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By : E. M. S. Nlar·IIIJOrJdnlHUI

P'E 0 p L E • s p u B L I s I-ll N 6 H0 usE I

190 B. IChetwadi Main Road.

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New Age Printing Pre. People's Publishing Hoaae
190 B. Khetwadi Xai:n ~ 190 B. KhetW'IIdi Xain Bead,.

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Publiahed io .July. 1943.


1. In the Grip of the Oriaia

2. The OaU of PAtrioLiam to the IDeM
8. A Paper Campaign. 'Miml8 the Peop
~····~ Uai~tp CJ:rt•·:llom ~
~~ !W• of the Kiam &bh•
!%:• ~---- Uait;y ler N&denat UDifi7
Our country is p~sing through the most seriouB National
CJ!isiit in her history.·.· There is no aspect' of national Jife that i.ti
not affected by it, tio section of the Indian people that, is
~ut of it. · .,
AgricUltural production is the major ooou~tian i:rl the
~nntyY; nearly 75% of our people live on agricultur~. ,·No crisis
ean be called a. National Crisis unle8s it disturbs and disnpw
the daily life of thiS mast numerous section~£ the people; nothin:g
can solve the nation's problems without at the same time sol'eing
their ::;problems. On the other hand, anything which, solves
then, problems cannot bu"' l1ave its, favourable repercnssions on
tlle;p-reblems of the ~~&tion it&elf .. , · ,
Let tt8 therefore see how this National Crisis has · aileotefl,
th,e'kisans, ho-w the kisans; .ea.n solve their own problems 'in'
t~e:ir own'way and ·how in·solving thei? o-wn prt)blems they can
~tribute·their share in solving the nati<;>n'sproblems.·

Defence In Danger ...

&tween a , Government that wa;nts · to k:eep N atipnai
Defence ~way from the p~pfe and a national movement th~~!
wants the people to ~~ away, fro~ National. Defence, our'
oount:.w:y has been tlj,reatened with enemy invasion for Ido.e 1than
a.'Yedf·n 'J;his w&sthe key point' of· the National CrisiS ,nptd
AUgUSt 9, {9~2 •.. :: . . . ·. , · . ·"
. Prom that f~t&ldayy however: this h~ bee~ aggrava~d:
In~ ofour Nationt-.1. :Pefen9e being kept .at a. weak position··
a~d tlQponseious eftoi"t being D)a.de to strengthen it, a p:r:oc~ <4.
weakening and disrupting National Defence was sta.rted. on.
Aug11St .9.. The arrest of National ~ers and the ban on ·the·
Indian ··National Congr~s deStroyed the remnants of.the. 'fill to
def(tnd. the count7 while the. patriotic fury which folloW'ed .it
·destblyed the means· of ~~:pee. Thus ~he . moral and materia.T'
irul~rliiiU~J:ttJ; W~~.df!St,ro~d.from two sides by peoplewbo were
'-Vitillyinteres~. in Na.~ion&l Defence. . ·. . · .. , ·. . .
. .The Go:v~nlll~Ilt ~~at it' w:~ ~ ~ave the .wM. ~ffo~'
frotn the ~tive ~ti:vities of the '•rebel" Congress that theY·J
' - ' - - - ''f -- ' - .. --- -,__ ,
arrested its leaders and banned its organisation. This very act
worked such a countrywide people's fury that the next few weeks.
saw the destruction of a considerable part of means . of N ationa.l
Defence: In ·~ppressing this populat •. fury it emp!oyed means.
which in their very process strengthened the Fifth Column.
N ationa.l leaders like ~eh.ru and. .A zad .declared that it
was to prevent the rise of pro-J ap sentiments among the people
that they w~nted to launch a struggle. This talk of.· Jtraggle,..
however, led to a situation in which ·avowed enemies could sow
the seed of pro-J ap sentiments and reap the harvest of sabotage.
Thus the Government started repreSsion in the name of
Defence; the N ationalleaders wanted to start strmggle in the-
name of National Defence. Both_ however, ended ·u.p with
s~euing Fifth Column and sapping the morale of'
the people.
If the N az:i hordes cannot ioday attack ··our western
frontiers, if the J aps have not so far made any full....,eeaJe attack.
on our eastern border, that is not because the A Uied military-
machine in:Jndia is formidable enoagh to repel any such attack.
Nor are the Fascist hordes deter.-ed by the proJpect of a people's.,
resistance independent of the Allied military machine. and led.
by the National Congress. Hitler and .Tojo know full well.
that the moment they start their offensive ~ainst
India there will be c~ and panic among the·
people of India which . neither the popular . urge .. to-
freedom nurtured :by the National Movement nor the mighty
milit-..7 machine built by t"Jle Unite9. Nations. can overcome.
The one thing that matters in strengthening National Defence,
w bich made the British people stand the ordeals of 1940, which.
haS created the epic resistance of the Chinese dur:irl.g the last six
years. which gave birth to the historic .defensive and offensive,
operations of the Red Army, that vital factor of National Defen-
c~ i. e.~ people,s will to resist the enemy and annihilate him, is ·
not there.
Jror six years, froiP 1936' onwards, .t.b.e i,nsp:Wng lead given
by N"ehru had made the Indian N ation&l, dong!e&S a pqwem:.I
a11ti-fa.JOisf. people's~organisation~ .It. J:aad. cree,teq s·ach a, feel:-
mgin the minds of the Jndiap people that OJ! its baais a lfa.,ti-
on&l resistance as powerful .~ . trlu,.t.. ~f ~a c0~d ~ve 'been;
built. up•..... It wa.S S1lch a .people's prganisa.tipn thAt w~ handed
over to th'e enemi~ 'of the ·people' .rn. tile. days. a.fter August 9,.
1942. And it •as this anti-fascist Will to resiSt ·that ha.S beeii:
blownc up by the mne IJ!IOnth...;.tale of collective fines, m&Qhlae-
gnn~ga, arrestsa.nd detenticns without' trial and 'Other' acts
·~. reprr$Sion' that have no parallel in any Allied country..
· The ~eail~ois, t:ha,t th~t.e is nothing thst sta.nds bet~n the
Indmn'people:.nd .4X:is 'aggression except tire heroic Red ..&rm.y,.
the ·bra.e aJI):Rtese,Army. a.:nd the growing streagtli of .AHJ.'eii
lforces ·in Ausira.li& •'n.d the P&clmc. Had it not 'been for these,
Zlndia would . a;J~y have l)eeri the target of '.i\..X.is att.aek.
E?en tod•y;,tba sligntest unr•vaura.ble turn .in the :Yottunes 6f
·war in the Pacific would bring the wa.:r 'into Indian soiL ·· Ana
't1le ip.teD:sity.w~t1l which peopl~s lllQrsle :won!d then coll~pse is
·simply utpm..ginable. . . . . . .. ' . .
...,.. ·. . T;hn%11 N~tioo.aJ Crisis m,ea.~ tQ .every lllan and. wotaa.n in
'India tbe ,~fl\ible :PI"''peet Qi; enEtmy 0001\IW'tion,. &rSQn anci raPEf
'by ~.lw' notori,ollS. Ba.sc~t pngmen,. un4.esoriba.ble horrors e.a4
Jl,~m~li~ti9,ns ~t arre. th~ tale of cou:r,ltry uqder·., Fascist ~•Pfr
tiOJl'! ..• It ¥so ~ns to WillS anfl, home%lt~s on t~e ·~rn
'!C~.'t8ts, ~Jl'tin~oias. &!ld ;i.ntEtnsive bQmbing and its . attend-.nt
~+se:ry~not a. p, distaJlt;pros~t a prresent day reality.

