G.R. No.
L-55509 April 27, 1984 between the attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm,
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of
Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and
LINDA GRIMM, respondents.
N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of
wills and to annul a partition, approved in anintestate proceeding
by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be
entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district
court).
Antecedents. — Edward M. Grimm an American resident of
Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on November 27,
1977. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm
and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and
Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm
Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which
ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B. pp. 36-47, Rollo).
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco,
California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he
described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The
second win disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The
two children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the
will disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will
dealing with his property outside this country, the testator
said: têñ.£îhqwâ£
I purposely have made no provision in this
will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris,
or my daughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden
(Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have
provided for each of them in a separate will
disposing of my Philippine property. (First
clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine
Tate Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No.
3720 of the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah.
Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino, California and Mrs. Roberts of
15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City were notified
of the probate proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate
petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53, Rollo). In
its order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court
admitted to probate the two wills and the codicil It was issued
upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 4, 1978 "by and
Rule 77
Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first
wife), Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts" (Annex C,
pp. 48-51, Rollo).
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two
children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita
Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the
second parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in
Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding
the estate. It was signed by David E. Salisbury and Donald B.
Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the
attorney-in-fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel,
Juanita Grimm Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel
would be designated as personal representatives (administrators)
of Grimm's Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that
Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate should be reserved
for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the
homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila (par. 4). The agreement
indicated the computation of the "net distributable estate". It
recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the Angara
law firm (par. 5).
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children
"shall share equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel
and Juanita Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the
total of the net distributable estate and marital share. A
supplemental memorandum also dated April 25, 1978 was
executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F, pp. 49-61, Annex, F-1, pp.
75-76, Testate case).
Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be
stated that forty- three days after Grimm's death, or January 9,
1978, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through
lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo B. Macaraeg, filed with
Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance intestate
proceeding No. 113024 for the settlement of his estate. She was
named special administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law
office, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate
proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a
proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that
she be appointed special administratrix, She submitted to the
court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate. It is
found in pages 58 to 64 of the record.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that
Maxine, through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of
Gerardo B. Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case withdrew that
opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine,
Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators. Apparently,
this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise
agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the
authority and approval of the court, they sold for P75,000 on
March 21, 1979 the so-called Palawan Pearl Project, a business
owned by the deceased. Linda and Juanita allegedly conformed
with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It turned out that the buyer,
Makiling Management Co., Inc., was incorporated by Ethel and
Page 1
her husband, Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were
90, testate case). defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the
1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate
proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the
Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and
partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.
Juanita, they sold for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and others
193,267 shares of RFM Corporation (p. 135, Record).
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied
it for lack of merit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying
and filed by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by
that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or. alternatively that
Maxine and her two children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his
the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and
order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the
that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise
decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four
agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate (pp. 22-23,
children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140-142, Record). No mention at all was
Rollo).
made of the will in that order.

Ruling. — We hold that respondent judge did not commit any

Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in
children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their
denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.
lawyer who on August 9, moved to defer approval of the project
of partition. The court considered the motion moot considering
that it had already approved the declaration of heirs and project A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died
of partition (p. 149, Record). with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec.
1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979
alleged that he was no longer connected with Makiling
Management Co., Inc. when the Palawan Pearl Project was sold: The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74
that it was Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the sale with Rex Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7,
Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to sue Maxine for the 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person
lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p. 78, testate case). who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding.
Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the
testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant
proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It was
stated therein that Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and
penalties and that he interposed no objection to the transfer of Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this
the estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153, Record). The court noted the judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she
certification as in conformity with its order of July 27, 1979. considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for
the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate
case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five
papers in the testate case.
months, there was no movement or activity in the intestate case.
On April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers,
filed a motion for accounting "so that the Estate properties can be WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining
partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be order is dissolved. No costs.
closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion.
SO ORDERED.
Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the
Angara law firm filed again its appearance in collaboration with
Del Callar as counsel for Maxine and her two children, Linda and
Pete. It should be recalled that the firm had previously appeared
in the case as Maxine's counsel on March 11, 1978, when it filed a FIRST DIVISION
motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding and furnished the
court with a copy of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm was
then superseded by lawyer Limqueco.

G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994

Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. —
On September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm
in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,
lower court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two vs.
wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan, respondent.
administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and
that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the Natividad T. Perez for petitioner.
properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine
(pp. 25-35, Rollo).
Benedicto T. Librojo for private respondents.

