Pearson, Prophasis and Aitia PDF

American Philological Association
Prophasis and Aitia

Author(s): Lionel Pearson
Source: Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 83 (1952), pp.
205-223
Published by: Johns Hopkins University Press
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Vol. lxxxiii] Prophasis and Aitia 205
XVI.-Prophasis and Aitia

LIONEL PEARSON
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
These two words do not, as a rule, offerany special difficulty

to studentsof Greek,exceptwhen theytryto decide what precisely
theirmeaningis when they are used by Thucydides and Polybius
in discussingthe causes of a war.' Only then, perhaps, do they
realize the shortcomingsof theirGreek lexiconand beginto wonder
whethertheGreek use ofthesewordsis logicaland clear. Attempts
have been made to clear up the apparent difficulty in editions of
Thucydides and elsewhere,and I shall not take time to consider
the meritsand shortcomingsof earlierdiscussions,2except to point
out that theyoftenfailto recognizethe fullrangeof meaningwhich
the firstof these two words displays in Greek writers;we must be
preparedto admit that,ifwe tryto confineourselvesto translations
like "excuse" "motive" or "cause" we are doomed to permanent
misunderstanding.3
Aitia, since it offersno difficulty
at all, may be disposed of in
very fewwords. It has the active meaningof "accusation" "com-
plaint" "grievance" and the correspondingpassive meaning"guilt"
''blame" "responsibility";and by logical developmentit also means
"that which is responsible"- the "cause," as in the openingsen-
tenceof Herodotus,b&'i' ainh iroX,iAnuaa &XxiXoLta.4 There is often
some doubt whethera Greek writeris thinkingin termsof "cause"
or "accusation" or "guilt," an ambiguitywhichwe finddisconcert-
1 EspeciallyThuc. 1.23 and Polyb. 3.6-15. These passageswill be discussedlater
in thisarticle.
2 This task has been largelyrenderedunnecessaryfor
me thanks to the recent
article of Gordon M. Kirkwood,"Thucydides' words for 'Cause,"' AJP 73 (1952)
37-61. Though I shall have occasion to disagreewith Kirkwoodin detail,his article
has been most useful and helpful. Cf. also K. Deichgraber,"llPO4A2MIZ. Eine
terminologische Studie," Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften
und der Medizin, 3.4 (1933) 1-17.
3 In this respectthe new Liddell and Scott
is sadly at fault. Gomme's note on
Thuc. 1.23.6 in his Commentary on Thucydidesis farmoreilluminating.
4 "Reason," not "grievance,"mustbe the meaning, as Herodotusgoes on llepcr&nv
A vvvol X6y&ot4OiLVKKas allriovs4aacL-yevaoOcaTris8&acopiw. He clearlyhas in mindthe
openingof the Iliad, and its attemptto establishthe cause or originof a quarrel
the angerof Apollo,not the "grievance"of Achilles.
206 Lionel Pearson [1952
ing since modern English has differentiated"cause" and "case"

and speaks of "cause forcomplaint"whereGreek mightuse simply
aitia.5 But the adjective aLnos is always passive in meaning, denot-
ing the personor thingheld responsible. Hence the neuterrO a'TrLoV
is quite naturallyused in the sense of "cause" and is in fact less
ambiguous than alfta.6
means in
Prophasis,whetherderived from7rpo4alvw or 7rpO64q.t,7
the mostgeneraltermssomethingthat you show or say, an explana-
tion that you offerforbehaviour,givingthe reason or the purpose.
Herodotus paraphrases it by 1rp6oax7ia rov3Xoyov,8 so that the irpo-
element means "in front,"plain for everyone to see and also a
shield for your real actions or intentions. Your explanation may
be true or false, reasonable or unreasonable,convincingor worth-
less, creditableor discreditable.9 It is frequentlyproper,however,
to use the translation"excuse" or "pretext"because we most com-
monlyofferexplanationsforour behaviour if it appears reprehen-
sible or if we wish to conceal our true intentionsor motives.'0
Even when a man is clearly or definitelyin the wrong,he will
usually offersome kind of prophasis,and an explanation,however
lame and unsatisfactory, is oftenexpected by the injured party as
a symbol of ordinary good manners. Suppose, for example, a
pedestrianis knocked down by a car, he asks the driverwhy he
Cf. what Pontius Pilate says in John 18:38 i"yc'ob6eculavalTiav ebp1fKw e-vavbr4
(in Luke 23:4 we have obbiv ebptlaKc alTov). In both passages the King James version
renders "I find no fault," but the Vulgate has nihil causae - "no case" as a modern
judge might say.
6 Kirkwood (see note 2 above) 58, recognized that aZrtov in Thucydides was less
ambiguous as a word for "cause," but failed to point out the reason. Cf. also Plato
Rep. 4.443B.
7 Either derivation is defensible linguistically. Hellenistic writers, like Polybius,
who were so fond of a'7r6Oaats, i7r4caaus,and e'Oaais which they clearly regarded as
derived from 4aLvw,must have regarded vrp64aas as parallel with them. And Aristoph.
Nub. 55 makes a prophasis something that one can "show" rather than "say." In
favour of the derivation from 4nqylis the Latin use of professio as an almost exact
translation of the word (cf. Tac. Agr. 3). And 67roaots in earlier writers is not
"demonstration" (as in Polybius) but "denial" and derived from 4rnidt as clearly as
the old Greek word vap4auas.
8 6.133.1, cf. 7.157.1, and Thuc. 1.96.1; 3.82.4; 5.30.2.
a&X-Ohs, t'svb's, Thuc. 1.23.6; 6.6.1; Dem. 18.225. KMXM,4oabX, Dem. 21.98;
Proem. 32.2. 8tKaha, caL8Kos Dem. 11.1; 18.284; 20.97; 21.98; 48.39. evbXoyos, Thuc.
3.82.4; 6.79.2. eIrLELKIs, Thuc. 3.9.2. axpt13's, Thuc. 4.47.2. birpevhs,Thuc. 6.8.4.
arovos, Dem. 48.36.
'5 Cf. the proverb quoted by Aristot. Rhet. 1.1373A: 7rpo4oaws belrat ,AOsovo X'
7rov-'pta.
did not stop, and the driverwill reply "I did not see you" or "My
brakes didn't work," as though to show that he did not intend
any harm. Neitherplea is a properdefenceof his action; nor will
it save him frombeing finedin a police court, particularlyif the
true explanationof his careless drivinghappens to be drunkenness.
This last wouldhardlybe a 7rp6a4acs,but it is a
&tKaLaKai eb7rpe7rl7s
prophasisall the same. Demosthenesin his speech against Meidias
mentionsa certain Charicles who, while taking part in a solemn
procession, suddenly attacked one of his personal enemies and
struckhim with a whip; he was drunkadmittedly,and apparently
expectedhis offenceto be treatedmorelenientlysince he could offer
drunkennessas a prophasis. Demosthenes,however,approves the
verdictof the people, who decided that his assault was a deliberate
act of hybris- that his drunkennesswas a pretextdesignedto hide
his real intention,not an excuse which explained his action." In
Englishusage thetwo notions(excuse and pretext)are quite distinct
in meaning;but prophasiscoversthemboth,the explanationoffered
by way of apology and the pretencedesignedto conceal the reality.
Pindar calls prophasis "the daughter of After-thought''12and
it is a brilliantdescription- the apology that we have to produce
afterour offence,the pretencethat we devise afterdecidingon our
action. But not every kind of prophasisis an after-thought.For
example, one man may dislike another forpurelyprivate reasons,
which public opinion will not respect; he will be unable to take
action against him openlyuntilhe has a prophasis;ifthe otherman
is rude and insultingto him in public, he then has a S%KaLa irpo6acns
fordoinghimharm,he can explainand justifytakingaction against
"1 Dem. 21.180. The argument of Demosthenes may help us to understand
Agamemnon's oath in Iliad 19.258-262, when he swears he has not laid a hand on
Briseis
our' ebvus 7rpo64acav KEXp7lIuE.vos
oiure rev) &XXou,
"whether my prophasis was sexual desire or anything else." If Agamemnon had

