Genesis 18:16-32

Abraham Intercedes for Sodom

16
Then the men got up from their meal and looked out toward Sodom. As they left, Abraham went with them to send
them on their way.
17
“Should I hide my plan from Abraham?” the LORD asked. 18 “For Abraham will certainly become a great and mighty
nation and all the nations of the earth will be blessed through him. 19 I have singled him out so that he will direct his
sons and their families to keep the way of the LORD by doing what is right and just. Then I will do for Abraham all that I
have promised.”
20
So the LORD told Abraham, “I have heard a great outcry from Sodom and Gomorrah, because their sin is so
flagrant. 21 I am going down to see if their actions are as wicked as I have heard. If not, I want to know.”
22
The other men turned and headed toward Sodom, but the LORDremained with Abraham. 23 Abraham approached him
and said, “Will you sweep away both the righteous and the wicked? 24 Suppose you find fifty righteous people living
there in the city—will you still sweep it away and not spare it for their sakes? 25 Surely you wouldn’t do such a thing,
destroying the righteous along with the wicked. Why, you would be treating the righteous and the wicked exactly the
same! Surely you wouldn’t do that! Should not the Judge of all the earth do what is right?”
26
And the LORD replied, “If I find fifty righteous people in Sodom, I will spare the entire city for their sake.”
27
Then Abraham spoke again. “Since I have begun, let me speak further to my Lord, even though I am but dust and
ashes. 28 Suppose there are only forty-five righteous people rather than fifty? Will you destroy the whole city for lack of
five?”

And the LORD said, “I will not destroy it if I find forty-five righteous people there.”
29
Then Abraham pressed his request further. “Suppose there are only forty?”

And the LORD replied, “I will not destroy it for the sake of the forty.”
30
“Please don’t be angry, my Lord,” Abraham pleaded. “Let me speak—suppose only thirty righteous people are
found?”

And the LORD replied, “I will not destroy it if I find thirty.”

31
Then Abraham said, “Since I have dared to speak to the Lord, let me continue—suppose there are only twenty?”

And the LORD replied, “Then I will not destroy it for the sake of the twenty.”
32
Finally, Abraham said, “Lord, please don’t be angry with me if I speak one more time. Suppose only ten are found
there?”

And the LORD replied, “Then I will not destroy it for the sake of the ten.”

ST. THOMAS MORE - Feast Day: June 22

Thomas More entered Oxford in 1492, where he would learn Latin, Greek and prepare for his future studies. In 1494,
he left Oxford to become a lawyer and he trained in London until 1502 when he was finally approved to begin practice.

Almost as soon as More became a lawyer, he found himself contemplating another path in life. For two years, between
1503 and 1504, More lived next to a Carthusian monastery and he found himself called to follow their lifestyle of simple
piety. He often joined their spiritual exercises.

By 1504, More had decided to remain in the secular world, and stood for election to Parliament. But he did not forget
the pious monks who inspired his practice of the faith.

In 1504, More was elected to Parliament to represent the region of Great Yarmouth, and in 1510 rose to represent
London. During his service to the people of London, he earned a reputation as being honest and effective. He became a
Privy Counselor in 1514.
More also honed his skills as a theologian and a writer. Among his most famous works is "Utopia," about a fictional,
idealistic island society. The work is widely regarded as part satire, part social commentary, part suggestion. Utopia is
considered one of the greatest works of the late Renaissance and was widely read during the Enlightenment period. It
remains well by scholars read today. From 1517 on, Henry VIII took a liking to Thomas More, and gave him posts of ever
increasing responsibility. In 1521, he was knighted and made Under-Treasurer of the Exchequer.

The King's trust in More grew with time and More was soon made Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, which gave
him authority over the northern portion of England on behalf of Henry. More became Lord Chancellor in 1529.

More was immediately effective, working with speed and precision that is admired today. He was likely one of Henry
VIII's most effective servants, and was fiercely loyal to the king.

During his tenure as Lord Chancellor, More prosecuted those accused of heresy and worked tirelessly to defend the
Catholic faith in England. This was an arduous, but achievable task as long as he enjoyed Henry's favor. However, in
1530, as Henry worked to obtain an annulment from his wife, Catherine, Moore refused to sign a letter to the Pope,
requesting an annulment. This was More's first time crossing Henry.

The relationship between More and Henry became strained again when seeking to isolate More, Henry purged many of
the clergy who supported the Pope. It became clear to all that Henry was prepared to break away from the Church in
Rome, something More knew he could not condone.

In 1532, More found himself unable to work for Henry VIII, whom he felt had lost his way as a Catholic. Faced with the
prospect of being compelled to actively support Henry's schism with the Church, More offered his resignation, citing
failing health. Henry accepted it, although he was unhappy with what he viewed as flagging loyalty. In 1533, More
refused to attend the coronation of Anne Boylen, who was now the Queen of England. More instead wrote a letter of
congratulations. The letter, as opposed to his direct presence offended Henry greatly. The king viewed More's absence
as an insult to his new queen and an undermining of his authority as head of the church and state. Henry then had
charges trumped up against More, but More's own integrity protected him. In the first instance, he was accused of
accepting bribes, but there was simply no evidence that could be obtained or manufactured. He was then accused of
conspiracy against the king, because he allegedly consulted with a nun who prophesied against Henry and his wife,
Anne. However, More was able to produce a letter in which he specifically instructed the nun, Elizabeth Barton, not to
interfere with politics.

On April 13, 1534, More was ordered to take an oath, acknowledging the legitimicies of Anne's position as queen, of
Henry's self-granted annulment from Catherine, and the superior position of the King as head of the church. More
accepted Henry's marriage to Anne, but refused to acknowledge Henry as head of the church, or his annulment from
Catherine. This led to his arrest and imprisonment. He was locked away in the Tower of London.

He faced trial on July 1 and was convicted by a court that included Anne Boylen's own father, brother and uncle, hardly
an impartial jury. Still, More had one thing going for him. He could not break the law of which he was accused if he
remained silent. However, he had no defense against treachery, and several dubious witnesses were able to contrive a
story that he had spoken words that had the same effect as treason.

Despite a brilliant defense of himself and persuasive testimony, grounded in truth and fact, More was convicted in
fifteen minutes. The court sentenced him to be hanged, drawn, and quartered, which was the traditional punishment
for treason.

Henry was pleased with the outcome, although likely upset that one of his favorite advisers refused, even upon pain of
death, to sanction his annulment and break from Rome. Henry was a Machiavellian king and while he may have
regretted the loss of More, he was more intent upon retaining his authority. As a final act of mercy, Henry commuted
More's punishment to mere decapitation. More ascended the scaffold on July 6, 1535, joking to his executioners to help
him up the scaffold, but that he would see himself down. He then made a final statement, proclaiming that he was "the
king's good servant, but God's first."

