On Social Structure

Author(s): A. R. Radcliffe-Brown
Source: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol.
70, No. 1 (1940), pp. 1-12
Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2844197
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 ON SOCIAL STRUCTURE

PresidentialAddress

By A. R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, M.A.

It has been suggestedto me by some of myfriendsthat I shoulduse this occasionto offer

some remarksabout my own pointof view in social anthropology;and since in my teaching,
beginningat Cambridgeand at the London School of Economicsthirtyyearsago, I have con-
sistentlyemphasisedthe importanceof the study of social structure,the suggestionmadeto
me was thatI shouldsay something on thatsubject.
I hope you will pardon me if I begin with a note of personalexplanation. I have been
describedon morethan one occasionas belongingto somethingcalled the " FunctionalSchool
of Social Anthropology " and even as beingits leader, or one of its leaders. This Functional
Schooldoes not reallyexist; it is a mythinventedby ProfessorMalinowski. He has explained
how,to quote his own words," the magnificent title of the FunctionalSchool of Anthropology
has been bestowedby myself,in a way on myself,and to a largeextentout ofmy ownsenseof
irresponsibility." ProfessorMalinowski'sirresponsibility has had unfortunateresults,since
it has spread over anthropology a dense fog of discussionabout " functionalism."Professor
Lowie has announcedthat the leading,thoughnot the only,exponentof functionalism in the
nineteenthcenturywas ProfessorFranz Boas. I do not thiinkthat thereis any special sense,
otherthan the purelychronologicalone, in whichI can be said to be eitherthe followerof
ProfessorBoas or the predecessorof ProfessorMalinowski. The statementthat I am a
" functionalist,"or equallythestatementthat I am not,wouldseemto me to conveyno definite
meaning.
Thereis no place in naturalsciencefor" schools" in thissense,and I regardsocial anthro-
pologyas a branchof naturalscience. Each scientiststartsfromthe workof his predecessors,
findsproblemswhichhe believesto be significant, and by observationand reasoningendeavours
to make some contributionto a growingbody of theory. Co-operationamongstscientists
resultsfromthe factthattheyare workingon the same or relatedproblems. Such co-operation
does not resultin the formation ofschools,in the sensein whichthereare schoolsofphilosophy
or ofpainting. Thereis no place fororthodoxiesand heterodoxies in science. Nothingis more
in
pernicious science than attemptsto establishadherenceto doctrines. All that a teachercan
do is to assistthe studentin learningto understandand use the scientific method. It is not his
business to make disciples.
A
2 Address
A. R. RADCLIFFE-BRowN-Presidential

I conceiveof social anthropologyas the theoreticalnatural science of lhumansociety,

that is, the investigationof social phenomenaby methodsessentiallysimilarto those used in
the physicaland biologicalsciences. I am quite willingto call the subject " comparative
sociology,"if any one so wishes. It is the subjectitself,and not the name,that is important.
As you know,thereare some ethnologistsor anthropologists who hold that it is not possible,
or at least not profitable,to apply to socialphenomenathe theoreticalmethodsof natural
science. For thesepersonssocial anthropology, as I have definedit, is something that does not,
and neverwill,exist. For them,ofcourse,myremarkswillhave no meaning,or at leastnotthe
meaningI intendthemto have.
While I have definedsocial anthropology as the study of humansociety,thereare some
whodefineit as the studyofculture. It mightperhapsbe thoughtthatthisdifference ofdefini-
tion is of minorimportance. Actuallyit leads to two different kinds of study,betweenwhich
it is hardlypossibleto obtainagreement in the formulation ofproblems.
For a preliminary definition of social phenomenait seems sufficiently clear that what we
have to deal withare relationsof associationbetweenindividualorganisms. In a hive of bees
thereare the relationsof associationof the queen, the workersand the drones. Thereis the
associationof animalsin a herd,of a mother-cat and herkittens. These are social phenomena;
I do not supposethat any one will call themculturalphenomena. In anthropology, of course,
we are onlyconcernedwithhumanbeings,and in social anthropology, as I defineit, what we
have to investigateare the formsofassociationto be foundamongsthumaxn beings.
Let us considerwhatare the concrete,observablefactswithwhichthe social anthropologist
is concerned. If we set out to study,for example, the aboriginalinhabitantsof a part of
Australia,we finda certainnumberofindividualhumanbeingsin a certainnaturalenvironment.
We can observetheacts ofbehaviouroftheseindividuals,including, ofcourse,theiracts ofspeech,
and the materialproductsof past actions. We do not observea " culture,"since that word
denotes,not any concretereality,but an abstraction,and as it is commonlyused a vague
abstraction. But directobservationdoes revealto us that these humanbeingsare connected
by a complexnetworkof social relations. I use the term " social structure " to denotethis
networkofactuallyexistingrelations. It is thisthat I regardit as mybusinessto studyif I am
working,not as an ethnologistor psychologist, but as a social anthropologist.I do not mean
thatthe studyofsocialstructure is the whole social anthropology,
of but I do regardit as being
in a veryimportantsensethe mostfundamental partofthe science.
My view of naturalscienceis that it is the systematicinvestigationof the structureofthe
universeas it is revealedto us throughoursenses. Thereare certainimportantseparatebranches
ofscience,each of whichdeals witha certainclassorkindofstructures, theaim beingto discover
the characteristics of all structuresofthat kind. So atomic physicsdeals withthe structure
of atoms, chemistrywith the structureof molecules,crystallography and colloidalchemistry
withthe structureof crystalsand colloids,and anatomyand physiologywiththe structures of
I
organisms. Thereis, therefore,suggest,place for a branch of natural science which will have
forits task the discoveryof the generalcharacteristics of thosesocial structuresof whichthe
componentunitsare humanbeings.
 On Social Structure 3