slept with Briseis, he would of course have pleaded sexual desire as an excuse; but
Achilles might have argued that it was a mere pretext -that Agamemnon's real
purpose was to spite Achilles. It is surely a mistake, therefore,to argue, like Deich-
graber (see note 2) pp. 1-3 and Kirkwood (see note 2) p. 48, that prophasis here means
"true reason." The word is used in only one other passage in Homer, in Iliad 19.302,
where the women weep for their own private woes" but taking the death of Patroclus
as a prophasis." Leaf in his commentary thinks that "true reason" may be the mean-
ing in both passages, but he appears not to recognize the distinction between "excuse"
and "pretext."
12Pyth. 5.28.
him; but this prophasis is not the real reason for quarrelling,the
originalground forenmity. In this way we can distinguishsome
evrpo4a'awLros ara - "a complaint thatcan wellbe used as a pro-
phasis" - fromthe fundamentalcause of a quarrel.'3
Herodotus gives several examples of this kind of prophasis in
describingquarrels between both individualsand states. Croesus
findsfault with Cambyses because he has been killingnumerous
people without any propergrounds,and warns him that such be-
haviour will bringon a revolt; whereuponCambyses seizes on this
ill-timedwell-meantadvice as a prophasisforpunishinghim. "You
dare to give me advice afterall the bad advice you gave my father
Cyrus; but you shall not escape, since I have long been wantinga
prophasisto use against you."''4 The Argives,who have made up
their mind not to fightagainst Xerxes, insist that the Spartans
give them a share in the command 'vrairl 7rpoqf5a'oos -cruvLb7v
&awo-L
(7.150.3). So also the Athenians,constantlyat enmitywithAegina,
when they learn that the Aeginetanshave given earth and water
to Darius, seize upon this prophasisto denouncetheirbehaviourat
Sparta (6.49.2). Likewise Miltiades has a prophasisforhis expedi-
tion to Paros - the triremewhichtheysent to fighton the Persian
side; but this is only a formalexcuse, since he has an old personal
quarrel with the Parians (6.133.1).15
This prophasis of Miltiades is described by Herodotus as a
-Xyov, and we find both expressionsused to describe
7rpobxr7y,aroi
Darius' formalpretextor reason for the expeditionof Mardonius
and the Marathon expedition.'6 Darius' intentionof conquering
the citieson the mainlandofGreece is clearlyregardedby Herodotus
as part of his general imperialistpolicy,so that his readerswill not
require any particularexplanation of it; but his formalreason is
the part played by the Atheniansin thesack of Sardis,whichcauses
him to tell his servantto remindhimto "rememberthe Athenians."
He intends to use this prophasisto conquer the states in Greece
who did not give him earth and water. It is his formaljustifica-
13 Cf. Thuc. 6.105.2.
14 3.36.3. Cf. the similar usage in Plato Ep. 3.318c, 7.349D.
16 Other examples are in 6.13.2 and 8.3.2. Cf. also 6.137.2, where the Athenians
drive out the Pelasgians without offering any prophasis. Cleon in Thuc. 3.40.6
remarks that the aggressor who has no prophasis is the most dangerous enemy of all;
because he knows that his victim need have no scruples about retaliation, he will try
to destroy him utterly.
16 6.44.1 and 94.1.
tion forthe expedition;but it is also a statementof his purpose; he

says he willhumbleAthensand Eretria,but reallyintendsto conquer
all Greece; he is, therefore,misrepresenting not only the reason,
but also the purpose of his expedition. It is the same as with
Charicles,and the excuse and the pretextforhis assault described
by Demosthenes,except that Darius' prophasisis more dignified.
Prophasis does not always imply deceit in Herodotus. When
Croesus is afraidthat, afterthe Lydians have revolted,Cyrus will
make slaves of them qTh lrporEvpn, he is not actu-
A' aLt6LoxpEov7rp4aoutPv
ally thinkingof deceivinghim (1.156.1). The precise meaningof
the word here is difficultto establish,because it is not quite clear
forwhom Croesus wants to offera prophasisis it an excuse to
explain the rebellionof the Lydians, a pretextforleniencyon the
part of Cyrus, or a mere explanationor objection'7of his own so
as to restrainCyrus? Herodotus does use the word several times
in the general sense of explanationor statement,withoutany im-
plied contrastwithtruecause or truefacts.'8 It is worthremember-
ing that aitia, in the sense of complaint,can be practicallyidentical
in meaningwithprophasis. Hence the impossibilityof establishing
any constant relationshipbetween the two words; they are often
contrasted,but sometimes almost synonymous. An explanation
is not necessarilyfalse,just as an accusation is not necessarilytrue;
but when explanation is contrastedwith reason, the explanationis
at least partlymisleadingand certainlyinadequate.
Herodotus has a very remarkableuse of prophasisin describing
the downfallof people who are "destined to come to a bad end."
He introducesthe detailedstoryby sayingE7rETre 6i EMEs Ol KaKus
'yEPEYOLO, AVyevero 'ar6 7rpoqf5a'tos TOLt-a (4.79.1, cf. 2.161.3). It is as
though the jealous gods, who have decided (forsufficient reasons)
to destroya man, have to findsome formaljustificationlike mere
mortals.'9 And indeed it is true that Greek traditionvery rarely
representsthe gods strikingdown a man withoutmakinghis death
17 There are timeswhen the translatorwill want to
use the term "objection" as
when Plutarch (Moralia 77B) speaks of the seriousstudentof philosophy&aK67rTWv
Tas Vrpo494rets6onrep 6ZX)ovnro&,VO 6PvTa(in contrastto the man who is put offby
obstacles).
18 7.229.2 and 230.1. The reason Solon gives for his journey (KarT Oewp-is
rp64iaav,1.29.1) is not the wholetruth.
19Plato, Rep. 8.567A, describeshow the tyranttries to make the death of dis-
contentedcitizensappear natural 7rcosav rob-rovsLAer6t7rpo4reows&7roXxb-av
Cvaous ro7s
vroXc4ots.Cf. also Rep. 5.460A-B.
look natural; they do not allow themselvesmiracles to convince

