ASSIGNMENT FOR AUGUST 1, 2018
person being investigated with counsel.” Hence, the administrative body
READ THE FOLLOWING CASES:
Purisima vs. Phil. Tobacco Institute, G.R. No. 210251, Apr. 17, 2017
Issue:Is Section 11 of Revenue Regulation No. 17-2012 issued on
authority of R.A. No. 10351, otherwise known as the Sin Tax Reform
Law of 2012?
Ruling: No. Section 11 of RR 17-2012 and Annex "D-1" on Cigarettes
Packed by Machine of RMC 90-2012 clearly contravened the provisions
of RA 10351. RA 10351, in amending Section 145(C) of the NIRC
provided that "duly registered cigarettes packed by machine shall only
be packed in twenties and other packaging combinations of not more
than twenty.'· However, nowhere is it mentioned that the other
packaging combinations of not more than 20 will be imposed individual
tax rates based on its different packages of S's, lO's, etc. In such a case, a
cigarette pack of 20's will only be subjected to an excise tax rate ofP-
12.00 per pack as opposed to packaging combinations of S's or lO's
which will be subjected to a higher excise tax rate of P24.00 for lO's and
P48.00for S's.
The lawmakers intended to impose the excise tax on every pack of
cigarettes that come in 20sticks.Individual pouches or packaging
combinations of S's and lO's for retail purposes are allowed and will be
subjected to the same excise tax rate as long as they are bundled
together by not more than 20 sticks. Thus, by issuing Section 11ofRR17-
2012 and Annex "D-1" on Cigarettes Packed by Machine of RMC 90-2012,
the BIR went beyond the express provisions of RA10351.
Cudia vs. PMA, G.R. No. 211362, Feb. 24, 2015
Issue: Does Cudia have the right to counsel not just in assisting him
in the preparation for the investigative hearing before the HC and
the CRAB but in participating in said hearings?
Ruling: No. there is nothing in the 1987Constitution stating that a party
in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel.
The assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not indispensable. a party
in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity
to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the
is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance
of counsel is not an absolute requirement
Besaga vs. Acosta, G.R. No. 194061, April 20, 2015
Issue: Is the liberality of procedure in administrative actions
subject to any limitation?
Ruling: Yes. In proceedings before administrative bodies the
general rule has always been liberality. The liberality of procedure in
administrative actions, however, is subject to limitations imposed by the
requirements of due process. Liberal construction has no application
when due process is violated. The crucial point of inquiry in cases
involving violation of administrative rules of procedure is whether such
violation disregards the basic tenets of administrative due process. If the
gravity of the violation of the rules is such that due process is breached,
the rules of procedure should be strictly applied. Otherwise, the rules are
liberally construed.
Issue: Can the liberal construction be applied on appeal
reglementary period as in this case?
Ruling: Yes. First, there is no violation of due process. In fact, to
sustain the position of the petitioner and strictly apply Section l(a) of
DAO No. 87 may violate the respondent spouses right to due process as
this would result to a denial of their right to appeal. In this case, appeal
was timely filed, although not directly to the office which issued the
order sought to be reviewed. They also paid the full appeal fees although
beyond the 15-day period. These procedural lapses were neither
prejudicial nor unfair to the petitioner. The petitioner's right to due
process was not breached.
ISAA v. Green Peace GR 209271 Dec. 8, 2015
Issue: What is “hot tubbing” and how does the method of hot tub
hearing work?
Ruling: In a "hot tub" hearing, the judge can hear all the experts
discussing the same issue at the same time to explain each of their points
in a discussion with a professional colleague. The objective is to achieve
greater efficiency and expedition, by reduced emphasis on cross-
examination and increased emphasis on professional dialogue, and
swifter identification of the critical areas of disagreement between the
experts.
Issue: Were the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies violated in this case?
Ruling: No. This case falls under the exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Respondents sought relief under
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, claiming serious health
and environmental adverse effects of the Bttalong field trials due to
"inherent risks" associated with genetically modified crops and
herbicides. They sought the immediate issuance of a TEPO to enjoin the
processing for field testing and registering Bttalong as herbicidal
product in the Philippines, stopping all pending field trials of Bttalong
anywhere in the country, and ordering the uprooting of planted Bttalong
in the field trial sites.Clearly, the provisions of DAO 08-2002 do not
provide a speedy, or adequate remedy for the respondents "to determine
the questions of unique national and local importance raised here that
pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection, thus they were
justified in coming to this Court." We take judicial notice of the fact that
genetically modified food is an intensely debated global issue, and
despite the entry of GMO crops (Bt corn) into the Philippines in the last
decade, it is only now that such controversy involving alleged damage or
threat to human health and the environment from GMOs has reached the
courts.
Addtl:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he
should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The
issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be
summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such
administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due
deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public
policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many
accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay
or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where
the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is
urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h)
where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy (such as the situation in this
case); (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (1) in quo warranto
proceedings.
Ocampo v. Enriquez
G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016
Issue: Did petitioners violate the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies in challenging before the Supreme Court
the interment of the Late President at LNMB?
Ruling: Yes. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court,
one should have availed first of all the means of administrative processes
available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction,
then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial
power can be sought. For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of
justice shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error
and dispose of the case. While there are exceptions43 to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners failed to prove the
presence of any of those exceptions.
Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, petitioners should be faulted for failing to
seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive before
the Secretary of National Defense. The Secretary of National Defense
should be given opportunity to correct himself, if warranted, considering
that AFP Regulations G 161-375 was issued upon his order. Questions on
the implementation and interpretation thereof demand the exercise of
sound administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of his office to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact. If petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the decision
of the Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the Office of the
President which has control and supervision over the Department of
National Defense (DND).
Gonzales vs. Marmaine Realty, G.R. No. 214241, Jan. 13, 2016
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for
