What

 is  an  art  work?  What  makes  an  object  an  artwork?  
Providing  a  definition  of  what  constitutes  an  art  work  is  the  main  problem  in  the  philosophy  of  art,  
since  philosophers  want  to  know  what  it  is  that  makes  an  art  work  different  from  ordinary  objects.  If  
a  definition  can  be  provided  that  uniquely  identifies,  or  characterizes,  only  those  objects  that  are  art  
works,  and  doesn't  leave  any  art  works  out,  or  include  objects  that  are  not  art  works  (i.e.,  a  
"necessary  and  sufficient"  condition  has  been  provided  for  art  works),  then  a  satisfactory  theory  of  
art  will  have  been  found  (although  there  could  be  many  such  definitions).  

Definitions  can  go  misleading  in  one  of  two  ways:  

1)  "too  narrow":  the  proposed  definition  leaves  out  many  objects  that  we  believe  should  be  included  
in  the  definition.  Example:  the  definition  of  a  "chair"  as  "a  four-­‐legged  sitting  object"  is  "too  narrow"  
a  definition  since  it  doesn't  include  all  the  chairs  that  have  three  legs,  or  two  legs.,  etc.  

2)  "too  broad":  the  proposed  definition  includes  many  objects  that  we  believe  should  not  be  
included  in  the  definition.  Example:  the  definition  of  a  "chair"  as  "a  four-­‐legged  sitting  object"  is  also  
"too  broad"  a  definition  since  many  people  sit  on  desks,  and  many  desks  have  four  legs,  thus  the  
proposed  definition  also  includes  desks  (which  are  not  properly  considered  to  be  chairs,  of  course).  

Imitation  Theory:  x  is  an  art  work  if  x  is  an  imitation.  
The  Imitation  theory  believes  that  art  imitates  life,  so  art  works  try  to  accurately  resemble  real  life  
objects,  persons,  events,  etc.,  and  this  imitation  evokes  an  aesthetic  (artistic)  response  in  the  
observer/audience.  

Plato  thought  that  art  also  aroused  emotions  in  the  audience  members,  and  since  he  believed  that  
emotional  behavior/responses  tended  to  override  a  person's  rationality,  Plato  was  thus  skeptical  of  
the  worth  or  value  of  art  (since  emotionally  aroused  citizens  in  a  state  may  act  irrationally).  Aristotle  
rejected  Plato's  misgivings  over  the  value  of  art:  (a)  art  can  cause  people  to  think  and  reflect  on  
human  affairs,  as  well  as  their  actions  and  emotions,  and  this  can  have  an  educational  effect;  and  (b)  
art  serves  as  a  "catharsis"  of  the  emotions,  such  that  art  helps  people  to  channel  out,  or  purge,  raw  
and  powerful  emotions—and  purging  these  emotions  has  a  beneficial  effect  on  people.  

Problems  with  the  Imitation  Theory:  Most  art  does  not  "imitate"  anything  (e.g.,  absolute  music,  
abstract  paintings  and  sculpture,  architecture,  etc.).  So,  the  definition  is  "too  narrow",  since  it  leaves  
out  many  objects  that  we  consider  to  be  art  (i.e.,  it  leaves  out  those  art  works  that  don't  imitate  
anything).  Also,  much  art  does  try  to  imitate  something,  but  no  one  knows  what  the  
object/event/person  looks  like  (such  as  God,  or  a  historical  figure,  etc.);  so,  how  can  the  art  work  
imitate  something  that  no  one  knows  about?  

Representation  Theory:  x  represents  y  (where  y  ranges  over  a  domain  comprised  of  objects,  
persons,  events  and  actions)  if  and  only  if  (1)  a  sender  intends  x  (e.g.,  a  picture)  to  stand  for  y  (e.g.,  a  
haystack)  and  (2)  the  audience  realizes  that  x  is  intended  to  stand  for  y.  

The  Representation  theory  tries  to  get  around  the  problem  of  art  imitating  unknown  objects  (such  as  
God,  etc.)  by  claiming  that  art  works  "represent"  something,  without  having  to  imitate  it:  that  is,  a  
painting  of  God  tries  to  represent  God,  but  it  clearly  can't  imitate  God  (since  no  one  knows  what  God  
looks  like).  

Problems  with  the  Representation  Theory:  the  same  problem  discussed  with  respect  to  the  Imitation  
theory  also  arises  for  this  theory;  that  is,  the  Representation  theory  is  also  "too  narrow".  Much  art  is  
not  representational,  such  as  architecture,  design  patterns  in  furniture,  abstract  music,  etc.  For  
example,  what  does  DuChamp's  sculpture  "Fountain"  represent  (since  it  is  simply  a  urinal  put  on  a  
pedestal)?  