Social phenomenaconstitutea distinctclass ofnaturalphenomena. Theyare all, in one way

or another,connectedwiththe existenceofsocial structures, eitherbeingimpliedin or resultinig
fromthem. Social structures justare as real as are individualorganisms. A complexorganism
is a collectionoflivingcells and interstitialfluidsarrangedin a certainstructure; and a living
cell is similarlya structuralarrangement of complexmolecules. The physiologicaland psycho-
logical phenomenathat we observein the lives of organismsare not simplythe resultof the
natureoftheconstituent moleculesor atomsofwhichtheorganismis builtup, but are the result
of the structurein whichtheyare united. So also the social phenomenawhichwe observein
any humansocietyare not the immediateresultof the natureofindividualhumanbeings,but
are tlie resultof the social structureby whichtheyare united.
It shouldbe noted that to say we are studyingsocial structuresis not exactlythe same
thingas sayingthatwe studysocialrelations,whichis howsomesociologistsdefinetheirsubject.
A particularsocial relationbetweentwo persons(unlesstheybe Adam and Eve in the Gardenof
Eden) exists only as part of a wide networkof social relations,involvingmanyotherpersons,
and it is thisnetworkwhichI regardas the object of ourinvestigations.
I am aware, of course,that the term" social structure" is used in a numberof different
senses,some of them veryvague. This is unfortunately true of many othertermscommonly
used by anthropologists.The choice of termsand theirdefinitions is a matterof scientific
convenience, but one ofthecharacteristicsofa scienceas soonas it has passed thefirstformative
periodis the existenceoftechnicaltermswhichare used in the same precisemeaningby all the
studentsofthat science. By this test, I regretto say, social anthropology revealsitselfas not
yet a formedscience. One has thereforeto select for oneself,for certainterms,definitions
whichseemto be the mostconvenientforthepurposesofscientific analysis.
Thereare some anthropologistswho use the termsocial structureto referonlyto persistent
social groups,such as nations,tribesand clans, whichretaintheircontinuity,theiridentity
as individualgroups,in spite of changesin theirmemberlship.Dr. Evans-Pritchard,in his
recentadmirablebook on the Nuer, prefersto use the term social structurein this sense.
Certainlythe existenceof such persistentsocial groupsis an exceedinglyimportantaspect of
structure.But I findit moreusefulto includeunderthe termsocial structurea good deal more
than this.
In the firstplace, I regardas a part of the social structureall social relationsof personto
person. For example,the kinshipstructureof any societyconsistsof a numberof such dyadic
relations,as betweena fatherand son, or a mother'sbrotherand his sister's son. In an
Australiantribethe wholesocial structureis based on a networkof such relationsof person
to person,establishedthroughgenealogicalconnections.
of individualsand of classes
Secondly,I includeundersocial structurethe differentiation
socialpositionsofmenand women,ofchiefsand commoners,
bytheirsocialrole. The differential
of employersand employees,are just as muchdeterminants of social relationsas belongingto
clans or different
different nations.
A2
4 Address
A. R. RADCLIFFE-BROwN-Presidential

