78. People v.

Canton
G.R. No. 148825 December 27, 2002

FACTS:

Appellant Susan Canton was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, under an Information whose accusatory portion reads as follows:

That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has in her possession NINE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT
TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the
corresponding prescription or license.

Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN imputing to the trial court the following errors: (1) in justifying the warrantless
search against her based on the alleged existence of probable cause; (2) in holding that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the
warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the frisker went beyond the limits of the “Terry search”
doctrine; (4) in not ruling that SUSAN was under custodial investigation without counsel; (5) in admitting to the records of the case the
report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, which was not testified on or offered in evidence, and using the same in determining her guilt; (6)
in justifying under the rule on judicial notice its cognizance of the medical report that has not been offered in evidence; and (7) in
applying the ruling in People v. Johnson.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of Susan were violative of
her constitutional rights.

RULING:

No, warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of SUSAN, were not violative of her
constitutional rights. What was done to Susan was a stop and frisk search.
“stop and frisk” situation refers to a case where a police officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. The search was made
pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 which states that “
Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances xxx”.
This is another exemption in warrantless arrest and seizure. After the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which
resulted in the discovery of packages on her body. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable.

Note:

 The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized exceptions established by
jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented
searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.

 The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined only to search for weapons under the Terry search
doctrine.
The Terry search or the stop and frisk situation refers to a case where a police officer approaches a person who is acting
suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection. To assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might
be used to assault him.
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following
condition printed thereon: Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited
materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft, which shall constitute a part
of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.
 This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and shown
in Annex D of her Brief, the afore-quoted provision is stated in the Notice to All Passengers located at the final security checkpoint at the
departure lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. Passengers
are also subject to search for prohibited materials or substances.
In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which resulted in the discovery of packages on her
body. It was too late in the day for her to refuse to be further searched because the discovery of the packages whose contents felt like
rice granules, coupled by her apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement that the packages contained only money, aroused the
suspicion of the frisker that SUSAN was hiding something illegal. It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited
materials or substances. To limit the action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her
home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving them of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search
without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of
society. Thus, the strip search in the ladies room was justified under the circumstances.

79. DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 203335

FACTS OF THE CASE

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of R.A. 10175, known as The Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012 unconstitutional and void. This case holds a handful of petitions seeking the removal of different sections deemed to be infringing
on privacy rights and more.
For this instance, the focus is the creation of the “Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center” which, in the same breath,
promulgates powers and functions to the agents of the said center. “Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its
power when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan
without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.”

“Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices,
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and user’s assets. This definition serves as
the parameters within which CICC should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.”

ISSUE
 W/N The CICC is constitutional for it to operate under delegated powers by Congress

HELD
 YES. “In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1
The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot.103

Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity
plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a
definition of cybersecurity.”

IMPORTANT LAWS/STATUTES/PROVISIONS/SECTIONS
R.A. 10175
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center.– There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center
(CICC), under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned
agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.

Sec. 26. Powers and Functions.– The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time commission of cybercrime
offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT); x x x.

 Art. 1, Sec. 6 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

Sec 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS (PHIL.), INC., and HARRY LYONS, petitioner,

vs.
FELIPE NATIVIDAD, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and LOPE SARREAL, respondents.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha for petitioner.
Claro M. Recto for respondent Lope Sarreal.
No appearance for respondent Judge.

PERFECTO, J.:

On March 24, 1947, Lope Sarreal filed a complaint (amended on April 10, 1947, to include Harry Lyons) seeking a money judgment
against petitioners on three causes of action in the total of P1,256,229.30.

On May 27, 1947, Sarreal filed a motion for the production and inspection of the following documents:

I. Books or Papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc.:

1. Cash Receipts Journal

2. Cash Payments Journal
3. All Individual Ledgers, specially of the following persons or entities

(a) British-American Engineering Corporation

(b) Philippine Refinery
(c) Felipe Buencamino
(d) Luzon Stevedoring
(e) Standard Oil Company of New York
(f) Philippine Exchange Co., Inc.
(g) Manila Laundry Company
(h) Filipino Businessmen's Syndicate
(i) Material Distributors Inc., Wichita, Kansas
(j) Harry Lyons

4. All letters exchanged between Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc., Material Distributors, Inc. of Wichita, Kansas and
Harry Lyons, between October 9, 1946 and March 31, 1947.

