TITLE IX asked for a loan, they still deprived Nagao of liberty to

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND compel him to pay the loan.
SECURITY
2. Court’s Jurisdiction
Kidnapping and Illegal Detention Yes. The crime was committed in various places.
Moreover, in the proceedings of the lower court, the
accused never questioned the jurisdiction of the
PEOPLE V. TOMIO
court.The court also directs the Philippine National
Police to conduct a thoroughinvestigation into the
Facts: Tatsumi Nagao, a Japanese national, came to involvement of the five policemen and should the
Manila. Maida Tomio alias SatoToshio and Mitamura evidencewarrant, file the appropriate criminal and
gave Nagao a pack of cigarettes that the policemen administrative cases against them. Asregards
whosearched him said contained marijuana and Mitamura efforts must be exerted by the Bureau of
proceeded to bring him to jail. Theaccused acted as Immigration andDeportation, in coordination with the
interpreters in jail and told Nagao that the penalty for National Bureau of Investigation, to have
illegalpossession of marijuana is 6 to 12 years himinvestigated and prosecuted, should the evidence
imprisonment but the policemen are willingto accept warrant.
$100,000 in lieu of this. Nagao agreed and accused
told him that they haveadvanced the money to the
PEOPLE V. LIM
police, Nagao was then brought back to his hotel
wherehe was not allowed to leave. He called up his
Facts: Siblings Aida and Evelyn went to the theatre
friend to ask for help and called up hisdad as well who
after their mother failed to arrive at the port. There,
agreed to send 3M yen. While retrieving money from
the bank, thepolice, whose help was asked for by the they were called by appellant and fed them at her
Japanese embassy, brought the accused tothe police house in front of the theatre. After eating, Aida was
told by the accused to take a bath and was given
district for investigation and were charged with
clothes to wear. Aida then served her from July 1 to
kidnapping and seriousillegal detention.The accused
claims that they were guarding Nagao, they claim that 15, 1986 doing chores for Lim. On the same day they
he couldhave left them anytime as they did not arrived, Evelyn was brought to Cebu. On July 15,
when Aida’s father went to the house of the accused,
physically restrain him.
Aida refused to leave. Aida was only taken with the
Issue: help of a PC.
1. WON kidnapping for ransom was committed
Issue: WON the court erred in convicting Lim despite
2. WON court had jurisdiction
the fact that Aida was not detained by appellant?
Held:
Held: Yes, Carmen Lim is acquitted.
1. Kidnapping for ransom was committed
Even granting for the sake of argument that, in
Ratio: There is no kidnapping in this case. The 2
effect, there was created a simple loan
minors voluntarily entered the appellant’s residence
contract between appellants and Mr. Nagao, as
through the front entrance. The fact of detention
asserted by appellant Tomio Maeda, the deprivation
which is essential in the crime charged was not
of the former's liberty until the amount shall have
clearly established. There was no showing that there
been fully "paid" to them, is still kidnapping or
was actual confinement or restrictions of the person of
illegal detention for ransom.
the offended party. The appellant’s residence has a
store fronting the street where many customers come
The accused got Nagao’s passport and his money
and go. The place is busy with a movie house in front.
was taken by the police, he cannot speak Tagalog or
English and had no friends or relatives in the There is no indication that Aida was locked up,
Philippines. Even if he could have left, where would physically restrained of her liberty or unable to
communicate with anyone.
he go without his money and passport? Plus the fact
that Nagao thought he was on a temporary leash by
The actuation of Aida trying to escape is not proved.
the police, which would mean at least 6 years
imprisonment plus the threat of scandal, which would
The fact of detention which is an essential element in
cause him ignominy as he is a Buddhist priest. Even
the kidnapping was not clearly established as there
though he was not physically restrained, he was
was no showing that there was actual confinement or
psychologically restrained.
restriction on the person of the offended party. The
two minors voluntarily entered the appellant's
Accused claims that the money they were asking is
residence and there is no indication that one of the
for is the payment of hotel expenses and to pay them
minors was locked up, physically restrained of her
back for the alleged payment to the police to release
liberty or unable to communicate with anyone.
Nagao. The court did not believe this as the evidence
points to an elaborate plan to kidnap Nagao and ask
for ransom money. Even assuming that they merely
 PEOPLE V. PADICA
Facts: Leon Marajas, Jr., Romeo Padica, Leslie
Gans, Florentino Fabrigas, Romeo Pradez, Leonardo
Marajas and Leopoldo Marajas were originally
charged in the latter part of 1978 with kidnapping for
ransom with murder and illegal possession of firearms
before Military Commission No. 27
However, on January 11, 1979, counsel for accused
Leon Marajas, Jr. prayed for the transfer of the case
to the civil courts.
On August 17, 1981, the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal filed an information for kidnapping for
ransom with murder, before Branch III of the then
Court of First Instance of Pasay City against the
aforementioned accused, but with the exception of
herein appellant whose name was inadvertently not
included therein.
A separate charge for illegal possession of firearms
was lodged before Branch 146 of the Makati Regional
Trial Court but the case was later placed in the
archives some time in 1985.
Accused Romeo Padica and herein appellant were
both arraigned on January 15, 1982 and, with the
assistance of their respective counsel, both pleaded
not guilty. It appears, however, that appellant entered
his plea during the arraignment under the name of
"Leonardo Marajas." 6 Trial thereafter ensued but,
subsequently, the case was reraffled to Branch CXVI,
Pasay City, of the Regional Trial Court where it
remained until the conclusion of the trial in 1990.
However, upon discovery of the omission of herein
appellant's name in the original information, the
prosecution filed a motion for the admission of an
amended information including appellant's name as
one of the accused. The admitted the amended
information. Thereafter, appellant, duly assisted by
counsel, entered a plea of guilty upon being arraigned
on the amended information. On the other hand,
accused Padica was discharged from the information
to be utilized as a state witness.
Appellant contended that the failure of the prosecution
to charge him as an accused in the original
information is a fatal defect.
Issue: WON the failure of the prosecution to include
him in the information is a fatal defect
Held: No. The rule is that the complaint or information
should sufficiently allege the name of the accused,
failing which the complaint or information would be