Following his death, it was revealed that More wore a hair shirt, a garment destined to be itchy, and worn to as a sign
of atonement and repentance. It became obvious to all that he was a man of deep piety, asceticism, voluntary self
discipline, and penitence.
More's decapitated body was buried in the Chapel of St. Peter ad Vincula at the Tower of London, in an unmarked
grave. His head was put on display, but his daughter Margaret possibly bribed someone to take it down. The skull may
be in the vault of a church in Canterbury.

Thomas More has been widely remembered as a man of tremendous integrity, and he has since been described as a
martyr and canonized a saint. Pope Leo XIII beatified More in 1886, and he was canonized by Pope Pius XI on May 19,
1935.

He is the patron saint of adopted children lawyers, civil servants, politicians, and difficult marriages.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN - (CASE VS. SNOW BROTHERS)

George W. Miner tells the following story of the manner in which Mr. Lincoln handled a jury: "In the spring
term of the Tazewell County Court, in 1847, I was detained as a witness. Lincoln was employed in several suits, and
among them was one of Case vs. Snow Brothers. The Snow Brothers (who were both minors) had purchased from a Mr.
Case what was then called a 'prairie team,' consisting of two or three yoke of oxen and a prairie plow, giving therefore
their joint note for some two hundred dollars; but when pay-day came they refused to pay, pleading the minor act. The
note was placed in Lincoln's hands for collection. The suit was called and a jury impaneled. The Snow Brothers did not
deny the note, but pleaded through their counsel that they were minors, and that Mr. Case knew they were at the time
of the contract and conveyance. All this was admitted by Mr. Lincoln, with his peculiar phrase, 'Yes, gentlemen, I reckon
that's so.' The minor act was read and its validity admitted in the same manner. The counsel for the defendants were
permitted without question to state all these things to the jury, and to show by the statute that these minors could not
be held responsible for their contract. By this time you may well suppose that his client became quite uneasy. 'What!'
thought I, 'this good old man who confided in these boys to be wronged in this way, and even his counsel, Mr. Lincoln,
to submit in silence.' I looked at Judge Treat, but could read nothing in his calm and dignified demeanor.

Just then Mr. Lincoln slowly rose to his strange, half-erect attitude and in clear, quiet accents began:
'Gentlemen of the jury, are you willing to allow these boys to begin life with this shame and disgrace attached to their
character? If you are, I am not. The best judge of human character that ever wrote has left these immortal words for us
to ponder:

"Good name in man or woman, dear my lord,


Is the immediate jewel of their souls:


Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;


'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;


But he that filches from me my good name


Robs me of that which not enriches him


And makes me poor indeed.

"Then rising to his full height, and looking upon the defendants with the compassion of a brother, his long arm
extended toward the opposing counsel, he continued: 'Gentlemen of the jury, these poor innocent boys would never
have attempted this low villainy had it not been for the advice of these lawyers.' Then for a few minutes he showed
how even the noble science of law may be prostituted. With a scathing rebuke to those who thus belittle their
profession, he concluded: 'And now, gentlemen, you have it in your power to set these boys right before the world.' He
pleaded for the young men only; I think he did not mention his client's name. The jury, without leaving their seats,
decided that the defendants must pay the debt; and the latter, after hearing Lincoln, were as willing to pay it as the jury
were determined they should. I think the entire argument lasted not above five minutes."

*******

Leonard Swett, of Chicago, for years an intimate associate, and himself one of the most famous of American
lawyers, says that "sometimes, after Lincoln entered upon a criminal case, the conviction that his client was guilty
would affect him with a sort of panic. On one occasion he turned suddenly to his associate and said, 'Swett, the man is
guilty; you defend him, I can't,' and so gave up his share of a large fee."

*******

It was a common thing for Lincoln to discourage unnecessary lawsuits, and consequently he was continually
sacrificing opportunities to make money. One man who asked him to bring suit for two dollars and a half against a
debtor who had not a cent with which to pay, would not be put off in his passion for revenge. His counsel therefore
gravely demanded ten dollars as a retainer. Half of this he gave to the poor defendant, who thereupon confessed
judgment and paid the $2.50. Thus the suit was ended, to the entire satisfaction of the angry creditor,

*******

Gen. John H. Littlefield, who studied law with Abraham Lincoln, tells this anecdote in his recollections of this
great figure: "All clients knew that, with 'Old Abe' as their lawyer, they would win their case—if it was fair; if not, that it
was a waste of time to take it to him. After listening some time one day to a would-be client's statement, with his eyes
on the ceiling, he swung around in his chair and exclaimed: 'Well, you have a pretty good case in technical law, but a
pretty bad one in equity and justice. You'll have to get some other fellow to win this case for you. I couldn't do it. All the
time while standing talking to that jury I'd be thinking, "Lincoln, you're a liar," and I believe I should forget myself and
say it out loud.'"

*******

Lincoln, who was one of the most generous and kind-hearted of men, often said that there was no act which
was not prompted by some selfish motive. He was riding in a stage from Springfield, Illinois, to a neighboring town and
was discussing this philosophy with a fellow-passenger.

As the stage rumbled past a ditch which was filled with mud and mire the passengers could see a small pig,
caught fast in the muck, squealing and struggling to free himself. Many persons in the stage laughed heartily, but Mr.
Lincoln, then a lawyer, asked the driver to stop for a few moments.

Leaping from the stage, he walked to the ditch over his shoetops in mud and picked the little animal up, setting
it on the solid road.

"Now, look here," said the passenger with whom he had been talking, "you cannot say that was a selfish act."

"Extremely selfish," said Mr. Lincoln. "If I had left that little fellow in there the memory of his squealing would
have made me uncomfortable all day. That is why I freed him."

*******

He was a poor money-maker. Daniel Webster, who sent him a case, was amazed at the smallness of his bill,
and his fellow-lawyers looked upon his charges as very low. This was his only fault, in their eyes. Once, when another
attorney had collected $250 for their joint services, he refused to accept his share until the fee had been reduced to
what he considered fair proportions and the overcharge had been returned to the client. When David Davis, the
presiding judge of the circuit, heard of this, he indignantly exclaimed, "Lincoln, your picayune charges will impoverish
the bar."

*******

He was equally ready to take up a just case without hope of pay as he was to refuse an unjust one even at the
loss of a good fee. He once dragged into court a pension agent who insisted on keeping for himself half of a $400 claim
which he had collected for a poor widow. There, in his own expressive phrase, he "skinned" him, moved the jury to
tears by his stirring appeal for justice to the old woman, and won the verdict, all without charge to his client.
 *******

His advice to lawyers was sound and clear. Herndon quotes him as saying: "Don't shoot too high. Aim lower,
and the common people will understand you. They are the ones you want to reach—at least they are the ones you
ought to reach. The educated and refined people will understand you, anyway. If you aim too high, your ideas will go
over the heads of the masses and only hit those who need no hitting."

*******

Herndon relates, as an instance of Lincoln's moral honesty and his horror of a lie, that he (Herndon) once drew
up a dilatory plea for the purpose of delaying a case for another term. But when it came to Lincoln's attention he
promptly repudiated it.

