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Indian Political Science Association

Critical Issues in Electoral Reforms


Author(s): B.Venkatesh Kumar
Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 63, No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 73-88
Published by: Indian Political Science Association
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Critical Issues in Electoral Reforms

B.Venkatesh Kumar*

Electoral reforms Have been an issue of intense debate


in contemporary India, particularly in the last two
decades. The recent growth in electoral malpractices
and the fact that none of the serious proposals for
electoral reforms have ever got implemented have kept
the issue alive. This has been a cause for concern for
the election authority , political parties and the public in
general. In view of this, it is appropriate to examine the
working, on the basis of experience, and ascertain the
distortions and search for legal, administrative
measures to eliminate them.

The Constitution of India provides for a permanent and independent


body, the Election Commission of India, and vests in it the
'superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral
rolls for the conduct of all elections to Parliament and to the Legislature
of every State and of elections to the offices of the President and Vice-
President' (Article 324). The Commission may have one or more than one
member to be appointed by the President, i.e., the Executive. The Chief
Election Commissioner enjoys a constitutional protection in manner of
removal from the position, which requires parliamentary impeachment
[Article 324(5)]. Apart from the Commission, the Constitution or the law
does not provide for any other permanent structure to administer the
elections. Administrative Officers at the State and district level are
assigned additional charge to look after the elections; some of them are
temporarily deputed to the Election Commission during the period of the
general elections.

In balance, this semi-autonomous and technically weak institutional


apparatus has served the Indian democracy better than many other
institutions (e.g. the office of the Speaker, the UPSC or middle rung
judiciary). This is not to deny that there have been a number of serious
complaints of irregularities and partisanship involving the Election
Commission but merely to recognise that the Election Commission has

* Lecturer, Department of Civics and Politics, University of Mumbai, Mumbai.

The Indian Journal of Political Science , Vol.63, Number 1, March 2002


© Indian Political Science Association

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74 The Indian Journal of Political Science

norm or where corruption begins from the top.


level functionaries are, of course, a different matt
the partisanship of the local functionaries has be
The paper discusses the major areas of electora
taken by the Election Commission and various pr
put forth in various forums for ensuring fre
representatives of the elected candidates.

Election Financing

In spite of the recommendations to curb the ro


ground realities have defined a contrary movem
the ceiling of expenditure. The Indian Electoral L
the Representation of the People Act, 1951, requ
should disclose the correct account of all the
connection with the elections and that they a
accounts between the day on which they have bee
and the day of declaration of the result thereof
123(6) of the Act defines incurring of excessive
as a corrupt practice. It also lays down a limit on
The spirit of the above section can further be see
Representation of the People Act, 1951. The
election expenditure, which may be incurred by
States, has been laid down under Rule 90 of th
Rules, 1961. It specifies that mere non-disclosure
corrupt practice but becomes so as it amounts to
of the prescribed amount and contravention of S
Representation of the People Act, 1951, which fa
Section 123 Clause 6.

In addition, failure to furnish an account of election expenses within


the time limit prescribed under Section 77(6) of the Act, 1951 can lead to
disqualification of membership to the Parliament or State Legislature,
which is enforced by the President of India after seeking the opinion of
the Election Commission. The President here acts in his/her capacity of a
constitutional authority, to discharge constitutional obligations. But,
according to Section 10A of this Act, the Election Commission itself has
the right to disqualify a candidate, if it is satisfied that s/he has failed to
submit an account of the expenses incurred within the specified time limit
and in the manner required by the Act. In fact, under Section 77 of the
Act, the election returns are to be filed within 30 days of the publication
of results. All accounts of election expenditure and other expenses are to
be filed by the candidate with the concerned District Election Officer
(DEO), as stipulated under Rule 89(1) of the Conduct of Election Rules
1961 and each District Election Officer is required to send his/her report

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Critical Issues in Electrol Reforms 75

about the filing of such accounts to the Elec


On receipt of this report from the District E
Commission scrutinises the account. In cases of default, it issues
notification to the candidates about their disqualification under section
10A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, but before doing so,
the Election Commission provides ample opportunity to the candidates to
represent their cases. Valid for 3 years from the date of the order, the
disqualification notification under Section 10A has to be published in the
official gazette.