Pebplefrs Daily
' - - ~ -' ' '
' - - ' "'\

If. theeoUapse of ~P~~'s mQrale in the face ot; e~e~ inva-

'Bion is a distaD:t. prospect to mo~t people, .the coll~pse' of normaJ
lifenas beerla,reaH.ty to~he ov¢nvhelr~;ting majority o(the India~
~pie for the last few_ 1mqnths. · . ·. · · .· · ·. . .
'I'l:l~outbreak,of ~W~rld ;W-ar. No. II ,had meant for the
.coJp.Jnon people ~ing pri~s for:. daily necessaries, ~ed
taxatio~and..a,eo~uent increase in the cost of living. It had
n:leQ.Jlt t:Q. the kisa.:n a sl;i.ght incre&se in the prices. of his proouoe
.accompanied by • .totally disproportionate rise in the prices of
'"W~t he has,fu buy frQ>m the bazaar. It theref'Ore made a hole in
the inco!lle of the kisans in the same WBiY as in that of the wor-
~~·and employees whose cost... of living rose to a fsr greater
~tentthan they were compensated for by the grra.nt.6f Dearness
These hardships of the common peo:ple a,nd along . ;wiib
them of. the kisa.ns vere further intensified by the N ati 0 naJ
•('!risis which broke out on August 9. From that da,y onw~d~
it was no more a question of high prices but actual non~XiB­
:tenoe of daily necessaries. No food for the worker who ·p!-oduces
.clothes for the soldier and the civilian; no clothes for the kiBat!i.
who produoes,food for the worker and the soldier; no kerosene
•or sugar in the poor man's home-auoh is the grim piotm-e of
India at least since N o:vember last. , Those who eat wheat &Te
given Bajra; rice is substituted by oiller graina;;I.Dythlng tha.t
,ca.n 1Je :gttlped through the throa.t is reoouu:aeadecl '¥ a . wartilne
substitute for food grains. Eve11 these are ·!lOt aV&ilable in seve-
ral places so that people are actually starring. At no time in
,the history t>f a predominantly aparian cmmt.ry have we seen
.uch an acute shortage of food with its accompaniments of food
riots and social disorder.
By no means ean we eall this a simple food crisis. It is a
cloth crisis, a sugar crisis, a kerosene crisis, a match crisis, a cri-
sis in the daily neeessariea of the Indian people. There is a crisis
in the transport system which has redueed the number of trains.
and buses to no mo~ than· half of what it wa8 before. There is
a crisis in the means of exoha.J:tge and people are not able to get.
as many small coins as they need~ There is a erisis . in pa~ by
which pe8ple are asked to be content with no more tlum a fifth
of the quantity of paper they Were using before. There is a criSis
in medicine and pec;>ple are, not able. to cure them.selves as they
s:&ou.ld. There is a crisis in the daily needs hi the people.
. Hqw do the kisa.ns stand in riu&tion to food.·~ I They
suffer under it no les8 than wo~k.ers. In respect of cloth, sagar,
kerosene, they are in no way better t~ any' · other section. of
the people. With regard to food itself,. kisa.ns engaged in the
cUltivation of commercial crops like cotton, jute, sugar-cane,
grountlnut, cocoanut etc., are equally hit by the food crisis..
Among those sections of kisans whO cultivate food crops like
-wheat. rice etc.. it is only a small minority -who get enough grain
for their maintenance all the year round.' The large number of
kiana who are ground down by thetriple load of revenue~ rent
and debts ha.ve t~ go to the market and get grain for their own
maintenance at least for 6 months in the year. :Most of them
will be seized by the creditor, the landlord or the tax--eolleetor
at the time of the harvest, have therefore to sell their. grain at
low price and then, after a month or so to buy back grain at
'double the price at which they sold it. This is no mo:r-e · ~ible
now because what they sell at the time of harvest goes to th&
The position of kisans therefore.. may .he summed· ap
-they do not get their daily necessaries like matches, kero-
sene, sugar and cloth.
- . ~~of',, t,hem .who ~ the cultivators of commercial
crops d.ondtt.ttheir foodeither.
-the large majority of &gricUltarallabourers, tenant cul·
tivators and poor Cbltivating owners do not get food for more
'than· a few weeb during .and ~the harvests.
-even tb(Jse•who need not depend on the purchase of food
grain-.; frOm the bazaar are exploited by the hoarders ad profi-
~·· It is the latter who exploit the misery and starvation of
people; '~'Mit, if and when the people ·get infariated it is the pros-
~- )dsans who ha~e to fall victims to looting and Su6h other
Activities of the peopl« · . •
. . It is th~ot:e uiiscbieyolJ.s lie to allege tltai there is no
f(,)Od. ~ •. for: the; jisan,, that they stand to gain by the starva-
jion. of the ~ple. •. ~j~ ·.~ .. .,.. far ~ID t"'th to say that the
cloth crisis has made and is making all the textile workers rich
or that the sugar crisis benefits the workers at sugar-mills and
the sugar cap~, growers of !Jenarand t1 ~. P. Kis~ns suffer as much
from t:piscri~s.pf, daily n~saries of life as. any other section
of .the people. None. ;b11t a tfuy .. lot of hoarders and profiteers
sta~d ~ ben~ by tl,Us .all-round economic crisis.
II. THE CA~LL OF .l?ATJllQ;i'lSM '-:-;


Kisans are not o:rllt the IDoSt' numerous sectiea, of ,tile

Indi=m peqple.. Nor ve they ~7 the p~u~s ef ~ood. on
Wl'hich the 400 aillioa peo(Ueof.India liy~ TbM ~lhe~
d11cers ·of cotta~ Jute. J.'ict\ :wbeat a.D.4 . · oth.., ~io,les .•01\·· :wh•a
export .t() foreign lancls depends the illlwrl:of mOf!Jt of t)le ariio~
:wldoh .tile Indian people consume in .th~ir . · 4aily .life, ... Rain of
the kisans, failure of crops, means not on1y ~.sta.rva~n ~J:'/ctb,.
people of India. but. a total 1l~ha.lancing ?f the State :Qudget,
contraetion of, Foreign Trad7 st,...m· on eurte}fcy• in short a
veritable'economi~ ~risiS·.. Th~,f~t ~~~ .. ~U'~g~ ~t
Central and ~vmciaJJ;ntdgets ~" gf!nera.lly caBin ~61~
on the season~.,, ' · · · •• ·. ··. · •·· ·

If kisans ·~upy su~li .. vit&l .rMe: in the eeononrle life -1

lpdia., if their productive work has sue~ ·. an 9ver-riding . i!Jl..
porta.nee in Indian. socicety, it. ·goes W;itlio~ &aying ·that . ·they
must have an equally vital roJe·in sofving the variolU problems
of Indian econoaic life. ·If a. crisis in agriculture cannot but
create a. ;Jimila.r crisis in other spheres of econonic life. a solution
of crisis in agriculture is also bound to lead to a solution "in
other spheres of life. Particularly must this be true when one
of the most characteristic factors of the N ationa.l Crisis is an
absence of those very commodities {like wheat and rice} in whose
production the kisans are engaged.
No Solution Of Food Crisis Without Food Product:ion
There is no doubt about the fact that the food crisis is
mostly a. product of bad distribution. The absence of a centra...
lised plan of getting grains frl>m surplus areas and transporting
them to deficit areas, the utter ineffectiveness of measures to
check hoarding and profiteering, the sense of inseeurity created
in the minds of the people because of the continuance of the.
N a.tional Crisis, are at the back of the food. crisis. If a highly
industrialised country like Great Britain can evolve & rational
distribution of whatever food is available for her, if the Soviet
'ttnio~ ~an··· '"ig~ntie battles and yet feed all hftr soldie:rg, and
c}vTli~ns, 1f · after 6 years of a. pistoric •.W'ar can carry on
without food s there is no reason wh.JfOOd Hbts should ocour
' ~
~n.I•4i•:~ltt.c · a: pntdominantly a.grar~•n c~nt;ry. With a
minimum of pla.ne:lng .#l<nd .Ol'ga:uisa.tiol); of tra~pprl. a:nd . 4is-
tt.:ihution, with people's c<mfjdence .in and co-opera.tionwith the
Government,'lllefood tha.t we ha.ve 1n theeottnt:ry can be pro-
petly n;tade alv;iifa1Ue tb the people; and;· if.tlmt is done; non& of
·tho~· thing: w}tich together constitute what is, called~ke· ttFood
c:Jirins» Witi·~·'there.'· in other words, this Fobd Orisi!~ds.ne~>t\n
una.voida.ble incident ofthe war in which India is involved bat
f<~Alt?~<\~l:>~~:hfJ.f<hFlip ~mpQ.sM .on us }?ya.:Q jrra.tiona.l sy~tem of
~;t1BJii:Yt~~d 4i~i~iquti«;»IJ of foqd,gr~nJi. . .. ,
• What a.Ji.t this;ihe.wever.; means is &nlv tha.t thE} food crisis
is out of' aU propof!t.iOti to thefrea.I :sho~ oi food. gra.ins. It
does Jilot ~ean tlulit th&re istoflay enough food in,tbe QOantl'y to
feed"rthe )vh.ol~~pla of Iadi:4. Tha.t there is a l'eM· s}lorta,.g~ of
fotid·may be gathered from the following facts:-.
· · {l) India used td impoi"b.,.l;OOO,OOO tons of rice every year
from>:Burma and it was onthis importtb.'l.tla.rge parts of Madras
and (Bengal used to be fed .. ·And this has ceased to come in ·for
over a yea.t no.~. .· ·
(2) With regard to wheat, India iri peace time has enough
o_f it for her ~'f.~·~ons~~p~pn in ~norm~;1ear...But it is very
· hkely that~ Wltti the large IIicl"ease in consum}"tiOn due to the
PO!i~jng pf A.l,ijefi t.:~~ d~ ,:L~dia a.~£1 tpe · exports to the l\Iiddle
Efl.st \fig~~ fqr nej.th• of, t~ a.l'.eavaila.hle bu.t their existence
ifl, ~dp;t~t~eP. in ofliQiai .sta.terqeAts) are sure to ha.ye canverted
. tft:ls, st:P.aU. ·~pins into '.a . defipit .whose Si,?;e it is difficult to
p~tima~e· · ·
43) T:Dera·l:lave been· faib.1res of· crops in certain places like
i::M'idnapore· ili Bengal, • Ananta.pore and, other districts in
· M:adrarst·Bala.soJ'e'in• Ori~ Bija.pur in 'Bom~y ete.. Some of
'~h&ve,created local fa.mineconditions and the GovernJD.ents
ha.Te applied F.mine Codes and Regula.tions.
Ttl~ Secretary·of ''8tate./'Mr. L. s. Amery, in answer to
questions in the Commons on January 2lla.st said:
<.· ."li~t tea,'r'~ fo?d crops were ·ill general sa.timlc~· but
'.~.~~ Jffl~,of,~"~:a ~ice; of ·wlli~q ··l,50<Y,~ to11s pprr~~lly go to
~tidia,·co,~R¥<f)Vit11tne iqc,ea.sT denla.n~s for the'i*mf•nn the
''SeriOus failure of'the•millet~ "ci"6p in certain parts. have caused

prices to rise and food to become in many parts not only rare but
scarce. The floods in Sind and the cyclone in Orissa and Bengal
have been contributory factors." ~.
,- 't --~ __;,_:

:Mr. N. R. Sarkal", Member-in-Charg• ··01· Pood of the

Viceroy's Executive Council, said on Feb~ 8:
••Taking into account the deficit m rice produotiQr;t, the
loss of B11l"m& rice and the requirements of certa:in neig-bonri.ng ·
countries and the Defence forces, there ma.y be a. deficit of nearly
2.800.000 tons in Kha.rif crops which, if the improvement anti-
cipated materialises~ may fall to about 2,.500,000...,., ·
Neither an improvement in the efficiency of Government's
machinery of purchase, transport and distribtttion of food grains
nor the perfection of people's organisation for 8ec'aring food can
wipe out the real shortage tha~ is there. What it can do is to
prevent whatever quantity.. of food is available from going into
the black-market, arrange its proper distribution . ~ plaCes
where it is tneeded, introduce rationing of those commodities
that are really scarce; create confidence in the people that they
will get w ha.tever is available and thus bring order and system
inthe food market. This, of course, is n.o mean achievement,
but it cannot solve the food crisis completely. Only the total
extinction of food shortage can do that.
Feed The People--Kisans' Duty
It is here that the kisans' role in the solution of the Natio-
nal Crisis comes. Other sections .of the people can, if they
organise themselves, remove many defects in the supply and
distribution of food; they can keep Tigilant watch over the
doings of hoarders and see that no black-market exista. They
can so organise the distribution ,of food and other daily necessar-
ies that hardships are reduced to the minimum; they can carry
on effective propaganda against looting and thus prevent social
disruption and dislocation. In fact, one or more of these has
been partially achieved in cities and town& in various provinces
of India by the joint activity of workers and other sections of
the urban population.
It is. however. only the ldsans -who.' C&ll remove the
basic weakness of all t~ activitieS' of. securing, food through
People's Food Committees and Food Volunteers-the weakness
of the real, though small, shortage of food ~ It is oQ.ly by·
growing more food alld thus increasing th.e quantity of food
available to the people tha.t the crisis can ultimately he solved.
Can~ th• kisa.~t:;do ~this~ Of course~. they cil.n. Indian
~iculture is n~~no'llsly ha.ckward•. Moder:p scientific. meth-
ods of cultivation ~hich ~ave increased agricultural productiQn
have not yet been applied in India. Their application will
enormouslyincrease the quantity of food produced per acre of
cultivated land. But, apart from this~ even on the basis of the
:peFsend..:..d.ay b&ok:wa.rd technique of cultivation, production can
be increased to an enormous extent ..Jf only all the fallow lands
that are aVailable for cultivation are. hrQught nnder the plough.
ProfeSSor Mukerjee calculates in his ''Food Planning for Four
Hundred Millions" that~ on the basis of existing technique
itself, the available land area for cultivation in India can main-
tain a popn!ation of 447 millions of the people. In fact, the food
shortage is so small that, if only. ~]!~ kisans adopt a policy of
reducing non-food crops to the minimum, adopt whatever means
are at their disposal to inereasethe yield per acre of cultivated
land, they can easily wipe out this shortage. ""
,- '

To do this is the specific forQl m which kisans can contri-

bute to the solution of the food. crisis, save their brethren from
s~vation and miseJ"Y~ w:ard off looting and civil war between
sections qf. the Indian people. This is the patriotic duty which
the kisans owe to their lqotberland. Doing this, kisans can
save ,the nation from ~aster; refusing to do this, they allow the
nation to lie ruined and desolate and along with the nation,
they themselves will perish.

Grow More Food, Solve The Crisis ·

. Growing more food.is not, however, a simple problem of
feeding the people. It has far greater significance .than that.
~or, by organising themselves for growing more food, the 300
million kisans of India not only wipe out the shortage of food
gl'ains and thus aolve·iihe food crisis but take an effective part
i:B· the solution qf the all._~11nd National Crisis.
Grow more food is indissohlbly liB.ked ~up with iB.dustrial
production. Scarcity of food, difficult to get them conveniently,
has led and~ is leading to stoppages of production at mills and
factories. Most of the trade disputes that have recently oocured
in various industrial centres can directly or indirectly be traced
' to the sense of panic and insecurity which arose out of the
non-availability of food .grains. This means t~t food scamitl"
is not only starving the people but reducing the produotien ;.&f
industrial goods like cloth necessary both for the. front and the
rear and .the production. of goods necessary for. the front ..... In
other words, growing more food is not only feeding the people
but helping the workers to clothe and ·otherwise serve the
soldiers and civilians.
The same applies to transport. Lack off~ and ;the terri·
bly heavy prices that have to.be paid for it when available ·~
created acute discontent among Railway workers. Stoppages of
work are threatened at several places. Giving food to .these
workers is the surest way of making the transport system
function smoothly.
:&lore important than all .this. however, is. the cgeneral
toning up of the morale of all seetions of the people. That 75%
of the Indian people come forward to d9 their patriotic duty ·. tp.
their brethren cannot but have its e~~ts on the remaining 25~
kisans working harder to feed the people is a challenge· to the
workers to work harder and clothe the people; it is a. patriotic
call to the citizens in town and oountry to see that the food thus
produced is not allowed to go into·thebl&ck market and be used
as a means of fleecing the people: it is an incentive to the soldier
at the front to :fight harder and sma.Sh the euemy faster and·
more completely; it is a stimulus to the entire nation to unite.
and secure freedom just as the kisa.ns unite among themselves
and solve the crisis.
Growing more food is the kisans' wa.y of building N ~tiona.l
Unity. It unites the town and village on the basis that
the vill~ae produces food and the town produces cloth a.nd other
daily necessaries. It unites the kisans and the traders on the
basis that kisans produce mgre and the traders distribute better
tllan before. It unites people of all ·castes, communiti~ and
political parties on the basis of a programme which is in the
interests of every one of them. In short, there can be no
programme of National Unity~ without mobilising and unitinc
the k:isallS in order to grow more food. ·. .
"There are about lOi croTe acres of land described as
-ct11tiva.ble waste" t sa.id Sir J ogendra. Sing~ Member for Educa.-
ti~n, Health and Lands, decla...-ing open the f\...-st meeting .of the
Central Food Advisory Council at New Delhi on AuguSt 24,
1942. "It is hoped that a.t least 50 lakh acres --~out of this area.
could he brought under oultivatfon.. I devoatly wish·tha.t this
hope. would be fulfilled~ lmt I have grave don:bts as to ·its

50 la.khs ou~ of a possible ],~ .crores !. ~s than 5% of

what is possible is hoped to be <lone,. but even a.bQn:t this "I have -
grave doubts as to its fnlfilment".
This at a. t:i.mewhe~even if the hope of bringing all this
land into cultivation and other items of Grow More Food Cam-
·~$.~. prove a thulll.ping succ~s, the country will be met with a
net d.e,f.lcit of 11 la.kh tons of rice for its normal requirements.
Why is it that in this land of agriculture where 75% of the
- "POPnla.tion bas no other occupation than cultivation, the Hon'ble
Membe..,. responsible for I.~a.nds does :sot hope to increase the·
production of food to· such .. an extent tha.t the whole deficit of
f90d graiDs is wiped out 1 Why is it that he is afraid that even
the modest programme of bringing less than 5.% of caltivable
waste into cultivation· may not be ca.rried out f
Government•s Grow More Food Campaiga,
A Synibolic CaiJipaign
lnspite of the wide publicity given to it, the Government's
Grow Hore.Food.ea.mpa.ignis.not taken seriously by. the people
of l,ndia... A mere comparison of people~s response to this
ea,mpaign of, the Government of . India. with similar eampa-igns
in a.ny.<Jther countries included in the U uited N a.tions will show
u.s. how miserably it has. failed.bere..
Perhaps a more imporiaat ctue&tion 'is whether this campa-
ign is taken seriously by the Government itself.. How·else can
one expect the Government Member to bewail if he can bring:
5% of cultivable waste into cultivation 7
Sir Jogen.dra Singh's staten:t.ent at a :Press Conference held
at New Delhi on May 9, 1943 is significant in ~his respect;· Says
he: "Agriculture does;not. ~r.U,t of any innovation; so our
efforts in achieving or exceeding the production targets have to-
be on traditional lines."
Compare this with what is taking place in Grea't Britain~
Oa.nada and Austr&lia, leaving alone the unparalleled achieve-
ment of the Soviet.Union.. ·
Ever since the war began, 6 million a.eres of land were'
brought under cultivation, food production increased· by SO%
and the number of tractors ha.s increased by 100% in Britain: ·
Canada's wheat production was only 84l&c tons in 1941
while it has gone upto 150 lacs tons in 1942.
Australia increased its wheat production from 22· lac tons
in 1940-41 to 43lac tons in 1941-42 ..
To those who are not moved by the spirit which moves
these United N a.tions, agriculture does not, of course, upermit
any *novation". But those who ha.ve imbibed the spirit of
sacrificing everything in the interests o.f the final defeat of
Fascism, those who will not a.llow their prejudices to stand in the:
way of the victory of the war efforts can undoubtedly bring about
innovations. It is this fear of making innovations, anXiety to•.
confirm to the "traditional lines" that is making the Government
of India's Grow More Food campaign a .failure. It is this that.
makes Sir Jogendra Singh doubt whether his Government's
modest phgpamme·of &ringing 5% of waste ]t.nd .···under cultiva-
tion can succeed in - country where. there is admittedly a super-
fluity of both idle hands to "work and of empty stomachs to fill

~he present ori.sis iar n<>t a trl.l.ditional phenom~n; the·

steps taken by· other Governments to increase production are not·
OD traditional•Jioes either. ~if the Government of Inoi• m
more anxious to ·Stick•to •tradition ·•· t:h.~ to fuorease prod uetio~
it only means that its Grow More;Food~ca.mpaig.6 is jl1St ·• so:rrr
i.mjtati:On 'Of·· other ~~iow' G.rc;:.;-.y )J;~ Food ~~pa.ign and not.•t.,"
a ~riollJi,calql,l&igp.. . ., ..
Vested Interests Vs. People's ' Needs
, Wherever there, is a clash, between vested interests And
~ple,s needs, :wherevu the rights of landlords" money-lenders
etc., come ,in f)pposition to the urgent necessity ofgrowin~Jnore
food. will ,i;be Government of India follow its traditional line of
sacrificing the people's needs,, will it prefer , protection to the
rigbtsofla.ndlords, money-lenders etc. to greater production Qf
food 1 1t is on this that the success or failure of its Grow M:QI'e
Food campaign depends. ,
If the Government is prepared to make innovations in the
matter of its attitude towards landlords and ten~tonts, if it is
bold enough .tp, declD!l"e that np landlord has in these grave tillle«;
the right. to keep ~res ~nd acres Qf.land in their possession, it
wi~ be able to bring not 50 lakhs b]lt"at least 5 crores of culti,;a-
ble, waste land into cultivation,., Just issue an order that any
cultivator may go and cultivate &Jly plot of waste- land that he
finds in his area., that no landlord of such land has the right to
drive him out of that plot of,' land. You will see thousands and
thousands of kisa.ns bringing- these lands into cultivation.
Does the Government of India do this 1 Ha.s aDy provin-
cial Government done it so far 1 No. It is nearly a year since
the All-India Kisan Sarbh.a. at its Bihta Session demanded
fallow lands. · That demand has now been repeated by the Kisan
Sa.hha at, its Bhakna. Session. This has been endorsed by
Provincial, Dist:rict and lower units of the Kisan Sa.bha. at
several places and on several occasions. The Government has
only to carry it out and as much of waste land a.s is necess~ny
to . feed our civilian population as well as our Defence forces
will come under cultivation.