Neo-­‐Representational  Theory:  x  is  an  artwork  only  if  x  has  a  subject  about  which  it  makes  some  
comment  (about  which  it  says  something,  or  expresses  some  observation  or  opinion,  etc.).  In  short,  
art  works  are  "about  something".  The  Neo-­‐Representational  theory  tries  to  resolve  the  problem  
raised  for  the  Representational  theory  by  allowing  art  works  to  simply  be  about  some  general  
subject:  therefore,  DuChamp's  "Fountain"  can  be  understood  as  making  some  comment  about  the  
overall  nature  of  art  (i.e.,  the  urinal  makes  us  reflect  on  the  very  nature  of  art,  and  art  objects,  such  
that  we  may  now  look  upon  ordinary  objects  as  prospective  art  works,  and  thus  see  their  previously  
unrecognized  beauty).  

Problems  with  the  Neo-­‐Representational  Theory:  Many  art  works  are  not  clearly  "about  anything",  
such  as  architecture,  purely  decorative  art,  abstract  music,  etc.  (so  the  definition  is,  once  again,  "too  
narrow").  One  might  try  to  state  that  a  particular  piece  of  absolute  music  is  "about  sadness"  (such  as  
the  slow  movement  of  Beethoven's  "Hammerklavier"  piano  sonata),  but  this  seems  to  be  an  
incorrect  judgment:  a  piece  of  music  can  "express"  sadness,  but  it  is  not  "about"  sadness.  

Expression  Theory  of  Art    

The  "Transmission"  Theory    

x  is  a  work  of  art  if  and  only  if  x  is  (1)  an  intended  (2)  transmission  to  an  audience  (3)  of  the  self-­‐same  
(4)  individualized  (5)  feeling  state  (emotion)  (6)  that  the  artist  experienced  (himself/herself)  (7)  and  
clarified  (8)  by  means  of  lines,  shapes,  colors,  sounds,  actions  and/or  words.  In  short,  the  Expression  
theory  holds  that  an  artwork  is  an  object  that  transmits  an  emotional  state,  or  is  the  expression  of  an  
emotion,  to  an  audience.  

What  do  the  criteria  accomplish?:  (1)  excludes  unintended  or  accidental  art  works  (e.g.,  a  painter  
accidentally  spilling  paint  on  a  canvas);  (2)  guarantees  that  there  is  an  audience;  (3)  requires  that  the  
emotion  transmitted  to  the  audience  is  the  same  as  that  intended  by  the  artist;  (4)  requires  that  the  
emotional  message  be  personal,  and  not  general  or  generic  (as  in  a  greeting  card  or  TV  commercial);  
(5)  demands  that  the  artist  express  an  emotion  in  an  artwork;  (6)  guarantees  that  the  artist  really  
has  the  emotion,  and  didn't  fake  it;  (7)  requires  that  the  emotion  be  clear  and  unambiguous;  and  (8)  
the  expression  of  emotion  should  utilize  the  normal  artistic  media.  

Problem  with  criterion  (2):  Many  great  works  of  art  were  never  performed,  read,  seen,  etc.,  for  
many  years,  but  it  seems  crazy  to  declare  that  they  were  not  artworks  during  that  time  period.  
Therefore,  if  we  drop  criterion  (2),  we  end  up  with  the  "Solo  Expression"  Theory  (as  a  version  of  the  
Expression  Theory),  which  has  all  the  other  criteria  (except  (2),  of  course).  On  this  theory,  if  an  art  
work  uses  a  normal  artistic  media,  then  it  assumes  an  audience  either  (i)  in  principle  (i.e.,  
hypothetically),  or  (ii)  the  artist  is  himself/herself  the  audience  (since  he/she  critically  examines  it  
while  it  is  under  construction).  

