Statcon:
Act or progress of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where the
intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the
given case is not explicitly provided in the law.
Interpretation of the constitution:
Nitafan v cir:
- This case is about the taxing of the income of judges, ndi pinayagan,
bawas parin.
The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
adoption of the constitution.
RATIO LEGIS ET ANIMA – which means that in case of ambiguity, the words of the
constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
Filoteo v Sandiganbayan:
- Interpretation of criminal statute
Penal statutes, generally
Penal statutes are those that define crimes, treat of their
nature and provide for their punishment
o Acts of legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violation
Those which impose punishment for an offense committed
against the state, and which the chief executive has the
power to pardon
A statute which decrees the forfeiture in favor of the state of
unexplained wealth acquired by a public official while in
office is criminal in nature
Penal statutes, strictly construed
Penal statutes are strictly construed against the State and
liberally construed in favor of the accused
o Penal statutes cannot be enlarged or extended by
intendment, implication, or any equitable
consideration
o No person should be brought within its terms if he
is not clearly made so by the statute
o No act should be pronounces criminal which is not
clearly made so
Language:
How language of constitution construed
primary source in order to ascertain the constitution is the
LANGUAGE itself
The words that are used are broad because it aims to cover
all contingencies
Words must be understood in their common or ordinary
meaning except when technical terms are employee
o WHY? Because the fundamental law if essentially
a document of the people
Do not construe the constitution in such a way that its
meaning would change
What if the words used have both general and restricted
meaning?
Rule: general prevails over the restricted unless the contrary
is indicated.
JM Tuason & Co. V LTA:
“the intent of the framers of the Constitutional Convention, as
shown not only by the specific provisions allowing the
expropriation of landed estates, but also by the social justice
provision as reflected in our decisions, save possibly Republic vs.
Baylosis, preclude a favorable action on the impassioned plea of
petitioner for a reconsideration of our decision. “
Civil liberties union v executive secretary:
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
issue: whether EO 284, which authorizes a cabinet member,
undersecretary and assistant secretary to hold not more than
two positions in the government and GOCCs and to receive
corresponding compensation therefore, violates Sec. 13, Art.
7 of the 1987 Constitution
court examined the history of the times, the conditions under
which the constitutional provisions was framed and its object

held: before the adoption of the constitutional provision,
“there was a proliferation of newly-created agencies,
instrumentalities and GOCCs created by PDs and other
modes of presidential issuances where Cabinet members,
their deputies or assistants were designated to head or sit as
members of the board with the corresponding salaries,
emoluments, per diems, allowances and other prerequisites
of office
since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987
Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple
government offices or employment in the Government
during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be
read with equal severity
on its face, the language of Sec 13 Art. 7 is prohibitory so
that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment
La Bugal V ramos:
FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995.
Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President
signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with
WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to
100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del
Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary
Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later
repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20,
1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA
between the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on
ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to
exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention
of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration
company - sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of
which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil
Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and
registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated
assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of
Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes
the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving
wither technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate
recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with
the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of
the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia
which provides for the protection of Australian investments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is
unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to
exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and
WMCP is a ―service contract‖ that permits fully foreign owned
companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
HELD:
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for
permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural
resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian
Doctrine which states that ―All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State.‖ The same section also states that, ―the exploration and
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973
Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases
for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural
resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the
public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed
under the 1987 Constitution.

Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity
investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within
a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the
concessionaire over the country‘s natural resource, for it is given exclusive
and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of
extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management
or other forms of assistance‖ in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution
now allows only ―technical and financial assistance.‖ The management
and the operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the
primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters
of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is
an exception to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources
is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be
construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA
7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts.
Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and technical
agreements‖ in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent
provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant
beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental
law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign
contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor
in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate
all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed
beneficial ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these
contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a
circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization
requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation,
development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as
conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other
as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if
some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent,
conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned
corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to
the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
Rules of construction:
Rules of construction, generally
Rules of statutory construction are tools used to ascertain
legislative intent.
NOT rules of law but mere axioms of experience
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to know the
rules of statutory construction, in case of doubt, be construed
in accordance with the settled principles of interpretation
.
Legislature sometimes adopts rules of statutory construction
as part of the provisions of the statute: - see examples page
49-50
Legislature also defines to ascertain the meaning of vague,
broad words/ terms
Sarmiento V mison:
This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by
then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla,
being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law
questioned the appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s
appointment was not submitted to the Commission
on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new
Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then
Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary
payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of
bureaus” as one of those officers needing confirmation by the Commission
on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the
president which require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and
fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison
as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group
hence he does not need to be confirmed by the COA.
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear
provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos
stated in Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that:
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to
the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it.
The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and
expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves.
The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in
accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want
them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whoseappointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads
of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of
contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or without the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission onAppointments? By following
the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would
follow that only thoseappointments to positions expressly stated in the first
group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission
on Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of
constitutional construction. We can refer to historical background as well
as to the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with
more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the framers of the 1987
Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the appointments by
the President, under the second, third and fourth groups, require the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission onAppointments.
