Tug End Hat 1970

The Meaning of 'Bedeutung' in Frege
Author(s): Ernst Tugendhat

Source: Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 6 (Jun., 1970), pp. 177-189
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of Analysis Committee
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ANALYSIS 30.6 JUNE 1970
THE MEANING OF 'BEDEUTUNG' IN FREGE
By ERNST TUGENDHAT
in of Frege's term 'Bedeutung' as 'reference',

THE rendering English
which has become popular since the translation of Geach and
Black, is quite as misleading as the earlierrenderings'denotation'and
'nominatum'. They all suggest that what Frege meant by the Bedeutung
of an expressionis the object which the expressionnames. This cannot
be correct, since Frege speaks of the Bedeutung not only of names but
also of predicates. It is true that Frege often used the term 'name', in
keeping with the then accepted usage in logic, for predicatesas well,
reservingfor what are normallycalled names, words that name objects,
the term 'propername'. But this extendeduse of the term 'name'should
not misleadus, since it is well known that Frege insisted that predicates,
in contrast to proper names, do not name objects at all. In a recently
published manuscriptFrege himself expressly repudiatesthe extended
use of the term 'name': 'The word "common-name"may mislead one
into assuming that a common-name, like a proper name, essentially
refers to objects .... But this is incorrect; and consequentlyI preferto
say "concept-word"instead of "common-name".'1Therefore,although
it is true that in the case of propernames, including assertivesentences,
Frege consideredthe Bedeutung of the expressionto be an object named
by it, the name-relationcannot be implied in the very meaning of the
word 'Bedeutung'. What, then, did Frege mean by this word?
In orderto state the problemwithout begging the question, we have
in English to use a word which is as free of definite associationsfrom
semantictheory as the Germanword 'Bedeutung' in Frege. 'Bedeutung' is
not free of such associationsin ordinaryGermanusage, but Frege made
it so for the Germanreadersimply by using it in an unusualway. The
translatorshave preferredto withhold from English readersthe puzzle-
ment which every German reader experienceswith this word on first
readingFrege's essay 'UberSinnundBedeutung'. They chose to anticipate
an answer, and to have done this is perhapsworse than that it happens
to be the wrong one, since it deprivesEnglish readersof the opportunity
even to become awareof the question.
It seems safest to use for Frege's term the nearestEnglish equivalent
to the word 'Bedeutung' in ordinary German usage. In semantical
contexts other than that of Frege the word 'Bedeutung' is usually trans-
xFrege, NachgelasseneSchriften(Hamburg 1969), p. 135. In the same manuscript, Frege
even goes so far as to consider misleading the term 'dieBedeulung',when applied to concept-
words, on the grounds that the definite article suggests that the predicate must refer to some-
thing (p. 133).
177
178 ANALYSIS
lated by the English word 'meaning', and therefore Mr. Dummett

