i.
Preparatory to filing a complaint for violation of BP22
RULE 7
Parts of a Pleading
SECTION 1. Caption. — The caption sets forth the name of
the court, the title of the action, and the docket number if
assigned.
The title of the action indicates the names of the parties.
They shall all be named in the original complaint or
petition; but in subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if
the name of the first party on each side be stated with an
appropriate indication when there are other parties. Their
respective participation in the case shall be indicated. (1a,
2a)
SECTION 2. The body. — The body of the pleading sets forth
its designation, the allegations of the party’s claims or
defenses, the relief prayed for, and the date of the
pleading. (n)
Paragraphs. — The allegations in the body of a pleading
shall be divided into paragraphs so numbered as to be
readily identified, each of which shall contain a statement
of a single set of circumstances so far as that can be done
with convenience. A paragraph may be referred to by its
number in all succeeding pleadings. (3a)
(b) Headings. — When two or more causes of action are
joined, the statement of the first shall be prefaced by the
words, “first cause of action,” of the second by “second
cause of action,” and so on for the others.
When one or more paragraphs in the answer are addressed
to one of several causes of action in the complaint, they
shall be prefaced by the words “answer to the first cause of
action” or “answer to the second cause of action” and so
on; and when one or more paragraphs of the answer are
addressed to several causes of action they shall be prefaced
by words to that effect. (4)
(c) Relief . — The pleading shall specify the relief sought,
but it may add a general prayer for such further or other as
may be deemed just or equitable. (3a, R6)
(d) Date. — Every pleading shall be dated. (n)
SECTION 3. Signature and address. — Every pleading must
be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating
in either case his address which should not be a post office
box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief there is a good ground
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. An
unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the
court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be
remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere
inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading
in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent
matter therein, or fails to promptly report to the court a
change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action. (5a)
SECTION 4. Verification. — Except when otherwise
specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has
read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true
and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on “information and belief, or upon
“knowledge, information and belief,” or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (4a)
(As amended by SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 48-00,
August 29, 2000, [A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC. Re: Amendments To
Section 4, Rule 7 And Section 13, Rule 41 Of The 1997 Rules
Of Civil Procedure]).
SECTION 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The
plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith; (a) that he has not
therefore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such
other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not
be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for dismissal of the
case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
1
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of
court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal sanctions. If the acts of the
party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
(n)
RULE 8
Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings
SECTION 1. In general. — Every pleading shall contain in a
methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading
relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting
the statement of mere evidentiary facts. (1)
If a defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent
provisions thereof and their applicability to him shall be
clearly and concisely stated. (n)
SECTION 2. Alternative causes of action or defenses. — A
party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or
defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause
of action or defense or in separate causes of action or
defenses. When two or more statements are made in the
alternative and one of them if made independently would
be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the
insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements.
(2)
SECTION 3. Conditions precedent. — In any pleading a
general averment of the performance or occurrence of all
conditions precedent shall be sufficient. (3)
SECTION 4. Capacity. — Facts showing the capacity of a
party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or
be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence
of an organized association of persons that is made a party,
must be averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as to the
legal existence of any party or the capacity, shall do so by
specific denial, which shall include such supporting
particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader’s knowledge.
(4)
SECTION 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. — In all
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge or other condition
of the mind of a person may be averred generally. (5)
SECTION 6. Judgment. — In pleading a judgment or decision
of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial
tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the
judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing
jurisdiction to render it. (6)
SECTION 7. Action or defense based on document. —
Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written
instrument or document, the substance of such instrument
or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the
original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading
as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the
pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in
the pleading. (7)
SECTION 8. How to contest such documents. — When an
action or defense is founded upon a written instrument,
copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as
provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted
unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies
them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse
party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or
when compliance with an order for an inspection of the
original instrument is refused. (8a)
SECTION 9. Official document or act. — In pleading an
official document or official act it is sufficient to aver that
the document was issued or the act done in compliance
with law. (9)
SECTION 10. Specific denial. — A defendant must specify
each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does
not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the
substance of the matters upon which he relies upon to
support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only
a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is
true and material and shall deny only the remainder.
Where the defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material
2
averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this
shall have the effect of a denial. (10a)
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed
admitted. — Material averment in the complaint, other
than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall
be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.
Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious
interest are deemed admitted if not denied under oath. (1a,
R9)
SECTION 12. Striking out of pleading or matter contained
therein. — Upon motion made by a party before
responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is
permitted by these Rules, upon motion made by a party
within twenty (20) days after the service of the pleading
upon him, or upon the court’s own initiative at any time,
the court may order any pleading to be stricken out or that
any sham or false, redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter be stricken out therefrom. (5, R9)
RULE 9
Effect of Failure to Plead
SECTION 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. —
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However,
when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on
record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is
barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the
court shall dismiss the claim. (2a)
SECTION 2. Compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim not set
up barred. — A compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim
not set up shall be barred. (4a)
SECTION 3. Default, declaration of . — If the defending
party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the
court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice
to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare
the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall
proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such
relief as the pleading may warrant, unless the court in its
discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such
reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of
court. (1a, R18)
(a) Effect of order of default. — A party in default shall be
entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings, but not to
take part in the trial. (2a, R18)
(b) Relief from order of default. — A party declared in
default may at any time after notice thereof and before
judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of
default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and
that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order
of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as
the judge may impose in the interest of justice. (3a, R18)
(c) Effect of partial default. — When a pleading asserting a
claim states a common cause of action against several
defending parties, some of whom answer and the others
fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the
answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence
presented. (4a, R18)
(d) Extent of relief, to be awarded. — A judgment rendered
against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be
different in kind from that prayed for nor award
unliquidated damages. (5a, R18)
(e) Where no defaults allowed. — If the defending party in
an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court
shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether
or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is
no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it
that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. (6a, R18)
RULE 13
Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers
SECTION 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. —
Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings
and other papers shall be done personally. Except with
respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to
other modes must be accompanied by a written
explanation why the service or filing was not done
personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider
the paper as not filed.
j.LGC
Section 139. Professional Tax. -
(a) The province may levy an annual professional tax on
each person engaged in the exercise or practice of his
profession requiring government examination at such
amount and reasonable classification as the sangguniang
3
panlalawigan may determine but shall in no case exceed
Three hundred pesos (P300.00).