Integrated Bar of the phil v Zamora:
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters.[33] That the intent of the Constitution is
exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary
to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional
Commission, to wit:
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII
of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP
Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of
the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature
and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall
have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment
of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy
over the military and the civilian character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may
review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no
such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the
President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the
calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial
law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped
together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without
any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights
the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion
in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and
more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which
involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and
review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary
power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is
totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such
heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there
exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the
Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of
Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not
constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the
operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not
with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted
as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position
to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility
patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Marcelino v cruz:
Marcelino v. Cruz
Sec 15(1) Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution – the maximum
period within which a case or matter shall be decided or
resolved from the date of its submission shall be
 24 months – SC
 12 months – lower collegiate courts
 3 months – all other lower courts
Sec 15(1) Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution – directory
Reasons:
 Statutory provisions which may be thus departed
from with impunity, without affecting the validity
of statutory proceedings, are usually those which
relate to the mode or time of doing that which is
essential to effect the aim and purpose of the
legislature or some incident of the essential act –
thus directory
 Liberal construction – departure from strict
compliance would result in less injury to the
general public than would its strict application
 Courts are not divested of their jurisdiction for
failure to decide a case within the 90-day period
 Only for the guidance of the judges manning our
courts
 Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground
for administrative sanction against the defaulting
judge
A certification to this effect is required
before judges are allowed to draw their
salaries
Co V electoral Tribunal:
“The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in
the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers”
Facts:
 The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and
reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
 The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural
born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes.
 On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second
district of Northern Samar was held.
 Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative
in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners,
Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
 Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative
of the second district of Northern Samar.
 The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent premised on the following grounds:
 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines; and
 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of
Northern Samar.
 The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the
private respondent.
 A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on
November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its
resolution dated February 22, 1989.
 Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
Issue:
 WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.
Ratio:
 The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose
Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te
established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land
which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
 As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a
certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.
 The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan
was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the
year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.
 As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside
community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices.
He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan
met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and,
thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
 The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose
Ong who was born in 1948.
 Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He
decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the
vicissitudes of life in Samar.
 The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable.
As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime,
Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal
affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
 On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared
Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First
Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955
as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his
Oath of Allegiance.
 Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of
Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to
him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old,
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos
insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were
concerned.
 After completing his elementary education, the private
respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to
acquire his secondary and college education.
 Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and
passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities
were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job
in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he
worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.
 In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural
born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in
drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived
 citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly
declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino.
The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural
born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
 The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article
IV read:
 SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the
Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
 SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.
 The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as
applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2,
1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to
correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an
alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen
while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to
elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier
laws, conferred the status of a natural-born
 Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV
of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino
mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.
 To expect the respondent to have formally or in
writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural
and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a
natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old.
 He could not have divined when he came of age
that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him
to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957.
 In 1969, election through a sworn statement
would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had
been a citizen since he was nine years old
 In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise
of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute
a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
 The private respondent did more than merely exercise his
right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
 Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a
naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of
citizenship.
 SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of
stripping respondent’s father of his citizenship after his death. An attack on
a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its
nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine
citizenship to respondent’s father as null and void would run against the
principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION:
Aids to construction, generally
apart from its language courts may refer to the following in
construing the constitution:
1. history
2. proceedings of the convention
3. prior laws and judicial decisions
4. contemporaneous constructions
5. consequences of alternative interpret-tations
these aids are called extraneous aids because though their
effect is not in precise rules their influence describes the
essentials of the process (remember preamble? ganito lang
din yun)
Generally
Where the meaning of a statue is ambiguous, the court is
warranted in availing itself of all illegitimate aids to
construction in order that it can ascertain the true intent of
the statute.
The aids to construction are those found in the printed page
of the statute itself; know as the intrinsic aids, and those
extraneous facts and circumstances outside the printed page,
called extrinsic aids.
Legaspi v. Minister of Finance ( history )
In construing constitutional law, the history must be taken
into consideration because there are certain considerations
rooted in the historical background of the environment at the
time of its adoption
Montejo V comelec ( proceedings of the convention )
Montejo v. COMELEC
Whether the COMELEC has the power to transfer, by
resolution, one or more municipalities from one
congressional district to another district within a province,
pursuant to Sec 2 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution
The Court relied on the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission on “minor adjustments” which refers only to
the instance where a municipality which has been forgotten
(ano ba ‘to…kinalimutan ang municipality) is included in the
enumeration of the composition of the congressional district
and not to the transfer of one municipality from one district
to another, which has been considered a substantive or major
adjustment
Proceedings of the convention
RULE: If the language of the constitutional provision is plain
it is not necessary to resort to extrinsic aids
EXCEPTION: when the intent of the framer doesn’t appear
in the text or it has more than one construction.
Intent of a constitutional convention member doesn’t
necessarily mean it is also the people’s intent
The proceedings of the convention are usually inquired into
because it sheds light into what the framers of the
constitution had in mind at that time. (refers to the debates,
interpretation
Vera v avelino:
ANG HIRAP!!!!!
De castro v judicial and Bar council:
Ayoko ng case na toh lagpas!!
SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS:
Generally, constitutional provisions are self-executing
RULE: constitutional provisions are self executing except
when provisions themselves expressly require legislations to
implement them.
SELF EXECUTING PROVISIONS- provisions which are
complete by themselves and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary legislation.
Just because legislation may supplement and add or prescribe
a penalty does not render such provision ineffective in the
absence of such legislation.
In case of Doubt? Construe such provision as self executing
rather than non-self executing.
Tanada V Angara:
Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question
the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as
Senators via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major
trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new
opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated
with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the
predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by
the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one
that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and
legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution
was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations.
