FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 103149. November 15, 2000.]

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK , petitioner, vs .

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE NICASIO O. DE LOS REYES,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 11, MARIA
LETBEE ANG, BLANQUITA ANG, LETICIA L. ANG HERNANDEZ,
JESUS L. ANG, JR., LORETA L. ANG, BONIFACIO L. ANG, LORENA L.
ANG, LANI L. ANG, JEMMUEL L. ANG and LIZA L. ANG , respondents.

Dominguez Paderna & Tan Law Office for petitioner.

Rama Abarquez Alabastro Olaguer & Kintanar Law Offices for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

PCIBank led with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City a claim for the payment of
a loan account. It claimed that decedent Jesus Ang, Sr. executed a security agreement and
a real estate mortgage in favor of Insular Bank of Asia and America (predecessor-in-
interest of PCIBank) to secure a loan in favor of JA Enterprises. PCIBank caused an extra-
judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property and its sale at public auction. However it
failed to recover the full amount of the decedent's obligation. Thus PCIBank led its claim
against the estate of Jesus T. Ang, Sr. The administratrix of the estate led an opposition
to the PCIBank claim, questioning the interest rates imposed as usurious and illegal. Ang's
wife also led a motion for intervention as half owner of the properties in question. The
trial court granted the motion. The wife led a petition for preliminary injunction to enjoin
PCIBank from consolidating title of the mortgaged properties in its name claiming that the
mortgage of the conjugal properties was without her knowledge. The trial court granted
the preliminary injunction and ordered the posting of bond, which was executed by the
wife. PCIBank led a petition for a temporary restraining order with the Court of Appeals,
which the latter granted. PCIBank led a supplemental petition for prohibition and
certiorari with preliminary injunction, so as not to enforce the writ issued by the trial court.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the supplemental petition and denied the motion for
reconsideration. Thus, this petition.
PCIBank asserted that the writ may not be issued because of the restraining order
by the Court of Appeals. However, the latter was withdrawn by the Court of Appeals and
sustained the injunction issued by the trial court. The grant or denial of an injunction rests
upon the sound discretion of the court. Hence, considering that there were factual reasons
for the issuance of the writ, the Supreme Court found no error on the part of the Court of
Appeals in a rming the issuance of an injunction. The decision of the Court of Appeals
was affirmed.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PLEADINGS; EXTENSION OF TIME TO

FILE A RESPONSIVE PLEADING; DISCRETIONARY UPON THE COURT. — Adequate
opportunity was given to petitioner to oppose the application for the writ as well as to le
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 its answer to the complaint-in-intervention. Petitioner may not presume that its motion for
extension would be granted as a matter of course. The grant of an extension of time to le
a responsive pleading is discretionary on the part of the court.
2. ID.; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; MAY BE
GRANTED AT ANY STAGE PRIOR TO THE JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER. — Preliminary
injunction may be granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or
nal order, ordering a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or
acts. For as long as the requisites for its issuance are present in the case, such issuance is
valid.
3. CIVIL LAW; SALES; FORECLOSURE SALE; CONSOLIDATION OF TITLE MAY BE
DONE ONLY AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE REDEMPTION PERIOD. — It is only upon
expiration of the redemption period, without the judgment debtor having made use of his
right of redemption, that ownership of the land sold in a foreclosure sale becomes
consolidated in the purchaser. The probate court issued the writ to enjoin petitioner and
other concerned parties from performing any act which would directly or indirectly enforce
the effects of the extra-judicial foreclosure of decedent's property caused by petitioner
bank, in order to preserve the estate of the decedent. Consolidation of title would have the
consequence of transferring ownership since the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the
absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one
year after the registration of the sale. Therefore, at the time the writ was issued there was
yet no issue regarding ownership because the period for redemption had not lapsed. SaIEcA

4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF

DECEASED PERSONS; OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY; MAY BE PASSED UPON WITH
FINALITY IN A SEPARATE ACTION TO RESOLVE TITLE. — The probate court may pass
upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may not be included
in the estate proceedings, but such determination is provisional in character and is subject
to nal decision in a separate action to resolve title. Thus, the allegations of Blanquita Ang
that her signatures on the real estate mortgage documents were forged may be ventilated
in a separate proceeding, requiring the presentation of clear and convincing evidence.

