RAMON GERARDO B.

SAN LUIS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PABLITO M. ROJAS in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC. Br. 70, Pasig City and BERDEX
INTERNATIONAL INC.

On July 12, 2001, Berdex International, Inc. (private respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City (RTC) a complaint3 for a sum of money against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 68530 alleging
that: it is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of the United States of America with
principal office in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.; it is maintaining the present action only to enforce its
rights by virtue of an isolated transaction with petitioner; in June 1997, petitioner received from it certain
amounts of money which were meant partly as advances or loan and partly for the purchase of 40% shares
in both Seanet and Seabest Corporations, however, not a single share in those corporations was
transferred to private respondent by petitioner and the shares were retained by the latter; the parties then
agreed to treat all the payments/advances made by private respondent to petitioner as the latter's loan;
petitioner proposed the payment of the loan within a period of three years, which proposal was accepted by
private respondent with the agreement that in case of non-payment of any installment on their due dates,
the entire amount shall become due and demandable; petitioner later refused to sign a formal contract of
loan; petitioner confirmed such loan to private respondent's auditors on August 8, 2000; and he had only
paid US$20,000.00 and no further payment was made despite repeated demands. Private respondent
prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay the amount of US$150,335.75 plus interest until fully paid and
attorney's fees.
Petitioner filed his Answer4 contending that: he is a businessman engaged in the trading of seafoods; he
received from private respondent the total amount of US$141,944.71 with instructions that petitioner first
deduct therefrom the amount of US$23,748.00 representing the latter's commission from private
respondent in their other transaction; the money was intended to be used to buy 70% of the outstanding
shares of Seanet Corporation on behalf of private respondent and the balance as private respondent's
advances as Seanet's stockholder, which he complied with; in view, however, of subsequent substantial
losses incurred by Seanet and petitioner's desire to maintain good business with private respondent,
petitioner offered that the amounts he received from private respondent be paid by Fuegomar Traders, Inc.
(Fuegomar), a company which he subsequently put up and which he substantially owned and engaged in
the same line of business as Seanet; Fuegomar will purchase at cost the stock investment of private
respondent in Seanet; while the documentation of such agreement was being finalized, petitioner then
gave US$20,000.00 to private respondent on behalf of Fuegomar; however, private respondent then
claimed that its investment in Seanet was petitioner's personal loan and the amount of US$20,000.00 paid
on behalf of Fuegomar was maliciously interpreted as petitioner' admission of personal liability.
The pre-trial conference was terminated on January 11, 2002 and the case was subsequently set for trial.
On April 4, 2002, private respondent filed a MOTION (To Authorize Deposition-Taking Through Written
Interrogatories)5 alleging that initial presentation of its evidence is set on May 3, 2002; that however, all of
its witnesses are Americans who reside or hold office in the USA; that one of the witnesses is already of
advanced age and travel to the Philippines may be extremely difficult if not dangerous; and there is a
perceived danger to them in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2002;6 that written
interrogatories are ideal in this case since the factual issues are already very few; that such mode of
deposition-taking will save precious judicial and government time and will prevent needless delays in the
case.
In his Opposition and Comment,7 petitioner contends: If indeed there was an oral contract and petitioner
was liable to private respondent for the amount he received from the latter, the documents attached to
private respondent's complaint did not support its claim, but rather supported his position. There is a very
strict standard in proving an oral contract. Taking the deposition through written interrogatories would
deprive the court of the opportunity to observe the general bearing and demeanor of witnesses. Petitioner's
right to cross-examine the witnesses will be prejudiced, since he will be limited to cross-interrogatories
which will severely limit not only the scope but the spontaneity of his cross-examination. It is doubtful
whether the witnesses will give their deposition under sanction of the penalties prescribed by Philippine law
for perjury. It will not necessarily save precious judicial and government time but may in fact lengthen the
trial, as both parties will have the right to review and to object to interrogatories submitted by the other
party. The claim that travel to the Philippines would be dangerous for the witnesses who are all Americans
is frivolous, since respondent has not presented evidence that the US government has prohibited its
citizens from traveling to the Philippines; and if ever there was such prohibition, it was not binding on our
own legal system. Old age was not a valid reason.
In an Order8 dated May 9, 2002, the RTC granted private respondent's Motion, as it found the same
appropriate and sanctioned by the rules on deposition-taking.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in an Order9 dated July 3, 2002.
In a Resolution dated May 20, 2003, the CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. In denying the
motion, the CA found that non-compliance with the requirements as a result of misapprehension and
unfamiliarity with the rules is not excusable; that in any case, SC Administrative Circular No. 3-96 dated
June 1, 1996 states that subsequent compliance with the requirement shall not warrant a reconsideration.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE
THE UNIQUENESS OF THE LEGAL ISSUE RAISED BY THE PETITIONER AND THE GRAVE INJUSTICE
THAT WILL BE VISITED UPON THE PETITIONER IF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT, A NON-RESIDENT
FOREIGN CORPORATION, WILL BE ALLOWED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF AN ORAL CONTRACT
THROUGH DEPOSITION BY WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES OF ALL ITS WITNESSES TAKEN
OUTSIDE THE PHILIPPINES.

While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, and
the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, they nevertheless must not be met at the
expense of substantial justice.20 Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of
procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. A strict and
rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the
rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the
substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.21 Thus, the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion in hastily dismissing the petition on procedural flaws.
While herein petitioner prays that the CA be ordered to give due course to the petition for certiorari filed
before it and to remand the case to the CA for proper disposition, the Court opts to resolve the sole issue
raised in the present petition which is a pure question of law, i.e., whether Section 1, Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court allows a non-resident foreign corporation the privilege of having all its witnesses, all
of whom are foreigners, to testify through deposition upon written interrogatories taken outside the
Philippines to prove an oral contract, in order to avoid further delay.
Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, which substantially reproduced Section 1, Rule 24 of the old
Rules, provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. - By leave of court after jurisdiction
has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without
such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not,
may be taken, at the instance of any party, by depositions upon oral examination or written
interrogatories.
Unequivocally, the rule does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can avail of deposition. The
fact that private respondent is a non-resident foreign corporation is immaterial. The rule clearly provides
that the testimony of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories, at the instance of any party. Depositions serve as a device for ascertaining the facts relative
to the issues of the case. The evident purpose is to enable the parties, consistent with recognized
privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus
prevent the said trials from being carried out in the dark.22
Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts
resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court.
Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by
adverse party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical and mental examination of
persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to him and
his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the latter's own witnesses. In fine, the object
of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant facts,
from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from
inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the
Court, without omission or suppression.
Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all
the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open
court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at
the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides:
"SECTION 1. Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of witnesses presented in
a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally."
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual
oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is
hearsay: the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time
that his testimony is offered. It matters not that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the
taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the
time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing.
However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand
by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. These exceptional
situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 2424 of the Rules of Court.
SEC 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion of an interlocutory proceeding,
any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any
party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in
accordance with any of the following provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the
testimony of deponent as a witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer,
director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a
party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness if out of the
province and at a greater distance than fifty25 (50) kilometers from the place of trial or
hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the
party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age,
sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due
regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the
deposition to be used;
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to
introduce all of it which is relevant to the party introduced, and any party may introduce any other
parts.
The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is dead, out of the Philippines, or
otherwise unable to come to court to testify, is consistent with another rule of evidence, found in Section 47,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The testimony or deposition of a witness
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him."
It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines
or abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition "shall be taken before any judge,
municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign state or country, the deposition
"shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be
appointed by commission or under letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24).
Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a secretary or embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines," and the
defendant's answer has already been served (Sec. 1, Rule 24). After answer, whether the deposition-taking
is to be accomplished within the Philippines or outside, the law does not authorize or contemplate any
intervention by the court in the process, all that is required being that "reasonable notice" be given "in
writing to every other party to the action . . (stating) the time and place for taking the deposition and the
name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general
description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs . . . "(Sec. 15, Rule
24). The court intervenes in the process only if a party moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time" stated in
the notice (id.), or (2) "upon notice and for good cause shown," to prevent the deposition-taking, or impose
conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall not be inquired into" or that the taking be "held with no
one present except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel," etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or (3) to
terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that "it is being conducted in bad faith or in such
manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24). 26
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in granting private respondent's MOTION
(To Allow Deposition-Taking Through Written Interrogatories) considering private respondent's allegation in
its MOTION that its witnesses are all Americans residing in the U.S. This situation is one of the exceptions
for its admissibility under Section 4(c)(2), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the witness resides at a
distance of more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the
Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition.
Petitioner insists that Dasmariñas does not constitute a precedent in the instant case as the facts are
substantially different; to wit: (1) in Dasmariñas, plaintiff filed a motion to take deposition through written
interrogatories of two witnesses abroad after it had already presented its first witness, while in the present
case, private respondent will not present a single witness to testify in court but only the witnesses'
depositions; (2) in Dasmariñas, the existence of the contract involved was not in issue at all, while in the
present case, petitioner denied the existence of the alleged contract of loan and private respondent has not
presented any documentary evidence to support its claim.
We do not agree.
The situation in Dasmariñas is the same as in the instant case since in both cases, it was already during
the trial stage that the deposition through written interrogatories was sought to be taken. It does not matter
whether one witness for the plaintiff had already testified since the Dasmariñas ruling did not make such
testimony in court a condition to grant the deposition of the two other witnesses. Also, in Dasmariñas, the
plaintiff sued defendant to recover a certain sum of money which was the same as in the instant case as
private respondent was suing petitioner for collection of sum of money.
Petitioner claims that the right to take depositions upon written interrogatories in lieu of oral testimony in
open court would result in grave injustice to him, as private respondent is seeking to establish the existence
of an oral contract which requires stricter standard in proving the same.
We find such argument untenable.
While there are limitations to the rules of discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without leave
and without judicial intervention,27 such limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the
examination is being conducted in bad faith;28 or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the
person subject to the inquiry;29 or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the
recognized domains of privilege.30
It has been repeatedly held that deposition discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment31 and should not be unduly restricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not
privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. Otherwise, the advantage of
a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be
defeated.32 In fact, we find nothing in the rules on deposition that limits their use in case of oral contract as
alleged by petitioner.
In any event, the admissibility of the deposition does not preclude the determination of its probative value at
the appropriate time. The admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The
admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains
to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.33
Petitioner argues that to allow such deposition-taking will prevent the RTC from observing the witnesses'
demeanor and credibility; and that petitioner's right to cross-examine the witnesses would be curtailed if not
denied as he is limited to cross-interrogatories and re-cross interrogatories based on written interrogatories.
We are not persuaded.
Depositions are allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining
witnesses in open court, where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge; and the procedure is
not on that account rendered illegal nor is the deposition, thereby taken, inadmissible.34 It precisely falls
within one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of a deposition in lieu of
the actual appearance and testimony of the deponent in open court and without being subject to the prying
eyes and probing questions of the Judge.35 Depositions are consistent with the principle of promoting just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding.36 Depositions are allowed provided the
deposition is taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court; that is, with leave of
court if the summons have been served, without leave of court if an answer has been submitted; and
provided, further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists.37
We also find no merit in petitioner's claim that his right to cross-examine private respondent's witnesses will
be curtailed since petitioner is fully accorded the opportunity for cross-examination under Section 25, Rule
23 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 25. Depositions upon written interrogatories; service of notice and of interrogatories. - A party
desiring to take the deposition of any person upon written interrogatories shall serve them upon
every other party with a notice stating the name and address of the person who is to answer them
and the name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the deposition is to be
taken. Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so served may serve cross interrogatories upon the
party proposing to take the deposition. Within five (5) days thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct
interrogatories upon a party who has served cross interrogatories. Within three (3) days after being
served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve re-cross interrogatories upon the party
proposing to take the deposition.
(CA still conducted grave abuse of discretion- dismissal due to technicality; therefore Petition AFFIRMED)
ERNESTO GARCES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 dated January 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed with modification the Judgment2 rendered by Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Bangued, Abra, finding petitioner Ernesto Garces guilty as an accessory to the crime of Forcible Abduction
with Rape. Also assailed is the Resolution3 dated July 27, 2006 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
that accused Ernesto Garces later on covered the mouth of AAA and take her out of the barn; that accused
Senando Garces, Antonio Pira, Jr. and Aurelio Pira stand guard outside the barn while Rosendo Pacursa is
raping AAA; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party

Inside the barn, Pacursa started kissing AAA. Private complainant fought back but to no avail. Thereafter,
Pacursa succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. After a while, they heard people shouting and
calling the name of AAA. At this point, petitioner Ernesto Garces entered the barn, covered AAA’s mouth,
then dragged her outside. He also threatened to kill her if she reports the incident.6
Upon reaching the house of Florentino Garces, petitioner released AAA. Shortly afterwards, AAA’s relatives
found her crying, wearing only one slipper and her hair was disheveled. They brought her home but when
asked what happened, AAA could not answer because she was in a state of shock. After a while, she was
able to recount the incident.7
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision finding Pacursa guilty of Forcible Abduction with
Rape while petitioner Garces was found guilty as an accessory to the crime. Antonio Pira, Jr. and Aurelio
Pira were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.11

