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REYES V COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, having
been elected to that office on May 11, 1992. On October 26, 1994, an administrative complaint was filed against him with
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr. Ernesto Manalo. It was alleged, among other things, that petitioner exacted and
collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market; that certain checks issued to him by
the National Reconciliation and Development Program of the Department of Interior and Local Government were never
received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer; and that he took twenty-
seven (27) heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after the latter had reared and fattened the
cattle for seven months.

In its decision, dated February 6, 1995, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered
his removal from office.

As a result, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not be served upon Reyes. But on March 3, 1995, following
the expiration of the temporary restraining order and without any injunction being issued by the Regional Trial Court, an
attempt was made to serve the decision upon petitioner's counsel in Manila. However, the latter refused to accept the
decision. Subsequent attempts to serve the decision upon petitioner himself also failed, as he also refused to accept the
decision.

Meanwhile, on March 20, 1995, petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy

On March 24, 1995, private respondent Rogelio de Castro, as registered voter of Bongabong, sought the disqualification
of petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No .7160) which states:

§40. Disqualification. — The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

....

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.

Nonetheless, because of the absence of any contrary order from the COMELEC, petitioner Reyes was voted for in the
elections held on May 8, 1995.

ISSUE: Whether or not Reyes was “removed from office as a result of an administrative case” even if the decision was not
received by him

HELD: Yes

RATIO: It appears that the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision was due to the refusal
of petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. As the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Mario Manzo,
stated in his certification, repeated attempts had been made to serve the decision on Reyes personally and by registered
mail, but Reyes refused to receive the decision.

Personal service is completed upon actual or constructive delivery, which may be made by delivering a copy personally to
the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with a person having charge thereof, or at his residence, if his office
is not known. 4 Hence service was completed when the decision was served upon petitioner's counsel in his office in
Manila on March 3, 1995. In addition, as the secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan certified, service by registered
2

mail was also made on petitioner Reyes. Although the mail containing the decision was not claimed by him, service was
deemed completed five days after the last notice to him on March 27, 1995. 5

If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the
judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him
would be valid were it not for his or his counsel's refusal to receive it.

His refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.
3

RODRIGUEZ V COMELEC

FACTS: Eduardo T. Rodriguez and Bienvenido O. Marquez were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon
Province. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez challenged Rodriguez' victory

Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the United States where a charge, filed on November 12, 1985, is pending against
the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft
of personal property. Rodriguez is therefore a "fugitive from justice" which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility
under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160), so argued Marquez.

ISSUE: Whether Rodriguez, is a "fugitive from justice" as contemplated by Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code
based on the alleged pendency of a criminal charge against him

HELD: No

RATIO: The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a
particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is
knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.

Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June
25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April 27 3 and June 26 of 1995, 4 preceded the
filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the
arrest warrant by the same foreign court, by almost five (5) months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known
about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest
warrant — much less conviction — to speak of yet at such time. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez
deliberately running away from with his departure from the US? The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under
the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be found in the circumstances of Rodriguez.

To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to
run for any elective local petition under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be understood according to
the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision, to wit:

A "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who,
after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. (Emphasis ours.)

Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction
or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition,
Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.
4

SALALIMA V GUINGONA

FACTS: Petitioners seek to annul and set aside Administrative Order No. 153, signed on 7 October 1994 by the President
and by public respondent Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., approving the findings of fact and
recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee and holding the petitioners administratively liable for the following acts or
omissions: (a) wanton disregard of law amounting to abuse of authority in O.P. Case No. 5470; (b) grave abuse of authority
under Section 60 (e) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) in O.P. Case No. 5469; (c) oppression and
abuse of authority under Section 60 (c) and (e) of R.A. No. 7160 in O.P. Case No. 5471; and (d) abuse of authority and
negligence in O.P. Case No. 5450. The said order meted out on each of the petitioners penalties of suspension of different
durations, to be served successively but not to go beyond their respective unexpired terms in accordance with Section 66
(b) of R.A. No. 7160.

ISSUE: Did the Office of the President act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
suspending the petitioners for periods ranging from twelve to twenty months?

HELD: Yes

RATIO: Section 66(b, of R.A. No. 7160 expressly provides:

Sec. 66. Form and Notice of Decision. — . . .

(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for
every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as
he meet the qualifications for the office.

This provision sets the limits to the penalty of suspension , viz., it should not exceed six months or the unexpired portion
of the term of office of the respondent for every administrative offense. An administrative offense means every act or
conduct or omission which amounts to, or constitutes, every of the grounds or disciplinary action. The offenses for which
suspension may be imposed are enumerated in Section 60 of the Code, which reads:

Sec. 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. — An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office
on any of the following grounds:

(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;

(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;

(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;

(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at Least prision mayor;

(e) Abuse of authority;

(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay;

g) Acquisition for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status ,e an immigrant of another country; and

(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
5

An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court

The fact remains that the suspension imposed for each administrative offense did not exceed six months and there was
an express provision that the successive service of the suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the term of
office of the petitioners. Their term of office expired at noon of 30 June 1995.
6

MORENO V COMELEC

FACTS: Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground
that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.

Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation.

Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the
probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully
discharge his liability for any fine imposed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed.

HELD: Yes

RATIO: It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a
public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the
probation.

Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged.
Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence.
During the period of probation,[12] the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is
merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.[13]

The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Moreno fortifies his position. Sec. 16 of the
Probation Law provides that [t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which
probation was granted.
7

JALOSJOS V COMELEC

FACTS: Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010
elections.

Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under
oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.

Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by final
judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City, in Criminal
Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his
conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’
probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order dated 5
February 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation.

Surprisingly, on December 19, 2003, Parole and Probation Administrator Gregorio F. Bacolod issued a Certification
attesting that respondent Jalosjos, Jr., had already fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation.

This prompted Cardino to call the attention of the Commission on the decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September
29, 2008 finding Gregorio F. Bacolod, former Administrator of the Parole and Probation Administration, guilty of violating
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for issuing a falsified Certification on December 19, 2003 attesting to the fact that respondent
Jalosjos had fully complied with the terms and conditions of his probation.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
(1) ruled that Jalosjos’ probation was revoked

HELD: No

RATIO: Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray
votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.

A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for public office is a false material
representation which is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the same Code.

The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,15 the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary
absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective
office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the
principal penalty. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means
that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification," which is
perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to
hold elective public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and
commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to
vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence
8

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage.
— The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular
election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of disqualification.

The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied distributively to their
respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the
phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration between the
perpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their
durations into one period, states that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" — which means according
to whether the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification.

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or
hold public office perpetually."

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction
becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on
whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not.

In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time his
judgment of conviction became final.

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this
accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the
statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath.

If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is
eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material
representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications
but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications
required of the public office he/she is running for.

If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is
empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under
Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or
qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation,
while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.

The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of
ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes.21 Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run
for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the
cancellation on such ground means he was never a valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy
being void ab initio. Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it.
9
10

MAQUILING V COMELEC

FACTS: Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen
of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the
10 May 2010 local and national elections.

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner,
attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of
Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum
a computer-generated travel record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number
of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a
renunciation earlier made

HELD: YES

RATIO: Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance
and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for
public office.

By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of
Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued
to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009.

. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring
before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges
granted by the United States of America.
11

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated
the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil
and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.

A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality,
but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective
position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he
recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America."38

However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status
as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport.
12

FERMO V COMELEC

FACTS: "Manuel Laxina, Sr. and Roque Fermo were both candidates for the position of Punong Barangay, Barangay
Batasan Hills, District II, Quezon City, during the May 12, 1997 elections. The canvassed results showed Laxina obtaining
1,957 votes and Fermo getting 1,712 votes. With a plurality of 245 votes, Laxina was proclaimed duly elected to the
post. Subsequently, Fermo filed an election protest questioning the results in four (4) clustered precincts of Capitol Bliss
and twenty four (24) COA precincts on the ground that the elections therein was attended by massive fraud and serious
irregularities.

After all the proceedings were terminated, the Court a quo rendered its decision holding that Fermo won the contested
post. The Courts decision was promulgated on January 8, 1999.

Not satisfied with the decision of the MTC, respondent Manuel D. Laxina (LAXINA) appealed to the COMELEC, which
reversed the order of the MTC granting herein petitioners motion for execution pending appeal. In reversing the MTC,
the COMELEC found that the possibility that the term of the contested seat might expire by the time the appeal is
decided was not a "good reason" to warrant execution pending appeal.

ISSUE: The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in annulling the order of the MTC granting herein petitioners motion for execution
pending appeal on the ground that there were no "good reasons" for the issuance therefor.

HELD: We rule in the negative.

RATIO: Execution of judgments pending appeal in election cases is governed by Section 2, Rule 39[6] of the Rules of
Court which reads:

"Sec. 2. Discretionary execution.

(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. - On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the
record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order
execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.

Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing."

A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be based "upon good reasons
to be stated in a special order." The following constitute "good reasons" and a combination of two or more of them will
suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1.) public interest involved or will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness of the
remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3.) the length of time that the election contest has been
pending

In the present case, the petitioner relies solely on one ground to support his petition i.e. "shortness of term". We find
that the COMELEC committed no reversible error in ruling that:

"Shortness of term, alone and by itself cannot justify premature execution. It must be manifest in the decision sought to
be executed that the defeat of the protestee and the victory of the protestant has been clearly established."
13

When the COMELEC nullified the writ of execution pending appeal in favor of FERMO, the decision of the MTC
proclaiming FERMO as the winner of the election was stayed[14] and the "status quo" or the last actual peaceful
uncontested situation preceding the controversy[15] was restored.
14

PECSON V COMELEC

FACTS: Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in the Municipality of Magalang, Province of
Pampanga in the May 2007 elections. On May 17, 2007, Cunanan was proclaimed the winning candidate, garnering a
total of 12,592 votes as against Pecsons 12,531, or a margin of 61 votes. Cunanan took his oath and assumed the
position of Mayor of Magalang. Soon thereafter, Pecson filed an election protest, docketed as EPE No. 07-51, with the
RTC.