By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered
automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda –
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty
is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality
be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial
relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the
United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right
under the “concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.” What Senate
did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such
exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial
inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a
legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership
should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not
be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as
the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable
forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative
is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the
people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their
free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS:
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
Issue: w/n the sale at public bidding of the majority
ownership of the Manila Hotel a qualified entity can match
the winning bid of a foreigner
Held: resolution depends on whether the issue is self
executing or not. The court ruled that the qualified Filipino
entity must be given preference by granting it the option to
match the winning bid because the provision is self
executing.
Oposa V factora:
A taxpayer’s class suit was initiated by the Philippine Ecological Network,
Inc. (PENI) together with the minors Juan Antonio Oposa et al and their
parents. All were duly represented. They claimed that as taxpayers they
have the right to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resources of the country’s rainforests. They prayed that a judgment be
rendered ordering Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr, his agents,
representatives, and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements, Factoran being the secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?
HELD: Yes, petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of
common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy
ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the
country’s forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through
DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to
a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action.
STARE DECISIS, RED JUDICATA, LAW OF THE CASE:

Stare decisis- when the SC has once
laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
casese where the facts are substantially the same
Villena v sps Chavez:
Stare decisis simply means that a judgment reached in one case should
be applied to successive ones in which the facts are substantially identical,
even though the parties may be different. Like cases ought to be decided
alike.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not
what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if
the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different
Velloso Jr. v ca
-
Agustin v ca:
“law of the case”. This principle is defined as “a term applied to an
established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and
remands the cause to the lower court for further proceedings, the question
there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal.”
De mesa v pepsi cola:
- How does a bill become a law?
Racio dicedendi and obiter dictum:
Racio dicedendi: The legal principle upon which the decision in a specific case
is founded. The ratio decidendi is also known as the rationale for a decision.
Mercado v people:
The substance of the Footnote may not be the ratio decidendi of the case, but it
still constitutes an important part of the decision since it enunciates a
fundamental procedural rule in the conduct of appeals. That this rule is stated in
a Footnote to a decision is of no consequence as it is merely a matter of style.
Villanueva v ca:
As held by the Supreme Court, an obiter dictum lacks force of adjudication. It is
merely an expression of an opinion with no binding force for purposes of res
judicata (City of Manila vs. Entote, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA, 508-509). What is
controlling is the dispositive portion of the subject decision of the Court of
Appeals which denied due course and ordered dismissed the petition of the
movant questioning the Order of this Court granting the Motion to Admit
Informations and admitting the Amended Informations that include the name of
Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. as the private offended party, which in effect upheld
and/or affirmed the questioned Order of this Court admitting the amended
informations.
Obiter dictum – opinion expressed by a court upon some
question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the
case before it; not binding as a precedent
Ledesma v ca:
The statement that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best,
merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is
susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this
case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it
safe from judicial examination.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
3 ways of how a bill becomes a law.
President signs
inaction of president with in 30 days after receipt
vetoed bill is repassed by congress by 2/3 votes of all its
members, each house voting separately.
Enrolled bill doctrine:
Bills passed by congress authenticated by the Speaker and
the Senate President and approved by the President
Importing absolute verity and is binding on the courts
o It carries on its face a solemn assurance that it was
passed by the assembly by the legislative and hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified
executive departments. period. For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is
Courts cannot go behind the enrolled act to discover what required to be paid. Neither a purchase of Caltex products is required.
really happened Entry forms were available upon request at each Caltex station where a
o If only for respect to the legislative and executive sealed can was provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
departments Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails, not only as amongst the
Thus, if there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill mediator publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of
before it was certified by the officer of the assembly and communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex
approved by the Chief Executive, the remedy is by with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for
amendment by enacting a curative legislation not by judicial mailing, in view of sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised
decree. Administrative Code. Such overtures were formalized in a letter to the
Enrolled bill and legislative journals - Conclusive upon the Postmaster General, dated 31 October 1960, in which the Caltex, thru
courts counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify
If there is discrepancy between enrolled bill and journal, its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions
enrolled bill prevails. of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General
Enrico Palomar opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the
provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance.
Differentiate construction and interpretation: Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing a petition for
declaratory relief against the Postmaster General, praying that judgment
Construction be rendered declaring its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be
- process of drawing warranted violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner
conclusions not always the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public.
included in direct expressions, The trial court ruled that the contest does not violate the Postal Code
or determining the application and that the Postmaster General has no right to bar the public
of words to facts in litigation distribution of the contest rules by the mails. The Postmaster General
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Interpretation
- art of finding the true Issue(s):
meaning and sense of any form • Whether construction should be employed in the case.
of words • Whether the contest is a lottery or a gift enterprise that violates the
provisions of the Postal Law.
Definition, purposes, and concept:
Held:
Caltex V palomar:
Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the
Caltex vs. Palomar meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
Caltex v. Palomar application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
GR L-19650, 29 September 1966 (18 SCRA 247) amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided for in the law. In the present case, the prohibitive provisions of
Facts: the Postal Law inescapably require an inquiry into the intended meaning
of the words used therein. This is as much a question of construction or
In 1960, Caltex (Phils) Inc. conceived a promotional scheme “Caltex interpretation as any other. The Court is tasked to look beyond the fair
Hooded Pump Contest” calculated to drum up patronage for its products, exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and
calling for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a pernicious tendencies that the law is seeking to prevent.

