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Loving V Virginia

Facts:

The state of Virginia enacted laws making it a felony for a white person to intermarry with a black person
or a black person to intermarry with a white person. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that
the statutes served the legitimate state purpose of preserving the “racial integrity” of its citizens. The State
argued that because its miscegenation statutes punished both white and black participants in an interracial
marriage equally, they cannot be said to constitute invidious discrimination based on race and, therefore,
the statutes commanded mere rational basis review.

Issue:

WON the Virginia miscegenation statutes constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause and due process
clause of the 14th amendment.

Ruling:

The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very
existence and survival. Decisions of the SC and CA of Virginia are reversed.

Republic of the Philippines V Cagandahan

Facts:

Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and
her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female
characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition,
Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan
genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of
the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

Issue:

WON Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the
Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made
use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks
of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for considering
him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the respondent’s
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person.
The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in
the light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.

Pugeda V Trias

Facts: Movants argued that, (1) the lots purchased by Miguel Trias under the operation of the Friar
Lands Act which at the time of his death were not yet fully paid and were subsequently transferred
in the name of the widow who paid the balance out of the proceeds of the fruits of said lands and
thereafter the title was issued in her name, belong to her as her exclusive paraphernal property
not conjugal; (2) that the decision of the trial court was set aside by the Court of Appeals; and
(3) that the lots were never partitioned as conjugal assets of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C.
Ferrer. Movants cited the case of Arayata vs. Joya, et al., 51 Phil. 654. The Supreme Court denied
the motion and declared the decision as final.

Ruling:
Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot of the Friar Lands, said lot ipso
facto forms part of the conjugal properties of the husband and wife and this status remains
unaltered even after his death and the subsequent transfer of the land in the name of the widow
or by the setting aside of the trial court's decision holding said property as conjugal by the Court
of Appeals based on newly discovered evidence. The doctrine in the Arayata vs. Joya, et al. case
refers to the superior right of the widow recognized in Section 16 of Act 1120 (Friar Lands Act)
over transfers made by the husband without the approval of the Director of Lands; hence, not
applicable in the instant case. Adjudication may be made pro indiviso in a project of partition
without the need of actual division or partition of the properties among the heirs.

Republic V Orbecido

Facts:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly,
respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife
sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with
the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article
26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen
who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under
Philippine law.