Journal of Integrative Neuroscience, Vol. 14, No.

3 (2015) 431–435
°c Imperial College Press
DOI: 10.1142/S0219635215800011

Book Review

The Relativistic Brain by Ronald Cicurel and Miguel L. Nicolelis (2015)

J. Integr. Neurosci. 2015.14:431-435. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

Roman R. Poznanski
The Rockefeller University
by FLINDERS UNIVERSITY on 02/12/16. For personal use only.

New York
rpoznanski@rockefeller.edu

[Published 25 September 2015]

The reference to \relativistic" in the title has nothing to do with Einstein's theory of
relativity, but rather it refers to a brain that is relative to one's own point of view, i.e.,
the brain's own internal account of material reality as opposed to a software/hard-
ware dichotomy implied in computational approaches of brain function. In the
Relativistic Brain, the authors have set a course on explaining why higher brain
function cannot be simulated by a Turing machine. Indeed what they argue is for
computationalisma to be replaced as the ¯eld ignores essential issues for under-
standing how the brain works. These issues relate to physiological, mathematical,
evolutionary, and information arguments that explain away computational neuro-
science as a ¯eld not much di®erent from arti¯cial intelligence.
The Relativistic Brain o®ers a complete paradigm shift on how we comprehend the
brain to work. Electrical ¯ring of digital spikes propagating along axons in widely
distributed networks of axons form bundles of white matter that continuously gen-
erate neuronal electromagnetic ¯elds (NEMFs). The continuous interferences of these
NEMFs de¯nes the neuronal space-time continuum form which \mental-space"
emerges that underlies higher-order brain functions, including consciousness. How
does this neuronal space-time continuum emerge? The superposition of time-varying
NEMFs form bulkier white matter from \biological coils" that enable strong NEMFs
to \glue" the digital component (neurons) of the brain together. The combination of
NEMFs provides the \physiological glue" for the creation of the neuronal space–time
continuum de¯ned as the \mental-space" over widespread areas of the brain that
include both cortical and subcortical structures.

a Claims the fundamental operations in neuroscience can be reduced to algorithms by relying on mathematical
approximations.

431
 432 BOOK REVIEW

The authors call their theory the \relativistic brain theory". According to this
theory, internal neuronal NEMFs would be responsible for creating the brain space–
time continuum from where \mental-space" emerges. The \mental-space" accounts
for all the emergent properties of the brain that de¯ne higher-order brain functions.
NEMFs could continuously act on neural networks located far apart in the brain
which would allow the brain to constantly integrate any internal, continuously
variable sources of neural information. The authors describe how the \mental-space"
is essentially our sense of Self arising from widely distributed NEMFs generated over
cortical and subcortical structures. The brain internally represents an expectation
based on genotype and stored memories in a distributed fashion across the cortical
tissue. The \mental-space" itself proposes the computational activity on the organic
J. Integr. Neurosci. 2015.14:431-435. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

substrate that generates spiking within neural circuits. The geometry and topology of
the \mental-space" de¯nes a multi-dimensional manifold that can curve during a
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large range of mental experiences suggesting the geometry governing the \mental-
space" is Riemannian and not Euclidean.
The authors' theory resembles CEMI theory of McFadden (2013) where NEMF as
the mechanism for consciousness feedback on the neural networks by causal e±-
ciency with three additional postulates: (i) brain's own point of view due to antici-
patory expectations (i.e., \a priori" binding as opposed to \posteriori " binding); (ii)
NEMFs generate a space–time continuum from which non-Euclidean \mental-space"
emerges; (iii) NEMFs render the brain to be non-computational, i.e., a brain does
compute, but its computation is intrinsically bound to its physical structure. The
intrinsic dynamics that de¯nes the brain spatiotemporal continuum matters for
processing information. A priori binding produced by NEMFs enables information
processing to be carried through a space–time continuum from which a \mental-
space" emerges and all mental computations take place. The authors infer that
\mental-space" resides across scale in the brain that they consider to be an inte-
grative system. The authors state that a proper mathematical language could be
employed to analyze the \mental-space" with NEMFs comprising of an in¯nite un-
countable set of points in continuous space. Naturally this entails the mathematical
analysis in Banach vector spaces (Brzychczy & Poznanski, 2013).
The authors postulate ¯ve arguments as to why the brain is not computational.
The physiological argument posits anticipatory expectations found in brains; the
evolutionary argument posits that organisms di®er from mechanisms; the compu-
tational argument posits non-tractability of solutions in computational neuroscience;
the mathematical arguments posit for non-integrability of functions and non-
Euclidean geometry for analysis; and the informational argument posits for non-
Shannon information theory that is intrinsically intertwined with the substrate of
brain matter. These ¯ve arguments give su±cient grounds to reject computational-
ism as the book astonishingly advocates in great detail and is brie°y summarized, viz