The Supreme Court in many cases has had occasions to deal with the
question, as to whether expenses incurred by a political party or a
candidate falls within the scope of Section 123 Clause 6, read with
Section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Supreme
Court in the famous Kanwarlal Gupta vs Amarnath Chawla (1975 (3)
SCC 646) case expressed the view that the expenses incurred by a
political party should be included in the candidate's election expenditure.

As a fallout of the Supreme Court judgement in the case mentioned


above, the Representation of the People Act, 1951 was amended, so as to
nullify the 1975 Supreme Court judgement. Explanation 1 to Section 77
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 was appended, by which,
unauthorised party and supporter expenditure in support of the candidate
did not count in election expenses incurred by a candidate, for the purpose
of ceiling, making the limit an exercise in futility.

On the other hand, a consideration of corporate financing reveals that


the Indian Companies Act, prior to 1969, did not make any specific
provision for donation by companies, but in 1969 a law was brought into
force, banning any company contribution to the election arena. Later,
Section 293, an amendment brought about in 1985, permitted companies
to make contributions to charitable and other funds up to 5 per cent of
their average profit of the three previous years. This amendment, brought
in with the view of curbing the parallel practice of black marketing in the
business-politics nexus has in fact turned volte face and has been replaced
by a lack of transparency and nepotism (Kochanek, 1987). The Election
Commission, however, does not approve of a total ban on donations by
companies to political parties.

Having considered existent strategies, which seem to have failed, the


curbing or channelising of money in the electoral process has become the
subject of growing concern, and the only hope in sight seems to be one
offered by state funding of elections. As against curbs being exercised
from without on a cash flow, which is beyond the control of a machinery
trying to ensure its proper use both vis-a-vis the limit and the manner of
its use, state funding offers an alternative, which might possibly induce
checks at inception rather than at the tail end, when things are

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76 The Indian Journal of Political Science

surreptitious and often only technically redeema


Election Commission, in a reversal of its earl
disfavour for direct cash subsidy and has suggeste

In the final analysis, one of the most pres


democracy today is a certain level of institu
elections. But this should, as far as possible, be i
monitoring and implementation. Furthermore, i
its purpose would otherwise be defeated; as, the
funding is not only to reduce the cost of élection
ways of political financing of elections, which ar
fact, state funding will certainly ensure a healthy
of parties, however limited the extent may be (K

Democracy within the Party

While pronouncing his order in the Janata


October 16, 1994, the Chief Election Commission
the political parties that if they failed to hold the
according to their constitution, necessary ac
according to the Election Symbols (Reservation
Thereby their status of being legitimate democr
jeopardy.

Some of the political parties particularly the Communist parties had


reacted sharply and questioned the authority of the Chief Election
Commissioner to interfere in internal party matters. In any case, these
parties, when in power, are not perceived as votaries of democracy and
free elections. The fundamental purpose of holding national elections is to
find a set of persons who can represent the people, make laws and govern
the country democratically. Elections provide a legislature and a
government that are representative and draw their legitimacy from the
consent of the people.

A necessary concomitant of representative democracy is the institution


of political parties. After the insertion of the 10th Schedule in the
Constitution, political parties have also received constitutional
recognition. It is usually the parties that fight elections and even after the
electoral battle is over, the roles of the government and the opposition are
assumed by the political parties. Governments in our democratic polity
have got to be party governments.

The role of political parties in elections and thereafter certainly


necessitates that any reforms in the political system or in the electoral
processes would have to start with the political parties. No party should
be eligible to participate in the democratic processes of the nation's
governance unless its own internal organisation and functioning are fully

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Critical Issues in Electro I Reforms 77

democratic. The provision of the respective pa


strictly followed and elections to constitute va
also be held regularly. The dismal record of alm
regard dictates the need for regulating and disc
with provision for deregistration of defaulting p

However, democratic principles and propr


necessary to examine whether the Chief Ele
exceeded his authority in this case or whether
at the altar of legality. Article 324 of the Const
of superintendence, direction and control of
Commission, which in fact is very wide and com

Section 29 A of the Representation of the Pe


for the registration with the Election Commis
application. The application for registration ha
names of party officer bearers, the nume
membership, memorandum or rules and regula
of the party. The Commission has been author
particulars, as it may deem fit'.