the unbeliever. The thunderboltof Zeus is practicallythe only
exception to this rule, since the arrows of Apollo generallytake
the formof sickness. We learn in the opening lines of the Iliad
that it was the will of Zeus that the souls of many brave Achaeans
be sent down to Hades; yet we are also told that it was the wrath
of Achilles which made this possible-it was, as it were, the
prophasiswhich Zeus employed,or in moreconventionallanguage,
the means wherebyhe accomplishedhis purpose.20 "Occasion" is
perhaps the word that a translatormay be inclined to use for
prophasis in such circumstancesas these; the incidentwhich pro-
vides a prophasisis itselfcalled a prophasis. It is exactlythe same
as with aitia, which can mean the charge itselfor the groundsfor
the charge.
If war or violentdeath rarelyhappens withouta prophasis,we
cannot be surprisedthat the same is true of disease. Thucydides
makes it clear that one of the terriblefeaturesof the plague at
Athenswas that it attacked healthypeople withoutany prophasis.21
Many criticsare contentto explain what he means by referring to
the medical writers,who frequentlyuse the word to describewhat
may be called the "immediate cause" or "exciting cause" of a
disease, as contrastedwith its "underlyingcause."22 But we can-
20 Plutarch's comment on these lines of Homer is worth quoting (Moralia 23D-E).
He says that when Homer gives the name "Zeus" to the aitia of the events of the Iliad
he really means "Destiny." He will not allow that the poet represents Zeus as "de-
vising evil for men," but says that Homer is pointing to the inevitable necessity that
if men make mistakes they will cause their own destruction. Accordingly, like Plato
(Rep. 2.380A), he objects strongly to the lines of Aeschylus:
O-os Ofiva'LTcav 4 uet ,3poToZs

oTaV KaKWOcaL OkXii
6wjsn 7raAl7r/rl67lv
(Moralia 17B, Aesch. Fr. 156, Nauck).

21 Thuc. 2.49.2.
22 For the usage of the medical writers see Deichgraber (see note 2 above), who
shows that prophasis means for them the "external" or "contributory" cause of a
disease, sometimes contrasted with its underlying cause (aition) as in De Aer. (CMG
1, P. 158.17). Some modern critics, however, have argued that Thucydides borrowed
the word prophasis from the Ionian scientific and medical writers in the technical
sense of "scientific cause" (cf. E. Schwartz, Das Geschichtswerkdes Thukydides, ed. 2
[Bonn 1929] 250, W. Jaeger, Paideia [Eng. trans.] 1.389-90). This cannot be right in
view of what Thucydides himself says about the "scientific causes" of the plague,
which he calls aitiai (2.48.3): ,fV oiJv 7rept' abuTo
XefyETw W')s eKaoros
T ytOyV(XoKeL Kacl Larpos Ka
Lhtc,r7So a+' OroV ELKOS VV TOVfraLabr6, Kat Tas avrLas ao-al VO/sifL roaur0seraqos
tKavas dYaL
va /vaSLv f'S TO' AeTaoT-JaaL oXe7V -' yw' 6 o6ov re '-yiyveTo Xktw.
not accept this semi-technicaluse of the word without tryingto

decide how it came to be used in this way. There are two possi-
bilities. The prophasiscan be simplythe "explanation,"adequate
or not, as the case may be, whicha patient feelsdisposed to give of
his ailment. For example, when someone goes to the doctor with
a stomach ache or a sore throat, he "explains" how it happened
(he ate too much lobsteror caught cold sittingin a draughtyroom),
but he does not expect the doctor to be satisfiedwith his explana-
tion; in fact, the doctor may examine him fora stomach ulcer or
an infectionof the throatand then announcewhat is the "scientific
cause" (not the prophasis) of his pain. The prophasisis of great
importanceto the patient, because if he can see no "excuse" for
his pain and misery,he is inclinedto suspect very serioustrouble,
some constitutionalweaknesswhich predisposeshim to indigestion
or catchingcold.
Alternativelythe prophasismay be looked upon fromthe point
of view of the disease - the "excuse" or "occasion" whichit needs
for attacking a person, as pneumonia or tuberculosismay take
advantage of a man's weakened condition if he has overworked
himself;a doctor may say that overwork"broughton" the attack,
but he will not give it as the "scientificcause." It would be equally
incorrectto say that lack of preparednessat Pearl Harbour was
the "cause" of war with Japan. The parellel is pertinentbecause
the patient and the sickness are enemies; sickness,like war, is a
strugglebetween two parties,and if you do not know the excuses
and pretextswhich your enemyor the disease will use, you are at
a disadvantage.
This leaves us, therefore,with a quite simple account of the
word as used by Herodotus: an explanation,whethertrue or not;
an explanationofferedin one's defence,an excuse; an explanation
of what one is going to do, a statement(frequentlyfalse) of inten-
tion or of motive, a pretext;and finallythe occasion which offers
the excuse or pretext. The difference betweenexcuse and pretext
be in
might put this way. An excuse is defensive,most commonly
given only in reply to criticism;23a pretextis offensiveand it pre-
cedes the action and hopes to anticipatecriticism.
23 Sometimes the translator will want to use the term "defence," as in Plut.
Moralia 73E-F. Be kindly in criticizing your friends' conduct, Plutarch advises; you
should not cut them short when they try to defend themselves; on the contrary:
Kat vrpo4aaelS ebaxCO,uovas aiMwo-yerwS OvVEKvropt'ELv KatO Tris Xepovos acTrasIq5tora,uevovs
Beforeexamininghow Thucydides uses this word in describing