rendered invalid. The test of sufficiency is laid down in
Section 7, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which
states that a complaint or information must state the
name and surname of the accused or any appellation
or nickname by which he has been or is known, or if
his name cannot be discovered he must be described
under a fictitious name with a statement that his true
name is unknown.
If in the course of the proceeding the true name of the
accused is disclosed by him, or appears in some
other manner to the court, the true name of the
accused shall be inserted in the complaint or
information and record."
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that appellant
was arraigned under the original information and that
he entered thereto a plea of not guilty under the name
of "Leonardo Marajas."
Where the taking of the victim was incidental to the
basic purpose of killing, the crime is only murder and
this is true even if before the killing, the victim was
taken from one place to another. From the acts of the
accused, it cannot be inferred that the latter's purpose
was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their
liberty and the fact alone that ransom money was
demanded did not per se qualify the crime to
kidnapping in the absence of other elements.
PEOPLE V. SILONGAN
Facts: On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander
Saldaña went to Sultan Kudarat with three other men
to meet a certain Macapagal Silongan alias
Commander Lambada. They arrived in the morning
and were able to talk to Macapagal concerning the
gold nuggets that purportedly being sold by the latter.
The business transaction was postponed and
continued in the afternoon due to the death of
Macapagal’s relative and that he has to pick his
brother in Cotabato City. Then at around 8:30 PM, as
they headed to the highway, Macapagal ordered the
driver to stop. Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared.
Alexander and his three companions were ordered to
go out of the vehicle, they were tied up, and
blindfolded. Macapagal and Teddy were also tied and
blindfolded, but nothing more was done to them.
Alexander identified all the abductors including the
brothers of Macapagal. The four victims were taken to
the mountain hideout in Maguindanao. The
kidnappers demanded P15, 000,000 from Alexander’s
wife for his release, but the amount was reduced to
twelve million. The victims were then transferred from
one place to another. They made Alexander write a
letter to his wife for his ransom. But on several
occasions, a person named Mayangkang himself
would write to Alexander’s wife. The two other victims
managed to escape but Alexander was released after
payment of ransom. The trial court convicted
Macapagal and his companions of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention.
Issue:
1. WON it is necessary that there is actual payment
of ransom in the crime of Kidnapping.
2. WON the crime of kidnapping committed by the
accused should be absorbed in rebellion?
Held:
1. Crime of Kidnapping
The prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that the kidnapping was committed “for the
purpose of extorting ransom” from Alexander, as to
warrant the mandatory imposition of the death
penalty. For the crime to be committed, at least one
overt act of demanding ransom must be made. It is
not necessary that there be actual payment of ransom
because what the law requires is merely the existence
of the purpose of demanding ransom. In this case, the
records replete with instances when the kidnappers
demanded ransom from the victim
2. Crime of Kidnapping absorbed in Rebellion
As regards the argument that the crime was politically
motivated and that consequently, the charge should
have been rebellion and not kidnapping, we find the
same likewise to be without merit. As held in Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte vs.
CA, the political motivation for the crime must be
shown in order to justify finding the crime committed
to be rebellion. Merely because it is alleged that
appellants were members of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front or of the Moro National Liberation
Front does not necessarily mean that the crime of
kidnapping was committed in furtherance of a
rebellion. Here, the evidence adduced is insufficient
for a finding that the crime committed was politically
motivated. Neither have the appellants sufficiently
proven their allegation that the present case was filed
against them because they are rebel surrenderees.
This court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-
up with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, it can be
just as easily concocted.
Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor
PEOPLE V. TY
Facts: Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty were charged with
the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor.
On November 1987, Johanna Sombong brought her
seven-month old daughter, Arabella, to Sir John
Medical and Maternity Clinic owned and operated by
the accused-appellants. She could not pay the bills so
she left her daughter there but she was being charged
P50.00 each day. After five years, Sombong came
back to claim her daughter. hen, a criminal case was
filed against accused-appellants and an
administrative case was filed against Dr. Carmen Ty
before the Board of Medicine of PRC
Issue: WON the accused appellants are guilty of
kidnapping and failure to
return a minor?
Held: No, the Court ruled that before a conviction for
kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article
270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two
elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has
been entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b)
the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to
his parents or guardians. The essential element
herein is that the offender is entrusted with the
custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is
not the kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the
article seems to indicate, but rather the deliberate
failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to
restore the latter to his parents or guardians.
The said failure or refusal must not only be deliberate
but must also be persistent as to oblige the parents or
the guardians of the child to seek the aid of the courts
in order to obtain custody. The word deliberate as
used in the article must imply something more than
mere negligence; it must be premeditated, obstinate,
headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and
maliciously wrong. In the case at bar, it is evident that
there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part
of the accused-appellants to restore the custody of
the complainant’s child to her.
What is actually punishable is not the kidnapping of
the minor but rather the deliberate failure or refusal of
the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his
parents or guardians. Said failure or refusal, however,
must not only be deliberate but must also be
persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardians of
