III — Interpretation of Statutes

1. A statute is the will of the legislature.

2. The process by which the court seeks to ascertain the meaning of the legislature
through the medium of the authoritative forms in which it is expresses is called
interpretation.
3. Judicial interpretation or construction is necessary only in the case of an enacted law
and it is not necessary in a customary or case law.
4. To determine whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intention of
the legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed.
5. Some statutes receive narrower interpretation whereas some get wider interpretation.
The former is termed as strict interpretation and the later is known as liber
interpretation.
6. A remedial statute is one which is enacted to cure a defect in a prior law.
7. The courts in the process of construction of a statute, must take into consideration the
text of the statute, context of the statute and the object of the statute.
8. Technical words to be understood in technical sense is related to literal or grammatical
rule of interpretation.
9. The rule of Beneficent construction is to be applied – Where the policies of the
legislation are extended to promote public good and prevent misuse of power.
10. The Maternity Benefit Act is a Beneficent Legislation.
11. The basic rule of interpretation is that the words of an enactment are to be given their
ordinary and natural meaning.
12. When two provisions of the same statute are in conflict, the court should try to give
effect to both of them by applying the rule of Harmonious Construction.
13. The maxim ‘Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat’ means – Uphold the constitutionality of
Statutes.
14. Absurdity or ambiguity due to a literal interpretation commands the application of the
golden rule.
15. Exact meaning preferred to loose meaning is related to which of the literal rule of
interpretation.
16. A taxing statute is to be strictly construed. If the person sought to be taxed comes
within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear
to the judicial mind.
17. A taxing statute is to be interpreted from what is clearly expressed in the statute. It
cannot be interpreted based on assumptions and presumptions.
18. Lord Simons in the case of Russel v Scot [1948] 2 AII ER 1, gave the maxim of tax law
that ‘the subject is not to be taxed unless the words of the taxing statute
unambiguously imposes the tax on him.
19. An important principle in relation to taxing statutes is the avoidance of double taxation
by the same act.
20. Where a beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or
doubt there in, the court should not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of
the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those not covered by it.
21. The rule of ‘ejusdem generis’ requires that the specific words are all of one genus in
which case the general words may be presumed to be restricted to that genus.
22. The word ‘vegetables’ in taxing statutes is to be understood as in common parlance
that is, denoting the class of vegetables which are grown in the kitchen garden or in a
farm and are used for the table. In Motipur Zamindary Co. State of Bihar, the SC stating
the above principle held that sugar cane cannot fall within the entry of vegetable.
23. Contemporanea Exposito Est Opima Et Fortissima Lege – means Old statutes should
be interpreted as they would have been at the date when they were passed. This is
also known as ‘Historical Interpretation’.
24. In the case of Ramavtar v Asst. Sales Tax Officer, the court held that the sale of beetle
leaves was subject to sales tax as its ordinary and natural meaning is clear and
unambiguous and thus does not fall under the category of ‘vegetable’.
25. The mischief rule of interpretation originated in Heydon’ case (1584).
26. While interpreting statutes, the court must start with the presumption that the legislature
did not make a mistake.
27. The Statute where the period of operation or validity is fixed is known as temporary
statute.
28. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is a codifying statute.
29. Nosciture A Sociis means the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by
reference to the meaning of words associated with it.
30. A word which occurs more than once in the same Act should be give the same
meaning throughout the Act unless the context shows that the legislature inserting it in
the interpretation clause words such as “unless the context otherwise requires”.

Short Questions:
1. Rule of Ejusdem Generis: Ejusdem Generis means — ‘of the same kind’ or ‘of the
same nature’. The rule says that where particular or specific words are followed by
general words, the meaning of the general words is restricted to the meaning of the
specific or particular words. It is a well-known maxim of construction.
1. Mandatory and directory statutes:
1. Mandatory statute is one which requires a course of action as opposed to merely
permitting it. It is a statute which leaves nothing to the discretion of the court in
respect of compliance with its terms. If a mandatory provision in a statute is not
followed, the proceeding to which it relates becomes illegal and void.
2. A directory statute if an enactment of the legislature that indicates only what should
be done, with no provision for enforcement. These provisions are a matter of form
only and do not affect any substantial right. Strict fulfilment in a proceeding is not
necessary, but there is a duty to comply as best as practicable.
2. Heydon’s rule: It is also called ‘Mischief rule of Interpretation’. In some cases,
difficulties arise in interpreting the statute. The construction of sentences gives rise to
double meaning and absurdity. In such cases ‘Mischief Rule of Interpretation’ is
applied. The court takes the assistance of counsel, refers all materials connected to
the statute, and goes deep to see the intention of the Legislature, object of the statute,
and what mischief was intended to be remedied. Then only courts could understand
the inherent mischief. This is called Heydon’s Rule or Mischief rule of Interpretation.
3. Logical interpretation: It is also called ‘Functional Interpretation’. When the provisions
of a statute do not give clear meaning, the courts look into ‘sententia legis’ (legislative
intent), subsidiary rules, object of statute, and externals and internal aids, and then
clearly understands the meaning of the provision and comes to appropriate conclusion.
The above factors serve as logic, and therefore this interpretation is called ‘Logical
Interpretation’.

4. Principles of strict construction of penal statutes as laid down by Maxwell:

Maxwell explains that the strict construction of penal statutes seems to manifest itself
in four ways:
1. express language for the creation of an offence;
2. interpreting strictly words setting out the elements of an offence;
3. fulfilment of statutory conditions precedent to the infliction of punishment; and
4. strict observance of technical provisions concerning criminal procedure and
jurisdiction