In the studyofsocial structure, the concreterealitywithwhichwe are concernedis the set

of actuallyexistingrelations,at a givenmomentof time,whichlink togethercertainhuman
beings. It is on thisthat we can make directobservations. But it is not thisthat we attempt
to describein its particularity. Science (as distinguishedfromhistoryor biography)is not
concernedwiththe particular,the unique,but only with the general,with kinds,with events
whichrecur. The actual relationsof Tom, Dick and Harryor the behaviourof Jack and Jill
may go down in our fieldnote-booksand may provideillustrationsfora generaldescription.
But whatwe needforscientific purposesis an accountoftheformofthestructure.For example,
if in an AustraliantribeI observein a numberofinstancesthe behaviourtowardsone another
ofpersonswhostandin therelationofmother'sbrotherand sister'sson,it is in orderthat I may
be able to record as preciselyas possiblethe generalor normalformof this relationship,
abstractedfrom the variations of particular instances, though taking account of those
variations.
This importantdistinction,betweenstructureas an actuallyexistingconcretereality,to
be directlyobserved,and structuralform,as what the field-worker describes,may be made
clearerperhapsby a consideration ofthecontinuity ofsocialstructurethroughtime,a continuity
whichis not static like that of a building,but a dynamiccontinuity, like that of the organic
structureof a livingbody. Throughout the lifeof an organismits structureis beingconstantly
renewed; and similarlythe social lifeconstantlyrenewsthe social structure. Thus the actual
relationsof personsand groupsof personschangefromyearto year,or even fromday to day.
New memberscomeintoa community by birthor immigration;othersgo out ofit by deathor
emigration.Thereare marriagesand divorces. Friendsmay becomeenemies,or enemiesmay
makepeace and becomefriends. But whilethe actual structure changesin thisway,the general
structuralformmay remainrelativelyconstantovera longeror shorterperiodoftime. Thus if
I visit a relativelystablecommunity and revisitit afteran intervaloftenyears,I shallfindthat
manyofits membershave died and others have been born; the memberswho stillsurviveare
now ten yearsolderand theirrelationsto one anothermay have changedin manyways. Yet
I may findthat the kinds of relationsthat I can observeare verylittle different fromthose
observedten yearsbefore. The structuralformhas changedlittle.
But, on the otherhand, the structuralformmay change,sometimesgradually,sometimes
with relativesuddenness,as in revolutionsand militaryconquests. But even in the most
revolutionary changessome continuityof structureis maintained.
I mustsay a fewwordsaboutthe spatialaspectofsocialstructure.It is rarelythatwe find
a community thatis absolutelyisolated,havingno outsidecontact. At the presentmomentof
history,the networkof social relationsspreads over the whole world,withoutany absolute
solutionof continuityanywhere.This givesrise to a difficulty whichI do not thinkthatsocio-
logistshave reallyfaced,thedifficulty ofdefining whatis meantby the term" a society." They
do commonly talk ofsocietiesas if theyweredistinguishable, discreteentities,as, forexample,
whenwe are told that a societyis an organism. Is the BritishEmpirea society,or a collection
ofsocieties? Is a Chinesevillagea society,or is it merelya fragment ofthe RepublicofChina?
 On Social Structure 5

