ALEX ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, respondent.

AC No. 2417, Feb 6, 2002

FACTS:

The complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent as legal counsel of one Nemesia Garganian claiming
for the support of the alleged child of the complainant with the latter. A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a
letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno (Agaw), an emissary of the complainant. In this letter, the respondent listed
down the alleged additional financial demands of Ms. Garganian against the complainant and discussed the courses
of action that he would take against the complainant should the latter fail to comply with his obligation to support
Ms. Garganian and her son.

It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganian’s son was the complainant’s brother and that the complainant
merely assumed his brother’s obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who was threatening to sue them. The
complainant then did not comply with the demands against him.

Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the City Fiscal (now Prosecutor’s Office)
of Dumaguete City against the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and one Albina Ong, for alleged violation of the Retail
Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law.

The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint against the complainant, Lim, Ong and Adela Peralta
for their alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.

In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against the complainant before the Bureau of
Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, and the Office of the Solicitor General. According
to the complainant, these cases were subsequently denied due course and dismissed by the aforesaid government
agencies.

The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for disbarment. The records show that the
respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him any information against the complainant
just so he would have a leverage in his actions against the latter. The complainant branded the respondent’s tactics
as “highly immoral, unprofessional and unethical, constituting…malpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming
of a lawyer.”

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of lawyer.

HELD: YES.

The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It mandates lawyers to
represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that “a lawyer shall
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate or
threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.”

We find the respondent’s action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against the complainant did not have any
bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, the respondent has violated the proscription
in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His behavior is inexcusable. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to the rules that a
lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding and he shall not do any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.

The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play
and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in
such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months and sternly warned that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

In Re: Luis Tagorda

In 1928, Luis Tagorda was a provincial board member of Isabela. Before his election, he campaigned
that he is a lawyer and a notary public; that as a notary public he can do notarial acts such as
execution of deeds of sale, etc.; that as a lawyer, he can help clients collect debts; that he offers free
consultation; that he is willing to serve the poor.
When he won, he wrote a letter to the barrio lieutenant of Echague, Isable advising the latter that even
though he was elected as a provincial board member, he can still practice law; that he wants the
lieutenant to tell the same to his people; that he is willing to receive works regarding preparations of
sales contracts and affidavits etc.; that he is willing to receive land registration cases for a charge of
three pesos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Tagorda admitted doing the foregoing acts. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with
his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well- merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. Solicitation
of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted
by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection
through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure
the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be
influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the
importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the
tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties
of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.
Tagorda’s liability is however mitigated by the fact that he is a young inexperienced lawyer and that he
was unaware of the impropriety of his acts. So instead of being disbarred, he was suspended from the
practice of law for a month.

Ulep vs. Legal Clinic A.C. No. L-533

Facts of the Case:

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales, was to move
toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms.

Atty. Ulep files a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of its advertisements which states undignified
phrases like-- “Secret Marriage? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Information on DIVORCE, ANNULMENT,
ABSENCE, VISA. The Legal Clinic, Inc. Please call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041 8:30am to 6:00pm 7 th Floor
Victoria Bldg. UN Avenue, Manila.”
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal Problems in The Philippine Star
because it is composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s situation no matter how complicated it is,
especially on marriage problems like the Sharon and Gabby situation.

Citing John Bates vs. The State Bar of Arizona, Atty. Nogales said that it should be allowed based on this
American Jurisprudence. According to him, there is nothing wrong with making known the legal services his
Legal Clinic has to offer.

Issue:

Whether or not such advertisement may be allowed.

Court Ruling:

The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals, which is undoubtedly beyond the domain of the paralegals.
As stated in a previous jurisprudence, practice of law is only reserved for the members of the Philippine bar, and
not to paralegals. As with the Legal Clinic’s advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that “a lawyer in making known his legal services must use only honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts.

A lawyer cannot advertise his talents in a manner that a merchant advertise his goods. The Legal Clinic promotes
divorce, secret marriages, bigamous marriages which are undoubtedly contrary to law.

The only allowed form of advertisements would be: (1.) Citing your involvement in a reputable law list, (2.) An
ordinary professional card (3.) Phone directory listing without designation to a lawyer’s specialization.

Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant vs.BAKER & MCKENZIE
AQUINO, J.:

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G.
Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized
in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie,
which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay

Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested
that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using
the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule
138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world.
Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero &
Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a
representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to
multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents'
memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E.
Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
AVELINO ANGELES et al v ATTY AMADO O IBANEZ
A.C. No. 7860, 576 SCRA 90, January 15, 2009
CARPIO, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment for notarizing the "Extrajudicial Partition with
Absolute Sale" without a notarial commission and in the absence of the affiants.

Facts:
Atty. Amado Ibañez allegedly notarized an "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale"
without having the authority to notarize such as he did not have a commission as notary
public at that time. The petitioners further denied executing the said document or, that they
ever appeared before respondent Atty. Ibañez for this purpose. He stated that his failure to
require the presence of the parties to the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" is wholly
justified because of the assurance of complainant Rosalina Angeles that the signatures
appearing in the said document were indeed those of her co-heirs. The respondent also
alleged that almost all the complainants submitted their residence certificates, the numbers
of which were recorded in the acknowledgement portion of the document.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" in the
absence of the affiants.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale"
in the absence of the affiants. Respondent himself admits that he merely relied on the
representation of Rosalina Angeles that the signatures appearing on the "Extrajudicial
Partition with Absolute Sale" subject of the present complaint are those of her co-heirs.
Respondent claims that he reposed confidence upon Rosalina Angeles because she is his
confidential secretary. Unfortunately for respondent, he cannot exculpate himself from the
consequences of his recklessness and his failure to comply with the requirements of the law
by relying on his confidential secretary.
Time and again, the Supreme Court have reminded lawyers commissioned as notaries
public that the affiants must personally appear before them. The physical presence of the
affiants enables the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signatures of the
acknowledging parties and to ascertain that the document is the parties’ free act and deed.
Under the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent’s notarial commission should not
only be suspended but respondent must also be suspended from the practice of law.

Adjudication:
The Court finds respondent Atty. Amado O. Ibañez guilty and suspends him from the
practice of law for one year, revokes his incumbent notarial commission, if any,
and prohibits him from being commissioned as a notary public for one year.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

49 SCRA 22

FACTS:

Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and Appropriating Funds
Therefore” was passed in September 1971, ordaining “Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar.” The Supreme Court formed a
Commission on Bar Integration and in December 1972, the Commission earnestly recommended the integration of
the bar. The Court accepted all comments on the proposed integration.
ISSUES:

Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?

Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?

Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?

RULING:

In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition given by the Commission to “integration” in this
wise: “Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the
Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions
sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.” The
term “Bar” refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or
unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so; the State. Bar integration
therefore, signifies the setting up by government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based
on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the rule of law, integration fosters
cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the
objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision
and regulation by the Supreme Court.

On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power “to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.” Indeed, the
power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional authority over the Bar.

The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of association and of speech, as well as the
nature of the dues exacted from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court thus levies a tax. The Court held:

Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not compel a lawyer to become a member of
any group of which he is not already a member. All that it does is “to provide an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.” The lawyer too is
not compelled to attend meetings, participate of activities, etc. The only compulsion is the payment of annual dues.
Assuming, however, that it does compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated bar, the court held that “such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state”

Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues paid b the lawyer may be used for
projects or programs, which the lawyer opposes. To rule otherwise would make every government exaction a “free
speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice out his objections to positions taken by the integrated bar.

The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for purposes of regulation.

As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration. Survey showed an overwhelming
majority of lawyers who favored integration.
EDNA S.V. OGKA BENITO v RASAD G. BALINDONG, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2103
In a complaint dated April 30, 2007, complainant Dr. Edna S.V. Ogka Benito, then acting mayor of the
Municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, charged respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Branch 12, with gross ignorance of the law.