5. All cablegrams exchanged between Material Distributors (Phil.), Inc., and Material Distributors, Inc., Wichita,
Kansas, between October 9, 1946 to March 31, 1947.

II. Books and Papers of the defendant Harry Lyons.

1. Letters exchanged between Harry Lyons and Material Distributors, Inc., Wichita, Kansas between September 14,
1946 and March 24, 1947.
2. Cablegrams exchanged between Harry Lyons and Material Distributors, Inc., Wichita, Kansas, between September
14, 1946 and March 24, 1947.
3. Cash Receipts Journal.
4. Cash Payments Journal.

On June 4, 1947, Sarreal filed a supplemental motion for the production and inspection of the originals of Annexes A and B of the
complaint.

On June 12, 1947, petitioner filed a memorandum and opposition to Sarreal's above mentioned original and supplemental motion on
the ground that he failed to show good cause and that the motion were evidently filed for the purpose of fishing evidence.

On July 16, 1947, respondent judge, granting both motions, required petitioners to produce the documents and annexes in question on
July 24, 1947.

On account of the absence in the Philippines of Harry Lyons, petitioner moved, reserving whatever rights they have under the Rules of
Court, to postpone the inspection of the documents and annexes in question and accordingly respondent judge postponed it to August
15, 1947.

On August 13, 1947, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the order of July 16, on the following grounds:

"(a) Article 46 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits the delivery, communication and general examination of the
correspondence of merchants, a substantial right, as well as the petitioners' right to the inviolability of their correspondence as
guaranteed by the Constitution would be violated by the order requiring the production of the following documents:

BOOKS AND PAPERS OF DEFENDANT HARRY LYONS

 (1) Letters exchange between Harry Lyons and Material Distributors, Inc., of Wichita, Kansas, between Sept. 14, 1946 and
March 24,1947;

(2) Cablegrams exchanged between Harry Lyons and Material Distributors, Inc., of Wichita, Kansas, between September 14,
1946 and March 24, 1947.

BOOKS AND PAPERS OF MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS (PHIL.) INC.

(4-5) All letters and cablegrams exchanged between Material Distributors (Phil.), Inc., Material Distributors, Inc., of Wichita,
Kansas, and Harry Lyons between October 9, 1946 and March 31, 1947.

"(b) That the production for the plaintiff's inspection of all the foregoing documents above enumerated, as well as of the
following documents, would constitute a "fishing expedition," not allowed by Rule 21 of the Rules of Court, since their
materiality or probable materiality is not shown by the pleadings of the parties except by movant's bare allegation which are
disputed by your petitioners:

BOOKS AND PAPERS OF MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS (PHIL.) INC.

1-2. Cash Receipts Journal and Cash Payments Journal.

3. All individual Ledgers, specially of the following persons or entities.

(b) Philippine Refinery.

(c) Felipe Buencamino.
(d) Luzon Stevedoring.
(e) Standard Oil Company of New York.
(f) Philippine Exchange Co., Inc.
(g) Manila Laundry Company.

"(c) That plaintiff is not entitled to the production and inspection of the originals of Annexes A and B because his only purpose,
as stated in his supplemental motion, Exhibit D, was to find out if a case of falsification has been made; that the issue between
the parties in this regard is material only to your petitioners' affirmative defense, and if the plaintiff's purpose was as stated in
said supplemental motion, then your petitioners claimed their privilege against self-incrimination. That this letter privilege was
also claimed insofar as the production and inspection of the other documents were concerned by your petitioners in view of
counsel for respondent Lope Sarreal's charge to the Honorable City Fiscal for the City of Manila that your petitioners were
violating our Corporation Law."

On September 27, 1947, respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners impugn the validity of the orders of July 16 and September 27, 1947, as were issued by the respondent judge in excess of
his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of his discretion, and prayed for the annulment or modification of the order of July 16, 1947.