the beginningsof wars and quarrels, it is worth while to take a
glance at some laterGreek writingto see how the usage of the word
has developed in the hands of orators and philosophers. Demos-
thenes is a particularlysuitable author to consult, as he uses the
word with great freedom,but always in connectionwithsome kind
of quarrel or dispute,whetherin the law courtsor in international
politics.
The so-called medical use of the word appears in the Second
Olynthiac. Demosthenessays that when a politicalorganizationis
based on good will and communityof interestsit can survive set-
backs and misfortunes;but when, like Philip, a political leader
owes his strengthpurelyto lack of scruplesand to greed, then he
can be throwndown by the firstprophasis or a slight stumble.24
A slight stumble will be sufficientexcuse (or occasion) to disable
him; no furtherprophasiswill be needed, but the real cause of his
downfallof course lies in his constitution.
The usages familiar from Herodotus appear many times in
Demosthenes. The synonyms which he uses are interesting -
cTK0l7ELS Kai 7rpo4LT0&S (19.100; cf. 21.41; 54.17); 7rpOOOdELS Kac Xo6yoL
(22.19); ivrovoLac 7rXaoura Kac 7rpo/aoLts7L&a&KOL(48.39). It is interesting
to see how aitia is sometimesused as a synonymaOTLas OV1K oi6uas
7rXaaaMEvOSKaL rpoaes (11.1),Kvs
aKov 7rpocfaaets irX4rrcP Kalt Vt'Ev6US
aitLaS (25.28), but sometimescontrastedwith prophasisas
OVPTLGes
the real cause.25 A prophasisis oftenindicated by a single word
cL
'a /LXOPLKLaP KaL Kact& ExOpav
a' 06Pvov KacL6' aXaaS srpoakacs (57.6),
ELP rp/oqaov TOVS OpKOVS (19.159), tevLa &Airpbcauwa(19.167). Here
the word denotes sometimesthe excuse, sometimesthe occasion.
acrobs iv6i66vac $srTptcTepav (and he compares how Hector, in Iliad 6.326, instead of
calling Paris a coward for avoiding battle, prefersto charge him with "storing up anger
in his soul"). Prophasis as "defence" is here clearly contrasted with aitia as "accusa-
tion"; we should discard the more serious accusation and allow them a presentable
defence of their actions, even suggesting it to them (as the polite pedestrian, nearly
killed by a careless motorist, might say "I suppose you didn't see me" instead of
charging him with attempted murder). Cf. Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 29 (Rhet. Graec.
12 ed. Spengel and Hammer) ras &7roXo'ylaS Kal ras 7rpoc/an-eLs,and Plut. Pericles 12.
'
242.9 i5rav 5' eK 7rXeovetLaVKa'L rov?7plas TLs 6o-rvep o&ros Loxvbop17, rpwr-q7vrp6oasL
KaL /.LKpIV 7rTai-Asa a7ravTAv & aexITTOe
X Kac 5EXvo-ev. The usage is imitated by the
author of 11.7. Cf. also Plato Rep. 8.556E.
25 Cf. 22.38, 58.39. The quotations have not been restricted to speeches which
are certainly authentic. For the purposes of the present argument another fourth
century orator or a conscientious imitator is just as good a witness as Demosthenes
himself.
There is a passage in the De Corona where the true prophasis

is contrastedwith the false. Philip, says Demosthenes,concealed
the "trueexplanation"(7PV a&Xn00irpo6kaa-LV) of his acts (his designs
against Greece, especially Thebes and Athens) and claimed falsely
to be carryingout the decisions of the Amphictyons;and it was
Aeschineswho providedhimwithsuch aqop,4al Kal 7rpof540S.26 The
use of &4op,4' as a synonymis enlightening;it shows how well the
meaningof occasion or opportunityis established. This is clearly
the aggressiveaspect of prophasis,as contrastedwith the defensive
whereo-vyyvyx,t- can be its synonym.27
Sooner or later a translatorwill be tempted to use "motive"
forprophasis. Demosthenesobjects to the psephismofAristocrates
on the groundthat it does not respecta man's prophasis,"which
determineswhetheran individual action is good or bad"; whether
in strikingsomeone he is the aggressoror acts in self-defence;
whetherin revilingsomeone he speaks truth or lies; whetherhe
kills a man deliberatelyor against his will. "And we shall find,"
says Demosthenes,"everywherein the laws the prophasisestablish-
ing the quality of the act. But you do not recognizethis; you lay
it down simply 'If a man kills Charidemus,let him be arrested,'
even though he kill unwillingly,with justification,in self-defence,
in circumstanceswhere the laws permit it - no matter how."28
"Motive" fitssome of the distinctionswhich Demosthenesmakes,
but not all of them; we have to thinkof the defencehe may make
himself(if he pleads he is speaking the truthwhen charged with
slander), of the occasion and the excuse it gives him, as well as of
his intention. This is an admirable passage to illustratethe full
range of meaningof prophasis.
It is easy to see, therefore,that the meaningof the word has
not become narroweror morespecializedin the courseof the fourth
century;and, as with all words that offera considerablerange of
meaning,it cannot be rashly identifiedwith anotherword that is,
on occasion, used as a synonymforit. The readerof Demosthenes
will notice that it is not used in speakingof oneselfor one's client.
Demosthenesneversays that he or his clienthas a perfectprophasis
for prosecutingor the best possible prophasis in defence,or that
the Athenians have an excellent prophasis for war with Philip.
26 18.156 (cf. 158).
27 Cf.45.67.
28 23.49-50.
Take, forexample, the openingof the FirstPhilippic wherehe says

that he might fairlybe pardoned for speaking first- 7oi,uaC Kal
'rp&r0s iu'aor% 5lKOTWSav vcyx TvrXavELv. It would be quite
impossible to substitute prophasis for avyyPv&,it here, though in
offering reasonswhy othershave not spoken he can list the various
prophaseis.29 It can be used onlyin findingfaultwiththe Athenians
or negativelywhen they are warned to avoid a prophasis or to
avoid offering othersa prophasisfordoing somethingundesirable.30
He says in the First Olynthiacob6E-yap Xo'yos ob6E 0-K/lS "O'W0' ZV ro-
,7 Ta sfo'ra 7rOLEl'ePElOXVEPro XELIEraL (1.6). He might have added
0U6E TLS 6&Kal'a 1rp64aots but in the previous sections where he is
insistingthat they have the perfectopportunityfor action (o gEv

7rap v KaLpos ,6ovov oVxL XE yEL 4C01J?1
aPLELS), it would have been impos-
sible to urgethemto seize the prophasiswhichthe situationoffered.
No one, in fact,is proud of having a prophasisor of offering it
to someoneelse, no morethan we are proudofhaving"a magnificent
excuse for neglectingour duty"; in fact, when we claim such an
excuse,we do not intendto make use of it, but to bera-tethe person
who presentedus with it. Hence the verb rpoqakLoEo-OaLis never
used in a good sense; it means to make excuses insteadof doing the
rightthingor to give the false explanationinstead of the true one.
A special use that should be mentionedis theprophasisof friend-
ship or alliance. If one wishes to deny that a man has any right
to call anotherhis friend,it is possibleto say that he has no reason-
able prophasis for calling him so. So Demosthenes denies that
Aeschines has any fair or just prophasis to be Philip's friend-
he can only be his hireling(18.284). Here too, as generally,pro-
phasis would not be the word to describethe basis of a sound and
enduringfriendship. On the other hand friendshipmay itselfbe
the prophasisforan act; it may be the pretextand one may pretend
to make concessions in friendship'sname, as when Demosthenes
says to Leptines 4' ro70vV &
I.Ev 75v a,iapTvpa, ravT
E3r' 7nir oiv 67Aov
7rpocaLOELbta aOlv 6E60ao0W, 6' av9ro'so6 6iuo s aprvpLas 'E07770EPev TloZs
X'v
lEpOlSavaapa^as Ka 7avrEs auvtaatv, ra9-' acEaOaL rapaLvEL (20.149).