Complainant alleged that on May 3, 2005, she filed administrative and criminal complaints against Mamarinta
G. Macabato, then municipal treasurer of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, for grave misconduct in the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman) docketed as OMB-M-A-05-175-E. On September 15, 2005, the Ombudsman
impleaded then Mayor Hadji Amer R. Sampiano as co-respondent. Complainant claimed that these respondents
refused to pay her salary as vice mayor since July 1, 2004 despite repeated demands.[1]

On May 16, 2006, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in that case finding respondents therein guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposing on them the penalty of suspension from office
without pay for a period of nine months. It further directed the Regional Secretary[2] of the Department of the Interior
and Local Government, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (DILG-ARMM) in Cotabato City to immediately
implement the decision.[3]

In compliance with the decision of the Ombudsman, the Regional Secretary of the DILG-ARMM issued Department
Order (D.O.) No. 2006-38 dated September 1, 2006 implementing said decision.[4] Due to the suspension of Mayor
Sampiano, complainant was sworn in as acting mayor.[5]

Meanwhile, on September 4, 2006, respondents in OMB-M-A-05-175-E filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition[6] in the RTC of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Branch 12. The petition was raffled to the sala of herein
respondent and docketed as Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 12-181. Their prayer was to annul and set aside D.O. No.
2006-38 of the DILG-ARMM and prohibit its implementation.[7]

On the same date, respondent issued an order granting a temporary restraining order (TRO) effective for 72 hours
directing the Regional Secretary of the DILG-ARMM to cease, desist and refrain from implementing the D.O.[8]

In an order dated September 6, 2006, respondent extended the TRO for a period of 20 days.[9]

On September 25, 2006, respondent issued another order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
directing the Regional Secretary to cease, desist and refrain from implementing D.O. No. 2006-38.
On October 5, 2006, respondent rendered an order/decision annulling D.O. No. 2006-38.[10] This decision and
the writ of preliminary injunction were annulled by the Court of Appeals (CA) in its February 8, 2007 decision. [11] The
CA held that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the petition filed by the respondents in OMB-M-A-05-175-E pursuant
to Sections 14 and 27 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770[12] (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 7, Rule III of the
Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17-03.

Complainant asserted that, despite the clear provisions of the law and procedure, respondent took cognizance
of SCA No. 12-181 and issued the TROs, writ of preliminary injunction and October 5, 2006 decision. Hence, she
submitted that respondent should be administratively disciplined because of his gross ignorance of the law which
prejudiced the rights of her constituents in Balabagan, Lanao del Sur. [13]

Respondent countered that he issued the orders in good faith. He was not moved by corrupt motives or
improper considerations. This could be shown by the fact that complainant filed this complaint only after eight months
from the resolution of SCA No. 12-181. Considering that complainant failed to establish bad faith or malevolence on
his part, the complaint against him should be dismissed.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its evaluation dated September 24, 2007, found that the pertinent
provisions of the law were clear. It stated that:
the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction is not a mere deficiency in prudence, or
lapse of judgment by respondent judge but is a blatant disregard of basic rules constitutive of gross
ignorance of the law. In the first place, respondent Judge should have refrained from taking
cognizance of the said special civil action when it was raffled to his court, he ought to know this, yet
he did otherwise.

It recommended that respondent be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and fined P21,000.[14]
We agree with the findings and evaluation of the OCA but we modify the penalty.
 A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.[15] Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with laws and procedural rules.[16] They
must know the law and apply it properly in good faith.[17] They are likewise expected to keep abreast of prevailing
jurisprudence.[18] For a judge who is plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office and great privilege vested in
him. Respondents gross ignorance of the law constituted inexcusable incompetence which was anathema to the
effective dispensation of justice.

In SCA No. 12-181, respondents in OMB-M-A-05-175-E sought to annul and set aside D.O. No. 2006-38 of
the DILG-ARMM and prohibit its implementation. Since D.O. No. 2006-38 was issued merely to implement the
decision of the Ombudsman, respondents in OMB-M-A-05-175-E were actually questioning this decision and seeking
to enjoin its implementation by filing a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC.

This is not allowed under the law, rules and jurisprudence. Under Sections 14 and 27 of RA 6770, no court
shall hear any appeal or application for a remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the
Supreme Court, on a pure question of law.

Section 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima
facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisd7iction of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on [a] pure question of law.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of
the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. A motion for reconsideration of any order,
directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of
written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the
interest of justice may require.