(b) Every person legally authorized to practice his

profession shall pay the professional tax to the province
where he practices his profession or where he maintains his
principal office in case he practices his profession in several
places: Provided, however, That such person who has paid
the corresponding professional tax shall be entitled to
practice his profession in any part of the Philippines
without being subjected to any other national or local tax,
license, or fee for the practice of such profession.

(c) Any individual or corporation employing a person

subject to professional tax shall require payment by that
person of the tax on his profession before employment and
annually thereafter.

(d) The professional tax shall be payable annually, on or

before the thirty-first (31st) day of January. Any person first
beginning to practice a profession after the month of
January must, however, pay the full tax before engaging
therein. A line of profession does not become exempt even
if conducted with some other profession for which the tax
has been paid. Professionals exclusively employed in the
government shall be exempt from the payment of this tax.

(e) Any person subject to the professional tax shall write in

deeds, receipts, prescriptions, reports, books of account,
plans and designs, surveys and maps, as the case may be,
the number of the official receipt issued to him.

4
k. Bar Matter No. 287, SC En Banc Resolution dated July 9,
1985, quoted in OCA Circular No. 10-85, July 24, 1985

CIRCULAR NO. 10
[1985]

TO: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, SANDIGANBAYAN,

COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS
IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS

SUBJECT: INCLUSION OF NUMBER AND DATE OF OFFICIAL

RECEIPT OF PAYMENT OF ANNUAL MEMBERSHIP DUES TO
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, IN ALL
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND PAPERS TO BE FILED IN COURT.

For the information and guidance of all concerned, quoted

hereunder is the Resolution En Banc of this Court dated July
9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Effective August 1, 1985, all lawyers shall indicate in all
pleadings, motions and papers signed and filed by them in
any ourt in the Philippines, the number and date of their
official receipt indicating payment of their annual
membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for the current year: Provided, however, That such official
receipt number and date for any year may be availed of and
indicated in all such pleadings, motions and papers filed by
them in Court up to the end of the month of February of
the next succeeding year.” Strict compliance herewith is
hereby enjoined.

July 24, 1985.

[Sgd.] ARTURO B. BUENA

Acting Court Administrator

5
L..[B.M. No. 1132.November 12, 2002]

RE:REQUEST TO REQUIRE LAWYERS TO INDICATE IN THE

PLEADING THEIR NUMBER IN THE ROLL OF ATTYS.

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of

this Court dated 12 NOV 2002.

Bar Matter No. 1132(Re:Request to Require Lawyers to

Indicate in the Pleading their Number in the Roll of
Attorneys.)

The Court Resolved, upon recommendation of the Office of

the Bar Confidant, to GRANT the request of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte to require all
lawyers to indicate their Roll of Attorneys Number in all
papers or pleadings submitted to the various judicial or
quasi-judicial bodies in addition to the requirement of
indicating the current Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) and
the IBP Official Receipt or Life Member Number.

Strict compliance herewith is hereby enjoined effective

immediately.Austria-Martinez, J., is on leave.