A clearer example is in Thucydides. Leontini sent an embassy to
29 13.18, 19.118.
30 13.2, 6.32. An apparent exception is 20.97: Kal 7rpo2aoLs &tKaca Ka-ra Trv
IrapaKpoVa/l.evwv 27 /AETa Ta&T' a4'&K70-aVTWV r ')(OSW avatt'wv, 5 *v 8v V$L'AOKp
aY
e?Xev Tr7vbpeav.
KcWXVoeTr' The answer here seems to be that Demosthenes is speaking
of a purely hypothetical case - if the proposal of Leptines becomes law. But see
also Plato Ep. 7.352A and Aristoph. Nub. 55.
Athens asking help against Syracuse "on the strengthof theirold

alliance and because they were Jonians" (not rpo5a-EL tv,u,AaxLas,
because it is an honourableand sincereclaim that theyare making);
the Atheniansin replysent ships to Sicily rS ,z' OlKGlOrTfTOS rpo4aat,
"but what they wanted was to preventgrain fromthe West being
importedinto the Peloponneseand theyweremakinga preliminary
experimentto see if it would be possible forthem to gain control
of affairsin Sicily" (3.86.4). Indeed Thucydides makes it clear
that in all the expeditionssent by the Atheniansto Sicily the pre-
text of helping an ally or a friendwas really the cloak for more
ambitiousschemes.
The Thucydidean usage of prophasisis forthe most part quite
easy to followafterone has observed how Demosthenes uses the
word. He sometimesuses it in a neutral sense, meaning simply
"explanation." Pausanias asks the suppliantat Taenarum to give
his prophasisforseekingrefugein the temple (1.133.1), and when
Nicias in his letterreportsthat mercenarytroops are desertinghe
says i7r'abro,AoXMas 7rpoaa-EL abrEpXovTaL (7.13.2). Pausanias asks and
is given the real reason forthe suppliant's presence,whichconsists
largelyof a complaint,3'and thereis no pretenceabout the troops'
desertion(what Nicias means is that theyare leavingwithoutoffer-
ing any other reason or pretext). The ordinarydefensivemean-
ing of "excuse" occurs several times, as when before the naval
battleofNaupactusthePeloponnesian
commanders
sayOVK
GUK PEV
rpo6aorLv
06(EP KaK4 and the Mytileniansrealize
Ev'EoOaL (2.87.9)32
that theycannotexpectmuchsympathyunlesstheyshow a irpo6ats
E7rLELK?S fortheirrevolt (3.9.2). Cowardice in battle and disloyalty
to an ally are generallyto be blamed and so need an excuse (and
so mostcertainlydoes desertionin the field). Thucydidesalso uses
the word to denote the expressedintention,as opposed to the real
intention,as when Hermocrateswarnshis listenersthat the Athen-
ians are cominglrpo6fapLv /iEtv'EyEo-Ta1wP vu4vAaXk%Kal AEOVrLVPAV
KaTot-
KLCTEl, TO U a&X?0sE2LKEXLas E'LvOU,vaI, /laXtora U Tis -4AErEpas roEs ;33
31 KaL IIavoaviov C,.vav-rov X6ovTroSKaL ePWTWVTOST7?7 irpo6qao-v T7rS LKeTrelas fOovTro

7ravTa aaq5Cos, aLTuw,levov TOO &vOpc7rov Tra rE 7rep abnov ypaoivTa KaL TaXX' adr04oat'OvTos
KaO' fKaoTov (1.133.1).
32The verb ev&6toval can be used equally with vrp6oaats or KaLpoS (cf. Dem. 4.18).
For this military use of prophasis cf. Plato, Rep. 5.469c.
33 6.33.2. Cf. 6.76.2 ifKOVOl 'yap es T27V 24KeXIav vrpoO4doE Iuev n rvvO4veo-e, utavo'Lq
6 Here the prophasis is simply the expressed purpose (cf.
7v 7ravres v'rovoo,.uev.
Aristoph. Eq. 466); but in 33.2 it is divided into parts - the alliance (which is the
when Nicias complains that the Atheniansare aiming at the con-

quest of all Sicily rpo4aaSeL OpaaXeLQL
Kac eiVrpc-re(with only the simple
honourable intentionexpressed,of helpingthe people of Segesta),
he calls theirprophasisslightbecause it does not adequately repre-
sent their large purpose.34 The fourthuse of the word that was
noted in Herodotus is also to be foundin Thucydides- to denote
the occasion which supplies the excuse or pretext;but the distinc-
tion fromthe moreordinaryuse of the word is not always clear and
Thucydides does not clarifyhis meaning by using synonyms,as
Demosthenes did in speaking of Tpo4ao-ESL Kal &0oplial. When he
says irt7rppo45aUet(as Herodotus says eirtirpo4a'os), he probably
means "relyingon an excuse or pretext" ratherthan "taking ad-
vantage of an occasion."3" The distinctionmay seem a slightone,
but it is importantbecause it involves the difference(so funda-
mental for Thucydides) between logos and ergon. An excuse is
somethingthat one says; an occasion is provided by the circum-
stances.
The distinctioncan be seen clearlyby comparingtwo instances
of the word which are only a few chapters apart. Thucydides
finisheshis account of the Pentecontaetiaby saying ieTa& U TravdTa
07 ov 7roXXOZs 9TrEaLV
eyL'yvErca voTEpoV Ta rpoELpryTva, Ta Te KEPKvpafKa&
Kal r& OTeL.eEamLaK& Kal oOa lrporwaYLs TOU#5E'TOv IroXE/.O KarEOt71 (1.118.1).
Here, since the events themselvesare called a prophasis,we must
take the meaning to be "occasion" -the incidentsprovidedthe
excuse or pretextforfighting; but Thucydideswrote7rp04a-tS KarEofrT7
not irp64autp lrapcEaXEV. Then, afterthe account of the Congressat
Sparta wherethe Peloponnesiansdecide on war, we read iv ToVTc be
frpe3eviovTo r
VP xpOvP 'rp& robs 'AG,1valovs IrotowevoL, oirws
e'yKX7fl/.aTa
EZ7 Totv7roXE/OV, Xv /.1 TL 'ffaKOvwL;v (1.126.1).
uc/lu'V 6TL ME-YIoTq 7rp6q5a4XLS
excuse) and the restoration of Leontini (which is the supposed purpose). Hermocrates
uses the word again, for "excuse," in 6.34.6.
34 6.8.4. The adjectives here (f3paXe-LQ Kat ebvrpeire) deserve attention. Like
Hermocrates in 6.33.2 Nicias is dividing the prophasis into two parts - the expressed
purpose is inadequate, but the excuse is honourable in appearance.
35Cf. Hdt. 7.150.3 (see p. 208 above). In Thuc. 4.80.2 and 5.42.1 i7rrpoo&aet
seems to contain the idea of excuse, but Pericles' words in 1.141.1 are more problem-
atical. He tells the Athenians that they must make up their minds either to give in
to the Spartans before they are hurt or, if they decide to go to war, they must be firm:
Kat erL uey6aXfl Kat erLt fpaxEdsL byohos -7rpo4ioet pi) eovrTes. Here the prophasis might
be the demand to which they must not submit (the occasion) or their expressed reason
for going to war (which would be refusal to submit to a demand); the prophasis, in
any case, is "great" or "slight" according as the demand is large or small.
Here the meaning of the word is the defensiveone of "excuse."