DECISION

PARDO , J : p

The case under consideration is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1
of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition of the Philippine Commercial International
Bank (PCIBank) for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and denying the
motion for reconsideration of PCIBank. AcSHCD

On June 5, 1990, PCIBank led with the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 11 2
a claim for payment of a loan account. 3 PCIBank alleged that on November 28, 1983 and
September 18, 1984, the decedent, Jesus T. Ang, Sr., executed a surety agreement and real
estate mortgage, respectively, in favor of PCIBank's predecessor-in-interest (Insular Bank
of Asia and America) to secure a loan extended by it to JA Enterprises.
According to PCIBank, the outstanding obligation of the decedent as of November
20, 1989, amounted to P5,883,779.74. PCIBank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
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 mortgaged property and its sale at public auction; however, it failed to recover the full
amount of decedent's obligation. On December 20 and 21, 1989, the deputy sheriff of
Davao City issued two provisional certi cates of sale 4 stating that the mortgaged parcels
of land were sold to the sole and highest bidder, PCIBank, at an auction sale, for the
amount of P2,080,100.00 and P1,269,600.00, respectively. Thus, PCIBank led its claim
against the estate of Jesus T. Ang, Sr. to recover the de ciency of P2,703,818.12 and
attorney's fees of P781,325.22.
On September 25, 1990, Maria Letbee L. Ang, judicial administratrix of the estate of
Jesus T. Ang, Sr., led an opposition to PCIBank's claim, questioning the interest rates
imposed by PCIBank. 5 According to Ang, PCIBank imposed usurious and illegal interest
rates and the amount sought to be collected "would in effect practically wipe out the entire
holdings of the intestate estate of the decedent." 6
On September 14, 1990, Blanquita L. Ang, wife of the decedent, led a motion for
leave to intervene in the proceedings to dispute the claim of PCIBank, 7 attaching a copy of
her complaint-in-intervention. Blanquita Ang maintained that she had legal interest in the
subject of the claims of petitioner bank, being the legal wife of the decedent and
considering that the property involved belonged to the conjugal partnership, to which she
was entitled to one-half share. She neither encumbered her conjugal share nor conformed
to any encumbrance. She was not a party to the execution of the agreements entered into
between the decedent and petitioner bank involving conjugal property of the spouses Ang
because, due to her meager educational attainment, she was neither aware nor apprised of
the business transactions entered into by her husband. It was her husband alone who
conducted the management, administration and operations of the business ventures and
property. 8
On September 24, 1990, the trial court granted Blanquita's motion to intervene and
ordered her to le additional copies of her complaint-in-intervention to be attached to the
summons to be served upon defendants-in-intervention. 9
On October 24, 1990, Blanquita Ang led with the Regional Trial Court, Davao City,
Branch 11 a petition for preliminary injunction 1 0 to enjoin PCIBank and the other
defendants-in-intervention from consolidating title in the name of PCIBank, canceling any
of the certi cates of title of the mortgaged property and issuing new certi cates of title in
the name of PCIBank. Blanquita Ang alleged that several documents purporting to be
promissory notes and real estate mortgages covering various parcels of land included her
share in the conjugal property. However, she denied being a party to any of those
documents.
On November 5, 1990, PCIBank received a copy of respondent Blanquita L. Ang's
petition for preliminary injunction. Thereafter, PCIBank led its opposition, stating that the
application was premature because PCIBank had not received a copy of Blanquita Ang's
complaint-in-intervention. 1 1
On November 23, 1990, PCIBank received a copy of the complaint-in-intervention of
Blanquita Ang. Thereafter, it led with the trial court an urgent motion for extension of time
to file "responsive or any other pleadings" to the complaint-in-intervention. 1 2
On November 28, 1990, the trial court issued an order resetting the date of hearing
of the application of preliminary injunction to December 4, 1990, and noti ed the parties
accordingly. 1 3