Respondent Sarreal advanced the following reasons to show that the orders complained of were not issued in excess of the trial court's
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion:

(a) The motions of the respondent Lope Sarreal of May 27, 1947 and June 4, 1947 contain allegations of the ultimate fact that
the books and papers mentioned in said motions constitute or contain evidence material to the matters involved in the case
and are in the possession, custody or control of the petitioners herein, and allegation to this effect is adequate showing of
good cause for the production and inspection of the documents mentioned therein, being an allegation in the very words used
in Form 11 of the Appendix Forms of our Rules of Court, and therefore a sufficient compliance with said Rule (Go Tianco vs.
Judge Diaz, G. R. L-7, January 22, 1946, reported in the June 1946 issue of the official Gazette).

(b) Article 46 of the Code of Commerce invoked by the petitioners does not apply to cases of production and inspection of
books and papers belonging to a party to the action in which such production and inspection are sought(Decision of Supreme
Court of Spain of March 30, 1894). At any rate, said Article of the Code of Commerce has been impliedly repealed by Act No.
190, pertinent portions of which are now embodied in our Rules of Court (3 Op. of Atty. Gen., 380).

(c) Neither would the inspection of books and papers of the petitioners amount to a violation of the inviolability of the
correspondence under Sec. 1, No. 5, Article III of the Constitution of the Philippines, considering that the inspection of said
books and papers are sought through proper order of the trial court, and the Constitutional provision invoked by the petitioners
precisely allows inspection of communication and correspondence upon lawful order of the court. Moreover, this provision of
our Constitution creates no new right, being merely a re-enforcement of the Constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures (Sinco, Philippine Government and Political Law, 4th Edition, p. 632), and when
the inspection of such books and papers was allowed "upon lawful order of the court" made through the respondent Judge,
 such inspection cannot be considered as unreasonable although such books and papers are private in character (First
National Bank vs. Hughes, 6 Fed., C 737, 741, appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction in 106 U.S., 523, 27 Law ed., 268, 1
Sup. Ct. Rep. 489; Johnson Steel Street-Rail Co. vs. North Branch Steel Co., 48 Fed., 191; Victor G. Beede Co. vs. Joseph
Bancroft and Sons Co., 98 Fed., 175, affirmed in 52 L. R. A., 734, 45 C. C. A., 354, 106 Fed., 396, where this question was not
involved; Burnham vs. Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226, 74 A. Dec., 676; United States vs. Terminal R. Assoc., 148 Fed., 486; Re
Dunn, 9 Mo. App., 225; Elder and Bogardus, 1 Edm. Sel Cas., 110; Boston and M. R. Co. vs. States [N. H.], 77 Atl., 996;
Hopkinson vs. Burghley, L. R. 2ch., 447; Groker-Wheeler Co. vs. Bullock [C. C.], 134 Fed., 241; Re Bolster, 110 Pac., 547.).

(d) The inspection of the said documents is not for the purpose of "fishing evidence" but with a view to enabling the respondent
Lope Sarreal to designate with the particularity of the subpoena duces tecum to be obtained in connection with trial of the case
on its merits the specific books and papers containing the entry of receipts and payments made by the petitioners, such books
and papers being material to the case in view, among others, of the allegation in the amended complaint that the defendants,
the petitioners herein, had been remitting all or the greater volume of the proceeds from the sales of equipment and materials
of the defendants in Civil Case No. 2059 outside the jurisdiction of the trial court and had been disposing of their properties
with the intention of defrauding their creditors. At any rate, "fishing expedition" is allowed and is precisely contemplated in Rule
21 of our Rules of Court as a weapon of discovery (XXVI Am. Bar. Ass. Jur. No. 1, Jan. 1940, 48; Golden vs. Arcadia Mutual
Casualty Company, D. C. III., 1942, 3 F. R. D., 26; Leach vs. Griff Bros. Coop. Corp., D. C. Miss, 1942 2 F. R. D., 444; Civil
Aeronautics Board of Aeronautics Authority vs. Canadian Colonial Airways, D. C., 1941, 41 F. S., 1006; Quemus Theatre
Co. vs. Warner Bros. Pictures, D. C. N. J., 1940, 35 F. S., 949; United Mercantile Agency vs. Silver Fleet Motor Express, D. C.
Ky., 1941, F. R. D., 709; Walling vs. Richmon Screw Anchor Company, D. C. N. Y., 1943,4 F. R. D., 265; Monarch Liquor
Corp. vs. Schenley Distillers Corp., D. C. N.Y., 1941, 2 F. R. D., 51; Walsh vs. Comm. Mutual Life Insurance Company of
Hartford, Conn. [1939], 26 F. Supp., 556; Olson Transportation Company vs. Socony Vacuum Oil Company, 7 F. R. D., 234).