The Peloponnesians are protectingthemselvesagainst the charge
that they are the aggressors. Their excuse will take the formof a
complaint,36 and they will want this to be substantial,so that their
excuse will not appear trivial.
The use of pEiu7 rq 7rp6oao-ns here prepares the way for the
E7rt 4,/7LCya KaL fhrlI3paxel 64uolows7rponaioEtin Pericles' speech
(1.141.1). Then Thucydidesclosesthebook by writingacTnaL bi av'Tat
KaL&ackopal pots 7rp6TO- 7OrXEOv, &pta/IevaL ebs a7ro TrwJv
(yVOVTO a'/oT
ev 'E7rt6a,u' a
KaEpKbpcy 668
'ireLyvvvro
ocos 'v a'nra?S Ka' 7rap' &XX Xovs
aKflpbKTwsjAiv, avv7ro6rrws
E43OlTWJv 3 oiV* 7rovw'v zyap o-v-Xyxvosra -yrvoyEva
Xv KaL 7rp6oaats r-o 7roXEidie'v (1.146). Here the eventsare the pro-
phasis and the word clearly means "occasion." This prophasisis
the situationwhich results fromthe abinat Kal bta4opal, a situation
in whichwar is nearly,ifnot quite, inevitable. So also stayingout
all nightin a blizzard mightlead to a situationin whichpneumonia
was almost inevitable and the hybris of some of the tyrantsin
Herodotus makes the vengeance of the gods seem not only just
but natural.
This still does not mean, however,that Thucydides regarded
these quarrels as the true cause of the war. We might consider
that the real cause of pneumoniawas not the blizzard but a con-
stitutionalweakness,and that the cause of a tyrant'sdownfalllay
not in his acts but in his character; and we might reasonably
expect Thucydides to distinguishthe immediate occasion which
precipitatedthe war fromits underlyingcauses. He recognized
the distinctionin speakingof the plague,whenhe refusedto discuss
the aitia and remarkedthat it sometimesattacked a man without
a prophasis.37 It would not be surprisingifhe used the same terms
in makingclear his view on the causes of the war.
Furthermore,these are the terms which Polybius uses in his
famous discussion on causes of wars in general and the Second
Punic War in particular. He complains of the foolishhabit of
confusingthe causes withthe "openingincident"- the apX-38 He
36When their complaintis not recognizedby the Athenians,they proceed to
make demands; and this, according to Pericles, produces an intolerablesituation
(1.140.2).
37 2.48.3-49.2 (see notes 21 and 22 above).
38 3.6.1-3. He definestwo of his termsclearlyenough: wyco&
bl 7rarT's tpxas 1A6
etval 0),uL ra's 7rpc'Tcas rt,&oX&s Kal rp&tets TCOV jB7) KeKIcpplJO'V, allrias ra&T s rpoKKa6Ojyov-
/,vas C TOV KPLOEOW Kat &aXj41/4vO Xkyco .' lrl'oLaS Kac bLaO&tkeLS Kac robs 7reptraC+ra
has no quarrelwithThucydidesand no doubt thinkshe is borrowing

the term apx71fromhim, since Thucydides writesin 1.23.4 `)pcavro
be abvrov 'AO77vaZoL KaF HeXoirovviaulot XUavoavrEsTas TptaKOVTOVTELS o-rov5As
. . .rtO' ras ai-r'Las7rpoutypa4a KTX. Polybius does not tell
'E'Xvaavai
us what were the aitiai of the PeloponnesianWar as opposed to the
prophaseis,but he illustrateshis meaningby referenceto the expe-
dition of Alexander the Great and the war of the Romans with
Antiochus.39 The aitiai of Alexander's war with the Persians, he
says, were the March of the Ten Thousand and the expeditionof
Agesilaus,as resultof whichPhilip saw the weaknessof the Persian
empire and the rich prizes to be won by conqueringit; and the
prophasisof the war was his eagernessto avenge the Persian inva-
sion of Greece. Evidently Polybius considersthat causes should
sometimesbe ex alto repetitae,but why does he pick on Xenophon
and Agesilaus in particular? It must be because he regards the
end of the PeloponnesianWar as markingan epoch and he picks
out the firstsignificantevent afterthat date. It makes one think
that, if he were asked forthe causes of the PeloponnesianWar he
would turn to Thucydides 1.89 and say - first,the withdrawalof
Leotychides fromAsia, secondly, the rebuildingof the Athenian
walls, and continuewith a summaryof the historyof the Pente-
contaetia. For the prophasis he gives the "professedpurpose."
It is the same with the Roman war against Antiochus; a simpler
"cause" is given (the anger of the Aetolians), and the liberationof
Greece is the prophasis. The prophasishere is not the "occasion"
as it sometimesis in Thucydides.
When Polybius discusses the causes of the Second Punic War
he goes back to events immediatelyfollowingthe end of the First
War - the strongfeelingof Hamilcar, the Roman annexation of
Sardinia, the success of the Carthaginianventure in Spain ;40 but
he uses the termprophasisonly forthe wild chargesthat Hannibal
makes against the Romans and Saguntines during the argument
over SaQuntumr.4 nreferrings to denote occasion or
the term &doouhi
OVXXOyLO/AOuS KacL Sa' c'V FrL TO KpLvacl Tl KaL rpoOaeOOL rapacytv6jAo/0a. (3.6.7). But
he does not define prophasis.
39 3.6.9-14.
40 3.9.6-10.6.
413.15.9 KaO6Xov 5' 7'V rrX^p7js &XoylaS KaO Ovu,oD3ltaCLov. 61o Kal TraLs /Av CX7)7Lva?s
aLTLaIs OVK iXP?TO, KLT4iEvye 4 rpo,04 eLs AX6-yovs.