If we say that our subjectis the studyand comparisonof humansocieties,we oughtto be able
to say whatare the unitentitieswithwhichwe are concerned.
If we take any convenientlocalityof a suitablesize, we can studythe structuralsystemas
it appears in and.fromthat region,i.e., the networkof relationsconnectingthe inhabitants
amongstthemselvesand withthe people of otherregions. We can thus observe,describe,and
comparethesystemsof social structureof as manylocalitiesas we wish. To illustratewhat I
mean, I may referto two recentstudiesfromthe Universityof Chicago,one of a Japanese
village, Suye Mura,by Dr. JohnEmbree, and the other of a French Canadian community,
St. Denis, by Dr. Horace Miner.
Closely connectedwith this conceptionof social structureis the conceptionof " social
personality " as thepositionoccupiedby a humanbeingin a socialstructure, thecomplexformed
by all his social relationswithothers. Every humanbeinglivingin societyis two things: he
is an individualand also a person. As an individual,he is a biologicalorganism,a collection
of a vast numberof moleculesorganisedin a complexstructure,withinwhich,as long as it
persists,there occur physiologicaland psychologicalactions and reactions,processes and
changes. Human beingsas individualsare objectsofstudyforphysiologists and psychologists.
The humanbeingas a personis a complexof social relationships.He is a citizenof England,a
husbandand a father,a brick-layer, a memberof a particularMethodistcongregation, a voter
in a certainconstituency, a memberofhis tradeunion,an adherentof the Labour Party,and so
on. Note that each of thesedescriptionsrefersto a social relationship, or to a place in a social
structure.Note also that a social personality is somethingthatchangesduringthecourseofthe
lifeof the person. As a person,the humanbeingis the object of studyforthe social anthro-
pologist. We cannotstudypersonsexceptin termsof social structure, norcan we studysocial
structureexceptin termsofthe personswho are the unitsofwhichit is composed.
If you tell me that an individualand a personare afterall reallythe same thing,I would
remindyou oftheChristiancreed. God is threepersons,but to say that He is threeindividuals
is to be guiltyof a heresyforwhichmenhave been put to death. Yet the failureto distinguish
individualand personis not merelya heresyin religion; it is worsethanthat; it is a sourceof
confusionin science.
I have nowsufficiently defined,I hope,the subjectmatterofwhatI regardas an extremely
importantbranchof social anthropology.The methodto be adoptedfollowsimmediately from
thisdefinition.It mustcombinewiththeintensivestudyofsinglesocieties(i.e., ofthestructural
systemsobservablein particularcommunities)the systematiccomparisonof many societies
(or structuralsystemsof different types). The use of comparisonis indispensable. The study
of a singlesocietymay providematerialsforcomparativestudy,or it may affordoccasionfor
hypotheses,which then need to be tested by referenceto other societies; it cannot give
demonstrated results.
Our firsttask,of course,is to learnas muchas we can about the varieties,or diversities,of
structuralsystems. This requiresfieldresearch. Many writersof ethnographical descriptions
do not attemptto give us any systematicaccount of the social structure. But a few social
6 Address
A. R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN-Presidential

anthropologists, hereand in America, -do recognisethe importanceof such data and theirwork
is providingus witha steadilygrowing bodyofmaterialforourstudy. Moreover, theirresearches
are no longerconfinedto what are called " primitive" societies,but extendto communities in
suchregionsas Sicily,Ireland,Japan,Canada and the UnitedStates.
If we are to have a real comparativemorphology of societies,however,we must aim at
buildingup some sortof classification of typesof structuralsystems. That is a complexand
difficulttask,to whichI have myselfdevoted attentionforthirtyyears. It is the kind of
taskthatneedsthe co-operation ofa numberofstudentsand I thinkI can numberon myfingers
thosewhoare activelyinterested in it at thepresenttime. Nevertheless, I believesomeprogress
is beingmade. Such work,however,does not producespectacularresultsand a book on the
subjectwouldcertainlynotbe an anthropological best-seller.
We shouldremember thatchemistry and biologydid not becomefullyformedsciencesuntil
considerableprogresshad been made withthe systematicclassification of the thingstheywere
dealingwith,substancesin the one instanceand plantsand animals in the other.
Besidesthismorphological study,consistingin the definition, comparisonand classification
of diversestructuralsystems,thereis a physiologicalstudy. The problemhere is: how do
structuralsystemspersist? What are the mechanismswhich maintaina networkof social
relationsin existence,and how do theywork? In usingthe termsmorphology and physiology,
I mayseem to be returning to the analogybetweensocietyand organismwhichwas so popular
withmediaevalphilosophers, was takenoverand oftenmisusedby nineteenth centurysociologists,
and is completely rejectedbymanymodernwriters. But analogies,properlyused, are important
aids to scientific thinkingand thereis a real and significant analogybetweenorganicstructure
and social structure.
In whatI am thuscallingsocialphysiology, we are concernednot onlywithsocialstructure,
but with everykind of social phenomenon. Morals,law, etiquette,religion,government, and
education are all partsof the complex mechanism by which a social structure exists and persists.
If we take up the structuralpointofview,we studythesethings,notin abstractionor isolation,
but in theirdirectand indirectrelationsto social structure,i.e., with reference to the way in
whichtheydependupon, or affect,the social relationsbetweenpersonsand groupsof persons.
I cannotdo moreherethan offera fewbriefillustrations ofwhatthismeans.
Let us firstconsiderthe studyoflanguage. A languageis a connectedset ofspeechusages
observedwithina definedspeech-community.The 'existenceof speech-communities and their
sizesarefeaturesofsocial structure.Thereis, therefore, a certainverygeneralrelationbetween
social structureand language. But if we considerthe special characteristics of a particular
language-its phonology, its morphology, and even to a greatextentits vocabulary-thereis no
direct connection of either one-sided or mutual determination betweenthese and the special
characteristics of the social structureof the communitywithinwhichthe languageis spoken.
We can easily conceive that two societiesmighthave verysimilarformsofsocial structureand
verydifferent kinds of language,or vice versa. The coincidenceof a particularformof social
structure and a particularlanguagein a given communityis always the resultof historical
 On Social Structure 7