Very truly yours,

LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court

(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA

6
Am No. 07-6-5-SC
[A.M. No. 07-6-6-SC : February 26, 2010]
RE: NON-OBSERVANCE BY ATTY. EDEN T. CANDELARIA,
CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES (OAS), OF EN BANC
RESOLUTION A.M. NO. 05-9-29-SC DATED SEPTEMBER 27,
2005 AND EN BANC RULING IN OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN V.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (G.R. NO. 159940 DATED
FEBRUARY 16, 2005),
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This administrative matter is about the possible liability of
the Court's Chief of Administrative Services as a
consequence of the Civil Service Commission's (CSC's)
denial on June 1, 2007 of the two coterminous
appointments of Joseph Raymond Mendoza as Chief of the
Management and Information Systems Office (MISO).
The Facts and the Case
On September 27, 2005 the Court en banc issued a
resolution in A.M. 05-9-29-SC, classifying as highly technical
or policy-determining the position of Chief of MISO, a
permanent item in the Court's list of personnel. On March
14, 2006 the Court additionally issued a resolution in A.M.
06-3-07-SC, establishing the qualification standards for
Chief of MISO, including a Bachelor's Degree in Computer
Science or any equally comparable degree with Master in
Science Degree in Computer Science or Information
Technology. The CSC approved these standards.
Subsequently or on June 20, 2006 the Court lowered the
educational requirement to Bachelor's Degree in Computer
Science or any equally comparable degree, with post-
graduate level (at least 18 units) in Computer Science or
Information Technology and submitted the same to the CSC
for approval.
On August 8, 2006, pending CSC approval of the lowered
standards, then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
appointed Mendoza as MISO Chief. Since the latter did not
then meet the approved March 14, 2006 qualification
standards, it was thought best that his appointment be
made coterminous with the Chief Justice's tenure that was
to end on December 7, 2006.
With the retirement of Chief Justice Panganiban and acting
on the recommendation of the Project Management Office
(PMO) and Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Chair of the
Computerization and Library Committee, Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno directed the preparation of the
reappointment paper of Mendoza as MISO Chief. But the
Chief Justice set it to last for six months.
The Office of the Administrative Services (OAS), through its
Chief, Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, prepared the paper, stating
in it that Mendoza's reappointment was coterminous with
Chief Justice Puno but he was to serve for only six months
from December 7, 2006. On January 4, 2007 the OAS
submitted this and the earlier coterminous appointments
of Mendoza to the CSC for approval.
Four months later or on May 8, 2007 the PMO
recommended the permanent appointment of Mendoza as
Chief of MISO after he passed the Career Service
Professional Exams. But action on this was deferred to first
await the CSC's approval of Mendoza's coterminous
appointments. On June 1, 2007, however, the CSC
disapproved Mendoza's coterminous appointments on the
ground that the CSC had no occasion to declare the position
of Chief of MISO as primarily confidential, highly technical,
or policy-determining as to qualify Mendoza to a
coterminous appointment. The CSC letter to the Court
stated in part:
In a letter dated September 1, 2006 to CSC, [Atty.
Candelaria] represented that except for the positions of
Executive Assistant III and Chauffer, all the positions in the
MISO are permanent in nature.
Sec. 12 (9), Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 states in part the following:
Sec. 12. Powers and Functions.-- The Commission shall have
the following powers and functions: x x x
(9) Declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be
primarily confidential in nature, highly technical or policy-
determining.
Item 7(a) Part I of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, s.
2003 likewise provides:
7. The Commission may allow agencies to establish
qualification standards for their positions belonging to the
following categories:
a. Positions declared by the Commission as primarily
confidential in nature are exempted from the qualification
standards requirements prescribed in the Qualification
Standards Manual x x x.
7
Records are bereft of any showing that the position of Chief
of MISO has been declared by the Commission as primarily
confidential, highly technical or policy-determining to
qualify as coterminous in nature.
In view thereof x x x the coterminous appointments of
[Mendoza] are disapproved.[1]
On June 12, 2007 Justice Carpio wrote a Memorandum to
Chief Justice Puno, recommending the taking of disciplinary
action against Atty. Candelaria for gross neglect of duty,
gross incompetence in the performance of official duties,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as
follows:
(a) She violated the Court's resolution in A.M. 05-9-29-SC
and its 2005 ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil
Service Commission[2] when she submitted Mendoza's
appointments and all other Supreme Court third level
appointments to the CSC for approval when this was not
legally required;
(b) She failed to inform the CSC Assistant Commissioner
when she met the latter that the Court had already
classified the position of Chief of MISO as highly technical
or policy-determining; and
(c) She indicated in Mendoza's second appointment paper a
"coterminous" appointment instead of a six-month
appointment as the Chief Justice directed.
Justice Carpio points out, relying on the Court's resolution
in A.M. 05-9-29-SC and its ruling in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission, that the Court en
banc, as the appointing power under the Constitution, may
appoint, without need of CSC approval, employees in the
judiciary to third level positions classified as highly technical
or policy-determining. Once so classified, the CSC has a
ministerial duty to accept such appointments.
Consequently in submitting them to the CSC for approval,
she undermined the independence of the judiciary. She also
embarrassed the Court when the CSC disapproved the
appointments and made it appear that the Court was not
following its own en banc resolution and ruling.
Justice Carpio also imputed the CSC's disapproval of
Mendoza's appointments to Atty. Candelaria's failure to
inform the CSC Assistant Commissioner that the Court had
already classified the position of Chief of MISO as highly
technical or policy-determining when she met with the
Assistant Commissioner to discuss Mendoza's appointment
papers two days before the disapproval of the
appointments.
On being required, Atty. Candelaria submitted on July 10,
2007 her comment. She denied committing the offenses
charged. She said that she submitted Mendoza's
appointments to the CSC for approval in compliance with
the Civil Service Law and implementing rules and that she
would have faced administrative sanction if she had not.
Atty. Candelaria pointed out that, although the Court
classified certain third level positions in its organization as
highly technical or policy-determining, this merely
exempted them from a Career Executive Service (CES)
eligibility requirement. The status of the positions as
permanent remained and did not make them primarily
confidential, resulting in the disapproval of Mendoza's
appointments.
Although Atty. Candelaria does not deny that she did not
tell the CSC Assistant Commissioner that the position of
Chief of MISO was a highly technical or policy-determining
position when they met, she pointed out that she had
earlier informed the CSC about it officially and that she had
attached to Mendoza's first appointment a certification
that the position of MISO's Chief had been classified as
highly technical.
In answer to Justice Carpio's charge of incompetence for
stating in Mendoza's second appointment paper that it was
a "coterminous" appointment rather than a six-month
appointment as the Chief Justice directed, she pointed out
that she indicated the appointment as "coterminous" based
on the recommendation of the PMO and Justice Carpio
himself. The first appointment was also coterminous and
the reappointment could not just deviate from it.
The Issue Presented
The issue in this administrative matter is whether or not
there are sufficient grounds to discipline Atty. Candelaria
for gross neglect of duty, gross incompetence in the
performance of official duties, and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service:
1. For submitting to the CSC for approval the Court's
appointments to third level positions, which the Court
previously determined as highly technical or policy-
determining like the position of the Chief of MISO;
2. For failing to inform the Assistant Commissioner of CSC
whom she met shortly before it disapproved Mendoza's
appointments that the Court had already classified as highly
technical or policy-determining or both the position of Chief
of MISO; and
8