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision convicting accused ROSENDO PACURSA as
principal and accused-appellant ERNESTO GARCES as accessory of the crime of forcible abduction with
rape is AFFIRMED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but same was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on
certiorari.
Petitioner claims that no rape was committed and that there is no evidence to show that he covered the
mouth of the complainant when he brought her out of the barn.
The petition lacks merit.
It has been established that Pacursa forcibly took AAA against her will and by use of force and intimidation,
had carnal knowledge of her. The trial court found complainant’s testimony to be credible, consistent and
unwavering even during cross-examination.
As regards petitioner’s complicity, his defense of alibi cannot prevail over complainant’s positive
identification of her assailants. Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving
negative evidence which can not be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of
credible witnesses.23
For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence
at the scene of the crime.24 Petitioner alleged he was watching television at Aurelio Pira’s house, which is
about 20 meters away from the barn at the time of the incident. However, it will only take one minute for
him to reach the barn from the house.25 Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission.
Complainant’s failure to testify during her direct examination that her mouth was covered by petitioner
when she was pulled out of the barn does not preclude resort to her sworn statement to provide the
missing details, since said sworn statement forms part of her testimony. As held in People v. Servano:29
Evidence in criminal cases is not limited to the declarations made in open court; it includes all documents,
affidavits or sworn statements of the witnesses, and other supporting evidence. It comprehends something
more than just the mere testimony of a witness. Thus, when a sworn statement has been formally offered
as evidence, it forms an integral part of the prosecution evidence which should not be ignored for it
complements and completes the testimony on the witness stand. A sworn statement is a written declaration
of facts to which the declarant has sworn before an officer authorized to administer oaths. This oath vests
credibility and trustworthiness on the document. The fact that a witness fails to reiterate, during trial, the
contents of his sworn statement should not affect his credibility and render the sworn statement useless
and insignificant, as long as it is presented as evidence in open court. This is not to say, however, that the
sworn statement should be given more probative value than the actual testimony. Rather, the sworn
statement and the open court declarations must be evaluated and examined together in toto so that a full
and thorough determination of the merits of the case may be achieved. Giving weight to a witness’ oral
testimony during the trial should not mean being oblivious to the other pieces of available evidence such as
the sworn statement. In like manner, the court cannot give probative value to the sworn statement to the
exclusion of the oral testimony. In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the totality of the
evidence presented by the parties. It should not confine itself to oral testimony during trial.
additional monetary award can only be imposed upon petitioner who pursued the present appeal.45
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals finding Rosendo Pacursa
guilty as principal by direct participation, and petitioner Ernesto Garces as an accessory, to the crime of
Forcible Abduction with Rape, is MODIFIED. Accused Rosendo Pacursa is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, and being a minor at the time the crime was committed, is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Petitioner Ernesto Garces is found guilty as
an accomplice to the crime of rape, and is also sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
EMILIO DE LA PAZ, JR., ENRIQUE DE LA PAZ, MANUELA DE LA PAZ, NATIVIDAD DE LA PAZ,
MARGARITA DE LA PAZ and ZENAIDA DE LA PAZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ADELAIDA S. TRINIDAD, CONRADO P. SANTOS, JR.,
CESAR P. SANTOS, FELICITAS S. DE LEON, PONCIANITO P. SANTOS, SR., EVANGELINE S.
TANSINGCO, ANTONIO P. SANTOS, and JAIME P. SANTOS,
On May 12, 1983, Loreto de la Paz filed a complaint against the petitioners with the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal for a judicial declaration of ownership of a 43,830 square meter parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 901 of the Register of Deeds, Rizal in the name of Ponciano de la Paz with
damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 164-A.
Loreto alleged that the subject parcel of land was among the properties adjudicated to her and her mother
as a result of a partition submitted by the heirs of Ponciano de la Paz and approved by the court in Civil
Case No. 1399 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The subject matter of Civil Case No. 1399 was
Ponciano's testate estate.
In their answer, the petitioners denied that the disputed lot was among the properties adjudicated to Loreto
and her mother. They claimed that the parcel of land was not accounted for in the probate proceedings but
is actually community property of the parties.
The parties, except for petitioner Enrique de la Paz, were admittedly compulsory heirs of Ponciano de la
Paz who died in 1916. Loreto was the only legitimate child of Ponciano while: 1) Emilio de la Paz, Jr., is the
son of Emilio, a recognized natural child of Ponciano; 2) Manuela de la Paz is the recognized natural child
of Ponciano; 3) Natividad de la Paz is the daughter of Emilio, recognized natural child of Ponciano; 4)
Margarita de la Paz is the daughter of Wenceslao, a recognized natural child of Ponciano; and 5) Zenaida
de la Paz, is the daughter of Augusto, another recognized natural child of Ponciano. As regards petitioner
Enrique de la Paz, Loreto denied his claim that he is one of the heirs of Ponciano. The petitioners,
however, allege that he is also a compulsory heir of Ponciano, he being the son of Ponciano de la Paz, Jr.,
the eldest child of the decedent.
The parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement during pre-trial. Hence, trial on the merits followed.
Loreto took the witness stand. She finished her direct testimony on March 12, 19984.
On April 25, 1984, the petitioners' counsel began his cross-examination of Loreto. The cross-examination
was, however, not completed. The petitioners' counsel moved in open court for the continuance of the
cross-examination on the ground that he still had to conduct a lengthy cross-examination. (p. 17, Court of
Appeals' rollo).
On May 18, 1984, Loreto's counsel filed a motion for "correction of transcript" due to some errors in the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the direct testimony of Loreto. The motion was granted.
This order granting the correction prompted the petitioners'' counsel to manifest that he would not be able
to undertake the cross-examination of the witness as scheduled. He asked for the postponement of the
May 23, 1984 hearing. The trial court postponed the trial of the case to May 31, 1984 and later to July 5,
and 11, 1984. (p. 16, Court of Appeals' rollo)
On August 13, 1984, trial resumed. The petitioners' counsel, however, asked for still another postponement
of the cross-examination to give him a chance to go over the stenographic notes. In an order of the same
date, the hearing was again postponed. (p. 17, Court of Appeals' rollo)
During the scheduled trial on September 14, 1984, neither the petitioners, nor their counsel appeared
despite due notice. Loreto's counsel, therefore, filed a motion that she be allowed to present evidence ex
parte before a commissioner. The motion was granted and Loreto presented additional evidence ex parte in
the afternoon of the same day. On this same date, she finished the presentation of her evidence and
submitted her case for decision.
Despite this development, the petitioners upon their motion were allowed to cross-examine Loreto.
On the scheduled hearing set on September 18, 1984, the petitioners' counsel failed to appear, and the
cross-examination of Loreto was deferred for the fourth (4th) time. (p. 17, Court of Appeals' rollo)
Finally, on November 7, 1984, the petitioners' counsel resumed his repeatedly postponed cross-
examination of Loreto. The cross-examination was, however, cut short and rescheduled again on motion of
the petitioners' counsel.
Unfortunately, Loreto died on December 1, 1984. An amended complaint was filed for the purpose of
substituting the respondents, herein, they being the children and heirs of Loreto.
At the resumption of the trial on January 21, 1985, the petitioners moved verbally to strike off the record the
entire testimony of Loreto. The motion was denied. A verbal motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.
In view of the petitioners' manifestation that they will appeal the ruling the appellate court, the trial court
issued on January 24, 1985 a more detailed order denying the motion to strike off the record Loreto's
testimony. (p. 17, Court of Appeals' rollo).
On February 11, 1985, the trial court issued another order allowing, among other things, the private
respondents to present their exhibits. A controversy as to the contents of this February 11, 1985 order will
be discussed later.
On February 18, 1985, the petitioners filed a petition with the Intermediate Appellate Court to annul the
lower court's orders dated January 24, 1985 and February 11, 1985 and to prohibit the court from further
proceeding in Civil Case No. 164-A. The petition for certiorari and prohibition was docketed as AC-G.R. SP.
No. 05472.
This petition notwithstanding, the lower court continued the proceedings in Civil Case No. 164-A. Thus, on
March 29, 1985, the lower court promulgated a decision in Civil Case No. 164-A declaring the private
respondents, the children and heirs of Loreto, as the true owners of the subject parcel of land. Damages
were also awarded in favor of the private respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered
(a) Declaring plaintiffs as the true and lawful owners of the parcel of land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 901 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal;
(b) Ordering the defendants to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificate of
Title No. 901;
(c) Directing the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Pasig Branch to cancel Original Certificate of
Title No. 901 and to issue a new one in the names of the plaintiffs;
(d) Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay to the plaintiffs Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as actual damages, Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) as moral damages, Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as
exemplary or corrective damages, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees,
 plus the costs; and
(e) Dismissing the defendants counterclaim. (pp. 13-14, rollo)
On June 20, 1985, the appellate court also rendered a decision in AC-G. R. SP No. 05472. The petition
was denied due course and dismissed. A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Initially, the petitioners filed only a petition to review on certiorari the appellate court's decision and
resolution respectively.
Upon motion of the petitioners, we admitted the amended petition which now seeks to annul the decision of
the lower court in Civil Case No. 164-A aside from setting aside the appellate court's decision and
resolution in AC-G.R. SP No. 05472.
In another resolution dated January 20, 1986, we gave due course to the petition and considered the
respondents' comments as answer.
We first review the challenged decision and order of the appellate court. The petitioners contend that the
appellate committed grave abuse of discretion when it sanctioned the trial court's orders which denied the
striking out of the testimony of original plaintiff Loreto de la Paz from the record.
A motion to strike off testimony from the record is an interlocutory order. Well-settled is the rule that
interlocutory orders may not be subjects of a petition of certiorari unless issued in patent abuse of
discretion. (See Villalon, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 443; Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138
SCRA 587).
We see no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it issued the questioned order. True,
we have consistently ruled on the nature of the right of cross-examination, to wit:
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation,
be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-
judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. (Savory Luncheonette v.
Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., 1975, 62 SCRA 258).
xxx xxx xxx
The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary in invaluable as it is
inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express
recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto
of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of the due
process guaranteed by the fundamental law. ... Until such cross-examination has been
finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not,
therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding
the case. (Bacrach Motor Co., Inc., v. Court of Industrial Relations, 86 SCRA 27 citing
Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., supra, Ortigas, Jr. vs.
Lufthansa German Airlines, 64 SCRA 610)
But we have also ruled that it is not an absolute right which a party can demand at all times. This Court has
stated that:
xxx xxx xxx
the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct
amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had
the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily
forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the
witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.
The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right to cross-
examine may take various forms. But the common basic principle underlying the application
of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to confront and
cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons
attributable to himself alone.
 xxx xxx xxx
The case of the herein petitioner, Savory Luncheonette, easily falls within the confines of
the jurisprudence given above. Private respondents through their counsel, Atty. Amante,
were given not only one but five opportunities to cross-examine the witness, Atty. Morabe,
but despite the warnings and admonitions of respondent court for Atty. Amante to conduct
the cross-examination or else it will be deemed waived, and despite the readiness,
willingness and insistence of the witness that he be cross-examined, said counsel by his
repeated absence and/or unpreparedness failed to do so until death sealed the witness' lips
forever. By such repeated absence and lack of preparation on the part of the counsel of
private respondents, the latter lost their right to examine the witness, Atty. Morabe, and they
alone must suffer the consequences. The mere fact that the witness died after giving his
direct testimony is no ground in itself for excluding his testimony from the record so long as
the adverse party was afforded an adequate opportunity for cross-examination but through
fault of his own failed to cross-examine the witness. (Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng
Manggagawang Pilipino, supra; at pp. 263-267)
In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to cross-examine Loreto was through no fault of the respondents.
As can be gleaned from the record, Loreto was available for cross-examination from the time she finished
her direct testimony on March 12, 1984 to November 7, 1984, the last scheduled hearing of the case before
her death on December 1, 1984. The petitioners not only kept on postponing the cross-examination but at
times failed to appear during scheduled hearings. The postponement of the trial on May 23, 1984 to a later
date duet o the correction of the stenographic notes of Loreto's testimony may be justified, but the same
cannot be said for the subsequent posponements requested by the petitioners. The scheduled trials before
November 7, 1984, did not push through, because of the petitioners' fault. It may also be recalled that at
the scheduled hearing on September 14, 1984 neither the petitioners nor their counsel appeared leading to
the presentation of evidence ex parte. And also during the scheduled hearing on September 18, 1984,
when the petitioners were allowed to cross-examine Loreto despite the fact that the case was already
deemed submitted for decision, the petitioners again failed to appear.
Under these circumstances, we rule that the petitioners had waived their right to cross-examine Loreto.
Through their own fault, they lost their right to cross-examine Loreto. Her testimony stands.
[G.R. No. 146689. September 27, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO (FERDINAND) MONJEY ROSARIO
@ Fernan, LORDINO (BERNARD) MAGLAYA Y ALVAREZ @ Odeng (acquitted),
CHRISTOPHER BAUTISTA Y ROSARIO @ Totde (acquitted), and MICHAEL CASTRO Y OSIAS
@ Iking (acquitted), accused.
FERNANDO (FERDINAND) MONJE y ROSARIO @ Fernan, accused-appellant
To administer by final judgment the dreaded lethal injection on the basis of cumulus circumstantial evidence
- consisting mainly of the testimony of a witness who failed and refused to return to court and submit to
cross-examination four (4) times - is judicial tyranny of the highest order, which this Court should never
commit. In conscience and in absolute fidelity to our trust, we cannot agree to what would amount to a
blatant misuse of the strong arm of the law, in complete disregard of the constitutional guaranties of the
accused. Where the life of a human being - who is presumed to be innocent - is at stake, we should require
nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. And if proof is by circumstancial evidence, the
circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. Otherwise,
indubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.
To illustrate: A met B with blood-stained clothes hurriedly coming out of the room still holding a knife
dripping with blood. A entered the room and saw his wife lifeless on the floor with blood still oozing from a
stab wound on her chest. There was no other person in the room which had only one door for ingress and
egress. By a chain of unbroken circumstancial evidence, there can be no other conclusion than that B and
B alone, and no other, could have stabbed A's wife to death.
The case before us is a classic example of circumstantial evidence of what the above illustration is not.
Aside from the unexplained non-appearance of the "principal witness" at his scheduled cross-examination
no less than four (4) times, the chain of circumstances brought out by the witness is too weak - not
unbroken to incriminate the accused-appellant in the crime charged. The possibility of other people being
responsible therefor is not remote considering that it supposedly happened in a wide open ricefield freely
accessible to people from all walks of life, as may be shown hereunder:
Fernando (Ferdinand) Monje y Rosario alias Fernan, together with Lordino (Bernard) Maglaya y Alvarez
alias Odeng, Christopher Bautista y Rosario alias Totde and Michael Castro y Osias alias Iking were
charged with rape with homicide for the brutal rape and killing of 15-year old Imee Diez Paulino.[1] On 13
November 2000, after trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, of Malolos, Bulacan, acquitted Maglaya,
Bautista and Castro but convicted Monje of the crime charged and sentenced him to death, and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim P75,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus
costs.[2]
As the trial court found, in the evening of 24 April 1997 at around 9:00 o'clock Imee Diez Paulino asked
permission from her mother to play bingo at the house of their barangay captain at Francisco Homes, San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Three (3) days later, Imee's lifeless body was found lying in the ricefields naked,
except for her brassiere, with several injuries including a fractured skull that caused massive brain
hemorrhage. The body was already in a state of decomposition. The medico-legal officer surmised that the
injuries on the skull were caused by fist blows or by a hard blunt instrument. The genital examination
disclosed that Imee was brutally raped before she was killed. Her hymen was completely lacerated and
there was a 2.5-centimeter laceration of the perineum. The medico-legal officer further opined that such
laceration could not have been caused by an ordinary-sized penis but by a much bigger object forcibly
inserted to the vagina. The blood clots in the vaginal area showed that Imee was still alive when the object
was forced into her.
During the wake, Michael Cordero, a tricycle driver plying the vicinity of Francisco Homes, told Maria Isabel
Diez Paulino, mother of Imee, that in the evening of 24 April 1997 at around 11:00 o'clock he saw the victim
back-riding with accused-appellant Fernando Monje with three (3) other persons in the sidecar whom he
did not know. From a distance of about six (6) arms length he allegedly saw Imee, accused-appellant
Monje, and the three (3) unidentified persons alight from the tricycle and walk towards the ricefields. At
about 1:00 o'clock the following morning only Monje and his three (3) companions returned to the tricycle.
When placed on the witness stand Cordero identified the three (3) companions of Monje as Lordino
Maglaya, also a tricycle driver, Christopher Baustista, a taxi driver, and Michael Castro, a bus conductor, all
residents of Francisco Homes.
Another prosecution witness Jojit Vasquez testified that at about midnight of 24 April 1997 he eloped with
Irene, sister of Imee, and they went to the vacant house of a certain Alvin situated also at Francisco
Homes. At about 2:00 o'clock the following morning, 25 April 1997, Monje and Maglaya followed by
Bautista and Castro arrived at the same house on board two (2) tricycles, but Bautista and Castro left after
a short while. Monje appeared surprised, especially upon seeing Irene. At around 3:00 o'clock Jojit and
Irene left the house and proceeded to Cubao where they boarded a bus for Pangasinan.
Monje denied complicity in the crime charged and pleaded for his acquittal. He claimed that on 24 April
1997 at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening he was already sleeping in his uncle's house in Francisco
Homes, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. He further claimed that he never woke up until 6:00 o'clock the
following morning.
Nobody saw the actual commission of the crime. But death now lurks upon accused-appellant Monje on the
basis alone of the following circumstantial evidence put together by the court a quo: (a) the testimony of
Michael Cordero to the effect that he saw the accused and his three (3) companions with victim Imee
Paulino back-riding with the accused on a tricycle at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening of 24 April 1997
heading towards a ricefield, and that at around 1:00 o'clock the following morning he saw accused-
appellant with three (3) companions returning to the tricycle without the victim; (b) the testimony of Jojit
Vasquez that at around 2:00 o'clock in the morning of 25 April 1997 he saw the accused and his
unidentified companions in the house of a certain Alvin; (c) the fact that the decomposing body of the victim