renderedFrege's 'Bedeutung', in his article 'Frege' in TheEndyclofaedia of
Philosophy,adequately enough as 'meaning'. However, 'Bedeutung' is
used in Germannot only in the sense of 'meaning',but also in the sense
of 'importance', 'significance'. And since Frege obviously did not
understandby 'Bedeutung' what the word means in normal semantical
contexts,we should expect the second, not specificallysemantical,sense
of the word to have had some weight with him when he chose this word
in order to introduce a new concept into semantics. In English, the
word 'significance'is used, more or less like the German word 'Bedeu-
tung',in the sense of 'meaning'as well as that of 'importance'. The word
'significance' further recommends itself as the rendering of Frege's
term by being relatively free of definite associations from semantic
theory.1
So much for terminology;now to the problem. I shall deal with the
significanceof predicateslater by way of supplementaryconfirmation
and shall tackle the problem of significancefirst at a point which has
found extensive though unsatisfactorytreatment in the literature. I
mean Frege's doctrine of the significanceof assertive sentences. Here
the translationof 'Bedeutung'by 'reference'seems partiallyjustified,since
Frege conceives of sentencesas propernamesand takes their significance
to consist in one of two objects, "the True" and "the False" (SB 34).2
But of course it is misleadingeven here to anticipatethe answer by the
choice of the word used to state the question.
Over this Fregeandoctrine of the significanceof assertivesentences
logicians have been divided into two camps, in dispute not concerning
the interpretationbut concerningthe evaluationof the doctrine. On the
one side, thereare thosewho, like Kneale,find Frege'sdoctrineunaccept-
able because the assimilationof sentences to proper names obliterates
importantsemanticaldifferencesand becausethereis no way of identify-
ing the alleged objects "the True" and "the False" except as froferties
of sentences or propositions.3 On the other side, there are those who,
with Church, insist on the analogies which Frege has shown to exist
between the reference of a name and the truth-value of a sentence.4
Surely both parties have a point, but neither point is enough for an
outright rejectionor an outright acceptanceof Frege's doctrine. Let us
grant to the second party that the referenceof a name and the truth-
value of a sentencehave somethingin common, and let us call this their
significance;does it follow that, since the significanceof the name is the
1 1 owe this suggestion and other advice concerning this paper to Mr. J. L. H. Thomas
of All Souls College, Oxford.
2All citations are to the original German edition. The translation by Geach and Black
and the German edition of Patzig give the pagination of the original. I use 'SB' as abbre-
viation for 'UberSinn undBedeutung'.Translations are my own.
3W. and M. Kneale, The Developmentof Logic, pp. 576f.
4A. Church, Introductionto MathematicalLogic, pp. 23-25.
THE MEANING OF 'BEDEUTUNG' IN FREGE 179
object named,the significanceof the sentencemust also be thought of as
an object? Surelynot. And if we grant to the first party that sentences
are not names, do these philosophersnot agree that there is a functional
connection between the referenceof a name and the truth-valueof the
sentences of which the name may be a part and that so far they have
somethingin common? Let us call this again their significance. Now if
the significanceof a sentence cannot be thought of as an object named,
this party ought to present an alternativeaccount of significance. The
two partiescould thereforebe reconciledon the basis of a new account
of significancewhich is not biased towards the name relation and yet
does full justice to Frege's discovery of the functional connection
between objects of proper names and truth-valuesof sentences.
Nothing would seemeasierthanto provide such an account. Modern
semantics is alreadyin possession of a technical term for significance
which is not biasedtowardsthe name relation,the term 'extension'. We
speak of the extension of names and of sentences (and of predicates)
without necessarilyimplying that the extension is, except in the case of
names, an object. So the solution to our problem seems readyat hand:
the significanceof an expression is its extension.' Although I believe
that this answer leads in the right direction, it is not satisfactoryas it
stands, because the term 'extension' is defined in a differentway for