3. For grievously erring in indicating in Mendoza's second
appointment that it was "coterminous" with the term of
the Chief Justice rather than simply that it was for a term of
six months as the Chief Justice directed.
The Court's Rulings
One. Justice Carpio points out that Atty. Candelaria should
be made administratively liable for submitting to the CSC
for approval appointments to third level positions when
that was unnecessary since the Court had previously
determined those positions as highly technical or policy-
determining like the position of the Chief of MISO, thus
undermining the independence of the Judiciary.
But, with few exceptions, all appointments to the civil
service have to be submitted to the CSC for approval.
Section 9(h) of the Civil Service Law bestows on the CSC the
power and function to approve allsuch appointments and
to disapprove the appointments of those who do not
possess the required qualifications and eligibility. Section
9(h) states:
SECTION. 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - The
Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have
the following powers and functions:
x x x x
(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or
promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those
of presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards,
and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess
the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An
appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by
the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his
duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is
disapproved by the Commission, if this should take place,
without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority
for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or
rules: Provided, finally, That the Commission shall keep a
record of appointments of all officers and employees in the
civil service. All appointments requiring the approval of the
Commission as herein provided, shall be submitted to it by
the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance,
otherwise, the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days
thereafter; x x x.
To implement the above and in exercise of its rule-making
power, the CSC requires in Section 1, Rule VI of its
rules[3] all government agencies and their personnel
officer, Atty. Candelaria in the case of the Supreme Court,
to submit to the CSC all appointments in the civil service
under pain of administrative sanction for neglect of duty.
Since Congress has enacted no law superseding the above
provisions of the Civil Service Law or its implementing rules
and since the Supreme Court has rendered no decision
annulling the same, Atty. Candelaria, the officer charged
with the duty to submit all appointments from the Court,
had no choice but to abide by them and submit Mendoza's
appointments to the CSC for its approval. Historically, this
has been done in all past Court appointments and she
received no instruction in this particular case from the
Court to depart from the practice. Consequently, no ground
exists for sanctioning her action.
The Court did not say in Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil
Service Commission cited by Justice Carpio that
appointments to the third level of the civil service do not
have to be submitted to the CSC for approval. The issue
raised in that case was whether or not the CSC encroached
on the Ombudsman's appointing authority when it refused
to change the third level appointee's appointment from
temporary to permanent just because he did not have
Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) or CES eligibility.
Section 2(2), Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that
appointment to positions in the civil service, which are
policy-determining, highly technical, or primarily
confidential (classified as third level positions), are exempt
from the requirement that they be made based on merit or
fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, by
competitive examinations. These kinds of positions are non-
competitive. Merit and fitness for the same are determined
by other than competitive examinations.
The Court held that the CSC's authority under Section 9(h)
to approve appointments in the civil service is limited to
determining whether or not the appointee has the legal
qualifications and the appropriate eligibility. Since the
Ombudsman's appointee had all the basic qualifications for
the position, except the CSEE or CES eligibility which was no
longer required for a permanent appointment to third level
positions, the CSC had the ministerial duty to grant the
change of status of the appointee from temporary to
permanent.
Still, the Court's ruling implies that the CSC still has the
power and the duty to pass upon the subject appointments,
if only to determine whether the appointees meet the
qualification standards adopted by and approved for that
agency. Nothing in the decision in the Ombudsman case
says that CSC's approval of appointments to third level
9
positions has been dispensed with. It merely says that CSEE
or CES eligibility is no longer required for those positions.
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, who dissents from the
Court's opinion, cite in support of Justice Carpio's position
the 2007 identically titled case of Office of the Ombudsman
v. Civil Service Commission.[4] In that case, the Office of the
Ombudsman sought the CSC's approval of its amended
qualification standards for a Director II position. The
amendment reduced the requirement from CSEE or CES
eligibility to that of Career Service Professional or other
relevant eligibility for second level position, invoking the
Court of Appeals ruling in Inok v. Civil Service
Commission[5] that the letter and intent of the law is to
restrict the CES eligibility to CES positions in the Executive
Department. The CES governed by the CES Board, it was
claimed, did not cover the Office of the Ombudsman. But
the CSC disapproved the amendment, saying that the CES
covered the Director II position being a third level position.
This Court disagreed. It reiterated that the CES covers
presidential appointees only. Since Director II appointees
are appointed by the Ombudsman, they are neither
embraced in the CES nor do they need to possess CES
eligibility. The Court upheld the Ombudsman's
administrative control and supervision of its Office,
including the authority to determine and establish the
qualifications, duties, functions, and responsibilities of its
various services. The Ombudsman, said the Court,
possesses the authority to establish reasonable
qualification standards for the personnel of the Office. The
CSC cannot substitute its own standards for those of the
department or agency, its role being limited only to
assisting the department or agency with respect to these
qualification standards and approving them.
The dissenting opinion interprets the above ruling as doing
away with the requirement of approval by the CSC of the
qualification standards set by the department or agency,
concluding that the qualification standards are effective as
of the date of their issuance by the department or agency.
But, although the law vests in the department or agency
concerned the responsibility for establishing, administering,
and maintaining its qualification standards, such standards
have to be drawn with the assistance and approval of the
CSC and in consultation with the Wage and Position
Classification Office.[6] The Court's ruling in the
2007 Ombudsman case affirms this.[7] The CSC approval is
still a must since it remains the government's clearing
house for all appointments in the civil service. The duty to
enforce the laws on the selection, promotion, and discipline
of civil servants primarily rests in the CSC. Once approved,
the qualification standards serve as guide for new
appointments and for adjudicating contested
appointments.[8]
Contrary to the view expressed in the dissenting opinion,
the 2007 Ombudsman case did not do away with the
requirement of CSC approval of appointments. It merely
said that in passing upon and approving qualification
standards, the CSC should not substitute its own standards
for those of the department or agency concerned. Indeed,
the dispositive portion of the decision directed the CSC to
approve the Ombudsman's amended qualification
standards for Director II.
The requirement of CSC approval of qualification standards
is demonstrated in Paredes v. Civil Service
Commission,[9] where the Court held that the CSC was in
error in applying qualification standards that it had not
previously approved. Not even the exigencies of the service
can justify the use of unapproved qualification standards.
Said the Court:
Without a duly approved Qualification Standard it would be
extremely difficult if not impossible for the appointing
authority to determine the qualification and fitness of the
applicant for the particular position. Without an approved
Qualification Standard the appointing authority would have
no basis or guide in extending a promotional or original
appointment in filling up vacant positions in its department
or agency. Public interest therefore requires that a
Qualification Standard must exist to guide the appointing
authority not only in extending an appointment but also in
settling contested appointments.[10]
The applicable qualification standards for the position of
Chief of MISO at the time of Mendoza's first appointment
included a requirement for a Bachelor's Degree in
Computer Science or any equally comparable degree with
Master in Science Degree in Computer Science or
Information Technology. Mendoza simply did not have this
qualification. Chief Justice Panganiban thus gave him a
coterminous appointment, not a permanent one, as Chief
of MISO, trusting that the CSC would approve it. Chief
Justice Puno followed suit, but with the further limitation
that it was to last for six months. These are not the
circumstances contemplated by the
2007 Ombudsman ruling.
At any rate, whether or not the CSC was correct in denying
Mendoza's appointments is of course irrelevant to the
charge against Atty. Candelaria. She is not answerable to
the Court for the decision of the CSC no matter if that
decision is perceived to be wrong. All that she did was
submit those appointments to that constitutional body as
the law and the rules required of her.
10