Some provincial Governments have~ of course, issued

-<lrders to the effect that waste land may be taken possession of
by cultivators and food crops raised on them. This has been
coupled with concessions in the matter of land revenue to he
paid to the Government as also with promises of T&ka.vi loans.
But to this right of cultivation is added a. proviso that the culti-
vator should~ pay ''reasonable rent'' to the landlord. No Govern-
ment has so far issued an order by which the landlord is
~ompelled to allow his land to be cultivated on terms other tha.n
i>t,,ipe usualpea.ce-time terms. ~Some Governments are prepared to
· make concessions, with regard to their own Land Revenue, hut
even they do not force landlords to make any ooncessions with
regard to their rent.
• The Malabar Tenancy Commit~ for 'instance~ made- a.
TeCOmmendation for ptJG~ime legislation tha& any plot of, cul-
_tivable ...-aste land may be oeeupied by any culti~or if
the , :Ja.ndlord does not himself propose to cultivate it~
The Collector t~ whom the cultivator sllould apply shall
grant permission unless there ·&re reasonable grounds for
reje-Cting it. No revenue or rent shall he pa.yable on sueh lan~s
for the first 5 years.
Inspite of the-fact that this wa.s·a.greeci·to even by the two
landlords' representatives on the Commit~ inspite of the_ bet
that this peace-time pn>posal is an urgent necessity in these
days of ...-ar, inspite of the fMt that Malabar· is. an extremely
deficit district With regard to supply of rice and &n _extremely
surpJ~ district with regard to waste }and,'. the Gomnment elf
Madras is not prepared to implement this as a war time measu~
The qqestion is not only wheth•laD.dlords shan Qe- aJlowed
te keep vast ~tretehes of,.land w:aste hut alSo whether they sha~
be &llowed to exploit this food crisis by collecting rent out of
land.·brought into cultivat:ioa in order to tide ovs this · crisis.
Have the landlords no obligation to the nation 7 Is it:unf&ir OD
the part of the State to ask the landlM"ds , that, till tais war is
over, they shall not realise a single pie they were not receiving
•hefore the war ~
Allowing landlords to realise ren-t on waste land brought
·into cultiva'tion as a result of the Grow More l'ood campa.1g:ri is
&Jiowing them to make profit out of the nation~s food crisis~ If
the Government feels itself obliged to make concessions with
regard to Land ,Revenue, Water Tax and other demand~ there ·
is no reason why it should not force landlords to make similar
concessions in respect of rent. ·

Creat:e Serise Of Security Amoog Kisans

In statement after statement of Government spokesmen
has the assurance been repeated that ushould the pl"ieet: of foo4:
grains go below a reasonable level the GoverniBent of India
would 'be prepared to inte~ene and buy at fair prices all food
- tp'&ins offered to them in the open market during the war and
for one year thereafter. "The Government of Iadia trast tlut\ ,.,
tbis .-uratl~ couple-do with other steps which are being taken;. ""'
..Vm iafeguard the t:ultiva.tors' interest by ~uring for them a
reasonable return for their l&bou:r." . .
Does this assurance convince the kisa.ns that they will get
AI "reasonable return for their labour" 1· Does it create in them
the sense of security that, if they '!ork harder and produce more;,
~ey will be a..ble to enjoy the fruits of their additional labonr 1
J,n the c~ of a few. well-to-do ~iS,an whq have a sur-plu qf
gJ"..bls oveJ" &lld above their own requirements ~ that they can
sell~ surplus at a. r~a.Sona.ble price in the market, this
ass~&J:l.~ certainly creates such a sense of security. But what
about the overwhelming majority of kisans for whom greater
production of food crops means larger payments towards arrear&
of rent, interest •nd debt' P~IIlents ~·· To such kisa.ns who form
the majority of Indian kisans, .Grow More Food will mean
work ha.rdeD and fill the:coffeJ,!si of tJMm- masters more.
.'J:'his> is why the Jlihta Session of· the Kisan Sa.bha.
demanded : · · · ·
. ·.. "'(a.J ¥oratqri.U:m shall be de,clared for rent and revenue
arrears, agrarian debts .and coercive processes.
(b) Liberal reii}issio:p.a.s well as suspension ;in rents, debt
pa~ents, a.ssessm~nt,. arrett,.r etc., must be. granted t() the Kiaans
• ~qJ" t)).e..sa\.son. U ;Qless th~ famine and crisis stricken kisa.n is ·
hee. ,from these unbearable encumbrances he woald not be
·~tp.'-qsedto.and capable of growing more food crops."
··!Along with
'*Peasa'llt.S in general m nst be a.sslired of minimum prices
for their produce and agriculturalla.bourers must be gua.ranteed
a minimum living wage a.nd work all the season."
The sense of security cannot~ however, be created simply
by a.ssuring minimum price for the agricUlturaJ.· produce or by
&imply making concessions with regard to rent and debt pay-
ments. Tqgether with these.steps should be taken to see that
ldsans are supplied with·· all their da.ily necessaries. Difficulty
itt securing cloth, kerosene, matches, sugar etc.* will be a great
demora.lising factor so far a.s kisa.ns a.re concerned. They
cannot be enthused to grow more ;food unless they are assured
enough supply of what they need.
This is why the Kisan Sa.bha. demands:
uCo-operative Societies in villages and talukas shorud
e take over all the grain stocks with dealers and guarantee the
transport and sapply of graj.n to all at cheap price. 'XlUs is
essential to st.op all cornering of grains by merchants a;nd w ..
sing of prices". (Bihta).
":I'o get supply of food and other essential commodities at
reasonable prices ensured to kisa.ns." (Bhakna}. .
It is idle to suppose that kisans can be enthused to grow
more food by a simple assurance of reasonable price. What
they require is an assurance that they can get their daily needs.
And this cannot be done unless they are assured of protection
from their exploiters-the landlords, moneylenders, the profi-
teering merchants.

