
1. the manner
are arguments given in an authoritarian freedom of (re-
fully self-representing citizens to act
gardless of the overall good will of theandcitizen).
make choices
It based
is on their understanding of
not "Our tradition teaches us that life is sacred or that their own interests;
laws ought to be moral; we think this reflects some2. the interests of those who cannot fully represent
truth which all should be able to endorse." Rather, it is themselves within a social contract framework;
"Our revealed text has laid this down and we are not 3. the interests of those who cannot represent them-
concerned about what effect this has on others or what selves or advance claims within a social contract
they think about it." framework;
But while these distinctions are important, I believe4. the morality of collective action and public institu-
they are broadly recognized in the literature (particu- tions;
larly through the notion of translation), and they still do 5. the morality of a society's overall character or di-
not give us enough to understand what is at stake in the rection.
debate over religion and public reason. As I acknowl-
edged above, religious arguments are not likely to fitThe justification of these categories will require more
clearly into one and only one of my four categories. It work than my typology of religious arguments.
might also be suggested that in order to make religious We begin with full members of the political com-
arguments in support of policies that I also support munity in good standing- sane adults. All laws that
(more social justice, less torture) seem less problem-we enact restrict the choice set of self-representing
atic I engaged in excessive, and selective, interpretiveindividuals- from traffic regulations to taxation to pub-
charity. At some level, the religious may be willing tolic nudity ordinances. But for my first category I have
say that torture is forbidden and charity commandedin mind restrictions on citizens' choices as to what to
by a revealed scripture or religious authority that only do with their bodies and property, or with the narrow
the faithful will be able to fully appreciate. The reli-category traditionally referred to as the sphere of neg-
gious are happy in these cases if others agree for other ative freedom. Laws on assault, blasphemy, traffic, land
reasons, but isn't this also true in the case of opposition use, public decency, pornography, raw milk, abortion,
to sexual equality or abortion? In other words, when sodomy, rape, material support for terrorism, and so on,
there are clear examples of religious arguments that are all prevent me from (or punish me for) using my body
given in a nonauthoritarian, nonscripturalist manner,or property in particular ways. Obviously, merely to say
public reason liberals may have good reasons for distin- that a law restricts one in this way is not to pronounce
guishing between those arguments and arguments that on its justifiability. Our individual actions, of course,
merely cite the Bible. But do public reason liberals have often impinge on the rights and interests of others. But
any good way of distinguishing between a scripturalist all of these can coherently be described in ways that
argument that says that Catholics must oppose same-identify discrete individual actions of members of a
sex marriage and one that says Catholics must supportpolitical community as objects of legislation. The scope
universal health care? Some might say that they do not and significance of this category will only become clear
and that any liberal attempt to argue for the differ-in light of the subsequent ones, particularly category 4.
ence is yet further evidence of liberal bad faith and Political communities also have partial citizens. With
failure to give the aspiration to neutrality the my second category I primarily have in mind children,
(dis)honorable dispatch that it deserves (Zerilli 2012). although it is not hard to recall political imaginaries
That may be the right answer. However, I think we are in which women or racial minorities were treated as
not there yet. Just as we tried to unpack the conceptincapable of representing themselves. Political com-
of "religious arguments" into more basic parts, can wemunities do many things that directly and indirectly
do the same with the idea of a "political problem" thataffect the interests of children, although it is also not
does not beg substantive questions of justice? hard to recall political imaginaries that deny that the
state ought to provide for the education, health care,
or security rights of children. (Some of the political
agenda of the religious right in the United States fo-
WHAT IS A "POLITICAL PROBLEM"? cuses on a restoration of more robust parental rights
over children, including through a proposed Parental
While it may be argued that the primary salient feature Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Lane
of a law is that it is coercive and thus that the main 1998).) Political communities argue internally about
distinction is between those aspects of morality that what interests partial-cum-future citizens have, what
are legitimately enforced by the state and those that interests citizens have in those future citizens, and who
are not (Larmore 2008, 86; Quong 2011, 233-50; Rawls is entitled to enforce which interests.
1996, 12; Solum 1993, 738-9; Vallier and D'Agostino There may be subjects of political power that fall in
2012), this does not capture all the salient features of between these first two categories at times. There are
the different areas in which humans act collectively. It persons who are neither foreigners nor children yet
is even more challenging to offer a typology of political who are often spoken of in paternalistic terms. Debates
issues than to offer one of religious arguments, but theover punishment, prostitution, exploited workers, the
following is an attempt. We can see that religious and elderly, the mentally infirm, women in patriarchal reli-
other moral arguments and judgments are frequently gious communities, the poor, and resident noncitizens
given concerning the following: are often conducted in a way that does not quite reflect
530
a desire to enforce a singleIn controversial conception