Parenthetically, the CSC apparently did not deny Mendoza's
coterminous and temporary appointments because it
disagreed that the position was highly technical, which it
was, by any reckoning. But the position of Chief of MISO is a
permanent position, he being the head of an office that
performs a vital and continuing function in the work of the
Court. Yet, his appointments as recommended were to be
coterminous with the tenure of the Chief Justice or for six
months, whichever ended first. This uncertain or diminutive
tenure does not seem to make sense in the light of the
constitutionally protected right to security of tenure of
government personnel under the civil service system.
Two. Justice Carpio claims that Atty. Candelaria failed in her
duty to inform the Assistant Commissioner of CSC, whom
she met shortly before that body disapproved Mendoza's
appointments, that the Court had already classified as
highly technical or policy-determining the position of Chief
of MISO.
Atty. Candelaria does not deny failing to tell the Assistant
Commissioner at that meeting that the Court already
classified the position of Chief of MISO as policy-
determining or highly technical. But, as the record shows,
her office sent a copy of the Court's resolution in A.M. 05-9-
29-SC embodying that classification to the CSC earlier on
October 18, 2005. Indeed, the CSC wrote back to say that it
had placed on record the Court's classification for guidance
and reference. Further, Atty. Candelaria's office also
attached to Mendoza's first appointment a certification
that the Court had classified the position of Chief of MISO
as highly technical. These rendered it unnecessary for Atty.
Candelaria to reiterate the matter to the CSC Assistant
Commissioner at their meeting.
Still, Atty. Candelaria should have immediately taken up
with the Court the result of her meeting with the Assistant
Commissioner of the CSC. It seems likely that the latter
gave her an inkling of the position that the CSC might take
on Mendoza's appointments. Of course, neither Atty.
Candelaria nor the Assistant Commissioner had control of
the actions of the CSC but, by the nature of the
bureaucracy, the outright denial of Mendoza's
appointments could have been aborted and the matter
negotiated to the satisfaction of the two Constitutional
bodies. Since this is not a step prescribed by the rules,
however, it cannot be said that Atty. Candelaria had
violated a duty enjoined on her by law.
The dissenting opinion would have Atty. Candelaria held to
answer for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service for having met, sub rosa, with the CSC Assistant
Commissioner, thereby undermining the judiciary's
independence. The dissenting opinion attacks Atty.
Candelaria's comment as eerily silent regarding the nature
and details of the meeting.
But, first, the charge against Atty. Candelaria is about her
failure to inform the Assistant Commissioner of CSC that
the Court had already classified as highly technical or
policy-determining the position of Chief of MISO. Justice
Carpio did not charge her of improperly meeting sub
rosa with the CSC Assistant Commissioner. The Court
cannot punish Atty. Candelaria for an alleged wrong of
which she has not been charged nor given the opportunity
of a hearing.
Second, under the rules of evidence, a party's silence only
amounts to admission when he is accused of some
wrongdoing that naturally calls for comment if not
true.[11] Here, Justice Carpio censured Atty. Candelaria
solely for something she failed to tell the CSC Assistant
Commissioner at that meeting and she commented on this,
defending her omission. The censure did not call for her to
defend the meeting itself or disclose its other details.
Consequently, it would not be fair to infer that Atty.
Candelaria had chosen to be "eerily silent" regarding those
other details.
The dissenting opinion of course insists that the technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to
administrative proceedings. This may be true but only with
respect to those rules that are really "technical" like a
party's failure in a petition for review to state the correct
evidence of the identity of the person who signed the
certification of non-forum shopping. Rules of evidence that
are founded on fairness, such as the rule that a party's
silence only amounts to admission when he is accused of
some wrongdoing that naturally calls for comment if not
true, are not technical rules that can be thrown out when
convenient--even in administrative proceedings.
Third, even Justice Carpio, who appeared stunned and
despaired by the CSC's disapproval of Mendoza's
appointments and had information about the
circumstances of the subject meeting, was critical of it only
because Atty. Candelaria did not tell the CSC Assistant
Commissioner that the Court had already classified the
position of Chief of MISO as highly technical or policy-
determining. Justice Carpio did not make out a case of
treachery against her.
There is no evidence for instance that the meeting took
place at the wee hours of the night behind some trees at
the Luneta Park. Justice Carpio, who seems to know what
the two talked about at that meeting, did not characterize
it as done secretly or sub rosa. Many court employees are
11
required by their jobs to meet and transact business with
those from other government agencies. That these
employees give no prior briefing to the Court about the
purposes of such meetings cannot justify an assumption
that those meetings took place sub rosa.
Further the dissenting opinion recalls that Atty. Candelaria
had disagreed with the Court's position that coterminous
appointments can be made for permanent positions. The
dissenting opinion speculates that her views may have,
through discussions with its Assistant Commissioner,
influenced the CSC's opinion regarding the propriety of
Mendoza's appointments. But such speculation places an
unfairly low esteem on the competence of the CSC and its
head, experts in the legal requirements of all sorts of
appointments. It cannot be assumed that the CSC would
give more weight to the opinion of a subordinate like Atty.
Candelaria than to the opinion of the Court and its Chief
Justice.
Besides, honest difference in opinion cannot be a cause for
unfavorable inference or speculation. If this were so, the
Court itself would have no reason for being. Honest
disagreements are catalysts of sound ideas especially in
democratic institutions like the Court.
Three. Justice Carpio claims that Atty. Candelaria exhibited
gross incompetence when she stated in Mendoza's second
appointment that it was "coterminous" with the term of
the Chief Justice rather than simply that it was for a term of
six months as the Chief Justice directed.
But, firstly, in making that statement in the second
appointment, Atty. Candelaria merely echoed the Court's
stand respecting the nature of Mendoza's appointment as
coterminous. The Court originally adopted this idea on
recommendation of the PMO and Justice Carpio when Chief
Justice Panganiban issued Mendoza's first appointment.
The Court had done nothing since then to change that
stand.
And, secondly, Chief Justice Puno signed the renewal of the
appointment, which renewal contained the same
coterminous proviso and his additional instruction to limit
the particular appointment to six months, thus showing his
acceptance of those two conditions of the appointment.
The dissenting opinion suggests that Mendoza's second
appointment paper could have been better facilitated had
it indicated a "temporary" status rather than a
"coterminous" one, especially since the Chief Justice's
marginal note on Memorandum PMO-PDO 12-08-
2006[12] directed the issuance of a "six-month
appointment" to him.
But in a temporary appointment, the appointee meets all
the requirements for the position except the appropriate
civil service eligibility. At the time of his second
appointment, Mendoza did not meet even the lowered
qualification standards that the Court set for his position.
The lesser standards wanted a bachelor's degree holder
with a major in computer science. Mendoza's transcript of
records from the Philippine Military Academy showed that
he had a bachelor's degree but not the required major. He
took a master's course in computer science at the Ateneo
Information Technology Institute but his transcript there
does not show that he finished the course or had been
conferred a master's degree in Computer
Science.[13] Consequently, the Court could not give
Mendoza a temporary appointment as Chief of MISO.
The coterminous appointment that the PMO and Justice
Carpio recommended for Mendoza was also apparently
problematical since the Court and the CSC had always
regarded his position as permanent, not dependent on the
tenure of the appointing power. The job of the Chief of
MISO does not fit the usual descriptions of primarily
confidential positions that call for trust and confidence
above anything else.
In sum, no sufficient ground exists to take disciplinary
action against Atty. Candelaria for gross neglect of duty,
gross incompetence in the performance of official duties,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
At most, she may be admonished in regard to the results of
her meeting with the CSC Assistant Commissioner.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to NOTE Atty. Eden T.
Candelaria's Comment dated July 10, 2007 and
to ADMONISH her for failing to take up with the Court the
results of the meeting she had with the Assistant
Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission.
SO ORDERED.
12
BM 1922