"Is this founded on fact?" Lincoln inquired, and when Herndon admitted it was done merely to save their
client's interests, which might otherwise be endangered, Lincoln instantly replied:

"You know it is a sham, and a sham is very often but another name for a lie. Don't let it go on record. The
cursed thing may come staring us in the face long after this suit is forgotten." And the plea was withdrawn.

*******

A New York firm applied to Lincoln some years before he became President for information as to the financial
standing of one of his neighbors. This was the answer:

"Yours of the 10th received. First of all, he has a wife and baby; together they ought to be worth $500,000 to
any man. Secondly, he has an office in which there is a table worth $1.50 and three chairs worth, say, $1. Last
of all, there is in one corner a large rat-hole, which will bear looking into.

"Respectfully,

"A. Lincoln."

MAHATMA GANDHI

Mahatma Gandhi was a prominent Indian political leader who campaigned for Indian independence. He employed non-
violent principles and peaceful disobedience. He was assassinated in 1948, shortly after achieving his life goal of Indian
independence. In India, he is known as ‘Father of the Nation’.

“When I despair, I remember that all through history the ways of truth and love have always won. There have been
tyrants, and murderers, and for a time they can seem invincible, but in the end they always fall. Think of it–always.”

– Gandhi

Short Biography of Mahatma Gandhi - Mohandas K. Gandhi was born in 1869, in Porbandar, India. Mohandas was from
the social cast of tradesmen. His mother was illiterate, but her common sense and religious devotion had a lasting
impact on Gandhi’s character. As a youngster, Mohandas was a good student, but the shy young boy displayed no signs
of leadership. On the death of his father, Mohandas travelled to England to gain a degree in law. He became involved
with the Vegetarian Society and was once asked to translate the Hindu Bhagavad Gita. This classic of Hindu literature
awakened in Gandhi a sense of pride in the Indian scriptures, of which the Gitawas the pearl. Around this time, he also
studied the Bible and was struck by the teachings of Jesus Christ – especially the emphasis on humility and forgiveness.
He remained committed to the Bible and Bhagavad Gita throughout his life, though he was critical of aspects of both
religions.

Gandhi in South Africa

On completing his degree in Law, Gandhi returned to India, where he was soon sent to South Africa to practise law. In
South Africa, Gandhi was struck by the level of racial discrimination and injustice often experienced by Indians. It was in
South Africa that Gandhi first experimented with campaigns of civil disobedience and protest; he called his non-violent
protests satyagraha. Despite being imprisoned for short periods of time, he also supported the British under certain
conditions. He was decorated by the British for his efforts during the Boer War and Zulu rebellion.

Gandhi and Indian Independence - After 21 years in South Africa, Gandhi returned to India in 1915. He became the
leader of the Indian nationalist movement campaigning for home rule or Swaraj.

Gandhi successfully instigated a series of non-violent protest. This included national strikes for one or two days. The
British sought to ban opposition, but the nature of non-violent protest and strikes made it difficult to counter.

Gandhi also encouraged his followers to practise inner discipline to get ready for independence. Gandhi said the Indians
had to prove they were deserving of independence. This is in contrast to independence leaders such as Aurobindo
Ghose, who argued that Indian independence was not about whether India would offer better or worse government,
but that it was the right for India to have self-government.

Gandhi also clashed with others in the Indian independence movement such as Subhas Chandra Bose who advocated
direct action to overthrow the British.

Gandhi frequently called off strikes and non-violent protest if he heard people were rioting or violence was involved.

In 1930, Gandhi led a famous march to the sea in protest at the new Salt Acts. In the sea, they made their own salt, in
violation of British regulations. Many hundreds were arrested and Indian jails were full of Indian independence
followers.

However, whilst the campaign was at its peak some Indian protesters killed some British civilians, and as a result,
Gandhi called off the independence movement saying that India was not ready. This broke the heart of many Indians
committed to independence. It led to radicals like Bhagat Singh carrying on the campaign for independence, which was
particularly strong in Bengal.

Gandhi and the Partition of India- After the war, Britain indicated that they would give India independence. However,
with the support of the Muslims led by Jinnah, the British planned to partition India into two: India and Pakistan.
Ideologically Gandhi was opposed to partition. He worked vigorously to show that Muslims and Hindus could live
together peacefully. At his prayer meetings, Muslim prayers were read out alongside Hindu and Christian prayers.
However, Gandhi agreed to the partition and spent the day of Independence in prayer mourning the partition. Even
Gandhi’s fasts and appeals were insufficient to prevent the wave of sectarian violence and killing that followed the
partition.

Away from the politics of Indian independence, Gandhi was harshly critical of the Hindu Caste system. In particular, he
inveighed against the ‘untouchable’ caste, who were treated abysmally by society. He launched many campaigns to
change the status of untouchables. Although his campaigns were met with much resistance, they did go a long way to
changing century-old prejudices.

At the age of 78, Gandhi undertook another fast to try and prevent the sectarian killing. After 5 days, the leaders agreed
to stop killing. But ten days later Gandhi was shot dead by a Hindu Brahmin opposed to Gandhi’s support for Muslims
and the untouchables.

Gandhi and Religion - Gandhi was a seeker of the truth. “In the attitude of silence the soul finds the path in a clearer
light, and what is elusive and deceptive resolves itself into crystal clearness. Our life is a long and arduous quest after
Truth. – Gandhi

Gandhi said his great aim in life was to have a vision of God. He sought to worship God and promote religious
understanding. He sought inspiration from many different religions: Jainism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism
and incorporated them into his own philosophy.
On several occasions, he used religious practices and fasting as part of his political approach. Gandhi felt that personal
example could influence public opinion.

“When every hope is gone, ‘when helpers fail and comforts flee,’ I find that help arrives somehow, from I know not
where. Supplication, worship, prayer are no superstition; they are acts more real than the acts of eating, drinking,
sitting or walking. It is no exaggeration to say that they alone are real, all else is unreal.”

JOSE W. DIOKNO

Sen. Jose W. Diokno's Letter to his eldest son, Jose Ramon | written on 23 October 1972 while in detention

Dear Popoy,

When you asked me about a month ago, for a list of books that you could read to start studying law, I was loathe to
prepare the list because I felt that you would be wasting your time studying law in this “new society.”

I am still not sure that it would be worth your while to do so.

A few days ago, while chatting with a soldier, he asked, in all seriousness and sincerity, “Pero sir, kailangan pa ba ang
mga abogado ngayon?” And in a way that perhaps he did not intend, he raised a perfectly valid question.

A lawyer lives in and by the law; and there is no law when society is ruled, not by reason, but by will—worse, by the will
of one man.

A lawyer strives for justice; and there is no justice when men and women are imprisoned not only without guilt, but
without trial.

A lawyer must work in freedom; and there is no freedom when conformity is extracted by fear and criticism silenced by
force.

A lawyer builds on facts. He must seek truth; and there is no truth when facts are suppressed, news is manipulated and
charges are fabricated.

