American Express International, Inc.

VS Noel Cordero

G.R. No. 138550 [October 14, 2005]

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Facts of the Case:

American Express International was a foreign corporation that issued charge cards used to
purchase goods and services at accredited merchants worldwide to its customers. Nilda Cordero, wife
of respondent Noel Cordero, was issued an American Express charge card. An extension charge card,
was likewise issued to respondent Noel Cordero which he also signed. Respondent, together with his
family went on a three-day holiday trip to Hong Kong. The group went to the Watson’s Chemist Shop.
While there, Noel picked up chocolate candies and handed his American Express
extension charge card to the sales clerk to pay for his purchases. Susan Chong, the store manager,
informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondent’s American
Express card in half with a pair of scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him embarrassment
and humiliation. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases using her own American Express charge
card.

The card was placed in the Inspect Airwarn Support System, a system utilized by petitioner as a
protection both for the company and the cardholders against the fraudulent use of their charge
cards. Once a card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the system, the person to whom the
card is tendered must verify the identity of the holder. If the true identity of the card owner is
established, the card is honored and the charges are approved. Otherwise, the card is revoked or
confiscated.

Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against petitioner. He prayed
for the award of moral damages and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees as a result of the
humiliation he suffered. According to the trial court, petitioner should have informed respondent that
on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong Kong attempted to use a charge card bearing similar number
to that of respondent’s card and that petitioner’s inexcusable failure to do so is the proximate cause of
the “confiscation and cutting of respondent’s extension card which exposed the latter to public
humiliation for which the petitioner should be held liable. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s decision.

Issue:

Whether the lower courts gravely erred in awarding moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees to Cordero.

Ruling of the Court:

YES. The Court ruled that petitioner can revoke respondent’s card without notice, as was done. The
subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had respondent talked to petitioner’s
representative and identified himself as the genuine cardholder. As explained by respondent himself,
he could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the
authorized cardholder. That could have been accomplished had respondent talked to petitioner’s
representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent was indeed the true holder of the
card. Clearly, no negligence which breached the contract could have been attributed to petitioner. If at
all, the cause of respondent’s humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioner’s
representative. It was thus safe to conclude that there was no negligence on the part of petitioner and
that, therefore, it cannot be held liable to respondent for damages.

The petition was granted.

Jose Cangco vs Manila Railroad Co.
On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an employee of
the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his
destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was
about to alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of
watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This caused him to lose his balance
at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was
dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of watermelons. MRC
raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting
from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of
people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young
manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same
act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of
watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under Article 2180 and their
liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:
NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of
the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or
not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master
and the person injured.
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which,
without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act
which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the
parties.
Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual
undertaking or in itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential
characteristics are identical.
Vinculum Juris: (def) It means “an obligation of law”, or the right of the obligee to enforce a civil matter in
a court of law.
G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995
Far East Bank and Trust Company, petitioner
vs Court of Appeals, Luisa Luna and Clarita Luna, respondents
Ponente: Vitug

Facts:
Luis Luna applied for a far east card issued by far east bank at its Pasig branch. Upon his request, the bank
also issued a supplemental card to private respondent Clarita Luna. Then Clarita lost her credit card and
submitted an affidavit of loss. Later on October 6, 1988 in a restaurant, Luis' credit card was not honored.

Luis thru a counsel then demanded from far east to pay damages for the humiliation he felt. The vice-
president of the bank expressed bank's apologies to Luis.

Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December 1988, filed a complaint for damages
with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC.
On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings, rendered a decision ordering
FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages;
and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court
with this petition for review.

There is merit in this appeal.

In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad
faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of
carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is
presumed) of the common carrier.

Held:
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching
a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort 9 even where there is a
pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot
improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of
would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be
deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract
between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact
that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case.
Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without
such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of
action or as an independent actionable tort.
PETROPHIL CORPORATION,
petitioner,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DR. AMANDA TERNIDA-CRUZ, JESSIE DE VERA, MARCIALMULIG, ANTONIO CUENCA, and RUFINO
CUENCA,
respondents.