was later found in a ricefield naked except for a brassiere; and, (d) that the accused went home to Cagayan
two (2) weeks after he learned that an Information had been filed implicating him in the crime.
Quite significantly, these circumstances do not establish an unbroken chain of events that would show
the complicity of the accused in the rape-slay of victim Imee Paulino. Apparently, the case for the
prosecution is woven principally around the testimony of witness Michael Cordero. It must be emphasized
however that his testimony was not sufficiently tested on the crucible of cross-examination, specifically, that
significant portion of his direct examination where he purportedly saw the accused and three (3)
unidentified persons returning to the tricycle from the ricefield without the victim around 1:00 o'clock the
following morning.
After his initial cross-examination by defense counsel, witness Cordero failed and refused to return to court
for the continuation of his cross-examination. In other words, except for his brief cross-examination which
had barely scratched the surface, so to speak, and despite the insistence of the defense counsel to pursue
his cross-examination and the repeated warnings from the trial court that it would be constrained to strike
out and disregard his testimony should he fail to appear again, the witness stubbornly refused to return to
court for his cross-examination.[3]
It bears stressing that the cross-examination of a witness is an absolute right, not a mere privilege, of the
party against whom he is called. With regard to the accused, it is a right guaranteed by the fundamental law
as part of due process. Article III, Sec. 14, par. (2), of the 1987 Constitution specifically mandates that "the
accused shall enjoy the right to meet the witnesses face to face," and Rule 115, Sec. 1, par. (f), of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure enjoins that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial.[4] Cross-examination serves as a
safeguard to combat unreliable testimony, providing means for discrediting a witness' testimony, and is in
the nature of an attack on the truth and accuracy of his testimony. The purpose of cross-examination,
however, is not limited to bringing out a falsehood, since it is also a leading and searching inquiry of the
witness for further disclosure touching the particular matters detailed by him in his direct examination, and it
serves to sift, modify, or explain what has been said, in order to develop new or old facts in a view
favorable to the cross-examiner. The object of cross-examination therefore is to weaken or disprove the
case of ones adversary, and break down his testimony in chief, test the recollection, veracity, accuracy,
honesty and bias or prejudice of the witness, his source of information, his motives, interest and memory,
and exhibit the improbabilities of his testimony.[5]
In other words, the ultimate purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or falsity of the statements
of a witness during direct examination. Unfortunately, for the accused, these objectives of cross-
examination were never attained in this case because of the continued failure and refusal of witness
Cordero to appear for his cross-examination. How can the truth be ascertained if the cross-examination is
not completed?
In the Sur-Rejoinder of Mme. Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, it is submitted that Cordero was
sufficiently cross-examined on the substantial points of his direct testimony, citing People v. Seneris[6]
which held that testimony may not be stricken from the record where the witness has already been
sufficientlly cross-examined.
We discussed at length in Seneris the effects of the absence or the incomplete cross-examination of a
witness on the admissibility in evidence of his testimony on direct examination. The basic rule is that the
testimony of a witness given on direct examination should be stricken off the record where there was no
adequate opportunity for cross-examination. Of course, there are notable modifications to the basic rule
which make its application essentially on a case-to-case basis. Thus, where a party had the opportunity to
cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits his right to cross-examine
and the testimony given by the witness on direct examination will be allowed to remain on record.[7] But
when the cross-examination is not or cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party
offering the witness, or to the witness himself, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent
and inadmissible in evidence.[8] The direct testimony of a witness who dies before the conclusion of the
cross-examination can be stricken only insofar as not covered by the cross-examination,[9] and the
absence of a witness is not enough to warrant striking of his testimony for failure to appear for further
cross-examination where the witness has already been sufficiently cross-examined, which is not true in the
present case, or that the matter on which further cross-examination is sought is not in controversy.[10]
Under the facts of the present case, the prosecution witness Michael Cordero alone was responsible for his
failure to appear on four (4) scheduled hearings for his cross-examination. He was absent from the
hearings without valid cause on record. In Seneris, the prosecution witness Mario Nemenio was not
responsible for his failure to appear and complete his cross-examination owing to his untimely death.
Hence, it was impossible for him to return to court for his cross-examination. On the other hand, Cordero
was directed by the trial court to complete his cross-examination in four (4) scheduled hearings but which
he failed to attend without giving any justifiable reason.
In the instant case, it is beyond cavil that the accused was not afforded adequate opportunity to cross-
examine, not of his own design but because of the unexplained failure of the witness to appear on the
succeeding four (4) scheduled hearings despite repeated warnings from the court. As may be noted, the
defense counsel was barely through with his preliminary questions at the initial stage of his cross-
examination. In fact, the defense counsel repeatedly manifested his desire to further cross-examine
witness Cordero as counsel still had "important matters" to clear up with the witness regarding some
"conflicting testimonies."[11]
In the case before us, no less than the presiding judge himself recognized the need for further cross-
examination when he warned that witness Cordero should return otherwise his testimony "not touched
upon by the cross-examination would be stricken off the record." And the cross-examiner was insisting on
the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him and to cross-examine them.
Even the other witness, Jojit Vasquez, failed to appear on 8 October 1998 when required as may be
gathered from the order of the trial court issued on that date. In the instant case, prosecution witness
Cordero failed to appear four (4) times for his cross-examination without justifiable reason, thus depriving
the cross-examiner of the right to confront him and test his credibility and shed light on matters vital to the
defense.
Combining the testimony of Cordero with those of the other prosecution witnesses, the identity of the
perpetrator or perpetrators of this abominable crime could not have been deduced. A reasonable inference
about a matter in issue, more specifically, about the likely existence of a fact in issue is necessary to
achieve sufficient circumstantial evidence to support not only a conviction but the death sentence. Having
allegedly seen the victim and the accused on that fateful evening of 24 April 1997 from a distance of six (6)
arms length, what did the witness observe about the behavior of the victim in relation to the accused? Did
the witness notice anything unusual about the appearance of the accused at 11:00 o'clock that evening of
24 April 1997, and again at 2:00 o'clock the following morning? Were there marked differences observed
between the appearance of the accused at 11:00 o'clock that evening and their appearance at 2:00 o'clock
the following morning? What clothes were they wearing? What were their sizes - height, build, or possibly
their estimated weight? What was the color of the tricycle or tricycles or tricycles; was there only one or
were there two (2) tricycles? Did the vehicle or vehicles have any distinguishing marks, dents, or other
peculiar physical distinguishing appearances? Did the witness or witnesses notice any marks or signs of
physical struggle on the bodies of the accused when seen at 2:00 o'clock in the morning of 25 April 1997?
These are only a few of the questions which could have been propounded to witness Cordero to ascertain
the truth or falsity of his testimony. But, unfortunately, he failed to attend the scheduled hearings for his
cross-examination. Thus, he left more questions than answers on the circumstances of the tragedy that
befell the Paulino family.
Cordero's cross-examination did not even delve on the matter that Monje and his three (3) unidentified
companions returned to the tricycle without the victim. Besides, even if we take into account Cordero's
partial cross-examination, the same would not have proved beyond reasonable doubt that Monje was the
perpetrator of the heinous crime. At the very least, what it tended to establish was that at around 11:00
o'clock in the evening of 24 April 1997 Cordero saw Imee in the company of Monje and three (3)
unidentified persons. But was this enough to deny the accused his fundamental right to life and to be free?
Right from the beginning, Cordero was already a reluctant witness for the prosecution. He could not be
found in the address given by the prosecution when the first subpoena ad testificandum was served. On
the second attempt to secure his attendance in court, he could not again be located. Only his mother was
at the given address but she even refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of the subpoena.[12] Cordero
was cross-examined on 24 October 1997 but only briefly because of lack of time and the court had to call
the other scheduled cases; on 29 January 1998 Cordero could not be cross-examined because, as the
court observed, he appeared physically and emotionally unfit to go on with his cross-examination. He never
showed up in court on the subsequent trial dates, i.e., 19 March, 28 August, 17 September and 8 October
1998. No valid excuse or justification can be discerned from the records to explain his continued refusal to
appear for his cross-examination.
Being the supposed "star witness" for the prosecution, the presence of Cordero in court was the
responsibility of the public prosecutor, and it was incumbent upon him to take the initiative in ensuring the
attendance of his witnesses at the trial; more so in this case where, as admitted no less by the public
prosecutor himself, "Cordero's testimony was very vital considering that the evidence against the
accused were (sic) purely circumstantial and none of the witnesses saw the actual rape-slay."[13]
The public prosecutor could have easily moved for an arrest, or in the alternative, to have the witness cited
in contempt for his willful failure to appear at the trial as a material witness for the prosecution.
Quite significantly, during the hearing on 17 September 1998 the defense counsel moved that the
testimony of Cordero be stricken off the record. But the public prosecutor prayed for a last chance to
present Cordero on the next scheduled hearing, which was granted by the trial court with a warning that
should Cordero "fail to give any satisfactory explanation for his failure to appear, his testimony given
so far will be stricken off the record."[14] Then, on 8 October 1998 the court a quo made good its
warning, albeit qualifiedly, and ordered thus -
Despite due notice, the last two (2) witnesses for the prosecution, Michael Cordero and Jojit Vasquez, as
shown in the return of service by the Court Process Server, again failed to appear without justifiable
cause or reason. For that reason, as agreed upon by the prosecution and the defense, the testimony so
far given by witness Michael Cordero not touched upon by the cross-examination partially
conducted by the defense counsel is hereby stricken off the record, saving that part of his testimony
upon which he was duly cross-examined by the defense counsel (underscoring supplied).[15]
The foregoing order notwithstanding, the trial court convicted the accused and sentence him to death on
the basis of the testimony of Cordero, but at the same time acquitting his three (3) co-accused after
observing that such testimony was an "unexplained development." Without the benefit of a full cross-
examination, the ex parte statements of the witness are too uncertain, shaky and unreliable to be included
in the review of controverted facts. They cannot be allowed to form part of the evidence and their
consideration by the court a quo was clearly unwarranted.
It is a well-entrenched doctrine that courts should only consider and rely on duly established evidence and
never on mere conjectures or suppositions. Professor Wigmore explains that legal relevancy of evidence
denotes "something more than a minimum of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance
must contain a "plus value."[16] This may be necessary to prevent the court from being satisfied by matters
of slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without this
"plus value" may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the court to
balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would result from its admission.
The verdict in a criminal case can be sustained only when there is relevant evidence from which the court
can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the test in
determining the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence can be summed up as follows: Is the evidence
sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis proving innocence, except the guilt of the accused, given
the circumstances of the case? In reviewing criminal cases that could very well exact the ultimate penalty
of death, we should do more than merely determine whether the trial court could reasonably conclude that
the established facts were more probable than not. We must, in every instance, determine whether the trial
court could reasonably conclude that the facts were certain to have occurred.
It bears stressing that even the trial judge who was privy to the entire proceedings below did not lend full
credence to the entire testimony of Cordero. On the contrary, he even expressed doubt as to their veracity.
Consider the following: When Cordero executed his sworn statement before the police authorities he
declared that he did not know the identities of the three (3) companions of Monje, but when finally placed
on the witness stand he readily identified them as Maglaya, Bautista and Castro. No explanation was
proffered on why he flip-flopped on his testimony. Perplexed, the trial court described this as an
unexplained development -
While the Court believes that he indeed saw at that time accused Monje with the victim before she was
found dead at the same vicinity they were seen, the Court also believes that in both instances he saw with
said accused in the same vicinity three other persons not known to him, like he said to the police. That is
why his testimony at the trial that those three persons were the three other accused known to him
and he pointed to in court as the companions of accused Monje when he saw them with the victim
that fatal night, came as an unexplained development. If he saw and recognized that night his co-
tricycle driver accused Monje, he could not have failed to recognize accused Lordino Odeng
Maglaya, another tricycle driver at Francisco Homes, and most probably also accused Christopher
Bautista and Michael Castro who were residents of Francisco Homes like he was, if indeed, these
were the three unknown persons he saw that night with accused Monje and victim Imee.[17]
Interestingly, the trial judge acquitted the three (3) other accused based on the weakness of the testimony
of Cordero and Vasquez. Strangely, however, based on the same weak evidence, the trial judge convicted
the accused-appellant. Could it not be that the most logical step for the court a quo was to acquit likewise
herein accused Monje in view of the clearly weak and unreliable testimony of witnesses Cordero and
Vasquez? In hindsight, even if we take into account Cordero's partial cross-examination, the same would
not have established an unbroken chain of circumstances proving beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused was the perpetrator of the heinous crime. At most, what it tended to establish was that at about
11:00 o'clock in the evening of 24 April 1997 Cordero saw Imee in the company of Monje and three (3)
unidentified persons and nothing more - nothing of the rape and slaying of Imee!
Indeed, other than the anemic testimony of Cordero, there is no evidence effectively linking the accused to
the rape and brutal slaying of Imee Diez Paulino. The testimony of the second witness for the prosecution,
Jojit Vasquez, as to the presence of the accused and his companions in the house of a certain Alvin, is
likewise disappointingly unreliable to establish a logical relationship between the commission of the crime
and complicity of the accused therein. This evidence, even if tied up with the testimony of Cordero that
accused was last seen with the victim, does not establish a causal connection, nor support an inference,
much less a conclusion, that accused had something to do with the rape and killing of the victim.
In assaying the probative value of circumstantial evidence, four (4) basic guidelines must be observed: (a)
It should be acted upon with caution; (b) All the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of
guilt; (c) The facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt of the accused; and, (d) The facts must
establish with certainty the guilt of the accused as to convince beyond reasonable doubt that he was the
perpetrator of the offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the series of events pointing to
the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt of the accused cannot be
deduced from scrutinizing just one (1) particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which when put
together reveals a convincing picture pointing to the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime.
[18]
Under the rules, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict an accused if the following requisites
concur: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proved; and, (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence finds application in crimes such as rape with homicide. The nature of the crime of
rape, where usually only the victim and the rapist are present at the crime scene, makes prosecutions for
the complex crime of rape with homicide particularly difficult since the victim can no longer testify against
the perpetrator of the crime.[19] Circumstantial evidence must form a complete and unbroken chain which,
taking the evidence as a whole, leads directly to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
excluding any reasonable inference other than that of guilt.
Conceding arguendo that indeed Imee was last seen alive at 11:00 o'clock in the evening of 24 April 1997
in the company of the accused, yet, there was no other circumstance tending to prove that he was the one
who raped and killed her. In fact, the time of the rape as well as the killing was not even satisfactorily
established. The medico-legal officer did not give a categorical answer as to the exact time of death of the
victim. On the contrary, he merely gave an approximation, i.e., "two (2), three (3), four (4) days or more." In
fact, this approximation is of no help at all because if we reckon it from the time when the decomposing
body of the victim was found, i.e., on 27 April 1997, the three (3) dates when the victim supposedly died
would be 25 April (counting two (2) days from 27 April), 24 April (counting three (3) days from 27 April), 23
April (counting four (4) days from 27 April), and 22 April backwards (counting more than four (4) days). This
would have been absurd and in no way coincide with the date when the victim was supposedly last seen
alive.
Notably, no mention was made of the circumstances leading to the discovery and retrieval of the
decomposing body of the victim. Plainly, there is no basis to deduce, much less conclude, that the victim
was brought to and later recovered from the same ricefield.
So much time elapsed from the moment Imee was last seen alive on 24 April 1997 and when her
decomposing body was found on 27 April 1997. Possibilities abound as to what actually happened between
24 and 27 April 1997. The prosecution miserably failed to fill the void with satisfactory and convincing
evidence.
Accused-appellant allegedly "fled" to Cagayan after the filing of the Information, supposedly when he
learned he was included therein, which the trial court considered as evidence of a guilty conscience.
Although as a general rule flight is an indication of guilt, the same should not be flippantly considered.
"Flight" is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn only when it is unexplained and
with an evident purpose of evading prosecution. The accused-appellant adequately explained that he went
home to Cagayan upon the prodding of an uncle after a quarrel with his cousin who chided him as one they
had to feed or "palamunin" since he was allegedly jobless. Accused-appellant went to his home province
after more than two (2) weeks from the filing of the Information. Thus, he did not leave the place
immediately after learning he was being implicated in the crime. There was no indication whatsoever that
he intentionally made his presence scarce in his community to evade prosecution.
Admittedly, the evidence for the defense is weak and that the facts established do not entirely rule out the
possibility that the accused could be responsible for the crime. However, from our understanding of basic
procedural due process, his conviction must come from the strength of the prosecution evidence and not
from the weakness of his defense; never upon possibilities. Proof, to sustain conviction, must withstand the
test of reason and the constitutional right of confrontation. Mere suspicion of guilt, no matter how strong,
cannot be permitted to sway judgment.
So, too, while this Court as a rule desists from disturbing the findings and conclusions of the trial court,
especially with respect to the credibility of witnesses, we must bow to the superior and immutable rule that
the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt because the law presumes that the
accused-appellant is innocent. This presumption must prevail until the end unless overcome by strong,
clear and compelling evidence.
A proposal has been expressed for the remand of this case to the trial court for further proceedings,
apparently to enable the prosecution to prove again what it failed to prove in the first instance. We cannot
agree because it will set a dangerous precedent. Aside from its being unprocedural, it would open the
floodgates to endless litigations because whenever an accused is on the brink of acquittal after trial, and
realizing its inadequacy, the prosecution would insist to be allowed to augment its evidence which should
have been presented much earlier. This is a criminal prosecution, and to order the remand of this case to
the court a quo to enable the prosecution to present additional evidence would violate the constitutional