B.M. No. 1922 June 3, 2008

RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE OF

COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED IN ALL
PLEADINGS/MOTIONS.

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of

the Court En Banc dated June 3, 2008

"Bar Matter No. 1922. – Re: Recommendation of the

Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Board to
Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel’s
MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption.
– The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2,
2008, of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura,
Chairperson, Committee on Legal Education and Bar
Matters, informing the Court of the diminishing interest of
the members of the Bar in the MCLE requirement program.

The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of

the Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters,
to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in
all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies,
the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of
Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be
applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance
period. Failure to disclose the required information would
cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
pleadings from the records.

The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation." Caprio-
Morales Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on official leave.
(adv216a)

Very truly yours,

MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA(sgd)

Clerk of Court

13
AM 05-11-07-CTA address to the Clerk of Court and file his written
appearance within forty-eight hours from such open court
A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA November 22, 2005 appearance. An attorney or party who has filed his
appearance and who changes his address of record shall
REVISED RULES OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS
notify the Clerk of Court and the adverse party of such
Sirs/Mesdames: change of address, and a separate notice of such change of
address shall be filed for each additional case. (RCTA, Rule
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of 10, sec. 1a)
this Court dated NOV 22 2005.

Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on

Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this Court’s
consideration and approval the Proposed Revised Rules of
the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court Resolved to APPROVE
the same.

The Rule shall take effect on the fifteenth day of December

2005 following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines not later than 25 November
2005.

22 November 2005.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-

Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and
Garcia, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.

RULE 6
PLEADINGS FILED WITH THE COURT

SEC. 6. Entry of appearance. – An attorney may enter his

appearance by signing the initial pleading. An attorney may
later enter his appearance only by filing an entry of
appearance with the written conformity of his client.

The initial pleading or entry of appearance shall show:

(1) The attorney’s specific address which must not be a Post

Office Box number;

(2) His Roll of Attorney’s Number;

(3) The date and number of his current membership due in

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) per Official
Receipt, or Lifetime Member Number;

(4) Current Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) number together

with date and place of issuance; and

(5) MCLE certificate number and date of issue, unless

exempt.

The attorney or party entering his appearance shall serve a

copy of the entry of appearance upon the opposing party.
An attorney who appears in open court without previously
having filed his written appearance must give his business

14
P.B.M. No. 2012 February 10, 2009 expedite the resolution of cases involving them. Mandatory
free legal service by members of the bar and their active
PROPOSED RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE FOR support thereof will aid the efficient and effective
PRACTICING LAWYERS administration of justice especially in cases involving
indigent and pauper litigants.
RESOLUTION
SECTION 3. Scope. - This Rule shall govern the mandatory
Acting on the Memorandum dated January 27, 2009 of
requirement for practicing lawyers to render free legal aid
Justice Renato C. Corona re: Comment of the Integrated Bar
services in all cases (whether, civil, criminal or
of the Philippines on our Suggested Revisions to the
administrative) involving indigent and pauper litigants
Proposed Rule of Mandatory Legal Aid Service for Practicing
where the assistance of a lawyer is needed. It shall also
Lawyers, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
govern the duty of other members of the legal profession
This Resolution shall take effect on July 1, 2009 following to support the legal aid program of the Integrated Bar of
publication of the said Rule and its implementing the Philippines.
regulations in at least two (2) newpapers of general
SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule:
circulation.
(a) Practicing lawyers are members of the Philippine Bar
February 10, 2009
who appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of law and
quasi-judicial agencies, including but not limited to the
National Labor Relations Commission, National Conciliation
REYNATO S. and Mediation Board, Department PUNO of Labor and
Chief Justice Employment Regional Offices, Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board and National Commission for
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO Indigenous Peoples. The term "practicing lawyers" shall
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justiceexclude:

