IV.
MUNICIPAL AUTONOMY Court enjoined the Secretary of Local Government from further issuing suspension
A. DEFINITION
Ganzon v. CA
G.R. No. 93252 | August 5, 1991 | SARMIENTO, J
Digest by: ZABALA
Petitioners: RODOLFO T. GANZON (Mayor of Iloilo City)
Respondents: CA and LUIS T. SANTOS (Secretary of Department of Local
Government)
Doctrine:
Local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization." Notwithstanding the
change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the
legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing
legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials.
Facts:
10 administrative complaints were filed against the Mayor of Iloilo City, Mayor
Ganzon.
● The complaints were filed by various city officials on various charges, among
them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and
immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and
arbitrary detention. (for a more detailed narration of the charges, see
additional facts after dispositive portion)
During the investigation and the hearings of the cases, Mayor Ganzon filed several
postponements. Secretary of the Department of Local Government then issued three
preventive suspensions against Mayor Ganzon, each lasting 60 days, pursuant to the
Local Government Code.
In the instant case, Mayor Ganzon's argues that the Secretary of Local Government is
devoid of any authority to suspend and remove local officials.
● According to him, the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President, as
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension
and/or removal over local officials, based from the deletion of the phrase “as
provided by law” in the Sec 04, Art X of the 1987 Constitution.
● Sec 04, Art X 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions
● Counterpart in the previous Constitutions:
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments
as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.
Issue/s: WON the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can
suspend and/or remove local officials. ---- YES. However, in this case particularly, the
orders.
Ratio: Notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not
intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as
conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local
officials. The omission signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments'
autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government
affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to
deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular,
concerning discipline.
Local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization." Under the Constitution, it
involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power.
● There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden
the base of government power. At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general
supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own.
● Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. It amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities
but to its constituency
It is noteworthy that:
1. under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to,
among other things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income
distribution legislation, and a national representation law, and measures designed to
realize autonomy at the local level.
2. in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the
general supervision of the Executive.
3. the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for
removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers,
and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the
President.
The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is
albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is
the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact
facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield
prima facie findings.
● The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming
that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 1
 question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to ● As for the case filed by a brgy tanod, he was appointed by the former mayor,
suspend him out of office. and was later arrested without warrant even if no charges were brought
● It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent. against him
● It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's
guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because
needless to say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is
reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.

The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary
to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor
Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had
sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor
without suspending him a day longer.

Dispositive:
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third
suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier
issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the
Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake
steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal,
judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding
the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining
complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.

Complaints against the Mayor:

● When the City Health Clerk (Mrs. Cabaluna) supported the Mayor’s rival
candidate, the Mayor puller her out from rightful office and assigned her to a
work that should be the function of a non-career service employee. To make
matters worse, a utility worker replaced her from her office.
● As for the Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City, she claims that the
petitioner handpicked her to perform task not befitting her position, her office
was padlocked, her salary was withheld without cause, and given the run-
around treatment in the approval of her leave. She was also the the object of
a well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint.
● As for the cases filed by the Vice-Mayor of Iloilo City and members of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod, their complaint arose from the case where
Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was unceremoniously and
without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong
had to hold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the other
complainants sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However,
the petitioner, together with its fully-armed security men, forcefully drove
them away from Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner's
actuations the following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at
the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who
gathered to witness the incident. However, before the group could reach the
area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a
firetruck in dozing water to the people and the bystanders.

PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 2

 Joson v. Torres
G.R. No.131255 | May 20, 1998 | J. Puno
Digest by: REYES
Petitioners: HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON
Respondents: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN D. TORRES, the
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, et al.
Doctrine:
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective
local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local
governments. The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate.
As the President has the power to investigate complaints against local government
officials, A.O. 23 nevertheless delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a
Special Investigating Committee as may be constituted by the Disciplining
Authority. This is not undue delegation as the President remains the disciplining
authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline.
Facts:
● Respondent Torres filed a complaint against petitioner Governor Joson for
barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with
the company of armed men. The case was endorsed to the DILG. Petitioner
was declared in default and was ordered 60-day preventive suspension for
failure to file an answer after three (3) extensions.
● Petitioner later filed a “Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation”. DILG denied
the motion declaring that the submission of position papers substantially
complies with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative
proceedings.
● Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the
findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He imposed on
petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without
pay.
● Petitioner argues that there is undue delegation of power to the DILG and
that this motion should not be dismissed because of the submission of
position papers.
investigate to the DILG or a special investigating committee, as may be
constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation,
contrary to Petitioner Joson’s claim.
● Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, “…all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required
by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive”
● This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President. The power of
control is provided in the Constitution. Control is said to be the very heart of
the power of the Presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the
President, however, may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet
members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or
the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. The
members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain
matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control
(and supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of a department
is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department
where the President is required by law to exercise authority
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of January 8, 1998 of the public respondent Executive
Secretary is declared null and void and is set aside.

Issue/s:
● W/N the resolution of the DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue
delegation -- that it is the President who is the disciplining authority, not the
Secretary of DILG? – NO

Ratio:
● The DILG’s delegation of power is valid. The President remains the
disciplining authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the
power to discipline. The power to discipline evidently includes the power to
investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power
derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local
government officials. A.O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to

PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 3

Basco v. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 91649 | May 14, 1991 | PARAS, J.
Digest by: NAVARRO
Petitioners: ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE,
SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ
Respondents: PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR)
Doctrine:
The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
"decentralization". It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or
an "imperium in imperio."
Facts:
● The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was
created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A and was granted a franchise under P.D.
1067-B "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or
water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."
● Subsequently, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the
Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by
existing franchise or permitted by law.
● Petitioners filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869,
because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and
because:
o It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's
right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by
law;
o For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding
paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's
right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in
contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of
local autonomy;
o It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it
legalizes PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most other forms
of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking
and other vices;
o It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from
monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and
privatization.
Issue/s:
1. W/N PAGCOR’s charter is contrary to morals, public policy and order -- NO
2. W/N PAGCOR’s charter is inconsistent with the principle of local
autonomy since petitioners allege that the charter waived Manila City’s
right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law --
NO (MAIN ISSUE: DECENTRALIZATION)
3. WN PAGCOR’s charter violates the equal protection clause
Ratio:
1. Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the
prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the
exercise of its police power.
● Police power is the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."
● P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate
and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized
by existing franchise or permitted by law". Regulating and centralizing
gambling operations in one corporate entity, was beneficial not just to the
Government but to society in general.
● It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped
Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected
gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the
Government".
● With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government,
the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if
not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of PD 1896.
2. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes.
● Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is
superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent
power to tax."
● Congress has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress
can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also
provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
● Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or
revoked", its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the
exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It
cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle
of local autonomy.
○ The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution
simply means "decentralization". It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in
imperio."
○ Local government can only mean a measure of
decentralization of the function of government.
○ The matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with
gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole
prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local
governments.
3. The equal protection clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may
be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary.
● The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or
opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno
G.R. No. 190259 | June 7, 2011 | En Banc
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 4
 Digest by: MANZANO
Petitioners: DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE
SAHALI-GENERALE
Respondents: HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government and alter-ego of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and on behalf of the President
of the Philippines, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their
units operating in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, or any of their units operating in ARMM
Doctrine: There is no take over of control by the national government, if the rules
on succession, as provided for by law, is followed.
Facts:
● One day after the Maguindanao Massacre where 57 men and women were
killed, Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946 placing the Provinces of
Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency.
● She directed the AFP and PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed
by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in the named places.
● 3 days later, Pres. Arroyo also issued AO 273 transferring supervision of the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the
President to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). It was
later amended and used the term “delegating” rather than “transferring.”
● The petitioners, who are ARMM officials claim that the issuances were violative
of ARMM’s autonomy, based on the Constitution and the Expanded ARMM Act.
They claim that the AO empowered the DILG Secretary to take over the
operations of the ARMM and seize the regional government’s power.
Accordingly, it gave the DILG Secretary the control over ARMM because he
could suspend and/or replace ARMM officials
● The petitioners also claim that the President had no factual basis in declaring a
state of emergency, thus, it was an invalid exercise of emergency powers
● The OSG claims that Proclamation 1946 does not deprive ARMM of its
autonomy, and it was issued pursuant to the president’s calling-out power as
Commander-in-Chief. Also, AO 273 only delegated her supervisory powers of
the ARMM to the DILG Secretary, who is her alter ego any way.
Issue/s:
● W/N Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local
autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article
V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act - NO
Ratio:
● The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM.
After law enforcement agents took the Governor of ARMM into custody for
alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, ARMM Vice-Governor
Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated pursuant to the rule on succession
● FURTHERMORE, there was no unlawful exercise of emergency powers
because the situation is not the one contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution1 because:
○ The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of
emergency in the three places mentioned.
○ She did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers.
○ It was part of her calling out powers, which the Constitution directly
vests to the President
● The President may call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence as provided in Section 18, Article VII. While it is true that the Court
may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above
power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter, unless there
is grave abuse of discretion.
● The Court takes note that the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified
as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state.
● In this case, the petitioner failed to prove that the declaration of State of
Emergency and the exercise of calling out powers had no factual basis
● The OSG explained the factual basis for such actions by the President:
○ The Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans are prominent families engaged
in the political control of Maguindanao. It is also a known fact that both
families have an arsenal of armed followers who hold elective positions in
various parts of the ARMM and the rest of Mindanao.
○ Some of the victims were part of the Mangudadatu while the perpetrators
were the Ampatuans, both the military and police had to prepare for and
prevent reported retaliatory actions from the Mangudadatu clan and
additional offensive measures from the Ampatuan clan.
○ Basically, the imminence of violence and anarchy
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
1 In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 5
B. DEVOLUTION AND DECONCENTRATION
Plaza v. Cassion
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente
Digest by: KEE
Petitioners: DEMOCRITO D. PLAZA II and VIRGINIA V. TUAZON
Respondents: CAROLINA M. CASSION, ALBERTA M. SAMPAYAN, JOSEPHINE
NATALIA U. LOPEZ, JOCELYN M. ALMANZOR, LUZVIMINDA G. ARDECER,
MAGDALENA S. BALACUIT, WINDELYN B. CABUSAO, JULIETA R. JANDAYAN,
NERI O. SAMUYA, INES V. YAOYAO, TERESITA I. ROSALES, MARIA DEBRA
M. LANAJA, RUTH O. NICOLASURA
Doctrine:
The local chief executive is authorized by the Local Government Code to reappoint
devolved personnel and designate an employee to take charge of a department
until the appointment of a regular head.
Facts:
● Upon the passage of the LGC, some of the functions of DSWD were
transferred to local government units. The City of Butuan, through its
Sangguniang Panglungsod (Sanggunian) passed SP Resolution 427-92
“Resolution Authorizing the City Mayor, Honorable Democrito D. Plaza II, to
Sign the Memorandum of Agreement for the Devolution of the DSWD to the
City of Butuan.”
● Pursuant to the MOA, DSWD’s services, personnel, assets and liabilitiies
and technical support systems were transferred to its city counterpart. Mayor
Plaza issued EO 06-92 reconstituting the City Social Services Development
Office (CSSDO) devolving or adding 19 national DSWD employees thereto,
which will be headed by Virginia Tuazon. The latter was designated as
Officer-in-Charge of the CSSDO.
● The CSSDO was originally composed of Cassion et al (respondents herein),
headed by Carolina M. Cassion. Aggrieved, they refused to recognize
Tuazon as their new head and to report at the DSWD building. They assailed
the validity of EO 06-92 and designation of Tuazon.
● Despite Mayor’s series of orders to Cassion et al to report for work at the
DSWD building, they failed to do so. They charged administratively for grave
misconduct and insubordination and were suspended for 60 days. They
informed Mayor Plaza that they were willing to return to work but to their old
office, not to DSWD Building.
● Mayor issued an Order dropping them from the rolls. The CSC issued
Resolutions affirming Mayor’s Order. CA: Set aside the CSC Resolutions
and EO 06-92, reinstating Cassion et al’s positions.
Issue/s:
● W/N Mayor Plaza was authorized to devolve the national DSWD employees
and appoint a new head of CSSDO? - Yes
Ratio:
● Mayor Plaza is empowered to issue EO 06-92 to give effect to the devolution
decreed by the LGC. As the local chief executive of Butuan City, he is
authorized to reappoint devolved personnel and may designate an employee
to take charge of a department until the appointment of a regular head.
● Section 17 of the LGC authorizes the devolution of personnel, assets and
liabilities, records of basic services and facilities of a national government
agency to local government units. “Devolution” refers to the act by which the
national government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions.
● President Corazon Aquino issued EO 503 to ensure the efficient transfer of
responsibilities. Section 2(g) provides:
○ The local chief executive shall be responsible for all devolved
functions. He may delegate such powers and functions to his duly
authorized representative whose position shall preferably not be
lower than the rank of a local government department head.
● Section 22 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19 also provides:
○ "The positions absorbed by the local government units from the
national government agencies shall be automatically created upon
transfer of their corresponding budgetary allocation.
○ "Devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed
by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their
transfer.
○ "However, pending the completion of the new organizational
structure and sta􏰀ng pattern, the local government executives may
assign devolved personnel to divisions/sections/units where their
quali􏰀cations are best suited or appropriate."
● Further, the CSC Memorandum Circular also provides that the heads of
departments appointed by the local chief executive must have concurrence
of the majority of all the members of the Sanggunian concerned. The
Sanggunian later confirmed her appointment.
● The change of Cassion et al’s work place from the original CSSDO office to
the DSWD is not a transfer. It was only a physical transfer done in the
interest of public service.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 14, 1996 of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED. The CSC Resolution No. 94-4626 dated August 22, 1994, and
Resolution No. 94-6243 dated November 17, 1994 dropping private respondents from
the rolls are AFFIRMED.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 6
 Pimentel v. Executive Sec.
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente
Digest by: JOSEF
Petitioners: AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., SERGIO TADEO and NELSON
ALCANTARA
Respondents: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA and
SECRETARY CORAZON JULIANO-SOLIMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT (DSWD)
Doctrine:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including
autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to
political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more
directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and
social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and
economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a
whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and
coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire
country still lies in the President and Congress.
Facts:
● In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy with the
poorest of the poor as target beneficiaries. Dubbed "Ahon Pamilyang
Pilipino," it was pre-pilot tested in the municipalities in Agusan del Sur; the
municipalities in Misamis Occidental, the Caraga Region; and the cities of
Pasay and Caloocan upon the release of the amount of P50 Million Pesos
under a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) issued by the Department
of Budget and Management.
● In 2008, the DSWD issued Administrative Order No. 16, series of 2008 (A.O.
No. 16, s. 2008), setting the implementing guidelines for the project renamed
"Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program" (4Ps).
● This government intervention scheme, also conveniently referred to as
CCTP, "provides cash grant to extreme poor households to allow the
members of the families to meet certain human development goals."
● After an assessment on the appropriate assistance package, a household
beneficiary could receive from the government an annual subsidy for its
basic needs up to an amount of P15,000.00, under the certain conditions,
such as: … e) Children 6-14 years of age are enrolled in schools and attend
at least 85% of the time.
● Congress sought to ensure the success of the CCTP by providing it with
funding under the GAA. The biggest allotment given to the CCTP was in the
GAA of 2011 at P21,194,117,000.00.
● As the DSWD takes on the role of lead implementing agency that must
"oversee and coordinate the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of
the program," the concerned LGU as partner agency is particularly tasked to:
b. Provide necessary technical assistance for Program
implementation
c. Coordinate the implementation/operationalization of sectoral
activities at the City/Municipal level to better execute Program
objectives and functions
d. Coordinate with various concerned government agencies at the
local level, sectoral representatives and NGO to ensure effective
Program implementation.
● Petitioners argue that the CCP should not be implemented primarily through
a national agency like DSWD but instead through the LGUs. They argue that
the responsibility and functions of delivering social welfare, agriculture and
health care services have been devolved to the LGUs pursuant to Section 17
of Republic Act No. 7160, also known as the Local Government Code of
1991, in relation to Section 25, Article II & Section 3, Article X of the 1987
Constitution.
● Petitioners assert that giving the DSWD full control over the identification of
beneficiaries and the manner by which services are to be delivered or
conditionalities are to be complied with, instead of allocating the P21 Billion
CCTP Budget directly to the LGUs that would have enhanced its delivery of
basic services, results in the "recentralization" of basic government
functions, which is contrary to the precepts of local autonomy and the
avowed policy of decentralization.
Issue: W/N the P21 billion CCTP Budget allocation under the DSWD in the GAA FY
2011 violates art II, Sec 25 and Art X Sec 3 of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sec.
17 of the Local Government Code of 1991 by providing for the recentralization of the
national government in the delivery of the basic services already devolved to the
LGUs
—NO. The allocation of a P21 billion budget for an intervention program
formulated by the national government itself but implemented in partnership
with the local government units to achieve the common national goal can by
no means be an encroachment upon the autonomy of local governments.
Ruling:
The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the autonomy of local
governments and even devotes a full article on the subject of local governance 15
which includes the following pertinent provisions:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide
for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
In order to fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and meaningful autonomy that would
develop them into self-reliant communities and effective partners in the attainment of
national goals, Section 17 of the Local Government Code vested upon the LGUs the
duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as
follows:
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 7

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to
this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers
and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic
services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the
functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them
from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services
and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same
provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-
funded projects, facilities, programs and services, thus:
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that,
unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power
over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government
under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery
of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
While it is through a system of decentralization that the State shall promote a more
responsive and accountable local government structure, the concept of local
autonomy does not imply the conversion of local government units into "mini-states."
With local autonomy, the Constitution did nothing more than "to break up the
monopoly of the national government over the affairs of the local government" and,
thus, did not intend to sever "the relation of partnership and interdependence between
the central administration and local government units."
of government power and in the process to make local governments ‘more responsive
and accountable’ and ‘ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress.’ At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises ‘general supervision’ over them, but only to ‘ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law.’ He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power
in the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future
with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional
author, decentralization of power amounts to ‘self-immolation,’ since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government
Code itself weighs against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded from
taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national development
programs especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs
concerned.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED.

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly
responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic
growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the
programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a
common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the
President and Congress.
Certainly, to yield unreserved power of governance to the local government unit as to
preclude any and all involvement by the national government in programs
implemented in the local level would be to shift the tide of monopolistic power to the
other extreme, which would amount to a decentralization of power e as beyond our
constitutional concept of autonomy, thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 8
C. EXECUTIVE SUPERVISION
Province of Negros Occidental v. Commissioners, Commission on Audit
G.R. No.182574 | September 28,10’ | Justice Carpio
Digest by: INFANTE
Petitioners: THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, represented by its
Governor ISIDRO P. ZAYCO
Respondents: THE COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT; THE
DIRECTOR, CLUSTER IV-VISAYAS; THE REGIONAL CLUSTER DIRECTORS;
and THE PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
Doctrine:
The President’s power of general supervision means the power of a superior officer
to see to it that subordinates perform their functions according to law. Since LGUs
are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the
President’s authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are
faithfully executed.
Facts:
● The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed a resolution
allocating P4,000,000 of its retained earnings for the hospitalization and
health care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and employees of the
province. The Committee on Awards granted the insurance coverage to
Philam Care Health System Incorporated (Philam Care).
● Petitioner Province of Negros Occidental, and Philam Care entered into a
Group Health Care Agreement with a total payment of ₱3,760,000
representing the insurance premiums of its officials and employees.
● After a post-audit investigation, the Provincial Auditor issued Notice of
Suspension suspending the premium payment because of lack of approval
from the Office of the President as provided under Administrative Order No.
103 (AO 103).
● Then President Joseph E. Estrada directed the COA to lift the suspension
but only in the amount of P100,000. The Provincial Auditor however ignored
the directive of the President. The COA ruled that under AO 103, no
government entity, including a local government unit, is exempt from
securing prior approval from the President granting additional benefits to its
personnel. This is in conformity with the policy on standardization and
compensation laid down under RA 6758
Issue/s:
● Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
disallowance of P3,760,000 for premium paid for the hospitalization and
health care insurance benefits granted by the Province of Negros Occidental
to its 1,949 officials and employees. - YESSIR
Ratio:
● It is clear from Section 1 of AO 103 that the President authorized all
agencies of the national government as well as LGUs to grant the maximum
amount of P2,000 productivity incentive benefit to each employee who has
rendered at least one year of service as of 31 December 1993.
● In Section 2, the President enjoined all heads of government offices and
agencies from granting productivity incentive benefits or any and all similar
forms of allowances and benefits without the President’s prior approval.
● From a close reading of the provisions of AO 103, petitioner did not violate
the rule of prior approval from the President since Section 2 states that the
prohibition applies only to “government offices/agencies, including
government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their
respective governing boards.”
● Nowhere is it indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition also applies to LGUs.
● Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the
President, the President’s authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are
followed and laws are faithfully executed.
● The President may only point out that rules have not been followed but the
President cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to
modify or replace the rules.
● Thus, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by
the 1987 Constitution, under Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X,
and the Local Government Code of 1991, we declare that the grant and
release of the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits given to
petitioner’s officials and employees were validly enacted through an
ordinance passed by petitioner’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE AND SET ASIDE Decision
No. 2006-044 dated 14 July 2006 and Decision No. 2008-010 dated 30 January 2008
of the Commission on Audit.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 9
 National Liga ng mga Barangay v. Paredes
G.R. No. 130775 | September 27, 2004 | Tinga, J.
Digest by: HAM
Petitioners: THE NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY, represented by ALEX
L. DAVID in his capacity as National President and for his own person, President
ALEX L. DAVID
Respondents: HON. VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES, Presiding Judge RTC
Branch 124 Caloocan City, and the DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, represented by SEC. ROBERT Z. BARBERS and MANUEL A.
RAYOS
Doctrine:
The President’s power of general supervision over local government, which it
exercises through the DILG, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay. However, such
power of general supervision does not come with it the power of control, and thus
the DILG cannot alter or modify the acts of the Liga ng mga Barangay, especially in
the conduct of the election of the Liga’s officers.
Facts:
● On June 11, 1997, respondent Manuel Rayos, Punong Barangay (PB) of
Brgy 52 in Caloocan City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with
prayer for TRO, alleging that Alex David, PB of Brgy 77, then-President of
both the Caloocan and National Liga ng mga Barangay Chapters, committed
certain irregularities in the notice, venue, and conduct of the proposed
synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay elections in 1997.
● Said TRO was granted but was not properly served on David and thus the
election continued, with David being elected as Caloocan Liga President and
became the ex-officio member of the Sangunniang Panlungsod of Caloocan.
● Thereafter, Rayos filed a second petition for quo warranto, prohibition, and
mandamus with prayer for TRO, this time alleging that he was the true
winner of the Liga elections in the Caloocan chapter pursuant to a resolution
made by the Liga Caloocan chapter.
● On July 18, the court granted the TRO and enjoined David and DILG
Secretary Barbers from proceeding with the (subsequent) synchronized
election for 72 hours.
o In its response, the DILG Secretary prayed that it be allowed to
appoint a caretaker for managing the Liga ng mga Barangay
pending the election of new officers, invoking the President’s power
of general supervision.
● While the case was pending, DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez issued
Memorandum Circular No. 97-176 and 97-193.
o According to the MC 97-176, pending appointment of an Interim
Caretaker of the Liga, local governments were not to recognize any
Liga Presidents in the Metropolitan or Provincial levels until further
notice, and that all were to disregard any pronouncements to be
made by David relating to affairs and matters of the Liga.
o MC 97-193, on the other hand, provided supplemental guidelines
for the 1997 synchronized elections of the metropolitan and
provincial chapters of the Liga.
● On August 4, 1997, Judge Paredes issued the assailed order, granting the
DILG the authority to appoint an interim caretaker for the Liga, using as
basis the President’s power of supervision over local governments.
● Petitioners assail the order as being violative of due process as they were
divested of their authority as president and board members of the Liga when
it allowed the DILG to appoint an interim caretaker for the Liga, and that the
President’s power of general supervision of local governments does not
apply to the Liga as it is not a local government unit.
Issue/s:
● W/N the President’s power of general supervision of local governments
extend to the Liga ng mga Barangay - YES.
● W/N the respondent judge gravely abused its discretion in allowing the DILG
to appoint an interim caretaker for the Liga - YES.
Ratio:
ISSUE 1
● In the case of Bito-Onon v. Fernandez, the Court has ruled that the
President’s power of general supervision of local governments extends to
the Liga ng mga Barangay.
○ The rationale for making the Liga subject to the DILG is quite
evident. The Liga is an aggroupment of barangays which in turn are
represented by their respective Punong Barangays. The
representatives of the Liga sit in an ex-officio capacity at the
municipal, city, and provincial sanggunians.
○ As such, they enjoy all the powers and discharge all the
functions of regular municipal councilors, city councilors, or
provincial board members, as the case may be. Thus, the Liga is
the vehicle through which the barangay participates in the
enactment of ordinances and formulation of policies at all the
legislative local levels higher than the Sangunniang Barangay, at
the same time serving as the mechanism for the bottom-to-top
approach of development.
ISSUE 2
● When the respondent judge eventually appointed the DILG as interim
caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively
removed the management from the National Liga Board and vested control
of the Liga on the DILG.
● The acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere of general supervision and
constituted direct interference with the political affairs, not only of the Liga,
but more importantly, of the barangay as an institution when it took over as
interim caretaker of the Liga.
● In succession, the DILG assumed stewardship and jurisdiction over the Liga
affairs, issued supplemental guidelines for the elections and nullified the
effects of the Liga-conducted elections. Clearly, what the DILG wielded was
the power of control which even the President does not have.
● As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILG’s authority over
the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 10
 down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace
them.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court
dated 04 August 1997 is SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. DILG Memorandum Circulars
No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are declared VOID for being unconstitutional and ultra
vires. No pronouncements as to costs.

PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 11

 Drilon v. Lim
G.R. No. 112497| August 4, 1994 | CRUZ, J.
Digest by: FAJARDO
Petitioners: HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE,
Respondents: MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA,
CITY TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND
THE CITY OF MANILA,
Doctrine:
The familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the power
of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the
latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower
officers perform their functions in accordance with law.
Facts:
● The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the
Local Government Code reading as follows:
o Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And
Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. — The procedure
for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be
in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That
public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the
enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue
measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from
the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall
render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt
of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have
the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the
accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein:
Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the
decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of
Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
● Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice Drilon had, on appeal to him of
four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise
known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with
the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
● Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao of the RTC of Manila revoked the Secretary's
resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural
requirements had been observed.
● More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as
unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the
power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local
autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein
conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision
over local governments.
● The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that
the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified
in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed.
Issue/s:
● W/N Section 187 of the Local Government Code is constitutional – YES
Ratio:
● The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the provision.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the
utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers
● The familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the
power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer
to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law."
● Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it
on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside
a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for
the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure.
● Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not
replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not
pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its
annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he
found only was that it was illegal.
● All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners
were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of
powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we
see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.
● An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 12
 the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does
he have the discretion to modify or replace them.

● If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but
only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own
manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to
see to it that the rules are followed.
● In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more
nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere
supervision.

(NOT IMPORTANT BUT INCASE SIR ASKS)

● The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment

of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter.

o We have agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements
have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were
sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits the proposed
ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard
and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993
issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita
o The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved
but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its
publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general
circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that
the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but
this requirement applies to the approval of local development plans
and public investment programs of the local government unit and
not to tax ordinances.

● We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue

Code as their validity has not been raised in issue in the present petition.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged
decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural
requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. No
pronouncement as to costs.

PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 13

 San Juan v. CSC
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente
Digest by: DY
Petitioners: Governor Reynaldo San Juan (Governor of Rizal)
Respondents: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CECILIA ALMAJOSE
Doctrine:
The law provides that the budget officer will be appointed by the Department head
upon recommendation of the head of the local government. None however of those
recommended by the local government head meets the requirements of law. The
department head can’t just choose any other person, he must return the
recommendations and ask for new ones.
Facts:
● March 1988 - The position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for Rizal was
left vacant by its former holder
● April 1988 - In a letter, Petitioner informed Director Abella of DBM Region 4
that Ms. DALISAY SANTOS assumed office as acting PBO since March
1988 pursuant to a memorandum issued by Petitioner. Petitioner also
endorsed Dalisay Santos for appointment to the position of PBO of Rizal.
Dalisay Santos was the Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal before
acting as PBO.
● July 1988 - In a Memorandum issued by Director Abella of DBM Reg. 4, he
recommended the appointment of CECILIA ALMAJOSE to the position of
PBO of Rizal
o He averred that Almajose was the most qualified since she was the
only CPA among the contenders.
● DBM Undersecretary Cabuquit signed the appointment papers of Almajose
as PBO of Rizal upon the recommendation of DIrector Abella.
● August 1988 - Petitioner further reiterated his request for the appointment of
Daisy Santos as PBO, unaware of the appointment of Almajose.
● DBM Regional Director Galvez wrote to petitioner that Daisy Santos did not
meet the requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of
local budget officer
o Requirements to be Provincial Budget officer:
▪ Filipino Citizen
▪ Good Moral Character
▪ Degree Holder in Law, Commerce, Public Administration,
or any related course from a recognized college or
university
▪ a first grade civil service eligibility or its equivalent
▪ 5 years (3 years?) experience in budgeting or any related
field
● Petitioner contested the appointed of Almajose on the ground that the DBM
Undersecretary is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO, and that
Almajose lacks the required number of work experience under the Local
Budget Circular, and that under E.O. No. 112, it is the PROVINCIAL
GOVERNOR, NOT the Regional Director, or Congressman, who has the
power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO.
● DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs (BLLA)
Virgilio A. Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the petitioner's letter-
protest is not meritorious considering that public respondent DBM validly
exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the
petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements.
o Petitioner’s MR is denied
Issue/s:
● W/N The Appointment of Almajose by the DBM Undersecretary is valid –
NOPE
Ratio:
● Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 provides that:
○ Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities
shall be appointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and
Management upon recommendation of the local chief executive
concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, and
they shall be placed under the administrative control and technical
supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management.
● The tug of war between the Secretary of Budget and Management and the
Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a seemingly innocuous
position involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and
principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on
local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor
of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
● When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of
the Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and
spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary
jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of
local governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling
of their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and
set back.
● The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More important,
however, is the proper administration of fiscal affairs at the local level.
Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after
completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. They are
prepared by the local officials who must work within the constraints of those
budgets.
● It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a
sharing of power between the two levels of government.
● The law provides that the budget officer will be appointed by the Department
head upon recommendation of the head of the local government. None
however of those recommended by the local government head meets the
requirements of law. The department head can’t just choose any other
person, he must return the recommendations and ask for new ones.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 14
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the
Civil Service Commission are SET ASIDE. The appointment of respondent Cecilia
Almajose is nullified. The Department of Budget and Management is ordered to
appoint the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal from among qualified nominees
submitted by the Provincial Governor.

PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 15

 Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos
G.R. No. 120082 | September 11, 1996 | DAVIDE JR
Digest by: ZABALA
Petitioners: MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Respondents: HON. FERDINAND J. MARCOS
Doctrine:
(Put Doctrine Here)
Facts:
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA), since the time of its
creation,menjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes in
accordance with Section 14 of its Charter. However in 1994, the Office of the
Treasurer of Cebu, demanded for the payment of realty taxes on several parcels of
land belonging to the petitioner.
MCIAA objected to such demand for payment as baseless and unjustified and
asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmental
functions, which puts limitations on the taxing powers of local government units.
The City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner’s realty tax account, insisting that
the MCIAA is a government controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has
been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code
(LGC), and not an instrumentality of the government but merely a government owned
corporation performing proprietary functions.
Issue: WON MCIAA is exempted from paying real property taxes ---- NO
Ratio:
Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity
of the LGC, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or
juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and the
petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily follows that
its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its Charter, R.A. No. 6958, has
been withdrawn.
Any claim to the contrary can only be justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under
any of the exceptions provided in Section 234, in light of the petitioners theory that it
is an instrumentality of the Government, it could only be within the first item of the first
paragraph of section 234 by expanding the scope of the term Republic of the
Philippines to embrace its instrumentalities and agencies.
● Sec 234(a): real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines, or any of
its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been
granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.
This view does not persuade us. In the first place, the petitioners claim that it is an
instrumentality of the Government is based on Section 133(o), which expressly
mentions the word instrumentalities; and, in the second place, it fails to consider the
fact that the legislature used the phrase National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities in Section 133(o), but only the phrase Republic of the Philippines or
any of its political subdivisions in Section 234(a).
An agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or
controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein; while an
instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned and controlled
corporations.
If Section 234(a) intended to extend the exception therein to the withdrawal of the
exemption from payment of real property taxes under the last sentence of the said
section to the agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government mentioned
in Section 133(o), then it should have restated the wording of the latter. Yet, it did not.
Note that as reproduced in Section 234(a), the phrase and any government-owned or
controlled corporation so exempt by its charter was excluded. The justification for this
restricted exemption in Section 234(a) seems obvious: to limit further tax exemption
privileges, especially in light of the general provision on withdrawal of tax exemption
privileges in Section 193 and the special provision on withdrawal of exemption from
payment of real property taxes in the last paragraph of Section 234.
These policy considerations are consistent with the State policy to ensure autonomy
to local governments and the objective of the LGC that they enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them effective partners in the attainment of national
goals.’
The power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance
and support myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic
services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of
peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. It may also be relevant to recall that
the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to
government-owned and controlled corporations and all other units of government
were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax
treatment of similarly situated enterprises, and there was a need for these entities to
share in the requirements of development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying the taxes
and other charges due from them
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged decision and order of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. CEB-16900 are
AFFIRMED.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 16
D. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL
Lina v. Pano
G.R. No.129093 | August 30, 2001 | QUISUMBING, J
Digest by: YBAÑEZ
Petitioners: HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF
LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ
Respondents: HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONY CALVENTO
Doctrine:
(Put Doctrine Here)
Facts:
● In 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the
operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro,
Laguna, for a mayor's permit to open the lotto outlet.
● The permit was denied by the mayor saying that an ordinance passed by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Kapasiyahan Bilang 508) was issued.2
● Calvento filed for declaratory relief, for mayor Cataquiz to issue the business
permit and an order declaring the Kapasiyahan invalid.
● Respondent judge Pano of the RTC decided in favor of Calvento.
● Petitioners assert that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of
the Provincial Government of Laguna, a valid exercise of the province’s
police power under the General Welfare Clause under the LGC.
● Calvento asserts that the resolution in effect curtailed the power of the state
since the national legislature itself had previously declared that lotto is legal
and its operations are permitted.
Issue/s: W/N the assailed resolution is valid - YES. The resolution expresses merely
a policy statement of the Laguna provincial board.
2 ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA "ILLEGAL GAMBLING" LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA
LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA
SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna ay talamak na;
SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng masasamang impluwensiya lalo't higit sa mga kabataan;
KUNG KAYA'T DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina Kgg. Kgd. Juan M. Unico at Kgg. Kgd. Gat-Ala A. Alatiit,
pinangalawahan ni Kgg. Kgd. Meliton C. Larano at buong pagkakaisang sinangayunan ng lahat ng dumalo sa
pulong;
IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN ang ano mang uri ng sugal dito sa
lalawigan ng Laguna lalo't higit ang Lotto;
IPINASIYA PA RIN na hilingin tulad ng dito ay hinihiling sa Panlalawigang pinuno ng Philippine National Police
(PNP) Col. [illegible] na mahigpit na pag-ibayuhin ang pagsugpo sa lahat ng uri ng illegal na sugal sa buong
lalawigan ng Laguna lalo na ang "Jueteng".
Ratio:
● As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the
lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s
autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national
government’s.
● This freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local
governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly
enacted by Congress. Thus, the assailed resolution in this case could not
and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the
operation of lotto.
● Power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and
resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in
Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute
enacted by Congress.The reasons are found in Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties:
○ Municipal governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred
upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter.
○ It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo
the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in
the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.
○ We know of no limitation on the right so far as the corporation
themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere
tenants at will of the legislature
● Thus, there is also nothing in the Constitution that provides that the decision
in Magtajas is against it:
○ Congress retains control of the local government units although in
significantly reduced degree now than under our previous
Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to
destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or
recall.
○ True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like
the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to
tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution), which cannot now be
withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which
cannot defy its will or modify or violate
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Regional
Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna enjoining the petitioners from implementing or
enforcing Resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Provincial Board of
Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 17
 Lim v. Pacquing
G.R. Nos. 115044 & 117263 | January 27, 1995 | Justice Padilla
Digest by: TORIO
Petitioners: HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, and the
City of Manila, petitioners (GR 115044)
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. and DOMINADOR R. CEPEDA (GR 117263)
Respondents: HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as Judge, branch 40, Regional Trial
Court of Manila and ASSOCIATED CORPORATION, respondents. (GR 115044)
HON. VETINO REYES and ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents. (GR 117263)
Doctrine:
The authority to grant franchises for the operation of jai-alai frontons is in
Congress, while the regulatory function is vested in the Games and Amusement
Board.
Facts:
1. June 18, 1946: RA 409 (Charter of Manila City) was enacted.
Sec. 18. Legislative Powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following
legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(jj) To tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting by the public on
boxing, sipa, bowling, billiards, pools, horse and dog races, cockpits, jai-alai, roller or
ice-skating on any sporting or athletic contests, as well as grant exclusive rights to
establishments for this purpose, notwithstanding any existing law to the contrary.
2. Jan. 1951: EO 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais form
the local government to the Games and Amusement Board (GAB).
3. June 1953: RA 954 ("An Act to Prohibit With Horse Races and Basque Pelota
Games (Jai-Alai), And To Prescribe Penalties For Its Violation") was passed:
Sec. 4. No person, or group of persons other than the operator or maintainer of a
fronton with legislative franchise to conduct basque pelota games (Jai-alai), shall
offer, to take or arrange bets on any basque pelota game or event, or maintain or use
a totalizator or other device, method or system to bet or gamble on any basque pelota
game or event.
Sec. 5. No person, operator or maintainer of a fronton with legislative franchise to
conduct basque pelota games shall offer, take, or arrange bets on any basque pelota
game or event, or maintain or use a totalizator or other device, method or system to
bet or gamble on any basque pelota game or event outside the place, enclosure, or
fronton where the basque pelota game is held.
4. Sept. 1971: Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 7065 which
authorized the Associated Development Corporation (ADC) to operate jai-alai in
Manila
5. Aug. 1975: PD No. 771 issued by Marcos. Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked
all existing franchises and permits issued by local governments
6. Associated Development Corp (ADC) is an operator of jai-alai. In an earlier civil
case (GR 115044), Judge Pacquing ordered Manila City Mayor Alfredo Lim to issue
the permit/license to operate jai-alai in favor of ADC. ADC moved to execute the
judgment to operate jai-alai in Manila. Executive Secretary Guingona, however,
ordered the chairman of GAB (Francisco Sumulong, Jr) to hold in abeyance the grant
of authority or if any had been issued, to withdraw such grant until the ff questions are
resolved:
a. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local
governments as of 20 August 1975 is unconstitutional.
b.Assuming that the City of Manila had the power on 7 September 1971 to issue a
Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development Corporation, whether the franchise
granted is valid considering that the franchise has no duration, and appears to be
granted in perpetuity.
c.Whether the City of Manila had the power to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated
Development Corporation on 7 September 1971 in view of executive Order No. 392
dated 1 January 1951 which transferred from local governments to the Games and
Amusements Board the power to regulate Jai-Alai.
7. ADC filed before the RTC a petition to prevent GAB from withdrawing the
provisional authority. Judge Reyes granted the TRO. Republic of the Philippines, thru
GAB, filed a motion to intervene. Judge Reyes issued another order compelling
Guingona and GAB to issue in favor of ADC the authority to operate jai-alai.
9. Guingona and the new GAB chairman (Dominador Cepeda, Jr) filed a separate
petition (GR 117263) assailing the orders of Judge Reyes.
10. The case at bar is a consolidation of the two cases. The Republic argues that
Manila Ordinance No. 7065 which purported to grant to ADC a franchise to conduct
jai-alai operations is void and ultra vires since RA 954 (approved very much earlier
than Ordinance No. 7065) requires a legislative franchise, not a municipal
franchise, for the operation of jai-alai. Additionally, the national government argues
that even assuming that Ordinance 7065 is valid, ADC's franchise was nonetheless
effectively revoked by Presidential decree No. 771, issued on 20 August 1975, Sec. 3
of which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of
gambling facilities (including the jai-alai) issued by local governments.
ADC, on the other hand, argues that Ordinance No. 7065 was validly enacted by the
City of Manila pursuant to its delegated powers under its charter.
Issue/s: Does ADC have a valid and subsisting franchise to operate jai-alai?-- NO
Ratio:
1. Neither the Charter of Manila and Manila Ordinance No. 7065 uses the word
'franchise.' The Charter merely empowers the Municipal Board of Manila to "tax,
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 18
license, permit and regulate wagers or betting" and to "grant exclusive rights to
establishments", while Ordinance No. 7065 authorized the Manila City Mayor to "allow
and permit" ADC to operate jai-alai facilities in the City of Manila.
2. Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or
betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such power "to franchise". What
Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, with respect to
wagers or betting, was the power to "license, permit, or regulate" which
therefore means that a license or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate
a wager or betting activity, such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted, would
not amount to something meaningful UNLESS the holder of the permit or
license was also FRANCHISED by the national government to so operate.
Moreover, even this power to license, permit, or regulate wagers or betting on jai-alai
was removed from local governments, including the City of Manila, and transferred to
the GAB on 1 January 1951 by Executive Order No. 392. The net result is that the
authority to grant franchises for the operation of jai-alai frontons is in
Congress, while the regulatory function is vested in the GAB.
of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the
executive and legislative departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of
government.
Talks regarding the supposed vanishing line between right and privilege in American
constitutional law has no relevance in the context of these cases since the reference
there is to economic regulations. On the other hand, jai-alai is not a mere economic
activity which the law seeks to regulate. It is essentially gambling and whether it
should be permitted and, if so, under what conditions are questions primarily for the
lawmaking authority to determine, taking into account national and local interests.
Here, it is the police power of the State that is paramount.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. allowing the Republic of the Philippines to intervene in G.R. No. 115044.

In relation, therefore, to the facts of this case, since ADC has no franchise from
Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or
permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.
3. The Revised Penal Code punishes gambling and betting under Articles 195 to 199
thereof. Gambling is thus generally prohibited by law, unless another law is enacted
by Congress expressly exempting or excluding certain forms of gambling from the
reach of criminal law. Among these forms of gambling allowed by special law are the
horse races authorized by Republic Acts Nos. 309 and 983 and gambling casinos
authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1869
2. declaring Presidential Decree No. 771 valid and constitutional.
3. declaring that respondent Associated Development corporation (ADC) does
not possess the required congressional franchise to operate and conduct the jai-alai
under Republic Act No. 954 and Presidential Decree No. 771.
4. setting aside the writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by respondent Judge Vetino Reyes in civil Case No. 94-71656.

4. While jai-alai as a sport is not illegal per se, the accepting of bets or wagers on the
results of jai-alai games is undoubtedly gambling and, therefore, a criminal offense
punishable under Articles 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code, unless it is shown that
a later or special law had been passed allowing it. ADC has not shown any such
special law.

Republic Act No. 409 (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) which was enacted
by Congress on 18 June 1949 gave the Municipal Board certain delegated legislative
powers under Section 18. A perusal of the powers enumerated under Section 18
shows that these powers are basically regulatory in nature.

4. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation (20 July 1994, G.R. No. 111097), this
Court stated thru Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz:

In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislative power may prohibit gambling
altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and
allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited
jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making
such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no
authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to
resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political
departments. It is settled that questions regarding wisdom, morality and practicability
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 19
 Magtajas v. Pryce
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente
Digest by: SAN DIEGO
Petitioners: MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO
Respondents: PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION
Doctrine:
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. This basic relationship between the national legislature
and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in
the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
Facts:
● PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize
and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
● PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.
● To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporation Inc. and PAGCOR renovated and equipped the same, and
prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.
● The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted two
Ordinances:
● -Ordinance No. 3353 (An Ordinance Prohibiting the issuance of business
permit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the
using and allowing to be used its premises or a portion therefor for the
operation of casino) and
● -Ordinance No. 3375-93 An Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation of Casino
and Providing Penalty Therefor.
● Pryce and PAGCOR assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals,
where it declared the ordinances invalid
● Mayor Magtajas and CDO filed a petition for review of the CA’s decision.
● The petitioners argue that by virtue of the LGC, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve
games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. They said that even if
the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the
government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within
its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government
Code.
Issue/s:
● W/N the Ordinances is valid – NO
Ratio:
● PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize
and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines
● Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to
enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code.
● The ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a
statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the
playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in
general.
● The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a
statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national
government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body.
● The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government
units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their
power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.
● This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
● The power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance,
including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the
Local Government Code, which empowers the local government units to
prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.
● Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a
statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.
● Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan
de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for
the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinance are
contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are
therefore ultra vires and void.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 20
 Berces v. Guingona
G.R. No. 112099 | February 21, 1995 | QUIASON, J.
Digest by: RIOFLORIDO
Petitioners: ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR.
Respondents: HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.,
CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR
NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY
Doctrine:
In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists
in the terms of the new and old laws.
Facts:
● Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court
○ With prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction
○ Assailing the Orders of the OP as having been issued with GAD —
said Orders directed the stay of execution of the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan suspending the Mayor of Tiwi, Albay
from office
● Petitioner Berces filed 2 administrative cases against respondent Naomi C.
Corral, the incumbent Mayor of Tiwi, Albay with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Albay
○ Administrative Case No. 02-92 — abuse of authority and/or
oppression for non-payment of accrued leave benefits due the
petitioner amounting to P36,779.02
○ Administrative Case No. 05-92 — dishonesty and abuse of
authority for installing a water pipeline which is being operated,
maintained and paid for by the municipality to service respondent’s
private residence and medical clinic
● July 1, 1993 — the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disposed the 2
Administrative cases in the following manner:
○ Administrative Case No. 02-92
■ Respondent Corral was ordered to pay Berces the sum of
P36,779.02 + legal interest, representing the money value
of his leave credits accruing for services rendered in the
municipality from 1988 to 1992 as a duly elected Municipal
Councilor
■ Respondent Corral was also ordered SUSPENDED from
office as Municipal Mayor of Tiwi, Albay, for a period of 2
months, for her blatant abuse of authority coupled with
oppression as a public example to deter others similarly
inclined from using public office as a tool for personal
vengeance, vindictiveness and oppression at the expense
of the Taxpayer
○ Administrative Case No. 05-92
■ Respondent Corral of Tiwi, Albay, was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of SUSPENSION from office as Municipal
Mayor thereof for a period of 3 MONTHS beginning after
her service of the first penalty of suspension ordered in the
previous AO
○ She is likewise ordered to reimburse the Municipality of Tiwi One-
half of the amount the latter have paid for electric and water bills
from July to December 1992, inclusive
● Consequently, respondent Mayor Corral appealed to the OP questioning the
decision
○ At the same time, she prayed for the stay of execution of the
decision in accordance with Section 67(b) of the LGC:
Administrative Appeals. — Decision in administrative cases may, within thirty
(30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panglungsod of highly
urbanized cities and independent component cities.
● July 28, 1993 — Acting on the prayer to stay execution during the pendency
of the appeal, the OP issued an Order, the pertinent portions of which read
as follows:
The stay of the execution is governed by Section 68 of RA 7160 and Section
6 of AO 18 dated 12 February 1987, quoted below:
Sec. 68. Execution Pending Appeal. — An appeal shall not prevent
a decision from becoming final or executory. The respondent shall
be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension
during the pendency of an appeal in the events he wins such
appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall
be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency
of the appeal (RA 7160).
Sec. 6 Except as otherwise provided by special laws, the
execution of the decision/resolution/order appealed from is stayed
upon filing of the appeal within the period prescribed herein.
However, in all cases, at any time during the pendency of the
appeal, the Office of the President may direct or stay the execution
of the decision/resolution/order appealed from upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem just and reasonable (Adm. Order No.
18).
xxx xxx xxx
After due consideration, and in the light of the Petition for Review filed before
this Office, we find that a stay of execution pending appeal would be just and
reasonable to prevent undue prejudice to public interest.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby orders the
suspension/stay of execution of:
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 21

a) the Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay in
Administrative Case No. 02-92 dated 1 July 1993 suspending Mayor Naomi
C. Corral from office for a period of two (2) months, and
b) the Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay in
Administrative Case. No. 05-92 dated 5 July 1993 suspending Mayor Naomi
C. Corral from office for a period of three (3) months (Rollo, pp. 55-56).
● Petitioner then filed a MR questioning the aforesaid Order of the OP
○ September 13, 1990 — MR DENIED
● Hence, this petition
Petitioner’s contentions:
● The governing law in the instant case is RA 7160, which contains a
mandatory provision that an appeal “shall not prevent a decision from
becoming final and executory.”
● AO 18 dated February 12, 1987, (entitled “Prescribing the Rules and
Regulations Governing Appeals to Office the President”) authorizing the
President to stay the execution of the appealed decision at any time during
the pendency of the appeal, was repealed by RA 7160, which took effect on
January 1, 1991
Issue/s:
● W/N Sec. 68 of RA 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of AO 18 — NO
Ratio:
● Repealing clause of Section 530(f), RA 7160 is not an express repeal of
Section 6 of AO 18.
○ Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of Section 530 (f), RA 7160,
which provides:
■ “All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, administrative regulations, part or parts
thereof, which are incosistent with any of the provisions of
this Code, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.”
○ The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of Section 6 of
AO 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws or
executive orders that are intended to be repealed.
● Repeal by implication is not favored
○ If there is any repeal of AO 18 by RA 7160, it is through implication
though such kind of repeal is not favored. There is even a
presumption against implied repeal.
● In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be
construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws.
○ An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition
that a substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior
laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law
cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of
the new and old laws.
○ The two laws must be absolutely incompatible. There must be such
a repugnancy between the laws that they cannot be made to stand
together.
● Provisions of Section 68 of RA 7160 and Section 6 of AO 18 are not
irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant.
○ The two laws must in fact be read together.
● If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of AO 18, it could have
used more direct language expressive of such intention.
○ The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal
shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory." As
worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving
discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the
appealed decision.
○ There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are
deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the
intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of AO 18, it could
have used more direct language expressive of such intention.
● The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory.
○ The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory
depending upon a consideration of the entire provision in which it is
found, its object and the consequences that would follow from
construing it one way or the other.
○ In the case at bench, there is no basis to justify the construction of
the word as mandatory.
● The OP made a finding that the execution of the decision of the Sagguniang
Panlalawigan suspending respondent Mayor from office might be prejudicial
to the public interest.
○ Thus, in order not to disrupt the rendition of service by the mayor to
the public, a stay of the execution of the decision is in order.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 22
 Province of Camarines Sur v. CA
G.R. No. 103125 | May 17, 1993 | J. Quiason
Digest by: REYES
Petitioners: Province of Camarines Sur
Respondents: Court of Appeals (third division), Ernesto San Joaquin and Efren
San Joaquin
Doctrine:
Although local governments do not have inherent power of eminent domain and
can exercise it only when expressly authorized by legislature, and the latter may
retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof, such
delegated power although limited it is complete within its limits.
Facts:
● On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the
Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the
provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-
traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government
employees.
● Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R.
Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San
Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin. The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the
complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their
property.
● The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the
Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by
the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in
the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued
a writ of possession in an order dated January18, 1990.
● Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the
Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code,
there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the
exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain.
However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of
Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a
housing project.
● The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands
and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It
also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until
after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification
of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural
land.
Issue/s:
● W/N a local government unit needs the approval of DAR to reclassify land
before it can expropriate it? NO
Ratio:
● The power of expropriation is superior to the power to distribute lands under
the land reform program. (Juancho Ardana v Reyes).
● It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent
domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the
legislature. It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the
legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the
exercise thereof by the local governments. While such delegated power may
be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations
on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in
the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
● Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9
of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which provides:
A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a
resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and
institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
● Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local
government units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land
Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use
before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise,
there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which
expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
● Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions
cannot be broadened or constricted by implication.
● To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units
can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of
roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of
the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of
these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it
would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the
expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
● Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall
determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be
public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer
to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular
undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use.
● There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad
their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is
specially mentioned as subject thereto.
● The orders of the CA nullifying the trial court's order allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property and
requiring the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents'
property from agricultural to non-agricultural use are set aside.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 23
 ● Although local governments do not have inherent power of eminent domain
and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by legislature, and the
latter may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise
thereof, such delegated power although limited it is complete within its limits.
Nothing in the LGC limits this power by requiring the approval of DAR.
Likewise, there is nothing in CAR law which expressly subjects such
expropriations under the control of DAR.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals is set aside.

E. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
Iloilo City Zoning v. Gegato-Abecia Funeral
G.R. No. 157118. December 8, 2003||Ynares-Santiago
Digest by: REGADO
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 24

Petitioners: THE ILOILO CITY ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT AND
APPEALS and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF ILOILO, represented by HON. CITY
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS,
Respondents: GEGATO-ABECIA FUNERAL HOMES, INC., represented by its
Attorney-In-Fact, DANIEL FAJARDO
Doctrine:
● The settled rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means
of administrative processes afforded him.
● Well-settled is the rule that mandamus may not be availed of to direct the
exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way, or to retract or
reverse an action already taken in the exercise of either
Facts:
● On May 2, 2001, the City Council of Iloilo enacted Zoning Ordinance No.
2001-072 which was duly ratified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB). Section 41 (3)(d) of said ordinance provides, among others,
for a prohibition to operate a funeral establishment at a minimum radial
distance of at least 25 meters from restaurants, food centers and other food
establishments, thus:
● Under the same ordinance, funeral establishments are classified and
allowed to operate in certain areas, as follows: [4]
● a) Funeral Establishments shall be classified as :
● Category I funeral establishments with chapels, embalming facilities and
offering funeral services.
● Category II - funeral establishments with chapels and offering funeral
services without embalming facilities; and
● Category III funeral establishments offering only funeral services from house
of the deceased to the burial place.
● b) Funeral establishments shall be allowed in the following zones:
● Category I C2 or an area within the city with quasi-trade business activities
and services performing complementary/supplementary functions to
principally commercial zone.
● Category II C1 or an area within the city principally for trade, services
and business activities ordinarily referred to as Central Business
District; C-2; and Institutional Zone.
● Category III C1; C2; and Institutional Zone.
● Respondent applied with the City Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals
(CZBAA) of Iloilo for the issuance of a permit to operate a funeral
establishment on a 4-storey building located between a restaurant] and a
bakery in the commercial zone of Iloilo City, classified as C2. Invoking
Section 46 of the zoning ordinance which gives the CZBAA the discretion to
grant exceptions from the provisions thereof,respondent contended that
since its business is classified under Category II, i.e., without embalming
facilities, it should be excepted from the prohibition to operate a funeral
establishment at a radial distance of less than 25 meters from food
establishments.
● In Resolution No. 7, dated June 25, 2002, the CZBAA of Iloilo denied
respondents application.
● Consequently, respondent filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC to
compel the CZBAA of Iloilo to grant its prayer for exception and to issue the
corresponding permit to operate a funeral establishment under Category II.
Respondent claimed that Zoning Ordinance No. 2001-072 is unconstitutional
insofar as it prohibits the operation of funeral establishments without
embalming facilities (Category II) within a radial distance of less than 25
meters from food establishments; and assuming that the ordinance is valid,
the CZBAA gravely abused its discretion in outrightly denying the
application.
● In its Answer the CZBAA of Iloilo averred that respondent violated the rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies as it failed to appeal the decision
to the HLURB as mandated by Section 56(C) of Zoning Ordinance No. 2001-
072.
● TC : Rendered a decision in favor of respondent. It did not pass upon the
constitutionality of the zoning ordinance but nevertheless ruled that the
CZBAA of Iloilo gravely abused its discretion in denying the application
without giving respondent an opportunity to prove that its application is
meritorious. The court a quo further held that respondents resort to judicial
remedy is correct because under the Local Government Code, the power to
act on pending applications for locational clearance is now vested with local
government units and no longer with the HLURB per resolution of the latter
dated July 19, 2002. It granted a writ of mandamus directing the grant of
appeal for exception.
ISSUE:
(1) whether or not respondent violated the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies; -YES
(2) whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a writ of mandamus directing the
CZBAA of Iloilo to issue a permit to operate a funeral establishment.-YES
HELD:
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 25
● The settled rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within
his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts
judicial power can be sought.
● The petitioner is taking an unwarranted shortcut. It must be stressed that the
authority to receive evidence, as basis for classification of properties for
taxation, is legally vested on the respondent City Assessor whose action is
appealable to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals, if necessary.The petitioner cannot bypass
the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and directly seek
redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly pure
question of law without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
● In the case at bar, respondent failed to exhaust the available administrative
remedies before seeking judicial intervention via a petition for mandamus.
Section 55C of Zoning Ordinance No. 2001-072, which was duly reviewed
and ratified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, categorically
provides that decisions of the Local Zoning Board of Adjustment and
Appeals shall be appealable to the HLURB.
● On March 23, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order
No. 71 devolving the power of the HLURB to approve subdivision plans to
cities and municipalities pursuant to the Local Government Code.
● Section 2 of E.O. No. 71, however, specifically states that [t]he HLURB
shall retain such powers and functions not otherwise expressly
provided herein or under existing laws. One of such powers not expressly
withdrawn by E.O. No. 71 is the power of the HLURB to act as an appellate
body to which decisions and actions of local and regional planning and
zoning bodies may be brought (Section 5(f) of Executive Order No. 648).
Expressio unius est exclussio alterius. The express mention of one person,
thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Inasmuch as
Section 1 of E.O. No. 71 does not include the appellate jurisdiction of the
HLURB over decisions of local government units, it follows that said power
was retained by it and not among those devolved to local government units.
● Moreover, Executive Order No. 72, series of 1993 (Providing for the
Preparation and Implementation of the Comprehensive Land Use Plans of
Local Government Units Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991
and other Pertinent Laws), gives the HLURB the power to review and ratify
land use plans of highly urbanized cities, like Iloilo City.
● Respondent cannot rely on the July 19, 2002 Order of the HLURB which
declined to assume jurisdiction over respondent's application for a locational
clearance to operate a funeral home. It appears from the record that
respondent filed his application for the issuance of a permit with the HLURB
before it filed a similar application with the CZBAA of Iloilo.
● We note that the HLURBs refusal to act on the application was not
based on the absence of appellate jurisdiction, but on lack of authority
to issue locational clearances.
● The HLURB correctly indorsed the application to the zoning administrator of
the city because the power to issue permits and locational clearances for
locally significant projects is now lodged with the city/municipality with a
comprehensive land use plan. This is in accordance with Executive Order
No. 72, which was issued to delineate the powers and responsibilities of
local government units and the HLURB in the preparation and
implementation of comprehensive land use plans under a decentralized
framework of local governance.
● The power of the HLURB to issue locational clearance is now limited to
projects considered to be of vital and national or regional economic or
environmental significance.
● Moreover, the fact that the Rules of Procedure of the HLURB does not
categorically provide for a procedure on the remedy of appeal from decisions
of local government units will not operate to divest the HLURB of the
appellate jurisdiction specifically granted to it by law. It must be stressed that
no rule or regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of
law.Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they
implement.
● Indeed, it would be in consonance with orderly procedure to provide an
administrative sifting process of matters peculiarly within the competence of
administrative agencies. Being the agency mandated to adopt standards and
guidelines for land use plans and zoning ordinances of local government
units, the HLURB is presumed to have the necessary knowledge and
expertise on matters specifically patterned after its rules and is therefore in a
better position to pass judgment thereon. Moreover, such administrative
process would not only save the parties the expenses and tedious litigation
but will also prevent clogging of dockets in court.
● Considering that the law provides for an administrative remedy of appeal to
the HLURB from decisions of the CZBAA of Iloilo, and that respondent failed
to exhaust the same, the petition for mandamus should have been dismissed
by the trial court.
● furthermore, the issuance of a permit to operate a funeral
establishment and the grant of exception from the zoning ordinances is
a discretionary act of the CZBAA of Iloilo. Well-settled is the rule that
mandamus may not be availed of to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion in a particular way, or to retract or reverse an action already
taken in the exercise of either
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 26
 ● In the present case, the trial court cannot substitute its judgment for that of
the CZBAA of Iloilo by directing the latter to issue a permit to operate a
funeral establishment in favor of respondent. All that the court can do is to
see to it that the licensing authorities have proceeded according to law.
Where an administrative body simply refuses to take any action whatsoever,
the court may issue a writ of mandamus to compel it to take some action, but
should not attempt to prescribe the action to be taken and thereby control
the discretion or judgment of the board or officer.[26]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The

December 19, 2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 29, which
granted the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the City Government of Iloilo to
issue a permit to operate a funeral establishment in favor of respondent is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for mandamus filed by respondent in Civil
Case No. 02-27308 is ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 27


LTO v. Butuan City
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente
Digest by: PEÑALOSA
Petitioners: LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE [LTO]
Respondents: CITY OF BUTUAN
Doctrine:
● Under the LGC, certain functions of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) were transferred to the LGUs. LGUs now have
the power to regulate the operation of tricycle-for-hire and to grant
franchises for the operation thereof. But this power is still subject to the
guidelines prescribed by the DOTC.
Facts:
● Pursuant to Sec 129 and Sec 133 of the Local Government Code, the
Sangguniang Panglungsod ("SP") of Butuan, on 16 August 1992, passed SP
Ordinance No.916-92 entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of
Tricycles-for-Hire, providing mechanism for the issuance of Franchise,
Registration and Permit, and Imposing Penalties for Violations thereof and
for other Purposes."
● The ordinance provided for, among other things, the payment of franchise
fees for the grant of the franchise of tricycles-for- hire, fees for the
registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permit for the
driving thereof (to the LGU of Butuan).
● Section 129 and Section 133 of the Local Government Code read:
"SEC. 129. Power to Create Sources of Revenue. - Each local
government unit shall exercise its power to create its own sources
of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to the
provisions herein, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively
to the local government units."
"SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local
Government Units. - Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise
of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
● "xxx.......xxx.......xxx.
"(1) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles
and for the issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the
driving thereof, except tricycles."
● The Land Transportation Office challenges the validity of the said Ordinance.
The LTO said the LGC only transferred to LGUs the franchising authority
over tricycles-for-hire of the LTFRB, and not the authority of LTO to register
all motor vehicles and to issue license to qualified persons.
● Ruling on the matter, the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City held that the
authority to register tricycles, the grant of the corresponding franchise, the
issuance of tricycle drivers' license, and the collection of fees therefor had all
been vested in the Local Government Units ("LGUs"). In effect, it prohibited
and enjoined the LTO from (a) registering tricycles and (b) issuing licenses
to drivers of tricycles.
● On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
● The LTO thus filed this instant petition for review on certiorari to annul and
set aside the CA decision that affirmed the permanent injunctive writ order of
the RTC.
Issue/s:
● Is the ordinance a valid exercise of the police power of the local government
of Butuan City? – NO.
Ratio:
● Under the LGC, certain functions of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) were transferred to the LGUs. LGUs now have the
power to regulate the operation of tricycle-for-hire and to grant franchises for
the operation thereof.
● But this power is still subject to the guidelines prescribed by the DOTC.
● A careful reading of the DOTC Guidelines shows that the newly delegated
powers pertain to the franchising and regulatory powers exercised by the
LTFRB and not the functions of the LTO relative to the registration of motor
vehicles and issuance of licenses for the driving thereof.
● The Local Government of Butuan greatly relied on the broad taxing power of
LGUs. It is true that police power and taxation are inherent powers of
sovereignty which the State may share with LGUs by delegation. But the
grant of one does not necessarily carry with it the grant of the other. The two
powers are by tradition and jurisprudence, separate and distinct powers.
● To construe the tax provisions of Section 133(1) of the LGC indistinctively
would result in the repeal to that extent of LTO's regulatory power which
evidently has not been intended.
● The exclusionary clause contained in the tax provisions of Section 133(1) of
the LGC must not be held to have had the effect of withdrawing the express
power of LTO to cause the registration of all motor vehicles and the issuance
of licenses for the driving thereof.
● These functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature, exercised
pursuant to the police power of the State, whose basic objectives are to
achieve road safety by insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles
and the competence of drivers prescribed by R. A. 4136, otherwise known
as Land Transportation and Traffic Code, as amended
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision which enjoins the Land Transportation Office
from requiring the due registration of tricycles and a license for the driving thereof is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 28
 LLDA v. CA (251 SCRA 42)
DECEMBER 7, 1995 | HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Digest by: NAVARRO
Petitioners: LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BINANGONAN
RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO ARROYO; THE
MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS
Doctrine:
The power of the LGUs to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue
purposes.
The power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-
culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring
activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake quality control and management.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order
No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected.
Facts:
● Republic Act No. 4850 created the Laguna Lake Development Authority.
● LLDA is supposed to carry out the policy of environmental protection and
ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development, so as to
accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area
and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns within the context of the
national and regional plans and policies for social and economic
development.
● Because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the
suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, PD No. 813 of former
President Marcos amended certain sections of RA 4850:
“(k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in Laguna de
Bay, the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permit for the
use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in or affecting the said lake
including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures,
fish corrals and the like, and to impose necessary safeguards for lake quality
control and management and to collect necessary fees for said activities and projects”
● Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991.
The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the
provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave
municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing
privileges within their municipal waters.
● Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing
privileges and fishpen permits.
● However, LLDA served notice to the general public that:
“1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay
Region, which were not registered or to which no application for registration
and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of
March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.
2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal shall
be subject to demolition which shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force
for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing.
3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal
shall, without prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally charged in
accordance with Section 39-A of RA 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the
same laws. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of not
exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the
discretion of the court.”
● Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against
the Authority before various regional trial courts.
● Temporary restraining order/Writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were
issued enjoining the LLDA from demolishing the fishpens and similar
structures in question.
● Hence, LLDA filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction.
Issue/s:
● W/N the LLDA should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is
concerned, and not the towns and municipalities comprising the region --
YES, LLDA should exercise jurisdiction
Ratio:
● The provisions of the LGC do not necessarily repeal RA 4850 LLDA and
granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake
region.
○ The LGC of 1991 does not contain any express provision which
categorically expressly repeal the charter of the LLDA.
● The charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special
law. The LGC of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction
that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be
construed to have repealed a special law.
● Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority,
which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and
sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative
intent is for the LLDA to proceed with its mission.
○ The power of the LGUs to issue fishing privileges was clearly
granted for revenue purposes.
○ The power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages
and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of
effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna
de Bay region and for lake quality control and management.
○ There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de
Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the
proper sharing of fees collected.
● The charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power
should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 29
 ● In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of the LGC of
1991 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA. Thus, the
LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of
fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated
therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter
vested on it.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby
granted, insofar as they relate to the authority of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority to grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake Region.

PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 30

 LLDA v. CA (231 SCRA 292)
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente
Digest by: NAGUIAT
Petitioners: LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,

Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding
Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City
Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN,
Doctrine: While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only
such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that
an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the
exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers
under its charter as a regulatory and quasi- judicial body with respect to pollution
cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and
desist order" is, perforce, implied.
Facts:
● On March 8, 1991, Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of 
 Lourdes
Parish filed a letter-complaint with the LLDA seeking to stop the operation of
the 8.6 hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Brgy. Camarin,
Caloocan City 
 body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the
● LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order to City Government of Caloocan
regarding the Camarin dumpsite
● RTC of Caloocan issued TRO enjoining LLDA from enforcing Cease and
Desist order 
 the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further
● LLDA filed motion to dismiss on the ground that under Pollution Control Law,
its Cease and Desist order is reviewable by CA not by RTC 
 ●
● RTC denied LLDA’s motion to dismiss 
 institute "necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall
● LLDA filed a petition with SC for certiorari, 
 prohibition, and injunction with
prayer for restraining order, 
 seeking to nullify 16 Oct 1992 order of RTC 
 program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from
● SC referred case to the CA. CA ruled that the LLDA has no power and
authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage
● Hence, The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review of the decision of the
CA
● LLDA claims that: As an administrative agency, LLDA was granted
regulatory and adjuratory powers by RA 4850. It has the power to issue the
said order pursuant to Section 4, Par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of EO 927 of
1983, an amendatory law of RA 4850.
● respondent claims that: LLDA has no power to issue the said order. In
accordance to Section 4, Par. (d) of RA 4850, LLDA is instead required “to
institute the necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall
commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or
program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from
the Authority.”
Issue/s:
● W/N LLDA has the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order
enjoining the gov. of Caloocan from dumping its garbage at Tala Estate -
YES
Ratio:
● ● series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order
requiring the discontinuance or pollution." Section 4, par. (d) explicitly
authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.
● To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and
ex-parte cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City
Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National
Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which,
admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 92. However, it
would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of
the power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or
modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and
clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by EO 927.
● There is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such
authority need not necessarily be express. While it is a fundamental
rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied
in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its
express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi- judicial
authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce,
implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by
legal steps would have been necessary.
The charter of LLDA has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to
commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or
the LLDA."
● said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad
powers in the regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region,
whether by the government or the private sector, insofar as the
implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with
cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant
to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the
thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet such contingencies, then the writs
of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the LLDA to
issue, may be sought from the proper courts.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by
the Court on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City
Government of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 31
People v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 144159)
G.R. No.144159 | September 29, 2004 | J. Callejo, Sr.
Digest by: MEDEL
Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN and MANUEL S. ALBA
Doctrine:
It does not appear from the Local Government Code that vesting of power in the
local chief executive to appoint city/municipal engineer who shall likewise act as
local building official, also carries with it the power to exercise appellate jurisdiction
over the decisions in matters involving non-issuance, suspension, revocation of
building permits.
Facts:
● An Affidavit-Complaint was filed by Pabalan in the Office of the Ombudsman
against the City Administrator of QC, Manuel S. Alba & the Chairman of
Iglesia Evangelica Metodista En Las Islas Filipinas (IEMELIF), Jeremias T.
Cruz.
● In his sworn complaint, complainant, Pabalan, stated that he is the owner of
a lot located at Susano Road, Novaliches, Quezon City, where the
Congregation of Evangelist Church of the Philippines (IEMELIF) headed by
Architect Cruz encroached when improvements on their structure were
made. He alleged that the construction was done without the necessary
building permit.
● The Quezon City building official was, accordingly, informed and
consequently after hearing, the Assistant Building Official ordered the
demolition of the structure. The Order becomes final and executory upon
failure of the religious congregation (IEMELIF) to appeal on time to the
DPWH.
● IEMELIF wrote City Administrator Alba requesting that said order be not
enforced pending appeal to the DPWH.
● The letter of IEMELIF was received on November 5, 1998 by the Office
of the Alba, but a Memorandum ordering the recall of the demolition
order was dated November 4, 1998.
● An Information was filed with the SB, charging the respondent with violation
of Section 3(e) of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:
That on or about November 5, 1998 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-
named accused, a public officer, being the City
Administrator of Quezon City while in the performance of
his official function and acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, issue a Memorandum
recalling the Order of Demolition issued by the Acting
Building Official knowing fully well that he has no
authority to do so, thus, giving unwarranted
preference to Jeremias T. Cruz in the discharged (sic)
of his official functions.
● SB issued a Resolution granting the motion to quash the information of the
accused and acquitting the respondent of the charge. The SB held that
based on the records, there was no probable cause to charge the
respondent of the crime.
Issue: Whether or not SB acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in quashing the information. YES.
Ratio:
● The records show that the SB quashed the information on the basis of a
January 12, 1994 Memorandum issued to Alba by then Mayor Ismael
Mathay:
MEMORANDUM
TO : DR. MANUEL ALBA
City Administrator
In view of the multifarious duties attendant to my dual position as Chairman, Metro
Manila Authority and Mayor of Quezon City, the authority to issue orders for the
demolition of illegal structures is hereby delegated to you. You may sign as follows:
BY AUTHORITY OF THE CITY MAYOR
MANUEL S. ALBA
City Administrator
It is understood that the aforementioned authority shall be exercised pursuant to the
attached copy of guidelines issued by the undersigned. Periodic reports of demolition
undertaken under this authority should be submitted to this Office.
This Memorandum takes effect immediately.
(Sgd.) ISMAEL A. MATHAY, JR.
City Mayor
● The SB concluded that, having acted on the basis of the memorandum of the
Mayor, Alba could not be considered as having usurped the authority of the
building official or of the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, or that he
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
● However, as pointed out by the petitioner, the Memorandum of the
Mayor had already been amended by a subsequent issuance,
Memorandum No. 4, which states, that the authority to act on violations of
the Building Code no longer rested on the respondent as City Administrator,
but on the City Engineer or his assistant, viz:
For violation of Building Code City Engineer/Asst. City Bldg. Official
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 32
 Illegal Structures under RA City Administrator
7279 (Squatting)

● We also agree with the petitioner’s contention that the January 12, 1994
Memorandum of Mayor Mathay is even contrary to the National Building
Code of the Philippines.
○ To rectify his erroneous January 12, 1994 Memorandum, Mayor
Mathay had to issue Memorandum No. 4 to Alba.
● Moreover, in Opinion No. 36, Series of 1996, the Secretary of Justice
succinctly ruled that only the city engineer, as the building official, has
the exclusive authority to act on matters relating to the issuance of
demolition permits or the revocation or suspension thereof.
● The law is clear that the Secretary of the Department of Public Works
and Highways has jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of
building officials involving the non-issuance, suspension or revocation
of building permits. His decision is final subject only to review by the Office
of the President.
● In line with existing jurisprudence, jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law.
Section 307 of P.D. No. 1096 is the law that confers jurisdiction upon the
DPWH Secretary to adjudicate appeals from the orders or decisions of the
building officials.
● Section 477 of the Local Government Code of 1991 is cited to support the
view that the appellate jurisdiction over decisions of building officials has
been devolved to the city/municipal mayor.
○ However, it does not appear from the Local Government Code
that vesting of power in the local chief executive to appoint
engineer who, in the case of cities and municipalities, shall
likewise act as local building official, also carries with it the
power to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the decisions in
matters involving non-issuance, suspension, revocation of
building permits.
● Absent any clear and explicit provision in the said code to this effect, we
cannot conclude that the appellate jurisdiction vested in the Secretary of
Public Works and Highways under Section 307 of the National Building Code
has been transferred to the city or municipal mayor

Dispositive: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The

assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are NULLIFIED. The records are
remanded to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 33

 Osea v. Malaya
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente
Digest by: MANZANO
Petitioners: DR. ELEANOR A. OSEA
Respondents: DR. CORAZON E. MALAYA
Doctrine: An appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested
with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office.
When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security
of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of
the nature of his office.
A reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one organizational unit
to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in
rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment. In the
same vein, a designation connotes merely the imposition of additional duties on an
incumbent official.
Facts:
● Dr. Osea filed a Protest Case with the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
● She claims that she was appointed as OIC, Asst. Schools Division
Superintendent of Camarines Sur, by then Education Sec. Ricardo T. Gloria,
upon the endorsement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur;
● Despite such recommendation, President Ramos appointed Dr. Mlaya.
● She claims that since the appointment was made without prior consultation
with the Provincial School Board, it was a violation of the LGC. Thus, the
appointment is null and void.
● The CSC dismissed the protest case. It held that Section 993 of the LGC
contemplates a situation where the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports issues the appointments, whereas Dr. Malay’s appointment was
made by no less than the President, in the exercise of his appointing power;
moreover, what took place was actually a reassignment, which did not need
consultation.
● On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition
Issue/s:
● W/N prior consultation with the local school board was mandatory - NO
Ratio:
● Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 applies to appointments
made by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. This is because
at the time of the enactment of the Local Government Code, schools division
superintendents were appointed by the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports to specific division or location.
3 Sec. 99. Functions of Local School Boards. --- The provincial, city or municipal
school board shall: The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall consult the
local school boards on the appointment of division superintendents, district
supervisors, school principals, and other school officials.
● In 1994, the Career Executive Service Board issued Memorandum Circular
No. 21, Series of 1994, placing the positions of schools division
superintendent and assistant schools division superintendent within the
career executive service. Consequently, the power to appoint persons to
career executive service positions was transferred from the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports to the President; The appointment may not be
specific as to location. The prerogative to designate the appointees to their
particular stations was vested in the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports Secretary
● In this case, the appointment of Dr. Malaya was issued by the President, but
did not specify her station.It was Secretary Gloria who assigned and
designated Dr. Malaya to the Division of Camarines Sur, and Dr. Osea to the
Division of Iriga City.
● The designation of Dr. Malaya as Schools Division Superintendent of
Camarines Sur was not a case of appointment, it was actually a re-
assignment. Thus, the required prior consultation under the LGC does not
apply
● An appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with
the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office.
When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in
security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure
because of the nature of his office.
● A reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one
organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does
not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the
issuance of an appointment. In the same vein, a designation connotes
merely the imposition of additional duties on an incumbent official.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49204, as
well as Resolutions 980699 and 982058 of the Civil Service Commission, are
AFFIRMED.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 34
F. AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Limbona v. Mangelin
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente
Digest by: LUMBRE
Petitioners: (Put Petitioner/s Here)
Respondents: (Put Respondent/s Here)

Doctrine:
(Put Doctrine Here)

Facts:
● Type Facts Here

Issue/s:
● W/N (Issue) – YES/NO
● W/N (Issue) – YES/NO

Ratio:
● Ratio to Issue 1
● Ratio to Issue 2

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, (copy and paste the entire dispositive portion here)

PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 35

 Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA ● E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the
G.R. No.79956 | January 29, 1990 | CORTES, J. Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the
Digest by: LAUIGAN enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In
short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict
Petitioners: LILIA YARANON and BONA BAUTISTA, assisted by their
with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.
spouses, BRAULIO D. YARANON and DEMETRIO D. BAUTISTA, JR.,
● The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an
respectively; JAMES BRETT and SINAI C. HAMADA,
autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Since such process will undoubtedly
take time, the President saw it fit to provide for some measures to address
Respondents: THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. CATALINO MACARAIG,
the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had
Executive Secretary, HON. VICENTE JAYME, Secretary of Finance, HON.
not yet been passed and the autonomous region created. At this time, the
GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management, and HON.
President was still exercising legislative powers as the First Congress had
ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC National Treasurer
not yet convened.
● Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing the basic
Doctrine:
structure of government in the autonomous region), the Supreme Court finds
CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for that E. O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government.
political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of The bodies created by E. O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local
transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already governmental structure; nor are they autonomous government agencies.
enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together
political autonomy the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government,
the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes and non-governmental organizations in a
Facts: concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
● Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the ● In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera
Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong autonomous region signed into law on October 23, 1989, and the plebiscite
Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall not undertake their for the approval of the act which completed the autonomous region-creating
demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such process outlined in the Constitution.
as political negotiations. ● Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional.
● A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such
agreement states that they are to: Dispositive:
o Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a WHEREFORE, petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
preparatory body that could perform policy-making and
administrative functions and undertake consultations and studies
leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.
o Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the
study group of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.
● Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of
the Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera
people. This was then signed into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative
Region [CAR], which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-
Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio.
● Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that
by issuing the said order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative
powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of
enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras.

Issue/s:
● W/N E.O 220 is constitutional - YES

Ratio:
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 36
 Ordillo v. COMELEC
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente
Digest by: KEE
Petitioners: Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO,
(Banaue), Ifugao Provincial Board Member CORAZON MONTINIG, (Mayoyao),
Former Vice-Mayor MARTIN UDAN (Banaue), Municipal Councilors MARTIN
GANO, (Lagawe), and TEODORO HEWE, (Hingyon), Barangay Councilman
PEDRO W. DULAG (Lamut); Aguinaldo residents SANDY B. CHANGIWAN, and
DONATO TIMAGO; Lamut resident REY ANTONIO; Kiangan residents ORLANDO
PUGUON, and REYNAND DULDULAO; Lagawe residents TOMAS KIMAYONG,
GREGORIO DANGO, GEORGE B. BAYWONG, and VICENTE LUNAG; Hingyon
residents PABLO M. DULNUAN and CONSTANCIO GANO; Mayoyao residents
PEDRO M. BAOANG, LEONARDO IGADNA, and MAXIMO IGADNA; and Banaue
residents PUMA-A CULHI, LATAYON BUTTIG, MIGUEL PUMELBAN, ANDRES
ORDILLO, FEDERICO MARIANO, SANDY BINOMNGA, GABRIEL LIMMANG,
ROMEO TONGALI, RUBEN BAHATAN, MHOMDY GABRIEL, and NADRES
GHAMANG
Respondents: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; The Honorable FRANKLIN
M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice; Hon. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive
Secretary; The Cabinet Of􏰀􏰀cer for Regional Development; Hon. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management; and Hon. ROSALINA S.
CAJUCOM, OIC, National Treasurer
Doctrine:
(Put Doctrine Here)
Facts:
● The people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra
and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite
held pursuant to RA 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for
the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR).”
● It was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and
was rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city. The
Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President reiterating the
COMELEC resolution and provided: ". . . [A]nd considering the proviso in
Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be included
m the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted
favorably — then, alone, legally and validly constitutes the CAR."
● Congress enacted RA 6861 setting the elections in the CAR of Ifugao.
● President issued AO 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera
Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all the offices
created under EO 220 were abolished in view of the ratification the Organic
Act.
● Ordillo et al: There can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only 1
province as the Constitution and RA 6766 require that the said Region be
composed of more than one constituent unit.
Issue/s:
● WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably
for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and
validly constitute such Region? - No
Ratio:
● The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the CAR. Art. X of the
Constitution provides that “There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao a n d in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas…”
● The keywords - provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas
mean that “region” is to be made up of more than 1 constituent unit. Ifugao is
a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces,
cities, municipalities and geographical areas.
● Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the
autonomous region. Otherwise, an absurd situation will arise having two sets
of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials
exercising executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small
area.
● The Ifugao province makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas
enumerated above (Benguet, Mountain Province, etc.) It has the second
smallest number of inhabitants from among the provinces and city.
● Not only would it violate the Constitution and RA 6766 but would also be
impractical and illogical.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of the
Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous region,
the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the February 5, 1990
memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic
Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order No. 220 is declared to
be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 37
 Abbas v. COMELEC
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente
Digest by: JOSEF
Petitioners: DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU
MACALIMPOWAC DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTANA BABAO,
JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS,
representing the other taxpayers of Mindanao
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO
C. CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
Doctrine:
The creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority
vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units.
Facts:
● In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time provided
for regional autonomy, Article X, section 15 of the charter provides that
"[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."
● In 1989, pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734, entitled "An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao” was enacted.
● A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and
Palawan, in implementation of RA No. 6734 was scheduled for November
19, 1989.
● Abbas, representing the other taxpayers of Mindanao, filed petitions praying
that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from
releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No.
6734 unconstitutional.
● Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an
autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of
the Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation of such
region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.
○ Abbas cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares
that "[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably
in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section
18, Article X of the Constitution."
○ Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the
creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only
two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region
would still be created composed of the two provinces where the
favorable votes were obtained.
● Petitioner Mama-o argues that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because
only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del
Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all
of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act,
possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other
relevant characteristics.
● Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of section 13 of R.A. No. 6734:
. . . Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite
do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in
the existing administrative regions: Provided, however, that the
President may, by administrative determination, merge the
existing regions.
● According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to
merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the
President. That the President may choose to merge existing regions
pursuant to the Organic Act is challenged as being in conflict with Article X,
Section 10 of the Constitution which provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement. (not
relevant to our topic)
ISSUES (with short answers):
1. W/N the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the
total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the
constituent units.
–YES. What is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of
votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and
not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put
together, as well as in the individual constituent units.
2. W/N determination by Congress of which areas should be covered by the
organic act for the autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislative
prerogative, whose wisdom may not be inquired into by this Court –YES
3. W/N administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
—YES. The power to merge administrative regions has traditionally
been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the
power of general supervision over local governments There is no
conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative
regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the
merger of local government units because the requirement of a
plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 38
 4. W/N provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an oversight Committee to
supervise the transfer of powers and properties to the regional government would
delay the creation of the autonomous region.
—NO. Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region
hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. If the Organic Act is approved
by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled
plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes
effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an
oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a
different date of effectivity.
RATIO:
Issue #1:
● Under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous
region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast
by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities
where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the
autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not
attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even
if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and
nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be
included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and
R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities,
among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
● As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous region in
Muslim Mindanao is made effective upon the approval "by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose" [Art.
X, sec. 18]. The question has been raised as to what this majority means.
Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the
constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or both?
● If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of
all the votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so indicated. Thus, in
Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that "[t]his Constitution shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
held for the purpose ... Comparing this with the provision on the creation of
the autonomous region, which reads:
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called
for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2].
● The creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total
majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the
constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the
framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes
cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for
the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose."
● It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of
votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a
double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in
the individual constituent units.
Issue #2:
● The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall
determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by
these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that
share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's
discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the
wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the
separation of governmental powers.
● After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act for lack
of basis, petitioner Mama-o would then adopt the extreme view that other
non-Muslim areas in Mindanao should likewise be covered. He argues that
since the Organic Act covers several non-Muslim areas, its scope should be
further broadened to include the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in
order for the other non-Muslim areas denies said areas equal protection of
the law, and therefore is violative of the Constitution.
● Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional provision
he had earlier invoked. Any determination by Congress of what areas in
Mindanao should compromise the autonomous region, taking into account
shared historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics, would necessarily carry with it the exclusion of
other areas. As earlier stated, such determination by Congress of which
areas should be covered by the organic act for the autonomous region
constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative, whose wisdom may not be
inquired into by this Court.
Issue #3:
● Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734: The provinces and cities which in
the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall
remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided, however, that the
President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing
regions.
● What is referred to here is the merger of administrative regions, i.e.
Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are mere groupings
of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated
Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land
by Pres. dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not
territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge
administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the
exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see
Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power of
the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional
provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 39
 because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to
provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.

Issue #4:
● Petitioners question the validity of provisions in the Organic Act which create
an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer to the autonomous region
of the powers, appropriations, and properties vested upon the regional
government by the organic Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said provisions
mandate that the transfer of certain national government offices and their
properties to the regional government shall be made pursuant to a schedule
prescribed by the Oversight Committee, and that such transfer should be
accomplished within six (6) years from the organization of the regional
government.
● It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are unconstitutional because
while the Constitution states that the creation of the autonomous region shall
take effect upon approval in a plebiscite, the requirement of organizing an
Oversight committee tasked with supervising the transfer of powers and
properties to the regional government would in effect delay the creation of
the autonomous region.
● Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on
the result of the plebiscite. If the Organic Act is approved by majority of the
votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the
autonomous region immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in
R.A. No. 6734 requiring an oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do
not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the
organization of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the
operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at effecting a
smooth transition period for the regional government. The constitutional
objection on this point thus cannot be sustained as there is no bases
therefor.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 40