right of the accused to due process, and to speedy determination of his case. The lamentable failure of the
prosecution to fill the vital gaps in its evidence, while prejudicial to the State and the private offended party,
should not be treated by this Court with indulgence, to the extent of affording the prosecution a fresh
opportunity to refurbish its evidence.
In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime charged; but justice must be dispensed with an
even hand. Regardless of how much we want to punish the perpetrators of this ghastly crime and give
justice to the victim and her family, the protection provided by the Bill of Rights is bestowed upon all
individuals, without exception, regardless of race, color, creed, gender or political persuasion - whether
privileged or less privileged - to be invoked without fear or favor. Hence, the accused deserves no less than
an acquittal; ergo, he is not called upon to disprove what the prosecution has not proved.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the court a quo finding accused FERNANDO (FERDINAND)
MONJE y Rosario alias Fernan guilty of rape with homicide is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency
of evidence; at least, on reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and is
ordered IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from custody unless lawfully held for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to implement this Decision immediately and to
report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
CONRADO DE LEON, ANDRING DE LEON, JOHN DOE (at large), accused,
CONRADO DE LEON, appellant.
In its Brief,10 the Office of the Solicitor General adopts the version of the facts "synthesized by the trial
court," as follows
"Simeona de la Peña narrated that around 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of June 23, 1995, the
bloodied body of her son, Crispin de la Peña was brought to their house at Emergency Relocation
Center in Tangos, Navotas, Metro Manila. She immediately embarked Crispin on a tricycle before
transferring him into a jeepney to bring him to the nearest hospital. Passing along Bacog Street,
Crispin related to her that he was ganged up and stabbed by three persons at the corner of M.
Naval Street, Tangos near a videoke joint. He was at that time urinating and in fact his zipper was
still open when apparently somebody tapped his shoulder. It turned out, however, that it was a stab
thrust. When Crispin backslided, he was again stabbed on the stomach while his hands were being
held as the battering continued. Crispin identified accused Conrado de Leon, along with the other
accused, as among the persons who stabbed and ganged up [on] him. From the time Crispin was
brought to her and on board the tricycle, he was repeatedly mentioning the names of the persons
who assaulted him without any apparent reason. Crispin told her that he did not quarrel with anyone
of the three (3) accused who ganged up on him. While traversing Bacog Street, Crispin was already
having difficulty in saying a word because he was speaking very softly and in fact ha[d] to move his
mouth near her ears in order to communicate. His eyes were dropping closing unlike earlier [when]
the same were wide open when he was brought home.
"Sometime in the month of May prior to the incident, Crispin went home crying because he was
slapped by accused Rudy R. Manlapaz alias Talakitok who was asking fish out of their catch
entrusted to Crispin by their manager. Nonetheless, the victim told accused Manlapaz that he
[would] give them fish some other time. Accused Manlapaz got mad and slapped Crispin before
threatening to kill him.1âwphi1.nêt
"Rudy dela Peña related that he was drinking inside MC kitchenette/Snack House at Naval Street,
Tangos, Navotas when his brother Crispin and Apollo Natividad arrived. The latter ordered and
consumed two bottles of beer, [after which], he gave them another bottle, which they did not drink
anymore. Crispin and Apollo told him that they could no longer drink more because they ha[d] each
consumed one bottle of beer so he told them to go home. When Crispin and Apollo proceeded
outside the MC Kitchenette, a commotion ensued which he did not bother to see because a melee
[was] a natural occurrence in the place. However, the trouble reached the kitchenette. It was there
when he saw a man x x x being held in both hands while accused Andring de Leon grabbed him by
the chin and delivered a stab thrust on his neck. At that juncture, the man turned his head to the
right. He readily recognized him to be his brother Crispin whose shirt was already tainted with blood
because of the several stab wounds he had sustained. On his recognition of his brother, he
immediately rushed towards him as Crispin was saying to his assailants 'Bakit, talu-talo na ba
tayo?' He then carried his brother with his left hand and us[ed] his right hand to parry x x x several
stab thrusts thrown by the assailants. He was able to destroy the wall of the comfort room despite
the presence of all the accused blocking their escape. The door led them outside the MC
Kitchenette. Seeing a pedicab, he immediately boarded his wounded brother therein. However, the
driver was hesitant to drive them away because of the trouble that took place so he decided to look
for another pedicab and brought Crispin home. His brother was still stable inside the pedicab
because he managed to divulge to him the names of his assailants. He immediately noticed the
blood oozing from the left side of the neck of Crispin as he was speaking. Upon reaching home, he
woke up his mother and they transferred Crispin to another vehicle. Two policemen later on blocked
and asked them where they were taking the victim. One of their companions instead uttered
'Putang-ina ninyo, mamamatay na ang tao pinipigilan pa ninyo.' He knew the assailants of his
brother because he was once a fisherman like them. Accused Andring de Leon frequents the billiard
hall in their place. He remembers the incidents that transpired between Crispin and accused Ruby
Manlapaz alias Talakitok when his brother denied the request of the accused for some fish catch.
Accused Manlapaz threatened Crispin that should they see each other again he would kill him."
In finding appellant guilty of murder, the RTC gave full faith and credence to the testimony of the
prosecution's witness, Reynaldo de la Peña, who had positively identified the former as one of the crime. It
likewise accepted the dying declaration of the victim regarding his death and deemed such declaration to
have been made under the consciousness of his impending death. These circumstances were held to
prevail over appellant's defense of denial and alibi. Finally, the lower court also ruled that the killing was
attended by treachery.
Not satisfied with the judgment, appellant has lodged this appeal.
“The trial court erred when it directly participated in the active cross-examination of defense witness
Armando Roque.”
Participation of the Trial Judge
Neither can appellant find solace in his attack against the trial judge who, allegedly "itching to convict the
accused-appellant[,] started cross-examining the witness even before the public prosecutor could ask his
first question, thereby taking over from the prosecution the task of impeaching Armando Roque's
credibility."41
As this Court has held, the participation of judges in the conduct of trials cannot be condemned
outrightly.42 They cannot be expected to remain always passive and stoic during the proceedings.43 After
all, they are not prohibited from asking questions when proper and necessary. In fact, this Court has
repeatedly ruled that judges "must be accorded a reasonable leeway in asking [witnesses] questions x x x
as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to bring out the truth."44
This means that "questions designed to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence are not
improper. Also, the judge, being the arbiter, may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to
expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time."45
Trial judges may examine some of the witnesses for the defense for the purpose of ferreting out the truth
and getting to the bottom of the facts. That they do so would not justify the charge that they assist the
prosecution with the evident desire to secure a conviction, or that they intimidate the witnesses.46
Verily, they are judges of both the law and the facts.47 They would be negligent in the performance of their
duties if they permit a miscarriage of justice through their failure to propound questions that have some
material bearing upon the outcome.48 In the exercise of sound discretion, they may cross-examine these
witnesses49 or ask them such questions as will enable the former to formulate sound opinions on the
ability of the latter o tell the truth, and to draw out relevant and material testimonies that may support or
rebut the position taken by one or the other party.50 Even if the clarificatory questions they propound
happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one of the parties, bias is not necessarily
implied.51
In the present case, the only purpose of the trial judge was to arrive at the truth and do justice to both
parties. An accusation of unfairness cannot be supported when his intention was merely to elicit the
truth.52 As this Court has already ruled, judges may ask questions that would elicit the facts of the issues
involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points that may have been overlooked
by counsel.53
(Start na yata ng Rule 130, 20-25 dito)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO DE JESUS y QUIZON, alias "ELIONG," accused-appellant.
Clara Mina, an unmarried woman of 28, lived with her parents in barrio Amistad, Alicia, Isabela (p. 7, tsn.,
March 21, 1974).
Clara Mina, however, is feeble-minded. She is unable to comb her hair, bathe herself and wash her clothes
(pp. 21, 31, 32, tsn., March 21, 1974). Because of her mental condition, she just stayed in the house, doing
no household chores (p. 31, tsn., Id.).
The accused, Rogelio de Jesus, a 19-year old farmer, who lived in the house of his sister some 15 meters
away from the victim's house, knew of Clara's mental infirmity, and has often seen her left alone in the
house (p. 20, tsn., March 21, 1974; pp. 38, 47, 49, tsn., April 25, 1974).
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of Jan. 3, 1974, Pastora Simon went out to the field in order to plant
palay, leaving her daughter Clara Mina alone in the house. Her husband (Clara's father), had gone to a
place called Soliven four days before, while the other members of the household had also left for the field
(pp. 17, 18, 19, tsn., March 21, 1974).
That afternoon, Clara Mina was seated on top of a trunk when Rogelio de Jesus suddenly entered the
house, carried her in his arms and laid her on the floor (pp. 8, 13, tsn., March 21, 1974). Objecting to what
was being done to her, Clara gave an outcry "Madi! Madi!" (which translated means "I don't like! I don't
like!") Rogelio, ignoring her cries, removed her panties as well as his own trousers. He lay on top of her,
inserted his penis into her vagina and performed the sexual act (pp. 7, 8, 9, 13,14, 15, tsn., Id.).
Meanwhile, Pastora Simon, who had already walked some 150 meters away from their house, when
sensing it was about to rain, hurried back to the house to get cellophane with which to shield her from the
rain (p. 17, tsn., March 21, 1974). Upon her return to the house, she found Rogelio de Jesus naked lying on
top of Clara Mina whose legs were spread apart (p. 19, tsn., Id.). Seeing them in that position, she rushed
to the kitchen to get a club but Rogelio spotted her and ran away. (p. 20, tsn., Id.).
The barrio captain, Glicerio Guzman, to whom Pastora Simon had immediately reported the incident,
looked for Rogelio but failed to locate him (p. 20, tsn., March 21, 1974; pp. 10, 20, tsn., March 22, 1974).
Returning from the barrio captain's house, Pastora Simon investigated Clara, who revealed to her that she
was carried away from the trunk where she was seated, then forcibly laid on the floor to have sexual
intercourse with Rogelio (pp. 20, 21, tsn., March 21, 1974).
The next day — January 4, 1974 — Clara Mina, accompanied by her parents, denounced Rogelio de
Jesus to the police authorities (p. 20, tsn., March 22, 1974). Clara Mina was examined by Fernando
Babaran, Municipal Health Officer of Echague, lsabela at the Southern Isabela Emergency Hospital, the
municipal health officer of Alicia being then on leave (p. 6, tsn., March 22, 1974). The medical certificate,
Exhibit "C", issued by Dr. Babaran, shows the following findings:
(1) hymenal lacerations at 3 o'clock, 8 o'clock and 11 o'clock.
(2) vagina admits one finger with ease. Two fingers with difficulty.
(3) fresh perineal abrasion.
(4) smear, not done due to lack of microscope.
(5) contusion — left temporal area. Lesions to heal within one week. (p. 3, Record).
According to Dr. Babaran, the abrasions were possibly inflicted the day prior to the examination and that
the contusion on the left temporal area of the girl's head could have been caused when her head was
pushed against a hard object (pp. 11, 12, tsn., March 22, 1974).
Subsequently, Rogelio de Jesus was surrendered by his brother-in-law, a councilor to the Alicia Police
Department. He executed an affidavit, Exhibit "D" subscribed before Alicia Municipal Judge Flor Egipto on
January 5, 1974, admitting that he had sexual intercourse once with Clara Mina, but denying that he raped
her (p. 7, record).
The accused denied that he had forced the complainant to have sexual intercourse with him and that he
only inserted his forefinger inside the complainant's private parts. He testified that he admitted having
sexual intercourse once with complainant in his affidavit
While the affidavit executed by the accused is not admissible in evidence for lack of evidence showing that
the accused during the custodial investigation was apprised of his constitutional rights under Art. IV, Sec.
20, of the New Constitution, 2 still there is sufficient evidence on record that the accused had performed the
sexual act to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
1. The accused testified that he merely inserted his forefinger into the complainant's vagina
to cure her of her mental malady. The records, however show, from the testimony of both
the prosecution and the defense, that the accused laid on top of complainant. If appellant's
purpose was merely to insert his forefinger into the complainant's vagina, then there is no
 necessity of lying on top of complainant.
2. Complainant testified, contrary to the testimony of the accused, that the latter brought out
his penis and inserted it into her vagina which pained her a lot.
3. The hymenal lacerations and the fresh perineal abrasions in complainant's vagina
corroborated her testimony that the accused had sexual intercourse with her.
The accused assailed the competence of the complainant as a witness on the ground that being
feeble minded she is not a competent witness in contemplation of the rules and therefore her
testimony should have been rejected by the lower court. That the complainant was feeble-minded
and had displayed difficulty in comprehending the questions propounded on her is an undisputed
fact. However, there is no showing that she could not convey her Ideas by words or signs. It
appears in the records that complainant gave sufficiently intelligent answers to the questions
propounded by the court and the counsels. The court is satisfied that the complainant can perceive
and transmit in her own way her own perceptions to others. She is a competent witness.
Having sexual intercourse with a feeble-minded woman is rape. The offense is described under paragraph
2 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, that is, the offender having carnal knowledge of a woman
deprived of reason. The Court, in the case of People vs. Daing, 3 said:
The offense committed by appellant is rape described under paragraph 2 of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, that is, the offender having carnal knowledge of a woman deprived of reason. The deprivation
of reason contemplated by law does not need to be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is enough.
So it was held by the Supreme Court of Spain that a man having carnal knowledge of a woman whose
mental faculties are not normally developed or who is suffering from hemiplegia and mentally backward or
who is an Idiot commits the crime of rape. ...
Being feeble-minded, complainant is incapable of thinking and reasoning like any normal human being and
not being able to think and reason from birth as aforesaid, and undoubtedly devoid or deficient in those
instincts and other mental faculties that characterize the average and normal mortal, she really has no will
that is free and voluntary of her own; hers is a defective will, which is incapable of freely and voluntarily
giving such consent so necessary and essential in lifting coitus from the place of criminality. 4 In this
connection, the Solicitor General properly stated: têñ.£îhqwâ£
That complainant possesses such a low mental capacity, to the extent of being incapable of
giving consent, could be gleaned from the fact, as testified to by her mother, that she is
unable to do the simple tasks of combing her hair and bathing herself. Thus, even granting it
to be true, as counsel has insinuated, that complainant had submitted to the sexual act
without resistance (p. 9 Appellant's Brief) such cannot be construed as consent on her part,
so as to preclude it from being rape. Incapable of giving consent, she could not thus
consent in intelligently. 5
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIOSCORO PEDROSA
SARMIENTO, J.:
The appellant, Dioscoro Pedrosa, was convicted by the trial court ** of the special complex crime of Rape
with Homicide committed against Maria Belen Almaden, a nine-year old girl, and was accordingly
sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death. The victim was brutally strangled to death after having
been sexually assaulted and abused.
Before us on automatic review, the appellant, who was twenty three years old at the time of his conviction,
three years after the commission of the crime, prays for acquittal, denying his participation in such a
barbaric, inhuman, and heartless crime.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that in the afternoon of June 9, 1977, spouses Leovigildo Almaden
and Erlinda Velasco Almaden left their house in Barangay Tacuranga, Palo, Leyte, to harvest palay in
neighboring Barangay Capiwaran. 1 They left behind their daughter Maria, their 11-year old son Roberto,
their 7 year old daughter Agnes, and a 13-year-old house guest, Delia Hezoli .2
The children went to bed at about 8:00 o'clock. Maria and Delia shared one bed while Agnes and Roberto
slept in another .3
At about 11:30 p.m., Delia was awakened when someone tugged at her head. As she sat up on the edge of
the bed, she heard Maria cry out in pain. She also heard the rattling sound of empty water gallon
containers in the house. She was seized with fear because she sensed that the hand that touched her
head was not Maria's. She groped for Maria but could not find her. Unable to find a match, she went out of
the house to seek help from the neighbors. The first house she went to was that of Santiago Villas. When
Villas refused to accompany her because his wife would not let him, she proceeded to the neighboring
house of 70-year old Francisco Mas. 4
In the meantime, Roberto, who slept only three (3) meters away from the bed of Delia and Maria, 5 had
also been awakened when Maria cried out in pain. When he heard the sound of water containers striking
one another, he stood up and went to the other bed but he found it empty. He sat down. Then he felt
something hit his foot; it was the foot of a man wearing pants but without shoes. The man's pants had
irregular and unravelled edges. Roberto went to the porch and sat down. A man emerged from the room
and joined him. Roberto, from apparent fright, shouted, calling for Delia. The man became angry, telling
Roberto that he would awaken the neighbors.6
Just then Francisco Mas and Delia arrived at the house of the Almadens with a lamp. They found the
appellant sitting at the porch .7 With the light provided by the lamp, Roberto saw that the man sitting on the
porch was wearing the unevenly edged trousers of the man who hit his foot; he identified the man as the
appellant.8 Francisco tried to go up the house but he had to beat a hasty retreat when the appellant
shouted at him not to enter.9
After Francisco left, Delia, Roberto, and the appellant went inside and found Maria lying in bed. Dioscoro,
the appellant, shook the girl, but she did not move. She was dead.10
That night, Agnes, Delia, and Roberto stayed together in one bed while the appellant lay beside Maria.11
The following morning, at about 9:00 o'clock, the appellant, who appeared restless and disturbed
("nalilisang'), went to the house of Nonilon Chiquillo, a 39-year old tuba gatherer of the same barrio, and
asked him for Endrin, a poisonous insecticide, but Nonilon said he had none. The appellant left thereafter.
12
Later that morning, the appellant accompanied Roberto to Bo. Capiwaran to inform Linda of her daughter's
death. 13 They found Linda doing laundry work near a well in the yard. Maria's father, Leovigildo, who was
working in the ricefield, heard the news and joined them. He heard the appellant tell his (Leovigildo's) wife:
"Mama Linda, Maria Belen is already dead. She suffered from stomach ache and pains." The bereft
Almadens went home. 14
Upon reaching home, Leovigildo saw his dead child, Maria, lying on a bloodied blanket. When he examined
her and found that the blood came from her vagina, he suspected foul play. He looked for a doctor, but
finding none at the Maternity House, he reported the matter to the police. Patrolman Rogelio Montejo, who
was assigned to investigate the case, accompanied Leovigildo back to his house. The two looked for the
appellant but he was nowhere to be found. According to Linda, the appellant ran when Leovigildo went out
to look for a doctor to examine their child. They found the appellant later in his house. When Pat. Montejo
asked him if he was Dioscoro, the appellant's reply was, "I did not know what I was doing.' The appellant
was then brought to Leovigildo's house, to the room where the dead girl still lay. There, he was told by Pat.
Montejo, "Look at what you have done." The appellant did not say anything. He did not deny the imputation
of the police officer.
In his defense, appellant Dioscoro Pedrosa presented a different version of the tragic incident which was
corroborated by the testimony of his elderly mother.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED AND HIS
WITNESSES.
Anent the second assigned error, we generally desist from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses. The findings of fact of the trial judge must be accorded great weight by an
appellate tribunal for the latter can only read in cold print the testimony of the witnesses which commonly is
translated from the local dialect into English. In the process of converting into written form the statements of
living human beings, not only fine nuances but a world of meaning apparent to the judge present, watching
and listening, may escape the reader of the written, translated words. 21
The trial court stated in its decision that the witnesses for the prosecution testified in a frank and
straightforward manner and showed no unwillingness nor hesitation in answering questions; that they
testified with apparent sincerity and in a manner which indicated sufficient intelligence; that they testified to
facts of which they had personal knowledge, and had the means and capacity of knowing and the