“Lottery” extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance,
such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs,
etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a
lottery are: (1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance. “Gift
enterprise,” on the other hand, is commonly applied to a sporting
artifice under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of
inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize. Further,
consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a
sociis, the term under construction should be accorded no other meaning
than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a
consideration, so also must the term “gift enterprise” be so construed.
Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent
to eliminate that element of consideration from the “gift enterprise”
therein included. Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance
does not constitute ‘lottery’, if it is not resorted to as a device to evade
the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the
party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or
stimulated thereby. Thus, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein
contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the
element of consideration. In the present case, there is no requirement in
the rules that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service
be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
participate; for the scheme to be deemed a lottery. Neither is there is a
sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an
inducement to the purchaser for the scheme to be deemed a gift
enterprise. The scheme is merely a gratuitous distribution of property by
chance.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment, without costs.
General v barrameda
Notwithstanding the impressive arguments presented by petitioners, the
crucial issue to determine is the choice of what rule to apply in determining
the start of the one year redemption period, whether from the date of the
auction sale or from that of the registration of the sale with the registry of
deeds. In other words it is whether a literal interpretation of the provision of
Section 31 of Commonwealth Act 459 — that the period of redemption
shall start from the date of the auction sale — shall govern, or whether the
words, "auction sale" shall be considered in their ordinary meaning or in
the same sense that site is used in the texts of Section 26, now 30, of Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, and Section 26 of Act 2938, now Section 20, R.A.
1300 (Charter of PNB). Stated differently, should the word "sale" used in
the above indicated provisions of the Rules of Court and the PNB Charter,
under whichWe ruled that the redemption period shall start from the
registration of the sale in the registry of deeds be applied to foreclosure
sales for the DBP and give to the words auction sale" in its charter the
same meaning of "sale" as used in connection with registered land?
We are of the view that a correct solution to the foregoing issue must entail
not merely trying to determine the meaning of the words auction sale" and
"sale" in different legislative enactments, but, more importantly, a
determination of the legislative intent which is quite a task to achieve as it
depends more on a determination of the purpose and objective of the law
in giving mortgagors a period of redemptiom of their foreclosed properties.
Mortgagors whose properties are foreclosed and are purchased by the
mortgagee as highest bidder at the auction sale are decidedly at a great
disadvatage because almost invariably mortgagors forfeit their properties
at a great loss as they are purchased at nominal costs by the mortgagee
himself who ordinarily bids in no more than his credit or the balance threof
at the auction sale. That is the reason why the law gives them a chance to
redeem their properties within a fixed period. It cannot be denied that in all
foreclosures of mortgages and sale of property pursuan to execution,
whether judicial or extrajudicial in nature, under different legislative
enactments, a public auction sale is a indispensable pre-requisite to the
valid disposal of properties used as collateral for the obligation. So that
whether the legislators in different laws used as collateral for the
obligation. So that whether the legislators in different laws used the term
"sale" or "auction sale" is of no moment, since the presumption is that
when they used those words "sale" and "auction sale" interchangeable in
different laws they really referred to only one act — the sale at public
auction indispensably necessary in the disposition of mortgaged properties
and those levied upon to pay civil obligations of their owners.
Molina V Rafferty
Molina v Rafferty (1918)
Molina v Rafferty
April 4, 1918
Jacinto Molina- Plaintiff-Appellee
Rafferty, Collector of Internal Revenue- Defendant- Appellant
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila
J. Abreu
I. Definition, Concept, and purpose of Statutory Construction
1. Judge Cooley- The underlying principle of all construction is that the
intent of the legislature should be sought in the words employed to
express it, and that when found, it should be made to govern…. If the
words of the law seem to be doubtful import, it may then perhaps become
necessary to look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the
legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what evil, is any, was
meant to be redressed;…
2. And where the law was contemporaneously been put upon it,
this construction, especially if followed for some considerable period, is
entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the
legislative purpose, & is not lightly to be overruled, although it isn’t
conclusive.
II. Facts:
1. The present case was a rehearing granted to the appellee for a trail
court decision on Feb 1, 1918. The petition was granted and oral argument
of the motion was permitted.
2. Jacinto Molina was the owner of various fish ponds in Bulacan. He was
required to pay the merchant’s tax required by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
3. Molina protested that he was an agriculturist and not a merchant and
therefore exempt from the taxes imposed by the Internal Revenue Law
upon the gross sales of merchants.
4. Point of contention- Plaintiff contends that the fish produced by him are
to be regarded as an “agricultural product” within the meaning of the
term used in paragraph (c) of Section 41 of Act No. 2339 (Now section
1460 of the Administrative Code of 1917), enforced when the disputed tax
was levied and that he is exempt from the percentage tax on merchants’
sales established by section 40 of Act No. 2339.
5. Paragraph (c) of Act No. 2339 sec. 41 reads:
In computing the tax above imposed transactions in the following
commodities shall be excluded:
(c) Agricultural products when sold by the producer or owner of the land
where grown, whether in their original state or not
6. In the Trial Court, the Honorable Jose Abreu in a carefully prepared
decision ordered defendant to refund the P71.81 paid by plaintiff as
internal-revenue taxes and penalties under protest, with legal interest
thereon from November 26, 1915, the date of such payment under protest.
III. Issue:
1. WON fish produced as were those upon which the tax in question was
levied are an agricultural product
IV Decision:
Decision set aside. Judgment of lower court affirmed.