religious moral systems, obligations to entities beof
the good or of virtue on yond allthepersons,
political community but yetnonhuman
often include involves
the assumption that certain and persons
non-natural entities.
must God, "thebe Church,"
spoken the honorfor
and defended by others. ofHere this or thatI prophet
merely or messiah want
figure, human to note
souls,
and bring attention to thisholy texts, sacredcategory
hybrid places, and buildings,of or even "the
persons
who are often the object of sacred"political
as such are often
debate
claimed to in be objects
this of moral
way.
Laws and policies that weconcern. oppose or religious
In rights-based defend on
moralities, thismoral
form
grounds (including religious of thought ones) are
is perhaps best often
included in this not thirdabout
cate-
the rights of sane adults capable gory. Islamic of representing
law, for example, speaks of "the rights them- of
selves, children, or thoseGod" outside
and the rights theof thesocial contract,
Prophet Muhammad, enti-
but about certain classes ties of whopersons
make claims on but who cannot would
directly representnor-
mally belong in the first category themselves withinbut the social contract.
for someWhile I would
contin-
gent politically, economically, also place ortheseculturally
entities in my third disenabling
category, it is clear
condition. why religious arguments in support of protections for
Political communities are faced with deciding to what the most basic and uncontroversial interests of certain
extent they ought to protect the most basic interests ofkinds of noncitizens (e.g., persons) are a very differ-
entities and agents with no direct representation within ent political act from similarly structured arguments
a polity. These issues are sometimes referred to as theon behalf of other kinds of noncitizens (e.g., deceased
"who is the subject of rights?" question (e.g., Benhabibprophets).
2004, 2011). If all agree, ex hypothesi , that all fellow My fourth category of collective political action can
citizens are owed obligations of justice and we then be difficult to distinguish decisively from the previous
seek to justify what those obligations are, we are left - ones, as all coercive laws have a public, collective char-
by the admission of some social contract theorists- with acter. But there are certain acts, policies, or institutions
no decisive answers about what we owe to others out- that are predominantly, if not always irreducibly, col-
side of the immediate social contract (Cohen and Sabel lective. A political community has nuclear weapons or
2006; Nagel 2005). This is not to claim that nontheist a state religion, to give two relatively clear examples,
moral thinkers have no resources derived from con- only as a collective act. All resolutions of collective
tractarian or constructivist methods for thinking about action problems- from traffic laws to the exploitation
what obligations we have toward these various noncit- of natural resources- are also a form of political action
izens (Forst 2012; Nussbaum 2006; Pogge 2002). (Many larger than the sum of the individual acts restricted or
constructivists are universalists first and struggle to regulated.
jus- This category also includes a community's
tify special and overriding obligations to citizens.)basic Butpolitical institutions, including its electoral laws
there is an undeniable legal, rhetorical, and emotional and system of distributing wealth.
deficit when it comes to persuading fellow citizens that What a society does with its public money thus falls
outsiders are owed obligations of justice. Nonetheless, into this category. (Including enforcing all of the laws
political communities often make laws and policies that discussed above as restricting the freedom of particular,
affect in the most immediately physical and vital discrete way agents.) There is something in the collective
the interests of noncitizens who are not directly nature rep- of the welfare state that exceeds the mere coer-
resented within the polity in question. Importantly for cive element and the rights claims involved. A mandate
my analysis, there is often no real dispute about what to send your child to any school, to purchase health
interests persons have- we are talking about bare care, life, or subscribe to a protection agency at your own
physical health, bodily security, economic well being- expense is a somewhat different public act than financ-
only about whose interests we have obligations to affect ing these projects out of public funds. Moreover, many
in certain ways. religious and secular arguments stress this collective
In this third category of political problems (con- dimension. Political argument is often about more than
cerning those who cannot represent themselves orthe ad-claim that specific rights are involved or that certain
vance claims within a social contract framework) I
policies would be more optimal than others; it is often
place such issues as abortion, the rights of enemy com- about what we are willing to accept "in our name."7
batants, stem cells, the rights of nonhuman animals, With my fifth category I have in mind reflections on
global economic and ecological justice, and the rights the moral quality of a society's present historical con-
of future generations. On first glance these issues seem sciousness and practices of valuing and judging that see
radically different from one another and my catego- that quality as transcending any of its individual moral
rization seems at variance with common associations.
We often speak about abortion alongside homosexu-
7 Consider, again, a passage from the "Evangelical Declaration
ality as belonging to the concerns of religious citizens,
against Torture": "We live in a free society, a representative democ-
united by a common connection to human bodiesracy, andand while only a few may be direct perpetrators of human rights
sexual choices (George 1997b). However, from a violations
con- or even torture, we all share the responsibility because we
tractarian standpoint these issues all have something
are the citizens on whose behalf interrogators and military person-
more philosophically compelling in common, namelynel are working. Whether we commit an offense against humanity,
or simply sin by refusing to speak up for someone who is being
that they pertain to the domain of legislating onvictimized,
the as individuals and a society we are accountable for the