opportunities of observing; and that there was no doubt, considering the circumstances then prevailing, that
their attention and interest were focused upon the facts to which they respectively testified.
The star witnesses for the prosecution in this case are children of tender years. And from the mouths of the
children we get the truth.
An intelligent boy is undoubtedly the best observer to be found. The world begins to take
him by storm with its thousand matters of interest; what the school and his daily life furnish
cannot satisfy his overflowing and generous heart. He lays hold of everything new, striking,
strange; all his senses are on the stretch to assimilate it as far as possible. No one notices a
change in the house, no one discovers the bird's nest, no one observes anything out of the
way in the fields; but nothing of that sort escapes the boy; everything which emerges above
the monotonous level of daily life gives him a good opportunity for exercising his wits, for
extending his knowledge, and for attracting the attention of his elders, to whom he
communicates his discoveries. The spirit of the youth not having as yet been led astray by
the necessities of life, its storms and battles, its factions and quarrels, he can freely
abandon himself to everything which appears out of the way; his life has not yet been
disturbed by education, though he often observes more clearly and accurately than any
adult. Besides, he has already got some principles; lying is distasteful to him, because he
thinks it mean; he is no stranger to the sentiment of self-respect, and he never loses an
opportunity of being right in what he affirms. Thus he is, as a rule, but little influenced by the
suggestions of others, and he describes objects and occurrences as he has really seen
them. We say again that an intelligent boy is as a rule the best witness in the world. 22
Truly, children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within their view
than older persons, so their testimony is likely to be more correct and truthful than that of older persons,
and where once established that they have fully understood the nature and character of an oath, as in this
case before us, their testimony should be given full faith and credence. 23
Moreover, Erlinda Velasco Almaden and Roberto Almaden are very close relatives of the appellant. We find
no reason for them to falsely testify against a close relative (the appellant) regarding such a heinous crime.
Furthermore, no evidence was adduced as to why Francisco Mas a neighbor of the appellant and already
70 years old when he testified, should impute false statements to the appellant. Neither was there any
impeaching evidence offered against the testimony of prosecution witness Nonilon Chiquillo. The crime
charged against the appellant is Rape with Homicide. The Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that
"[w]hen by reason or on the occassion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. 24
The gravity of the crime ordinarily would compel us to impose that penalty but which we can not do due to
the constitutional prohibition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the conviction rendered by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
However, due to the prohibition on the imposition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, the appellant, Dioscoro Pedrosa, hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the late Maria Belen Almaden the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00). Cost against the appellant.
TIMOTEO ARROYO, reclamante-apelante,
vs.
ANDREA AZUR, administradora del intestado de Eleuterio Dura, LEONCIA DURAY Y OTROS
Eleuterio Dura died on December 31, 1932 leaving a widow, Andrea Azur, and some collateral relatives as
heirs. On the occasion of his death, the proceedings on his intestacy were initiated before the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, having been appointed the widow administrator of the assets. The
corresponding appraisal and claims commission was formed before which Timoteo Arroyo presented a
claim for services rendered as a domestic servant to the aforementioned spouses for a period of 12 years
counted from the year 1921 until the aforementioned Eleuterio Dura died. According to Arroyo, his services
were contracted verbally on a monthly basis of P10 with no fixed term for payment, being the intelligence of
the parties that such services could be paid later, now in money, now in kind, that is, a piece of farm land.
Timoteo's services ranged from the purely home-based to the tillage and harvesting of the coconut and
abaca plantations and palayeros lands of his masters. Timoteo did not receive any payment during
Eleuterio's life. .
The appraisal and claims commission proceeded to consider Arroyo's claim at its session of January 16,
1939, and after the hearing issued a payment order in favor of the claimant in the amount of P1,200,
rejecting the opposition presented by the collateral relatives of the deceased. Opponents, not in agreement
with the judgment issued by the appraisal and claims commission, appealed against it to the First Instance
Court of Camarines Sur. Once the claim had been reproduced before the Court through the initiation of the
corresponding claim, the opponents again raised their opposition requesting, among other things, that said
demand be dismissed because it had been filed out of time. The widow, included as defendant, in her
concept of administrator, judicial of the assets, presented her answer admitting the verbal contract of rent of
services alleged by the plaintiff, but fixing in P8 the monthly salary.
The Court rejected the motion for dismissal and proceeded to see the claim in its merits. After articulating
the plaintiff's evidence consisting mainly of his testimony and that of the superstite spouse, Andrea Azur, -
tests that came to establish substantially the terms of the contract - the opponents and defendants
requested the dismissal of the suit for the reason that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the
plaintiff's right of action. The Court favorably considered the motion dismissing the claim on the grounds
that there was no written contract between the parties and, therefore, no action could be taken against the
intestate in accordance with the statute to prevent fraud (Article 335, Law No 190, and Article 21, Rule 123,
Rules of the Courts). Against the ruling so dictated, the plaintiff has filed this appeal. .
Are there sufficient evidence in the case file so that we can issue a ruling on the merits of the case? This
question is asked because the rule presupposes this requirement: that in the case file there is a basis for a
decision on the merits. And that base exists. We have two uncontested testimonies in support of the
lawsuit: from the same plaintiff, and that of Andrea Azur, widow of the principal and administrator of the
intestate.
However, the testimonies of the plaintiff and the widow are rejected on the grounds that, according to the
law, they could not testify against the intestate; and it is argued that if both testimonies were eliminated,
there is no evidence in the record in favor of the claim. Let us examine these recusations one by one. .
The objection against the widow's testimony is based on rule 123, article 26, subsection (d), Rules of the
Courts, which reads as follows: "the husband can not be examined for or against his wife without the the
wife's consent can not be examined in favor or against her husband without his consent . " Obviously the
rule is not applicable in the present case, because the husband having died, the conjugal relationship no
longer exists, "the widow is not the wife and, therefore, can testify like any other witness either in favor, well
against the intestate of her husband "(Williams vs. Moore [Mo. App.], 203 SW, 824, 835.).
(Sec. 151) (c) Death of one spouse . - As a general rule, after the death of one spouse, the other is
held a competent witness for or against the decedent's interest in any litigation concerning the
decedent's estate, except his or her jurisdiction was affected by the rules against the disclosure of
confidential communications, or testimony as to communications or transactions with persons since
deceased. (Corpus Juris, Vol. 70, p.124.).
There is now the objection against the plaintiff's testimony, based on rule 123, article 26, subsection (c),
previously article 383, par. 7, Code of Civil Procedure, which prescribes the following: "the parties or the
cause of these in a trial or action, or the persons in whose favor said trial or action is followed against the
executor or administrator or representative of a deceased person mentally incapacitated, about the claim or
claim against the property of said deceased or mentally incapacitated person, they can not declare with
respect to a matter of fact that had occurred before the death of said person or before the other had been
mentally incapacitated. " It is argued that under this rule the plaintiff could not be allowed to testify about
the verbal contract for the lease of services - a matter of fact that occurred before the death of Eleuterio
Dura. "If death has sealed the lips of one of the parties, the law follows the procedure of sealing them also
to the other" Maxilom against Tabotabo, 9 Jur. Fil., 399, 403). The objection would be valid and good if in
the present case the circumstance does not mediate that the widow herself, by herself and as defendant in
her concept of administrator of the intestate, expressly waived the privilege, declaring in favor of the
plaintiff. How to impose that prohibition against the actor if the same party whom the law tries to protect
under the cloak of privilege, has renounced the benefits of said interdiction? As things are now, the main
evidence in favor of the claim is the testimony of the administrator or legal representative of the deceased
who is at the same time spouse superstite. In fact, the testimony of Timoteo is no more than a
corroboration and can be perfectly suppressed, without suffering, in its absence, the substantivity and
effectiveness of the right of action of the plaintiff.
AVELINO ORDOÑO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANGEL DAQUIGAN
Avelino Ordoño was charged in the municipal court of San Gabriel, La Union with having raped his
daughter, Leonora, on October 11, 1970. The verified complaint dated November 7, 1973 was signed by
the twenty four year old victim (Criminal Case No. 104).
In support of that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoño, the mother of Leonora, executed a sworn statement
wherein she disclosed that on that same date, October 11th, Leonora had apprised her of the outrage but
no denunciation was filed because Avelino Ordoño threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina (his daughter
and wife, respectively) if they reported the crime to the police.
Catalina Ordoño in her sworn statement further revealed that her husband had also raped their other
daughter, Rosa, on March 25 and April 7, 1973. He was charged in court with that offense.
Catalina Ordoño said that the rape committed by Avelino Ordoño against Leonora was mentioned during
the investigation and trial of Avelino Ordoño for the rape committed against Rosa Ordoño. Catalina's
statement on this point is as follows:
Q — Why did you not file the complaint against your husband concerning the incident
involving Leonora Ordoño?
A — We Also narrated the incident during the investigation in the Fiscal's Office and also
when I testified in court in the case of my daughter Rosa Ordoño but then my daughter
Leonora Ordoño was still in Manila, sir.
During the preliminary investigation of the rape committed against Leonora, Catalina manifested that she
was no longer afraid to denounce Avelino Ordoño because he was already in jail for having raped Rosa
Ordoño.
The case against Avelino Ordoño, where Leonora Ordoño was the complainant, was elevated to the Court
of First Instance of La Union, San Fernando, Branch (Criminal Case No. 356). On May 29, 1974 the Fiscal
presented Catalina Ordoño as the second prosecution witness. After she had stated her personal
circumstances, the defense counsel objected to her competency. He invoked the marital disqualification
rule found in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. — The following persons
cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein
enumerated:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for
or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other
 or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other;
xxx xxx xxx
Counsel claimed that Avelino Ordoño had not consented expressly or impliedly to his wife's testifying
against him.
The trial court overruled the objection. After the denial of Avelino Ordoño's motion for the reconsideration of
the adverse ruling, he filed the instant action for certiorari and prohibition. He was allowed to sue in forma
pauperis.
The issue is whether the rape committed by the husband against his daughter is a crime committed
by him against his wife within the meaning of the exception found in the marital disqualification
rule.
Should the phrase "in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other" be restricted to
crimes committed by one spouse against the other, such as physical injuries, bigamy, adultery or
concubinage, or should it be given a latitudinarian interpretation as referring to any offense causing marital
discord?
There is a dictum that "where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such
harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of
perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of
private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home" (People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, 704).
In the Francisco case, the wife, as a rebuttal witness, was allowed to testify against the husband who was
charged with having killed his son and who testified that it was the wife who killed their son.
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargill vs.
State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and
the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the
exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly attack or directly and
vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one
shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committed (by) one against the other.
Using the criterion thus judiciously enunciated in the Cargill case, it can be concluded that in the law of
evidence the rape perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his
wife (the victim's mother).
The trial court did not err in holding that Catalina Ordoño could testify against her husband, Avelino
Ordoño, in the case where he is being tried for having raped their daughter, Leonora.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed. No costs.
MAXIMO ALVAREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN RAMIREZ, Respondent.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated May
31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56154, entitled "Susan Ramirez, petitioner, versus, Hon. Benjamin M. Aquino,
Jr., as Judge RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 72, and Maximo Alvarez, respondents."
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for arson 3
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein
petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first witness
against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.
Esperanza testified as follows:
"ATTY. ALCANTARA:
We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of the accused, Your Honor.
In the course of Esperanza’s direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed "uncontrolled emotions,"
prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion 5 to disqualify Esperanza from testifying
against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition6 to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court directed the
prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses.
On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from
further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. 7 The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999. 8
This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN, to file
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari9 with application for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order.10
On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders
issued by the trial court.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in Criminal Case
No. 19933-MN.
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one
against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct
descendants or ascendants."
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
testimony of the other.11
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions
between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule
itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support
of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no
more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon
such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent
danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their
absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. 12
In Ordoño vs. Daquigan,13 this Court held:
"We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargil vs.
State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:
‘The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the rule that
any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The
better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it
comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the other.’"
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him
and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all
the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal
relationship survives and flourishes.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
"The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully
well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to
the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The
criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It
underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have
become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme
Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences
of private life which the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home. (People v. Castañeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any
reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule."
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship
between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six
months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the
marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the courts so that
the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct testimony of
Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as stated by this Court in Francisco14), "it
was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court, RTC, Branch 72,
Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify against petitioner, her husband, in Criminal
Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against petitioner.
Inestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, represented by JOSEFA TONGCO, administratrix, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
ANASTACIA VIANZON
The fundamental question which is being litigated in this case and its companion case, R. G. No. 27499, 1 is
whether the property in dispute should be assigned to the estate of Marcelino Tongco, or whether it should
be set aside as belonging exclusively to the widow.
Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted marriage on July 5, 1894. The first named died on
July 8, 1925, leaving the second named as his widow. The niece of the deceased, Josefa Tongco, was
named administratrix of the estate. It appears that shortly before the death of Marcelino Tongco, he had
presented claims in a cadastral case in which he had asked for titles to certain properties in the name of
the conjugal partnership consisting of himself and his wife, and that corresponding decrees for these lots
were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership not long after his death.
In the cadastral case, the widow began action on April 28, 1926, when she presented a motion for a
revision of certain decrees within the one-year period provided by the Land Registration Law. Issue was
joined by the administratrix of the estate. A decision was rendered by Judge of First Instance Rovira
concluding with this pronouncement of a judgment: "Therefore, and by virtue of the provisions of section 38
of Act. No. 496, decrees Nos. 191390, 191504, and 190925, relative to lots Nos. 1062, 1263, and 491 of
this cadastral record, as well as the original certificates of title Nos. 3247, 3298, and 3297 in regard thereto,
and hereby annulled and set aside, and it is ordered that in lieu thereof new decrees and certificates of title
be issued for lots Nos. 1062, 1263, and 491, as the exclusive property of Anastacia Vianzon, of legal age,
widow, and resident of Orani Bataan, free from all encumbrances and liens. In regard to lot No. 460, the
court sustains the decree already issued in due time with respect to said lot." Sometime later, a motion for
a new trial was presented with accumulated affidavits by counsel for the losing party. This motion was
denied by the trial judge.
On July 19, 1926, the administratrix of the estate began action against Anastacia Vianzon for the recovery
of specified property and for damages. The issue was practically the same as in the cadastral case
Judgment was rendered by Judge Rovira couched in the following language: "Therefore, the court renders
judgment absolving the defendant from the complaint in this case, and only declares that one- half of the
value of the shares in the Sociedad Cooperativa de Credito Rural de Orani, to the amount of ten pesos
(P10), belonging to the intestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, which one-half interest must appear in the
inventory of the property of the estate of the deceased Marcelino Tongco." The motion for a new trial was
denied by His Honor, the trial judge.
From both of the judgments hereinbefore mentioned, the administratrix of the estate of Marcelino Tongco
had appealed. The first action filed, which was in the cadastral case, has now become the last in number
and is 27399. The second action filed in the property case has now become the first in number and is
27498. As pursuant to the agreement of the parties the two cases were tried together, they can be best
disposed of together on appeal.
The second error assigned in the property case and the first error assigned in the cadastral case attack the
ruling of the trial judge to the effect that the widow was competent to testify.
It is true that by reason of the provisions of article 1407 of the Civil Code the presumption is that all the
property of the spouses is partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. But even proceeding on this assumption, we still think that the widow has proved in
a decisive and conclusive manner that the property in question belonged exclusively to her, that is, it would,
unless we are forced to disregard her testimony. No reversible error was committed in the denial of the
motion for a new trial for it is not at all certain that it rested on a legal foundation, or that if it had been
granted it would have changed the result.
Counsel for the appellant, however, asserts that if the testimony of the widow be discarded, as it should be,