Problems  with  the  Expression  theory:  

Criterion  (1)  is  "too  narrow":  Why  should  an  object  be  disqualified  as  an  art  work  just  because  it  has  
been  accidentally  or  unintentionally  created?  In  fact,  many  ancient  artifacts,  such  as  religious  
icons/symbols,  are  appreciated  in  an  aesthetic  manner,  but  they  were  not  intended  to  be  art  
works—so,  are  we  mistaken  when  we  enjoy  these  objects  aesthetically?  Similar  "too  narrow"  
problems  can  be  raised  for  criteria  (3)-­‐(7):  (3)  Why  should  an  unintended  emotion  disqualify  the  
object  as  an  art  work  (i.e.,  bad,  or  faulty,  art  is  still  art)?  (4)  Why  can't  some  art  works  be  generic  
(such  as  postcards)?:  i.e.,  one  can  view  a  postcard  from  an  aesthetic  point  of  view.  (6)  Many  artists  
express  emotions  in  their  work  that  they  may  have  not  been  experienced  (such  as  extreme  fear  in  
battle,  etc.).  (7)  Some  of  the  best  works  of  art  express  emotions  which  are  very  ambiguous,  but  
often  such  works  are  more  admired  and  emotionally  powerful  for  that  very  reason  (e.g.,  absolute  
music,  such  as  symphonies,  fugues,  etc.)!  Also,  this  theory  seems  to  rule  out  all  computer-­‐generated  
art,  or  chance  art,  since  a  human  isn't  involved  in  the  actual  construction  of  these  works—yet,  we  do  
consider  these  objects  to  be  art  works.  

The  whole  Expression  theory  also  seem  "too  broad"  since  many  things  that  we  don't  consider  to  be  
art  works  would  seem  to  satisfy  all  of  the  criteria.  For  example,  an  angry  letter  in  the  editorial  page  
of  a  newspaper  would  seem  to  meet  all  of  the  criteria  (since  it  was  intended  to  express  an  emotion  
to  an  audience,  is  the  same  emotion  as  experienced  by  the  author,  is  not  generic,  was  not  a  faked  
emotion,  is  clearly  expressed,  and  uses  a  normal  artistic  medium—i.e.,  words).  

One  of  the  main  problems,  of  course,  with  the  Expressionist  theory  is  that  even  if  we  accept  that  an  
art  work  must  express  something  to  an  audience,  why  must  it  be  only  emotions?  Many  art  works  are  
more  properly  viewed  as  expressing  "ideas",  or  "concepts"  (such  as  DuChamp's  "Fountain"),  with  the  
emotions  being  very  secondary  to  the  artist's  main  intention.  

Also,  how  do  art  works  "express"  emotion?  Art  works  are  not  people,  and  thus  they  cannot  possess  
mental  properties  (since  emotions  are  mental  properties).  Yet,  we  do  attribute  such  properties  to  art  
works  (e.g.,  "the  fugue  is  sad",  "the  painting  is  happy").  How?—Carroll  argues  that  art  works  possess  
"configurational  properties"  (e.g.,  rhythms,  speeds,  shapes,  lines,  etc.—which  some  of  our  authors  
have  dubbed  "form"),  and  we  have,  anthropomorphically,  assigned  emotional  properties  to  these  
configurational  properties.  Does  this  theory  imply  that  a  different  "artistic"  culture  could  assign  a  
different  set  of  emotional  properties  to  the  very  same  work?  

Formalist  Theory  of  Art    

Definition:  x  is  a  work  of  art  if  and  only  if  x  is  designed  primarily  in  order  to  possess  and  to  exhibit  
significant  form  (where  "significant  form"  can  be  conceived  as  the  complex  structure  or  arrangement  
of  the  parts  of  the  object:  e.g.,  in  the  case  of  sculpture,  significant  form  is  the  arrangement  and  
interrelationship  of  lines,  shapes,  contours,  three-­‐dimensionality,  etc.,  to  form  a  whole  that  is  
greater  than  the  sum  of  its  parts).  The  Formalist  theory  focuses  upon  the  form  or  structure  of  art  
objects,  such  that  art  objects  are  those  objects  which  posses  the  appropriate  type  of  formal  or  
structural  features.  
  

In  this  definition,  the  criterion  "designed  primarily"  is  supposed  to  eliminate  those  objects  which  are  
not  artworks  but  possess  a  complex  arrangement  of  its  parts,  such  as  mathematical  equations  or  
road  signs.  Also,  the  requirement  for  a  "designed"  object  prevents  accidental  objects  from  being  
considered  as  artworks  (such  as  if  a  painter  accidentally  spilled  some  paint  on  a  canvas,  such  that  the  
spill  now  exhibits  the  appropriate  form).  

Formalism  has  the  advantage  (over  our  previously  examined  theories)  of  accounting  for  modern  
abstract  art.  To  count  as  an  art  work,  the  object  only  needs  to  have  a  significant  structure  and  
arrangement  of  its  parts—thus,  Duchamp's  "Fountain"  qualifies  as  an  artwork,  since  it  is  clearly  the  
case  that  even  a  urinal  has  a  complex  arrangement  of  lines,  curves,  shapes,  etc.!  