The decision of the Commission in the matter


final'. Under Section 170 of the same Act, th
courts to question the legality of any decis
conduct of Election Rules, 1961 issued under th
People Act 1 951, provides for the Election Com
assigning the symbols under Rules 5 and 1
(Reservation and Allotment) Order 1968, as
Commission in exercise of the powers un
Constitution, Section 29A and of the Represen
1951 and Rules 5 and 10 of the Conduct of Ele
lay down the regulations for recognition of po
of allocation of symbols.

Clause 3 lays down the additional particula


with an application for registration of a politic
political principles on which the party is ba
objects, programmes, functions and activities,
and the relationship of the party 'with the elect
it enjoys and tangible proof, if any, of such rel

Since the legal position is so strong, it hardl


that the Chief Election Commissioner is entirel
the much needed initiative for trying to disci
political parties before they can be allowed to t
process of election, as registered and recog
Election Commission's power to deregister a

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78 The Indian Journal of Political Science

follows from his power to register and/or recogn


over all constitutional provisions in Articl
Commission has the power to grant a symbol to a
authority not to grant or to withdraw a symbol.

While the party constitutions provide for perio


levels, these are rarely held. It is a party caucus,
boss who rules the roost with the help of power
sycophants and hangers on. The party bos
irremovable Czars. Even city and districts commi
one-person high commands, even if the show of
made, the supreme boss is authorised to nominat
an election is actually held, the elected ones are c
become nominated. Therefore, both on demo
propriety and on grounds of law, the Chief E
much needed directive to the political partie
commendable (Limaye, 1994).

Since the 1990s, the Commission has donned


efforts to cleanse the electoral system. The C
repolis at polling stations and whole constituenci
were vitiated. The Model Code of Conduct was
scheduled and bye-elections to the Legislative Ass
States were postponed for breach of Code by the
concerned State. The election law was also implem
disciplining the candidates and parties. The ef
election law and Model Code of Conduct by the e
salutary effects in the conduct of elections in th
were more peaceful and less expensive, compar
during the eighties. Seshan deserves the full cred
functioning of the election machinery in the coun
the common man as having interest, beside p
cleansing the electoral process and setting up con
of free and fair elections. His example deserv
successors.

Criminalisation of Politics

Criminalisation of politics is one of the most urgent issues for the


Parliament to consider and legislate to tackle the problem. The
Commission, in its declared statistics of August 1997, revealed that nearly
40 Members of the Parliament present were involved in criminal cases
pending against them, whereas nearly 700 Members of the Legislative
Assemblies, out of the 4072 members, were involved in criminal cases
and trials were pending against them ( The Tribune , 21 Aug. 1997). The
Election Commission suggested a series of steps including the filing of

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Critical Issues in Electrol Reforms 79

declarations by political parties with the Comm


field candidates and give tickets to tho
criminals, even if imprisoned for a period
cognizable offence, in any election. Anothe
Commission to crack the whip was that po
recognise and de-register political parties, whi
convicts, who were imprisoned for five year
the Parliament or Assembly elections, after gi
be heard. The Commission felt that the nomination form should contain a
column seeking information if the candidate had ever been jailed and its
duration, criminal cases pending against the persons, and, if the person
had been charge-sheeted for any offence. In the event of any person
providing false information or suppression of any information, not only
should the election be set aside, but it should be cancelled as well, and the
person should be punished with imprisonment up to 5 years or fine or
both.

In a significant order to curb the criminalisation of politics, the


Election Commission on 28th August 1997 passed an order, which
prohibited convicted persons, regardless of whether an appeal was
pending in a higher court, from contesting elections. The Election
Commission felt that though Section 8 of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951 provided that any convict would stand disqualified from
contesting elections to the Parliament and Legislatures for six years, those
on bail or with an appeal pending were being allowed to contest. The
Commission had referred to Article 324 of the Constitution and
judgements of High Courts (Madhya Pradesh High Court in the
Purshottam Kaushik v. Vidya Charan Shukla Case, the Allahabad High
Court in Sachindra Nath Tripathi v. Doodnath Case and the Himachal
Pradesh High Court in Vikram Anand v. Rakesh Singh Case) on Section 8
of the Representation of the People Act. It had directed the States, Union
Territories and Chief Electoral Officers that disqualification of candidates
under section 8 of the Representation of the People Act would commence
from the date of conviction, irrespective of whether the person was out on
bail. The Election Commission had asked the Returning Officers to get
affidavits from candidates mentioning whether they were convicted by a
court of law, beside the date of conviction, the nature of offence, the
punishment imposed and the period of imprisonment, on a prescribed
form {The Indian Express , 29 Aug. 1997).