6Ets
valid excuse.42 Despite his air of dogmatismPolybius is not trying

to establisha technicaldiplomaticusage forprophasis, and he does
not help us at all to understandthe terminologyof Thucydides.
It is perhaps typical of the pragmaticmannerof Polybius that
he should want to assign precisecauses fora war, in the "scientific"
style,43as for an earthquake. Thucydides in writingabout the
war, as about the plague, is really more concernedto tell how it
happened and what it was like; he is less dogmatic about causes
and much moredetailed in describingprophaseis.
A notable exception to this rule is in the Funeral Oration of
Pericles. Pericles proposes to discuss what makes Athens a great
nation and he scorns to describe to the people the stages of their
growthand the particulardeeds that established the empire; he
expects these historicaldetails to be familiarto his audience (as
they would be to a reader who had read Book 1), and he says:
ar be o"as Te EhrLrlt7EvcTes rXOoJIEv'Er' avTa Kal AEO' otas 1roXLrELaS KaL
,rpOrcovi O'lC,V MEyaXa E7Evero, r-ra f5?7XCWcas rpcVTrov EL/.LL KatL Ehrl Tov
Trcv'E Ehrawoov(2.36.4). Polybius certainly has these words in mind
when he declares his intentionof explainingwhat kind of constitu-
tion the Romans had whichenabled themto foundtheirempireand
a4rb rroLas rpo%o-Ecs 7X bvva/IEcos op,/770E'vrEs&EXELpm7o-av TOlS TOlOVTOLS Kal
r7XLKOVTOLS Ep7OLS (1.3.7).
It would have been quite impossible for Pericles to call the
Athenian tradition the prophasis of Athenian greatness. It is,
therefore,surprisingto many readers that in his most dogmatic
assertionabout the causes of the PeloponnesianWar Thucydides
shouldwriteas follows: toTl 65 'Xvo-av (sc. ra's -rovbais) ras abTlas
7rpovfypai/a 7rpi-OToV KaL T'as &aoopas, -ro AU' rtva ?flT?aTal rOTE t OT-ov
-oo Xros7rXEMos OrlS 'EXX770tKaTE-Tfl. rIvA',Uv
-yXp aXfloEo7arqv rpOXaacv,
& Xo6yco,
5avEo-ra'r?7v robs 'AOvalovs17yo-u/aL/E-yaXOVS7l7VO/ VOUVKal
ck6fov 7rapexovTas roZs AaKEbalqovLoLs aiva-yKafat Es rTOV
7ro?Xov* at (' s TO
5avEpowvXEyo/IEvaL
alrLaL ai8' rloav gKaTEpW',a+' xv XUv
Mr&aJ'TEs uIrovAas
Es -ro'v irbE,0oV Karorr-qo-av (1.23.5-6).
Critics have been tempted to interpretthis passage as though
Thucydides wrote aXfOEo-craJr-v
at-Tlav instead of 7rpo6aov, thinking
42 3.14.10
TabT71s be TfS r6oXews (sc. Saguntum) brtlp&TO KaTa v'va/LY &7reiXe&OaL,
,u5Aq.av &4op,/7t'v 6uoXoyov,uAeivv
flovX6,uAevos 6o6vaL roD 7roMki,ov
'PcW,uaIots,cs ra&XXa
7ra&vraf3e/3
aios IX' ai)rbv 7roL27oaLro.
43 Polybius
is fond of reminding us that he is concerned with the how and the
when and the why (e.g. 3.1.3-4; 1.2.1).
that he mustofferthemthe "true underlyingcause" of the war and

that this is it. Jaegerlays greatemphasison the idea of compulsion
and thinks Thucydides means "the immanent necessity of the
events," a view which appears to be shared by David Grene.44
Such a view, however,is made possibleonly by a misunderstanding
of the Greek text46- by maintainingthat prophasismeans "scien-
tificcause" (Jaeger)or "underlyingcause" (Grene). If Thucydides
had meant that, he could have writtenaitiovs 7'7-yov3alrovs'AO77valovs
ava-yK6wavTas. He would then be blamingthe Athenians,just as
Socrates in Plato's Gorgias blames Chaerephon for delaying him:
UE, kevcvyopa Ava&KAoKaUs
Tro'rwv aVrTos XaLp&/xawv /as &arp/'4aL." He
does not blamethe Athenianshere,because he is not concernedwith
praise or blame, like some later Greek historians,but with explain-
ing the Spartan point of view. He wants to give theirprophasis
forgoing to war, theirmotive,excuse, or occasion, and, as he tells
us again later,this was reallyfear- the fearof a worsealternative
to war; when the Spartans finallydecided to declare war, they did
so, according to Thucydides, "not so much because they were
persuaded by the argumentsof their allies as because they feared
the Athenians and the possible furtherextensionof their power"
(1.88). There is compulsionupon them only in so far as they are
compelled to choose between two disagreeable alternatives,like
Gyges in the storyas Herodotus tells it, who is "compelled" to kill
Candaules, when presentedwith the choice of killinghis king or
perishinghimself;47he does not blame the wife of Candaules for
putting this compulsion on him; the blame really rests on Can-
daules himself,who was so foolishas to admit Gyges into his bed-
chamberand thus became the cause of his own destruction.
Whatever preciselyone may think Thucydides means by pro-
44W. Jaeger, Paideia (Eng. trans.) 1.389-394; D. Grene, Man in His Pride
(Chicago 1950) 56-61.
* As Gomme points out in his comment on Thuc. 1.23.6. See also his review of
Grene's book, CR 66 (1952) 74.
46 Plato, Gorg. 447A, cf. Rep. 6.509c. Cf. also the language of Thuc. 4.65.4, when
the Athenians fined Eurymedon and exiled Sophocles, thinking it impossible that they
could have withdrawn from Sicily unless they had been bribed: airia 6' 'v i 7rapc
X&yovTr5V 7rXe6vwv edrpacyia acroZLsbrorOeLoa LoXbvris iXirl6os.
47 Hdt. 1.11.3-4. One might also compare the language in which Thucydides
describes the revolt of Mytilene. They had intended to revolt before the war (3.2.1);
now, before their plans are complete, the Athenians, frightened of losing their fleet to
the other side (3.3.1), anticipate their move by demanding that they surrender their
ships and dismantle their walls; and this compels the Mytilenians to fight (3.3-4.2).
phasis in this famoussentence,thereis no doubt that he is telling

us what he considers the most importantfactor in the minds of
the Spartans (though they may not have spoken much about it).
He contrastsit with the aitiai that were in men's mouthson both
sides; these are not the "causes" of Polybius,but the chargesmade
by one side against the other,as is shown by the use of EKaTkTpwv
and the couplingof the word with&a8Lopal. These complaintsand
quarrels,as the subsequent narrativewill show, lead in time to a
breachof the treatyand a prophasisof war; this is how Thucydides
sums it up at the end of Book 1, in language that is clearlyintended
to recall the wordsof this chapter.48
Thucydides evidentlymeans that although the recriminations
over Corcyra and Potidaea did indeed lead to a prophasisof war,
another prophasis which had nothingto do with these disputes
mustnot be forgotten - the fearofAthenianimperialism. Demos-
thenes has made us familiarwith the notion of an AX,1O'sirpocaaws,
the true reason (or purpose) of an action that a man would give if
compelled to tell the truth,as contrastedwith the formalexcuse
or pretextthat he offersor the occasion that gives him his excuse.
The parallel withthe passage fromthe De Coronais almost perfect:
Philip concealed his true prophasis and pretended that he was
carryingout the decisionsof the Amphictyons,makinguse of pro-
phaseis which.Aeschinesprovidedforhim.49
Since it was the Peloponnesians who opened hostilities,it is
they, not the Athenians,who are on the defensivein the inquiry
that Thucydides is conducting. They were provided with pro-
phaseis by the episodes of Corcyraand Potidaea, just as Aeschines
providedPhilip with "pretextsand occasions." But the trueexpla-
nation, fear (like the true explanation of Philip's acts, which was
greed and lust forconquest), they preferredto keep to themselves,
as it did them littlecredit. No prophasisis offeredforthe Athen-
ians, as they are not technicallythe aggressorsand have no need
to defendthemselves.
In thispassage, then,as elsewhere,we have the contrastbetween
positive grievancesor accusations (aitiai) and explanationsin de-
fence of one's action (prophaseis). Thel same antithesis can be
seen in the speech which the Mytilenians make at Olympia.50
48 1.146. The Greek is quoted on p. 217 above.
49 Dem. 18.156 (see p. 213 above).
50 3.9-14.
They begin by admittingthat there is a natural prejudice against