Problems  with  the  Formalist  Theory:  

(1)  Some  objects  that  we  consider  to  be  artworks,  such  as  ancient  religious  sculptured  figures  (to  
ward  of  evil  spirits,  bring  good  luck,  etc),  were  not  "designed  primarily"  to  exhibit  significant  form.  
(Furthermore,  road  signs  are  often  used  as  artworks,  as  a  sort  of  wall  decoration.)  If  the  formalist  
tries  to  account  for  this  problem  (of  being  "too  narrow")  by  dropping  the  "designed  primarily"  
criterion,  then  it  seems  that  all  objects  that  possess  a  complex  structure  now  qualify  as  artworks  
(such  as  road  signs  and  mathematical  equations),  Unfortunately,  a  theory  that  allows  everything  to  
count  as  an  artwork  is  in  serious  trouble,  since  we  do  believe  that  there  is  a  real  "aesthetic/artistic"  
difference  between,  say,  the  nutrition  label  on  a  candy  bar  and  a  Shakespeare  play!  (Now  the  
definition  is  "too  broad".)  

(2)  What  counts  as  significant  form?  All  things  have  some  type  of  form,  but  what  makes  it  a  
"significant  form"?  What  type  of  structural  complexity  must  an  object  possess  to  qualify  as  having  
significant  form  (and  how  much)?  There  are  real  difficulties  here,  since  some  artworks  do  not  seem  
to  possess  any  coherent  structure,  at  all:  e.g.,  John  Cage's  musical  piece  "four  minutes  and  thirty-­‐
three  seconds"  (where  a  pianist  simply  sits  before  a  piano  for  the  designated  time  period  without  
playing  or  doing  anything);  or  Robert  Morris'  sculptures,  which  are  simply  piles  of  junk.  Cage  and  
Morris's  work  are  considered  to  be  artworks,  but  it  is  hard  to  find  any  form  in  them.  If  the  Formalist  
declares  that  these  objects  do  possess  a  significant  form,  then  they  are  left  in  the  embarrassing  
position  of  bestowing  upon  all  piles  of  junk  and  all  silent  moments  the  status  of  an  artwork.  (Once  
again,  this  is  the  "too  broad"  problem.)  

(3)  As  mentioned  above,  there  seems  to  be  many  objects  that  were  "designed  primarily  to  exhibit  
significant  form",  but  we  don't  consider  them  to  be  artworks  (such  as  mathematical  equations,  chess  
games,  athletic  performances,  etc.,  which  is  the  "too  broad"  problem).  

(4)  In  the  Formalist  theory,  the  content  of  the  artwork  has  no  role.  That  is,  what  the  artwork,  and  the  
parts  that  comprise  that  object,  represents  or  signifies  is  irrelevant  to  significant  form  (since  
significant  form  is  only  concerned  with  the  structural  complexity  of  the  work).  For  example,  the  
Formalists  believe  that  the  content  of  a  painting  (what  it  represents  or  "stands  for")  is  not  important  
in  analyzing  and  qualifying  artworks—this  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  the  Formalists  can  allow  modern  
abstract  art  to  qualify  as  art,  since  the  parts  of  these  works  (like  the  colors  on  a  Pollack  painting)  
really  do  not  represent  anything.  Unfortunately,  this  belief,  that  the  content  of  an  artwork  is  
irrelevant  to  its  "aesthetic"  qualifications  or  value,  seems  to  be  quite  wrong.  The  aesthetic  value  of  
many  artworks,  if  not  the  majority,  depends  greatly  on  understanding  what  the  parts  of  a  work  
"stand  for".  For  example,  the  whole  aesthetic  point  or  intention  of  Bruegel's  painting  (depicting  the  
fall  of  Icarus,  p.  124)  depends  on  the  viewer  recognizing  the  leg  in  the  water  as  representing  Icarus'  
leg,  and  not  simply  in  viewing  the  leg  as  a  particular  shape,  color,  etc.,  within  a  sophisticated  
structure  of  other  shapes,  lines,  etc.  Thus,  the  Formalist  theory  seems  to  fail  in  fully  characterizing  
our  aesthetic  experiences  ("too  narrow").  

Neo-­‐Formalist  Theory  of  Art:            

Definition  x  is  an  artwork  if  and  only  if  (1)  x  had  content  (2)  x  has  form  and  (3)  the  form  and  the  
content  of  x  are  related  to  each  other  in  a  satisfyingly  appropriate  manner.  