accident. Theremay,ofcourse,be certainindirect,remoteinteractions betweensocialstructure

and language,but thesewouldseemto be ofminorimportance. Thus the generalcomparative
studyof languagescan be profitably carriedout as a relativelyindependentbranchof science,
in whichthe languageis consideredin abstractionfromthe social structureof the community
in whichit is spoken.
But, on the otherhand,thereare certainfeaturesoflinguistichistorywhichare specifically
connectedwith social structure. As structuralphenomenamay be instancedthe processby
whichLatin, frombeingthelanguageof the small regionof Latium, becamethe languageof a
considerablepart of Europe, displacingthe otherItalic languages,Etruscan,and manyCeltic
languages; and the subsequentreverseprocessby whichLatin splitup intoa numberofdiverse
local formsofspeech,whichultimatelybecamethe variousRomancelanguagesofto-day.
Thus the spread of language,the unificationof a numberof separate communities into a
single speech-community, and the reverseprocess of subdivisioninto differentspeech-com-
munities,are phenomenaof social structure. So also are thoseinstancesin which,in societies
havinga class structure, thereare differences of speechusage in different classes.
I have consideredlanguagefirst,becauselinguisticsis, I think,thebranchofsocialanthropo-
logy whichcan be most profitablystudied withoutreferenceto social structure.There is a
reason forthis. The set of speechusages whichconstitutea languagedoes forma systemand
systemsof this kind can be comparedin orderto discovertheircommongeneral,or abstract,
characters, the determinationof which can give us laws, which will be specifically laws Qf
linguistics.
Let us considerverybrieflycertainotherbranchesofsocial anthropology and theirrelation
to the studyof social structure. If we take the social lifeof a local community over a period,
let us say a year,we can observea certainsumtotal ofactivitiescarriedout by thepersonswho
composeit. We can also observea certainapportionment of theseactivities,one persondoing
certainthings,anotherdoing others. This apportionmentof activities,equivalent to what
is sometimescalled the social divisionoflabour,is an importantfeatureofthe social structure.
Now activitiesare carriedout because theyprovidesome sort of " gratification," as I propose
featureof social lifeis that activitiesofcertainpersonsprovide
to call it, and the characteristic
gratifications forotherpersons. In a simple instance,when an Australianblackfellowgoes
hunting,he providesmeat,not onlyforhimself,but forhis wifeand childrenand also forother
relativesto whomitis his dutyto givemeatwhenhe has it. Thusin any societythereis not only
an apportionment ofactivities,but also an apportionment ofthegratifications resultingtherefrom,
and some sortofsocialmachinery, relativelysimpleor,sometimes, highlycomplex,by whichthe
systemworks.
It is thismachinery,orcertainaspectsofit,thatconstitutes thespecialsubject-matter stuidied
by the economists. Theyconcernthemselveswithwhatkindsand quantitiesof goods are pro-
duced,howtheyare distributed(i.e., theirflowfrompersonto person,or regionto region) and
the way in whichtheyare disposedof. Thus what are called economicinstitutionsare exten-
sivelystudiedin moreor less completeabstractionfromthe rest of the social system. This
a A. R. RADCLIFFE-BRowN-Presidential Address

methoddoes undoubtedlyprovideusefulresults,particularlyin the studyof complexmodem