Rouse The Kisan Millions

The official Grow More Food campaign has failed to
~hieve tangible results not only beca~ it has not assured the
kisans that this will not ·be a handle for their exploiters to
further squeeze them. Such an assurance, however valuable it
rna.y be. will not cut any ice unless the kisans are roused to
their patriotic duty of growing more food.
To think that, by simply assuring fat profits to the kisa.;n,
you can make him work for you by growing more food is· on a
par with thinking that paying a. decent salary, yott can get ..
millions of boys to lay down their lives. Both the producing.
kisa.n as well as the fighting soldier ma.y cause tremendous diffi-
culties for you at critical times unless they are roused, to the
idea that what they are doing is not a simple means of making
profit for themselves .but a great patriotic act of saving their
country. ·
It it here that the official Grow More Food ca.mpa.ign is
the weakest. The posters and advertisements of the National
War Front or other agencies of the official Grow More Food
campaign a.ppea.l not to the patriotism hut to the greed of
the kisans. It is not the spirit of self-sacrificing hard WOJi"k
for feeding the people which is roused by the campaign but the
selfish greed of the kisans for greater earnings.
The enormous role played by patriotism· in increasing
production may be gathered from the tempo of production in
_Great Brita.in itself where the first large scale increase in pro-
duction of the whole Second World War took place in the
famous "Ta.nb for Russia Week" in 1941. Every worker felt
.at that tim& tha.t working harder in that week wa.s not earning
a few shillings more but contributing his share to the defence
~<1f the Workers' Fatherland. This has been followed by a. large
sca.le ptjoduetiQil'ju ~-reral pl~nts a.nd factories in Britain when
workers were convinced that· greater production means· earlier
-opening of S~cjud)?rt)Dt .a.nd hence earlier defeat of the Nazis.
It is the close. linking of agitation for Second Front a.nd
~rga.nisati&n 'f~r ~greater prodttction that ha.s given birth to
Production Committees in Britain which have proved the
:marvels of British industry.
Not only is this not do, tie in India but .the Gqvernmen t
.and.its agents are employing all available means to do tlie very
· ~pposite. N ationa.l Defence is proclaimed from the house tops
as something in which the people of this country have to take a.
pa.ssi:ve a.nd submissive role; the N~n's leaders are put be-
'hind bars and its organisations suppressed; thousands of kisa.ns
~re subjected to hea.vy collective :fines and other acts of repres-
sion; kisa.n leaden are not allowed to. hold meetings of kisans
or otherwise to rouse them to their patriotic duty. In short, a
··situation is created · in which mans begin to suspect whether
growing more food is not feeding the oppressors of the nation
and thus an anti-national act. ·
If this policy continues, kisans wilJ not respond to the call
·~f Grow More Food. They may, on the other band, refuse to
part with whatever they have. They &re likely to trust the hoar-
4ers and Fifth Columnists a.nd keep 1-.nds waste or keep what
· they produce themselves. This along with the conspiracy of
.hoarders and Fifth~ Columnists will not only defeat the Grow
More Food ca.mpw&:~n hut send whatever food there is In the
· country into the black-market. In fact, this is what ha.um
the U. P. Rationing Scheme and to the plan of getting
eontro11ed rates from th~ Punjab. This is going to.
.to all schemes of control and rationing of food grains a
prices, unless kisan millious are roused to do their
Key Role Of The Kisan .Sabha
That the Government has failed to ma.:k~ the .Gro,w :Mo,re
Food campaign a suooess a.nd thua to solve tqe · food .oriBD does
not mean that, till this Government is '~overthrown''; the kisans
of India. .cannot gro~ more food. It :js true,. of COl:J.rse, tba.t the
Government's policy is a·grea.t . obstacle to t~e na.tign's progra.-
mme of· greater prOduction of .f()od grains. But this is no obsta-
cle tha.t the organised kisa.n millions ..cannot overco~e.' .
Grow More Food is in ··the interests of .the entire na.ticoa.
There is no class or section of people that does not stand to
benefit by it exoep~ of course, a. handful af greedy ·landlords and
profiteers.; The moment they all realise that,. for a.ehieving
common object7 they have to unitea.nd sacrifice their own ·sepa-
rate and sectional interests~ the Government policy ceases to be
a.n obstacle in the way of Grow More Food campaign.
How .can the Government's policy hamper kisans from
~tting fallow land on ea.sy terms if the unitei;i people's move-
ment convinces the landlords tha.t it is their duty to a.llow land
to be cultivated in the interests of the nation Y
·. How oa.n the Government's unsympathetic policy prevent
kisans from getting seeds and loans if moneylenders and stock-
ists af grain are rol1Sed to their patriotic duty of supplying these ·
necessaries to the Kisans 1 ;
can the Government's policy of repression be' ~n
in the way of rousing the kisa.ns to their patriotic dut1
more food if Kisan Sa.bhas and other people's organ:r-
~n.?·YV- on a.n inteti.sive a.gitation and . propaganda. o;n. the,
N a.tiona.l Unity for N a.tional Defence and N ation1ll
ee(.IOln 1
Government's policy is therefore an obstacle to the na.tion's
programme of grow more food only so long a.s the kisans do ·
not realise the necessity of uniting among themselves and with
the other sections of the people, only so long a.s lanldords a.n~
moneylenders fail to realise their duty of enabling kisa.ns to·
grow more food, only a.s long a.s workers, office-employees and
other,n:on~cultural seetio,ns qfftll.e people consider 't1le grow
DlOI'!e food as an exclusively; kisan, aiia.:ir. The moment these
di:ffe;rent sections of the people realise their different roles in
~his cotnmon ,programmeof., producing. more food, grains and
thus S()lving the fOod, ~risis, ,Gover~me:dt's policy ,ce~ to be an
9bS.t~le,in t);;le 'fay of kisa11s. ,

Can l<isao Sc:J~I\a Pla,y lt:s Role ?

The main question, however, is: Can Kisan Sabha play its
role' in , this ' eaimpaign, can it rouse the 'kisaJ1 millions td, this
patriotic duty; can it· organise them: on ·a praotie&l plan of" pro-
duction ail.d get it carried out; can it persuade the landlordS. and
moneylenders to do,,tbeir part ofthe , job which alone will get
fallow lallld, :,seeds: etc:.; for> eU:ltiva.ti(!~~; can it overeome the
difticu}ties put in their way }:,Y petty locafofficiaJs and unpatrio-
tic landlords ~t.nd moneylenaers; can it inspire urban people with
cq~fidence that they ,~ill get food if only tney rally behind the
Kisan Sabh3' 'I • '. , ,
Undoubtedly it can.
' For quart~r ofa century, kisans have taken a.n effective·
share in the national patrfotic movement of the country. In
the No11,-co--operation Movefhent of 192()-22, in the National
struggles Qf', 193().,-33, in the Great Patriotic·. Rally of General.
El~ti9ns i:Q...1937, kisans in India took a. glorious part. Anything
~hicb g~. to the st:rengthemng of the national patriotic
movement ()annot but llliOV€ the people who added such brilliant
eb-a.p~rs in the history of N a.tional Movement as the Ba.rdoli
~qggle of 192.8, t},te U. P .. No--Rent Movemeut etc.

Not only have the kisans such a. glorious tradition ,of

patriotism but they aa.;Y~ a.Jso a. tra.dit~n of class-st:cuggles a.nd
a. class organisation. The innumer$,;'le .sma.ll, scattered local
struggles in the various parts of .the cou:;::ttry beginning from
the last century, the more organised and systematic tenancy
movements in aJl provinces, have all been brought under a.
®ntralised organisatioJ}hr;r-nd leadership since 1936 when the
All India Kisa.n Sabba.'\V'B6 fnrmed. Since tha.t ~till today this
all-India organisation of kisans bas represented all the aspira-
ti~s, struggleS and 9rga.nisation of kisans. Today, it has a
Ul'embership c;)f over 3 lakhs. it has properly funetioning · Kisa.n
Sabhas' in all major provinces:rit expects to raise its membership
in 1943 at least ,to 6 lakbs. In fact, there is no other orga.n~
tion,exoept the Indian National Congress wbichhas itsba.sein
.so many villages.
, , . The , resolution Oli nOrg<lJ!isationu , ~lllc}l tlie, Bhak~a
Session of the Kisan Sabha has adopted seeks. to .. opnsolida.te
this mass influence and patriotic tradition of the Kisa.n Sabha
into an effective weapon which Ca.lll get things done. By properly
implementing that resolution, theleadersof the Kisan Sabha
will be rendering signal service to the whole llation. For they
will be forging a. wea.pon with which thf.1Y ·~l1 overco1ne all obs:-
ta.cles to thegreaterproduction of foo4 alld,.thus to the solution
.pf the food erisiB.. ·

Kisan Sabha Has Overcome Obst:acles .

The qqestion whether the Kisan. Sabha can pveroome tb.ese
"Obstacles has, in fa.ot, been answered by, the Pr:avineia.l and
District Kisan Sabhas in Bengal, Andhra and Kera.la. The
a.chievements of certain districts in these provinces go to show
that, wherever Kisan Sabhas take it upon themselves to. attack
and overcome the difficulties that stand in the way of growing
more food, substantial results have been shown.
A large part of Khulna·distrt.tis marshy . land and 50%
of the people of Khulna district are landless peasants. What is
more natural than bringing these uncultivated acres of land
and these unemployed hands of cultivators by clearing the
marshes a.nd making them cultivable~ The Government, of
course, did not do it, but the kisa.ns were not discouraged by
this. They took upon themselves the task of erecting mounds
by ,their own collective labour, bringing the~e lands into culti-
vation and thus increase the quantity of grain grown in the
district. A total of not less than 10,000 bighas of land have
been thus made cultivable as a. result of which nearly 75~0QO
maunds of additional grain will be harvested. ,
I 200 acres of wasteland were secured to poor peasa.nts and
agricultural labourers in Kistna District through representa-
tions made by the District Kisan Sabha.
In the Central Delta of East and '\Vest Godavari Districts~
the usna,.la.crea.ge for second crop is 40,000 acres. The enormollS
drive made by t}le ;Kisan Sabha. raised this.to 'i':O,QOOaeres.; ' ·
In,Gu:atur Distric'tc (~' in Andhra., 1000 aeres of waste
land was bruught undar mdtivation by the joint efforts of the
Kisan &bh& and the Agricultural LabOurers' Association. The
additiona.l yield.on thisland.oomes • to ~ot Jess than 1400 bags
of paddy and 200 bags of maize. ·
In KasargOde Talultof Kerala-in the taluk which produ-
ced the undying martyrs of Kayyur-300 acres of land have been
mad~ .'cultivable by the collective labour of the ltisans who
mohUised au
their forces and repaired a canal.
These. -.re a few living examples as to how 1risans, by their
own epllective eftorts, can imple:ment• the slogan of Grow More,
Pood •... If only the kisans PJ'g&hise themselves, they can get
fallow land for cultivation.
y··-- '- - , - - -· - - -- '

The Grow More Food campaign.~l'n so far in these thre&

provinces has. ~ther: lessons -. well.· Jessore and K4ulna districts
ill :fre.n.gaJ and Kasargod~. Chirakkal and Call,eut taluks have:
shown that~ ill the; programme of Grow More Food, even za.min-·
dan .can be made to co---operate effectively. When kisans
actively. took up the work of ~owing more food, zamindars in
these places co-opera~d by .way of oontri'Quting to the expenses
of erecti]l.g mounds., digging or repairing sources of irrigation,
giving waste lands for cultivation either absolutely free of rent.
or on low rents etc. Andhr~~n the otl:,.er hand, has been able
to soolp"e substantial oonQess~ons from the o~cials. Concessions
in regard to taking of water fro.m irrigaj;ion soqrees,. remission
and suspension of penal taxes and levies on those who occupied
and cultivated waste land, seCuring of priority for poor pea,sants
and agricultural· labourers when fallo-w lands ·are assigned for
cUltivation, inel"e8i8e of allotment for Takavi l~ns ( the allot-
ment fov Kistna District has been raised from Rs. I lakh last
year toRs. 5 la.k.h this year) a:ntt finally a _Bill by which the·
Government takes power' to. intervene in the ease o~ irrigation
sourees €Jwtied by zaminda.rs ·&nd to repair them at Government
expenses etc.~~these·ar~ no mean aohiej-ements of the Andhra
Provincial Kisa.n Sabha.
. "the feW examples cited here. go· to show that, if .oDiyKisan
Salbha seri(.)usJ~~es up_ this programme of growing ' m.ore food
it' carr'·dra\V ~ ~ tlie best
elements among the· ~ndars and·
officials: 1csft@:progra.mm.e· is so beneficial to th-e whoi'e people.
that anybody who opposes or obstructs it will be isolated among
his:own,people.;·. No ho:aest. landlord, moneylender or official
wlio!does·moe;.,'\rit.nt'his6ountry to fall a; 'prey•to :foiei~ · a~ggres;:....
sion or to sooial disruption will refuse to c~per&te in this
programme; no pl"ofit-monger:ing landlord or :moneylender,
DO hardened bureaucrat' ean afford to put ohsta.cl~ in the wa~
.of Kisan Sahha which do.es this job of saving tke nUition from
social and economic disater.

