The Failure of British Naval Strategy During the American War for Independence

LT Kristen Kerns

Strategy and War

Donal O’Sullivan

05 October, 2010
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Mahan was harshly critical of British naval strategy during the War for American independence.

Do you agree with his critique? Why or why not?

Introduction

At the inception of the American War for Independence, the British sought to cow the

rebellious colonists into submission by taking the port of Boston. Their hope that this action

would intimidate the rebels backfired, however, and soon they found themselves in a fight with a

united front of colonies determined to oust the British tyranny. While the onset of the war was

an egregious miscalculation, the way the British conducted their naval campaign is surely one of

arrogant folly. Having failed to maintain an adequate fleet following the Seven Years War,1 the

British allowed France to build her navy untamed. They further allowed the French to entice the

Spanish to enter the war as allies, creating a united fleet that far outnumbered the already

overtaxed British Fleet. Then, the nail in the coffin, they fail to identify their military objectives,

and thus leave their fleet spread thin as paint, in all corners of the world, to defend every British

asset. The depth of their reserve force and their operational skill as seamen could not overcome

the inadequacies of their numerical inferiority nor their complete lack of global strategy. The

British naval fleet was completely ineffective during the American War for Independence as a

result of three major strategic failures: first, that their naval inventory was already weak at the

beginning of the war and remained so throughout, even after France declared war against them;

second, that they failed to identify key asset locations at which to bolster their fleet and instead

left a sparse squadron at every British port unable to mount a proper defense; and third, that they

failed to blockade any French and Spanish ports, leaving the allies with the strategic advantage

of deciding where and when they would fight.

1
Carpenter, Stanley D.M. “The British Strategic Failure in the Southern Campaign, 1778-1782.” Naval War College,
Unpublished Paper, 2008, page 12.
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Finest (or Finite-ist?) Fleet in the World

Britain’s failure to maintain a fleet capable of global warfare and defense of all her

empire proved a critical vulnerability that would contribute to her defeat in the Americas. The

Royal Navy had over 100 ships-of-the-line commissioned in 1763 following the Seven Years

War, but allowed that number to fall to only sixty-six decrepit ships in 1775 badly in need of

repair.2 This failure of preparation goes very well against Mahan’s belief in maintaining forces

in times of peace: “Naval strategy has indeed for its end to found, support, and increase, as well

in peace as in war, the sea power of a country.”3 At the start of the American War for

Independence, the British only had sixty ships-of-the-line. Seeing that the rebels had no native

navy, the British did not choose to strengthen their fleet. This myopic estimation failed to take

into account any international allies the Patriots may have made. Even after the French formally

joined the war, the British arrogance still blinded them to their blistering numerical inferiority.

Such disdain the British had for the French navy and their lack of reserve force that they scarcely

maintained the number of ships they had. Once the Spanish formally declared war, Britain

started to augment her scant fleet, but it was too little too late. As the allies churned out hull

after hull in the shipyards, Britain’s numerical inferiority was a sealed fate. The table below

shows how Britain allowed France to build her fleet to fifty-two ships-of-the-line only twenty

years after a humiliating defeat in the Seven Years War. Following France’s declaration of war,

the French fleet was fortified and even under the strain of combat rose to seventy-three ships-of-

the-line by 1782. Britain, by contrast, had only built their numbers from sixty ships-of-the-line

at the war’s inception to sixty-six ships the year France entered the war. Despite facing a clear

2
Carpenter, Stanley D.M. “The British Strategic Failure in the Southern Campaign, 1778-1782.” Naval War College,
Unpublished Paper, 2008, page 61.

3
Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. New York: Dover, 1987, page 89.
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disadvantage once Spain joined the cause, Britain only expanded her fleet to approximately 95

ships, while facing a fleet of over one hundred enemy ships. Only Mahan could sum this

recklessness up so eloquently: “‘Better late than never’ is not so safe a proverb as ‘In time of

peace prepare for war.’”4

Naval Balance of Power, 1778-1782 (ships-of-the-line in commission) 5

Allied
Year France Spain Holland Britain
Total
1778 52 -- -- 52 66
1779 63 58 -- 121 90
1780 69 48 -- 117 95
1781 70 54 14 138 94
1782 73 54 19 146 94

Presence is Not Defense

At the outset of the conflict in the Americas it seems clear that Britain did not know

where to concentrate her assets. Unable to assess the center of gravity of the colonies in the

Americas (public opinion)6 and unable to determine her own critical vulnerability (her fleet),7

Britain’s strategy appears to be placing ships at every territory and hoping that the merely the

sight of the Union Jack would cause enemy ships to scatter. Mahan stated: “This is one of the

most common and flagrant violations of the principles of war, - stretching a thin line, everywhere

inadequate, over an immense frontier.”8 When France entered the war Britain was faced with the
4
Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. New York: Dover, 1987, page 331.