bare life, physical integrity, or minimal welfare of
indignities that are authorized and carried out by our nation." (See
noncitizens. also Beerbohm (2012).)
531
the categorization
acts or judgments. Consider religious interventions thatof different modes of religious ar-
gument,
take the form of prophetic witnessing. I thinkwit-
Prophetic we are in a position to hold up the
nessing is very often tied to the specificquestion
things of religious argument in public debate at a
a society
different
is doing- practicing slavery, tolerating angle. Recalling the most compelling polit-
homosexuality,
ical issues
permitting blasphemy or heresy, cultivating on which inclusivists have defended reli-
feminism
gious but
or gender equality, abandoning the poor- contributions-
the cri-slavery, abortion, global justice,
domestic
tique goes beyond the call to rectify this or that social justice, torture, punishment, nuclear
policy.
weapons,
The idea is that society itself is somehow war, and imperialism- we see not only that
lost, ungodly,
or fallen. Rectifying specific policies or acts
religious is only
argument takes many different forms besides
the paradigmatic
a first step, a precondition for an overall repentancescriptural command form, but also
or return to a different state of character that would that the kinds of religious arguments we are discussing
never have permitted these impieties in the first place are interventions into radically different areas of demo-
(Hertzberg 2011). cratic political action.
Declinist narratives about modernity often involve a
similar scope. Alasdair Maclntyre's critique of modern
morality goes beyond a concern with specific policies RELIGION AND PUBLIC REASON:
or practices; he is reflecting on the loss of a common RESTATING THE QUESTION
moral vocabulary about the good and our failure toWhat do we think is either threatened or enhanced
replace it with anything equally stable and valuable
by the use of "religious" arguments in public debate?
(Maclntyre 1981). Maclntyre's Thomism is representa-
As noted above, I regard the following as the most
tive of a wider school of (particularly Catholic) thought
important considerations: (1) the fundamental moral
that laments the theological turn in late medieval Eu-
attitude towards others expressed in our public speech,
rope towards a nominalist metaphysics and voluntarist
(2) the democratic legitimacy of public decisions, (3)
God (Elshtain 2008; Gregory 2012). We are now in-
the justice of public decisions, (4) social solidarity, and
capable of seeing ourselves as wholly rational and
(5) the ability of a democratic society to respond to
connected to the divine through our participation in
collective problems. Whether an argument issued in
unchanging reason.
public has a "religious" or "comprehensive" charac-
There are, of course, secular versions of sociohis-
ter is insufficient for evaluating its impact on these
torical criticism on this scale, Nietzsche's being the
important political goods. The various forms that re-
paradigmatic one. Hannah Arendt's concerns with the
ligious arguments take affect the above considerations
practice of judgment in modernity also begin with a
in quite different ways, and the stakes for the above
story of loss and an effort to diagnose certain conditions
considerations differ with different kinds of political
that afflict modern Western societies at large: "we are issues.
living in a topsy-turvy world, a world where we cannot
An ideal of public reason is obviously most chal-
find our way by abiding by the rules of what was once
lenged by religious arguments of my first form, those
common sense" (Arendt 1953, 383; also, e.g., Arendt
that appeal directly to scriptural or ecclesiastical au-
1961, 1992). Foucault's analyses of psychiatry, prisons,
thority (in the most strict sense of the term) in order
education, and other modern discourses and practices
to justify a law or a position within practical ethics.
of power are not declinist or nostalgic, but they do resist
reduction to discrete normative demands or claims. He
However, we can also note that even that form of ar-
gument plays a morally distinct role in different areas
is trying to reflect back to us the state we are in as such,
of collective political life. Invoking a literal reading of
with the insistence that there is little we can do about
the revealed scripture of one's own religion is a very
it merely through the mechanisms of sovereign legisla-different act vis-à-vis fellow citizens when it is done:
tive power. We now live in societies where human free-
(a) to restrict the personal freedoms of others to make
dom, agency, and self-fashioning are diverted and pre-
decisions about their bodies and property based on a
empted through the countless processes and discourses
paternalistic understanding of their interests, (b) to ex-
that produce modern humans as subjects. Less drastic
hort fellow citizens to protect the rights of other fellow
are reflections on contemporary practices of valuing.
In moralities for which some nonhuman entities have citizens, or (c) to persuade fellow citizens to protect the
relatively uncontroversial interests of noncitizens. I will
noninstrumental value (for secular moral thinkers, such
try to demonstrate this through a few select examples.
entities might include the environment and the nat-
ural world, art, or the state of scientific knowledge
(Dworkin 1993; Raz 2001a, 2001b)), the question is
RELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS ON SEXUALITY
not what we owe to each other but whether we are
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: A PRINCIPLED
the kinds of persons who live in the kinds of societies
DISTINCTION?
that value the kinds of things that have intrinsic value.
If my previous categories presumed the possibility of
To return to a question I asked above: Do (public rea
internal, connected criticism, this fifth category often
son) liberals have any good way of distinguishing be-
involves tragic judgments about what humans are capa-tween the public use of an argument from scripture or
authority that says that Christians must oppose same
ble of within their present social and political horizons.
I do not intend the previous sketch to be perfectlysex marriage and one that says Christians must support
conclusive or stable. However, even more than with universal health care? I noted that a tempting answer
532
is to say that they do not