names and for sentences(and again for predicates). Two sentenceshave
the same extension if and only if they have the same truth-value,and
two nameshave the same extension if and only if they refer to the same
object. The term 'extension'is used in both cases for the samereasonas
Frege used the term 'significance'in both cases, but whilst Frege gave
an answer to what it is they have in common, the term 'extension'does
not give an alternativeanswer, it simply leaves the matter open. Our
question can now be reformulatedthus: what is it that the extension of
names and of sentences have in common? Can we find a unitary
definitionof 'extension'which is not biased towardsthe name-relation?
Let us take as our point of departureFrege's own introductionof the
term 'significance'for sentences. He writes (SB 32f):
Does a sentenceas a whole perhapshave only a senseand no signi-
ficance?It might indeedbe expectedthat such sentencesoccur,just as
there are parts of sentenceshaving sense but no significance. And
sentenceswhichcontainpropernameswithoutsignificance will be of this
kind. The sentence'Ulysseswas set ashoreat Ithacawhilesoundasleep'
clearlyhasa sense. But sinceit is doubtfulwhetherthe name'Ulysses'in
that sentencehas a significance,it is also doubtfulwhetherthe sentence
as a whole has one. But what is certainis that anyonewho seriously
takes the sentenceto be true or false ascribesa significance,and not
merelya sense,to the name'Ulysses'... Thatwe concernourselveswith
1 This is
Carnap's answer, given in his book Meaningand Necessity, to which the present
paper owes much.
180 ANALYSIS
the significanceof partof the sentenceat allis a signthatas a rulewe also
acknowledge,and require,the sentenceitself to havea significance....
Butnow whyis it we requireeverypropernameto havenot onlya sense,
but a significanceas well? Why are we not satisfiedwith the thought
alone? Because,and insofaras, we are concernedwith its truth-value.
. . It is the strivingfor truth,then, that urgesus in all casesto press
forwardfromthe senseto the significance.
The conclusion which Frege draws from this line of reasoning is:
'Thus we are impelled to accept the truth-value of a sentence as its
significance'. But the passage suggests a furtherconclusion. Frege says
that we are interestedin the significanceof any part of a sentence only
insofar as we are interestedin the truth-valueof the sentence. Is this
not to say that the significanceof the partsof sentences,and in particular
of names, consists in their contribution to the truth-value of the
sentences into which they may enter? In this case we should have to
take the significanceof sentencesas primary.Insteadof transferringthe
characteristicsof the significanceof namesto that of sentences,we should
reversethe orderand try to definethe significanceof names by meansof
the concept with which the significanceof sentencesis defined.
In order to do this I propose the technicalterm 'truth-valuepoten-
tial'. As a first step, this term can be definedfor names in the following
way: two names 'a' and 'b' have the same truth-valuepotential if and
only if, whenever each is completed by the same expression to form a
sentence,the two sentenceshave the same truth-value. This, of course,
is only a cumbersomeway of expressing the well-known definition of
extensional equivalence: a=b =Def. (P)Pa=Pb, which is Leibniz'
Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, to which Frege himself
explicitlyappeals(SB 35). But now a furtherstep suggests itself. With
slight modification, the definition can be converted into a general
definition for the truth-valuepotential of an expression,whether name
or sentence or predicate:two expressions 0 and0bhavethesametruth-value
potentialif andonlyif, whenever is
each comfileted bythesameexpression toformt
a sentence,thetwosentences havethesame truth-value. If we substitute names
for 0 and 0, this definitionbecomes identical with the first definition. I
shall returnlaterto the case of predicates. If we substitute sentences for
0 and f, we obtain the following statement:two sentences 'p' and 'q'
have the same truth-valuepotential if and only if, whenever each is
completedby the same expressionto form a sentence,the two sentences
have the same truth-value. Now 'p' and 'q' are alreadysentences;they
are not susceptibleto being completedas sentencesby a furtherexpres-
sion. Therefore, the addition 'whenever each is completed . . . ' is
superfluousin this case, and the definitionis reducedto the simpleform:
two sentences'p' and 'q' have the sametruth-valuepotentialif and only