review before it due to petitioners’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies?
Ruling: Yes. Sps. Gonzales correctly pointed out that the issue they
raised before the CA, i.e., the propriety of the cancellation of the Notice of
Lis Pendens, falls within the aforesaid exception as the same is a purely
legal question, considering that the resolution of the same would not
involve an examination of the probative value presented by the litigants
and mus trest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.
The CA erred in dismissing Sps. Gonzales’ petition for review before it,
considering that the matter at issue – a question of law – falls within the
known exceptions of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. In such a case, court procedure dictates that the instant case
be remanded to the CA for a resolution on the merits. However, when
there is already enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits
may be had, as in this case, the Court may dispense with the time-
consuming procedure of remand in order to prevent further delays in
the disposition of the case and to better serve the ends of justice.36 In
view of the foregoing – as well as the fact that Sps. Gonzales prayed for a
resolution of the issue on themerits37 – the Court finds it appropriate to
finally settle the conflicting claims of the parties.
DIGEST THE FOLLOWING CASES
SPCMB vs. AMLC, G.R. No. 216914, Dec. 6, 2016
Issue: Is AMLC an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers?
Ruling: No. Nowhere from the text of the law nor its Implementing Rules
and Regulations can we glean that the AMLC exercises quasi-judicial
functions whether the actual preliminary investigation is done simply at
its behest or conducted by the Department of Justice and the
Ombudsman.
AMLC does not exercise quasi-judicial powers and is simply an
investigatory body. The AMLC's investigation of money laundering
offenses and its determination of possible money laundering offenses,
specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts allowed by court order,
does not transform it into an investigative body exercising quasi-judicial
powers. Hence, Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court
order, cannot be said to violate SPCMB's constitutional right to
procedural due process.
Soriano vs. Sec of Finance, G. R. No. 184450, Jan 24, 2017
Issue: Whether Section s 1 and 3 of RR 10-2008 are consistent with
the law in declaring that an “an MWE who receives other benefits in
excess of the statutory limit of P30,000 is no longer entitled to the
exemption provided by R. A. 9504”, consistent with the law?
Ruling:No. Sections 1 and 3 of RR 10-2008 add a requirement not found
in the law by effectively declaring that a Minimum wage earner (MWE)
who receives other benefits in excess of the statutory limit of P30,000 is
no longer entitled to the exemption provided by R.A. 9504. Nowhere in
the above provisions of R.A. 9504 would one find the qualifications
prescribed by the assailed provisions of RR 10-2008. The provisions of
the law are clear and precise; they leave no room for interpretation -
they do not provide or require any other qualification as to who are
MWEs.
To be exempt, one must be a MWE, a term that is clearly defined. Section
22(HH) says he/she must be one who is paid the statutory minimum
wage if he/she works in the private sector, or not more than the
statutory minimum wage in the non-agricultural sector where he/she is
assigned, if he/she is a government employee. Thus, one is either a MWE
or he/she is not. Simply put, MWE is the status acquired upon passing
the litmus test - whether one receives wages not exceeding the
prescribed minimum wage.
While the Labor Code's definition of "wage" appears to encompass any
payments of any designation that an employer pays his or her
employees, the concept of minimum wage is distinct.63 "Minimum wage"
is wage mandated; one that employers may not freely choose on their
own to designate in any which way.
The minimum wage referred to in the definition has itself a clear and
definite meaning. The law explicitly refers to the rate fixed by the
Regional Tripartite Wage and Productivity Board, which is a creation of
the Labor Code.
The minimum wage exempted by R.A. 9504 is that which is referred to
in the Labor Code. It is distinct and different from other payments
including allowances, honoraria, commissions, allowances or benefits
that an employer may pay or provide an employee.
Likewise, the other compensation incomes an MWE receives that are
also exempted by R.A. 9504 are all mandated by law and are based on
this minimum wage.
R.A. 9504 is explicit as to the coverage of the exemption: the wages that
are not in excess of the minimum wage as determined by the wage
boards, including the corresponding holiday, overtime, night differential
and hazard pays.
In other words, the law exempts from income taxation the most basic
compensation an employee receives - the amount afforded to the lowest
paid employees by the mandate of law. In a way, the legislature grants to
these lowest paid employees additional income by no longer demanding
from them a contribution for the operations of government. This is the
essence of R.A. 9504 as a social legislation. The government, by way of
the tax exemption, affords increased purchasing power to this sector of
the working class. Benefits not beyond P30,000 were exempted; wages
not beyond the SMW are now exempted as well. Conversely, benefits in
excess of P30,000 are subject to tax and now, wages in excess of the
statutory minimum wage (SMW) are still subject to tax. Given the
foregoing, the treatment of bonuses and other benefits that an employee
receives from the employer in excess of the P30,000 ceiling cannot but
be the same as the prevailing treatment prior to R.A. 9504 - anything in
excess of P30,000 is taxable; no more, no less.
The increased purchasing power is estimated at about P9,500 a year. RR
10-2008, however, takes this away. In declaring that once an MWE
receives other forms of taxable income like commissions, honoraria, and
fringe benefits in excess of the non-taxable statutory amount of P30,000,
RR 10-2008 declared that the MWE immediately becomes ineligible for
tax exemption; and otherwise non-taxable minimum wage, along with
the other taxable incomes of the MWE, becomes taxable again.
Somboonsakdikul vs. Orlane, S.A., G.R. No. 188996, Feb. 1, 2017
Issue: As in this case, should the courts of justice respect the
findings of fact of the Intellectual Property Office [IPO] --- an
administrative agency?
Ruling: The CA erred when it affirmed the Decision of the IPO.
While it is an established rule in administrative law that the courts of
justice should respect the findings of fact of administrative agencies, the
courts may not be bound by such findings of fact when there is
absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly,
manifestly and patently insubstantial; and when there is a clear showing
that the administrative agency acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion or in a capricious and whimsical manner, such that its action
may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, when there is
a showing that the findings or conclusions, drawn from the same pieces
of evidence, were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on
record, they may be reviewed by the courts. Such is the case here
because there is no colorable imitation between the marks LOLANE and
ORLANE which would lead to any likelihood of confusion to the ordinary
purchasers.
Republic v. OG Holdings GR. No. 189290 Nov. 29, 2017
Issue: Did OG Holdings comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies?
Ruling: No. O.G. Holdings failed to abide by this doctrine. Administrative
remedies existed against the suspension of the subject ECC, made
available via DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 2003 (A.O. No.
30), which was prevailing at the time of the suspensive orders. A.O. No.
30 provides:
Section 6. Appeal
Any party aggrieved by the final decision on the ECC/CNC applications
may, within 15 days from receipt of such decision, file an appeal on the
following grounds:
a. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the deciding authority, or
b. Serious errors in the review findings.