The Commission, in continuation of its desire to curb the menace of


criminalisation, recommended to the Government sweeping changes in
the election laws, suggesting that a person sentenced for more than six
months should be debarred from contesting in elections for a period of six
years and above. It further suggested that by clubbing Sections 8(1), 8(2)
and 8(3) of the Act, it would make it mandatory for a person convicted by

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80 The Indian Journal of Political Science

a Court of Law and sentenced to imprisonment fo


be debarred from contesting elections for a perio
imposed plus an additional six years ( The Indian

Recommendations on Electoral Reforms: The Law Commission and


the Election Commission

The Law Commission of India, in its 170th Report, came out with
several proposals relating electoral reforms, which are worth considering.
One of the proposals relate to the introduction of the List System to cover
the 138 additional seats to be created in the Lok Sabha, taking its total
strength to 688. The suggestion made was to allocate the 138 seats to
various States or territorial units and fill them from previously published
lists of candidates nominated by recognised parties, in proportion to the
total number of votes polled by each party in a State/territorial unit. The
object was twofold: (a) to secure representation for a party which secures
a large number of votes, but fails to win a proportionate number of seats
and (b) to enable eminent persons who do not like to contest to be thus
elected.

It is not uncommon that a party secures a large number of votes polled


in a State but still does not win a single seat in the general election. The
List System helps such a party to some extent. It will benefit the leading
parties, more than the smaller ones. Although the List System is desirable,
the suggestion to increase the strength of the Lok Sabha needs to be
carefully considered.

The Law Commission's suggestion for amending the Tenth Schedule


of the Constitution to checkmate unprincipled defections and desertions
under the guise of a 'split' is most welcome. The Commission suggests
that once a candidate's elected to a party, s/he will remain thus till the
dissolution of the House or the end of his/her membership and the
concepts of 'split' and 'merger' should have to be given up. If one or more
members decide to leave a party and join another, they should resign their
membership of the House forthwith, and seek a fresh mandate on the
ticket of another party. Another suggestion that the disputes arising under
the Tenth Schedule be decided by the Election Commission under Article
103 or 192 as the case may be, and not by the Speaker/Chairperson of a
House is equally good, as some of the Speakers have exercised their
power under para 6 of the Tenth Schedule in a partisan manner.

Yet another important suggestion made by the Law Commission is the


amendment of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which now
provides for disqualification on the grounds of conviction, for certain
offences. The proposal is that on the framing of charges by a criminal
court for any of the specified offences, the accused should remain

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Critical Issues in Electro I Reforms 81

disqualified till s/he is acquitted. The Elect


same view. There are few connected suggestio
entry of criminals into Legislatures, which are

The need for a law mandating the political pa


accounts of income and expenditure and have
and to have an authority to oversee the functio
has been long felt. In 1994, the Justice V.R
suggested a law for the regulation of political
has, in several decisions, pointed out the futil
on election expenses, without removing the ex
(Law Commission of India, 1988).

The Commission suggests the deletion of ex


(1) of Section 77, which permits a political
interested in a candidate to spend any amo
election and recommends the insertion of a n
dealing with the maintenance of accounts by
It favours a partial state funding of the electio
parties and for this purpose suggests the i
providing for the free supply of copies of th
petrol and reimbursement of the expendi
loudspeakers. Although state funding to a muc
financial constraints stand in the way (Rao, 19

The Election Commission of India has alwa


political parties should be required to com
accounts and get them audited by agencies spe
There is a strong need for transparency in the
funds by the political parties and als p about
funds are expended by them. Therefore, th
required to publish their accounts annually, fo
of the general public and all concerned
maintenance of such accounts and their auditi
is a pre-requisite. The Commission, therefore,
acceptance of the proposal and reiterates its ea

The Election Commission is in favour of the


political party to be included in the election e
purposes of ceiling on election expenses. In
been insistently pressing for such a reform, ri
The Supreme Court of India has also, time and
inadequacy of the existing provisions in this
power definitely disturbs the level playing fi
between contesting candidates and contesting
great need to ensure that the role of money p
election arena is curbed significantly, if not, to

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82 The Indian Journal of Political Science

The Election Commission is in favour of empow


ceiling on election expenses before every general
Commission, which is in touch with the ground re
system in the country and with the elections and
place in various constituencies, is best equipp
election expenses for various constituencies,
election.