if they have the same truth-value.
It is obvious that the two definitions for the sameness of truth-value
potential of names and of sentences are identical with the well-known
definitions for the sameness of extension of names and of sentences.
But they now appear as applications of a single general definition of
sameness of extension. The concept of truth-value potential, thus
defined, can thereforebe consideredas an alternativeaccount of signi-
ficance to that given by Frege. Let us compare the merits of the two
accounts. I shall first show that the new account is more valuableeven
in understandingFrege's own exposition.
Frege's reason for calling both the object of a proper name and the
truth-valueof a sentencetheir 'significance'lies in what has been called
by Carnap the 'principle of interchangeability':if in a sentence we
replace one part by another with the same significancebut a different
sense, then the sense, but not the significance, of the sentence may
change (cf. SB 32). Frege did not give a justificationfor this principle,
and his interpretershave been puzzled over its precise status. Frege
enunciatesthe principlebefore saying what the significanceof sentences
consists in, and he clearly uses it precisely as an instrument for dis-
covering what the significanceof a sentence is. The principletherefore
does not seem to be a propositionthat can be true or false, but functions
ratheras a definitionfor introducingthe term 'significanceof a sentence'.
We shall,Frege seems to say, call the significanceof a sentencewhatever
it is which remainsunchangedwhen we replacea name in the sentence
by another name with the same significance. However, critics have
observed that this is unsatisfactory,since the truth-valueis not the only
thing that remainsunchangedwhen a name is replacedby anothername
of the same object. We can, for example, think of all the sentences
which have the same predicate and whose subject-termsrefer to the
same object as belonging to the same object-class. Then the object-
class of a sentence evidently meets the requirementof the principle of
interchangeabilityjust as the truth-valueof the sentencedoes.
The difficultyis solved if we go about it the other way and take the
function of the principle of interchangeabilityto consist in the intro-
duction of the significance,not of sentences, but of names. We then
start from the truth-valueof sentences, call this their significance,and
proceed to say that whateverpropertyof names remainsthe same when
we exchange them in otherwise identical sentences without changing
their truth-valueshall be called the significanceof the names. And this
simply amounts to saying that we shall call the truth-valuepotential of
names their significance. Proceedingin this direction,it then turns out,
instead of being assumed, that the significanceis, in the case of names,
the object referredto.x
xAs has been pointed out to me by Mr. Dummett, it is not strictly correct to say that the
truth-value potential is the object referred to. All we can claim is that two names that refer
to the same object have the same truth-value potential. Consequently, it would be preferable
to say that the truth-value potential of a name is, rather than the object referred to, its refer-
ence to that object.
182 ANALYSIS
One meritthereforeof the accountof significance hereadvancedis
thatit permitsa betterunderstanding of Frege'sown exposition.The
principleof interchangeability,in the interpretation
heregiven, simply
the of of
represents Principle the Identity Indiscernibles,and Frege
himselfrefersto it in this formwhenhe proceedsto the finaltest of his
proposal(SB 35). The conclusionsdrawnfromthe previousconsider-
ations he calls mere 'conjecture'('Vermutung'). Nonetheless,Frege
thoughteven then that he was provingby meansof the principleof
interchangeabilitythatthe truth-values of sentencescorrespondto the
objectsof names,whereasin factthe principleof interchangeability can
only provethatthe objectsof namescorrespondto the truth-values of
sentences.
That Frege proceeds in this reverse direction-from names to
sentences--must have been the main reasonwhy he appliedthe termin-
ology of the name-relationto the significanceof sentences. There was,
of course, an additionalreason,and that was his well-known distinction
between completeand incompleteexpressionsand his doctrinethat both
sentences and names are complete expressions.' But this doctrine in
itself is not enough to accountfor Frege's conception of the significance