then the presumption of the Civil Code, fortified by the unassailable character of Torrens titles, arises,
which means that the entire fabric of appellee's case is punctured. Counsel relies on that portion of section
383 of the Code of Civil Procedure as provides that "Parties or assignors of parties to an action or
proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person, . . ., upon a claim or demand against the estate
of such deceased person . . ., cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person . . . ." Counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing that the object and purpose of this
statute is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction is question on
the part of the surviving party. He has, however, neglected the equally important rule that the law was
designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress the truth.
The law twice makes use of the word "against." The actions were not brought "against" the administratrix of
the estate, nor were they brought upon claims "against" the estate. In the first case at bar, the action is one
by the administratrix to enforce demand "by" the estate. In the second case at bar, the same analogy holds
true for the claim was presented in cadastral proceedings where in one sense there is no plaintiff and there
is no defendant. Moreover, a waiver was accomplished when the adverse party undertook to cross-
examine the interested person with respect to the prohibited matters. (4 Jones on Evidence, pp. 767 et
seq.; Stair vs. McNulty [1916], 133 Minn., 136; Ann. Cas., 1918D 201.) We are of the opinion that the
witness was competent.
The result, therefore, must be to adhere to the findings and rulings of the trial judge. No prejudicial error is
noted in the proceedings.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTO V. CARLOS
It appears from the evidence that the victim of the alleged murder, Dr. Pablo G. Sityar, on March 3, 1924, in
Mary Chiles Hospital, performed a surgical operation upon the defendant's wife for appendicitis and certain
other ailments. She remained in the hospital until the 18th of the same month, but after her release
therefrom she was required to go several times to the clinic of Doctor Sityar at No. 40 Escolta, for the
purpose of dressing the wounds caused by the operation. On these occasions she was accompanied by
her husband, the defendant. The defendant states that on one of the visits, that of March 20, 1924, Doctor
Sityar sent him out on an errand to buy some medicine, and that while defendant was absent on this errand
Doctor Sityar outraged the wife. The defendant further states that his wife informed him of the outrage
shortly after leaving the clinic. Notwithstanding this it nevertheless appears that he again went there on
March 28th to consult the deceased about some lung trouble from which he, the defendant, was suffering..
He was given some medical treatment and appears to have made at least one more visit to the clinic
without revealing any special resentment.
On May 12, 1924, the defendant, suffering from some stomach trouble, entered the Philippine General
Hospital where he remained until May 18, 1924, and where he was under the care of two other physicians.
While in the hospital her received a letter (Exhibit 5) from Doctor Sityar asking the immediate settlement of
the account for the professional services rendered his wife. Shortly after his release from the hospital the
defendant sought an interview with Doctor Sityar and went to the latter's office several times without finding
him in. On one of these occasions he was asked by an employee of the office, the nurse Cabañera, if he
had come to settle his account, to which the defendant answered that he did not believe he owed the
doctor anything.
In the afternoon of May 26th the defendant again went to the office of the deceased and found him there
alone. According to the evidence of the prosecution, the defendant then, without any preliminary quarrel
between the two, attacked the deceased with a fan-knife and stabbed him twice. The deceased made an
effort to escape but the defendant pursued him and overtaking him in the hall outside the office, inflicted
another wound upon him and as a consequence if the three wounds he died within a few minutes. The
defendants made his escape but surrendered himself to the Constabulary at Malolos, Bulacan, in the
evening of the following day.
The defendant admits that he killed the deceased but maintains that he did so in self-defense. He explains
that he went to Doctor Sityar's office to protest against the amount of the fee charged by the doctor and, in
any event, to ask for an extension of the time of payment; that during the conversation upon that subject
the deceased insulted him by telling him that inasmuch as he could not pay the amount demanded he
could send his wife to the office as she was the one treated, and that she could then talk the matter over
with the decease; that this statement was made in such an insolent and contemptuous manner that the
defendant became greatly incensed and remembering the outrage committed upon his wife, he assumed a
threatening attitude and challenged the deceased to go downstairs with him and there settle the matter;
that the deceased thereupon took a pocket-knife from the center drawer of his desk and attacked the
defendant, endeavoring to force him out of the office; that the defendant, making use of his knowledge of
fencing, succeeded in taking the knife away from the deceased and blinded by fury stabbed him first in the
right side of the breast and then in the epigastric region, and fearing that the deceased might secure some
other weapon or receive assistance from the people in the adjoining room, he again stabbed him, this time
in the back.
The defendant's testimony as to the struggle described is in conflict with the evidence presented by the
prosecution. But assuming that it is true, it is very evident that it fails to establish a case of self-defense and
that, in reality, the only question here to be determined is whether the defendant is guilty of murder or of
simple homicide.
The court below found that the crime was committed with premeditation and therefore constituted murder.
This finding can only be sustained by taking into consideration Exhibit L, a letter written to the defendant by
his wife and siezed by the police in searching his effects on the day of his arrest. It is dated May 25, 1924,
two days before the commission of the crime and shows that the writer feared that the defendant
contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with the deceased.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK v THE MONETARY BOARD, CENTRAL BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE B. FERNANDEZ, CARLOTA P. VALENZUELA, ARNULFO B.
AURELLANO and RAMON V. TIAOQUI, respondents.
Subject of this "Petition to Set Aside Order to Produce Documents dated 17 February 1986" is the Order of
Branch 136, Regional Trial Court, Makati, granting the motion of the petitioner herein, based on Section 1,
Rule 27, of the Rules of Court, for the production, inspection, and copying of certain papers and records
which are claimed as needed by the Petitioner Bank for the preparation of its comments, objections, and
exceptions to the Conservator's report dated January 8, 1985, and Receiver's Report dated March 19,
1985. The documents now asked to be produced, inspected, and copied are the following:
(1) Copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board (MB) deliberations on the closure of Banco
Filipino (BF) and its meeting on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985;
(2) Copies of the letter and reports of first conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the MB and to Central
Bank Governor Jose Fernandez;
(3) Papers showing computations of all the interests and penalties charged by the CB against BF;
(4) Schedule of recommended valuation of reserves per Mr. Tiaoqui's report dated March 19, 1985;
(5) Adjustment per Annex "C" of Mr. Tiaoqui's report;
(6) Annexes"A","B",and"C"of the joint report of Mr. Tiaoqui, Mr. Aurellano, and Mrs. Valenzuela;
(7) Schedule of devaluation of CB premises of Paseo de Roxas of same report;
(8) Schedule of BF's realizable assets from P5,159.44 B to P3,909.23 B as of January 25, 1985;
(9) Documents listed in BF's letter to Mrs. Carlota Valenzuela dated October 25, 1985.
In issuing the challenged order, the court below took the view that the Supreme Court's resolution referring
to it the matters relative to the bank's closure does not preclude the petitioner from availing of this mode of
discovery as an additional means of preparing for the hearing. It considered the documents sought to be
produced as not privileged because these constitute or contain evidence material to the issues into by the
Court. These materials are said to comprise of records of the administrative proceedings conducted by
respondent's officials and representatives from the inception of and preparation of the challenged reports
and the resolution placing petitioner under receivership and thereafter under liquidation as it is the
regularity and impartiality of these administrative proceedings which are being assailed by the petitioner,
the trial court saw no reason why said documents should be thus concealed from it.
Respondents Monetary Board and Central Bank take exception to the said order and pray in their petition
before this Court for the reversal and setting aside of the same. The grounds recited in support of their
petition are the following:
(1) The ratiocination of the trial court is wholly in error because the proceedings before it do not at all deal
with either the administrative proceedings conducted by the respondents or the regularity and impartiality of
the CB actions on BF; it does so simply upon the charge that no "hearing" was given BF prior to those
actions of closure and liquidation. However, no such prior hearing had been called as none is required by
the law and by the Supreme Court decisions in force to this date (Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. vs. Arca, 15
SCRA 66, and Rural Bank of Bato vs. IAC, G.R. 65642, Oct. 15, 1984).
(2) The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are confidential pursuant to Sections 13
and 15 of the Central Bank Act.
Sec. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal interest. Whenever any member
attending a meeting of the Monetary Board has a material personal interest, directly or
indirectly, in the discussion or resolution of any given matter, said member shall not
participate in the discussion or resolution of the matter and must retire from the meeting
during the deliberation thereon. The subject matter, when resolved, and the fact that a
member had a personal interest in it, shall be made available to the public. The minutes of
the meeting shall note the withdrawal of the member concerned. (As amended by PD No.
1827).
 Sec. 15. Responsibility. — Any member of the Monetary Board or officer or employee of the
Central Bank who wilfully violates this Act or who is guilty of gross negligence in the
performance of his duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by the Bank as a
result of such violation or negligence. Similar responsibility shall apply to the disclosure of
any information of a confidential nature about the discussion or resolutions of the Monetary
Board, except as required in Section 13 of this Act, or about the operations of the Bank, and
to the use of such information for personal gain or to the detriment of the Government, the
Bank or third parties. (As amended by Presidential Decree No. 72). (Italics supplied).
(3) The Monetary Board deliberations were necessarily held subsequent t  the submission of the CB
reports. They did not enter into the making of those reports and can have no materiality to any question of
fact that may be raised in relation to their contents.
On April 16, 1986, Petitioner Banco Filipino filed its Comment on Respondent's petition to set aside the
order for the production of the documents. In said pleading, the petitioner bank assails the respondent's
petition on the following grounds:
(1) There is no reason why Banco Filipino should not be furnished the documents, particularly Nos. 3 to 9
of its motion, when these are merely attachments to the Supervision and Examination Sector, Dept. It
(SES) Reports, copies of which were given to it pursuant to a Supreme Court order.
(2) The Supreme Court in its referral of October 8, 1985 to the RTC Makati intended full evidence taking of
the proceeding for judicial review of administrative action filed with the Supreme Court, the trial court being
better equipped for evidence taking.
(3) The respondents cannot claim privilege in refusing to produce the Central Bank records because it is
based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality. Petitioner cites as a precedent the doctrine
established in the case of U.S. vs. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713, which states that "when the ground for
asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal case is based only on the
generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of
law."
(4) The requested documents and records of the Central Bank are material and relevant because BF is
entitled to prove from the CB records (a) that Governor Fernandez closed BF without a MB resolution and
without examiner's reports on the financial position of BF; (b) that a MB resolution was later made to
legalize the BF closure but it had no supporting examiner's report; (c) that the earlier reports did not satisfy
respondent Governor Fernandez and he ordered the examiners and the conservator, Gilberto Teodoro, to
"improve" them; and (d) that the reports were then fabricated.
Petitioner adds that what respondents fear is disclosure of their proceedings because petitioner has
accused the CB governor of (a) covering 51% of its stockholding, (b) encashing BF securities in trickles as
fuel a run, (c) appointing a conservator when the President ordered the MB to grant petitioner a P 3 Billion
credit line, (d) replacing Estanislao with Gilberto Teodoro when the former wanted to resume normal
operations of BF, and (e) changing the conservatorship to receivership when it appointed Carlota
Valenzuela as receiver again without hearing.
On May 13, 1986, Respondent Monetary Board filed their Reply to Petitioner Bank's Comment dated April
15, 1986. Respondents argue that:
(1) The case of U.S. vs. Nixon and the other decisions cited by petitioner are inapplicable because-
a) The authorities cited refer only to a claim of privilege based only on the generalized
interest of confidentiality or on an executive privilege that is merely presumptive. On the
other hand, the so-called MB deliberations are privileged communications pursuant to
Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court because statements and opinions expressed in
the deliberation of the members of the MB are specifically vested with confidentiality under
Secs. 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act. The "public interest" requirement for non-
disclosure is evident from the fact that the statute punishes any disclosure of such
deliberations.
 b) Petitioner has not in the least shown any relevance or need to produce the alleged MB
deliberations. What petitioner intends to prove are not "issues" raised in the pleadings of the
main petition.
(2) Petitioner is interested, not in discovering evidence, but in practicing oppression by the
forced publication of the MB members' confidential statements at board meetings.
(3) The so-called deliberations of the Monetary Board are in truth merely the individual
statements and expressions of opinion of its members. They are not statements or opinions
that can be imputed to the board itself or to the Central Bank. The transcripts of
stenographic notes on the deliberations of the MB are not official records of the CB; they are
taken merely to assist the Secretary of the MB in the preparation of the minutes of the
meetings. And as advertedly also, the tape recordings are not available as these are used
over and over again.
The motion for the production of the subject documents was filed by petitioner pursuant to Section 1, Rule
27, of the Rules of Court. It has been held that "a party is ordinarily entitled to the production of books,
documents and papers which are material and relevant to the establishment of his cause of action or
defense" (General Electric Co. vs. Superior Court in and for Alameda County, 45 C. 2d 879, cited in Martin,
Rules of Court, 3rd edition, Vol. 2, p. 104). "The test to be applied by the trial judge in determining the
relevancy of documents and the sufficiency of their description is one of reasonableness and practicability"
(Line Corp. of the Philippines vs. Moran, 59 Phil. 176, 180). "On the ground of public policy, the rules
providing for production and inspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection
of privileged matter, that is, books, papers which because of their confidential and privileged character
could not be received in evidence" (27) CJS 224). "In passing on a motion for discovery of documents, the
courts should be liberal in determining whether or not documents are relevant to the subject matter of
action" (Hercules Powder Co. vs. Haas Co., U.S. Dist. Ct. Oct. 26, 1944, 9 Fed. Rules Service, 659, cited
in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 Ed. Vol. 2, p. 102). Likewise, "any statute declaring in
general terms that official records are confidential should be liberally construed, to have an implied
exception for disclosure when needed in a court of justice" (Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII, p. 801, citing
the case of Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cr. 137,143).
In the light of the jurisprudence above-cited, this Court holds that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the court below in granting petitioner's motion for the production of the documents
enumerated herein. We accept the view taken by the court below that the documents are not privileged and
that these constitute or contain evidence material to the issues being inquired into by the Court.
With respect to Items Nos. 3 to 9, these are the annexes to the Supervision and Examination Sector, Dept.
II (SES) Reports submitted to the Central Bank and Monetary Board which were taken into consideration
by said respondents in closing petitioner bank. A copy of the SES Reports was furnished to the petitioner.
We, therefore, fail to see any proper reason why the annexes thereto should be withheld. Petitioner cannot
adequately study and properly analyze the report without the corresponding annexes. Pertinent and
relevant, these could be useful and even necessary to the preparation by petitioner of its comment,
objections and exceptions to the Conservator's reports and receiver's reports.
Regarding copies of the letter and reports of first Conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the Monetary
Board and to Central Bank Governor Fernandez (Item No. 2) these appear relevant as petitioner has
asserted that the above-named Conservator had in fact wanted to resume normal operations of Banco
Filipino but then he was thereafter replaced by Mr. Gilberto Teodoro. The letter and reports could be
favorable or adverse to the case of petitioner but whatever the result may be, petitioner should be allowed
to photocopy the same.
As to the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino and its
meetings on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985, (Item No. 1), respondents contend that "it is obvious from
the requirement (Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act) that the subject matter (of the deliberations),
when resolved. . . shall be made available to the public but the deliberations themselves are not open to
disclosure but are to be kept in confidence." This Court, however, sees it in a different light. The
deliberations may be confidential but not necessarily absolute and privileged. There is no specific provision
in the Central Bank Act, even in Sections 13 and 15 thereof, which prohibits absolutely the courts from
conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these are relevant or material to a matter subject of a suit
pending before it. The disclosure is here not intended to obtain information for personal gain. There is no
indication that such disclosure would cause detriment to the government, to the bank or to third parties.
Significantly, it is the bank itself here that is interested in obtaining what it considers as information useful
and indispensably needed by it to support its position in the matter being inquired to by the court below.
On the other hand, respondents cite Section 21, Rule 130, Rules of Court which states:
Section 21. Privileged Communications. The following persons cannot testify as to matters
learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public
interest would suffer by disclosure.
But this privilege, as this Court notes, is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the
protection of public interest (Vogel vs. Gruaz 110 U.S. 311 cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1980 Ed. Vol. 5, p. 211). Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule
will not be applicable.
The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in
official confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest
would suffer by the disclosure question. ... ,( Agnew vs. Agnew,'52 SD 472, cited in Martin
Rules of Court of the Philippines, Third Edition, Vol. 5, p. 199).
In the case at bar, the respondents have not established that public interest would suffer by the disclosure
of the papers and documents sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank was already closed as
of January 25, 1985, any disclosure of the aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this time pose
no danger or peril to our economy. Neither will it trigger any bank run nor compromise state secrets.
Respondent's reason for their resistance to the order of production are tenuous and specious. If the
respondents public officials acted rightfully and prudently in the performance of their duties, there should be
nothing at all that would provoke fear of disclosure
On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the documents. Not only the banks
and its employees but also its numerous depositors and creditors are entitled to be informed as to whether
or not there was a valid and legal justification for the petitioner's bank closure. It will be well to consider that
—
Public interest means more than a mere curiosity; it means something in which the public,
the community at large, has some pecuniary interest by which their legal rights or liabilities
are affected (State vs. Crocket, 206, p. 816 cited in Words and Phrases, Vol. 35, p. 229).
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order to produce documents dated February 17, 1986 issued by
the court below in S.C.- G.R. No. 70054, is hereby affirmed, except as to the copies of the tapes relative to
the Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino on January 25, 1985 and its meetings on
July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985 and only if such tapes are actually no longer available taking into
account respondent Monetary Board's manifestations that the tape recording of the deliberations of that
Board are, for purposes of economy, used over and over again inasmuch as these tapes are not required
to be kept or stored. (See Respondent's Reply, dated May 12, 1986; Rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 1288-1289).
NELLY LIM, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D. VICTORIO, as Presiding Judge of RTC-
Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, and JUAN SIM

REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; EVIDENCE; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT

PRIVILEGE; RATIONAL BEHIND THE RULE. — This rule on the physician-patient privilege is
intended to facilitate and make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician
of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and
enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a
correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public policy
and is for the general interest of the community.
Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully married to each other.

On 25 November 1987, private respondent filed with Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that petitioner has been allegedly
suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and until the
present." After the issues were joined and the pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued. Private
respondent presented three (3) witnesses before taking the witness stand himself to testify on his own
behalf. On 11 January 1989, private respondent’s counsel announced that he would present as his next
witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of
Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify on 25 January 1989. Petitioner’s counsel
opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged
since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be
suffering from schizophrenia. Over such opposition, the subpoena was issued on 12 January
1989.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

On 24 January 1989, petitioner’s counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash the subpoena and
suspend the proceedings pending resolution of the motion.

Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand on 25 January 1989, the court heard this urgent motion.
Movant argued that having seen and examined the petitioner in a professional capacity, Dr. Acampado is
barred from testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship. Counsel for
private respondent contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and
would not testify on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity.
The trial court, per respondent Judge, denied the motion and allowed the witness to testify. Dr. Acampado
thus took the witness stand, was qualified by counsel for private respondent as an expert witness and was
asked hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness she
examined and treated the petitioner for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the medicines she
had prescribed.