pean
andhuman
thatrights
any jurisprudence
liberal onattempt
the issue
to argue for the difference isIfan
tossing). it isattempt to
ever coherent to cheat
speak of b
a
claiming false neutrality choices about how
for their ownto rules
live our of
livesengage
when th
ment. Thus, liberals who harm the fundamental
concede interests of others,
that Christians ought th
to be encouraged to promote social
the area where the justice through
use of paternalistic argu
restrict
religious arguments simply have human choice with
to live is the most objection
Christian
arguments about sexual morality.
However, while But is the fact
contemporary tha
liberalism i
liberals tend to agree with Catholics
discourage religious andon social
other justi
perfectionist
and disagree with them in onthe sphere of individual
sexuality negative freed
and marriage th
theypositions?
only variable in these two are unavoidably and unacceptably
According topateth
analysis I have developed in
the thisfrom
lessons article, we need
this sphere should
to be indal
argued
ask broader questions about the for in other
area areas of collective
of human activity pol
being legislated on in these
Same-sextwo areas.
marriage is an issue that overlaps
of my categories
Before we get to the question of political action
of same-sex and is h
marriage
consider the question of tolerance
pendent on how we for homosexual-
describe it. Regulating m
ity per se , understood as
not the decriminalization
something that a state needs to be of in hth
mosexual acts between consenting adults.
of. It is highly likely (A numbe
that a modern state w
of U.S. states still had criminal
keep track of sodomy
new citizens, laws befor
tax property, de
Lawrence v. Texas (2003), a decision
interests from
of children, which
and arbitrate civil thr
litiga
it is far
justices dissented.) Such anfrom issue
clear that the clearly
state needs to concern it-
belongs
my first category- bringing self with who the can formlaw to bear
civil partnerships with whom. on wh
humans do with their bodies On this view and property.
of "marriage," the question of This
same-sexis th
category where political liberalism
marriage is as much a negative is liberty
most questionconcerne
as that
about the authoritarian of and
protection paternalistic
for homosexual conductinfluence insofar as we o
religious and other comprehensive, have a presumptive right to perfectionist
form partnerships and le- arg
ments. Moreover, out of all forms
gal contracts and the state'sof religious
interference in our privateargu
ments, those of the firstdecisions kind- is what scripturalist,
requires special justification. authorita
On this
tive, divine command arguments- description, it is hard are to imagine
the amost nonauthoritarian,
author-
itarian and theocratic. Importantly, nondominating use of any kind of religious
I would submit reason to tha
secular agonistic approaches prevent same-sex to legaldemocracy
partnerships. can al
accept not only that laws On another
against interpretation, marriage is a quasi-
homosexuality ar
unjust but also that the public public institution,use of arguments
something we establish as a com- fro
scripture or authority is indeed
munity collectively, an like added
nuclear weapons harm or a nationalin th
case, without subscribing church generally
(and thus belongingto to my a fourth
liberal category theor
of
of public justification based on the
political decisions). search
Of course, the very for decisionshare
to
reasons.
characterize domestic partnerships in the first or the
second way freedom
It is not hard to justify this. Human negative is a political act. What kind, though? In
is the most obvious standard that wethis use towe
case, judge the that the attempt to charac-
can observe
extent to which some human beings hold terize the
marriagemost as a ob-
public institution is an attempt to
remove it from the realm
vious form of authority over others. Furthermore, the of debate about what kinds of
use of our own bodies for pleasure and self-expression
personal choices are permissible in their own right or
is the clearest case of a sphere of human howactivity
people should wherelive their own lives. For many (this
a direct justification to the person being coerced
author included),is that
re-is precisely what is objectionable
quired if we endorse any conception about of freedom
this form of andopposition to same-sex marriage.
equality between citizens. To coercively Rightsrestrain and
claims are suppressed by changing the subject;
punish other human beings for activity the corein this of
interests areasome citizens are weighed at near
of human life for no other reason than zero inthat
order toGod,protect assome symbolic institution from
my reading of scripture or nature has anyit, has harm.
marginal declared
it vile and sinful is the clearest possible But my example
scheme providesof resources to say much more
regarding other human beings as subject about ato one's even
religious, own scripturalist, argument against
same-sexIf
extrapolitical epistemic and moral authority. marriage
any area than that it is a violation of re-
spect because
ought to be regulated in a democratic society by a it strict
advances religious reasons in public
application of the harm principle, this is it.
This is not, however, a statement only about reli-
8 This is not to claim that paternalistic policies, including over the
gious authority. Liberal opposition to European bans
actions of self-representing adults, can never be justified. (See Conly
on wearing the Muslim face veil in public has 2013
2012 and Sunstein exactly
for a recent discussion.) But it is to presume
this logic. The sense on the part of somea prima that antoadult
facie right justification and to articulate and act on a
voluntarily wearing a face veil is incompatible
conception of your ownper se I also mean to posit certain limits
interests.
on the sources ofby
with her own dignity or freedom is regarded knowledge
most about others' interests that can be used
to justify paternalistic coercion. (Conly, for example, is primarily
liberals as an insufficient justificatory reason for enact-
interested in faulty human reasoning in advancing our interests,
ing a coercive law (Nussbaum 2010; although seemeans
choosing effective Rosento our ends, not in identifying our true
2012, 63-77, for a paternalistic use of "dignity" in Euro-
interests and ends.)
533
deliberation. First, we can distinguish between such