Worse, when the Constitution is invoked to justify outrages against freedom, truth and justice, when democracy is
destroyed under the pretext of saving it, law is not only denied–it is perverted.

And what need do our people have for men and women who would practice perversion?

Yet the truth remains true that never have our people had greater need than today for great lawyers, and for young
men and women determined to be great lawyers.

Great lawyers—not brilliant lawyers. A scoundrel may be, and often is, brilliant; and the greater the scoundrel, the
more brilliant the lawyer. But only a good man can become a great lawyer: for only a man who understands the
weaknesses of men because he has conquered them in himself; who has the courage to pursue his ideals though he
knows them to be unattainable; who tempers his conviction with respect for those of others because he realizes he
may be mistaken; who deals honorably and fairly with all, because to do otherwise would diminish him as well as
them—only such a man would so command respect that he could persuade and need never resort to force. Only such a
man could become a great lawyer. Otherwise, “what you are speaks so loudly, I cannot hear what you say.”

For men and women of this kind, our country will always have need—and now more than ever. True, there is little that
men of goodwill can do now to end the madness that holds our nation in its grip. But we can, even now, scrutinize our
past; try to pinpoint where we went wrong; determine what led to this madness and what nurtured it; and how, when
it ends, we can make sure that it need never happen again.

For this madness must end—if not in my lifetime, at least in yours.

We Filipinos are proverbially patient, but we are also infinitely tough and ingeniously resourceful. Our entire history as
a people has been a quest for freedom and dignity; and we will not be denied our dreams.

So this madness will end; the rule of force will yield to the rule of law. Then the country will need its great lawyers, its
great engineers,its great economists and managers, the best of its men and women to clear the shambles and restore
the foundations of that noble and truly Filipino society for which our forefathers fought, bled and died.

So, there are two sides to the question of whether it is worth your while to study law; and, in the end, it is a question
that only you can answer.

"Government is always and only an instrument of the people."—Jose W. Diokno

Just be sure, that, whatever be your decision, it is truly yours, that it is truly what you want, not a choice dictated by a
sense of duty to follow in my footsteps.

To help you decide, I suggest that you read:

(a) The Attorney’s Oath, Form No, 28 appended to our Rules of Court; and the duties of an attorney, Rule 138, sec. 20 of
the Rules of Court, which you can ask from my office;

(b) “The Five Functions of a Lawyer” in Arthur T. Vandervilt’s “Cases and Materials on Modern Procedure.”

(c) “The Chicago Lawyer’s Pledge” on p. 395, and “The Crafts of Law Re-valued” on pp. 316-322 of Karl Llewellyn’s
“Jurisprudence.”

(d) “The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times” by Roscoe Pound.

(e) “Men of Law” by William Seagle.

These should give you an idea of what a lawyer should be and what he has been in the past. What he is in our country,
you have an idea;

(f) Martin Mayer’s “The Lawyers”, tells you what he is in the United

States; and

(g) Brian Abel-Smith’s “Lawyers and Courts”, what he is in England.

Read either and compare with our practice. And for a critique of lawyers, of courts, and even of law, read,

(h) “Law against the People,” by Robert Lefcourt.

As you read, cultivate the habit I have never been able to school myself to do of taking notes of your reading—not only
of the gist of what the author says, or quotations of thoughts he felicitously expresses, but also of your reactions to his
work (where you agree or disagree or suspend judgment, and why) and of the thoughts he arouses in you. File your
notes in orderly fashion. They will become invaluable to you as you mature.

After you have read enough to give you an idea of what a lawyer is and does, but before you firmly commit yourself,
one way or the other, discuss the matter with your wife and your friends, always bearing these things in mind:

– That the law is a demanding profession, exacting a constant and unswerving devotion that is always a thinking
obedience to its ideals, and that is much harder to give than blind obedience;

– That the rewards of the law as a profession are not in wealth or even in fame, but in the respect of your peers, in the
excitement of the chase after justice, and in the satisfaction not only of service to your clients but of having somehow
shaped the future by molding the law of today.

This has been a long letter on a short question—whether to study law—and is not an example to be emulated should
you decide in favor of law. My excuse is that time lies heavy on my hands in these days of detention, and since we can
talk only in snatches when you visit, I have written at length in the hope of anticipating some of your questions.
You may suspect that, by stressing the difficulties of the law profession and by suggesting that you read some eight
books before making up your mind, I am trying to discourage you from studying law. I am not. In a rather heavy-handed
way, I am trying to paint the lawyer’s role as accurately as I can and show you that, if you do decide to become a
lawyer, you must prepare yourself for a lifetime of study,reading, weighing and deciding, while at the same time acting
and doing. It sounds impossible–but every day it has been and is being done.

I have loved the law; and I have always been proud of being a lawyer. But I have never been prouder than the day, five
Sundays ago, that you told me that you wanted to study law. Regardless of what you may finally decide, the fact that
you even thought of becoming a lawyer, despite my arrest and detention, allows me to hope that I have not failed as a
lawyer and as a father.

For that, son, thanks.

Your father,

PEPE

Jose W. Diokno (1922-1987) served as a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, and was the founding chair of
Commission on Human Rights.

--------x-------

The Commission on Human Rights is unveiling Thursday the statue of its founding chairman and former senator Jose W.
Diokno.

Diokno was senator of the Philippines from 1963 to 1972. Prior to being a lawmaker, Diokno served as justice secretary
from 1961 to 1962 during the term of President Diosdado Macapagal.

Diokno was born on February 26, 1922 to Ramon Diokno and Leonor Wright. He earned a bachelor's degree in
commerce at then De La Salle College, before he studied law at the University of Santo Tomas.

His law studies, however, were interrupted by World War 2. Diokno continued his education by reading his father's law
books.

After the war, Diokno was given special permission by the Supreme Court to take the Bar exams even without a law
degree. He and Jovito Salonga tied at first place with a score of 95.3%

As justice secretary, Diokno started an investigation into American businessman Harry Stonehill, which turned up
evidence of massive corruption in government. Diokno, however, was asked to resign after President Macapagal
intervened in the case.

Diokno then ran for a Senate seat under the Nacionalista Party in 1963. As senator, Diokno focused on the interest of
the country in important economic legislation and foreign policy.

He was among those arrested when then President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972.

Diokno was released in 1974, and along with Joker Arroyo and Lorenzo Tañada Sr., formed the Free Legal Assistance
Group (FLAG) to provide legal assistance to victims of martial law.

Diokno was married to Carmen Icasiano. They were blessed with nine children, among them former National Historical
Commission of the Philippines (NHCP) chairperson Maria Serena Diokno and the current FLAG chairman Jose Manuel
Diokno.

Diokno died of lung cancer on February 27, 1987, a day after his 65th birthday.
SECOND DIVISION - [A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000]

1. LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral
relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.

The relevant facts are: On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes
Church in Quezon City[1] and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni,
Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her
husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a
daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village
in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her
office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent
admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over between her and
Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then
on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.