This  version  of  the  Formalist  theory  tries  to  account  for  problem  (4)  above  by  allowing  the  work,  and  
its  constitutive  parts,  to  have  content  (to  represent  something),  and  to  allow  the  content  of  the  
whole  work  to  pick  the  form  that  is  appropriate  to  expressing  that  content  (as  in  Breugel's  "Icarus").  

Problems:  

(A)  Many  artworks  do  not  have  content  (i.e.,  they  don't  represent  anything),  such  as  architecture,  
decorative  patterns  on  furniture,  etc.  (so  the  definition  is  "too  narrow").  

(B)  As  mentioned  above  (problem  2),  many  artworks  don't  have  a  significant  form  (and  if  they  don't  
have  content,  it  also  follows  that  they  don't  have  form,  since  form  and  content  are  co-­‐dependent  in  
this  theory).  ("too  narrow")  

(C)  Bad  artworks  would  not  qualify  as  art  since  the  form  wasn't  appropriately  tied  to  the  content.  
But,  we  do  consider  bad  art  to  be  art  (so  the  definition  is  "too  narrow"  once  more).  

(D)  Many  non-­‐artworks  are  intended  to  possess  a  significant  conjunction  of  their  form  and  content,  
such  as  a  Brillo  pad  box  or  stop  sign  (i.e.,  the  shape  and  color  of  the  stop  sign  are  conjoined  in  a  
significant  form  to  represent  the  information  "stop").  Thus,  since  the  theory  allows  non-­‐artworks  to  
qualify  as  artworks,  it  is  also  "too  broad".  

Art  as  Aesthetic  Experience    

Definition:  x  is  an  artwork  if  and  only  if  (1)  x  is  produced  with  the  intention  that  it  possess  a  certain  
capacity,  namely  (2)  the  capacity  of  affording  an  aesthetic  experience.  

The  Aesthetic  theory  tries  to  identify  artworks  as  those  objects  which  cause,  or  bring  about,  an  
"aesthetic"  (artistic)  experience  in  the  observer.  Of  course  the  problem  then  becomes,  "What  is  an  
aesthetic  experience?  How  does  it  differ  from  other  experiences,  and  what  causes  it?  There  are  two  
versions  of  this  theory,  which  attempt  to  answer  these  questions:  

(A)  Content-­‐oriented  definition:  x  is  an  artwork  if  and  only  if  x  is  intended  to  present  unities,  
diversities  and/or  intensities  for  apprehension  (i.e.,  the  work  has  "formal"  features  which  cause  
aesthetic  experiences  in  people).  

 
Problems:  The  criterion  is  "too  broad"  because  many  non-­‐artworks,  such  as  stop  signs,  billboards,  
etc.,  are  "intended  to  present  unities,  diversities  and/or  intensities  for  apprehension."  If  one  tries  to  
rule  out  these  potential  objects  by  insisting  that  only  artistically  or  aesthetically  "relevant"  features  
can  qualify  something  as  an  artwork,  then  the  definition  becomes  "circular"—that  is,  the  theory  was  
supposed  to  identify  the  aesthetic  feature  of  an  object,  but  now  it  seems  that  we  need  to  know  what  
those  aesthetic  feature  are  before  we  use  the  theory!  

(B)  Affect-­‐oriented  definition:  x  is  an  artwork  if  and  only  if  x  is  intentionally  produced  with  the  
capacity  to  afford  the  disinterested  and  sympathetic  attention  and  contemplation  of  x  for  its  own  
sake.  Problem:  same  as  above,  "too  broad",  since  many  non-­‐artworks  can  be  seen  to  "afford  the  
disinterested  and  sympathetic  attention  and  contemplation  of  an  object  for  its  own  sake"—e.g.,  car  
designs,  cutlery,  etc.  

One  of  the  main  problems  with  the  two  definitions  provided  above  is  that  they  accept  the  view  that  
an  aesthetic  experience  is  only  "pure",  or  valid,  if  the  observer  is  completely  "disinterested"  (or  at  
least  to  the  greatest  degree  possible),  the  reason  being  that  a  person  who  has  a  certain  non-­‐
aesthetic  reason  for  wanting  to  experience  an  artwork  may  be  biased  in  their  experience  of  that  
work.  Yet,  why  must  we  require  that  a  person  be  disinterested?  (And,  is  it  even  possible?)  It  seems  
that  we  can  have  "interested"  reasons  for  wanting  to  acquire  an  aesthetic  experience;  such  as  for  a  
class,  or  to  write  a  review,  etc.  It  would  appear  that  the  crucial  requirement  is  "attention":  someone  
must  "attend  to"  the  object  in  order  to  have  an  aesthetic  experience,  but  their  motivation  seems  
irrelevant    