However, in Fabian v. Desierto,[19] we enunciated the rule that appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA. Following our ruling in Fabian, the Ombudsman
issued Administrative Order No. 17[20] amending Section 7, Rule III[21] of Administrative Order No. 07:[22]

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge,
and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final,
executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the
Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension
or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive
by reason of the suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a

matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly
enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply
 with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a
ground for disciplinary action against said officer. (Emphasis supplied)

These provisions clearly show that respondent had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition and to
issue his subsequent orders. He proceeded against settled doctrine, an act constituting gross ignorance of the law or
procedure.[23]

Respondents defense of good faith has no merit. Indeed, good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations, are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find
refuge.[24] However

good faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable
judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principles evident
and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error.[25]

If ordinary people are presumed to know the law,[26] judges are duty-bound to actually know and understand it. A
contrary rule will not only lessen the faith of the people in the courts but will also defeat the fundamental role of the
judiciary to render justice and promote the rule of law.

Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,[27] punishable by either dismissal from service, suspension or a fine of more
than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.[28] Since this is respondents first offense, we deem it proper to impose upon
him a fine of P30,000.

Members of the bench are enjoined to behave at all times in a way that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.[29] Respondent's act of taking cognizance of a case which was plainly not
within his courts jurisdiction failed to meet the high standards of judicial conduct.

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,[30] this administrative case against respondent as a judge, based on grounds
which are also grounds for disciplinary action against members of the Bar, shall be considered as disciplinary
proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.[31]
When respondent entertained SCA No. 12-181, issued a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction and
subsequently granted the petition, he acted contrary to law, rules and jurisprudence. In doing so, he consented to the
filing of an unlawful suit, in violation of the Lawyers Oath. A judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicial office
tends to diminish the peoples respect for the law and legal processes. [32] He also fails to observe and maintain the
esteem due to the courts and to judicial officers.[33] Thus, respondent violated Canons 1 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR):

Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.

xxx xxx xxx

Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents gross ignorance of the law also runs counter to Canons 5 and 6 of the CPR:

Canon 5. A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical
training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

Canon 6. These Canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks. (Emphasis supplied)

Judges should be well-informed of existing laws, recent amendments and current jurisprudence, in keeping with their
sworn duty as members of the bar (and bench) to keep abreast of legal developments.
 For such violation of the Lawyers Oath and Canons 1, 5, 6 and 11 of the CPR, respondent is fined in the
amount of P10,000.[34]

WHEREFORE, Rasad G. Balindong, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Malabang, Lanao del Sur,
Branch 12 is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law. He is FINED P30,000.

Respondent is further hereby FINED P10,000 for his violation of the Lawyers Oath and Canons 1, 5, 6 and 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

He is STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.

Let this resolution be attached to the personal files of respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator and
the Office of the Bar Confidant.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE HERNANDO PINEDA of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte;
and TOMAS NARBASA, TAMBAC ALINDO and RUFINO BORRES, respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted before the Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate cases, four for murder, viz:

Criminal Case 1246 — murder of Neceforo Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1247 — murder of Epifania Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1248 — frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1249 — murder of Teofilo Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1250 — murder of Marcelo Mendoza.

The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney from his investigation. Of
course, the truth of these facts is yet to be tested in the crucible of a full-dress trial on the merits.

The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal facts:

On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana
Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22)
and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in rapid succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell
dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered therein, and let loose several
shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, — all minor children of the couple — and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de
Mendoza.

Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed — Tomas Narbasa and Tambak Alindo
— moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case." Their plea is that "said cases arose out of the
same incident and motivated by one impulse."

Giving the nod to defendants' claim, respondent Judge, in an order dated May 13, 1966, directed the City Fiscal
to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single information in Case 1246. He also ordered that the other
four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 "be dropped from the docket."

The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof, upon the ground that "more than
one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than one victim was killed." The defense opposed.
On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the position that the acts
complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused, not by different and
separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though the series of
shots killed more than one victim;" and that only one information for multiple murder should be filed, to obviate
the necessity of trying five cases instead of one."

Primarily to annul respondent Judge's orders of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966, as having been issued without
or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion, the People came to this Court on certiorari with
a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.

This Court, on July 1, 1966, issued the cease-and-desist order prayed for.

The question here presented, simply is this: Should there be one information, either for the complex crime of
murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of robbery with multiple homicide and frustrated
homicide? Or, should the five indictments remain as they are?

1. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
which reads:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed: first,
where a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and, second, when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other (delito complejo).1

Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from a gun results in the death of two or more
persons. Jurisprudence teaches that, in this factual setting, the complex crime defined in the first part of Article
48 finds application.2 A similar rule obtains where one stabbed another and the weapon pierced the latter's body
through and wounded another. The first died instantaneously; the second, seven days later. This Court
convicted the assailant of double murder.3 So where a person plants a bomb in an airplane and the bomb
explodes, with the result that a number of persons are killed, that single act again produces a complex crime.4

A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine
that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.5 Thus,
where the six defendants, with others (armed with pistols, carbines and also a submachine gun and Garand
rifles), fired volleys into a house killing eleven and wounding several others, each of the said accused is "guilty of
as many crimes of murder as there were deaths (eleven).6 Again, eleven persons were indicted for quadruple
murder — with the use of bolos, a pistol, a barbed arrow and a piece of bamboo — of a man, his common-law
wife, and their two children in cold blood. The accused were found guilty by the trial court of such offense. This
Court, in reversing this ruling below, held that "[t]he four victims were not killed by a single act but by various
acts committed on different occasions and by different parties"; that such acts "may not be regarded as
constituting one single crime"; and that "[t]hey should be held as separate and distinct crimes."7 And a third. At
the commencement exercises of an elementary school, "a shot suddenly rang out" followed by a "series of
shots" — from a pistol. Two persons lay dead and a third seriously wounded but who later on also died. This
Court there ruled that there were "three distinct and separate murders" committed by appellant Juan
Mones.8 And finally, in People vs. Gatbunton, L-2435, May 10, 1950, the spouses Mariano Sebastian and
Maxima Capule — who were asleep — were killed by one burst of machinegun fire; and then, by a second burst
of machinegun fire, two of the couple's children — also asleep — were killed. The accused, Tomas Gatbunton,
was found guilty by the trial court of quadruple murder. On appeal, this Court declared that "appellant must be
declared guilty of four murders."9

The present ease is to be differentiated from People vs. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30, 1955. There, on a single
occasion, about fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of home guards. It was held that there was only one
complex crime. In that case, however, there was no conspiracy to perpetuate the killing. In the case at bar,
defendants performed several acts. And the informations charge conspiracy amongst them. Needless to state,
the act of one is the act of all.10 Not material here, therefore is the finding in Lawas that "it is impossible to
ascertain the individual deaths caused by each and everyone" of the accused. It is to be borne in mind, at this
point, that apply the first half of Article 48, heretofore quoted, there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity
of criminal impulse is not written into the law.11
The respondent Judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that consolidation of the five cases into one
would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. To save time,
indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the trial judge the power to try these cases jointly,
such that the fear entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied.12

Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly presented the five separate
informations — four for murder and one for frustrated murder.

2. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because of an affidavit of one of the witnesses,
possibility exists that the real intent of the culprits was to commit robbery, and that the acts constituting murders
and frustrated murder complained of were committed in pursuance thereof. If true, this would bring the case
within the coverage of the second portion of Article 48, which treats as a complex crime a case where an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other.

A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been regularly performed.13 If the Fiscal has
not seen fit to give weight to said affidavit wherein it is alleged that certain personal properties (transistor radio
and money) were taken away by the culprits after the shooting, we are not to jettison the prosecutor's opinion
thereon. The Fiscal could have had reasons for his act. For one thing, there is the grave problem of proving the
elements of that offense — robbery. For another, the act could have been but a blind to cover up the real intent
to kill. Appropriately to be noted here is that all the informations charged evident premeditation. With
ponderables and imponderables, we are reluctant to hazard a guess as to the reasons for the Fiscal's action. We
are not now to say that, on this point, the Fiscal has abused his discretion. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature
of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has
evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is
not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to
recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In case of
doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts being unnecessarily
swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect's right to due process — the sporting idea of
fair play — may be transgressed. So it is, that in People vs. Sope 75 Phil. 810, 815, this Court made the
pronouncement that "[i]t is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution
of offenses, should determine the information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the off ended party."14

3. The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for that of the prosecutor's
on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed
to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges in court must have to be supported
by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views
between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or
the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to
dictation. We are not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional
cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is
necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was 'held
invalid.' "15 Nothing in the record would as much as intimate that the present case fits into any of the situations
just recited.
1äwphï1.ñët

And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance, we are loathe to tag the City
Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing separate cases for murder and frustrated murder, instead of
a single case for the complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide under the provisions of
Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code or, for that matter, for multiple murder and frustrated murder. We state
that, here, the Fiscal's discretion should not be controlled.

Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted; the orders of respondent Judge
of May 13, 1965 and May 31, 1966 are hereby set and declared null and void, and, in consequence, the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent insofar as it stops enforcement of the said orders;
and the respondent Judge, or whoever takes his place, is hereby directed to reinstate Criminal Cases 1246,
1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 as they were commenced, and to take steps towards the final determination thereof.

Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rutino Borres. So ordered.
SUAREZ V. PLATON GR No. 46371 – February 7, 1940
Laurel, SUBJECT: Canon 6 – Lawyers in Government Service

FACTS:

Lieut. Vivencio Orais of the Phil. Constabulary and one of the respondents, filed a complaint under oath with the
justice of peace of Calauag, Province of Tayabas, charging Fortunato Suarez, petitioner herein, and one Tomas
Ruedas, with sedition. While the preliminary investigation was pending, Lieut. Orais, in obedience to an order of the
Provincial Commander of Tayabas, moved for the temporary dismissal of the case.

Thereafter, Suarez charged Lieut. Orais and Damian Jiminez in the same court with the crime of arbitrary detention.
Since the justice of peace of Calauag, Judge Platon, is one of the accused, the preliminary investigation was
conducted by the justice of peace of Lopez, Tayabas, who thereafter bound the defendants over to the CFI. Motion
for dismissal was objected and denied by Judge David of 2nd Branch CFI Tayabas. Subsequently, Fiscal Yamson, who
was assigned by the DOJ to conduct the prosecution of the case, moved for reconsideration, denying the motion for
dismissal. Judge Servillano Platon, granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case holding that the
evidence was insufficient to convict the accused of the crime charged. Hence, the petitioner appealed to this Court
praying for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to reinstate the criminal case which
had been ordered dismissed.

ISSUE: WON there is sufficient ground to proceed with the criminal case for arbitrary detention against Lieut. Orais
and Justice of Peace Jimenez.

HELD: Petition dismissed. The Court cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of
prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst his Court is averse to any form of vacillation by such
officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do
justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding informations. The
prosecuting officer “is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and who interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that is shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocence suffer. He
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor, indeed, he should do so. But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.” (Mr. Justice Sutherland of the US SC)

In May 1935, Atty. Fortunato Suarez was riding a train on his way to Calauag, Tayabas. Apparently he was very vocal
and he was despising the abuses made by government officers. Incidentally, Lieutenant Vivencio Orais was aboard
the train. Orais arrested Suarez and charged him with sedition. Orais however later moved for the dismissal of the
case upon the instruction of his superior. Thereafter, Suarez filed a case against Orais for arbitrary detention.
Provincial Fiscal Ramon Valdez moved for the dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence. Suarez asked
Valdez to inhibit and later asked for a special prosecutor to take his place as he alleged that Valdez does not have the
courage to prosecute the case. Valdez was then replaced by special prosecutor Jacinto Yamzon who also found that
there is insufficient evidence to prosecute the case. Eventually, the case was dismissed by Judge Servillano Platon on
the ground that there is insufficiency of evidence. Suarez appealed the dismissal of the case but his appeal was
denied on the ground that mandamus is the proper remedy. Hence, Suarez filed this Mandamus case to compel
Platon to reinstate the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be reinstated.
HELD: No. The fiscals are well within their rights not to push through with the case if they find the evidence to be
insufficient. The prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he
is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape
or innocence shall suffer.
PEOPLE V PINEDA

FACTS:

Defendants are charged with five criminal cases of murder by the City Fiscal. However, two of the
defendants moved to consolidate the five criminal cases into one and disregard the other four. Their plea is
that said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse. The respondent Judge
approved the motion and directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single
information and drop the other four cases. The City Fiscal sought reconsideration thereof. . The respondent
Judge denied the motion to reconsider. Hence, City Fiscal, in behalf of the People, moved this case for
certiorari.

ISSUE

WON the certiorari should be granted

RULING

NO. The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the
investigating Fiscal. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did not
investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of
the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. It should not
to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in
equity "may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the
orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional
rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was 'held invalid.' "

Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted

Misamin vs. San Juan (Adm Case 1418 August 31, 1976)

Facts: Herein respondent admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar’s Bakery in the
proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. Respondent
contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that
his appearance as counsel while holding a government position is not among the grounds provided by the
Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys.

Issue: Whether or not the administrative case against the defendant should prosper

Held: The court ruled in the negative. The court ruled that the matter is to be decided in an administrative
proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor General. Nonetheless, the court held that while
the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to
avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from
living true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever
legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held
not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to be at
the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed.
Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar should refrain from laying himself open to such
doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in
the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his
honor remains unsullied.
A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976

JOSE MISAMIN vs. ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN

FERNANDO, J.:

It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a member of the bar,
respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of certain establishments
allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant
Jose Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's
Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on the part of respondent. The matter
was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it
would seem there was a change of heart on the part of complainant. That could very well be the explanation for
the non- appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor
General to get at the bottom of things were thus set at naught. Under the circumstances, the outcome of such
referral was to be expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and
adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the complaints
being dismissed, This is one of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent
cannot be found guilty of malpractice.

Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared as counsel for the New
Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan
Police. However, he contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He
contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a government position, is not among the grounds
provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies having
conspired with the complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into
signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal
protection to members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1

Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the resolution of this Honorable
Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office set the case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The
counsel for the complainant failed to appear, and the investigation was reset to August 15, 1975. At the latter
date, the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances, the said counsel did not file written
motion for postponement but merely sent the complainant to explain the reason for his absence. When the case
was again called for hearing on October 16, 1975, counsel for complainant failed once more to appear. The
complainant who was present explained that his lawyer was busy "preparing an affidavit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila." When asked if he was willing to proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the
complainant declared, apparently without any prodding, that he wished his complaint withdrawn. He explained
that he brought the present action in an outburst of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took active
part in the unjust dismissal of his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added that after reexamining his
case, he believed the respondent to be without fault and a truly good person." 2

The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of his profession
notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension or removal of an attorney. The respondent's appearance
at the labor proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City of Manila may
appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission." 3 As a matter of
fact, separate complaints on this ground have been filed and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor
of Manila and the National Police Commission." As for the charges that respondent conspired with complainant's
counsel to mislead complainant to admitting having' received his separation pay and for giving illegal protection
to aliens, it is understandable why the Report of the Solicitor-General recommended that they be dismissed for
lack of evidence.

The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is in accordance with the
settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice
Malcolm in this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is
a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of
the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." 5 The
Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to. 6

This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there might have been of the
Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his profession while holding his position of Captain in the
Metro Manila police force. That is a matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not
be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact
that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public
trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen
could assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be
justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter
that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from
laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but
also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even
take care that his honor remains unsullied

WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is dismissed for not having
been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record.

PNB v ATTY CEDO

Facts: PNB filed a complaint against Atty. Cedo for violation of Rule 6.02 that states: A lawyer shall not, after
leaving gov’t. service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter which he had intervened
with in said service. Cedo was the former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset management Group of PNB.

During Cedo’s stint with PNB, he became involved in 2 transactions: 1.) sale of steel sheets to Ms. Ong and
2.) intervened in the handling of a loan of spouses Almeda. When a civil action arose because of #1, Cedo, after
leaving the bank appeared as one of the counsel of Ms. Ong. Also, when #2 was involved in a civil action, the
Almedas were represented by the law firmCedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates of which Cedo was a Senior Partner.

Cedo claims that he did not participate in the litigation of Ms. Ong’s case. He also claims that even if it was
his law firm handling the Almeda case, the case was being handled by Atty. Ferrer.

Issue: W/N violated Rule 6.02.

Held: Cedo violated Rule 6.02.

In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between the atty. and the client, inquiry of the
nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further
prejudice the complainant cause. Whatever may be said as to w/n the atty. utilized against his former client
information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact that their previous relationship should have
precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side.

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all the parties concerned
after the disclosure of facts. A lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.