Rule 77 Page 2

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court to set aside the Order dated November 19, 1986 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan presided by respondent
Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M.
We grant the petition.
II
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who
became American citizens, established a successful medical
practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans lived at No. 2896
Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children,
Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and
testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the remainder" of his real
and personal property at the time of his death "wheresoever
situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive his wife, he
bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with
Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as
executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan,
Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will states:
If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I
shall die under such circumstances that
there is not sufficient evidence to
determine the order of our deaths, then it
shall be presumed that I predeceased her,
and my estate shall be administered and
distributed, in all respects, in accordance
with such presumption (Rollo, p. 41).
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her
own last will and testament containing the same provisions as
that of the will of her husband. Article VIII of her will states:
If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I
shall die under such circumstances that
there is not sufficient evidence to
determine the order of our deaths, then it
shall be presumed that he predeceased me,
and my estate shall be administered and
distributed in all respects, in accordance
with such presumption. (Rollo, p. 31).
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished
when they were trapped by fire that gutted their home.
Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute
executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the
probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of
Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two wills were admitted to
probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr.
Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional
P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial
Rule 77
Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two
bills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also
asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the
estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land
in San Miguel, Bulacan.
On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos,
Bulacan, presided by Judge Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an
order, directing the issuance of letters of special administration in
favor of petitioner upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The
following day, petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as
special administration.
As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion,
praying that the Philippine Life Insurance Company be directed to
deliver the proceeds in the amount of P50,000.00 of the life
insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn
Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The
trial court granted the motion.
Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then
filed a manifestation, stating that said company then filed a
manifestation, stating that said company had delivered to
petitioner the amount of P49,765.85, representing the proceeds
of the life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.
In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust
Company passbook with P25,594.00 in savings deposit, and the
Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates in the total amount
of P12,412.52.
On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as
counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio,
Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan
heirs). He also manifested that before receiving petitioner's
motion of May 19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the filing of
the testate estate case and therefore, "in the interest of simple
fair play," they should be notified of the proceedings (Records, p.
110). He prayed for deferment of the hearing on the motions of
May 19, 1983.
Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983,
asserting: (1) that the "Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor
creditors of the late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" and therefore, they had
"no legal or proprietary interests to protect" and "no right to
intervene"; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn
Perez-Cunanan, being American citizens, were executed in
accordance with the solemnities and formalities of New York laws,
and produced "effects in this jurisdiction in accordance with Art.
16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code"; (3) that under Article
VIII of the two wills, it was presumed that the husband
predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan collaterals are
neither distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as
heirship is only by institution" under a will or by operation of the
law of New York (Records, pp. 112-113).
On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May
19, 1983. However, on July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion
to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or
to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the estates of
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan. The motion
Page 3
stated: (1) that being the "brothers and sisters and the legal and be then distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]" (Rollo,
surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been p. 52).
"deliberately excluded" in the petition for the probate of the
separate wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the
On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was
Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the
estopped from claiming that they were heirs by the agreement to
spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived them of their
divide equally the estates. They asserted that by virtue of Section
right to "due process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the
2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provisions of Sections 3, 4
Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., the
and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs,
executor of the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise not
executors, devisees and legatees must be complied with. They
notified of the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3) that the
reiterated their prayer: (1) that the proceedings in the case be
"misrepresentation and concealment committed by" petitioner
nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified as special
rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix; (4) that Dr.
administratrix; (3) that she be ordered to submit an inventory of
Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of
all goods, chattels and monies which she had received and to
attorney, authorized his father,
surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan,
Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr.
Sr. be appointed the regular administrator.
Rafael Cunanan, Sr. is qualified to be a regular administrator "as
practically all of the subject estate in the Philippines belongs to
their brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-122). Hence, Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13,
they prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case be declared null 1983 decision of the American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr.
and void; (2) that the appointment of petitioner as special made "unauthorized disbursements from the estates as early as
administratrix be set aside; and (3) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be July 7, 1982" (Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner moved for
appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased the suspension of the proceedings as she had "to attend to the
spouses. settlement proceedings" of the estate of the Cunanan spouses in
New York (Records, p. 242). The Cunanans heirs opposed this
motion and filed a manifestation, stating that petitioner had
Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner
received $215,000.00 "from the Surrogate’s Court as part of
to submit an inventory or accounting of all monies received by her
legacy" based on the aforesaid agreement of November 24, 1982
in trust for the estate.
(Records, p. 248).