(1) Mathematical argument: The brain represents information at multiple levels of

organization and therefore has to be viewed as an integrative system where
 BOOK REVIEW 433

emergent properties at di®erent levels of brain's physical organization simulta-

neously a®ect everything; one can never be sure when some aspect of the inte-
grated system is a realistic model of the brain. Limiting the organization levels,
and thereby throwing away the interactions in order to simulate an integrated
system, one would likely miss crucial aspects at lower levels of the integrated
system, which can be critical for the analysis of the whole.
Any dynamical system is characterized in terms of the sum of its elements in
addition the sum of the element's interactions. The addition of interactions
makes the system nonlinear and non-integrable. If one way to study the brain as a
complex dynamical system with self-adaptable elements and connectivity and
between the elements and across di®erent organization levels then the dynamical
J. Integr. Neurosci. 2015.14:431-435. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

system would be non-integrable. The noncomputability of a formal system stems

from it being non-integrable.
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(2) Computational argument: Brain physically computes by simply obeying the laws
of physics and biology, rather than by running a pre-given algorithm within a
formal system. G€ odel's incompleteness theorems can be interpreted as giving a
clear indication of the limitations of a formal system. Mathematical modeling is
referred to as a formal system. In integrated system there is no separation
between hardware and software because the brain's hardware con¯guration is
responsible for performing all the computations. Some computations become
non-tractable because the computing time required to run a simulation with this
algorithm may not be viable in practical terms. A faster computer does not
transform a non-tractable problem into a tractable one, but only makes a better
approximation in a given time.
(3) Evolutionary argument: The evolutionary arguments point to a distinction be-
tween an organism and a mechanism. Mechanisms can be encoded by an algo-
rithm and reversed engineered. Organisms emerge as a result of large number of
evolutionary steps at multiple levels of organization that are random occurrences
in°uenced by the selective pressures brought upon by the environment. Organ-
isms are integrated entities as well as dissipative systems because their material
organization is totally dependent on energetic and informational exchanges with
the environment. Dissipative systems exist far from equilibrium. They self-or-
ganize by continuously reshaping and optimizing their matter substrate from
which information has emerged. This is known as causal action of information on
matter. In other words, intrinsic information within the organism continuously
modi¯es the material substrate (e.g., neurons, dendrites, proteins) that has
generated it. This causal action of information on matter binds both organic
matter and information in an irreducible single entity, i.e., information in
organisms is substrate-dependent while information created by mechanisms is
substrate-independent. Information processed the brain is used to recon¯gure its
structure and function through causal e±ciency thereby integrating information
with brain matter. This is what is referred to as complex adaptive systems.
Complexity is a necessary, but not a su±cient condition for consciousness. The
 434 BOOK REVIEW