Drop~ In Th~ Oceiln

The achievements of the Kisan ~abba are, a few droJ?s.in
the ocean. Not only are they far from having solved the fOOd
crisis but they are far behind what Kisan Sa.bha can·today
achieve. It is not merely·th&t Kisan S&bhas have to grow far
stronger than it is today if it should be able to wipe off the food'
shortage but that its existing strengthitself coUld and 'should
be utilised much more than has been so far done.
Kistna District in A:ndhra stands ftrst in' the whole ooun- ·
try .in the matter of number of members enrolled ,in lrrsa.IJ;
Sahha. It enjoys together with Rangpur· iti Bengal 11.nd' No'rth
Malabar in Kerala. the foremost rank in organised strerigtfi and
influence among kisans. It, how,ever, collld not . lllobiUse !the
kisa.ns :in snob a. way as to see that. Rs. 1 la.kh set. apart ·by tlt:e
Governn::tent of Madras. for gra.rits to Jdsans for · purcha.sin~
manure et.c., :is properly· distributed: A strong· and, mighty'
o~ga.nisation based on theihf!uen~it ·has w~mld. have ·enabled'
it to use this to the utmost benefit for the people of the District.:
That, however, bas not been done. ·· ·
Though the Andhra. Provincial Royts' Assooia.tioJt Jut,s: to.
its credit some remarkable achievements. in Kistn' Qu:n-1.', East
and West Godavari districts,. it is a fact that this has .not .toncbed
the za.mindars anywhere in the province. No za.mindar ·has
been made to give fallow lands,. seeds etc., for Grow More
Food campaign; wha.teverc(mcession has been seeured bas all
been from the Goverllllle:nt.. This :weans .that .Grow Mi'l're .Food
campaign has not gone.lleyo:nd ~be conception of getting co,n-
cession from Government; it has not ca.qgh.t the ima.ginat}Qm. of
the non-kisa.n. people as 1ft grep.t patriotic camr~gn pot to
participate in whieh is disgr,~ul to a.ny •;bone-. :w~ T~
ca.mpa.ign has not been a. .ca.IDrpa.ign for the . unity of the •. wbol~
- people against famine hut one for unity of kisans ag&iD.st za,min.,.
da.rs etc.
Even this pVtialachievement is not to be seen·~ the ether
· strongholds of c'Kisan . Sa.bbas.. . Not lDltil •the b.at.,;· Provmcial
23. ·
'Oonfeft;J;p• oi the Ce~Umunist Parif' and Comrade J'oshi's tour
did the kis&n eom:rtlides of Malabar realise that grow ·mo~
:fOOd ~s·' mu.ch more than agitating for eoncressions from
Government a.J.ad $811rlndws. It was after this that the cqmrades
4 K.au:!'god.e Taluk took up the job of repairing the eanal; it
..,..~ t.bat eomrades in other Taluks took up the question.
seriously and achieved some good results.
Now, what about Bengal! Rangpur a.nd Mymen&ingh~·
the. best organised districts in . Bengal {the former is one of the
·~·.best prgani,sed ·d_istricts i:I)~he.":holecount-9') has not only
not :LD.Creased prpductlo!l· ()f f09d .gra1ns but 50fo of the lands
. tha.t. are us~y <mltivated in 'tJ:teSe two districts are likely to
remai11 fa.U9w · .this y~ _.beea.use the requisite seeds are not
a~lable. The Kisan S&bba has, of eoune, . built. up .a terrific
agitation fp.,:s~pp~ying; ..~ek;isanrwith'tlijs' seedj perhaps .this
ma;r ultim4tel;r ~ead to secu~ing seeds. But it speaks vol~mes
for the failure of l{:U;an a~hh• as an organisation that lt was
not ablE? 'in two of it.s })eSt strongholds, to prevent such an eas!Iy
avoidable crisis from breaking in the district. ·
'~rovinces like Punjab, Behar. U. P. etc. have. done
no~hing. In fact, it ..-illuot be incorreQt to say tha:t, so far as
actua.lly getting more foqd grown is concerned, . Kisan S&bha
ha.s failed as much as,. if not ··more than, the Government. It·
is undoubtedly true. that Kisan Sa.pha has many difficulties to
f&Oeo But it is also true that it is in a far more favourable
position to get things done~ With the influence which it wields
among the kisans~ with the self-sacrificing and resourseful
cad.res that it can command~ Kisau Sabha · can overcome
~bstacles to a greater extent tha.n it has done so far.

The Root OE The Failure : LeH: National ism

In Kisan Sabha
The Government failed to carry out the slogan of grow
more food because it is so isolated from the kisa.n masses that
its c&ll does.not insfire.them. Why is it that the. Kisa.n Sahha
with its great influence among the peasantry also failed 'J
A review of the various resolutions ~d by the Kisaa
Sabha on difierent occasions will give us the clue to the answer.
The Central Kisan Cotlileil which met at Nagpur in
:J'e})Joaary lJJ42 u exhorted the kisans of India to align them..
selva on tlae •ide of RD&Sia and China and the allied progressive
for'ees in waging a relentless war for ~he xftnal exhrmi~U~.ti&b uf1
fascism." It also formulated the basic• meas1!l'eg neoessa.tt~ fOIF.,
'"enabling the masses of India tl;) translate this ~undou~d will:
to freedom into concrete actiou~a.nd .fight . ·the·. fascist ')D.enace..'r'
It~ however. did not plaee any positive· plan of r&etiori: }i)efore ~~
kisa.n millions,. The :Kisa.n Sabha. units were not· rgbren •·•aDy
specific programme of work ·on the.ba.sis of/whieh kisans may
play a. vital role in the anti-fascist. w~·
Abare comparison of this with the r~o~uti~n of the Congress
Working Committee and the A~~.C.C. wW s}1o'W a ffl?se parallel'
between . the .two. The Congress too declared·itsel£ on• the side .!>f·~
progressive forces in the world; it too demanded N ationat
Government for the eiiective .prosecution of the' war ·~ ·a.:J?eople's
Wa.r. The Congress a.ndthe :Kisan.Sabha. bOth pointed out the
f~!icz.. o~i!!~~e~~i!~~~;:th:nt~=··fb:a:S;~;:~r!g·:!l~*..:~.
positive plan of action (apart, of co1!l'se, fro~ agitation a.ga,inst
this policy ) to overcome this obstaele. In fact, •. ~he only ditfe;r-
ence between the two resolutions is tha.t while the Kisan Sabha.
demands of the great political pa.xotie8 and mass organisations
like the Congress, the League and the ·~-l.!.C. to unite• and get a.
N a.tiona.l Government, the Congress did not·gt> beyond formula,...:
ti:ng the demand for National ·Government. · ·' ··
Gi& The resolution of the .Bihtta. Session. of the K~:pc · Sa.b~,
goes a. step further; it realises that it is the duty of the .kisa.ns
to "in,9rea.3e production of food crops ( which is) absolutely
essential to build ample stores to meet the emergen,cies that may
arise in the event of an enemy invasion,'' pnd therefore adopts a..
comprehensive resolution on "Grow More. Food campaign and
the urgent demands. of the kisa.ns.'' But what does:the:nesolu-
tion do actually ~ Does it a.s~ kh~ans to grow more food a.s it is
their patriotic duty~ Does it place before them a. positiv~. plan
of action for tra.nsla.ting the slogan of Grow More Food into.
concrete B.etion 1 ·
N o,'it dqes not~ It d~. Qn the one band~ declare tru,.t.
uthe Government has done .. little to · make it possible for ov
kisa.ns. to in,creace the production.· of food crops " and ..t<irmulat;e:
9 demands e~enti:aJ for making tlie' Grow More FOOcf
- campaign a. suooess; on the ~ther hand it~~ calls upon all
Kisa:n Sa.bha.s, kisans and agM1iltu:rtU labourers·~· raise the96
demands·ini&n organtsed ~nner in their respective loealitie8~ C?.r
Kiaan B&U,. iu lmlkur Jruka, M.Uab&r1 inaugurating the Grow More Food Campaign
A section of the kisan present a.t the I:rmkur Firka. 'EMalab~r} Bally
, , . : ~pat dqea~~,IDean 1 Blaming t}J.e Govern~nt for its
fNll.U'~W·mak~.i:~ possiplefor Jti,sans. to grow. more~. concrete
_propOsals as to.bO'V morefoo<l C8J~.,be grown, call.to Jt~... tp
agitate for.impl~menting these proposals; but no. propOsals a.s to
.·~··lHSfti'!l8, as they *re situated today, w.ith:· all their difficulties
1but alSo•With a.U the advan~es that· they have, ean ta.ke oon-