Facts
Petrophil Corporation, petitioner, entered into contract with private respondent Dr. Amanda Ternida-Cruz, for hauling
and transport any and all packages and/or bulk products of Petrophil. The contract provided among others, that
Petrophil could terminate the contract for breach, negligence, discourtesy, improper and/or inadequate performance or
abandonment

Par 11 of the contract stipulated that the contract shall be for an indefinite period, provided that Petrophil may
terminate at any time with 30 days prior written notice. Annexed to the contract was the Penalty Clause which
contained calibrated penal sanctions for infractions that may be committed by Dr. Cruz and/or her employees. Petrophil
through its operations manager advised Dr. Cruz that Petrophil was terminating its contract in accordance of Par 11. Dr
Cruz appealed to Petrophil but was denied. Dr. Cruz filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 87-40930 on the RTC
Manila, seeking Petrophil the nullity of the termination of the contract and declaring its suspension as unjustified and
contrary to its terms and conditions. Other private respondents herein, Jessie de Vera, Marcial Mulig, Antonio and
Rufino Cuenca, all tank truck drivers of Dr. Cruz, also filed a complaint for damages against Petrophil Operations
Manager Antonio Santos, Pandacan Terminal Manager Crispino A. de Castro, and Pandacan Terminal Superintendent
Jaime Tamayo. During the hearing, Dr Cruz claimed that the termination of her hauling contract was a retaliation against
her for allegedly sympathizing with the then striking Petrophil employees and for informing the PNOC president of
anomalies perpetrated by some of its officers and employees.

Driver Jessie de Vera corroborated these allegations and said that the termination of Dr. Cruz's contract was intended to
silence her. Further, he testified that before the termination of the contract, Petrophil officials reduced their hauling
trips to make life harder for them so that they would resign from Dr: Cruz's employ, which in turn would result in the
closure of her business.

Petitioner denied that Petrophil officials were out to starve Dr. Cruz's drivers for their support of her. Additionally,
witnesses for Petrophil testified that on April25, 1987, there was a strike at the Pandacan terminal and Dr. Cruz and her
husband were at the picket line. They refused to load petroleum products, resulting in the disruption of delivery to
service stations in Metro Manila and in the provinces, which in turn resulted in loss of sales and revenues. Because of Dr.
Cruz's refusal to load, the management terminated the hauling contract.

Issues
Whether petitioner was guilty of arbitrary termination of the contract, which would entitle Dr. Cruz to damages

Ruling
Yes. The termination of contract appeared to be a retaliation or punishment for her sympathizing to the striking
employees. The petitioner did not ask her (Dr. Cruz) to explain her actions. Even if Petrophil have the right to terminate
the contract, the Petitioner could not act purposely to injure the respondent. Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that
every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
damage done. Petitioner might not have deliberately intended to injure the respondent-drivers. But as a consequence of
its willful act directed against Dr. Cruz, respondent-drivers lost their jobs and ,consequently suffered loss of income.
Note that under Article 20, there is no requirement that the act must be directed at a specific person, but it suffices that
a person suffers damage as a consequence of a wrongful act of another in order that indemnity could be demanded
from the wrongdoer.

The appellate court did not err, given the circumstances of this case, in awarding damages to respondent-drivers.

Laws Applied:
Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the damage done.Note that under Article 20, there is no requirement that the act
must be directed at a specific person, but it suffices that a person suffers damage as a consequence of a wrongful act of
another in order that indemnity could be demanded from the wrongdoer.
Orlando Garcia, Jr. v. Ranida Salvador & Ramon Salvador
GR No. 168512March 20, 2007YNARES-SANTIAGO,

FACTS:
Ranida Salvador (Ranida) worked as a trainee with the accounting department of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, Inc.
(The Company) and as a pre-requisite for regular employment she hadto undergo a medical examination. She
underwent the examination in Community Diagnostic Center (CDC) under Orlando Garcia (Garcia), a medical
technologist, who examined her and had resulted to a positive result for Hepatitis B. this resulted to Ranida
being terminated by the company and with her father suffering a heart attack. Refusing to believe the results,
she subjected herself to another examination at the Bataan Doctors Hospital which yielded a negative result for
the disease. After multiple examinations Ranida re-applied for with the Company which required her to go
another test, which also came out negative. Thus the company rehired Ranida. Ranida then filed for damages
against Garcia and another unknown pathologist claiming that due to their erroneous test she lost her job,
sleepless nights, mental anguish etc., and that her father was hospitalized. Garcia argued that it was due to the
false positives. RTC rules in favor or Garcia which was then reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether Garcia, a medical professional, can be guilty of negligence for issuing an erroneous medical result

RULING:
YES, negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury. For
the medical profession, test of the existence of negligence is:

Did the health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done;
and that failure or action caused injury to the patient; if yes, then he is guilty of negligence.
The elements of an actionable conduct are present in the case at hand – duty, breach, injury, and proximate
cause Duty: Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules
and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people by preventing the
operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical laboratories and by
improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory examinations.