In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole
On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order,
and only heir" of her daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the
disallowing the reprobate of the two wills, recalling the
exclusion of the "Cunanan collaterals"; hence they were complete
appointment of petitioner as special administratrix, requiring the
strangers to the proceedings and were not entitled to notice; (2)
submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received
that she could not have "concealed" the name and address of Dr.
by her as special administratrix and declaring all pending incidents
Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. because his name was prominently
moot and academic. Judge de la Llana reasoned out that
mentioned not only in the two wills but also in the decrees of the
petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on procedure and
American surrogate court; (3) that the rule applicable to the case
allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the
is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance of wills
wills were executed in accordance with the law of New York. In
proved outside of the Philippines and that nowhere in Section 2 of
the absence of such evidence, the presumption is that the law of
Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to the executor
succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the
who, by the same provision, should himself file the necessary
Philippines. However, he noted, that there were only two
ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that even if the Bulacan
witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan spouses and the Philippine
estate came from the "capital" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had
law requires three witnesses and that the wills were not signed on
willed all his worldly goods to his wife and nothing to his brothers
each and every page, a requirement of the Philippine law.
and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully
disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs, misappropriated
$15,000.00 for himself and irregularly assigned assets of the On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
estates to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160). of the Order dated February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently
proven the applicable laws of New York governing the execution
of last wills and testaments.
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24,
1982, petitioner and the Cunanan heirs had entered into an
agreement in the United States "to settle and divide equally the On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying
estates," and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall fix a the motion of petitioner for the suspension of the proceedings
time and place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be but gave her 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to
given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" act on the other order issued that same day. Contending that the
(Records, pp. 184-185). second portion of the second order left its finality to the
discretion of counsel for petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion
for the reconsideration of the objectionable portion of the said
Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for
order so that it would conform with the pertinent provisions of
contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order of June 23,
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the Interim Rules of
1983 and for appropriating money of the estate for his own
Court.
benefit. She also alleged that she had impugned the agreement of
November 24, 1982 before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga,
New York which rendered a decision on April 13, 1983, finding On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the
that "all assets are payable to Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan’s executor to Regional Trial Court, Malolos, to which the reprobate case was
reassigned, issued an order stating that "(W)hen the last will and