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 At the scheduled hearing on December 4, 1990, the trial court denied PCIBank's
motion for extension to le a responsive pleading. The trial court then proceeded to hear
the application for the issuance of preliminary injunction. PCIBank objected to the
continuation of the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, manifesting in
open court that since he had not yet led an answer to the complaint-in-intervention, the
hearing on the application should not proceed. The trial court overruled the objection.
Consequently, PCIBank's counsel walked out of the courtroom. The trial court then allowed
intervenor Blanquita Ang to present her evidence ex-parte.
On December 6, 1990, the trial court issued an order granting the application for
preliminary injunction and required the ling of an injunction bond in the amount of
P10,000.00. 1 4
On December 13, 1990, following the posting of the bond by respondent Blanquita
Ang, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction ordering the Provincial
Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Register of Deeds, Davao City, and PCIBank "to
cease, desist, refrain from, suspend, stop and defer any act or acts whatsoever, whether
directly or indirectly, which tend to enforce the effects of the foreclosure proceedings and
auction sale conducted on 20 December 1989, . . ., or cause and implement the
cancellation of any of the above identi ed certi cates of title which are now in the name of
the spouses Jesus T. Ang, Sr. and Blanquita L. Ang, or issue in lieu thereof any new
certi cates of title or titles in the name of Philippine Commercial and International Bank or
any other person or entity, until further order of this Court." 1 5
However, on December 12, 1990, the Court of Appeals, upon petition by PCIBank,
issued a temporary restraining order for respondent judge to desist from conducting
further proceedings in Special Proceedings Case No. 3215. 1 6
On December 17, 1990, PCIBank led with the Court of Appeals a Supplemental
Petition, 1 7 insisting that the enforcement of the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
issued by the trial court on December 13, 1990 could no longer be done in view of the
restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals on December 12, 1990.
On October 22, 1991, the Court of Appeals dismissed PCIBank's petition and
supplemental petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction. 1 8 On
December 9, 1991, the Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by PCIBank. 1 9
Hence, this petition. 2 0
At issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in a rming the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction by the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 11 in Special
Proceedings Case No. 3215-90, pertaining to the claim of petitioner PCIBank. CTEaDc

Petitioner submitted that such issuance was premature, because no answer was
led yet and the issues had not been joined. Petitioner also contended that the trial court
had no jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ because it effectively determined the
question of ownership over the property, which question was beyond the jurisdiction of the
probate court. Moreover, the writ was issued despite the prior issuance by the appellate
court of a temporary restraining order enjoining the trial court from continuing its
proceedings.
According to respondents, petitioner's insistence that the hearing on the application
for injunctive writ should not proceed due to the non-joinder of issues was a mere delaying
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 tactic intended to force the lapse of the redemption period on December 20, 1990, thus
rendering the right of redemption moot and academic.
Respondents denied raising any issue of ownership because the titles to the
property unquestionably belonged to Blanquita Ang as the legal heir and surviving widow
of Jose Ang, and the titles to the foreclosed property had not been consolidated in the
name of petitioner bank.
Respondents also emphasized that all the documents submitted by petitioner
evidencing the real estate mortgages and foreclosure thereof contained forged signatures
of Blanquita Ang. In several documents, she was not even included as party to the
transaction. Thus, she was not bound by the agreement entered into by the decedent Jose
Ang, Sr. and petitioner bank.
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner claims that it was not given su cient opportunity to le an answer in
opposition to the application for preliminary injunction due to its belated receipt of the
complaint-in-intervention. Such contention is untenable. Since it received a copy of the
complaint-in-intervention on November 23, 1990, there was ample time to prepare an
answer for the hearing set on December 4, 1990. Moreover, petitioner was duly noti ed of
the hearing on the application for the writ. In fact, the hearing had been reset and
appropriate notices given to the parties. The record further showed that petitioner's
counsel attended the hearing on December 4, 1990, but decided not to take part in the
proceedings when his motion for extension of time to le responsive pleading was denied.
Thus, adequate opportunity was given to petitioner to oppose the application for the
writ as well as to le its answer to the complaint-in-intervention. Petitioner may not
presume that its motion for extension would be granted as a matter of course. The grant
of an extension of time to le a responsive pleading is discretionary on the part of the
court.
Furthermore, contrary to petitioner's contention, the Rules of Court do not require
that issues be joined before preliminary injunction may issue. Preliminary injunction may be
granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or nal order,
ordering a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. 2 1
For as long as the requisites for its issuance are present in the case, such issuance is valid.
Petitioner's contention that the writ of injunction issued by the trial court effectively
adjudicated ownership of the mortgaged property in favor of respondent Blanquita Ang is
misplaced. It is only upon expiration of the redemption period, without the judgment
debtor having made use of his right of redemption, that ownership of the land sold in a
foreclosure sale becomes consolidated in the purchaser. 2 2 The probate court issued the
writ to enjoin petitioner and other concerned parties from performing any act which would
directly or indirectly enforce the effects of the extrajudicial foreclosure of decedent's
property caused by petitioner bank, in order to preserve the estate of the decedent.
Consolidation of title would have the consequence of transferring ownership since the
buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is
not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. 2 3 Therefore,
at the time the writ was issued there was yet no issue regarding ownership because the
period for redemption had not lapsed.
Nevertheless, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership
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 of a property which may or may not be included in the estate proceedings, but such
determination is provisional in character and is subject to nal decision in a separate
action to resolve title. 2 4 Thus, the allegations of Blanquita Ang that her signatures on the real
estate mortgage documents were forged may be ventilated in a separate proceeding, requiring
the presentation of clear and convincing evidence.