(e) The originals of Annexes A and B are relevant not only to the case of the defendants but also to that of the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 2059 here involved, in view of the issue of fact raised by the pleadings of the parties as to whether the originals of
Annexes A and B have been falsified by the insertion therein of the names of Gil J. Puyat and Raymond Lehmann after said
Annexes were signed by respondent Lope Sarreal and delivered to the petitioner Harry Lysons, in view of which respondent
Lope Sarreal is entitled to the production and inspection thereof under the provisions of Rule 21 of our Rules of Court.

(f) Even if ocular inspection of said Annexes A and B may reveal falsification thereof by the petitioners amounting to a violation
of the applicable provisions of our Revised Penal Code, the petitioners cannot exempt themselves from the production of said
exhibits for mere inspection and copying, inasmuch as the Constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination has been
extended in specific case only to the production of documents as evidence, and only when the person producing them is made
to take the witness stand and identify them under oath, and not to the production of such documents for mere
inspection (Comm. vs. Southern Express Co., 1914, 160 Ky., 1, 169 SW., 517, annotated cases 1916A, 373, L. R. A., 1915B,
913; U. S. vs. Hughes, 12 Blatchff, 553); the reason being that the Constitutional prohibition is one against compelling a
person to be a "witness against himself", and this has been held to mean testimonial compulsion or extraction of admission
form the person's own lips (4 Wigmore, 865, 2263; Wilson vs. U. S., 55 Law, ed., 776, citing cases).

(g) Moreover, the corporate records sought to be inspected are not covered by the Constitutional prohibition against self-
incrimination, even though such documents may contain evidence tending to subject any or all of the officers of a corporation
to a criminal indictment (Wilson vs. U. S., 221 U. S., 361, 51 Law. ed., 771; Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. vs. Walling, 327 U.
S.,186, 90 Law. ed., 614, 627-629; U. S. vs. Baunch & Lamp Optical Co., 321U. S., 707, 88 Law. ed., 1024, 1037 [1944]; U.
S. vs. White, 88 Law. ed., 1547).

(h) Production and inspection of documents have been allowed and sustained in decided cases, under Orders which were
broader than those here assailed, for the production and inspection of all books of accounts, all memoranda and records,
stocks book, ledger, journal, cash book, bank book, bank deposit slip, check book, voucher, contract, income tax return,
booking record and correspondence (U. S. vs. Duoder, 1 F. R. S., 466, U. S. D. C. June 16, 1939; Orange Country Theater
Corp. vs. League, 1 F. R. S., 448).

(i) The respondent Judge, before issuing the Orders complained of, gave the parties full opportunity, not only to discuss the
question involved by repeated oral arguments but also by written memoranda, and in the exercise of his discretion issued the
Orders complained of only after full consideration of all the questions of fact and law involved.

The production and inspection of documents and books here in question call for the interpretation and application of section 1 of Rule
21, which reads as follows:

SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. — Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon
notice to all other parties, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection
and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and
 manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are
just.

Petitioners contend that in filling his original and supplemental motions, Sarreal has failed to show good cause for the issuance of the
requested order. It appears, however, in the original motion of May 27, 1947, that the books and papers therein mentioned "constitute
or contain the evidence material to the matters involved in the above entitled case."

In the supplemental motion of June 4, 1947, it is alleged that there is direct conflict between the allegations of the complaint and
amended complaint and those of the answer and amended answer as to whether or not the names of Gil J. Puyat and Raymond W.
Lehmann appear in any part of the originals of Annexes A and B of the complaint, and plaintiff Sarreal wanted the production and
inspection of said originals to show that they did not contain the names of Gil J. Puyat and Raymond W. Lehmann, and that if said
names should appear now typed in said Annexes A and B, said additional names must have been typed by direction of Harry Lysons
without the knowledge or consent of Sarreal and after said originals were delivered by Harry Lysons and filed by the latter and that the
changes so introduced are a forgery.