of a sentenceas an object, becauseeven if it be conceded that names and
sentencesform one class of expressionsin contrastto predicates,it does
not follow that this classhas no essentialsubdivisionsin turn. And why
the name-relationshould be transferredfrom the sub-classof names to
the sub-classof sentencesFrege never explainedon any grounds other
than the principle of interchangeability.Hence we must conclude that
Frege'sapplicationof the terminologyof 'name'and 'object'to sentences
and their significance is due, in the last analysis, exclusively to the
traditionaldoctrine that the prototype of a complete ("categorematic")
expressionis the name. And yet it was Frege himself who had opened a
new approachwith the famous dictum in his Grundlagen derArithmetik
(?60): 'Only in the context of a sentence does a word signify anything'.
It is this statementwhich points to the conception of significanceas
truth-valuepotential.
So far I have been concerned to show the advantagesof the new
conception of significancefor the interpretationof Frege's own text.
Let us now comparethe two conceptions in their own right.
There exists a connection between names and sentences, expressed
by the principleof interchangeability.This, and this alone, is the fact to
be accountedfor. What the principleof interchangeabilityexpressesis
not the symptom of anything else, of some deeper propertythat names
and sentences might have in common. If we wish thereforeto charac-
terize both names and sentences by one and the same property, which
we can call the property of having a significance, this property must not
1 Cf. the essay 'FunktionundBegriff',especially p. 18.
consist in anything over and above the functional connection which is
expressedby the principleof interchangeability. This requirementis
met by the conceptionof the significanceof an expressionas its truth-
valuepotentialandis not metby theconceptionof the significance of an
expression as the objectnamed by it.
But the argumentdecisivefor the adequacyof the accounthere
proposed,andfor theinadequacy of Frege'sown account,is the follow-
ing. Granted on the one hand that namesand sentencesform two
differentsemanticcagetoriesandon the otherthattheyhavesomething
in common,we mustrequireof an adequateaccountof whattheyhave
in commonthatit shouldnot obliteratetheirdifferences.This require-
ment is only met by the presentaccount. Why is this so? Why is it
thatif we interpretthe significanceof sentencessettingout fromnames,
we cannothelp assimilatingsentencesto names,whilstnamesare not
assimilatedto sentenceswhen we interpretthe significanceof names
settingout fromsentences? Thereasonis thatwe havehereaninstance
of a functionalconnectionbetweenpartandwhole. In anysuchinstance,
for examplea tool, machine,or organism,the partcan only be defined
by its relationto the functionof the wholeandnot viceversa.Sincethe
relationof partto wholeis functional,the referenceto the wholein the
definitionof thepartdoesnot resultin the assimilation of theproperties
of the part to the propertiesof the whole. On the other hand, any
attemptto definethe wholeby meansof its partsis boundto resultin a
non-functional accountof the wholewhicheitherassimilates its proper-
ties to the propertiesof the partor definesit as a mereconglomeration
of its parts,or both.
Thus the fact that the interpretation of significanceas truth-value
potentialis adequatewhile its interpretation as referenceis inadequate
shedslight on the natureof sentencesandtheircomposition:it canbe
used as evidencefor the claimthat the primarysemanticunit is the
sentenceand it can also be used to protectthis claimfrom misunder-
standing.The contentionthatthe sentenceis theprimaryunitof mean-
ing does not excludeits divisibilityinto meaningfulparts; it only
claims that the significance,and consequentlythe sense, of words
cannotbe understoodin isolation,but ratherconsistsin theircontri-
butionto the significanceor senseof sentences,respectively.Wheels,
cranksandpistonscanexercisetheirfunctiononlyaspartsof a machine;
but this is not to say that they cannotbe takenapartand usedin the
constructionof a new machine.
WhatI havesaidso far canbe summarized as follows. The correct
accountof Frege'sterm'significance' would seemto be to understand
it as truth-value potential;andsincethis accountalsoagreesbetterwith
some parts of Frege's exposition thanhis own account does, we can also
say that this was what Frege himself really meant and that he was only
184 ANALYSIS
prevented from saying so by his attachment to the traditional conception