On November 23, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision in Pecsons favor. The RTC ruled that Pecson received a total of
14,897 votes as against Cunanans 13,758 a vote margin of 1,139.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Execution Pending Appeal was valid

HELD: Yes

RATIO: The remedy of executing court decisions pending appeal in election contests is provided under the Rules as
follows:

SEC. 11. Execution pending appeal . On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the court, while
still in possession of the original records, may, at its discretion, order the execution of the decision in an election contest
before the expiration of the period to appeal, subject to the following rules:

(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with three-day notice to the adverse party. Execution pending
appeal shall not issue without prior notice and hearing. There must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal.
The court, in a special order, must state the good or special reasons justifying the execution pending appeal. Such
reasons must:

(1) constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injury or damage should the
losing party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal; and

(2) be manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of the protestee or the victory of the
protestant has been clearly established.

(b) If the court grants execution pending appeal, an aggrieved party shall have twenty working days from notice
of the special order within which to secure a restraining order orstatus quo order from the Supreme Court of the
Commission on Elections. The corresponding writ of execution shall issue after twenty days, if no restraining order or
status quo order is issued.During such period, the writ of execution pending appeal shall be stayed. [3]

At the heart of the present controversy is the question of whether there has been compliance with the standards
required for an execution pending appeal in an election contest. As heretofore cited, the RTC found all these requisites
present.
15

We see no merit in Cunanans argument. The writ of execution issued by the RTC is a mere administrative enforcement
medium of the Special Order the main order supporting Pecsons motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ
itself cannot and does not assume a life of its own independent from the Special Order on which it is based. Certainly, its
nullification does not carry with it the nullification of the Special Order. This consequence does not of course hold true in
the reverse situation the nullification of the Special Order effectively carries with it the nullification of its implementing
writ and removes the basis for the issuance of another implementing writ. In the present case, the reality is that if and
when we ultimately affirm the validity of the Special Order, nothing will thereafter prevent the RTC from issuing another
writ.

As Pecson correctly argued, this reasoning effectively prevents a winner (at the level of the courts) of an election protest
from ever availing of an execution pending appeal; it gives too much emphasis to the COMELECs authority to decide the
election contest and the losing partys right to appeal.

Effectively, the two presumptive winners and the balancing act views negate the execution pending appeal that we have
categorically and unequivocally recognized in our rulings and in the Rules we issued. To be sure, the COMELEC cannot,
on its own, render ineffective a rule of procedure we established by formulating its own ruling requiring a final
determination at its level before an RTC decision in a protest case can be implemented.

It merely found that the defect Cunanan noted was actually inconsequential with respect to the results, thus showing
Pecsons clear victory under the RTC Decision. In other words, the Second Divisions corrected view of the RTC count
confirmed, rather than contradicted or placed in doubt, the conclusion that Pecson won.

Other than the clarity of Pecsons victory under the RTC Decision, the Special Order cited good and special reasons that
justified an execution pending appeal, specifically:(1) the need to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judges
decision as that which is initially given by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers; (2) public interest
and/or respect for and giving meaning to the will of the electorate; and (3) public policy something had to be done to
deal a death blow to the pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest technique often, if not invariably,
resorted to by unscrupulous politicians who would render nugatory the peoples verdict against them.
16

LOZANIDA V COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His
proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the
Regional Trial Court of Zambales, which in a decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure of elections.

In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio. On April 21,
1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in
the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998,
petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. On May 21, 1998 the First Division of the COMELEC issued the questioned
resolution granting the petition for disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and he is therefore disqualified to run for the same post for the fourth time.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner Lonzanidas assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March
1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local
government officials.

HELD: No

RATIO: Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be
three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.

Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule:

Sec. 43. Term of Office.

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and bars such officials from serving for more than
three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective official may be deemed to have served his
full term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The term served must therefore
be one for which the the official concerned was elected.

This Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. It stated:

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the
right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
17

consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number
of times before the disqualification can apply.

The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as
having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-
1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.

Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he
was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later
overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate
his post before the expiration of the term.

The respondents contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998
because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for
the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the
constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not

be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected.

Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term porvided by law amounts to
an interruption of continuity of service.

The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his
assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three
term limit.