5
Carpenter, Stanley D.M. “The British Strategic Failure in the Southern Campaign, 1778-1782.” Naval War College,
Unpublished Paper, 2008, page 59.

6
Carpenter, Stanley D.M. “The British Strategic Failure in the Southern Campaign, 1778-1782.” Naval War College,
Unpublished Paper, 2008, page 23.
7
“The key of the situation, it must be repeated, was in the fleet.” Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon
History, 1660-1783. New York: Dover, 1987, page 513.
8
Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. New York: Dover, 1987, page 414.
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difficult task of switching from an offensive strategy to a defensive strategy. Counter-intuitive

as it seems to the country’s tradition, Britain turned the strategic windgage over to the allies by

paring her fleet out to defend every port and refuge in the empire. Of this type of strategy, Sun

Tzu wrote: “If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.”9 The logical

course of action would have been to defend first the most necessary parts of the empire, and next

to decide which parts of the empire were most important and also most easily held using the

inherent strength possessed by Britain’s navy.10 Such islands as Barbados and Santa Lucia

should have been fortified, and supporting garrisons pulled out of the surrounding islands.

Gibraltar should have been fortified in the Mediterranean, and the Channel fortified between the

British Isles and France. By choosing only a few locations to secure a defense, it would free

forces to use for the offensive in the Americas and to blockade the allied nations in Europe.

“With the defence thus concentrated, England’s great weapon, the navy, should have been

vigorously used on the offensive.”11 Since Britain failed to identify key locations to concentrate

her fleet, she was not able to maintain the offensive in the Americas, not able to secure her

territories throughout the rest of the world, and not able to blockade the forces in Europe.

Blockade? What Blockade?

As was mentioned above, one of Britain’s gravest miscalculations was ignoring the

chance to choose the geographical location at which to take the naval fight against Spain and

France. Mahan stated: “…the whole fortune of the war should at the first have been staked on a

concentration of the English fleet between Brest and Cadiz.”12 There were endless benefits to
9
Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Samuel B. Griffith, trans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, page 99.

10
Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. New York: Dover, 1987, page 393.
11
Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. New York: Dover, 1987, page 394.
12
Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. New York: Dover, 1987, page 414.
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blockading the European ports. In the American War for Independence, the belligerents were

thousands of miles away from the battlefields. By blockading the allied ports, England could

bring the fight to their home soil, and weaken the people’s resolve to remain in the war. It would

give the British an offensive means to remove the allies from the war. It would essentially

provide the “counter-strike” of which Sun Tzu would approve. Any losses of ships or repairs

needed could easily be renewed from the resources of Great Britain, rather than taxing the

resources of smaller territories in the Caribbean or the Mediterranean, which would then require

replenishment. Rather than spreading the fleet out over the empire, it would concentrate the

naval forces to specific geographic areas, and give the decision to wage battle to the British.

Even if the British were unwilling to blockade both countries, it was critical to their objective to

blockade at least one country. Mahan’s opined: “If not strong enough to be in superior force

before both [nations], that of the more powerful nation should have been closed.”13 Blockading

even one nation would have forced the other to transport their logistics over land, which would

have been time consuming and expensive. It would also increase the likelihood of stopping

those supplies from reaching their destination, since the allies would be using fewer trade routes,

thus making their trade ships more interceptable. By ignoring this potentially crippling strategy,

Britain let loose the allies on all their empire, weakening their fight for the Americas and

forfeiting claim to territories in the West Indies and the Mediterranean.

Counterargument

Many of the issues which plagued the British were evident at the war’s commencement.