Objectivity/Subjectivity  of  Aesthetic  Properties:    

What  is  the  status  of  aesthetic  properties?  Are  they  subjective  (entirely  relative,  or  reducible,  to  
some  other  features  of  the  world,  such  as  human  emotions),  or  are  they  objective  (not  entirely  
relative,  or  reducible,  to  some  other  features  of  the  world)?  Furthermore,  how  do  we  detect,  or  
project,  aesthetic  properties?  Are  aesthetic  properties  like  the  properties  of  taste,  color,  or  other  
bodily  sensations?  

Objectivist  Theory:  aesthetic  properties  are  objective.  Just  as  people  agree  on  colors,  most  people  
agree  on  aesthetic  properties  (e.g.,  "the  piece  of  music  is  sad").  For  instance,  there  is  inter-­‐subjective  
agreement  on  color  properties  among  all  people  even  though  we  know  that  colors  don't  exist  in  the  
world  completely  independent  of  our  minds  (why?:  because  colors  are  sensations,  and  although  
objects  cause  those  sensations  in  us,  those  sensations  only  exist  in  the  mind—the  same  holds  true  
for  pains,  tastes,  feelings  of  hot  and  cold,  etc.).  In  the  same  manner,  aesthetic  properties  are  
objective  because  there  is  an  inter-­‐subjective  agreement  on  the  mental  properties  (e.g.,  sad,  happy,  
etc.)  produced  by  art  objects.  

Problems  with  the  Objectivist  theory:  

   

 
(1)  The  first  criticism  can  be  simply  stated:  There  is  inter-­‐subjective  agreement  on  color  properties,  
but  not  for  aesthetic  properties.  People  will  generally  agree  that  something  "looks  blue",  or  "tastes  
bitter",  or  "feels  hot";  but  they  often  disagree  on  aesthetic  properties,  such  as,  "this  movie  was  
funny,  or  deeply  moving,  etc."  In  response,  the  Objectivist  may  claim  that  all  people  experience  the  
same  aesthetic  property,  but  just  interpret  that  experience  differently  (so  there  really  is  still  an  
aspect  of  aesthetic  experience  that  is  common  to  all  people).  Unfortunately,  this  is  not  a  very  
plausible  reply,  since  how  do  you  separate  the  aesthetic  experience  from  the  interpretation  of  that  
experience?  That  is,  the  interpretation  of  the  aesthetic  experience  seems  to  be  part  of  the  aesthetic  
experience  (so  how  can  you  pull  them  apart?).  Moreover,  if  you  brought  our  non-­‐Western  tribesman  
to  a  concert  hall  (who  has  never  heard  Western  music  before)  it  is  not  clear  that  they  would  hear,  
say,  Beethoven's  5th  Symphony  as  "powerful"  (in  fact,  it  is  entirely  unclear  just  what  kind  of  
experience  they  would  have  at  all).  

(2)  Our  second  criticism  states:  unlike  color  properties,  Aesthetic  properties  are  socially  and  
culturally  conditioned,  or  constructed,  and  thus  are  not  objective  in  any  way.  In  response  to  this  
allegation,  the  Objectivist  may  respond  as  follows:  since  disagreement  presupposes  a  certain  
amount  of  agreement  (i.e.,  you  need  to  agree  on  many  things  before  you  can  begin  to  disagree),  it  
must  follow  that  the  different  uses  and  applications  of  aesthetic  properties  among  cultures,  
societies,  etc.,  presuppose  a  good  deal  of  agreement  on  the  objective  aspects  of  aesthetic  
experience.  However,  this  response  is  faulty  because  (even  if  we  accept  the  argument)  the  shared  
cultural  properties  required  to  guarantee  disagreement  need  not  be  aesthetic  properties  at  all!  
Rather,  the  properties  that  are  common  to  both  cultures  may  be  entirely  non-­‐aesthetic  objective  
properties,  such  as  the  rhythms,  tone,  pitch,  etc.,  of  a  musical  piece.  Therefore,  two  cultures  may  
experience  completely  different  aesthetic  experiences  (without  any  similarities)  given  the  same  
physical  (formal)  properties  of  the  artwork.  