such statements as arguments only directed to
religious arguments that object to same-sex marriage
believers justifying to them why they should
because homosexuality itself is a sin- an affrontcivil
same-sex to unions? The former obviously is
God, or a harm to the self- and those arguments
to certain that
objections. However, the scheme propos
this article
say that "marriage" is a public institution that ought allows
to us to make finer distinctions bet
be treated in a different way than the criminal law. even the same kind of religious arg
the roles that
The least that can be said is that the latter way
play in of
different political contexts.
framing the question does not subject the personal
Moving then to the case of Christian argumen
realm of choice, freedom, and expression to justice
social a com- from scripture or authority, we s
plete (theo)democratic veto. Furthermore, theaccording
religiousto my scheme the realm of politica
framing of the political issue of "marriage" sion atasstake
one is my fourth category- that of co
action pertaining
about a collective, public institution is compatible with to how much a state should
permitting same-sex civil unions that extend citizens
to homo-and what it should do with this mone
sexuals the same substantive legal rightsligious
and protec-
arguments are obviously controversial i
tions. area, precisely because of the public, coerciv
However, we also see the precise grounds collective nature of such political action. We o
for object-
ing to religious arguments from revelationto orthe state endorsing and sponsoring one relig
authority
against permitting same-sex marriage, beyond religion as such, because it sends the message t
the mere
point that "religious arguments" should be public
keptsphere
out of belongs to one moral community
"politics." Marriage is not merely a symbolic
than
institution
to others. Scripturalist arguments for redist
like a flag, powerless monarch, or national
tiveflower. It (such as the Bishops' Letter discus
taxation
is one that regulates access to crucial social goods,
Waldron atthe Protestant doctrines elaborat
and
least in many contemporary societies (although
Wolterstorff)
it is far do run the risk of asserting that a
from clear that a democratic society oughtian
to interpretation
distribute of revealed truth can serve as a
benefits and rights through a formal legal status like
justificatory reason for everyone for the kinds of
marriage). It is arbitrary to say that the a interests
state can do of with public money- money collec
religious citizens in preserving their monopoly
ercively from over citizens. Arguments for universal h
care easily
how the state defines this institution for symbolic andbecome arguments for subsidies to r
affective purposes outweighs the interests of free andfor sectarian religious goals.
organizations
equal citizens to the substantive goods and Why,
rights then,
dis- are public interventions like the
tributed through this institution. Because toral Letter
the that of
costs Waldron discusses and other Chris-
tian interventions
this exclusion from certain publicly distributed goods in support of social justice not as
authoritarian,
are specifically targeted at a particular class of free and theocratic, and disrespectful as equally
scripturalist
equal fellow citizens, justifications are owed directly to arguments about personal sexual decisions
those particular persons. and individual citizens' access to important publicly
My scheme permits us to draw still further distributed
distinc- goods? I think there are three readily per-
tions. Suppose the religious response to ceptible
the push for
considerations. First, the political demand at
same-sex marriage is to propose "leveling stakedown"
is othertoregarding . It speaks to what we owe each
a universal civil union status for all citizens, reserving
other within the political community, not what we owe
"marriage"- like baptism- for the realmGodoforreligious
other entities that we reasonably might not
associations. Suppose the religious move, even using
recognize as objects of moral concern. Obviously, the
deeper
scripturalist forms of religious argument, is not arguments
to deny for what we owe each other might be
civic and moral goods to homosexual fellow based on citizens,
obligations to God, to Jesus, or to ourselves
but to get the state out of the marriage in business
a natural law en-
sense. But the demand is to treat other
tirely, to save the symbolic and sacred associations by
persons in a particular way that benefits them.
removing "marriage" from state power. ThisSecond,
is notthe way we are being asked to benefit oth-
only
ers is not
politically reasonable, but something that many demeaning or humiliating to us. Unlike de-
liberal,
feminist, and queer theorists might equallymands toendorse
accept that our sexual life is inferior to that of
because of their own reservations about "marriage"
others to the extent of accepting material, emotional,
as a symbolic institution with which they,andor moral deprivations, we are not being asked in this
the state,
can identify (Butler 2002; Chambers 2013; case Cott 2000;
to accept our own inferiority by being singled out
March 2010, 2011; Metz 2010; Polikoff 2008; Sunstein
for exclusion or disadvantage. We are not asked to
and Thaler 2008; Warner 1999). render goods or duties to others in a servile or self-
This does not mean there are no grounds negatingfor ob-We are not asked to regard our own
way.
jecting to certain religious arguments inmaterial
this case.
welfareFor
as insignificant or spiritually tainted.
Wearguments
example, do these hypothetical scripturalist are only being asked to see a gap between our
for privatizing marriage (a policy that we are assum-
possessions and our selves, to accept that property is
ing here to be at least reasonable) imply that
acquired suchsocial relationships. Such arguments
through
scripturalist reasoning binds the state as such,
about that to
obligations a others are thus inherently differ-
state representing all of its citizens is bound tofor
ent from, enact
example, religious arguments exhorting
that marriage law preferred by the most convincing
women to obey men or homosexuals to deny the value
of their
interpretation of scripture? Or rather do we self-expression. The most intimate sphere of
interpret
534
our own negative liberty isthe not being