Britain’s Admiralty had to play the cards it was dealt, and so formed a strategy using what little

assets it had in order to achieve an objective which was never truly defined. At the outset of the

13
Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. New York: Dover, 1987, page 417.
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war the British fleet was in no shape to fight a global competitor. Britain quickly recognized the

numerical disparity of her fleet and in 1776 instituted a massive ship building program. This did

much to nullify the Allied quantitative advantage by 1782.14 It could be argued that the Allies

never did grasp a tactical advantage, as each battle with a French squadron resulted in stalemate

or victory. Thus while the strategy of trying to defend every territory rather than the most

important can be criticized, it cannot be argued that the French were repeatedly foiled in their

attempts to trap the British fleet or to soundly defeat it. The British had solid naval training and

skilled seaman capable of taking on the slim odds given them. The French had numerical

superiority certainly, but their fleet was poorly trained and lacked the reserve force to man the

ships she was putting to sea. Also while the British sought the windgage, the French preferred to

avoid it and simply mount a proper defense. The British may have relied upon the fact that they

would have the windgage and would thus be able to choose when they would fight and when

they would flee, thereby quashing any Allied advantage gained in numbers. Finally, while the

British were reluctant to blockade ports, they were not inactive in Northern Europe. Seeing a

vulnerability in the supply load carried by the Dutch trading companies, the British initiated war

with Holland. Such an action, Mahan explains, had the benefit because “[by] forcing Holland

into war, however, she obtained a military advantage; for, without increasing the strength of her

opponents, several important but ill-defended military and commercial positions were thereby

laid open to her arms.”15 And so even though Britain did not choose to attack the supply lanes

coming directly from France and Spain, she still intercepted goods intended for the Patriots and

was able to take control of the geography surrounding Great Britain to her benefit.

14
Carpenter, Stanley D.M. “The British Strategic Failure in the Southern Campaign, 1778-1782.” Naval War College,
Unpublished Paper, 2008, page 61.

15
Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. New York: Dover, 1987, page 508.
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Rebuttal to Counterargument

While the British attempted to repair their feeble fleet once war broke out in the colonies,

their failure was foreshadowed by years of naval neglect. Having lost a significant part of their

reserve force to the colonies, and having let their ships rot in the harbors, Britain’s navy was in

no condition to wage war with the Patriots, let alone with an Allied Force. Without sound

strategy, tactics cannot prevail. Or better said in this case: despite tactical precision, success

relies on sound strategy. Fine seamanship cannot overcome strategic shortcomings. Sending

their navy out without a clear objective to defend every corner of the empire was a plan doomed

to failure. It relied on letting the enemy choose where and when he would engage. Failing to

take the fight to the enemy’s door, Britain did not capitalize on the advantage she had of having

no land barrier to defend. Failing to blockade the enemy, Britain’s strategy seemed to be

allowing the Allies to leave port only to estimate their destination and hope to beat them there.

In the end, this cat and mouse strategy wore down the manpower of the fleet and was

unsuccessful in defending coastal cities on the Eastern Seaboard as well as islands in the West

Indies. Britain’s entire naval strategy was simply one of unimaginative failure.

Conclusion

“No one starts a war–or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so–without first being

clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”16

Clausewitz’ words could not be more relevant to the British struggle with the rebels in the

American colonies. The British did not understand the nature of the conflict they started. They

never identified their own objectives or what means they would use to get there. As a result,

16
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Michael Howard and Peter Peret, eds. And trans. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1989, page 579.
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their naval strategy was passive at best, leaving their ships facing slim odds against a numerically

superior opponent who was able to choose where and how he would fight. It would seem the

only belligerent to have read Sun Tzu was the French, as they followed the famous tenet: “Know

the enemy and know yourself, in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”17 While the Allies

drafted a document clearly stating the terms upon which they were declaring war and what

results they could achieve which would lead to war termination, the British never articulated

their political objectives. A newly formed Parliament under a displaced monarchy was issuing

orders to a military system which was not yet structured like the contemporary system. The lack

of communication between branches of the military and the lack of direction given to either is

evident in the flaccid execution of joint operations and the haphazard defenses assigned to each

territory. Perhaps letting their arrogance dictate their terms, the British failed to blockade key

Allied ports, and so missed the opportunity to limit the theater of war. The three strategic

missteps which crippled the British naval strategy were: failing to maintain an adequate fleet,

failing to identify strategic locations of importance and concentrating forces to guard only those,

and failing to blockade the French and Spanish ports.

17
Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Samuel B. Griffith, trans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, page 84.
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Bibliography

1. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. New

York: Dover, 1987.

2. Carpenter, Stanley D.M. “The British Strategic Failure in the Southern Campaign, 1778-

1782.” Naval War College, Unpublished Paper, 2008.

3. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Samuel B. Griffith, trans. Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1980.

4. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Michael Howard and Peter Peret, eds. And trans.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.