societies. Its weaknessesbecomeapparentas soon as we attemptto applyit to the exchangeof
goodsin whatare called primitivesocieties.
The economicmachinery of a societyappearsin quite a newlightifit is studiedin relation
to the social structure.The exchangeof goods and servicesis dependentupon,is the resultof,
and at the same time is a means of maintaininga certainstructure,a networkof relations
betweenpersonsand collectionsof persons. For the economistsand politiciansof Canada the
potlatchof the Indians ofthe north-west ofAmericawas simplywastefulfoolishness and it was
therefore forbidden. For the anthropologistit was the machineryfor maintaininga social
structure oflineages,clansand moieties,withwhichwas combinedan arrangement ofrankdefined
by privileges.
Any fullunderstanding of the economicinstitutionsof humansocietiesrequiresthat they
should be studiedfromtwo angles. From one of these the economicsystemis viewed as the
mechanismby whichgoodsofvariouskindsand in variousquantitiesare produced,transported
and transferred, and utilised. Fromthe otherthe economicsystemis a set ofrelationsbetween
personsand groupswhichmaintains,and is maintainedby,thisexchangeor circulationofgoods
and services. Fromthe latterpointof view,the studyofthe economiclifeof societiestakes its
place as part of the generalstudyof social structure.
Social relationsare onlyobserved,and can onlybe described,by reference to the reciprocal
behaviourof the personsrelated. The formof a social structurehas therefore to be described
by thepatternsofbehaviourto whichindividualsand groupsconform in theirdealingswithone
another. These patternsare partiallyformulatedin rules which,in our own society,we dis-
tinguishas rulesofetiquette,ofmoralsand oflaw. Rules, ofcourse,onlyexistin theirrecogni-
tion by the membersof thesociety; eitherin theirverbalrecognition, whentheyare stated as
rules,or in theirobservancein behaviour. Thesetwomodesofrecognition, as everyfield-worker
knows,are not the same thing and both have to be taken intoaccount.
If I say that in any societytherulesof etiquette,moralsand law are partofthemechanism
by whicha certainset ofsocialrelationsis maintainedin existence,thisstatementwill,I suppose,
be greetedas a truism. But it is one of thosetruismswhichmanywriterson humansociety
verballyaccept and yet ignorein theoreticaldiscussions,or in theirdescriptiveanalyses. The
point is not that rules exist in every society,but that whatwe need to knowfora scientific
understanding is just howthesethingsworkin generaland in particularinstances.
Let us consider,forexample,the study of law. If you examinethe literatureon juris-
prudenceyouwillfindthatlegalinstitutions are studiedforthemostpartinmoreorlesscomplete
abstractionfromthe restof the social systemof whichtheyare a part. This is doubtlessthe
mostconvenient methodforlawyersin theirprofessional studies. But foranyscientific investiga-
tionofthe natureoflaw it is insufficient.The data withwhicha scientistmustdeal are events
whichoccurand can be observed. In the fieldof law, the eventswhichthe social scientistcan
observeand thustake as his data are the proceedings thattake place in courtsofjustice. These
are the reality,and for the social anthropologist theyare the mechanismor processby which
 On Social Structure 9

certaindefinablesocial-relations betweenpersonsand groupsare restored, maintainedormodified.

Law is a partofthemachinery by whicha certainsocial structureis maintained. The systemof
laws of a particularsocietycan onlybe fullyunderstoodif it is studiedin relationto the social
,structure,and inverselytheunderstanding ofthesocial structure requires,amongstotherthings,
a systematicstudyofthe legal institutions.
I have talkedabout social relations,but I have not so faroffered you a precisedefinition.
A socialrelationexistsbetweentwoormoreindividualorganismswhenthereis someadjustment
of theirrespectiveinterests,by convergenceof interest,or by limitationof conflictsthat might
arise fromdivergenceof interests. I use the term" interest" herein the widestpossiblesense,
to referto all behaviourthat we regardas purposive. To speak of an interestimpliesa subject
and an object and a relationbetweenthem. Wheneverwe say that a subject has a certain
interestin an objectwe can state thesame thingby sayingthatthe objecthas a certainvalue for
the subject. Interestand value are correlativeterms,whichreferto the two sides of an asym-
metricalrelation.
Thus the studyof social structureleads immediatelyto the studyof interestsor values as
thedeterminants ofsocialrelations. A social relationdoes not resultfromsimilarity ofinterests,
but restseitheron the mutualinterestof personsin one another,or on one or morecommon
interests,or on a combinationof both of these. The simplestformof social solidarityis where
two personsare both interestedin bringingabout a certainresultand co-operateto that end.
Whentwo or morepersonshave a common interestin an object,that objectcan be said to have a
social valueforthe personsthus associated. If, then,practicallyall the membersof a society
have-aninterestin the observanceofthe laws,we can say that the law has a social value. The
studyofsocial values in thissenseis therefore a partofthe studyofsocialstructure.
in
It was fromthis point of view that an earlyworkI approachedthe studyof what can
conveniently be called ritualvalues,i.e., the values expressedin ritesand myths.It is perhaps
again a truismto say thatreligionis thecementwhichholdssocietytogether.But fora'scientific
understanding we need to knowjust how it does this,and thatis a subjectforlengthyinvestiga-
tionsin manydifferent formsofsociety.
As a last examplelet me mentionthe studyof magicand witchcraft, on whichthereis an
extensiveanthropological literature. I would pointto Dr. Evans-Pritchard's workon the Zande
as an illuminating exampleofwhatcan be donewhenthesethingsare systematically investigated
in termsof the part theyplay in the social relationsof the membersof a community.
Fromthe pointof viewthat I have attemptedbriefly to describe,social institutions,
in the
senseofstandardisedmodesofbehaviour,constitutethe machineryby whicha social structure,
a networkof social relations,maintainsits existenceand its continuity.I hesitateto use the
term" function,"whichin recentyearshas been so muchused and misusedin a multitudeof
meanings,manyof themveryvague. Instead of beingused, as scientific termsoughtto be, to
assist in makingdistinctions, it is now used to confusethingsthat oughtto be distinguished.
For it is oftenemployedin place ofthemoreordinarywords" use," " purpose" and " meaning."
It seemsto be moreconvenientand sensible,as wellas morescholarly, to speak ofthe use or uses
10 Address
A. R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN-Presidential