~erete steps ·to grow.·more foOd .. ·

Agail{, a eio.e paraJ1efiviththe Oongrf!ss stand of'" Yoit
ao these. thi~. S<) that we may. defend our ·country.'' The
Blli,ta resolution of G;row. M()re Food is nothing else than the
·~aha'bad { {X}ngress ) r!!so:W.tion on N a.tional Resista.n_,e witt.
·•·t~61Qsan.itnpr~'t." pu~ onit. ... '·· · ... .· .. ; !.· . . ···
.....··. .. ~~ C~~tJ..al Kis8.n Co9-n~il me' at J;lomliiy in September
1942, and passed a reso\ution 'oq.lh~ .f¥ problem. It re~tera­
tes the Bi}J.ta..resp}:utioJ1·QJl. Q~o.w l:J;ore Foodt takes note of tbe
~eterior~~.ion}q n.e tOQ4. · sitvation in tl~e country,, , proposes
.certain.~~~· to be. taken .bY.lilie GoveYnment ~d *' pending the
satisfaction of these demands calls upon the kisans to hold their
•'Cl'eps a.nd . to . tak:e other meMures "·· ete.
Again a close para1lel with £the 06ngress 'attitllde uf "strl'l
. ggle". Sincere desire to grow- more: food, jutifi.able indignation
against' Govet'nment policy~ sUggestion of concrete steps to avert
.£Ca.tastrophe followed by tf.te disastroas a.nd sUicidal call to ·~'hold
~e ~rops"' and thus to intensify and not solve the food crisis-·this
is'nothingelsethana ldsan editionofthe Bombay resolution of
tim A. I. C. 0. whose thoroughly a.nti-fa.seist stand is followed
by tf.te disastrous a.nd suicidal threat of stnrggle.
The Bombay threat of struggle landed the Congress into
t:he arms of the Pifth Column who screened themselves behind
t:hat fatal resolution and carried on anti-national sabotage work
thus landing the nation into a. terrible crisis. The "hold the
·crops" resohl.tion of the C. K. C. irs equally disastrous to the
Dation ·as a whole as w.ell as to the Kisan Sabha because it will
.hand the kisans over to hoarders and profiteers.
Fortnna.tely for the Kisa.n Sabha. as well .as for. tbe· nation,
this part of the resolution . bas not ,,been implemented by the
K.isan Sa.hha. Nevertheless the . irame of mind w.bicb expressed
itself in .it· still persists in Kisan. Sa.bha. circles as w.as seen at
Bha.kna. The. Comrades in Panjab still ·:~ook upon the food
·.crisis as ..-n exclusively non-Punjabi problem and are not
:sure if they ean succeed in convincing the kisans as to the nece-
:ssi1y of.controlling tl\es1Jpply and priee of food grins.
Comndes in most provinces think and act as if the slogan
of Grow Mor~ Food is nothing more than" a device to agitate
for and get the immediate demands of tbe kisa.Iis. ·
What is the ·exact meani,ng of . all this t Jt... faill}JZe to. see
that the food and economic crisis we are going~ thl"o~h js aa
all-round economic crisis, that it can be solyed ouly on an all":""
round scale; a. failQJ'e to see that thecl~b, sugarandmatchcrisis
which is actua.lly felt by every kisan even .:i,n Punjao cannot be
solved 'Unless the food .crisis felt by the workers an4f other sectiRns
.of the people is also solved; a failure to ~ that grow ~,OI'e .·.f.Qod
is not an a.rq.ir between kisa.ns on the o1,1e band and Lm~I,o:rds.
m~neylenders etc., on the other. bl.lt between all the peoplebiclud-
ing kisans on the one h&lld and a few profit-mOngering ·enemies
of the people on the other; a f&ilure to see not orqly that the
interests of.the·different eategories'·of kisa.ns .are mter-tJepend-
ent but that the interests of all categories Gf lrisans . at:e' closely
related .to the interests. ~fan the other seeti<JDS of the 4 ~ple.
"-.' "

This attitude is an extensio-. of Idt Nationalism into the

field of J{isa.n Sapba w~~ J u~* at· :left l)Jt.tignalism , e:w.p:resses
its sincere·des~ to pa.rti,~i~te in Natiopa}, ll~thisdeckr•
its willingness to grow ~o.-e food;j~s~ .a.s:Left ~~~Wismpoints
Government policy as the J;D.ain obsta.ele jJJ . . .,~y~<.4 its active
participation in N ationa.l·Defenee, t\lis bl~JP'tl \~ r@ov~nment
t,or its fail are to en.able J{isa.ns to. &row IJlOJ!e f~ ~~t as left

~ountry unless this obstacle is 6:-

llationa.lism does nota.sks the ~~~z,~le, w.·qe(eJ;Id. t•ir
~J'ed,~d does ;1,1ot believe
that the more we defend our co~~~~.~.,d\>si;a.qle will
dis~pea.r, this attitude asks the.kis.,.,_,tl~·remove the obsta.-
ele and then grow more food; just as· Left. Ji~JVI.lism ·show its
sectarian r.ttitude to .Muslim League. ~A4·; 1Jlps weakens the
National Movement as a waole, thi3'"adqf\ts a ,s~~ria.n .attitude
not only to non-kisa.ns but to ltisans,qf. other· •tegori.es :ta.,n
to what it itself belongs.
Where does this lea.d the Kisan Sabha 1 'N'Ot·to uity but
to disruption. This attitude pits not only the ldSJjns against
landlords and moneylenders bat kisartk"1against ~n popUla-
tion, food producing kisans agains•kBa.tiS'producing eommereial
crops, kisans of surplus provinces like Punjab a.gai~ kisans
of deftmt provinces. Not to the programme ·of ·growing more
food as a lever to rouse workers to initrease their prodliCtion, in-
spire a.ll sections of the people ·~d.Q·teeir duty irt N.ationai De--
~fenee··butt& its being degenerated into an instrument of disrup-
Tlie. l;'ssentials OE A Kis~n Sabha Campaign
This .Left Nationalist deviation has been partially corrected
·by the Grow More lrood resolution of the :Bhakft& Sessiun of the
Kisan Sabha.. Not only does it formulate the demands on whose
basis the production of food grains may be inerea.sed; it also
calls upon the Kisan Sabha. units uto take up such local schemes
of irrigation etc. as can he actually undertaken by tbem.'•
Kisans are thus asked :not merely to agitate for what they should
get .S:o .. as to enable them to grow more food; they are also asked
tf) ·utilise whatever resourees they_ have t()day to increase food.
The 'energy of kisan workers are from now on to be utilised no.t
merely to get certain immediate dan:ands conceded to the kisa.ns
but .··alBo· to use whatever Jn&teriah; are at their disposal to
,increase the production. of food ..... whit has been done at Khhln~
·Jessor~ Godavari and Kasa.rgod.e should be done on a. syste-
matic scale a.ll over the ooliiitry wherever a Ku&n S&bha unit
exiSts~- tnis and· nothing less is the meaning of Bhakna.
· . This is~u.Jtfipubtedly a great advance on any previous resolu-
tion of the J9san Sabha. If only the .Kisan Sa.bha. units start
implemen,ting this. part of the resolution over and above i;Jle
.gena-al campaign of propa.g,.nda and.agitation which they are
carrying on today. a sure. baSis will be laid for the solution of
the food shortage.
· It is, however, necessary to bear in mind that this is not
going to get done unless a few basic considerations are taken
into ~unt. viz:-
{1) Grow More Food is indissolubly connected with
every probleJ:J:l' we have to face in town and eountry. J UBt as no
.other. problem can be solved. without greater production of food~
80 is l:t true that food production is neither possible nor useful
'Without tackling other problems like distribution of food and
other daily :necessaries, transport, maintenance of morale both
:at the front and in the rear etc. · ·
(2) 1 t follows from the above that Grow More Food is
not a purely or exclusively kis&n afia.ir. The campaign should
th~efore be run as a. Great People's Rally,uniting in its ranks
not only all the ·food proda~ing kisans but :non-food--producing
,kisau. industrial, transport and agricuUural workers, intelle:-

.etuals of aU gr&des, traders and ~t9ckists of fOQd an.Q. otbsr·~¥ly
necessaries, landlords. moneylenders etc.
(3) All these classes fl.n.d .se<)tions of j)e()ple ~n •. ~ mobi-
lhed provided a. united people's · programme ispla.eed. before
'them,. Not only the tieh .experience of food ealtlpa.ign in · which
whole seetionsoftraders including wholesale·dealers,&a.vedwill-
ingly pa.I$ieipated hut little. expel'!:ienee.'of grow morefood
.campaign itself shows that the crisis is·so a.eute today that even
sections of people who iare usually hostile to khan m&vement
are bound to co-operate in this job..
(4} Thu,s uniting ~1 sections of 1he Jte().ple deQl.a~ds (\f
'the Kisan Sabha and kisa.n workers s•ch ~. ~o,rw~•tiO,Il
,of its demands, such .a. re~justmen~ ·.·of their outlopk fjo
problems tha.tthe pther se<)f;ions ()t the. pepple have no. rooJJ;l
lor suspicion that kisa.ns ;,re usmg tb.i.S <?pportlJnity to . .e.va.nce
the~r sectional ela.iti:l.s as aga.i.J)st tb.e r•t p( t4e people. lt ifi llO;t
.enough if" the central slogan of tb.e ;K1.sa.n Sapha. is .oha~ged f,ro~r;t
"abolition of landlordism'' i~to '~overcoml.ng qf,;:ill po~tacles. to
the greater production of food". Eve]). a£teJ" q~.a.ltil).g~~s change
comrades are likely to have the same· outlook in their dealings
with local and immedi&te problems. Pb:MnUlliting excessive
~nd impractical demands, fantastically l!nk1ng' them up with
:the necessities of production of f~ a.rgding on this basi!J .th&t
non-acceding to these ·dem&nds amounts on the part of the
l&n dlords and others to refuse to a.U6w kisans tp prc)duce ·
more food and thus to" expose" them &S Ja.p &gents would not
help praduction but its enemies. Pa.nta.stic demands like" 50%
reduction in rent " everywhere " so th&t kisanw:'may·Jbe enthus-
.ed to grow more food" are, for instance, not helpful to the e&m-
pa~n. What is needed is such a IJ:J:'Qgramme. of deJDa.nds th&t
any reasonable landlord and m9neylender ltfouW. a.p-ee to ,.nQ. the
non-a.cceptance of whi~);l ~ill .isolate those who· do it~ their
.own class. The more. concrete and practieal the dem&nds, the
greater the mass mobilisation around. them, the more .readily
they a.:re a.ecepted., the greater the production, theless:th~ in~­
sity of the crisis and the stronger .the growth of the Kisa!t Sabha
th&t is the position t9da.y!
( 5 ) Such being the.case., the kisa.ns dem&nd.s in .~lation
to Grow More Food. campaign would naturally vary from pro-
v,\noe to province, from district to district, even from village'to
~illa.ge. It is the task of the.Kis&n. Sa.b. . :io take these facts into
consideration and aeoordingly to formulate loeal demands and
plans.. They are in general what have been laid down by the
Bhakna Session of the Kisan Sabha and ar~:
(',.i. y T& seeu~ oi. e&s,.•nd llbeNJ,tertns ~e and fallow
land from zamind~ ~ Gove,nlll•t for }lOOr peasants~ and'
agricllltural labourers for the cultivation of food crops and ne-