We note that such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was
due to any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office.
18

LACEDA V LIMENA

FACTS: The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and bars such officials from serving for
more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective official may be deemed to have
served his full term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The term served
must therefore be one for which the the official concerned was elected.

This Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. It stated:

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the
right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number
of times before the disqualification can apply.

The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as
having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-
1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.

Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he
was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later
overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate
his post before the expiration of the term.

The respondents contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998
because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for
the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the
constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not

be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected.

Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term porvided by law amounts to
an interruption of continuity of service.

The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his
assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three
term limit.

We note that such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was
due to any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office.
19

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s defense it correct

HELD: No

RATIO: This Court has held that for the prohibition to apply, two requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he or she has fully served
three consecutive terms.

In this case, while it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and
converted into a city thereby abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it cannot be said
that for the purpose of applying the prohibition in Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, the office of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Panlayaan, Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different local government post as that of
the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan,Sorsogon City. The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan,
Sorsogon City, is the same as before the conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of the barangay are the same.They
are the same group of voters who elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms and over
whom Laceda held power and authority as their PunongBarangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt
Lacedas term.
20

RIVERA III V MORALES

FACTS: In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as
candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. Prior thereto or
on January 5, 2004, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy.

In his answer to the petition, respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term
commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the
second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" because of
the following reasons:

a. He was not validly elected for the second term 1998 to 2001 since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, Angeles City in its Decision dated April 2, 2001 in Election Protest Case (EPC) No.
98-131. The Decision became final and executory on August 6, 2001; and

b. He was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from January 16, 1999 to July 15, 1999.

ISSUE: Whether or not Morales is wrong

HELD: Yes

RATIO: Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He
served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the
electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor.
21

QUINTO V TOLENTINO

FACTS: Congress amended the law on January 23, 2007 by enacting R.A. No. 9369, entitled AN ACT AMENDING
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED
ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL
ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMPANSA BLG. 881, AS AMEMDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND OTHER
RELATED ELECTION LAWS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 13 of the amendatory law
modified Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, thus:

For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy:Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing
of his/her certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law violates the equal protection of the appointed officials

HELD: Yes

RATIO: The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those
occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm
of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:

(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate.
22

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE V GONZALES

FACTS: Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte by then Governor
Roy A. Padilla, Jr. on April 1, 1991. Her appointment was on a permanent capacity. On March 8, 1999, Governor Jess B.
Pimentel sent Gonzales a memorandum directing her to explain in writing why no administrative charges should be filed
against her for gross insubordination/gross discourtesy in the course of official duties, and conduct grossly prejudicial to
the best interest of the service; this was later on captioned as Administrative Case No. 001. After Gonzales submitted
her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation Committee found her guilty of the charges against her, and recommended to
Governor Pimentel that she be held administratively liable.4 On September 30, 1999, Governor Pimentel adopted the Ad
Hoc Investigation Committee’s recommendation and dismissed Gonzales.5

Proceedings before the Civil Service Commission

Gonzales appealed Governor Pimentel’s decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC issued Resolution No.
0014186 modifying Governor Pimentel’s decision, finding Gonzales guilty of insubordination and suspending her for six
months. This decision was appealed by Governor Pimentel, which the CSC denied in its Resolution No. 001952.7

Gonzales then filed a motion for execution and clarification of Resolution No. 001418, in which she claimed that she had
already served her six-month suspension and asked to be reinstated. The CSC issued Resolution No. 002245,8 which
directed Gonzales’ reinstatement.

Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator on October 12, 2000, but terminated her services the
next day for lack of confidence.

ISSUE: 1) Whether Congress has re-classified the provincial administrator position from a career service to a primarily
confidential, non-career service position; and

2) Whether Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines
Norte.

HELD: YES, NO

RATIO: We find the petition meritorious.

Congress has reclassified the provincial administrator position as a primarily confidential, non-career position

We support the CSC’s conclusion that the provincial administrator position has been classified into a primarily
confidential, non-career position when Congress, through RA 7160, made substantial changes to it.

RA 7160 made the position mandatory for every province.

RA 7160 made the provincial administrator position coterminous with its appointing authority, reclassifying it as a non-
career service position that is primarily confidential

Section 480(b) of RA 7160 now mandates constant interaction between the provincial administrator and the provincial
governor, to wit:

(b) The administrator shall take charge of the office of the administrator and shall:
23

(1) Develop plans and strategies and upon approval thereof by the governor or mayor, as the case may be, implement
the same particularly those which have to do with the management and administration-related programs and projects
which the governor or mayor is empowered to implement and which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for under
this Code;

(2) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the administrator shall:

(i) Assist in the coordination of the work of all the officials of the local government unit, under the supervision, direction,
and control of the governor or mayor, and for this purpose, he may convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of
the local government unit;

xxxx

(4) Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor and mayor, as the case may be, on all other matters relative
to the management and administration of the local government unit.
24