Their business is impressed with public interest, as such, high standards of performance are expected from
them.Breach: Violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty to do
something, his omission or non-performance will render him liable to whoever maybe injured thereby.

Violations of RA 4688 (The Clinical Laboratory Law) committed by CDC:

1) CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required by law, but by Ma.
Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed Medical Technologist. Castro was named as head of CDC, but his infrequent
visits to the clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an effective administrative supervision and control over the
activities in the laboratory.
2) Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without the supervision of Castro,who admitted that
he does not know and has never met her.
3) Disputed HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida without the authorization of Castro.Garcia
may not have intended to cause the consequences which followed after there lease ofthe HBsAG test result.

However, his failure to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued for the protection of public
safety and interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably prudent health care provider would observe.
Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.Injury: Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct
consequence of Garcia failure to comply with the mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was
terminated from the service for failing the physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and
was compelled to undergo several more tests. All these could have been avoided had the proper safeguards been
scrupulously followed in conducting the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report. Art. 20 provides
legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of
some legal provision. Art.20: Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Orlando Garcia guilty of gross negligence
 M.H. Rakes vs The Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company

M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day, they were
working in the company’s yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars (karitons?); each car
carrying the opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are
pushing the cars from behind. There were no side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails
were secured by ropes. The track where the cars move were also weakened by a previous typhoon. It
was alleged that Atlantic’s foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left
unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the track, and
while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg
and causing it to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for
damages ($2,500).
Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their workers to be
walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side guards
to protect them in case the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the foreman
as it was him who neglected to have the tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for having
known of the depression on the track yet he continued to work.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable.

HELD: Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was
another employee who swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of caution in
continuing to work is not of a gross nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other hand
though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact that he was on the side of the cars
when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from standing near the side of the cars.
His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of damages though; the Supreme Court instead
reduced the award of damages from 5,000 pesos to 2,500 pesos.
In this case, the SC also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are:

1. Culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between two
persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; may be also considered as a real source of an
independent obligation (extra-contractual or culpa aquiliana).
2. Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be presumed to exist without the
other, and which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation (contractual or culpa
contractual).
 SPS. ERLINDA BATAL AND FRANK BATAL vs. SPS. LUZ SAN PEDRO AND KENICHIRO
TOMINAGA

[G.R. No. 164601; September 27, 2006] Obligations and Contracts| Culpa| Liabilities in case of Negligence|
FACTS:
Respondents Sps. Luz and Kenichiro Tominaga contracted the services of petitioner Frank Batal who
represented himself as a geodetic engineer to survey the exact boundaries of their property for the construction
of their perimeter fence. Sometime in 1996, a complaint was lodged against the Sps. that allegedly they
encroached upon a designated right-of-way of an adjoining lot and upon further verification it was found out
that their wall indeed encroached to it. They also discovered that it was not Frank but his wife Erlinda Batal,
who is a licensed geodetic engineer. Frank, consequently admitted that he made a mistake and offered to share
in the expenses for the demolition and reconstruction of the questioned portion of fence, however failed to
deliver on his word, thus the filing of the instant suit.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners failed to exercise due care and diligence in the conduct of the resurvey which eventually
caused damage to the respondents.