which he was overthrowing. Now a claim such as this, that an author
really meant something that he did not actually say, easily arouses
suspicion. It is therefore fortunate that my proposal is practically con-
firmed by Frege himself, at least as far as the significance of predicates is
concerned.
In his published writings Frege never treated explicitly of the
distinction between sense and significance in the case of predicates, and
among students of Frege there has been considerable uncertainty and
disagreement on this matter. In particular, it has seemed strange to some
that in 'Begriffund Gegenstand'Frege says that the concept is the signific-
ance of the predicate (198). If that is so, what should we suppose the
sense of the predicate to be ? Might one not have expected the sense of
the predicate to be the concept and the significance its extension? On
the other hand, the contrast between concept and object, so essential to
Frege's thought, obviously committed him to thinking that the concept
is to the predicate what the object is to the name-it could only be the
significance of the predicate.
These difficulties can now be resolved thanks to the publication
in Frege's Nachlass of a small manuscriptx in which Frege deals with the
problem of the sense and significance of predicates, which was left
open in his essay. The manuscript, which the editors have published
under the title 'Ausfiihrungeniiber Sinn und Bedeutung',opens with the
following remarks:
I distinguished in an essay ('On Sense and Significance') at first
between the sense and significanceonly of proper names. ... Now the
same distinction can also be drawn for concept-words. Unclarity, how-
ever, may easily arise through confusing the distinction between concepts
and objects with the distinction between sense and significance,with the
result that sense and concept on the one hand and significance and
object on the other are conflated (p. 128).
Frege here anticipates the confusion which has led to the translation of
'Bedeutung'by 'reference'. He then explains:
Just as the proper names of the same object can replace each other
salvaveritate,the same holds of concept-words too if the extension of the
concept (derBegriffsumfang) is the same. Admittedly, as a result of such
substitutions the thought will be changed; but this is the sense of the
sentence, not its significance. And the latter, that is to say the truth-
value, remains unchanged. So one could easily be led to consider the
extension of the concept as the significance of the concept-word; but
then one would overlook the fact that the extensions of concepts are
objects and not concepts ... Nevertheless there is an element of truth in
this(p.128f).
The explanations which follow in the manuscript show that what Frege
1
Frege, NachgelasseneSchriften,pp. 128-36.
means is that, although we should not say that the significanceof a
concept-word is the extension, 'two concept-words have the same
significanceif and only if their extensions coincide'(p. 133). So here we
have a case where Frege refusesto considerthe significanceas any kind
of object whatsoever and is content to say under what condition two
predicateshave the same significance. And althoughFrege does not put
it in these words, this condition clearlyconsistsin having the sametruth-
value potential.
What Frege says in this manuscriptabout 'having the samesignific-
ance' corresponds to the characterizationof 'having a significance'
which he gives in the Grundgeset!e ?29. A predicate,he there says, has a
significance if, when to
applied any propername that has a significance,
it yields a sentencethat itself has a significance.1
These explanationsare furtherconfirmedby what Frege says about
what it means for a predicate to have no significance: 'When we are
concerned with truth, . . . we have to reject concept-words whose
demarcationis indistinct. Of every objectit must be determinedwhether
it falls under the concept or not; a concept-wordwhich does not satisfy
this requirement has no significance.'2 This passage is particularly
illuminating, for Frege is here pointing to the specific kind of truth-
value potentialof predicates,which is essentiallydifferentfrom the truth-
value potentialof names. This distinctionis all too easily blurredby the
usualaccount,accordingto which both objectsand conceptsareregarded
by Frege as "entities". Frege did not use such a term, and his so-called
"realism"appearsto be overemphasizedin the literature. Although we
may say that a concept-word "stands for" a concept, just as a name
standsfor an object, what this meansin the case of a concept-wordis that
it provides a demarcationfor the distinction of objects.
Looking back now at names, sentences and predicates, we can
conclude that what Frege discovered was not, as is often said, that
names have, besides a reference,a sense and that sentences and predi-
cates have, besides a sense, a reference,but that all these expressions
normally have, besides a sense, a significance in terms of truth and
falsity:3sentencesare significant('bedeutungsvoll') insofar as they are true
or false; predicatesare significantinsofaras they aretrue of some objects
property of predicates thus defined has been labelled by Montgomery Furth, in his
1 The
article 'Two types of denotation' (Studies in Logical Theory,ed. N. Rescher, Oxford 1968,
pp. 9-45) the 'property Z'. Furth thinks that 'the problem is: is possessing the property Z
anything like having denotation?' (p. 31). But Frege did not use the word 'denotation', and
the word which he did use does not commit us to asking any such further question. The
analogies which Furth proceeds to point out between what he calls two kinds of denotation
are precisely the analogies which obtain between names and predicates insofar as both have
a truth-value potential.
2 NachgelasseneSchriften,p. 133.
3 Here the non-technical meaning of in the sense of "significance" comes to
"Bedeulung"
the surface.
186 ANALYSIS
and false of others; and names are significantinsofar as they refer to