Ed's  view  (which  I  think  is  Hume’s  view):  While  I  agree  with  the  previous  two  criticisms,  it  doesn't  
rule  out  the  case  that  there  can  be  objective  aesthetic  properties  within  a  culture,  society,  etc.  That  
is,  if  we  are  willing  to  allow  a  slightly  "weaker"  notion  of  objectivity  for  aesthetic  properties,  then  it  
can  be  an  objective  fact  that  all  people  judge  Beethoven's  5th  Symphony  to  be  "powerful",  but  only  
within  my  culture,  of  course.  

Neo-­‐Wittgensteinian  Theory  of  Art  

The  Neo-­‐Wittgensteinian/Institutional  Theories  of  Art    

This  theory  is  largely  based  on  the  views  of  the  great  Austrian  philosopher,  Ludwig  Wittgenstein.  The  
theory  holds  the  following  views:  

(1)  Art  is  an  "open"  concept:  it  is  impossible  to  provide  an  exhaustive  list  of  all  the  properties  that  an  
object  must  possess  to  qualify  as  an  "artwork".  That  is,  it  is  not  possible  to  provide  an  "essential  "  
definition  (in  term  of  "necessary  and  sufficient  conditions",  see  notes  to  Introduction).  Previous  
theories  of  art  thought  that  you  could  provide  such  a  complete  list  of  all  the  conditions  that  an  
object  must  meet  to  qualify  as  an  artwork,  but  this  was  a  great  mistake,  as  the  history  of  art  has  
demonstrated  (e.g.,  at  one  time,  “imitation”  was  thought  to  be  the  only  important  criterion,  but  that  
changed,  as  did  the  other  beliefs  about  what  constitutes  an  artwork).  Hence,  our  concept  of  art  is  
constantly  changing  an  adapting  over  time,  which  is  what  it  means  to  call  "art"  an  open  concept.  
  

(2)  There  is  no  single  property  that  is  common  to  all  artworks;  rather,  there  is  a  complex  series  of  
overlapping  properties  and  resemblances.  In  short,  a  loose  collection  of  properties  is  what  is  
common  to  all  artworks,  but  it  is  not  the  case  that  there  is  a  single  property  in  this  loose  collection  
which  is  possessed  by  every  individual  artwork.  All  that  is  required  is  that  the  object  have  a  large  
number  of  those  properties,  but  it  might  not  be  the  case  that  one  single  property  is  possessed  by  all  
of  them.  This  way  of  conceiving  properties  is  called  a  "family  resemblance"  theory;  for,  just  as  in  a  
family  resemblance,  it  might  be  the  case  that  there  is  not  one  feature  (nose,  eyes,  hair,  etc.)  that  all  
of  the  people  who  are  judged  to  resemble  one  another  possess;  but,  each  person  has  some  of  these  
same  properties,  which  is  enough  to  guarantee  the  resemblance  among  them.  The  advantages  of  
this  theory  is  that  it  allows  many  different  objects,  none  of  which  possess  the  same  identical  feature,  
to  all  count  as  artworks.  

(3)  An  "art  practice"  is  the  means  by  which  the  open  concept  of  art  changes  over  time  (and  also  the  
means  by  which  certain  objects  are  judged  to  meet  the  family  resemblance  concept  of  what  qualifies  
as  an  artwork).  The  art  practice  is  simply  the  social  activity  (of  artists,  critics,  audiences,  etc.)  that  
deems  objects  to  be  artworks.  

Problems:  

(A)  The  "open"  concept  idea  of  art  is  "too  broad",  since  it  seemingly  allows  for  anything  to  qualify  as  
an  artwork.  In  other  words,  since  the  definition  of  artwork  can  change  over  time,  and  can  change  in  
any  way,  it  seems  that  anything  can  be  an  artwork,  which  is  absurd.  (Whether  or  not  this  criticism  is  
effective  is  left  for  the  reader  to  decide.)  

(B)  The  "family  resemblance"  theory  of  artworks  is  also  "too  broad":  since  everything  bears  some  
similarity  to  everything  else,  everything  can  qualify  as  an  artwork.  For  example,  DuChamp's  
"Fountain"  resembles  all  urinals  much  more  than  it  resembles  a  Beethoven  symphony;  so.  if  
"Fountain"  is  an  artwork,  then  is  seems  that  all  urinals  are  artworks!  In  short,  defining  artworks  by  a  
collection  of  properties  or  resemblances,  rather  than  a  single  property,  will  inevitably  open  the  door  
for  many  non-­‐artworks  to  qualify  as  artworks.  