HELD:
Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses, either as:

1. Culpa Aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates a vinculum juris and
gives rise to an obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other obligation, and is governed
by Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, or
2. Culpa Contractual, which is the fault or negligence incident in the performance of an obligation which
already existed, and which increases the liability from such already existing obligation, and is governed by
Articles 1170 to 1174 of the same Code.
In the present case, it is clear that the petitioners, in carrying out their contractual obligations, failed to exercise
the requisite diligence in the placement of the markings for the concrete perimeter fence that was later
constructed. As a result, the placement of the monuments did not accurately reflect the dimensions of the lot.
Because of the encroachment, the respondents had to demolish and reconstruct the fence and, thus, suffered
damages. Being guilty of a breach of their contract, petitioners are liable for damages suffered by the
respondents.
 LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC., vs. GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION and R&B INSURANCE
CORPORATION, / G.R. No. 179446 / January 10, 2011

FACTS:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the August 24,
2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82822.
On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure the
shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on
board the vessel "Richard Rey" from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on the same date.
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the
subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its
delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbia’s warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City.
The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and
accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Of the six (6) trucks route to Balagtas, Bulacan, only five (5) reached the
destination. One (1) truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo.
Later on, the said truck, was recovered but without the copper cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed
with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount ofP1,903,335.39. After the investigation, R&B
Insurance paid Columbia the amount ofP1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity.
R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), It sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss
of the subject cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated "to the right of the consignee to recover from the party/parties
who may be held legally liable for the loss."
On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision holding Glodel liable for damages for the loss of the subject
cargo and dismissing Loadmasters’ counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees against R&B Insurance.
Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered that the appellee is an agent of appellant Glodel, whatever liability the latter
owes to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation as insurance indemnity must likewise be the amount it shall be paid by
appellee Loadmasters. Hence, Loadmasters filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers to determine their liability for the loss of the subject cargo.

RULING:

The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Judgment is rendered declaring petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc.
and respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation jointly and severally liable to respondent
Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both by land, water or air for compensation, offering their
services to the public. Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of transporting goods by
land, through its trucking service. It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is
generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public. Glodel is
also considered a common carrier within the context of Article 1732. For as stated and well provided in the case of
Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc., a customs broker is also regarded as a common
carrier, the transportation of goods being an integral part of its business.
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them according to all
the circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. When the Court speaks of extraordinary
diligence, it is that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection observe
for securing and preserving their own property or rights. With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility,
the Civil Code provides that the exercise of extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally
placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or
constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.
The Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss
of the subject cargo. Loadmasters’ claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the
consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense.
For under ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and
helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be made
answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the
goods safely to the warehouse.
Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It failed to ensure that Loadmasters would
fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the designated destination. Glodel should,
therefore, be held liable with Loadmasters. Its defense of force majeure is unavailing.
For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself. The Court cannot come to its aid on equitable grounds.
"Equity, which has been aptly described as ‘a justice outside legality,’ is applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or judicial rules of procedure." The Court cannot be a lawyer and take the cudgels for a party who has been
at fault or negligent.
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY vs. NAVIDAD
G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003

FACTS:

Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got into an altercation with the
SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the tracks and was killed when a train came and
ran over him. The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver,
(Roman) the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent). The trial court
found Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the heirs. The CA exonerated
Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the train driver Romero jointly and severally liable as well as
removing the award for compensatory damages and replacing it with nominal damages. The reasoning of
the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed between Navidad and LRTA (by virtue of his havA
ing purchased train tickets and the liability was caused by the mere fact of Navidad's death after being hit
by the train being managed by the LRTA and operated by Roman. The CA also blamed LRTA for not having
presented expert evidEnce showing that the emergency brakes could not have stopped the train on time.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory damages.

HELD:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of a common carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code.
(3) No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.

RATIO:

Liability of LRTA – Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of the New Civil Code

A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to use utmost diligence in carrying
passengers with due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists not only during the course of the
trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises where they ought to be in pursuance to then
contract of carriage.

Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence
or wilful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers if the common carrier’s employees through theexercise of due diligence could have prevented or
stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or
been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the
fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that
the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.

Liability of Security Agency – If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for a tort under Art. 2176 in
conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the employee Escartin is established, the employer, Prudent,
would be held liable on the presumption that it did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family
in the selection and supervision of its employees.

Relationship between contractual and non-contractual breach – How then must the liability of the
common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It
would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission
causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the
Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of ontract would
have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties,
the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Nominal Damages - The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal
damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by
the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered by him. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages. The award was deleted.
ELCANO VS HILL

Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against
Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil
action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill
argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil
liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by
reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action.
A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the minor child”, it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority
over the child’s person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but
he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian.” Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however ruled since at the time of
the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a matter of
equity.