cessary .:q seeds etc..,
.: J To secure &oni GoVernment seeds, manure~ agrieul- ·
tu:nU ·loans, irriptioD facilities, moratorium on collection oC
ar1ears of· rent and tax:es from· kisans and :regulation of rent and
taxes and st.ppage of attachment of Jtisans• -erops and ejeet-
men't of tenants at will.
( e ) .To get ,supply of food and other essential eommqdi.-
ties at reasonable prices ensUred to kisans. "'
The key to the success of campaign is av stroD.g• a.nd.'ever-~
· growing Kisa.n Sabha. Only if the 4 lakhs af Kisan. Sabha
m~mbers are movedj.:nto action, only . if everW' primary KifMD.
Sabha becomes alive instrume.nt for rousing every kis•n .i.Dits
area., ca..n .the Kisan Sabha ·play its role iB leading this patriotic;
campaign. That is why the Bha.kna Session .of the Kisa.n Sabha
paid. the ut~ost ,at~ention, ~ }~ probl~lll of b:gjl~ng .up the
organisation of the Kitut.u,.Sabha. 1an,d ad,qpteif.. a., ff~ia,l ~ol~'7
tion on it. ·
But the moment the Kisan Sa.bha. takes up this campaign,
it ceases to be a sectional organisation of kisans alon~ it
becomes the most powerful organisation whic!;l effectively fights
to save every section of the people. Kisan men and women
going out to the fields with their implements become the
·saviours of the entire people of our country. Kisan ja.thas going
to Government officials, zamindars or money-lenders for fallow.
land, seeds, loans, irrigation facilities, etc., become the jathas of
.ail sections of the people. Kisa.n Sabha squads collecting
contributions (for purchasing seeds, for repairing sources of
irrigation) become patriotic squads embracing every cla.ss~ creed
and caste.
The campaign of the Kisan Sabha for growing more food ®

can, therefore, rouse every patriot in the villa.ge in which it

works. The patriotic servants of the people. the leaders and
volunteers of all people's organisations· (political, commanal or
social uplift) will wake up to the necessity of co-operating with
Kisan Sabha and procure fallow land, seeds, loans, etc. The
patriotic motley-lenders. zamindars and other well-to-do
sections of the people will be persuaded to give fallow land and
.<>ther facilities for cultivators. They can even go to the fielda
'!it,h the kisans, participate in the actual work of eultivatioD.
and thus express their solidarity with kisan1i. The teachers
~ and other intellectuals will use their talents to organise dramatics
:musical and other programmes which will rouse the people to the
role they have to play in this.
The Kisan Sabha campaign of Grow More Food will, there-
.fore, be a powerful force to unite and move every section of
the people not excluding those who .are proverbially opposed to
Xisan Sa.bha.. Every priltJary . Kiu.n ,Sa.bha. will thus be the
·strongest force uniting the entire people in its area. By subor-
"inating its class opposition to za.mindaJ"s, money-lender~ etc.
to the aJl-impor,tant and i~~di"te need of ,fighting famine ~d.
of f,ee(ling the pe.:.pl~, the Kis~ ,Sabh.a. .makes .t.he · hon~t .a~d
Pf"tri9~ic elements in ev.ery section. C?f. the people sacrifice ,tq4Rr
ow·n'cl&ss or sectionalinte,rests.. By working harder for produc-
ing grains and feeding the people, .the kisans ..set an example to
others in actively working for the common cause. ·
·.··~ .· 'Every V:ill~ge tb~ liD.j.ted ·throu~h th~ 91:ganisation of,
kisaps for t4e P:row, More. Foop. campaign will ·prove an 1ln-
p~a~~]~nk in ~4e ~in ~Of. national unity. Th~ more ~
fiUages lull~ to FodUCe fqQd, ~he m~ do the towns qnite fol" ,;,.·
pr-f~·~!~~f~b~.tion 9£ food ·~hllS. pro_~ 'lee,<!. ,~isans· ;t;Qli¥ in. tne;
Kisa:n.S.,.lilia andt~ J.!Wple of;t~e village un1te4 aroun(i Itli1qrow,
K,ore. ~ood' ~~gn wW be •ble 1post efiectively~to negotiate
wJ,tJ:t.. Jf<?9d ·q()mrp~t~ iP ~pwns. ~a cfvil an~ pUll~ purch.
ing agencies ol the Government so .as. to get a f1'ir ~rice for food
grains a.nd foil the game of the pronteers. On the strength of'
thilt~ltnity" and on the c&paoity to supply f()Od grains to towns,
tWeyeat\laiSoseolll"e cl9th~ sugar, matches and other necessaries
for the 'village.· By f~ming their own village People's . Food'
Ciunmi~7 they e&U 'solVe their own food problems.
. 'Por'tb:e very,, reason·· tha.~this vill~e unity Will hot be'
C(.Jmpi~ unless' there is'na.tiona.l unity, for the very reason· that
OroW' ~ore Pood camp~gn callnot be a. complete success lillless.
t!'~ is a.J¥ationa.l. ~o~me~t, t~e ca.mp~ign is· irreyooa.bly:
l:i.t'l&d up With N ationaF U mty and N ationa.l Govenune:Rt.
Xisan Sa.bha. running the Grow More Food Campa.ign has there-
fmre to act as aa org~ in its vill~e which campaigns for
tile relea.e of Congress leaden. for Congress-League unity and
&r .a,N.tional G~ernment of nationa.l defence.
Food situation has once again beeome critical.
happened all over the country in December and January
repeating itself 011 a far vaster scale. Disappearance of food,
starvation, epidemics, death-these have become the norma.J:
factors in thousands of villages in every'province.
What is happening to day is, however, nothing in com--
parison to what is going to happen unless every patriotic son oC
India wakes up in time. August and September 1942 is going
to repeat itself in July, August and September 1943. Instead
of the patriotic anger of millions of the Indian people which,
followed the arrest of N ationallea.ders, it will be the desperate
hunger of the starving millions that leads to chaos. aparohy and
Civil War. It will, however, be the sameindian people that
suffer from thissooial disruption as they did last year; it will
be the same Fifth Columnists that reap· a rich harvest out of this
.disorganisation of our social life.
But such a total disruption of our social life is not ineri~
able it can be prevented, our- people can be saved from the
'"horrors· of a Civil War a.nd social disruption, provided they are·
roused to this danger and organised to avert it. Food can be·
found to feed the 400 million people of India, food can be ""'"'....."'
to the soldiers fighting on the front, our industry and Ull~•nort,,,,.•\li',_,
can be saved from collapse arising out of food scarcity" if o
the people come forward and uni~e with the inspiripg pledg~
themselves: "This country is ours; we $hall defend it
fr:i>m enemy invasion and from, famine. " . . ·. ·
In thus coming forWard and saving our oo1lntr-y, the kisan ';_
millions, their mighty organisation, the Kisan Sabha, have a key ',
role to play. With the inspiring slogan of defending our coun-
try, with the effective programme of feeding the 400 millions,
with concrete a.nd effective work for uniting all sections of the,
people in their villages. every Kisans Sabha 1lDite can become ~
powerf1ll force in saving qUI:' oo1tn1iry.
On the contrary, they will hAve to undergo the worst suiier-
ings, bear the heaviest burdens, if they do not do this elemen-
tary job of defending the country.

P1•ic#J AB, tl
The fo,.d ia there but the natioo faees !4&rvatioJu How to get it with·
nnt nutting eaell other'it thrO&ta. ,
Sa1"deMi.. u1embe.r of the Central Oouunittee of the &mn:mnist PM~:y,
ebowe n.a how. ~

F•...~rrl' l'~ra•• F•~t•

By N. K. Kriab.-a . ·· · P~ As~ IJ
A aeatbiog eJ;pcanl'e ol U.e tlftb t~luana ia oar oo-p.~:' w.iri_. f~
lettara t.o •le.nt\er patriot&. Alt e.s:poaition of thec.i~u.uiat P•ty'a
poHey before and after AugtUlt 9.
N•tl•••l ll•ltfl For Tie• .
01 Tlae !M•t•erl••*'
Prit» As. 10
What aY&JY patriot oueht to lmow. Beaolutiou on the NatiooaH.lriai•
pt•ad by tba Central Committee of tl~a Comlilan:at Party of ludi& in
Septemhel' •42 and FebftUllY •43.


25 ¥eara Of TAe V. S. S. II. By M. Mitla
Why the Soviet people aad their ar'lilY fight ao well. M. Mltin. a Soviet
"iti~en. reveal• the !Jeftret of tbeir strength in thia brief hiatory.
Soeiet. Paraeltldisb Ia AeliDa Pf"~e At'. 4 ·.·
The Jted Army wu the f:llat to lnveat Paratrcaop Operatloa&. Read this
vivi•t battle aetion bom start to tintah cf a aebwhmQt ·u. tlie NM$i•, reu.

People's Pabliabiaa House.

190 B. 'Khetwadl M•m Road. BOMBAY 4.