authors claim that it is not just complexity that endures a system with con-
sciousness, but evolutionary shaping that allows for information and organic
matter to become intrinsically bound and intertwined. The authors do not
conjecture as what are the causal e®ects of such interactions.
(4) Informational argument: In the brain there are two kinds of information (i)
extrinsic Shannon information obtained from the outside environment; (ii) in-
trinsic or G€odel information obtained from the inside. Type (i) is expressed in
terms of syntax and type (ii) is expressed in terms of semantics. The Phi function
(Tononi, 2012), which measures in bits the amount of information generated by a
complex system measures Shannon information only and as such is insu±cient to
justify the emergence of higher-order brain function like consciousness. G€odelian
J. Integr. Neurosci. 2015.14:431-435. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

information de¯nes all information that cannot be proved to be true by a formal

system that is causally e®ective i.e., it induces brain changes which depict the
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unique point of view of each organism. G€odelian information is generated from

continuous generation of NEMFs that carries a record of all previous experiences
in the form of an internal representation bound by the continuous expression of
NEMFs invoking widespread neuronal ¯ring synchronization possibly only
through NEMFs since a degree of imprecision is needed for the possibility of
adaptability as opposed to rigid precision invoked by spiking through neural
coding. There is no neural code since NEMFs can in°uence di®erent groups of
neurons at a given moment in time which are themselves adapting.
(5) Physiological argument: The computational models of the brain originally
de¯ned the \binding problem" in perception require the image to be created
\a posteriori" (or after the stimulus). The authors suggest that brains generate
their own interface hypothesis of what are \expected to be seen" as the \a priori
expectation" created by the brain. Incoming signals interfere with the \a priori "
expectation until a ¯nal resulting image emerges. The anticipatory neuronal
¯ring represents the manifestation of the brain's own point of view and also
provides a physiological argument against the computational brain. Anticipatory
behavior was ¯rst discussed by theoretical biologist Robert Rosen (Kercel, 2004).
The brain's \own point of view" is a wave of anticipatory information that is
employed by the brain to build internal representations through the processing of
G€odelian information. When Shannon information is transmitted through par-
allel sensory pathways it interferes with the anticipatory information and the
resulting interferometry pattern emerging from this collision gives rise to the
perception of the surrounding world. Not all parts of the brain possess intrinsic
information necessary to su±ce the relativistic brain theory. For example, the
retina acts as one kind of Turning Machine when it solves the algorithm for
directional selectivity. The algorithmic properties of the retina are assigned to it
and are not intrinsic. The information to the retina depends on interpretation
from outside the system based on Shannon information.
 BOOK REVIEW 435

To summarize, the Relativistic Brain is one of the better books that I can recom-
mend. It sits at the epicenter of change and its theory is ripe for quanti¯cation. Like
with most pioneering ideas, come questions that have not yet been answered: How is
the \physiological glue" actualized in the brain? From where does the G€odelian
information originate? What is the source of the NEMFs? How is the \mental-space"
mapped without a homunculus? Is the \mental-space" perhaps a morphic ¯eld re-
lated to the quantum information ¯eld that manifests as G€odelian information? This
is perhaps one of many more unanswered questions that this fascinating book takes
readers on a journey of discovery.
The authors claim that their relativistic brain theory is a monist materialistic in
which the concept of a \mental-space" that takes the shape of emergent NEMFs that
J. Integr. Neurosci. 2015.14:431-435. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

modify the material substrate re-establishing a \peculiar sort" of dualism in which

information is measured from outside and from inside. With this they explain away
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Descartes brain–mind dualism that is considered to reman non-scienti¯c since it

involves an abstract non-material entity (the mind) that is able to act on matter (the
brain). The authors clearly state they are unaware how an abstract non-material
entity could exchange energy in order to act on a material object. The authors do not
exclude the existence of quantum phenomena in the brain.

REFERENCES
Brzychczy, S., & Poznanski, R.R. (2013) Mathematical Neuroscience. Academic Press:
San Diego.
Kercel, S.W. (2004) The endogenous brain. J. Integr. Neurosci., 3, 61–84.
McFadden, J. (2013) The CEMI ¯eld theory: Closing the loop. J. Consc. Stud., 20, 153–168.
Tononi, G. (2012) Phi: A Voyage from the Brain to the Soul. Pantheon Books: Singapore.