the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to
obtain custody.
PEOPLE V. AIDA MARQUEZ
While one of the essential elements of this crime is
that the offender was entrusted with the custody of
the minor, what is actually being punished is not the
kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to
restore the minor to his parents or guardians. It has
been held that “deliberate” must imply something
more than mere negligence – it must be
premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or
intentionally and maliciously wrong. In this case, it
does not matter, for the first element to be present,
how long said custody lasted as it cannot be denied
that Marquez was the one entrusted with the custody
of the minor Justine. Thus, the first element of the
crime is satisfied. Furthermore, Marquez’s deliberate
failure to return Justine, when demanded to do so by
the latter’s mother, shows that the second element is
likewise undoubtedly present in this case
Abandonment of One’s Victim
LAMERA V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: An owner type jeepney, driven by petitioner,
hit a tricycle resulting to the damage of the tricycle,
and physical injuries to the passengers of the said
tricycle. Two informations were filed against
petitioner. First is reckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property and physical injuries under Article
365 of the Revised penal Code and second,
abandonment of one’s victim under Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. The second information was
filed because the petitioner, instead of giving
assistance to the victims, fled and left them. He
invoked his right against double jeopardy saying that
his conviction of reckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property and multiple physical injuries is a
bar for the prosecution to charge him with the crime of
abandonment of one’s victim.
Issue: Whether or not there be a valid charge for
alleged abandonment under Article 275, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides as basis for
prosecution
Held: No. There is no double jeopardy, because
these two offenses are not identical. Reckless
imprudence is a crime falling under the chapter on
criminal negligence, while abandonment of one’s
victim is a crime falling under the chapter on crimes
against security. The former is committed by means
of culpa, while the latter is committed by means of
dolo. Failure to help one’s victim is not an offense by
itself or an element of reckless imprudence. It merely
Increases the penalty by one degree.
Grave Threats
REYES V. PEOPLE
Facts: Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian
employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point,
Cavite City. he led a group of about 20 to 30 persons
in a demonstration staged in front of the main gate of
the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. The
three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front
of Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice
Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at
the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and
his left holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly,
"Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka.
Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita."
Issue: WON in affirming the proceedings in the lower
court allowing the substantial amendment of the
information for grave threats after petitioner had been
arraigned on the original information.
Ruling: After a careful consideration of the original
information, we find that all the elements of the crime
of grave threats as defined in Article 282 1 of the
Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2
were alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender
threatened another person with the infliction upon his
person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a
crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a
condition.
CALUAG V. PEOPLE
Held: In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts
to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by
a condition. Considering the mauling incident which
transpired earlier between petitioner and Julia’s
husband, petitioner’s act of pointing a gun at Julia’s
forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict
serious physical injury on her person which
constituted grave threat.
Grave Coercion
TIMONER V. PEOPLE
Facts: Jose Timoner, the petitioner, was convicted by
the Municipal Court of Daet with the crime of Grave
Coercion, as penalized under Art. 286 of the Revised
Penal Code. Timoner, then mayor, wanted to close
among other structures that were along the sidewalk,
the barbershop of Dayaon and store of Rabustillos.
Timoner filed a complaint in the CFI of Camarines
Norte against Rebustillos and others for judicial
abatement of their stalls, alleged that the stalls
constituted public nuisances as well as per se.
Issue: WON Timoner committed Grave Coercion.
Held: No. He did not commit Grave Coercon as the
elements of Grave Coercion required that he acted
not under the authority of the law. As the then Mayor
of the City, Timoner had the authority to act on behalf
of the recommendation and his constituents’ right to
public order and safety, and that such stalls along the
sidewalk affected the community and general public,
as it is in a public place, and was annoying to all who
come within its sphere.
Grave coercion is committed when "a person who,
without authority of law, shall by means of violence,
prevent another from doing something not prohibited
by law or compel to do something against his will,
either it be right or wrong." In the case at bar, the
Mayor is not guilty of grave coercion as the element
that the restraint made by the Mayor upon
complainant, the owner of the barbershop considered
as a public nuisance, was not made under authority of
law or in the exercise of a lawful right, is absent
LEE V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: The petitioner confronted the complainant
about a forged Midland National Bank Cashier Check
No. 3526794, which the latter allegedly deposited in
the account of Honorio Carpio. During the said
confrontation, the petitioner Francis Lee was shouting
at her with piercing looks and threatened to file
charges against her unless and until she returned all
the money. Accordingly, the complainant was caused
to sign a prepared withdrawal slip, and later, an
affidavit prepared by the bank's lawyer, where she
was made to admit that she had swindled the bank
and had return the money equivalent of the spurious
check.
Issue: WON the acts of petitioner in simply "shouting
at the complainant with piercing looks" and "threats to
file charges against her" are sufficient to convict him
of the crime of grave coercion.
appellants saw fit to introduce as their defense a false
alibi.
Appellants are therefore acquitted of a violation of
article 133 of the Revised Penal Code but found guilty
of a violation of article 287 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Held: No. In the light of the foregoing circumstances,