With these allegations in the original and supplemental motions Sarreal has fulfilled the requirements of showing good cause for the
production and inspection of the books and documents in question under Rule 21.

Petitioners contained that the order of the trial judge violated petitioner's constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

We have considered carefully persons advanced by petitioners and memoranda in support of this allegation and we found nothing in
them to show how, without the inspection of Annexes A and B of the complaint, petitioners may incriminate themselves. We have,
therefore, to dismiss such contention.

(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizure shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1. Art. III, Constitution of the Philippines.)

(5) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when public
safety and order require otherwise. (Sec. 1. Art. III, Constitution of the Philippines.)

The orders in question, issued in virtue of the provisions of Rule 21, pertain to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused
with the unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution. But in the erroneous hypothesis that the production and inspection of
books and documents in question is tantamount to a search warrant, the procedure outlined by Rule 21 and followed by respondent
judge place them outside the realm of the prohibited unreasonable searches. There is no question that, upon the pleadings in the case,
Sarreal has an interest in the books and documents in question, that they are material and important to the issues between him and
petitioners, that justice will be better served if all the facts pertinent to the controversy are placed before the trial court.

The constitutional guarantee of privacy of communication and correspondence will not be violated, because the trial court has power
and jurisdiction to issue the order for the production and inspection of the books and documents in question in virtue of the
constitutional guarantee making an express exception in favor of the disclosure of communication and correspondence upon lawful
order of a court of justice.

After a careful consideration of the legal question raised by petitioners, this Court has arrived at the conclusion that the trial judge, in
issuing the order of July 16, 1947, has not exceed his jurisdiction or acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Petition denied with costs against petitioner.

81. CAMARA v. MUNICIPAL COURT (June 5, 1967)

An inspector asked to search Camara’s premises for possible violation of the Housing Code. Camara refused because there was no
warrant. This happened a few more times and he was eventually charged under the Housing Code for refusing to allow the warran tless
inspection. He assails the constitutionality of the law. The Court ruled in his favor because routine inspections are not so urgent that they
need to be effected without a warrant. This would give the agent unbridled discretion, which may be abused. They also noted that in these
types of inspections, probable cause is based on an appraisal of the entire municipal area and not knowledge of the conditions prevalent
in one specific structure.

Facts

An inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Dept. of Public Health entered herein appellant’s apartment
building to do routine annual inspection for possible violations of the Housing Code. The building manager informed the inspector that
appellant had been using the rear of his leasehold as personal residence, which the occupancy permit did not allow.
Inspector confronted appellant and demanded inspection of the premises, which appellant refused for lack of search warrant. Inspector
returned some time later and was again refused. Appellant was then required to appear at the district attorney’s office, for which he didn’t
show. Inspectors again went to his house informing him that he was required to submit to the inspection pursuant to Sec. 503 of the
Housing code:

Authorized employees…, so far as may be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall,…have the right to enter, at reasonable
times, any…premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them by the Municipal Code.

Appellant still refused without a warrant. He was charged with violation of the Code, arrested and released on bail. His demurrer to the
criminal complaint was denied and so this petition for prohibition. Appellant assails the constitutionality of Sec. 503 of the Housing Code
for being violative of the 4th and 14th amendments.

Issues & Ratio

Violative of the 4th amendment

4th amendment: (like Art. III Sec. 2 Bill of Rights)

The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

It is enforceable against the States through the 14th amendment.

General rule: Except in certain carefully defined cases, a search of private property without proper consent is “unreasonable” unless it
has been authorized by a valid search warrant.