something of which predicatescan be true or false.
In the last part of my paperI shall try to show how the explanation
of significance as truth-value potential also helps us to understand
Frege's theory of complex sentences and his doctrine of "oblique
significance".
Frege begins his analysis of sense and significance in complex
sentencesby enunciatingthe principleof interchangeabilityfor this case
also (SB 36), as if it were self-evident that it should hold universally.
He did not explicitlygive any reason why this principle should hold in
the case of simplesentences,nor does he give any reasonnow in the case
of complex sentences. In the former case we found the unexpressed
reasonto be that the significanceof the partswas definedby the principle
itself. This was possible, as we saw, because the significanceof a part
of a simple sentence can be taken to consist in the contributionit makes
to the significanceof the whole. This rationale obviously cannot in
turn be appliedto the case where the partitself is a sentence. We cannot
define the significanceof the sentenceas its contributionto the signific-
ance of complex sentences, since its significanceis alreadydefined,it is
its truth-value. If, therefore, the principle of interchangeabilityis to
hold in this second case too, it can do so only for the contraryreason:
whereas the significanceof the part of a simple sentence consists, by
definition, in its contribution to the significance of the whole, the
significanceof a complex sentencewould have to depend on the signific-
ance of its parts. And this is, of course, what we find actuallyto be the
casewhereverthe principleof interchangeabilityholds at all for complex
sentences: the complex sentences are defined in these cases as truth-
functions of their component sentences.
But what of the other cases? It might seem that the explanationjust
given shows that, and why, the principleof interchangeabilitydoes not
in fact have universal application in the case of complex sentences
but holds only in those cases where the significance of the complex
sentenceis definedby this principle. In all other cases the significance
of the whole depends on the sense, and not on the significance,of the
parts. It is well known how Frege solved the difficulty which thus
seems to arisefor his claim that the principleof interchangeabilityholds
universally:he callsthe sense of an expression,in particularof a sentence,
its 'oblique significance'('ungeradeBedeutung').And he thinks that he is
entitled to assert that where complex sentences are not truth-functions
of their component sentences, the significanceof the latter is not its
normal significance, its truth-value, but its oblique significance, its
sense. For in these cases the sentenceis nominalizedand functions as
the name of what normallyis its sense(cf. SB 28, 36f). The universality
of the principle of interchangeabilityis thus restored: the significance
of the complex sentence depends in one case on the normal significance
of the component sentences and in the other on their oblique signific-
ance, in every case thereforeon their significance.
This theory is usually considered to be somewhat artificial and
invented solely in order to save the universalityof the principleof inter-
changeability. Besides, Frege is accusedof having let himself be misled
by the close connection between significanceand the name-relation;it
is true that a sentence may function as a name, but how could the
significanceof a sentence, in Frege's technical sense of the word 'signi-
ficance',ever be anythingbut a truth-value? Is it not, then, more satis-
factory to throw overboard the universalityof the principle of inter-
changeabilityand remain content with saying, as one normally does in
contemporarysemantics,that there are extensional contexts and inten-
sional contexts?
I think not. The suggestion just madethat a sentencecould have no
other significance, in Frege's technical sense, than a truth-value, is
mistaken. A significance,in Frege's technical sense, can be anything
which may be considered a truth-value potential of any kind. Now
when a sentence is nominalized and a predicateattachedto it, or as is
common in intensional contexts a two-place predicateis attachedto it
and another name, the sentence, Frege says, merely expressespart of a
"thought", and only togetherwith a predicatecan itforma sentence,that
is to say, express a thought; such a sentence cannot stand by itself (cf.
SB 36f). And, we may add by way of elucidation, the truth-value
potential of such a sentencewhich cannot stand by itself cannot consist
in a truth-value. It can only consist in the contributionwhich it makes
to the truth-valueof sentencesinto which it may enter as a part. Apply-
ing our generaldefinitionof truth-valuepotentialto this case, we obtain
the statementthat two nominalizedsentenceshave the same truth-value
potentialif and only if, whenever each is completedby the same expres-
sion to form a sentence, the two sentences have the same truth-value.
And, since this is only the case when the sentences which have been
nominalized have the same sense, Frege's contention is fully justified
that what he calls the oblique significance,that is to say the significance
of the sentence in its new role as subject of a second-ordersentence, is
the sense which the sentence has when it functions independently.
Nominalization,then, is not just an accidentalgrammaticalfeature. In
whateverway it may be grammaticallyexpressed,a sentenceassumesthe
role of a name, when it is so used that its truth-valuepotential standsin
need of supplementationby a predicativetruth-valuepotential to yield
a truth-value. This result shows once more that Frege's concept of
significanceis functional:the significanceof one and the sameexpression
differsaccordingto whether it expresses a self-sufficientsemanticwhole,
a "thought", or only part of one.
188 ANALYSIS
This Fregeanaccountmaybe contrastedwith the usualcontemporary