However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent continued,
and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then
met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship
with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that
respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.

A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant
against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the
complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,[2] respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and
had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese
woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad,
Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985[3]. Upon their return
to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills
residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his
second marriage before they would live together.[4]

In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the
Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988,
respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui.
Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii
sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after
she reported to work with the law firm[5] she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife
of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.

It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that
after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent
averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio;
and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents funds.[6] By way of counterclaim, respondent sought
moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present
allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos
Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that
the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.

During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui,
and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-
5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The
resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:

Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship" between the respondents
allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos
Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.

It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was discovered by
complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast
Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early
(sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.

From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had
been prima facie established by complainants evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the
"fact of respondents cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house,
proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement
alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the
complainants evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).

It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective positions on the matter
support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8]

Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was
dismissed [9] on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived
together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in
Contempt of the Commission [10] wherein she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for
submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent
filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22,
1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage [11]
duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and
duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage
between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by
respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent
wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock.[12] It is the
contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183[13] and 184[14] of the Revised Penal
Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer
and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which
make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),[15] respondent averred that she did not have the
original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed
such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has
conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent
averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:

(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral character for the practice
of the legal profession; and

(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral manner.[17]

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui
because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent
immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that
the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his
courtship.[18]

On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have
knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent
reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place
either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant
confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent
stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the
marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui
on this matter.

Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of
respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a
picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No.
PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage,[19] does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have
no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency and
who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal
of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged [20] and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice [21]
to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui.
In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be
considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom
she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.

In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris
Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which
resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio,
personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs.
Bonifacio was the Branch Manager.[23] It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents
as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise
averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document
containing an intercalated date.

In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24], respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to show
sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is
no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her
mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent.

Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation,
finding that:

In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to
be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human
experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single, separated, or without
any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single
women prefer single men.

The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United
States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she
lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the
children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent that can be
considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim
that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode
destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.

x..........................x..........................x"

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated
December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the
complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED
for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty."

We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession
simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process,
once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:

a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied)

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess
good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to
the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege. It has been held -

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral
character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated
when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify
the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule
implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).[26]

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him
to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to
two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.

Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they
will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in
our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as
keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal
affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found
herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about
Carlos Uis personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.

Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents suspicion that something was amiss in
her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she
knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest
effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui
never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering
respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal
affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed
was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the
moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.[27] Moreover, for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[28]

We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards."[29] Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering
his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law
and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainants bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit.
After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she
establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.[30] This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to
believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was
provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the
date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget
the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially
so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage
Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession
exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds
and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest
degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby
DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate,
with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on
her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman and Acting C.J.), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

EN BANC [A.C. No. 6486. September 22, 2004]

2. EMMA T. DANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.
PER CURIAM:

Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions
where the practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has good moral character, and
once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the standard. In this jurisdiction too, good
moral character is not only a condition precedent[1] to the practice of law, but an unending requirement for all the
members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or
disbarred.[2]

In an Affidavit-Complaint[3] dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes,
sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of immorality, abandonment, and
violation of professional ethics and law. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 01-851.

Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit relationships with two
women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the time respondents illicit affairs started,
he failed to give regular support to complainant and their children, thus forcing complainant to work abroad to provide
for their childrens needs. Complainant pointed out that these acts of respondent constitute a violation of his lawyers
oath and his moral and legal obligation to be a role model to the community.

On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order[4] requiring respondent to submit his answer to
the Affidavit-Complaint.

Respondent submitted his Answer[5] on November 19, 2001. Though admitting the fact of marriage with the
complainant and the birth of their children, respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to separate eighteen
(18) years before after complainant had abandoned him in their Balintawak residence and fled to San Fernando,
Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when complainant returned after eighteen years, she insisted that she be
accommodated in the place where he and their children were residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a rented
apartment.

Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he could afford and provided for their needs.
He even bought two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave complainant adequate financial
support even after she had abandoned him in 1983.

Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force him to remit seventy percent (70%) of his
monthly salary to her.

Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the complaint. Complainant presented her evidence,
both oral and documentary,[6] to support the allegations in her Affidavit-Complaint.

From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that on January 19, 1979, complainant and
respondent were married[7] and lived with the latters mother in Balintawak. At that time, respondent was just a fourth
year law student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the buy and sell business and relied on dole-outs from
the respondents mother.

Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and Daisy, who were born on February 20, 1980,[8]
October 14, 1981[9] and August 11, 1983,[10] respectively. Complainant narrated that their relationship was marred by
frequent quarrels because of respondents extra-marital affairs.[11] Sometime in 1983, she brought their children to her
mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because respondent had failed to provide adequate support. From 1986 to
2001, complainant worked abroad as a domestic helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to live separately, complainant asseverated
that she was just compelled to work abroad to support their children. When she returned to the Philippines, she
learned that respondent was living with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly told her, that he did not want to live
with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses.

Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian
Dave,[12] all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his paramour[13] to prove the fact that
respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two different women. Letters of complainants
legitimate children likewise support the allegation that respondent is a womanizer.[14]

In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine complainant, after
he failed to appear during the scheduled hearings despite due notice. He, however, submitted his Comment/Opposition
to the Complainants Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to Exclude the Evidence from the Records of the
Proceedings[15] on August 1, 2002.

Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism.
Respondents motion was denied because it was filed after the complainant had already presented her evidence.[16]
Respondent was given a final chance to present his evidence on July 11, 2003. Instead of presenting evidence,
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, which was likewise denied for being a
prohibited pleading under the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent submitted his
Position Paper on August 4, 2003.

In respondents Position Paper,[17] he reiterated the allegations in his Answer except that this time, he argued that in
view of the resolution of the complaint for support with alimony pendente lite[18] filed against him by the complainant
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,[19] the instant administrative case should be dismissed for lack of
merit.

On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar Confidant its Report[20] and Resolution No. XVI-
2004-230 involving CBD Case No. 01-851.[21] The IBP recommended that the respondent be suspended indefinitely
from the practice of law.

Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.[22] To be the basis of disciplinary
action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree[23] or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.[24]

In Barrientos vs. Daarol,[25] we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but
should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much
greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect
the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to
protect errant lawyers from themselves.[26]

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their
legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.[27] They may be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long
as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.[28]

Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of
his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions.
Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondents
commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent had breached the high and exacting moral
standards set for members of the law profession. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity.[29]

In Toledo vs. Toledo,[30] we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman
who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,[31] we ruled that abandoning ones wife and resuming
carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.

We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,[32] that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of a member of the
bar to continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community as
exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.

The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.[33] Where a lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed.[34]
However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it
appears to be the most appropriate penalty.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar,
and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur. Carpio-Morales, J., on official leave. Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.

3. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., Complainant, - versus - ATTY. LEO J. PALMA, Respondent.

Adm. Case No. 2474
Promulgated: September 15, 2004

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral
fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar, the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation
but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered
after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal.[1]

Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging
as grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral
conduct.
The facts are undisputed: Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70s. Complainant was a client of Angara
Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Owing to
his growing business concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent as his personal counsel.

Consequently, respondents relationship with complainants family became intimate. He traveled and dined with them
abroad.[2] He frequented their house and even tutored complainants 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco
(Lisa), then a student of Assumption Convent.

On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainants family, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong. It was only the
next day that respondent informed complainant and assured him that everything is legal. Complainant was shocked,
knowing fully well that respondent is a married man and has three children. Upon investigation, complainant found
that respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring sessions. Immediately, complainant sent his two sons to Hongkong to
convince Lisa to go home to Manila and discuss the matter with the family. Lisa was persuaded.

Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent requested from his
(complainants) office an airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong; (b) respondent
misrepresented himself as bachelor before the Hong Kong authorities to facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and (c)
respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and
Eduardo Lorenzo.

On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First Instance, Branch XXVII, Pasay City a petition[3] for
declaration of nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa, docketed as Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P. In the
Decision[4] dated November 2, 1982, the CFI declared the marriage null and void ab initio.

Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant complaint [5] for disbarment, imputing to respondent the
following acts:

a. In grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant and his family and taking
undue advantage of his tutoring sessions with Maria Luisa, respondent secretly courted her. The great disparity in
intelligence, education, age, experience and maturity between Maria Luisa and respondent gave the latter an
overwhelming moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa as to overcome her scruples and apprehensions about respondents
courtship and advances, considering that he is a married man with three (3) children;

b. Respondent courted Maria Luisa with persistence and determination and even pursued her in her travels abroad
under false pretenses that he was traveling on official business for complainant. To break down the final resistance of
Maria Luisa and assuage her pangs of guilt, he made representations that there was no legal impediment whatsoever to
his marrying;

c. With his moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa and his misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or
prohibition to his contracting a second marriage, respondent succeeded in inducing and beguiling her into marrying
him. Without complying with the requirements of Philippine law that he should first obtain a judicial declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Elizabeth H. Palma and that the advice of Maria Luisas parents should first be obtained she
being only twenty-two (22) years of age, respondent succeeded in contracting marriage with her in Hongkong on June
22, 1982 by falsely representing himself before the Hongkong authorities that he is a bachelor. x x x.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss[6] on the ground of lack of cause of action. He contended that the complaint fails
to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or violation of his lawyers oath. There is no allegation
that he acted with wanton recklessness, lack of skill or ignorance of the law in serving complainants interest. Anent the
charge of grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that he married complainants daughter with utmost sincerity and good
faith and that it is contrary to the natural course of things for an immoral man to marry the woman he sincerely loves.

In the Resolution[7] dated March 2, 1983, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for
investigation, report and recommendation. Former Assistant Solicitor General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili conducted the
investigation.
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1983, the First Division of this Court issued in G.R. No. 64538[8] a Resolution[9] (a) setting
aside the CFI Decision dated November 2, 1982 in Civil Case No. Pq0401-P declaring the marriage between respondent
and Lisa null and void ab initio; and (b) remanding the case to the CFI for proper proceeding and determination. To this
date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of this case.

On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings[10] on the ground that
the final outcome of Civil Case No. Pq0401-P poses a prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding. It was denied.

Respondent sought refuge in this Court through an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Restraining Order.[11] In the
Resolution dated December 19, 1984, we enjoined the OSG from continuing the investigation of the disbarment
proceedings.[12]

Thereafter, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. On October
19, 1998, Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo issued the following order:

Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending and as a practical measure to ease the backlog of
this Commission, the parties shall within ten (10) days from notice, manifest whether or not they are still interested in
prosecuting this case or supervening events have transpired which render this case moot and academic or otherwise,
this case shall be deemed closed and terminated.[13]

In his Manifestation,[14] complainant manifested and confirmed his continuing interest in prosecuting his complaint for
disbarment against respondent.

On the other hand, respondent sought several postponements of hearing on the ground that he needed more time to
locate vital documents in support of his defense. The scheduled hearing of December 4, 2001 was reset for the last time
on January 24, 2002, with a warning that should he fail to appear or present deposition, the case will be deemed
submitted for resolution.[15] Respondent again failed to appear on January 24, 2002; hence, the case was considered
submitted for resolution.[16]

On March 20, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted a Report and Recommendation finding
respondent guilty of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. She recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years. Thus:

The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent committed the following acts which warrant
his disbarment:

a) Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant;

b) His misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or prohibition to his contracting a second marriage;

c) The acts of respondent constitute deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct and
violation of his oath as a lawyer.

Respondent admits that he married Maria Luisa in Hongkong representing himself as a bachelor, however, he claimed
that the marriage certificate stated a condition no different from term spinster with respect to Luisa.

There is no question that respondent as a lawyer well versed in the law knew fully well that in marrying Maria Luisa he
was entering into a bigamous marriage defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The
respondent betrayed the trust reposed in him by complainant. He was treated as part of the family and was allowed to
tutor Maria Luisa.

For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath
as a lawyer, and it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
years.

SO ORDERED.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above Report and Recommendation, but it reduced
respondents penalty to only one (1) year suspension.

Except for the penalty, we affirm the IBPs Report and Recommendation.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its
members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity or
in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere
citizen at another.[17] Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect
unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of
inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.[18]

Respondent claims that he had served complainant to the best of his ability. In fact, the complaint does not allege that
he acted with wanton recklessness, lack of skill and ignorance of the law.

While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good lawyer,[19] however, professional competency alone
does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensable requirement.

The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth
Hermosisima. The Certification[20] from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that he married Elizabeth on
December 19, 1971 at Cardials Private Chapel, Cebu City. On the other hand, the Certificate of Marriage[21] from the
Deputy Registrar of Marriages, Hong Kong, proves respondents subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9, 1982. That
Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondents second marriage was confirmed on the witness stand by Atty. Victor P.
Lazatin, Elizabeths classmate and family friend.[22]

Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.[23]

This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality. Thus, we have somehow come up with a common definition of
what constitutes immoral conduct, i.e., that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.[24] Measured against this
definition, respondents act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children. Second, he
lured an innocent young woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a bachelor so he could
contract marriage in a foreign land.

Our rulings in the following cases are relevant:

1) In Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo,[25] respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to
sever them. There, we ruled that [S]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage
and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential
to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. As such, there
can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred.

(2) In Tucay vs. Tucay,[26] respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left complainant with
whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute a grossly immoral conduct and only
indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession, warranting respondents disbarment.

(3) In Villasanta vs. Peralta,[27] respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their marriage still
valid and subsisting. We held that the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to honesty,
justice, decency and morality. Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was
disqualified from being admitted to the bar.