petitioner's demand that the private respondent return
the proceeds of the check accompanied by a threat to
file criminal charges was not improper. There is
nothing unlawful on the threat to sue. The allegation
that she did so because of petitioner's threats came
from the complainant herself. She has not been able
to present any other witness to buttress her claim.
Coercion did not exist in this case. Consequently, the
petitioner should be acquitted. ACCORDINGLY, the
decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and a
new one hereby entered ACQUITTING the accused
of the crime of grave coercion.

There is nothing unlawful when petitioner demanded

that the private respondent return the proceeds of the
check accompanied by a threat to file criminal
charges. Her lengthy stay in the bank and return of
money was not due to petitioner’s threat but to show
good faith. The most telling proof of the absence of
intimidation was the fact that the complainant refused
to sign the promissory note in spite of the alleged
threats of the petitioner.

Unjust Vexation

PEOPLE V. REYES

Facts: While the pabasa was going on the evening of

April 10, 1933, between 11 and 12 o'clock, the
defendants Procopio Reyes, Policarpio Nacana,
Florentino Clemente, Hermogenes Mallari, Marcelino
Mallari, Castor Alipio, and Rufino Matias arrived at the
place, carrying bolos and crowbars, and started to
construct a barbed wire fence in front of the chapel.
Alfonso Castillo, who was chairman of the committee
in charge of the pabasa, tried to persuade them to
refrain from carrying out their plan, by reminding them
of the fact that it was Holy Week and that it was highly
improper to construct a fence at that time of the
evening. A verbal altercation ensued.

Issue: WON the defendants are guilty of unjust

vexation.

Held: YES. It is urged upon us that the act of building

a fence was innocent and was simply to protect
private property rights. The fact that this argument is a
pretense only is clearly shown by the circumstances
under which the fence was constructed, namely, late
at night and in such a way as to vex and annoy the
parties who had gathered to celebrate the pabasa and
is further shown by the fact that many of the