bare life encroached
of some noncitizen on from
is quite different
when we legislate about obligations
saying that our to fellow
collective power citizens
should be deployed
realized through proportionate financial
to ensure contributions
that said noncitizen be saved through Jesus
to public institutions. Christ. No moral doctrine (with the possible exception
Third, the way we are being asked
of Stoicism) to benefit
disputes that bare life,others
physical integrity,
is not problematically paternalistic
or bodily to the
health beneficiaries
are goods. (Moral doctrines . dispute
The goods and interests that we
only are being
the weight asked to
and importance pro-
of these goods rela-
vide for others are relativelytiveuncontroversial
to other ones, and even the as goods
Stoic objection is as
and interests. The Pastoral Letter
much semantic is not asking
as categorical us 2001,
(Cicero to 67-89).)
provide goods or interests which
Thus, one wayare of themselves sec-
viewing religious argumentation in
the above
tarian in the sense of only being cases isas
valued that believers
goods orarein-
not advancing
terests from within a particular moral account
a controversial doctrine. We
of the good orare
of justice for
not asked to contribute Biblespublic
or enforcement,
instruction in sacred
but rather merely expanding the
tantric sex to the poor; we are being
sphere asked
of justice, to contribute
defending those persons whose vital
goods which (almost) everyone recognizes
interests as by
are adversely affected goods-
policy decisions we
food, housing, employment, health care,
make, and yet who domoney.
not speak for themselves within
I do not claim neutrality for my view
a particular or for
body politic. the torture,
Abortion, de- the envi-
mands of social justice. It very
ronment,much
and globalis the
justice case in
all involve, that
a crucial way,
deep religious views have beenthe most basic interests
essential toof progress
others.9 (as
well as reaction) in the areas of Thereracial and
are powerful social
reasons justice
why those attracted to
precisely when no prior consensus existed,
the ideal of public and
justification I have
should not regard re-
merely tried here to defend the ligiouspublic
interventionsuseinof disputes about what we owe
religious
arguments for social justice, not to proclaim
those outside them
the social contract as self-
a priori uncivil.
evident or victorious. But I believe that I have shown First, the terms of public reason are best suited to
that there are still some principled grounds for demo- routine, nonexceptional problems of collective self-
cratic citizens to distinguish between religious argu- governance in already well-ordered societies. In so-
ments on the question of sexual equality and religious cieties with strong commitments to civil and human
arguments on the question of social justice and, thus, rights, including rights to personal expression and pri-
that one cannot necessarily derive the conclusion that vacy, those capable of representing themselves within
the acceptability of advancing religious arguments in the social contract will likely not have to establish
public applies in the same way for all subject matters of themselves as subjects of rights. Religious and other
political action. It does not come down to whether the metaphysical arguments, or appeals to affect, to extend
policies being advanced are themselves just or unjust. considerations of justice to them will thus be superflu-
(Perhaps other citizens reasonably reject the social jus- ous, and religious attempts to export sectarian ethical
tice policies advocated for in religious terms.) Rather, it standards into the common system of rights will be
is that the very advocacy of coercive action in different unwelcome.
dimensions of political life makes different levels of However, political communities never expand their
demands on fellow citizens because of the kinds of in- sphere of moral concern without a struggle. Even do-
terests involved, and thus the use of equally "religious" mestically, contrary to Rawls's view that the constraints
arguments in public can express quite distinct moral at- of public reason apply only, or with particular force,
titudes towards others as free and equal fellow citizens. when communities seek to justify constitutional essen-
tials and the basic principles of justice (Rawls 1996;
in response: Quong 2004), it seems that it is precisely
EXPANDING THE SPHERE OF JUSTICE: at these moments of founding and refounding within
RELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF a polity, when obligations of justice are extended to
OF OTHERS previously excluded groups, that religious, philosoph-
ical, and extrarational modes of persuasion are most
To recall: in my scheme, the questions of abortion, the urgently needed. The challenge of extending moral
torture of enemy combatants, the global environment, concern to outsiders, who are not only excluded from
and global justice, for all their differences, shareofficial an political institutions but are unable even to en-
important feature, namely the concern with the basic, gage in extraconstitutional political struggles within the
relatively uncontroversial interests of persons (includ- public sphere of the polity in question, is that much
ing future persons) outside of the immediate politi- greater. Political particularism (i.e., nationalism) has a
cal community. The first part of this statement (that morally constraining quality. Outsiders are easily seen
these issues are concerned with relatively uncontro- as enemies, competitors, or strangers and their interests
versial interests) has been discussed above. It matters are easily dismissed or disdained. And yet it is hard to
that religious intervention in such cases is often about deny that we have imoral obligations to those outside
expanding the sphere of the most basic moral concern
to others. As far as the relationship between free and
equal citizens is concerned, saying on the basis of9 re- I say this without endorsing any particular policy prescription on
any of them, particularly abortion, which obviously involves also the
ligious arguments that our collective power and bodily re- and moral interests of self-representing citizens (women) in
sources should be deployed or constrained to protect ways the other issues do not.
535
the state, that the global community isIt always itselfthat