Frank v. Maryland (This was the governing doctrine, which the Court, in this case, overturned so it’s landmark):
 Facts: Appellant refused warrantless search of private premises for the purpose of locating and abating a public nuisance. He
was convicted for refusal and the Court upheld it.
 Ratio—justifications for permitting administrative health and safety inspections without warrant:
o Municipal fire, health and housing inspection programs are merely to determine if the premises is complying with the
minimum standards set in municipal ordinances and not to search for “evidence of criminal action”. The 4th amendment
interests at stake here are merely peripheral.
o They are designed to make the least possible demand on the individual occupant
o The warrant process could not function properly in this field—Inspections of entire municipal areas are based on broad
factors such as the area’s age and condition

Here’s where the Court overturns

Under this system, the occupant has no way of knowing what the search is about, what the limits are, and WON the agent is acting upon
proper authorization. He must first question the search and risk a criminal conviction for not allowing it. The practical effect is to give the
official wide discretion in the field.

Fire, housing and sanitation inspections may still be made. What we are disallowing is making them without warrant. There is no evidence
that these types of inspection programs cannot achieve their goals within the standards of the warrant process.

Thus, warrantless searches of these kinds, like the case at bar, are violative of the 4 th amendment.

Need for probable cause

Unlike searches pursuant to criminal investigation, the purpose of these kinds of warrants is citywide compliance with the minimum
physical standards for private property. The governmental interest here is the prevention of conditions, which will become a hazard to
public health and safety.

The only way to implement this is through routine periodic inspections of all structures. Probable cause then is based on an appraisal of
a certain area as a whole. What is required is probable cause arising from knowledge of condition of the district or area, and not
necessarily individual buildings.

When a warrant must be sought

Routine inspections aren’t so urgent as to have to take effect immediately without warrant. Furthermore, citizens usually allow routine
inspections of their premises anyway even without warrant. It is believed that warrants need only be sought when the citizen has refused
the warrantless search, unless there has been citizen complaints or other compelling reasons to effect immediate entry.

Appellant had constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and appellant may not be convicted
for refusing consent to the inspection.

82. Harvey vs Defensor Santiago

GR L-82544
Petitioners: Andrew Harvey, John Sherman, and Adriaan Van Del Elshout

Respondent: Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Commission on Immigration and Deportation

June 28, 1988

 Facts
o Petition for Habeas Corpus filed by
 Harvey, Sherman, and van del Elshout, old foreigners.
o The Arrest
 Petitioners were apprehended by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID)
 They are being charged with pedophilia, and are facing deportation
 When they were apprehended, rolls of photos an negatives of child prostitutes engaged in the sexual act
were seized. They were also found in the company of several young boys.
o The Warrant
 Warrants were issued by respondent Defensor-Santiago (Commissioner of CID) for violation of the
Immigration act, and the Revised Administrative Code
o The Issues : Petitioners questioned the validity on the ff. grounds
 Commissioner has no authority under Immigration Act or Admin Code to arrest and detain petitioners
PENDING DETERMINATION of probable cause
 Respondent violated Sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, since CID agents had no valid warrants of arrest, search and
seizure
 Confidential Information made to CID agents that petitioners were pedos is not a valid ground for arrest
unless they were caught in the act.
 They also allege that it is not a crime to be a pedo (not punishable by any Phil law)
 Held – PETITION DENIED, RESPONDENT ACTS UPHELD
 Ratio
o Rules of Crim Procedure – arrest with warrant may be done
 Person has committed/actually committing an offense in his presence
 When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of the facts
o In this case, probable cause was determined after close surveillance for 3 months.
o This probable cause justified the arrest and the [seizure of the evidence without warrant]
 These articles were incident to a lawful arrest (i.e, andun lang sila when the arrest was made) and thus are
admissible as evidence
o Even if we assume that the arrest was invalid (remember, this is a petition for habeas corpus)
 Naging moot and academic na ang habeas corpus, because they were already charged with violation of a
law (immigration act and admin code)
 Habeas corpus is not granted when the confinement becomes legal, even if it was originally illegal
o “That the petitioners were not caught in the act does not make their arrest illegal.”
 They were caught with young boys in their respective rooms, in one case, they were naked.
 CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners were committing pedophilia
 Even if not punishable under RPC, it is behavior offensive to public morals, and violative of the
State Policy protecting our youth. (Art 2, Sec 13, Consti)
o Please see Ratio for why the Immigration Act section empowering Miriam as Commish of the CID to issue warrants
leading to arrest and deportation is not unconstitutional – essentially, deportation is not a punishment and the
proceedings are administrative and not criminal.