Institutional  Theory  of  Art  

This  theory  can  be  seen  as  an  extension  of  the  general  idea  of  art  accepted  by  the  Neo-­‐
Wittgensteinians.  In  particular,  the  Institutional  theory  accepts  that  art  is  an  "open"  concept,  and  so  
what  constitutes  an  artwork  can  change  over  time.  However,  unlike  the  Neo-­‐Wittgensteinians,  the  
Institutional  theory  does  hold  that  certain  conditions  can  be  specified  that  identify  objects  as  
artworks  (i.e.,  artworks  have  an  essential  property,  or,  saying  the  same  thing,  there  is  a  "necessary  
and  sufficient  condition"  for  an  object  to  qualify  as  an  artwork).  The  means  of  identifying  objects  as  
artworks  is  simply  the  "Institution"  of  art:  that  is,  the  social  "practice"  that  comprises  the  world  of  
artists,  art  audiences,  etc.  It  is  this  practice,  conceived  as  a  social  entity,  that  picks  the  objects  that  
qualify  as  artworks.  Various  members  of  this  practice  have  the  ability  to  select/identify  objects  as  
artworks  (e.g.,  artists,  art-­‐appreciators,  etc.).  Consequently,  to  be  an  artwork  is  simply  to  be  the  
object  that  functions  as  an  artwork  in  the  artworld  practice.    

 
Definition:  x  is  an  artwork  in  the  classificatory  sense  if  and  only  if  (1)  x  is  an  artifact  (2)  upon  which  
someone  acting  on  behalf  of  a  certain  institution  (the  artworld)  confers  the  status  of  being  a  
candidate  for  “appreciation”.  

Problems:  

(1)  Other  social  practices  have  well-­‐defined  rules  on  what  can  be  legitimately  done,  who  can  do  it,  
etc.—but,  this  is  not  the  case  with  the  artworld  practice.  It  is  not  clear  just  who  has  the  authority,  
and  how  they  obtain  the  authority,  to  designate  objects  as  artworks.  This  is  not  really  a  major  
problem  for  the  theory,  however,  because  many  other  social  practices  may  also  have  loose  
parameters  for  designating  the  object  as  having  the  alleged  property,  such  as  Wittgenstein's  
examples  of  "games"  or  “family  resemblance”.    

(2)  It  is  unclear  if  a  solitary  person,  such  as  a  sailor  stranded  on  a  deserted  island,  is  a  member  of  the  
artworld.  If  not,  then  Robinson  Crusoe  (or  Tom  Hanks)  can't  make  an  artwork  on  his  deserted  island.  
But,  this  seems  a  false  conclusion,  since  we  have  no  problem  with  accepting  the  idea  that  artworks  
can  be  fabricated  in  complete  isolation  from  other  people.  This  raises  the  problem  of  just  who  is,  
and  who  is  not,  a  member  of  the  artworld.  An  Institutional  theory,  it  seems  to  me,  can  accept  the  
notion  that  an  isolated  individual  can  be  a  member  of  the  artworld  (because  one  can  claim  that  if  
other  people  come  around,  then  the  alleged  artwork  can  be  appreciated).  

(3)  The  definition  is  "too  broad"  since  many  other  social  practices  would  seem  to  fit  the  definition  of  
the  art  institution  (as  given  above).  For  example,  the  “business  practice”  could  be  seen  as  satisfying  
the  above  definition,  because  business  people  also  produce  "artifacts",  such  as  business  reports,  
that  are  conferred  the  "status  of  being  a  candidate  for  appreciation"  by  people  within  the  practice,  
such  as  when  the  business  committee  "appreciates"  the  report.  This  is  a  serious  problem,  because  it  
means  that  the  definition  of  the  artworld  practice  is  not  capable  of  singling  out  just  that  practice,  so  
we  still  need  to  know  what  specifically  makes  the  art  practice  different  from  the  business  practice,  or  
sports  practice,  etc.  If  one  tries  to  resolve  this  problem  by  claiming  that  the  art  practice  alone  deals  
with  art  works  (whereas  the  business  practice  deals  only  with  business  objects),  then  one  has  to  
identify  what  an  "artwork"  is  (as  opposed  to  a  business  object,  or  sports  object)—but,  the  
Institutional  theory  was  supposed  to  provide  this  definition.  So,  if  you  need  to  know  what  an  artwork  
is  before  you  use  the  theory,  then  the  theory  is  "circular"  (because  it  was  supposed  to  identify  
artworks,  but  now  it  seems  that  you  need  to  know  what  an  artwork  is  before  you  use  the  theory).      

Ref:  Notes  based  on  the  book,  PHILOSOPHY OF ART by Noël Carroll