Political parties are registered with the Com


provisions of Section 29A of the Representation
The Section, as it stands, suffers from a certain
about any small group of persons, if they so desir
political party, by making a simple declaratio
This has resulted in the mushrooming and prolife
of non-serious parties, which creates a considerab
management of elections. By way of example, mo
presently registered with the Election Commission
or so contested in the general elections of 1998. Si
aware as to how easy it is to get a political par
Election Commission, probably, the motivation fo
to get registered is to give some sort of distorted
standing in their localities, particularly in the ru
The Commission feels that election is a serious pr
of small groups of individuals, who have no serio
contest elections, should not be easily allowed to
from the Commission as active political parties. I
being sufficient conditions under Section 29A to
political party, the Section also suffers from a ser
registered, a political party would stay registered
does not contest any election over decades of
because there is no specific provision to de-regist
certain political parties, which have served t
presently become defunct, which is normal in
democracy, also stay on the rolls of the Comm
political parties. The Commission, therefore, su
existing Section 29 A of the Representation o
another clause may be introduced authorising the
issue the necessary orders, regulating the registra
of political parties.

In 1998 the Election Commission came out wi


procedural delay in invoking Section 8A, the auto
a person found guilty of corrupt practices, shoul
suitable amendments to the Representation of the

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Critical Issues in Electrol Reforms 83

The Commission felt that Article 324 of the Constitution should be


amended to provide that (a) there should be a maximum of two Election
Commissioners, along with the Chief Election Commissioner; and (b) the
method of appointment and the constitutional protection after
appointment, should be the same for the Chief Election Commissioner
and other Election Commissioners. The Election Commission reiterated
and urged early action on the need to have an independent Secretariat on
the lines of the Lok Sabha and the expenses of the Commission should be
'charged' to the Consolidated Fund of India.

The Election Commission reiterated its proposal that the Commission


should be specifically empowered under the statute to frame rules for
disciplinary proceedings and impose suitable penalties on Election
Officers, who are on deputation to the Commission and subject to its
control, superintendence and discipline, if found guilty of acts of
omission and commission while performing election duties, as mentioned
in Section 13 CC of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and
Section 28A of the Representation of the People Act 1951.

Government vs Election Commission

In an effort to curb the growing menace of criminalisation of politics,


the Delhi High Court, in a landmark judgement (November 2000 and as a
result of a Public Interest Litigation filed by a group of committed
individuals, under the aegis of Association for Democratic Reforms), has
reinforced and strengthened the Election Commission's desire to cleanse
the political system ridden with criminal elements. The Court has asked
the Election Commission of India to inform voters about the criminal
background of candidates contesting elections to the Parliament and
Legislative Assemblies. The Court observed, "The Election Commission
shall secure to the voters information whether a candidatè is accused of
any offence punishable with imprisonment'^ Judgement of the High
Court of Delhi, C.W.P. No. 7257 Of 1999, dated 02nd November on
Criminalisation of Politics).

It also said that information on assets possessed by candidates, his or


her spouse and dependent shall be collected and given to the voters. The
voters shall also be informed about the candidate's educational
qualifications. A candidate shall have to give the required information at
the time of filing of the nomination paper. The candidate can be
prosecuted for giving wrong or false information and the Commission can
file a criminal complaint against the candidate. Further, the Court has
asked the Commission to frame norms and modalities within four months
of the order. The Court left it to the Commission to issue directives to the
government or departments concerned to get assistance in gathering the
information.