(i) Government employees and incumbent elective officials

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
not allowed by law to practice;
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(ii) Lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court;
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice(iii) Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in law student
practice in duly accredited legal clinics of law schools and
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE lawyers of O. non-governmental organizations
TINGA (NGOs) and
Associate Justice Associate Justicepeoples’ organizations (POs) like the Free Legal Assistance
Group who by the nature of their work already render free
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO legal aid
J. to indigentVELASCO,
and pauper litigantsJR.and
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(iv) Lawyers not covered under subparagraphs (i) to (iii)
including those who are employed in the private sector but
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
do not appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of law
Associate Justice Associate Justice
and quasi-judicial agencies.
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO (b) Indigent M.
and pauper litigantsPERALTA
are those defined under
Associate Justice Associate JusticeRule 141, Section 19 of the Rules of Court and Algura v. The
Local Government Unit of the City of Naga (G.R. No.150135,
30 October 2006, 506 SCRA 81);
RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE
(c) Legal aid cases are those actions, disputes, and
SECTION 1. Title. - This Rule shall be known as "The Rule on controversies that are criminal, civil and administrative in
Mandatory Legal Aid Service." nature in whatever stage wherein indigent and pauper
litigants need legal representation;
SECTION 2. Purpose. - This Rule seeks to enhance the duty
of lawyers to society as agents of social change and to the (d) Free legal aid services refer to appearance in court or
courts as officers thereof by helping improve access to quasi-judicial body for and in behalf of an indigent or
justice by the less privileged members of society and pauper litigant and the preparation of pleadings or

