Liang vs.

Peole

FACTS: Petitioner Jeffrey Liang, an economist working with the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) , was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong with two counts of grave oral
defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against a fellow ADB worker. Liang was
arrested but later released. The next day, the judge received an "office of protocol" from the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that Liang is covered by immunity from legal
process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government.
Based on the said protocol communication, the judge, without notice to the prosecution,
dismissed the two criminal cases. The RTC set aside the MeTC ruling and ordered the latter
court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. Liang appealed arguing that he is covered
by immunity under the Agreement.

ISSUES:

1. Was the judge correct in dismissing the cases on the basis the protocol communication
without notice to the prosecution?

2. Is Liang covered with immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government?

HELD:

1. No. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered
by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the
DFA's advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the
prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is
a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity
petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary
basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled that the
mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.

2. No.

Under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
a.)....... immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official
capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity."
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was
done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case falls within
the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut
the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence,
should it so desire.

Likewise, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad
faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

Moreover, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming
petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the
case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic
agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. As already mentioned above, the
commission of a crime is not part of official duty. (Liang vs People, G.R. No. 125865, January
28, 2000)

Caleon v. Agus Development Corp. (G.R. No. 77365.

April 7, 1992)
18AUG
FACTS:
Agus Development Corporation leased to Rita Caleon its lot for P180.00/month. Caleon built a 4-door apartment and
sub-leased it at P350.00/door/month without Agus’ consent. Agus’ filed an ejectment suit under Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 25 after Caleon refused to vacate the lot. Caleon argued that B.P. Blg. 25 cannot be applied because
there is a perfected contract of lease without any express prohibition on subleasing. The MTC ruled in favor of Agus.
It was appealed to the RTC but was dismissed outright. Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not B.P. Blg. 25 is unconstitutional for being violative of “non-impairment clause” on the ground that it
impaired the lease contract.

HELD:
No. B.P. Blg. 25 is valid and constitutional. The lease contract is subordinate to the police power of the state. Petition
is denied.

RATIO:
B.P. Blg. 25 is derived from P.D. No. 20 which has been declared by the Supreme Court as police power legislation
so that the applicability thereof to existing contracts cannot be denied. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of police power of the state in the interest of public
health, safety, morals and general welfare. In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess
authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interest may
modify or abrogate contracts already in effect.

Paje v. Casino et al.

Posted on October 27, 2016

(Remedial law: Appeal; Environmental Law: Writ of Kalikasan)

G.R. No. 207257 February 3, 2015

HON. RAMON JESUS PAJE, in his capacity as DENR Secretary v. Hon.

Teodoro Casino, et al.

Facts

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an Environmental

Compliance Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to
be implemented by RP Energy.

Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of
Kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary
on the ground that actual environmental damage will occur if the power plant project
is implemented and that the respondents failed to comply with certain laws and rules
governing or relating to the issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated
the ECC. Both the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in
invalidating the ECC and its amendments, arguing that the determination of the
validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for a
Writ of kalikasan; while the latter claim that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.

Issues
 1. Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of
a writ of Kalikasan; and
2. Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan

Ruling

1. Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a
writ of Kalikasan because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section
16 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases)allow the parties to
raise, on appeal, questions of fact— and, thus, constitutes an exception to
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court— because of the extraordinary nature of the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.
2. Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because
such writ is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves
environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial
boundaries.

A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in
the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or
irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable
connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the
actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition
should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with due
regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even
attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of
the perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.