 Disomangcop v. Secretary
G.R. No.149848 | November 25, 04’ | J. Tinga
Digest by: INFANTE
Petitioners: ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR M. DIMALOTANG
Respondents: THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS SIMEON A. DATUMANONG and THE SECRETARY OF
BUDGET and MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN
Doctrine:
Facts:
● On Aug. 1, 1989, RA 6734 was passed (Organic Act of ARMM).
● Four provinces voted for inclusion in ARMM, namely: Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with it, EO 426 was
issued by Pres. Cory Aquino on Oct. 12, 1990.
● The same devolved to the ARMM the power of the DPWH. Consequently,
DO 119 entitled "Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office." was
issued by DPWH Sec. Vigilar last May 20, 1999, which is in accordance with
the E.O 124.
● It created a DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have
jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the
DPWH within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur.
● On Jan. 17, 2001, RA 8999 which created a new Engineering District in the
first district of Lanao del Sur was passed by Pres. Estrada entitled “An act
establishing an engineering district as the first district of Lanao Del Sur and
appropriating funds therefor”. On March 31, 2001, RA 9054 which amended
RA 6734 was passed. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi voted
to join ARMM through said law.
● Disomangcop and Dimalotang sin their capacity as Officer-in-Charge and
Engineer II respectively of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in
Lanao del Sur filed a petition questioning the constitutionality and validity of
DO 119 and RA 8999 on the ground that they contravene the constitution
and the organic acts of the ARMM.
● Moreover they sought mainly the following relief: to prohibit respondent
DPWH Secretary from implementing D.O 119 and R.A 8999 and releasing
funds for public work projects intended for Lanao Del Sur and Marawi City to
the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and other administrative regions
of DPWH.
Issue/s:
WON DO 119 and RA 8999 are both invalid and constitutionally infirm - YESSIR
(technically 8999 was never unconstitutional because it never came into effect)
Ratio:
● Republic Act 8999 never became an operative and was superseded or
repealed by Republic Act 9054.
● RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA 9054 which is a later law. RA 9054,
which is anchored on the 1987 Constitution advances the constitutional grant
of autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARMM which covers among
others Lanao del Sur. However, RA 8999 ventures to re-establish the
National Government's jurisdiction over the infrastructure programs in Lanao
del Sur.
● RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA 9054, and it destroys the latter
law's objective of devolution of the functions of DPWH in line with the policy
of the Constitution to grant LGUs meaningful and authentic regional
autonomy.
● DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has
jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur
is violate of the provisions of EO 426 which implements the transfer of
control and supervision of the DPWH to the ARMM in line with RA 6734.
● The office created under DO 119 having essentially the same powers with
the District Engineering Office of Lanao del Sur as created under EO 426, is
a duplication.
● The DO in effect takes back powers which have been previously devolved
under EO 426. RA 9054 however has repealed DO Department Order 119.
● R.A 8999 is contrary to and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM Organic
Acts. It contravened true decentralization which is the essence of regional
autonomy. And, D.O were issued unconstitutional and were issued grave
abuse of discretion
SUMMARY:
EO 642 was issued which placed the control and supervision of the offices of DPWH
within ARMM under the Autonomous Regional Government, specifically DPWH-
ARMM. DO 119 was subsequently issued which created a Marawi Engineering Office
which shall have jurisdiction over all projects under DPWH within Marawi City, a city
which would later form part of the ARMM. RA 8999 was later approved which
established an engineering district in the province of Lanao del Sur, a province part of
the ARMM. RA 9054 was passed amending the Organic Act of the ARMM (RA 6734).
It was ratified in a plebiscite. The City of Marawi now form part of the ARMM.
Consequently petitioners engineers for DPWH-ARMM filed petition for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus with prayer for TRO/WPI. SC granted petition except
mandamus. SC did not declare RA 8999 unconstitutional because law never became
operative
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, considering that Republic Act No. 9054 repealed Republic Act No. 8999 and
rendered DPWH Department Order No. 119 functus officio, the petition insofar as it seeks the
writs of certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Accordingly, let a writ of prohibition ISSUE
commanding respondents to desist from implementing R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119, and maintaining
the DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and the First Engineering District of the
Province of Lanao del Sur comprising the City of Marawi and the municipalities within the First
District of Lanao del Sur. However, the petition insofar as it seeks a writ of mandamus against
respondents is DENIED.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 41
Pandi v. CA ● On October 29, 1993, President Ramos issued EO 133, transferring the
G.R. No. 116850 | April 11, 2002 | Carpio, J. powers and functions of the Department of Health in the region to the
Digest by: HAM Regional Government of the ARMM.
● On November 6, 1993, Macacua again issued a Memorandum reiterating
Petitioners: DR. LAMPA I. PANDI and DR. JARMILA B. MACACUA
Pandi’s designation as OIC, IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, as well as Sani’s
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, and DR. AMER A. SABER
detail to the Regional Office of the DOH-ARMM in Cotabato City.
● The Court of Appeals, consolidating the cases of Pandi, Sani, and Saber,
Doctrine:
held that:
The power to appoint provincial officials by the autonomous regional government ○ Saber is the lawfully designated OIC, IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.
should be given to the autonomous region by law. The CA ruled that Governor Mutilan has the power and authority to
appoint the provincial health officer under Sec. 478 of the Local
Facts: Government Code of 1991.
● In 1993, the following appointments involving the Integrated Provincial ○ Pandi, on the other hand, was not validly appointed as IPHO-
Health Office-Amai Pakpak General Hospital, Lanao del Sur (IPHO-APGH, APGH, as there is nothing in the Revised Administrative Code that
Lanao del Sur) were made: gave the DOH-ARMM Regional Secretary the power to appoint
provincial health officers, and that such appointing power is given to
the provincial governor.
Person Appointing Previous Office Subsequent ○ Sani was only on detail to the position of provincial health officer,
appointed Officer Office IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Sani could not claim a vested right or
entitlement to permanence in that office.
Dr Lampa PANDI Dr Jarmila DOH-ARMM Officer-in-Charge, ● Pandi and Macacua thus appealed to the Supreme Court assailing the CA
(Aug 9, 1993) MACACUA, in her Assistant Regional IPHO-APGH, decision.
capacity as Secretary Lanao del Sur
Regional Director Issue/s:
and as Regional ● WHO has the power to appoint the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur during the
Secretary of period? - ARMM Regional Secretary of Health MACACUA
Health
Ratio:
Dr Mamasao Dr Jarmila IPHO-APGH, DOH-ARMM To answer the issue, the Court first apportioned five time periods to determine who
SANI (Aug 9, MACACUA Lanao del Sur Regional Office, had the power to appoint the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur and in the
1993) Cotabato City ARMM in general. (Note: I made it SIX time periods para’ di confusing.)

SUMMARY OF THE TIME PERIODS:

Dr Amer SABER Lanao del Sur None mentioned IPHO-APGH,

(Sep 15, 1993) Govenor Mahid Lanao del Sur Time Period Applicable Law Appointing Classification
MUTILAN Officer

PRIOR to the EXECUTIVE Minister of Health National

Organic Act of ORDER NO. 119 government official
● On August 12, 1993, Sani field a complaint with the Marawi RTC 1989
challenging the Macacua Memorandum which transferred him to the DOH-
ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City. AFTER the 1984 LOCAL Secretary of National
● On October 5, 1993, Saber filed with the CA a petition for quo warranto with Organic Act of GOVERNMENT Health government official
prayer for preliminary injunction, claiming that he is the lawfully designated 1989 (November CODE
OIC of the IPHO-APGH. The CA issued a TRO enjoining Pandi from further 19, 1989)
discharging the functions and duties of IPHO-APGH.
AFTER the Local 1984 LOCAL Secretary of National

PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 42

 Secretary of Health, in effect amending EO 119 which gave the
Government GOVERNMENT Health government
National Secretary of Health to appoint the provincial health officer.
Code of 1991 CODE official
(January 1, 1992)
● After the ARMM Local Code
○ The ARMM Local Code provides that the provincial health officer in
Executive Order EXECUTIVE Regional National the ARMM is BOTH a regional official and also a provincial
No. 113 (October ORDER 113 Secretary of government government official, thus catching up with provincial health officers
29, 1993) Health official outside the ARMM. The ARMM Local Code provides that the salary
of the provincial health officer shall be paid from regional funds.
AFTER the ARMM ARMM LOCAL Provincial Provincial official HOWEVER, if the provincial health officer is to be paid using
Local Code CODE governor OR OR regional provincial funds, then the provincial governor becomes the
(March 3, 1994) regional governor ofifical appointing authority. If the province is ready and willing to pay, the
provincial governor is the appointing authority.
ARMM Organic 1991 LOCAL Provincial Provincial ○ If the Regional Governor is to appoint the provincial health officer,
Act of 2001 GOVERNMENT governor government official the provincial governor is to submit to the regional governor his
CODE recommendations and must choose among those
recommendations.
Note: Time periods in BOLD are the relevant time periods in this case.
● The Organic Act of 2001
● Prior to the Organic Act of 1989 ○ After the ratification of the ARMM Organic Act of 2001 by plebiscite,
○ A provincial health officer is appointed to “a region” and not to a the LGC of 1991 was expressly made applicable to the ARMM.
province. The Minister of Health, upon recommendation of the Thus, the appointment of provincial health officer in the ARMM has
Regional Director, can assign the provincial health officer to any now become the sole prerogative of the provincial governor, and
province within the region. The 1984 Local Government Code did such are to be paid out of provincial funds.
not provide for a provincial health officer as a position that the
governor appoints, thus the Governor cannot appoint a provincial AS TO THE PERSONS INVOLVED
health officer at this time.
● On SABER:
● After the Organic Act of 1989 ○ Saber was appointed by Lanao del Sur Govenor Mahid Mutialn on
○ It is in the Organic Act of 1989 that until a regional law was passed Sept. 15, 1993. On this date, the provincial health officer of Lanao
implementing devolution of powers, the LGC of 1984 was to be del Sur was still a national government official. It is thus the
applicable. As the 1984 LGC did not give the provincial governor Secretary of Health who has the authority to appoint the IPHO-
the authority to appoint a provincial health officer, such authority is APGH, Lanao del Sur. Thus, Saber’s appointment is VOID.
still vested with the Minister/Secretary of Health.
● On SANI:
● After the Local Government Code of 1991 ○ Sani was appointed as provincial health officer by Secretary Alfredo
○ The LGC of 1991 for the first time vested with the provincial R.A. Bengzon on January 1, 1988. Sani was appointed, however,
governor the power to appoint a provincial health officer. not as the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur but was appointed to Region
HOWEVER, the LGC of 1991 DID NOT APPLY to the ARMM as XII, where Lanao del Sur belonged at that time. The Secretary of
the Organic Act of 1989 could only be amended through a Health, upon recommendation of the Regional Director, could
ratification process, and only applied prospectively to new assign provincial health officers to any province within the region.
autonomous regions made after the implementation of the Thus, Sani cannot claim any security of tenure as provincial
1991 LGC. Thus, it was STILL the 1984 LGC that was applicable to health officer of Lanao del Sur because he was NEVER
the ARMM, and as such, the provincial health officer is a national appointed to that position.
government officer appointed by the Secretary of Health. ○ Moreover, Macacua’s appointment of Sani to the Regional Office of
the DOH-ARMM was ultra vires. At that time, on August 9, 1993,
● After EO 133 the powers and functions of the DOH was not yet transferred to the
○ President Ramos issued EO 133 transferring the powers and ARMM regional government, and such authority still belonged to
functions of the Department of Health in ARMM to the Regional the Secretary of Health. Thus, such transfer was void.

PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 43

 ○ HOWEVER, Macacua again issued a memorandum on November
6, 1993, reitreating the transfer. At this time, EO 133 had taken
effect and the supervision and control of the regional office of the
DOH was transferred from the Secretary of Health to the Regional
Secretary of Health (Macauca). Thus, Sani’s transfer to the
regional office is VALID.

● On PANDI:
○ As EO 133 had taken effect during the second memorandum on
November 6, 1993, it was well within Macauca’s power to transfer
Pandi as IPHO-APGH. Thus, Pandi’s appointment is VALID.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 15, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32242 is SET ASIDE. The
designation on September 15, 1993 of Dr. Amer A. Saber as Officer-in--Charge of the
Integrated Provincial Health Office of Lanao del Sur is declared void. On the other
hand, the designation on November 6, 1993 of Dr. Lampa I. Pandi as Officer--in-
-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office of Lanao del Sur, and the
assignment on November 6, 1993 of Dr. Mamasao Sani to the DOH--ARMM Regional
Office in Cotabato City, are declared valid. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 44

G. SPECIAL METROPOLITAN POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS
MMDA v. Garin
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente
Digest by: GUEVARRA
Petitioners: MMDA
Respondents: Dante O. Garin
Doctrine:
MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is
that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and
regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of
authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis.
Facts:
● Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his
drivers license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street,
Binondo, Manila.
● Shortly before the expiration of the TVRs validity, the respondent addressed
a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his
drivers license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in
court.
● Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with
application for preliminary injunction with RTC Paranaqe contending that, in
the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act
No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of
their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the
deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The
respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it
does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited - fines
and other penalties on erring motorists.
● He further alleged that he suffered and continues to suffer great and
irreparable damage because of the deprivation of his license and that,
absent any implementing rules from the Metro Manila Council, the TVR and
the confiscation of his license have no legal basis.
● MMDA, represented by OSG, pointed out that the powers granted to it by
Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and
imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are
legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine
the validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of
separation of powers does not preclude admixture of the three powers of
government in administrative agencies.
● The MMDA also refuted Garins allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the
governing board and policy making body of the petitioner, has as yet to
formulate the implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 and
directed the courts attention to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001
dated 15 April 1995. Respondent Garin, however, questioned the validity of
MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, as he claims that it was
passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a quorum.
The RTC ruled that:
● there was indeed no quorum in that First Regular Meeting of the MMDA
Council held hence MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001,
authorizing confiscation of drivers licenses upon issuance of a TVR, is void
ab initio.
● The summary confiscation of a drivers license without first giving the driver
an opportunity to be heard; depriving him of a property right (drivers license)
without DUE PROCESS; not filling (sic) in Court the complaint of supposed
traffic infraction, cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence
unconstitutional.
Issue/s:
● WON MMDA can confiscate/ suspend/revoke driver’s license in the
enforcement of traffic rules and regulations
Ratio:
● Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local
government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services
affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as
the MMDA. Thus: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
"development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying
down policies and coordinating with the various national government
agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in
the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and
these are actually summed up in the charter itself
● * Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 states that the petitioner shall "install and
administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and
penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether
moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary
notwithstanding," and that f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all
traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation
center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local
government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-
governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority,
subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose."
● There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council to
“enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.” It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, People’s Organizations, NGOs and private sector for
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 45
 the efficient and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions are
administrative in nature

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 46

 MMDA v. Bel-Air
G.R. No. 135962 | March 27, 2000 | Puno, J.
Digest by: GARCIA
Petitioners: METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Respondents: BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.
Doctrine:
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in
R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila.
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an
agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in
nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself
Facts:
● Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), is a Government
Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila
● Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of
request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the
use of the public.
● The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient
movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City.
o This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924.
● On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall
separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
● The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the
wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order.
● Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower
court decided in favor of the Respondent.
● Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has
the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of
the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in
Metro Manila.
Issue/s:
● W/N the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic
pursuant to its regulatory and police powers? - NO
Ratio:
● The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police
power.
o Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature.
o However, police power may be delegated to government units.
● Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government
unit.
o Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it
cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the
government.
● Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of Manila.
● There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power.
● It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with various national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area.
● It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
o formulation
o coordination
o regulation
o implementation
o preparation
o management
o monitoring
o setting of policies
o installation of a system and administration.
● Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative
power.
● Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.
● The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is
an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating
with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its
functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in
the charter itself
Regarding the issue on the Metro Manila Council being the predecessor of MMDA:
● there was the mention of the Sangalang case which the Court held to be
inapplicable
● the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the
MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential
Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter
possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.
● The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of
establishing and administering programs providing services common to the
area
Dispositive:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549 are affirmed. SO ORDERED.
PUBCORP 2-D Digests | 47