ofan axe or diggingstick,the meaningofa wordor symbol,the purposeofan act oflegislation,

ratherthan to use the wordfunctionforthese variousthings. " Function" has been a very
usefultechnicaltermin physiology and by analogywithits use in thatscienceit wouldbe a very
convenientmeans of expressingan importantconceptin social science. As I have been accus-
tomedto use the word,followingDurkheimand others,I would definethe social functionof a
sociallystandardisedmode of activity,or mode ofthought,as its relationto the social structure
to the existenceand continuityof whichit makessome contribution.Analogously,in a living
organism,thephysiological functionofthebeatingoftheheart,or thesecretionofgastricjuices,
is itsrelationto theorganicstructure to theexistenceorcontinuityofwhichit makesitscontribu-
tion. It is in thissensethat I am interestedin such thingsas the social functionofthe punish-
mentofcrime,orthe socialfunctionof the totemicritesof Australiantribes,or of the funeral
ritesof the AndamanIslanders. But thisis not what eitherProfessorMalinowskior Professor
Lowie mean by functionalanthropology.
Besides these two divisionsof the study of social structure,which I have called social
morphology thereis a third,the investigation
and social physiology, of the processesby which
social structures change,ofhow newformsofstructures comeintoexistence. Ofthisimportant
branchofstudyI have timeforonlyone illustration, fromthe fieldofcolonialsociology.
Let us suppose that we wish to studyand understandwhat is happeningin a British or
Frenchcolonyor dependencyin Africa,at thepresenttime. Formerlythe regionwas inhabited
byAfricans havingtheirownsocialstructure.Nowa newand morecomplexsocial structurehas
been broughtinto existence. The populationnow includesa certainnumberofEuropeans-
governmentofficials, traders,missionariesand, in some instances,settlers. The new political
structure is one in whichtheEuropeanshave a largemeasureofcontrol,and theygenerallyplay
an importantpart in the new economicstructure. The outstandingcharacteristic of this kind
of social structureis that Europeans and Africansconstitutedifferent classes, with different
languages,different customsand modesof life,and different sets of values and ideas. It is an
extremeexampleof a societycompoundedofheterogeneous elements. As such it has a certain
instability,due to the lack ofadjustmentofdivergentinterests.
In orderto understandthe social changesthat are takingplace in a societyofthiskind,it
seemsto me essentialto studythe wholeset of relationsamongstthe personsinvolved. This
kindof studywas undertakenby some ofus in SouthAfricatwentyyearsago and is stillbeing
continued,profitably, I think. A fewyearsago, as a resultperhapsofre-defining social anthro-
pologyas thestudy,notofsociety,but ofculture, wewereaskedtoabandonthiskindofinvestiga-
tionin favourofwhatis now calledthestudyof " culturecontact." In place ofthestudyofthe
formationof new compositesocieties,we are supposedto regardwhat is happeningin Africa
as a processin whichan entitycalled Africanculturecomesinto contactwithan entitycalled
European or Westernculture,and a thirdnew entityis produced,or is to be produced,whichis
to be describedas Westernized Africanculture.To methisseemsa fantasticreification ofabstrac-
tions. European cultureis an abstractionand so is the cultureof an Africantribe. I findit
fantasticto imaginethese two abstractionscominginto contactand by an act of generation
 On Social Structure 11

producinga thirdabstraction. Thereis contact,but it is betweenhumanbeings,Europeanand