IV. Ruling:
1. Purpose of legislative in establishing the exemption –
exempting agricultural products from the tax the farming industry would be
favored and the development of the resources of the country encouraged.
2. As a consequence, it is fairly to be inferred from the statute that the
object and purpose of the Legislature was to levy the tax in question
(merchant’s tax) upon all persons engaged in making a profit upon goods
produced by others but to exempt from the tax all persons directly
producing goods from the land. Products were grouped under “agricultural
products”.
3. It is also the public interest to encourage the artificial propagation
of food. However, if the artificial production of fish is held not to be
included within the exemption of the statute this conclusion must be based
upon the inadequacy of the language used by the Legislature to express
its purpose, rather than the assumption that it was actually intended to
exclude producers of artificially grown fish from the benefits conferred
upon producers of other substances brought into the store of national
wealth by the arts of husbandry and animal industry.
4. Court held that the ponds where the fish were grown is agricultural land
within the definitions set by the Acts of Congress, the Philippine
Commission, and the Mapa vs. Insular Gov’t case.
5. With regard to the question that that the fish artificially grown and fed in
a confined area areagricultural products and therefore exempt, the Court
looked deeper. It said that a man might cultivate the surface of a tract of
land patented to him under the mining law, but the products of such soil
would not for that reason be any the less "agricultural products."
Conversely, the admission that the land upon which these fishponds are
constructed is not to be classified as mineral or forest land, does not lead
of necessity to the conclusion that everything produced upon them is for
that reason alone to be deemed an "agricultural product" within the
meaning of the statute under consideration.
3. Courts and lexicographers are in accord in holding that the
term agricultural products is not limited in its meaning to vegetable growth
but includes everything which serves to satisfy human needs which is
grown upon the land, whether it pertains to the vegetable kingdom or to
the animal kingdom.
4. Purpose of agriculture – obtain from the land the products to which it is
best adapted and through it will yield the greatest return upon the
expenditure of a given amount of labor and capital. This is similar to the
process of enclosing an area for fish production and one of the diets of the
products are marine plants rooted at the bottom of the pond.
5. Another distinction was made between fishermen and the people
artificially growing fish in ponds so as to delineate the scope of the
occupation tax. Fishermen were made liable to the occupation tax. The
ones growing fish in ponds were not included.
5. As the present case related to US vs Laxa, the court held that Laxa
wasn’t controlling due to evidence that the fish subsisted solely upon free
floating algae in Laxa while in Molina, the fish subsisted through plants
which grow from roots which attach themselves to the bottom of the pond,
thereby making Molina’s fish in the real sense a product of the land!
Dissent:
J. Malcolm:
1. illustrates how on the same facts, same law, and the same authorities,
judges can arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions
2. Take the Facts where distinction of marine plants rooted to soil of ponds
and floating algae make a small difference, or
3. Take the Laws the small difference in the meaning of “agricultural
products” needs to be ascertained. Primary duty of the court is to ascertain
legislative intention. The decision of the majority on reconsideration in a
laudable endeavor would make this the purpose of the law and would
follow this idea consistently to the end.
On the other hand, the original decision would start with the same
presumption but finding that to so construe the law would result in judicial
amendment must then necessarily reach a different result; if the
Legislature had intended to exempt all classes of domestic products which
would include fish, it would undoubtedly have done so in plain language.
4. When it came to the Authorities with regard to the limits of the term
“agricultural products”, another court could very well instead of prolonging
the examples ad infinitum merely judicially repeal the word agricultural and
include everything which would fall under the word products.
Suffice it to say that the argument on motion for reconsideration and the
decision of the majority have failed to convince me that fish — or to
accede to the critical suggestion of the majority — that fish produced as
were those upon which the tax in question was levied, are an agricultural
product. The administrative ruling of the Attorney-General, the decision of
this court in United States vs. Laxa and the original decision in the instant
case should not be overturned by granting this motion.
Disposition: Judgment of the lower court affirmed
Definitions:
Agriculture – science and art of the production of plants and animal useful
to man
Product – anything that is produced whether as the result of generation,
growth , labor or thought. Grow – raise, cultivate
Agricultural products – included animals which derived their sustenance
from vegetable growths and are therefore indirectly the product of the land
Power to construe: limitations
Endencia v david
FACTS:
Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges
Endencio and Jugo’s salaries. A case was filed. However, upon construing Article
VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial officers are exempt from
paying tax from their salaries and thus considered that the deduction of salaries
from the said judges as a violation from the compensation received by judicial
officers.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
RULING:
No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes
in judicial officers is considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII
Sec 9 of the Constitution. The compensation shall not be diminished during their
continuance of their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary received
by any public officer of the republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This
specific part of RA 590 is in contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has
provided.
Categories.
Endencia v David
Explains why legislative cannot overrule Supreme Court’s
Decision
Angara V electoral commission:
Angara vs. Electoral Commission Digested
Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION
FACTS:
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the
respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor
were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly
for the first district of Tayabas.
On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as
member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took
his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in
effect, fixed the last date to file election protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion
of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua
be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the
election of said position be nullified.
On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6)
stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended
that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon
the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested
elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has
no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon
the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
RULING:
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving
as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the
National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the
other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with,
when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not
follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of
the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority
under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies
of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary
in justiciable and appropriate cases.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."
The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an independent and
impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that
power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction
upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.
Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for
the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged
also in the Electoral Commission.
It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the
first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for
the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly
passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not
yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been
organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of
confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time
the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature,
confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving
the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional
power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the
filing of said election protests.
The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest
filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National
Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing
protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such
time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is
hereby denied, with cost against the petitioner.
Generally
Where the meaning of a statue is ambiguous, the court is
warranted in availing itself of all illegitimate aids to
construction in order that it can ascertain the true intent of
the statute.
The aids to construction are those found in the printed page
of the statute itself; know as the intrinsic aids, and those
extraneous facts and circumstances outside the printed page,
called extrinsic aids.
Title
It is used as an aid, in case of doubt in its language to its
construction and to ascertaining legislative will.
If the meaning of the statute is obscure, courts may resort to
the title to clear the obscurity.
The title may indicate the legislative intent to extend or
restrict the scope of law, and a statute couched in a language
of doubtful import will be constructed to conform to the
legislative intent as disclosed in its title.
Resorted as an aid where there is doubt as to the meaning of
the law or as to the intention of the legislature in enacting it,
and not otherwise.
Serve as a guide to ascertaining legislative intent carries
more weight in this jurisdiction because of the constitutional
requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject
who shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The constitutional injunction makes the title an indispensable
part of a statute.
Ebarle v sucaldito
Statute: EO 265 outlines the procedure which complainants
charging government officials and employees with
commission of irregularities should be guided, applies to
criminal actions or complaints.
EO 265 – “complaints against public officials and employees
shall be promptly acted upon and disposed of by the officials
or authorities concerned in accordance with pertinent laws
and regulations so that the erring officials and employees can
be soonest removed or otherwise disciplines and the
innocent, exonerated or vindicated in like manner, and to the
end also that other remedies, including court action, may be
pursued forthwith by the interested parties, after
administrative remedies shall have been exhausted”
Held: executive order does not apply to criminal actions.
The term is closely overshadowed by the qualification -
“After administrative remedies shall have been exhausted,”
which suggest civil suits subject to previous administrative
actions.
Peo v. Purisima
The language of the a statute which penalizes the mere
carrying outside of residence of bladed weapons, i.e., a knife
or bolo, not in connection with one’s work or occupation,
with a very heavy penalty ranging from 5-10 years of
imprisonment, has been narrowed and strictly construed as to
include, as an additional element of the crime, the carrying of
the weapon in furtherance of rebellion, insurrection or
subversion, such being the evil sought to be remedied or
prevented by the statute as disclosed in its preamble
CIR v TMX
Facts: TMX Sales Inc. filed its quarterly income tax for the 1st quarter of
1981. It declared P571,174.31 and paying an income tax of P247,019 on
May 13, 1981. However, during the subsequent quarters, TMX suffered
losses. On April 15, 1982, when TMX filed its Annual Income Tax Return
for the year ended in December 31, 1981, it declared a net loss of
P6,156,525. On July 9, 1982, TMX filed with the Appellate Division of BIR
for refund in the amount of P247,010 representing overpaid income tax.
His claim was not acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
On May 14, 1984, TMX Sales filed a petition for review before the Court of
Tax Appeals against CIR, praying that the CIR be ordered to refund to
TMX the amount of P247,010. The CIR averred that TMX is already barred
for claiming the refund since more than 2 years has elapsed between the
payment (May 15, 1981) and the filing of the claim in court (March 14,
1984). The Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition
of TMX Sales and ordered CIR to refund the amount mentioned. Hence,
this appeal of CIR.
Issue: Whether or not TMX Sales Inc. is entitled to a refund considering
that two years gas already elapsed since the payment of the tax
Held: Yes. Petition denied.
Ratio: Sec. 292, par. 2 of the National Internal Revenue Code stated that
“in any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after the expiration
of two years from the date of the payment of the tax or penalty regardless
of any supervening cause that may arise after payment.” This should be
interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code. The most
reasonable and logical application of the law would be to compute the 2-
year prescriptive period at the time of the filing of the Final Adjustment
Return or the Annual Income Tax Return, where it can finally be
ascertained if the tax payer has still to pay additional income tax or if he is
entitled to a refund of overpaid income tax. Since TMX filed the suit on
March 14, 1984, it is within the 2-year prescriptive period starting from
April 15, 1982 when they filed their Annual Income Tax Return.
StatCon maxim: The intention of the legislature must be ascertained from
the whole text of the law and every part of the act is taken into view.
People v subido
People v. Subido G.R. No. L-21734. September 5, 1975
Facts: The CFI found Subido guilty of liber. Therefore, he was sentenced of
3 months of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, pay the
fine of P500.00, indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, of
P10,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the costs. However, the Court of Appeals modified the judgment by
removing the penalty of arresto mayor, reducing the indemnity amount
from P10,000 to P5,000 and mentioned nothing of the subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. As a result, Subido filed with the trial
court to recognize the decision of the Court of Appeals and to cancel his
appeal bond.
Issue: Whether or not, the accused-appellant can be required to serve the
fine and indemnity prescribed in the judgment of the Court of Appeals in
form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency?
Held: Yes
Ratio: The use of a comma (,) in the part of the sentence is to make “the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency” refer not only to non-
payment of the indemnity, but also to non-payment of the fine.
People v Subido
FACTS:Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with
vagrancy.Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court has
nojurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case without prejudice to the re-
filingthereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16
years oldsup to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of
PD 603 or theChild and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as
those over 9years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the
offense.