Rule 77 Page 4
testament . . . was denied probate," the case was terminated and
therefore all orders theretofore issued should be given finality.
The same Order amended the February 21, 1984 Order by
requiring petitioner to turn over to the estate the inventoried
property. It considered the proceedings for all intents and
purposes, closed (Records,
p. 302).
On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on
account of the final settlement and termination of the probate
cases in New York. Three days later, petitioner filed a motion
praying for the reconsideration of the Order of April 30, 1985 on
the strength of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period
of 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the
denial of probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses. On August
19, respondent Judge granted the motion and reconsidered the
Order of April 30, 1985.
On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her
daughter, Natividad, filed a motion praying that since petitioner
was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and therefore
incapacitated to act as special administratrix, she (the counsel)
should be named substitute special administratrix. She also filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the Order of February 21, 1984,
denying probate to the wills of the Cunanan spouses, alleging that
respondent Judge "failed to appreciate the significant probative
value of the exhibits . . . which all refer to the offer and admission
to probate of the last wills of the Cunanan spouses including all
procedures undertaken and decrees issued in connection with the
said probate" (Records, pp. 313-323).
Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Order of August 19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their
counsel.
On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was
reassigned denied the motion for reconsideration holding that the
documents submitted by petitioner proved "that the wills of the
testator domiciled abroad were properly executed, genuine and
sufficient to possess real and personal property; that letters
testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on a
foreign tribunal and proofs taken by a competent judge who
inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being satisfied
with his findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in
question." However, respondent Judge said that the documents
did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and
allowance of wills (Records, p. 381).
On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present
further evidence on the foreign law. After the hearing of the
motion on April 25, 1986, respondent Judge issued an order
wherein he conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the
foreign law was not a fatal defect and was curable by adducing
additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the
evidence to that effect.
However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional
evidence, respondent Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986
that he found "no compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March
31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate
probate proceedings for each of the testator" (Records, p. 391).
Rule 77
The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a
second motion for reconsideration stating that she was "ready to
submit further evidence on the law obtaining in the State of New
York" and praying that she be granted "the opportunity to present
evidence on what the law of the State of New York has on the
probate and allowance of wills" (Records, p. 393).
On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to
allow the probate of two wills in a single proceeding "would be a
departure from the typical and established mode of probate
where one petition takes care of one will." He pointed out that
even in New York "where the wills in question were first
submitted for probate, they were dealt with in separate
proceedings" (Records, p. 395).
On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the Order of July 18, 1986, citing Section 3,
Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no party may
institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. She
pointed out that separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses
which contain basically the same provisions as they even named
each other as a beneficiary in their respective wills, would go
against "the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination
of the proceedings" (Records, pp. 405-407).
On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the
motion for reconsideration, citing Benigno v. De La Peña, 57 Phil.
305 (1932) (Records,
p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been
filed out of time and that the adverse party had not been
furnished with a copy thereof. In her compliance, petitioner
stated that she had furnished a copy of the motion to the counsel
of the Cunanan heirs and reiterated her motion for a "final ruling
on her supplemental motion" (Records, p. 421).
On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that
"the probate of separate wills of two or more different persons
even if they are husband and wife cannot be undertaken in a
single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378).
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the
evidence offered at the hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently
proved the laws of the State of New York on the allowance of
wills, and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not
be probated in separate proceedings.
II
Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had
submitted before respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the
allowance of the wills:
(a) two certificates of authentication of the
respective wills of Evelyn and Jose by the
Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs.
"F" and "G");
(b) two certifications from the Secretary of
State of New York and Custodian of the
Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard
L. Reagan is the Surrogate of the Country of
Page 5
 Onondaga which is a court of record, that
his signature and seal of office are genuine,
and that the Surrogate is duly authorized to
grant copy of the respective wills of Evelyn
and Jose
(Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1");
(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and
Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore stating that
they have in their records and files the said
wills which were recorded on April 7, 1982
(Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2");
(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose
(Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and Exh. "G-3" — "G-6");
(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the
Chief Clerk certifying to the genuineness
and authenticity of the exemplified copies
of the two wills (Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7");
(f) two certificates of authentication from
the Consulate General of the Philippines in
New York (Exh. "H" and "F").
(g) certifications from the Secretary of State
that Judge Reagan is duly authorized to
grant exemplified copies of the decree of
probate, letters testamentary and all
proceedings had and proofs duly taken
(Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1");
(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the
Chief Clerk that letters testamentary were
issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2"
and "I-2");
(i) certification to the effect that it was
during the term of Judge Reagan that a
decree admitting the wills to probate had
been issued and appointing Rafael G.
Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs. "H-3"
and
"I-10");
(j) the decrees on probate of the two wills
specifying that proceedings were held and
proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I-5");
(k) decrees on probate of the two wills
stating that they were properly executed,
genuine and valid and that the said
instruments were admitted to probate and
established as wills valid to pass real and
personal property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5");
and
(l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the
Chief Clerk on the genuineness and
authenticity of each other’s signatures in
the exemplified copies of the decrees of
probate, letters testamentary and
Rule 77
proceedings held in their court (Exhs. "H-6"
and "I-6") (Rollo, pp. 13-16).
Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the
Surrogate Court’s Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the
proceedings were terminated on November 29, 1984.
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American
citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance
with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad
produces effect in the Philippines if made
with the formalities prescribed by the law
of the place in which he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his
country, or in conformity with those which
this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities
prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills
which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as
follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the
foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign
country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted
to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is
a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on
procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the
Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil.
500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the
first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the
needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon
which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by
the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them
(Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA
266 [1974]).
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved
for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive
New York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed
over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein
courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive
the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a
purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v.
Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of
the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent
Judge’s view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in
singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that
there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the
Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such
view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding."
Page 6
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would
only result in the delay in the administration of justice (Acain v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v.
Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).

What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either
for the testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third
person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at
bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the
two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to
property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical
considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a
number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to
bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187
SCRA 743 [1990]).

This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a

very glaring fact — petitioner has always considered herself the
sole heir of
Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider
herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to
notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the
instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting
that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or
formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).

The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a
will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original
will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27,
Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated
abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will
that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly,
compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require
publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines"
and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.

The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to

petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for
proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules
of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the
time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator, . . . "

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent

Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to
submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the
Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings
pertinent to the probate proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

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