15
motions. It shall also cover assistance by a practicing lawyer
to indigent or poor litigants in court-annexed mediation
and in other modes of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).
Services rendered when a practicing lawyer is appointed
counsel de oficio shall also be considered as free legal aid
services and credited as compliance under this Rule;
(e) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is the official
national organization of lawyers in the country;
(f) National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) is the
committee of the IBP which is specifically tasked with
handling legal aid cases;
(g) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) is the committee of
the IBP which is specifically tasked with disciplining
members of the Bar;
(h) IBP Chapters are those chapters of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines located in the different geographical areas
of the country as defined in Rule 139-A and
(i) Clerk of Court is the Clerk of Court of the court where the
practicing lawyer rendered free legal aid services. In the
case of quasi-judicial bodies, it refers to an officer holding
an equivalent or similar position.
The term shall also include an officer holding a similar
position in agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or a
responsible officer of an accredited PO or NGO, or an
accredited mediator who conducted the court-annexed
mediation proceeding.
SECTION 5. Requirements. -
(a) Every practicing lawyer is required to render a minimum
of sixty (60) hours of free legal aid services to indigent
litigants in a year. Said 60 hours shall be spread within a
period of twelve (12) months, with a minimum of five (5)
hours of free legal aid services each month. However,
where it is necessary for the practicing lawyer to render
legal aid service for more than five (5) hours in one month,
the excess hours may be credited to the said lawyer for the
succeeding periods.
For this purpose, a practicing lawyer shall coordinate with
the Clerk of Court for cases where he may render free legal
aid service. He may also coordinate with the IBP Legal Aid
Chairperson of the IBP Chapter to inquire about cases
where he may render free legal aid service. In this
connection, the IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP
Chapter shall regularly and actively coordinate with the
Clerk of Court.
The practicing lawyer shall report compliance with the
requirement within ten (10) days of the last month of each
quarter of the year.
(b) A practicing lawyer shall be required to secure and
obtain a certificate from the Clerk of Court attesting to the
number of hours spent rendering free legal aid services in a
case.
The certificate shall contain the following information:
(i) The case or cases where the legal aid service was
rendered, the party or parties in the said case(s) for whom
the service was rendered, the docket number of the said
case(s) and the date(s) the service was rendered.
(ii) The number of hours actually spent attending a hearing
or conducting trial on a particular case in the court or quasi-
judicial body.
(iii) The number of hours actually spent attending
mediation, conciliation or any other mode of ADR on a
particular case.
(iv) A motion (except a motion for extension of time to file a
pleading or for postponement of hearing or conference) or
pleading filed on a particular case shall be considered as
one (1) hour of service.
The Clerk of Court shall issue the certificate in triplicate,
one (1) copy to be retained by the practicing lawyer, one (1)
copy to be retained by the Clerk of Court and one (1) copy
to be attached to the lawyer's compliance report.
(c) Said compliance report shall be submitted to the Legal
Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter within the court’s
jurisdiction. The Legal Aid Chairperson shall then be tasked
with immediately verifying the contents of the certificate
with the issuing Clerk of Court by comparing the copy of the
certificate attached to the compliance report with the copy
retained by the Clerk of Court.
(d) The IBP Chapter shall, after verification, issue a
compliance certificate to the concerned lawyer. The IBP
Chapter shall also submit the compliance reports to the
IBP’s NCLA for recording and documentation. The
submission shall be made within forty-five (45) days after
the mandatory submission of compliance reports by the
practicing lawyers.
(e) Practicing lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings filed
before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies the number and
date of issue of their certificate of compliance for the
immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to
disclose the required information would cause the dismissal
of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records.
(f) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by
the category under Section 4(a)(i) and (ii), shall fill up a
form prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that
16
year, they are employed with the government or
incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to practice
or lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court.
The form shall be sworn to and submitted to the IBP
Chapter or IBP National Office together with the payment
of an annual contribution of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000).
Said contribution shall accrue to a special fund of the IBP
for the support of its legal aid program.
(g) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by
the category under Section 4(a)(iii) shall secure a
certification from the director of the legal clinic or of the
concerned NGO or PO to the effect that, during that year,
they have served as supervising lawyers in a legal clinic or
actively participated in the NGO’s or PO’s free legal aid
activities. The certification shall be submitted to the IBP
Chapter or IBP National Office.
(h) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by
the category under Section 4(a)(iv) shall fill up a form
prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that year,
they are neither practicing lawyers nor covered by Section
(4)(a)(i) to (iii). The form shall be sworn to and submitted to
the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office together with the
payment of an annual contribution of Four Thousand Pesos
(P4,000) by way of support for the efforts of practicing
lawyers who render mandatory free legal aid services. Said
contribution shall accrue to a special fund of the IBP for the
support of its legal aid program.
(i) Failure to pay the annual contribution shall subject the
lawyer to a penalty of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) for
that year which amount shall also accrue to the special fund
for the legal aid program of the IBP.
SECTION 6. NCLA. -
(a) The NCLA shall coordinate with the various legal aid
committees of the IBP local chapters for the proper
handling and accounting of legal aid cases which practicing
lawyers can represent.
(b) The NCLA shall monitor the activities of the Chapter of
the Legal Aid Office with respect to the coordination with
Clerks of Court on legal aid cases and the collation of
certificates submitted by practicing lawyers.
(c) The NCLA shall act as the national repository of records
in compliance with this Rule.
(d) The NCLA shall prepare the following forms: certificate
to be issued by the Clerk of Court and forms mentioned in
Section 5(e) and (g).
(e) The NCLA shall hold in trust, manage and utilize the
contributions and penalties that will be paid by lawyers
pursuant to this Rule to effectively carry out the provisions
of this Rule. For this purpose, it shall annually submit an
accounting to the IBP Board of Governors.
The accounting shall be included by the IBP in its report to
the Supreme Court in connection with its request for the
release of the subsidy for its legal aid program.
SECTION 7. Penalties. -
(a) At the end of every calendar year, any practicing lawyer
who fails to meet the minimum prescribed 60 hours of legal
aid service each year shall be required by the IBP, through
the NCLA, to explain why he was unable to render the
minimum prescribed number of hours. If no explanation
has been given or if the NCLA finds the explanation
unsatisfactory, the NCLA shall make a report and
recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors that the
erring lawyer be declared a member of the IBP who is not in
good standing. Upon approval of the NCLA’s
recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors shall declare
the erring lawyer as a member not in good standing. Notice
thereof shall be furnished the erring lawyer and the IBP
Chapter which submitted the lawyer’s compliance report or
the IBP Chapter where the lawyer is registered, in case he
did not submit a compliance report. The notice to the
lawyer shall include a directive to pay Four Thousand Pesos
(P4,000) penalty which shall accrue to the special fund for
the legal aid program of the IBP.
(b) The "not in good standing" declaration shall be effective
for a period of three (3) months from the receipt of the
erring lawyer of the notice from the IBP Board of
Governors. During the said period, the lawyer cannot
appear in court or any quasi-judicial body as counsel.
Provided, however, that the "not in good standing" status
shall subsist even after the lapse of the three-month period
until and unless the penalty shall have been paid.
(c) Any lawyer who fails to comply with his duties under this
Rule for at least three (3) consecutive years shall be the
subject of disciplinary proceedings to be instituted motu
proprio by the CBD. The said proceedings shall afford the
erring lawyer due process in accordance with the rules of
the CBD and Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. If found
administratively liable, the penalty of suspension in the
practice of law for one (1) year shall be imposed upon him.
(d) Any lawyer who falsifies a certificate or any form
required to be submitted under this Rule or any contents
thereof shall be administratively charged with falsification
and dishonesty and shall be subject to disciplinary action by
the CBD. This is without prejudice to the filing of criminal
charges against the lawyer.
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(e) The falsification of a certificate or any contents thereof
by any Clerk of Court or by any Chairperson of the Legal Aid
Committee of the IBP local chapter where the case is
pending or by the Director of a legal clinic or responsible
officer of an NGO or PO shall be a ground for an
administrative case against the said Clerk of Court or
Chairperson. This is without prejudice to the filing of the
criminal and administrative charges against the malfeasor.

SECTION 8. Credit for Mandatory Continuing Legal

Education (MCLE). - A lawyer who renders mandatory legal
aid service for the required number of hours in a year for
the three year-period covered by a compliance period
under the Rules on MCLE shall be credited the following:
two (2) credit units for legal ethics, two (2) credit units for
trial and pretrial skills, two (2) credit units for alternative
dispute resolution, four (4) credit units for legal writing and
oral advocacy, four (4) credit units for substantive and
procedural laws and jurisprudence and six (6) credit units
for such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE
Committee under Section 2(9), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.

A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid service for the

required number of hours in a year for at least two
consecutive years within the three year-period covered by a
compliance period under the Rules on MCLE shall be
credited the following: one (1) credit unit for legal ethics,
one (1) credit unit for trial and pretrial skills, one (1) credit
unit for alternative dispute resolution, two (2) credit units
for legal writing and oral advocacy, two (2) credit units for
substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence and
three (3) credit units for such subjects as may be prescribed
by the MCLE Committee under Section 2(g), Rule 2 of the
Rules on MCLE.

SECTION 9. Implementing Rules. - The IBP, through the

NCLA, is hereby given authority to recommend
implementing regulations in determining who are
"practicing lawyers," what constitute "legal aid cases" and
what administrative procedures and financial safeguards
which may be necessary and proper in the implementation
of this rule may be prescribed. It shall coordinate with the
various legal chapters in the crafting of the proposed
implementing regulations and, upon approval by the IBP
Board of Governors, the said implementing regulations shall
be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final approval.

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