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84 The Indian Journal of Political Science

When the Union Government appealed against


Supreme Court, the latter upheld the Delhi Hi
Supreme Court's judgement is based upon two pre
to know and of informed voting under Arti
Commission's power and duty under Article 324
What Court has done is to merely fill "the void in
legislation" pending action by the legislature.
merely reminded the Election Commission that t
wide-ranging powers. Unfortunately, the presen
construed as a fight between the Supreme C
Commission on the one hand, and Parliament on
the right to legislate on electoral reforms. Pu
Judgement, the Election Commission issued i
candidate to furnish information to the Retur
criminal convictions, (ii) pending criminal cases
more than two years, (iii) assets, (iv)liabilities
and (v) educational qualifications.

Subsequently, the government prepared a draf


passed by the Parliament could override the
guidelines. The draft bill is silent on the need fo
their assets, liabilities and educational qualif
provides for "disqualification of those candidates
two separate criminal proceedings concerning he
by a court at least six months prior to filing the
stipulates that a candidate will have to furnish in
he/she has been accused of any offence punishabl
two years or more in a pending case in which a
by a court.

The bill is a complete dilution of what the Supreme Court had


pronounced. In fact, the government was forced to come out with this
draft bill (likely to be passed in the monsoon session), lest the Election
Commission's guidelines which are far more stringent be implemented. It
is thus perceived that though the ostensible purpose of the legislation is to
implement the Supreme Court judgement, there is reason to worry that the
actual object of the proposed law would be to dilute it in a manner which
negates its impact. The reform bill doesn't address many other issues such
as election financing and corruption, anti defection laws, reforms in
electoral machinery, which have been long debated and call for urgent
reforms. Unfortunately, the political elites don't seem to be serious with
the agenda for pursuing serious electoral reforms. In the absence of such
initiative and vigour, the institution of civil society alone can bring about
a sea change by electing representatives whose efforts find fruition in
validating a vivacious democracy (Kumar, 2002).

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Critical Issues in Electrol Reforms 85

Conclusion

The Commission continues to carry forward the mantle of activism


which it had donned during Seshan's era. Among the notable
achievements in recent times have been the raising of the expenditure
limit to Rs. 15 lakhs for a Parliamentary Constituency and Rs.6 lakhs for
an Assembly Constituency, ensuring inner party democracy among all the
recognised political parties, issuing the order on breakaway factions and
awarding national and State recognition to breakaway groups, effectively
enforcing the Model Code of Conduct, from the day of the announcement
of the elections by the Election Commission, barring the entry of
criminals in the electoral arena . It is, therefore, worth observing that the
Commission has in the last decade moved largely from being a
'procedural' institution to a 'proactive' one, thereby discharging the
onerous responsibility that has been entrusted to it by the Founding
Fathers of the Constitution and the people of India.

The role of the Election Commission of India in conducting free and


fair elections, has become more crucial for the consolidation of India's
democracy. This could be realised by strengthening the hands of the
Election Commission and plugging those loopholes that permit the
Executive to interfere with the working of the Commission. An Election
Commission that is able to assert its role and stand up to the political
pressures exerted by the Government of the day would significantly
contribute to enriching the quality and content of Indian democracy. In
the light of the four decades of experience and experimentation with
parliamentary democracy and with a view to strengthening the
commitment of the system to democratic values and principles, a review
of the organisation and functions of the Election Commission has today
become necessary.

In the early years after independence, free and fair elections used to
happen by themselves, largely due to the personalities involved in the
electoral fray and the relatively simple nature of the issues involved in
those elections. The Election Commission had at those times, a role to
perform that was not too difficult, namely, to ensure that everybody
concerned adheres to the procedures laid down for the conduct of
elections. However, as things became more complex, as rivalries between
political parties and personages became more acute and when gradually
the prevalent dictum in the political arena became one of end justifying
the means, the Election Commission had to assume a proactive role.

Political institutions encompass three kinds of entities ~ elected


institutions of the state such as Parliaments, non-elected institutions of the
state, such as the bureaucracy, police, judiciary and armed forces and the
organisations of civil society, such as the press and myriad professional
and other associations. In the final analysis, it would appear that the

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86 The Indian Journal of Political Science

process of institutional decay is ending and a


reinvigoration has begun, especially because I
become much more powerful than it was bef
institutions with overseeing responsibility
Commission and the Judiciary, have begun to rep
society much more effectively than before.

Finally, the success of the reform(s) would dep


of and adherence to the system on the part of th
all levels - the political parties, the candidates
independent press and enlightened public opinion
their role is crucial in pushing through reforms.

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