African,and it takesplace withina definitestructuralarrangement.
You are aware that in certainanthropologicalcirclesthe term " evolutionaryanthropo-
logist" is almosta termof abuse. It is applied,however,withoutmuchdiscrimination.Thus
Lewis Morganis called an evolutionist, althoughhe rejectedthe theoryoforganicevolutionand
whichhe conceivedas the steady
in relationto societybelieved,notin evolution,but in progress,
materialand moralimprovement of mankindfromcrudestoneimplementsand sexual promis-
cuityto the steam enginesand monogamousmarriageof Rochester,N.Y. But even such anti-
evolutionists as Boas believein progress.
It is convenient,I think,to use theterm" progress" fortheprocessby whichhumanbeings
attain to greatercontrolover the physicalenvironment throughthe increaseofknowledgeand
improvement oftechniqueby inventionsand discoveries. The way in whichwe are now able to
destroyconsiderableportionsofcitiesfromthe air is one ofthelateststrikingresultsofprogress.
Progressis not the same thingas social evolution,but it is, I believe,verycloselyconnected
withit.
Evolution, as I understandthe term,refersspecificallyto a processof emergenceof new
formsof structure. Organicevolutionhas two importantfeatures: (1) in the courseof it a
small numberof kinds of organismshave given rise to a verymuch largernumberof kinds;
(2) morecomplexformsof organicstructurehave come into existenceby developmentout of
simplerforms.WhileI am unableto attachany definite meaningto suchphrasesas theevolution
of cultureor the evolutionoflanguage,I thinkthatsocialevolutionis a realitywhichthe social
anthropologistshouldrecogniseand study. Like organicevolution,it can be definedby two
features. Therehas been a processby which,froma smallnumberofformsofsocialstructure,
manydifferent formshave arisenin the courseof history; that is, therehas beena processof
Secondly,throughoutthisprocessmorecomplexformsofsocialstructures
differentiation. have
developedout of,or replaced,simplerforms.
Justhow structuralsystemsare to be classifiedwithreferenceto theirgreateror less com-
plexityis a problemrequiringinvestigation.But thereis evidenceof a fairlyclose correlation
betweencomplexityand anotherfeatureof structuralsystems,namely,the extentofthe fieldof
social relations. In a structuralsystemwitha narrowtotal social field,an average or typical
personis broughtinto directand indirectsocial relationswith only a small numberof other
persons. In systemsof this type we may findthat the linguisticcommunity-thebody of
personswho speak one language-numbersfrom250 to 500,whilethepoliticalcommunity is even
smaller,and economicrelationsby the exchangeof goods and servicesextendonlyovera very
narrowrange. Apartfromthe differentiation by sex and age, thereis verylittledifferentiation
of social rolebetweenpersonsor classes. We can contrastwiththisthe systemsof social struc-
ture that we observeto-day in England or the United States. Thus the process of human
historyto which I thinkthe term social evolutionmay be appropriatelyapplied mightbe
definedas the processby whichwide-rangesystemsof social structurehave grownout of, or
12 Address: On Social Structure
A. R. RADCLIFFE-BRoWN-Presidential

replaced,narrow-range systems.Whetherthisview is acceptableor not,I suggestthat the con-

cept of social evolutionis one whichrequiresto be definedin termsof social structure.
Thereis no timeon this occasionto discussthe relationof the studyof social structureto
the study of culture. For an interesting attemptto bringthe two kinds of studytogetherI
would referyou to Mr. GregoryBateson's book Naven. I have made no attemptto deal with
social anthropologyas a whole and with all its various branches and divisions. I have
endeavouredonly to give you a verygeneralidea of the kind of studyto whichI have found
profitableto devotea considerableand steadilyincreasingproportionofmytime
it scientifically
and energy. The onlyrewardthat I have soughtI thinkI have in somemeasurefound-some-
thingof the kind of insightinto the natureof the worldof whichwe are part that only the
patientpursuitof the methodof naturalsciencecan afford.