Araullo v.

Aquino

Issue: was a law necessary to implement DAP?

Ruling: No. the DAP was a government strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated
spending, since the executive is the main actor during the budget execution stage of the budget.
Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the Budget Execution Stage. The
President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the
execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the country’s economic situation.

Issue: Were the unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments under the DAP
savings?

Ruling: No, they were not savings. The use of such appropriations contravened Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
Constitution. Any transfer of appropriated funds should conform to Sec. 25(5). Such safeguard was
intended to keep a tight rein on the power to transfer funds appropriated by Congress by the President
and other high officials.

Requisites for a valid transfer of appropriated funds:

a. There is a law authorizing the president, chief justice, senate president, speaker of the house,
and heads of constitutional commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices
b. The funds to be transferred are saving generated from the appropriations for their respective
offices
c. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices

Application of the requisites to the case:

a. 2011 and 2012 GAAs lacked provisions to authorize transfers of funds under the DAP
b. No savings from which funds could be sourced for the DAP
c. No funds from savings could be transferred under the DAP to augment deficient items not
provided in the GAA, cross-border augmentations from savings were prohibited by the
Constitution

Issue: should this ruling be applied retroactively?

Ruling: no. the doctrine of operative fact would apply. The consequences resulting from DAP and its
related issuances could no longer be ignored or could no longer be undone.
Belgica v. Ochoa

Issue: what is congressional pork barrel?

Ruling: a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively
organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization
through various post-enactment measures and/or practices.

Issue: what is presidential pork barrel?

Ruling: a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of
its utilization.

Issue: was the separation of powers violated?

Ruling: yes. legislators – may it be through project lists, prior consultations or program menus– have
been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded
through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. , legislators have also been accorded post-
enactment authority in the areas of fund release and realignment. these post-enactment measures
which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties
that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators
have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the
various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers
principle.

Issue: does the pork barrel system violate the non-delegabilitIssue: does the pork barrel system violate
the non-delegability of legislative power?

Ruling: yes. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal
lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a
specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise
the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF
Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.
Issue: is the item veto power of the president impaired?
Ruling: yes. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who
would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are
made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means
that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-
enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a
budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
President‘s power of item veto.