Petitioner asserts that the writ may not issue because of the prior issuance of a
temporary restraining order by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, later
on withdrew its temporary restraining order and sustained the injunction issued by the trial
court. The grant or denial of an injunction rests in the sound discretion of the court. 2 5
Considering that there were factual reasons necessitating the issuance of the writ, we nd
that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the issuance of an injunction.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto. No
costs. HTCSDE

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. In CA-G.R. SP No. 23624, promulgated on October 22, 1991, Benipayo, J., ponente,
Herrera, M.C. and Garcia, JJ., concurring.

2. In Special Proceedings Case No. 3215-90, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate of Jesus
T. Ang, Sr."
3. Petition, Annex "G", CA Rollo, pp. 41-43.

4. Petition, Annexes "D" & "E", CA Rollo, pp. 33-39.

5. Petition, Annex "H", CA Rollo, pp. 44-47.
6. Opposition to PCIBank Claims dated June 5 and August 8, 1990, CA Rollo, p. 44.
7. Petition, Annex "I", CA Rollo, p. 49.

8. Ibid., CA Rollo, pp. 49-51.

9. Petition, Annex "J", CA Rollo, p. 53.
10. Petition, Annex "K", CA Rollo, pp. 55-59.
11. Petition, Annex "L", CA Rollo, pp. 61-64.
12. Filed on December 4, 1990, Petition, Annex "Q"; CA Rollo, pp. 81-82.

13. Petition, Annex "S", CA Rollo, p. 84.

14. Petition, Annex "B-Supplement," CA Rollo, pp. 96-97.
15. Petition, Annex "A-Supplement," CA Rollo, pp. 94-95.
16. Resolution, CA-G.R. SP No. 23624, CA Rollo, pp. 87-88.
17. CA Rollo, pp. 89-93.

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 18. Rollo, pp. 22-27.
19. Resolution, Rollo, p. 29.
20. Filed December 27, 1991, Rollo, pp. 2-20. On July 6, 1992, we gave due course to the
petition, Rollo, p. 180.
21. Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 771 (1997).
22. Oronce v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 133 (1998).
23. Unionbank v. Court of Appeals, 311 SCRA 795 (1999).
24. Vizconde v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 217 (1998), citing Pastor, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, 207 Phil. 758 (1983).
25. Ortañez-Enderes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128525, December 17, 1999.

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