(4) In Cabrera vs. Agustin,[28] respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied
his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected
of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.
(5) In Toledo vs. Toledo,[29] respondent abandoned his wife, who supported him and spent for his law education, and
thereafter cohabited with another woman. We ruled that he failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected
and required of a member of the bar. For this, respondent was disbarred.

(6) In Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[30] respondent abandoned his lawful wife and child and resumed cohabitation with his
former paramour. Here, we ruled that abandoning ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a
married woman, constitute grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment.

The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. It was respondents closeness
to the complainants family as well as the latters complete trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship with
Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be complainants legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latters back and courted
his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of
complainants resources by securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the latters daughter in
Hongkong. He did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure complainant
that everything is legal. Clearly, respondent had crossed the limits of propriety and decency.

Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and since he married her, he cannot be charged with
immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a brazen regard on the sanctity of marriage. In such relationship,
the man and the woman are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity.[31] How could respondent
perform these obligations to Lisa when he was previously married to Elizabeth? If he really loved her, then the noblest
thing he could have done was to walk away.

Respondents culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just a 22-year old college student of Assumption
Convent and was under psychological treatment for emotional immaturity.[32] Naturally, she was an easy prey.

Anent respondents argument that since the validity of his marriage to Lisa has not yet been determined by the court
with finality, the same poses a prejudicial question to the present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say that a
subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. As we held in In
re Almacen,[33] a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not
determinative of an administrative case against him,[34] or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not
affect its course,[35] then the judgment of annulment of respondents marriage does not also exonerate him from a
wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof --- clear preponderance of evidence --- in disciplinary
proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.[36]

The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is that they shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. This is founded on the lawyers primordial duty to society
as spelled out in Canon 1 which states:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.

It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of Professional Responsibility ranked the above responsibility first
in the enumeration. They knew then that more than anybody else, it is the lawyers -- the disciples of law -- who are
most obliged to venerate the law. As stated in Ex Parte Wall:[37]

Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for
him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very
bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic.

Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorneys Oath which every lawyer in the country has to take
before he is allowed to practice.
In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1)
year suspension recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity of his offense. The bulk of jurisprudence
supports the imposition of the extreme penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer,
and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let respondents name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys immediately. Furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country with copies of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

4. In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
March 23, 1929

Duran & Lim for respondent.

Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that
previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads
as follows:

LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela

(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral
office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead;
and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as
any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is
willing to help and serve the poor.)

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home
municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:

ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928

MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into office as member of
the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear
your suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can
come to my house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may
desire.

I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in Echague. I will attend the
session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you
as a lawyer and notary public. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession
as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can always
find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of documents of
contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays.

I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that my residence as
member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as
notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and
that I will have my residence here in Echague.

I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meetings or social
gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary
public. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the
registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for
every registration.

Yours respectfully,

(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA

Attorney
Notary Public.

The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the
Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following:
"The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice."

The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:

27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication
or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of
convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interview not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to
procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies
advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to
be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.

28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice
to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up
strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in
titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by
seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them
as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring
or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians,
hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the
criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to
the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any
practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.

Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at the
common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes
intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself,
and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a
profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do
so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19
L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is
destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting
to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly
understood.

Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having
solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon
the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the
Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think
that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which
unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent
elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his
intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third,
his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of
the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which
have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as
indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.

In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is
hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929,

Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
Separate Opinions

OSTRAND, J., dissenting: I dissent. Under the circumstances of the case a reprimand would have been sufficient
punishment.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

5. MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the
same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday
during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232;
521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of
the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and
that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs
sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims
that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the
use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United
States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P.
Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion
International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their
memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the
subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present
hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the
memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support
services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without
substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of
basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business
registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to
state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to
the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and
of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain
respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in question give
the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier
mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name being used by
respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services
for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the
term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case, appears with
(the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar
and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person
being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the
nature of the service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or whether it
offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a
distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements
in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers,
whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public
order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the
general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any
law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized,
and that is:

Article 26. ...

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered into accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can
avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a
divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least,
this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the
sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition,
which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those
planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent
union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its
sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy,
which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above impressions one may
gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone
confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts
does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services as
commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in
the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the advertisements in
question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from
further performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services
to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal
profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-
members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields, such
as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the
exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will
deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will
be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form,
not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public.
Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of
illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such services are
made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance,
not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered
to the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken.
This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts
which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void
under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such
matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law,
that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal
opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a
"paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and
effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the
legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation
and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court.5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers
and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and
3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name
"The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which
thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in
paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty.
Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in
court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by a
corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an
odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the
business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of
the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court.
Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline.
The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am.
Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice.6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers
for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support services"
to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of
Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly
and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly
regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other
related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures
related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and are
embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law."7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the protection of the
general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the
practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor
of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice
law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice, there are in
those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general
public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact
remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to
make measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public
in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about by
advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but
by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to
those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that information
regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence,
adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services.
The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent
will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are
doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article."9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as
provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in
this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold
letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not
only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid
marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers
authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise
their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can
justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act
even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become
justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this
country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here, when it
cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not
be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars
of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms or travel
agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of
respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does
not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes
and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that
(the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he
shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is
a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law —
accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving
others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their
particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire
prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in harmony with the
law. This is not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the
industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor
Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal
advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in
respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this function would probably be considered
to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-
empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case.
The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and
few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate
special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in
such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the
same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate courses are offered by
our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established
method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain
function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in
their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a
whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of
course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts
are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the
zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice
or information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as
a minor feature of his work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be
practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in
collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for
negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is
free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception
where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers.
But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the
probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a
definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of
an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such agency. The State of New
Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one
whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person,
or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here
means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully
do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of
the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states
the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall
make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on
routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge,
may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal
Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the
practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See
Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to
that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines
by himself what courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply
the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of
law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which purports to say what the
law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a
particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of
these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful
practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at
large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE —
THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to
give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation
— in their publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . .
There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction
against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment
or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the
memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing
his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does
fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the
course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of
the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of
law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of
particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should
be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of
law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious
disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion)
that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et
seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily
related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and
not legal services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of
the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the
subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines
explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic
of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge
or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not
be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of
documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before
public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in
order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who
confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter
to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and
rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as
to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to
determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces
all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129
Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose
of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any
act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick
v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where
the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr.
p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having
no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of
the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp.
665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned
criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations
that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which
are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology
in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as
computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers;
document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance
to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage,
property, or business registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful,
like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country,
and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems,
programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other
entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or
the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention
that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for
example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it
were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said
law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That
activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by
the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority
holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the
Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as
the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in
various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it caters to
clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's what
doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you
for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's
referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes
of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis.
Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died
and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist
in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even
taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to
deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a
litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it
is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the
ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the
main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail
of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services
are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the
practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of
law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as
such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if
he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court,
the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his
thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and
have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a
lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the
rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired
through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to
the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law
those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the
public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the
judicial department can exercise little control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as
an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent
cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral
adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities
there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept
of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect
the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set
up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to
certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional
ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal
service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited
representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority,
a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot
be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That
policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay
or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract
legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had
also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing
or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the
lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs.
Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding,
39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among
other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to
and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the
bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of
a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome
of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching
public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions
to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions
are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may
include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools
attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof,
in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature
of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a
lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or
society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents
of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name,
the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced.
The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates,
firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his
name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to
task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find
and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception
is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of
Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions
stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This
goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only
if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude
of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly
47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public
opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community
in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at
times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to
regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services
except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a
member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic,
Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on
that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely
administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different
proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized
for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising,
cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor
General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-
off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the
circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or
causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and
purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or
transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General
for appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ.,
concur

6. ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, complainant, vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.[1]

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the
published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that
her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree
within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo
also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the
other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar
advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of
The Philippine Star.[2]

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public
Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and
solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not
prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that
the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban
on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed
that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of
legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.[4]

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.[5] On
June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts
would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.[7]

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,[8] which was denied by the IBP in Resolution
No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo,
Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Respondents. This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated
March 4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.[10] Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating
that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the
basis of pleadings and records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on
June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.[12] It is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and
law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.[15] The following elements
distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and
reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.[16]

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition
rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after
claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal
services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the same
advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent are a deliberate
and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment of Marriage
Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution
still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring
prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,[19]
he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving
their marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it
must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would
bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers,
the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same
brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.[21] Publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is
likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of
birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions;
public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature
of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a
lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or
society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents
of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the
profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name,
the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced.
The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates,
firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his
name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics
supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and
3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.

[A.C. No. 4984. April 1, 2003]

7. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG,
DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA CORONACION, and JOSE RABALO, complainants, vs. ATTY. FELINA DASIG,
respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig,[1] an official of the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorneys Oath for
having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.

Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs
Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27,[2] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:

a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs
Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in
Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application
for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...

b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge
of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to
P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED

c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of
Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of
her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition, Respondent
even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full knowledge of the existence of a prior registration

d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-
Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which
was subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her application
for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even
suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for
correction of name.[3]

Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless,
groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently
dismissed.[4]
Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 36[5] of Presidential Decree No.
807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to Borela Tire Supply and Novas Lining Brake & Clutch as evidenced by
the dishonored checks she issued,[6] the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent.[7]

Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against complainant Celedonia R.
Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997.
As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats against the respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 86052, was lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.[8]

Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair
report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify
her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of securing an appointment for herself.[9]

In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on the charges.[10] A copy of said
resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City,
only to be returned to this Court with the notation Unclaimed.[11]

On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be served by registered mail to
respondent at her office address in CHED.

In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office informed the Court that the said
mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed for by one Antonio Molon, an authorized agent of
respondent on August 27, 1999.[12]

On November 22, 2000, we granted complainants motion to refer the complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed respondent to submit her Answer to
the Complaint, failing which she would be considered in default and the case heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed
said order and on January 8, 2002, the Commission directed her anew to file her Answer, but again she failed to comply
with the directive. As a result, the Commission ruled that she had waived her right to file her Comment or Answer to
the Complaint and the case was mainly resolved on the basis of the documents submitted and on record.

In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline stated as follows:

From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in violation of her oath as a government
official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful demands or attempted to extort money from certain people
who had pending applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to act favorably on said
applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the
detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education.

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the maximum
period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar action in the future will be a ground for
disbarment of respondent.

On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full text of which reads as
follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A:; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules; and
considering that respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the
dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) years.[13]
At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED,
may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of filing of the
complaint, was Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards,
CHED.

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.[14] However, if said misconduct as a government
official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the
Bar.[15]

In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services,
CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of
money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her office. The
evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of
the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have
known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of
applications and requests awaiting action by her office.

The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground for
disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorneys Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the
duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[16] Respondents demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending applications or
requests before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such
actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private
practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6[17] of said
Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should
be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant
scrutiny of the public.

Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office are
violative of Rule 1.01[18] of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging
or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02[19] of
the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private
interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or
which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good
moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office
is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and
is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.

For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 1[20] and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal
Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years suspension from membership in
the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her
name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the
Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the respondent, as well as
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992

8. EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,
vs. ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral character, in two
Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present
Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.

It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage,
solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil
Code1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).

The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law studies (began in
l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).

Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he declared that
he was "single." He then passed the examinations but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar
Matter No. 78, claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to
take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law studies,
he became aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).

The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.

Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June 1982. Said "Explanation" carries
Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3
October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his law
studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted having
indicated that he was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have still to
declare my status as single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He
further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the "Explanation," for which
reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.

Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance,
which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was
refraining from pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.

Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent to take
his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.

On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for Respondent's
disbarment based on the following grounds:

a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me assuming that our
marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage institution.

b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his application to take the
bar exam.
c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the Supreme Court;

d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing of the affidavit of desistance and
the conformity to his explanation and later on the comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not
sincere, for he only befriended me to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his
wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court.

Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter addressed to
Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he
was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and considered
her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the
Civil Code, among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the marriage, an affidavit
to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they
were not as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised Complainant not to do anything more so as
not to put her family name "in shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and
there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any court." According to Complainant,
although the letter was unsigned, Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope
(Exh. "8-A-1").

Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant who has been
indulging in fantasy and fabrications.

In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was
void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the marriage and that said parties
shall state the same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have
abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar
examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.

On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with the recommendation that
Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to
substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the various
pleadings he had filed before this Court.

On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and
recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the
status of his marriage is settled.

Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent's lack of good
moral character sufficiently established.

Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross
misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01,
Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for admission to
the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar
Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.

Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not only because of his
pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was void
from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that his marriage
to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional
character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty in connection therewith
has been regularly performed.
Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings submitted in Bar Matter No.
78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.

The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of
which he admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he
denied under oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is only the second
page where his signature appears that he meant to admit and not the averments on the first page which were merely
of Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative Case, he admits and
makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).

Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant (par. 1), in this case,
however, he denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his
signature in the marriage contract.

In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made public so as to allow him to
finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because
it was "not in order from the beginning."

Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its very
tenor coincides with the reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is,
for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.

Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had reconciled with Complainant and
admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which
otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he
again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.

Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing,
he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts
are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them (Chavez
v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the
candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court.

It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People v.
Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As
good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is
bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts
retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until
further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.