O.G. Holdings thus had the opportunity to file an administrative appeal

on the suspension of the beach resort project's ECC, beginning with the
Office of the EMB Director. Indeed, the administrative machinery
afforded even an appeal to the Office of the President, but O.G. Holdings
did not avail of such.

ALFI vs. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, April 26, 2017

Issue: Were the certification proceedings conducted by the FDA in

the exercise of its “regulatory powers”, and therefore, beyond
judicial review?

Ruling: No. On the argument that the certification proceedings were

conducted by the FDA in the exercise of its "regulatory powers" and,
therefore, beyond judicial review, the Court holds that it has the power
to review all acts and decisions where there is a commission of grave
abuse of discretion. No less than the Constitution decrees that the Court
must exercise its duty to ensure that no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is committed by any branch
or instrumentality of the Government. Such is committed when there is a
violation of the constitutional mandate that "no person is deprived of
life, liberty, and property without due process of law." The Court's power
cannot be curtailed by the FDA's invocation of its regulatory power.
Nowhere in the law can it be inferred that the exercise of "regulatory
power" places an administrative agency beyond the reach of judicial
review. When there is grave abuse of discretion, such as denying a party
of his constitutional right to due process, the Court can come in and
exercise its power of judicial review. It can review the challenged acts,
whether exercised by the FDA in its ministerial, quasi-judicial or
regulatory power.