is not, however, a religious exhortations to pro-
form of political community insofar tect the basic
as the globalentities
po-of persons outside the political
community are
litical structure distributes benefits, advantages, trivial and make no controversial de-
costs,
and suffering. mands on fellow citizens. For example, in the case of
How to bridge this gap between the thefact of moral
exhortation to not torture a suspected terrorist, the
obligation to others and the morally cramping powers
protorture citizen might claim that the religious citizen
is asking
of nationalism? This is not a question for her tophi-
political accept the risk of losing her life if the
losophy, but for political psychology.captive
Our is not compelled
moral con- to divulge the information he
supposedly
cern, defined as an uncoerced willingness possesses. (She would be right, although
to sacrifice
she may
any of our own interests for the interests be wildly wrong
of others, is about the actual size of the
contracted and expanded in a variety risk.)
of Rather,
ways,the point is that if the religious argu-
most
of them nonrational. Religious argumentment isand
derived from the value of the human life of
persua-
sion include both rational and nonrational processes
the terrorist, rather than, say, from the insignificance
of our own
of moral growth. Religious efforts of various death since
forms to we will be given an afterlife by
God , thento
persuade us that we have moral obligations that particular "religious" argument is no
those
who are not protected and represented more controversial,
within the so- demanding, or paternalistic than
cial contract- enemy combatants, the identical
distant"secular"
poor, arguments
fe- that it is better to live
tuses, and other future persons- cannot with the
be risk of violent death than to live in a world
dismissed
where torture
by political liberals for two core and mutually is acceptable (Shue 1978; Sussman 2005).
defining
reasons: (1) the terms of political and Whether
socialdemanding
cooper- that I expose myself to mortal
ation do not claim to have settled thedanger
rights on the
of basis
such of revelation or theology is un-
civil and
entities and thus religious interventions do disrespectful
not chal- seems to depend as much on
the reasonableness
lenge some existing political achievement (here even of the demand deriving from the
political liberals should be able to join in
theistic the poli-
premises as on the mere use of those premises.
tics of rupture and risk celebrated by I may reasonably and
agonists); reject both faith-based attempts to
persuadethe
(2) most political liberals are uneasy about me, nation
but there is (quite literally) a world of
state as an exhaustive context for moraldifference between the moral attitude expressed to-
and political
obligation, at least in the world as it ward
is, me
andwhen I amopen
are told that the life of another human
matters and the
to domestic laws that protect the interests of certain one expressed when I am told that my
entities outside the social contract. While some such own death does not.
entities may be presumptively inappropriate as objects A truly strong inclusivist position would have to ac-
of political protection (the Qur'an, Jesus Christ, the cept as blameless the kind of religious argument that
Sun-God Ra) I do not believe that the entities we have appeals to the fact of an afterlife to justify why free
focused on here- enemy combatants, the distant poor, and equal citizens should be willing to accept the risk
and future persons- are inappropriate in this way. Lib- of losing this life. Most inclusivist positions do not go
erals may welcome or solicit this help in some areas that far but rather endorse religious contributions that
(global poverty, torture) more than others (abortion), are largely justifiable as attempts to expand the sphere
but if my scheme is persuasive, then liberals ought to of moral concern by (a) protecting the generally recog-
at least regard religious interventions about abortion nized interests (b) of entities that are generally recog-
as belonging to the same sphere of political activity.nized as worthy of moral concern (c) in ways that do not
(Obligations to the nonhuman natural world, including require unintelligible or unreasonable self-sacrifice. In-
animals, are a harder case, which I do not address here, clusivists are thus right that secular democratic citizens
and perhaps do not admit of determinate answers.) should welcome "religious arguments" in such areas,
If the preceding is convincing, though, there is abut we see precisely why this evidence cannot be lever-
greater lesson for the inclusivists. Religious advocacy aged into a defense of religious arguments in those
for the protection of the basic, uncontroversial interestsareas where it would be paternalistic, inaccessible, and
of entities and agents beyond the social contract ought authoritarian vis-à-vis free and equal fellow citizens.
to be tolerated, respected, and welcomed by secular
political actors for three very concrete and limiting
reasons: (1) we accept that such entities have inter-CONCLUSION
ests that ought to be protected; (2) there is no real
dispute over what interests those entities have; andMy primary conclusion is that the enduring appeal o
(3) we recognize that the interests of such entities are religious reasoning in democratic life has less to do wit
often terribly hard to advocate for in national political the general incompleteness of public reason as such,
contexts- we need all the help we can get and in with a concerns about fairness to religious citizens wh
partially religious society such help ought to be reli-want to act on their conscientious commitments, tha
gious. But there is no implication that advocating for with the limitations of public reason in a certain select
the protection of entities one might reasonably deny set of areas, particularly how to conclusively justify
the existence of (spirits, saints, sun gods) or for thebasic obligations to those outside the bounded politic
imposition of interests one might reasonably reject as community and how to remedy failures to secure basic
interests (to be saved in Jesus Christ, to be liberated justice within it. But even here the scope for religiou
from sinful desires) is equally acceptable. contributions seems limited. In the case of expandin
536
the sphere of moral obligation,