Since petitioner’s counsel insisted that the ruling of the court on the motion be reduced to writing,
respondent Judge issued the following Order on the same date:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In his omnibus motion filed with the Court only yesterday, January 24, 1989, petitioner seeks to prevent Dr.
Lydia Acampado from testifying because she saw and examined respondent Nelly Lim in her professional
capacity perforce her testimony is covered by the privileged (sic) communication rule.

Petitioner contends that Dr. Acampado is being presented as an expert witness and that she will not testify
on any information she acquired in (sic) attending to Nelly Lim in her professional capacity.

Based on the foregoing manifestation of counsel for petitioner, the Court denied the respondent’s motion
and forthwith allowed Dr. Acampado to testify. However, the Court advised counsel for respondent to
interpose his objection once it becomes apparent that the testimony sought to be elicited is covered by the
privileged communication rule.

On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered routinary (sic) questions to qualify her as an expert in
psychiatry; she was asked to render an opinion as to what kind of illness (sic) are stelazine tablets applied
to; she was asked to render an opinion on a (sic) hypothetical facts respecting certain behaviours of a
person; and finally she admitted she saw and treated Nelly Lim but she never revealed what illness she
examined and treated her (sic); nor (sic) the result of her examination of Nelly Lim, nor (sic) the medicines
she prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the omnibus motion dated January 19, 1989 is hereby DENIED." 1

On 3 March 1989, petitioner filed with the public respondent Court of Appeals a petition 2 for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991, to annul the aforesaid order of respondent Judge
on the ground that the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
and to prohibit him from proceeding with the reception of Dr. Acampado’s testimony.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library

On 18 September 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution 3 denying due course to the petition
on the ground that "the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of the testimony given by or
obtained from Dr. Acampado when she testified on January 25, 1989." Hence, the respondent Judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion. In support thereof, the respondent Court discussed the conditions
which would render as inadmissible testimonial evidence between a physician and his patient under
paragraph (c), Section 24, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court and made the following
findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The present suit is a civil case for annulment of marriage and the person whose testimony is sought to be
stopped as a privileged communication is a physician, who was summoned by the patient in her
professional capacity for curative remedy or treatment. The divergence in views is whether the information
given by the physician in her testimony in open court on January 25, 1989 was a privileged communication.
We are of the opinion that they do not fall within the realm of a privileged communication because the
information were (sic) not obtained from the patient while attending her in her professional capacity and
neither were (sic) the information necessary to enable the physician to prescribe or give treatment to the
patient Nelly Lim. And neither does the information obtained from the physician tend to blacken the
character of the patient or bring disgrace to her or invite reproach. Dr. Acampado is a Medical Specialist II
and in-charge (sic) of the Female Service of the National Center for Mental Health a fellow of the Philippine
Psychiatrist Association and a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatrists. She was summoned to
testify as an expert witness and not as an attending physician of petitioner.

After a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr. Acampado’s testimony, We find no declaration that touched
(sic) or disclosed any information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during the period she
attended her patient in a professional capacity. Although she testified that she examined and interviewed
the patient, she did not disclose anything she obtained in the course of her examination, interview and
treatment of her patient. Given a set of facts and asked a hypothetical question, Dr. Acampado rendered an
opinion regarding the history and behaviour of the fictitious character in the hypothetical problem. The facts
and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer and (sic) had no bearing to (sic) whatever
information or findings the doctor obtained from attending the (sic) patient. A physician is not disqualified to
testify as an expert concerning a patient’s ailment, when he can disregard knowledge acquired in attending
such patient and make answer solely on facts related in (sic) the hypothetical question. (Butler v. Role, 242
Pac. 436; Supreme Court of Arizona Jan. 7, 1926). Expert testimony of a physician based on hypothetical
question (sic) as to cause of illness of a person whom he has attended is not privileged, provided the
physician does not give testimony tending to disclose confidential information related to him in his
professional capacity while attending to the patient. (Crago v. City of Cedar Rapids, 98 NW 354, see Jones
on Evidence, Vol. 3, p. 843, 3rd Ed.).

The rule on privilege (sic) communication in the relation of physician and patient proceeds from the
fundamental assumption that the communication to deserve protection must be confidential in their origin.
Confidentiality is not to be blindly implied from the mere relation of physician and patient. It might be
implied according to circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the nature of the ailment and
the occasion of the consultation. The claimant of the privilege has the burden of establishing in each
instance all the facts necessary to create the privilege, including the confidential nature of the information
given." 4
This is a reproduction of paragraph (c), Section 21, Rule 130 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court with two
(2) modifications, namely: (a) the inclusion of the phrase "advice or treatment given by him," and (b)
substitution of the word reputation for the word character. Said Section 21 in turn is a reproduction of
paragraph (f), Section 26, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court with a modification consisting in the change
of the phrase "which would tend to blacken" in the latter to "would blacken." 9 Verily, these changes
affected the meaning of the provision. Under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was sufficient if the information
would tend to blacken the character of the patient. In the 1964 Rules of Court, a stricter requirement was
imposed; it was imperative that the information would blacken such character. With the advent of the
Revised Rules on Evidence on 1 July 1989, the rule was relaxed once more by the substitution of the word
character with the word reputation. There is a distinction between these two concepts." ‘Character’ is what
a man is, and ‘reputation’ is what he is supposed to be in what people say he is.’Character’ depends on
attributes possessed, and ‘reputation’ on attributes which others believe one to possess. The former
signifies reality and the latter merely what is accepted to be reality at present." 10

This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and confidential
disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by
apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end
that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient.
11 It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the community. 12

Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is made to
the physician’s testimony. 13

In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must
concur:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;

2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics;

3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity;

4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and

5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of
the patient." 14

These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment of a
privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.

2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation
between the parties.

3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered

4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than
the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 15

The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient
for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the
physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. 16 It is to
be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a
communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not
privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated." 17

One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites. 18

Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Us to no other course of action but to agree with
the respondent Court’s observation that the petitioner failed to discharge that burden. In the first place, Dr.
Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals,
she did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the
petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had
no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the patient. There is,
as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the
hypothetical problem were influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her
expert opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was
acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert witness, her
testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded. The rule on this point is summarized as
follows:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"The predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the statutory physician-patient
privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in
response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical mental condition of a patient
whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated,
excluding and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may have concerning such patient.
But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient privilege where it is asserted in such a case, the
physician must base his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in the question, excluding from
consideration his personal knowledge of the patient acquired through the physician and patient
relationship. If he cannot or does not exclude from consideration his personal professional knowledge of
the patient’s condition he should not be permitted to testify as to his expert opinion." 19

Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado’s testimony that the petitioner was never interviewed alone.
Said interviews were always conducted in the presence of a third party
There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation with a physician in the presence
of third parties removes such information from the mantle of the privilege:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third person destroys the confidential nature of the
communication between doctor and patient and thus destroys the privilege, and that under such
circumstances the doctor may testify. Other courts have reached a contrary result." 21

Thirdly, except for the petitioner’s sweeping claim — that" (T)he information given by Dr. Acampado brings
disgrace and invite (sic) reproach to petitioner by falsely making it appear in the eyes of the trial court and
the public that the latter was suffering from a mental disturbance called schizophrenia — which caused,
and continues to cause, irreparable injury to the name and reputation of petitioner and her family," 22 —
which is based on a wrong premise, nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that indeed, the
information obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken the former’s "character" (or "reputation"). Dr.
Acampado never disclosed any information obtained from the petitioner regarding the latter’s ailment and
the treatment recommended therefor.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the quashal of the said subpoena
a day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her
counsel had objected to any question asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that
would violate the privilege, despite the trial court’s advise that said counsel may interpose his objection to
the testimony "once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the
privileged communication rule." The particular portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr.
Acampado quoted in the petitioner’s Petition 23 and Memorandum, 24 and in the private respondent’s
Memorandum, 25 do not at all show that any objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the
testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto
amounted to a waiver thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit

In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in some subjects in the
1948 Bar Examinations.
In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was involved, such as the theft of the
plans of fortifications, Senator Cuenco was obviously giving it only as an example of what he meant by
"interest of the state;" it was not meant to be the only case or example. We do not propose to define or fix
the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that the phrase "interest of the state"
can not be confined and limited to the "security of the state" or to "public safety" alone. These synonymous
phrases, — "security of the state" and "public safety," — are not uncommon terms and we can well
presume that the legislators were familiar with them. The phrase "public safety," is used in Article III, section
1(5) of the Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of communications and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and order
require otherwise;" and Article VII, section 10(2) of the same Constitution provided that the President may
suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when the public
safety requires it.
Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that Bar Examination questions in at
least one subject had been obtained and used by bar examinees coming from a certain university, one
week before the examinations were actually held. Parazo in his statements and answers during the
investigation said that examination questions in several subjects were involved in the anomaly. But no copy
or copies of said examination questions were furnished us. No one is willing to testify that he actually saw
said alleged copies of examination questions; that they were actually and carefully compared with the
legitimate examination questions given out on the day of the examination and found to be identical; no one
is ready and willing to reveal the identity of the persons or bar examinees said to have been seen with the
said Bar Examination questions, although they as well as the university where they came from, was known;
and even the law subjects to which the questions pertained are not disclosed; and, lastly, we are not
allowed to know even the identity of respondent Parazo's informants who claim to have seen all these
things.
In this connection it may be stated that in the las Bar Examinations held in August, 1948, approximately
nine hundred candidates took them, each candidate writing his answers in a book for each subject. There
were eight subjects, each belonging to and corresponding to each one of the eight bar examiners. There
were therefore eight sets of bar examination questions, and multiplying these eight sets of questions by
nine hundred candidates, gives a total of seven thousand two hundred (7,200) examination papers
involved, in the hand of eight different examiners. The examination books or papers bear no names or
identifications of their writers or owners and said ownership and identification will not be known until the
books or papers are all corrected and graded. Without definite assurance based on reliable witnesses
under oath that the alleged anomaly had actually been committed, — evidence on the identity of the
persons in possession of the alleged copies of questions prematurely released or illegally obtained and
made use of, the law subjects or subjects involved, the university from which said persons come, this Court
does not feel capable of or warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and desperately revising each and
every one of the 7,200 examination books with the fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity or identity
in the answers of any group of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding or conclusion. Apart from
the enormity of the task and its hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base its findings and
conclusions, especially in any serious and delicate matter as is the present, on that kind of evidence. Under
these circumstances, this Court, for lack of basis, data and information, is unable to conduct, nay, even
start, an investigation; and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the identities of his informants,
and those informants and or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid and cooperate with the Court in its
endeavor to further examine and probe into the charges contained in the news items, said charges are
considered and held to be without basis, proof or foundation.
When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal the names of his
informants, it was not impelled or motivated by mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on which to
start an investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations clean and above
board and specially, not only to protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for membership therein
and the public dealing with the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who cooperate with and act as
agents of this Court in preparing the examination questions and correcting the examination papers, but
also, as already stated, to keep the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge
of its function relative to the admission to the practice of law. These, it can only do by investigating any Bar
Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and punishing those found guilty, even annulling examinations
already held, or else declaring the charges as not proven, if, as a result of the investigation, it is found that
there is insufficiency or lack of evidence. In demanding from the respondent that he reveal the sources of
his information, this Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It merely wanted
their help and cooperation. In this Court's endeavor to probe thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity
allegedly committed, it was its intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty
parties, if the charges are found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice
to the innocent parties who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this because in every
examination, whether conducted by the Government or by a private institution, certain standards are
unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of the correction of
many or all of the examination papers, it is found that only very few have passed it, the examiner might
reasonably think that the questions he gave were unduly difficult or hard to understand, or too long, as a
result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make allowances. On the hand, if too many
obtain passing grade, the examiner may think that the examination questions were too easy and constitute
an inadequate measure of the legal knowledge and training required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise
his standard and become more strict in his correction of the papers and his appreciation of the answers.
So, in a case where examinees, especially if many, succeed in getting hold of questions long before
examinations day, and study and prepare the answers to those questions, it may result that when the
examiner finds that many of the examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may think
that said questions were too easy, raise the standard by being strict in his correction of the papers, thereby
giving a grade below passing to a number of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the
examinations.
In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent Angel
J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information which formed the basis of his news items or story
in the September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of his decision, and that, in
refusing to make the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed contempt of Court. The
respondent repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the names and identities of the persons
who furnished him the information. In other words, he omitted and still refuses to do an act commanded by
this Court which is yet in his power to perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of Court.)Ordinarily, in such
cases, he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the demand. However,
considering that case like the present are not common or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that there is no
reason and immediate necessity for imposing a heavy penalty, as may be done in other cases where it is
advisable or necessary to mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of an alarming number of cases of
a certain offense or a crime wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the respondent, the majority
of the members of this Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate arrest and
confinement in jail for a period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to
this Court the revelation demanded of him. So ordered.