any secedingstate which renouncesan alliance in war time, if the
seceding state and the ally are equally matched in power and if
thereis no reasonableprophasisforsecession; "but such is not the
situation between us and the Athenians." In the followingthree
chapters, therefore,they describe the situation. First, they say
what the Athenians have done they have enslaved their allies
one by one, so that it became impossibleto feel any confidencein
them as leaders of a confederacy,leaving the more powerfulstates
to the end and lettingLesbos enjoy a nominal sort of autonomy.
Then they describe and justify their own behaviour and their
relationshipwith Athens, which hardly deserves the name of
"friendship,"since it was fear, not good-will, that kept them
together.
The rhetoricaldivision of the speech is clear; firsttheir com-
plaint against the Athenians, then their defence of themselves.
Athens was waiting for an opportunityto make them tributary
subjects, while they were waiting foran opportunityto withdraw
fromthis so-called alliance. "You cannot blame us," they say,
"for secedingwhile theyhesitated,instead of waitingto make sure
whethertheywould attack us; ifthe initiativerestedwiththem,we
surely had the right to anticipate them by defensive action
these are our prophaseisand aitiai": rotabTas EXOVTEs 7FpO4ATUSL KaC
airtas, co AlaKE3atC,AvLoLKaCL(v/..aXOL, a7rEoTflAEV, a4ELs I.avro?s aCKOvova(
Pyv&'c~ &S EtKOTS EApc9:p
afaaTEv, cKav 'as b5efl/LaESEK4f30aatc KaL 7rpo's a9oTaXELcav
Lva pTE#cla (3.13.1).
The prophaseisare their "excuses," the reasons which justify
theirsecession;and theyare "plain enoughto convinceour hearers
that we acted fairly";and the aitiai (the Athenianactions of which
they complain) are "sufficient to frightenus and make us look for
safety." The Mytilenians in this sentence put their "excuses"
first;but the "accusations" have preceded them in chapters 10
and 11, as indeed they must; just as with the PeloponnesianWar
itself, the airat KaL bta4opat precede because they provide the
-pOq4o-Ls roV alroo-r7vat.
Thus we may say that when Thucydides directly contrasts
prophasiswith aitia he contrasts"defence" or "justification"with
"accusation" or "grievance." And he was not thefirstGreekauthor
to do this; we findexactly the same contrastin the Old Oligarch,
when he describesthe behaviourof a democraticgovernmentthat
does notwishto standby an agreement:

aaaa 6' av o067fl/os
OvUvOTaL,
EOtUr7 abTC#)
EVL 'acVaTLOEVTL v
pr7 a7trta rc,
EayOVPL KalL -c, Irc4/fl4qlcaWTl
appldoOal TOlS aclXXOTlO VL 0
lraptpv ov
OE& apEOKEL E/OLYE, a O-W7KELIEVa rvvvGa-
VOpTral (V' rX2pEl T&,
r Xp , Kal'l .A' aOtl Eal Tra-Vha,7rpo oEs Avptcas
E477Vp77KETOv /A7rOEtv ooaa av 3Xo avw .
$1[Xen.] Ath. Resp. 2.17. The language of Thuc. 3.82.4 (from the discussion
of stasis) is more difficult:roTXIAa
jAyp -y,p &6'ywo-ros &vupelaOr/LraLpos ivoyj-O, j4XXqoLs
Sc 7rpo7O76s beELXLa evrpev's, rT 5' o-CoipovroV &vIuvOpoVwp6ofX77pa, Kac rT irphs rav
UVvcThJ'f xav&p"y6vv r6 5 iALrX?KTrS6o&v4pb LoSpolpq 7rpooeTkO77,&o-0aXeq ,i r
e7r43ovXev'oaouaL &7rorpois vp64rLoaoseviXo-yos.The reading T,6caXeiq must certainly be
preferred to the nominative &o,&XLeLa,but the precise meaning of this closing remark
has puzzled commentators. One solution (cf. Deichgraber [note 2 above] p. 12) is to
take safety as the object of planning - "planning with a view to safety was regarded
as a specious excuse for declining action." This is admitted to be a repetition or
variation of what he has just said; we should expect Thucydides to add some new
thought, instead of merely repeating himself; and in difficultpassages of this sort it is
always best to seek enlightenment in what follows, where we find that "planning" or
"plotting" is accepted as a respectable precaution - i7rL3ovXeboas be,TSL TvXc.v tvverbs
icc bropo'aas eTL bewo'repos. Evidently, then, though the caution of delay was derided,
the precaution of plotting or anticipating a plot was admired. I would propose to
take the dative &o-aXeiq as governed by 7rpoo-eriO'(like &v5p6syolpq), to put a comma
after b7rLqovuevEruaroaL,and to take &7rorporis in the meaning of "defending oneself"
(not "declining action") and as a defining genitive with 7rpo6r,arLs:"An impulsive bold
act was attributed to manly courage, but plotting an attack was attributed to 'pre-
caution' - the excuse of 'defending oneself' was considered reasonable."
Postscript. This article was already in proof when my attention was drawn to
the discussion of prophasis by J. Lohmann, "Das Verhiiltnis des abendlandischen
Menschen zur Sprache," Lexis 3 (1952) 5-49 (esp. 18-28, 33-34). He has anticipated
me in some criticisms of current views; but I cannot agree with him that the later
Greek usage of the word is so greatly differentfrom the earlier and I am not convinced
by his attempt to explain the so-called "objective" meaning of prophasis as prophai-
nomenon ("Vorerscheinung"), in the sense that the prophasis of war or disease is the
phenomenon which precedes it.

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Prophasis and Aitia

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XVI.-Prophasis and Aitia

These two words do not, as a rule, offerany special difficulty

ing since modern English has differentiated"cause" and "case"

"whether my prophasis was sexual desire or anything else." If Agamemnon had

tion forthe expedition;but it is also a statementof his purpose; he

look natural; they do not allow themselvesmiracles to convince

O-os Ofiva'LTcav 4 uet ,3poToZs

(Moralia 17B, Aesch. Fr. 156, Nauck).

not accept this semi-technicaluse of the word without tryingto

Beforeexamininghow Thucydides uses this word in describing

There is a passage in the De Corona where the true prophasis

Take, forexample, the openingof the FirstPhilippic wherehe says

insistingthat they have the perfectopportunityfor action (o gEv

lEpOlSavaapa^as Ka 7avrEs auvtaatv, ra9-' acEaOaL rapaLvEL (20.149).

Athens asking help against Syracuse "on the strengthof theirold

31 KaL IIavoaviov C,.vav-rov X6ovTroSKaL ePWTWVTOST7?7 irpo6qao-v T7rS LKeTrelas fOovTro

when Nicias complains that the Atheniansare aiming at the con-

Here the meaning of the word is the defensiveone of "excuse."

has no quarrelwithThucydidesand no doubt thinkshe is borrowing

aLTLaIs OVK iXP?TO, KLT4iEvye 4 rpo,04 eLs AX6-yovs.

valid excuse.42 Despite his air of dogmatismPolybius is not trying

that he mustofferthemthe "true underlyingcause" of the war and

phasis in this famoussentence,thereis no doubt that he is telling

They begin by admittingthat there is a natural prejudice against

does notwishto standby an agreement:

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