ISSUE:W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from
theregular courts to the Juvenile Court.
HELD:The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a
specialand limited jurisdiction over criminal cases wherein the accused is under
16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case. The subsequent issuance of PD
603 knownas the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as
one who isover 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the
offense did not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases
involving accused whoare 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to
the Juvenile Court.
Hidalgo v hidalgo
- not yet
Legislative History:
Songkiat Chocolate Factory v Central Bank
Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank of the Philippines G.R. No. L-8888
November 29, 1957
Facts of the case:
On January 1953 to October 1953, Song Kiat Chocolate Factory imported
sun dried cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17%
totalling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from the said tax under section
2 of the R.A. No. 601, it sued Central Bank that had enacted payment, and
in its amended complaint it included the Treasurer of the Philippines.
Sec. 2 of the aforesaid Act provides that “the tax collected or foreign
exchange used for the payment of costs transportation and/or other
charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of rice, flour, soya
beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup... shall be refunded to any importer
making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual
importation...”
In support of contention, appellant quotes from dictionaries and
encyclopedias interchangeably using the words “chocolate”, “cacao”, and
“cocoa”; however the legal exemption refers to “chocolate”... not the bean,
nor the nut nor the tree. Cocoa beans however, do not become chocolate
unless and until they have undergone the manufacturing processes above
described.
Issue
Whether or not cocoa beans may be considered as chocolate for the
purposes of exemption from foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act
No. 601 as amended.
Ruling
Strict construction of statutes apply in exemption on taxations.
Principles of strict construction of statutes apply in exemption on
taxations. Hence, the exemption for chocolate in the above section 2 does
not include “cocoa beans”. The one is raw material, the other
manufactured consumer product; the latter is ready for human
consumption, the former is not.
Enrolled bill vs. Journal, Committee Hearings. Enrolled bill
prevails.
Despite the committee hearing regarding Republic Act 1197 amending sec.
2 substituting cocoa beans for chocolate; Courts, however do not give
decisive weight to one legislator’s opinion expressed in Congressional
debates concerning application of existing laws. Moreover, in approving
Republic Act 1197, Congress agreed to exempt cocoa beans instead of
chocolate.
Prospectivity of laws.
Despite the proclamation no. 62 on September 1954 specifying that
exemption of cocoa beans from foreign exchange tax shall operate from
and after the date only, it is also a general rule that statutes operate
prospectively.
Buenaseda v flavier:
Buenaseda vs. Flavier G.R. No. 106719 (226 SCRA 649, 21 September
1993)
0
Written on 10:42 PM by Jan
Ponente: Quiason, J.
Petitioners: Dra. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Lt. Col. Isabelo Banez, Jr.,Engr.
Conrado Rey Matias, Ms. Cora S. Solis, and Ms. Enya N. Lopez
Respondents: Secretary Juan Flavier, Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez,
and NCMH
Nurses Association, represented by Raouilito Gayutin
PETITION for certiorari to nullify the order of the Ombudsman
This petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated 7 January
1992, issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, directing the
preventive suspension of petitioners without the opportunity to controvert
the charges filed against them.
It also seeks to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de
Villa – Rosero of the office of the Ombudsman, from participation in the
preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioners for manifest
partiality and bias.
FACTS
On September 10, 1992, this court required respondents’ to Comment on
the petition and thereafter, received a “Supplemental Petition and an
Urgent Supplemental Manifestation” from petitioners dated September 14
and 22, 1992. On the same day of September 22, 1992, the court
“Resolved to REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN STATUS QUO
pending filing of comments on the original supplemental manifestation”.
On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent
Secretary of Health to comply with the Resolution dated September 22,
1992 and in a Resolution dated October 1, 1992, this Court required
respondent Secretary of Health to comment on the said motion.
On September 29, 1992, respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted
its Comment on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent
Supplemental Manifestation in a pleading entitled “Omnibus Submission”.
Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of
petitioners in contempt and to disbar them.
On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a “Manifestation and Supplement
to ‘Motion to Direct Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with the 22
September 1992 Resolution’ “ and on November 13, 1992, the Solicitor
General submitted its Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that
xxx (b) the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September 22,
1992 is to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners’ preventive
suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant
petition; xxx.
This court, in the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, required
respondent Secretary to comply with the said status quo order stating that:
“ xxx the last peaceable uncontested status xxx was the situation xxx
wherein petitioners were then actually occupying their respective positions,
the Court hereby ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform the
duties of their respective positions xxx, and that respondents and/or any
and all persons acting under their authority desist and refrain from
performing any act xxx until further orders from the Court.”
ISSUE
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government
officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the
Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints
filed against said officials and employees.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 – Preventive Suspension
The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment
the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charges against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect
in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the status quo ordered to
be maintained in the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and
SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
RATIO DECIDENDI
The court held that Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 grants the Ombudsman
power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing
administrative charges before him, and that the status in question is
procedural. In contrast to penal statutes, which are strictly construed,
procedural statutes are liberally construed.
As to the preventive suspension, it is imposed as an aid in the
investigation of the administrative charges. Under the Constitution, the
ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate
official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees.
And in order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend
such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation where the
need to suspend the respondents may arise to conduct such investigation
in an expeditious and efficient manner.
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers, as
he may need to perform efficiently the task committed to him by the
Constitution. As such, said statute, particularly its provisions, should be
given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of
the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the
Ombudsman should be avoided.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should
be liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives
for which it was created.