version of Frege's discovery in terms of extensional and intensional
contexts by taking an example in the classificationof which the two
accountsdiffer. Sentencesformedby applyingto a nominalizedsentence
'thatp' the predicate'is true' or 'is false' are extensionaland thereforedo
not differat all, according to the usual version, from any other truth-
functionalcomplex sentence. According to the Fregeanaccount, on the
other hand, the significanceof 'thatp' is, in this case as in any other, not
the truth-valuebut the sense of 'p'. However, the significanceof the
whole sentence'thatp is true' does not depend on the sense, but only on
the truth-valueof 'p'. Does this not show thatFrege'srelianceon nomin-
alizationis, afterall, mistaken,and that the usual contemporaryaccount,
which is based on the principleof interchangeabilityalone, is really far
more satisfactory? I think not. The reasonwhy the significanceof the
sentence 'that p is true' depends on the truth-value, and not on the
sense, of 'p' is to be found in the particularmeaningof the predicate'is
true' and not, as in other truth-functionalsentences,in the construction
of the sentence. This distinctionis effacedby the contemporaryversion,
whereas it is brought out perfectlyby the original Fregeanaccount.'
What conclusion are we to draw from this vindication of Frege's
doctrineof oblique significance? Should we say that afterall Frege was
right in assumingthe principleof interchangeabilityas a universallaw?
But this in itself would not be very illuminating. We have seen that the
principle of interchangeabilityholds for quite differentreasons in the
case of subject-predicatesentencesand in the case of complex sentences.
The importantresult, which was not expressedby Frege himself, rather
seems to be the curious primacywhich apparentlybelongs to subject-
predicatesentencesin assertivelanguage. This primacyconsists in the
fact that the significance(and, in consequence, the sense) of all other
expressionswithin assertivelanguageis definedin terms of the signific-
ance (or the sense) of subject-predicatesentences. The parts of subject-
predicate sentences are essentially components; their significance
consists therefore in what they may contribute to the significance of
subject-predicatesentences. These expressions in turn are essentially
wholes. If thereforethey are to enteras partsinto largerunits which are
to be sentencesthemselves,eitherthe significanceofthese largersentences
must be definedas a function of the significanceof the simple sentences,
or else the simple sentences can no longer function as sentences, but
1 On the other
hand, a weakness in Frege's account might be discerned in the fact that
names can occur intensionally in contexts other than nominalized sentences, as in 'a is
believed to be different from b'. However, such a sentence can always be transformed into a
sentence part of which is a nominalized sentence. Again, it would seem that although the
Fregean account is more involved than the usual version, it is nevertheless more illuminating,
because it refers us back to the reason for the intensional occurrence of expressions: inten-
sionality is, it seems, bound up with intentionality, which is to be found primarily in pro-
positional attitudes, and these are directed to what is expressed by nominalized sentences.
must be converted into names, and the larger sentences then turn out
to be themselves subject-predicatesentences. The universality of the
principle of interchangeabilityis, then, a consequence of this primacyof
the subject-predicatesentence.
I have passed over sentences with 1st and 2nd order quantifiers.
But their significance is also defined in terms of the significance of
subject-predicatesentences. There are, however, kinds of sentence
which seem to resist this account, in particularcausal sentences and
contrary-to-fact-conditionals.But such sentencespresent difficultieson
any account. Frege tried, in the last part of his essay, to explicatesome
of these more recalcitranttypes of complex sentence,in particularcausal
sentences,but he did not attemptto relatehis explicationof these types
to the assumeduniversalityof the principleof interchangeability.
University
of Heidelberg

Tug End Hat 1970

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Tug End Hat 1970

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The Meaning of 'Bedeutung' in Frege

Author(s): Ernst Tugendhat

THE MEANING OF 'BEDEUTUNG' IN FREGE

in of Frege's term 'Bedeutung' as 'reference',

lated by the English word 'meaning', and therefore Mr. Dummett

prevented from saying so by his attachment to the traditional conception

and false of others; and names are significantinsofar as they refer to

This Fregeanaccountmaybe contrastedwith the usualcontemporary

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