same way that we are
religious almost
arguments always
against homosexu-
discussing policies where the
ality,human interests
gender equality, atHPV
birth control, or the stake-
vaccine
do. Public moneygoods-
life, physical integrity, primary and energies are
are often directed to
relatively
uncontroversial and religious contributions
projects that are
many citizens would not have less
chosen or a
matter of justifying moral actively object to. And yet than
knowledge we recognize
of that having
provid-
ing moral motivation. In one's
areas own share
such of theas
collective disposable income
torture, global
diverted
poverty, the rights of future to something we
persons, or would
the not have
ill chosen is not
effects of
greed, what religious arguments are
the same kind of assaultdoing is and
on our dignity not quite
autonomy
as is having
completing the terms of public the criminalso
reason law that
brought to bear on
the our
latter
now has a device or language personal
for choices or as is being excluded
definitively for arbitrary
resolving
political disputes. Rather, it
reasons
is from
pricking
public goods or
the
institutions.
consciences
Many collec-
or enlarging the moral imaginations of of
tive acts reflect a conception those
the good orwho are
of virtue,
predisposed to experiencing yet not religiously based
necessarily in an unjust way. Creatingexhor-
national
tations as moving in areas parks
that and other
are public spaces, public matters
neither service obliga- of
applying existing norms of tions,justice
public mourning
nor and memory,
merely exhortations
making to
policy beneath the radar of justice.
love and sacrifice, andThus,
other similarthe appeal
political practices, of
religious arguments or forms are not best ofdiscussed through the language
persuasion of rights,
is primar-
ily related to the dilemmas and yet a priorityby
faced for justice as the first virtue
bounded of a
political
communities in conditions political of universalcommunity doesmorality.
not exclude public consid-
There remain harder cases that I do not claim to be eration of non-justice-impinging public acts. As with
able to address within such a brief treatment. Public basic obligations to noncitizens, public reason leaves a
problems such as the interests of children, a society's
gap that must be filled.
use of natural resources, modes of relating to nonhu- Nonetheless, while there are good reasons to wel-
man life, the cultivation of political virtues (such comeas many kinds of religious contributions to public
life, this does not leave us devoid of any resources
charity and sacrifice) amongst citizens, the protection
of entities of noninstrumental value, the use of pub- for a nonhypocritical, good-faith rejection of the use
lic space, or the quality of social relationships are of
not specific kinds of religious premises in debates over
specific problems of political life. Public reason liber-
easily reduced to determinations of core interests held
by identifiable agents that others ought to observe alsorcan save the most important parts of the doctrine
protect (i.e., rights). Deep and controversial moral of
rea- religious self-restraint (the freedom of individuals
soning in these areas is not exactly excluded by or in arbitrary external domination and fairness in the
from
tension with public reason, but such topics exceed distribution
the of the costs and benefits of association)
realm that Rawlsian or Habermasian forms of public without requiring that all religious arguments be sus-
deliberation excel at giving complete and determinate pect in public life.
answers. Thus, we don't often know what public dis-
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Rethinking Religious Reasons in Public Justification

Author(s): ANDREW F. MARCH

Rethinking Religious Reasons in Public Justification

INTRODUCTION: THE INCLUSIVIST to public reason as an ideal of citizenship in conditions

reason for church people to refrain from thatparticipation

to note here that both including and excludingabout

Despite the positive

expression of Christian love. This is now theof

a desire to enforce a singleIn controversial conception

is to say that they do not

deliberation. First, we can distinguish between such

our own negative liberty isthe not being

the state, that the global community isIt always itselfthat

the sphere of moral obligation,

Perry, Michael. 2003. Under God? Religious

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