Further, as it can be inferred from the Ombudsman Law, the Congress
intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials
and employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of the
whether they are employed “in his office” or in other offices of the
government. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed
with the Ombudsman, the respondent is deemed to be “in his authority”
and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent should be
placed under preventive suspension.
In the claim that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting o lack of jurisdiction when he issued the suspension order
without affording petitioners the opportunity to confront the charges
against them, the order for preventive suspension is validly issued even
without a full-blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence. In the
case at bench, the Ombudsman issued the order only after: (a) petitioners
had filed their answer to the administrative complaint and the “Motion for
the Preventive Suspension” of petitioners; (b) private respondent had filed
a reply to the answer of petitioners, specifying 23cases f harassment by
petitioners of the members of private respondent; and, (c) a preliminary
conference wherein the complaint and the respondents in the
administrative case agreed to submit their list of witnesses and
documentary evidence.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Director Raul Arnaw and
Investigator Amy de Villa – Rosero acted with manifest partiality and bias
in recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be said that
the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion in acting
favorably on their recommendation.
The motion for Contempt which charges the lawyers of petitioners with
unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing their clients to openly defy and
disobey the preventive suspension as ordered by he Ombudsman and the
Secretary of Health cannot prosper. The motion should be filed, as in fact
such a motion was field, with the Ombudsman. The court find the acts
alleged to constitute indirect contempt were legitimate measures taken by
said lawyers to question the validity and propriety of the preventive
suspension of their clients.
However, the court take cognizance of the intemperate language used by
the counsel for private respondents hurled against petitioners and their
counsel. A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client’s
cause. The use of abusive language by counsel against the opposing
counsel constitutes disrespect to dignity of the court of justice.
As to the Motion for Disbarment, it has no place in the instant special civic
action which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion
for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and
quasi-judicial officers.
CONCURRING OPINION: BELLOSILLO, J.
I agree as to the authority of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend any
government official or employee administratively charged before him
pending the investigation of the complaint to avoid prejudice in
respondent’s continued stay in the prosecution of the case.
But in the case at bar, the facts that were presented were not adequate to
reasonably place the petitioners under preventive suspension. It is also
important to determine whether it is necessary to issue the preventive
suspension under the circumstances. I do not see any sufficient basis to
justify the preventive suspension.
I would be amenable to holding oral argument to hear the parties if only to
have enough factual and legal bases to justify the preventive suspension
of petitioners. The court may be suspending key government officials and
employees on the basis of mere speculation, which may not serve the
ends of justice but would deprive them of their right to due process.
Petition dismissed.
Contemporary Construction:
Generally
Are the constructions placed upon statutes at the time of, or
after their enactment by the executive, legislative or judicial
authorities, as well as by those who involve in the process of
legislation are knowledgeable of the intent and purpose of
the law.
.
Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. CA
Reasons for why interpretation of an administrative agency
is generally accorded great respect
- Emergence of multifarious needs of a modernizing
Society
- Also relates to experience and growth of
specialized capabilities by the administrative
agency
- They have the competence, expertness, experience
and informed judgment, and the fact that they
frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret
Adasa vs. Abalos
Facts: Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged in the complaints-affidavits that
petitioner Bernadette Adasa, through deceit, received and encashed two checks
issued in the name of respondent without respondent’s knowledge and consent
and that despite repeated demands by the latter, petitioner failed and refused to
pay the proceeds of the checks. A resolution was issued by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iligan City finding probable cause against petitioner and ordering
the filing of two separate Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of
Commercial Document by a Private Individual, under Article 315 in relation to
Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City,
petitioner later filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ. In a Resolution, the
DOJ reversed and set aside the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Iligan City and directed the said office to withdraw the Information for Estafa
against petitioner. The said DOJ resolution prompted the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iligan City to file a Motion to Withdraw Information.
Respondent Abalos thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution
of the DOJ arguing that the DOJ should have dismissed outright the petition for
review since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates that when an accused has
already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a petition for review before
the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the
petition, or even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright. Respondent
claimed Section 12 thereof mentions arraignment as one of the grounds for the
dismissal of the petition for review before the DOJ.
In another resolution, the DOJ denied the Motion for Reconsideration opining that
under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary
of Justice is not precluded from entertaining any appeal taken to him even where
the accused has already been arraigned in court. This is due to the permissive
language “may” utilized in Section 12 whereby the Secretary has the discretion to
entertain an appealed resolution notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been
arraigned.
Issue: Is the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of Department Circular No.
70 permissive and directory such that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an
appeal despite the fact that the accused had been arraigned?
Held: No. When an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give
the appeal or petition for review due course and must dismiss the same. If the
intent of Department Circular No. 70 were to give the Secretary of Justice a
discretionary power to dismiss or to entertain a petition for review despite its
being out rightly dismissible, such as when the accused has already been
arraigned, or where the crime the accused is being charged with has already
prescribed, or there is no reversible error that has been committed, or that there are
legal or factual grounds warranting dismissal, the result would not only be
incongruous but also irrational and even unjust. For then, the action of the
Secretary of Justice of giving due course to the petition would serve no purpose
and would only allow a great waste of time. Moreover, to give the second
sentence of Section 12 in relation to its paragraph (e) a directory application
would not only subvert the avowed objectives of the Circular, that is, for the
expeditious and efficient administration of justice, but would also render its other
mandatory provisions – Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory.