Joselano Guevarra v. Atty Jose Emmanuel Eala, AC No.

7136, August 1, 2007

Facts:

Wife of petitioner, Irene Moje was having an illicit affair with the respondent. After leaving the
conjugal home, petitioner found out that Irene and respondent was living together in a residential
house few blocks away from the church they were married. Few months thereafter, Irene gave
birth to a baby girl and wrote the name of the respondent as the father in the certificate of live
birth.

Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of marriage to Irene and a criminal complaint for
adultery against respondent and Irene.

Petitioner also filed a complaint for disbarment before the IBP-CBD on the ground of gross
immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath which was dismissed by the IBP
Board of Governors due to lack of merit.

Hence, the petition of complaint before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Would an illicit affair between a married lawyer and a married woman constitute gross immoral
conduct?

Ruling:

Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage
should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances."
The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is
not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.

Sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests

deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws. (Vitug v. Rongcal)

Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral
conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession.
This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor
and privileges which his license confers upon him. (Tucay v. Atty. Tucay)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law.

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution

reading: Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional
provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support."

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."

WHEREFORE, Petition is GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is

DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

DOMINADOR P. BURBE VS. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA AC NO. 99-634. JUNE

10, 2002

Facts: Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money
against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not
successful and so the former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner
paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case.

A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the status of
his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer, to
prove that the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to
the JusticeHall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the
prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the
case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent
that day.

Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of court
to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed.

Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay
was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that
he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own
purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2)
checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in theamounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00,
respectively.

Issue: Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
IBP as follows: “It is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law
Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing
fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created
and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client.
The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited
by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent
of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent
for his misappropriation of said funds.”

Efigenia Tenoso, complainant

Atty Anselmo Echanez, respondent

Facts:
Complainant Efigenia Tenoso filed a complaint against Atty Anselmo Echanez, respondent
alleging that the latter was engaged in notarial practice without having been properly
commissioned by RTC Santiago City, the court having jurisdiction over Cordon, Isabela. The
complainant support her allegations by presenting documents issued by Executive Judge Efren
Cacatian bearing the names of commissioned notaries public for the years 2006 to 2008 which
respondent’s name does not appear; documents notarized by the respondent in year 2006, 2007
and 2008, and a copy of a certification issued by Judge Cacatian stating respondent’s notarization
could not be authenticated. Respondent denied the allegations and added he never committed any
malpractice, nor deceit nor have violated the lawyer’s oath and that such allegations is politically
motivated and meant to harass or intimidate him and guessed that the affidavit-complaint were
tampered and adulterated or that somebody might forged his signature.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty Echanez’s contention is tenable.
Rulings:
No. The court empahasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that “ a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to this brethren in the profession, to
the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State-the
administration of justice-as an officer of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain not
only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-ligitants, courts, other
lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public instruments.
Respondent committed act of deceit and falsehood in open violation of the explicit pronouncement
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Evidently, respondent’s conduct falls miserably short
of the high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers. It is
proper that he be sanctioned.

ANITA C. PENA v. ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO

A.C. No. 4191, 10 June 2013, (Per Curiam)

Facts: Complainant was the owner of a parcel of land covered by a TCT with an apartment
constructed thereon. She personally knew Atty. Paterno, as she was her lawyer in a legal separation
case. The TCT, however, was with the GSIS since complainant had a balance on her previous loan
with the former. The title was released when Atty. Paterno lent some money to complainant to pay
the loan. That, sometime in 1986, she gave Atty. Paterno her owner’s duplicate of said TCT upon
insistence by respondent that she (complainant) should apply for a loan from a bank and use the
TCT as collateral to finance the construction of townhouses on her property for sale to interested
buyers. Because of her assurances, complainant did not bother to check on her property, relying
on Atty. Paterno's words that she would handle speedily the preparation of her application for loan.
Later, in 1994, complainant discovered that her apartment was already demolished and that four
residential houses were constructed thereon. When asked about this, Atty. Paterno just ignored
her. After verification, complainant learned that her property was sold on November 1986 to
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., and Atty. Paterno was the Notary Public before whom the sale
was acknowledged. Complainant alleged that she did not sell her property to Krisbuilt and that she
neither signed any deed of sale in its favor nor appeared before Atty. Paterno to acknowledge the
sale. She alleged that Atty. Paterno manipulated the sale of her property to Krisbuilt using her
trusted employee, Estrella D. Kraus, as the instrument in the sale, and that her signature was forged,
as she did not sign any deed selling her property to anyone.

Atty. Paterno, in her defense, belied the allegations of complainant arguing that it was complainant
who requested her to secure bank loans for the construction of townhouses on her property and
that it was her who negotiated the sale of the property with the Spouses Kraus (owners of
Krisbuilt). Complainant allegedly told Atty. Paterno that she would inform respondent when the
transaction was completed so that the deed of sale could be recorded in the Notarial Book.
Thereafter, Atty. Paterno claimed that she had no knowledge of what transpired between
complainant and the Spouses Kraus. Atty. Paterno stated that she was never entrusted with
complainant's certificate of title.

Issue: WON Atty. Paterno is administratively liable for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Notarial Law.

Held: Yes. The Investigating Commissioner gave credence to complainant's testimony that she
gave respondent her owner's copy of the certificate of title to her property as respondent would
apply for a bank loan in complainant's behalf, using the subject property as collateral. Respondent
admitted in her Answer that she executed the Deed of Sale per the request of the Spouses Kraus.
The said Deed of Sale was notarized by respondent as evidenced by Entry No. 15032237 in
complainant's title. As the Deed of Sale could not be presented in evidence, through no fault of the
complainant, nonetheless, the consequence thereof is failure of complainant to prove her allegation
that her signature therein was forged and that respondent defrauded complainant by facilitating the
sale of the property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. without complainant's approval. However,
complainant proved that respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila,
National Capital Region her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986, when the Deed of
Sale was executed.

The Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila issued a Certification stating that respondent was duly
appointed as a Notary Public for the City of Manila for the year 1986, and that respondent has not
yet forwarded to the Clerk of Court's Office her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986,
when the Deed of Sale was executed and notarized by her. The failure of respondent to fulfill her
duty as notary public to submit her notarial register for the month of November 1986 and a copy
of the said Deed of Sale that was notarized by her on the same month is cause for revocation of
her commission under Section 249 of the Notarial Law.

The failure of respondent to submit to the proper RTC Clerk of Court her Notarial Register/Report
for the month of November 1986 and a copy of the Deed of Sale, which was notarized by her
within that month, has far-reaching implications and grave consequences, as it in effect suppressed
evidence on the veracity of the said Deed of Sale and showed the deceitful conduct of respondent
to withhold the truth about its authenticity.

Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended
for any deceit or dishonest act. For the aforementioned deceitful conduct, respondent is disbarred
from the practice of law. As a member of the bar, respondent failed to live up to the standards
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following Canons:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.

Atty. Paterno was disbarred from the practice of law and her notarial commission was perpetually
revoked.

VICTOR LINGAN VS. ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB AND JIMMU P. BALIGA

A.C. NO. 5377, JUNE 15, 2006
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
A complaint for disbarment was filed by Victor Lingan against Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and
Jimmy Baliga on November 16, 2000. Complainant alleged that respondents, both notaries
public, falsified certain public documents, as follows:
1. A complaint for annulment of title with damages filed by Isaac Villegas against complainant
with the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Respondent Calubaquib signed the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the complaint as notary public and
entered the same as Doc. No. 182; Page No. 38; Book No. CLXXII; Series of 1996, which
according to the records of the National Archives, the document entered as Doc. No. 182; Page
38; Book No. CLXXII; Series of 1996 in respondent Calubaquib’s notarial register was an
affidavit of one Daniel Malayao.
2. A special power of attorney dated September 10, 1996 executed by Isaac Villegas appointing
respondent Calubaquib as his attorney-in-fact to “enter into a compromise agreement under such
terms and conditions acceptable to him” which was notarized by respondent Baliga and entered
as Doc. No. 548, Page No. 110; Book No. VIII; Series of 1996, which according to respondent
Baliga’s notarial register, Doc. No. 548; Page No. 110; Book No. VIII; Series of 1996 pertains to
an affidavit of loss of one Pedro Telan, dated August 26, 1996.
3. A petition for reappointment as notary public for and in Tuguegarao,Cagayan by respondent
Baliga, which was notarized by respondent Calubaquib and entered in his notarial register as
Doc. No. 31, Page No. 08, Book No. CXXX, Series of 1995. However, Notarial Register Book
No. CXXX was for the year 1996 and entered there as Doc. No. 31, Page No. 08 was a
cancellation of real estate mortgage dated January 11, 1996.
Respondents Calubaquib and Baliga both admitted the incorrectness of the entries and simply
attributed them to the inadvertence in good faith of their secretary and legal assistants to whom
they had left the task of entering all his notarial documents.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents violated the Notarial Practice Law
RULING:
It is abundantly clear that the notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial
register. Section 245 of the Notarial Law provides that every notary public shall keep a register
to be known as the notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as
notary; and he shall supply a certified copy of such record, or any part thereof, to any person
applying for it and
paying the legal fees therefore. Section 246 of the same law also provides that the notary public
shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn
to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the
instrument, the witnesses, if any, to the signature, the date of execution, oath, or
acknowledgment of the instrument, the fees collected by him for his services as notary in
connection therewith, and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep a correct copy thereof
as part of his records, and shall likewise enter in said records a brief description of the substance
thereof and shall give to each entry a consecutive number, beginning with number one in each
calendar year. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the
instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be
left between entries.
In this connection, Section 249(b) provides that the failure of the notary to make the proper entry
or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law shall, in
the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his
commission:
Respondents cannot be relieved of responsibility for the violation of the aforesaid sections by
passing the buck to their secretaries, a reprehensible practice which to this day persists despite
our open condemnation.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act but one invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized to do so may act as notaries
public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized
to act must be prevented from inflicting themselves upon the public, the courts and the
administrative offices in general.
Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one and makes it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Notaries public must therefore
observe utmost care with respect to the basic requirements of their duties.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondents Atty. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Atty.
Jimmy P. Baliga are hereby found guilty of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and of their lawyer’s oath. They are both ordered SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately, with a warning that another
infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
Their present commissions as notaries public, if any, are hereby REVOKED, with
DISQUALIFICATION from reappointment as notaries public for a period of two years.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Atty. Romeo I. Calubaquib
and Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga, and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office
of the Court Administrator and Office of the Bar Confidant for dissemination to all courts
nationwide.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

IN RE: CAESAR DISTRITO

FACTS:
On April 23, 2003, the petitioner filed his Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll
of Attorneys alleging that on April 4, 2003, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Bacolod, rendered a decision acquitting him in Criminal Case No. 99609.

The petitioner stated that an invitation[14]cralaw was sent to him by the IBP Negros Occidental
Chapter to attend the testimonial dinner and the annual judicial excellence awarding ceremonies,
but that there was no mention of any induction ceremony.Considering the he in fact successfully
passed the bar examinations and was being recognized therefore he was inspired to attend the
occasion.He admitted that during the occasion, all those who just passed the bar exams were called
for the induction of new members, and that he was left with no choice but to join the others onstage
when his name was called.However, the petitioner did not intend to deceive or to keep the IBP in
the dark, as he in fact informed them of his status.To prove the absence of malice on his part, he
did not sign any document that night.
 ISSUE: w/n Caesar distrito is fit to take the lawyer’s oath and sign in the roll of attorneys

RULING:

The petitioner's erroneous belief that a person who passed the bar examinations may allow himself
to be called an attorney should be corrected.An applicant who has passed the required examination
or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before
the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.[31]cralaw The Court shall thereupon admit the
applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to
be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him by
the clerk of court, which certificates shall be his authority to practice.[32]cralaw The clerk of the
Supreme Court shall keep a Roll of Attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by
the person admitted when he receives his certificate..[33]cralaw

The Oath is thus a prerequisite to the admission to the practice of law, while the signing in the Roll
is the last act that finally signifies membership in the bar, giving the applicant the right to call
himself "attorney".Continued membership in the IBP and regular payment of membership dues
and other lawful assessments that it may levy are conditions sine qua non to the privilege to
practice law and to the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys.[34]cralaw

The unauthorized use of the said appellation may render a person liable for indirect contempt of
court.[35]cralawThe Court may deny the applicant's petition to take the Lawyer's Oath for grave
misconduct, such as calling himself and "attorney" and appearing as counsel for clients in courts
even before being admitted to the bar.[36]cralaw Although the evidence in this case does not include
that the petitioner actually engaged in the practice of law, the fact is that he signed in an attendance
sheet as "Atty. Caesar Distrito."He called himself "attorney" knowing fully well that he was not
yet admitted to the bar.[37]cralaw

Thus, we disagree with the findings of the OBC, and find that the petitioner is unfit to become a
member of the bar.The petitioner must show this Court that he has satisfied the moral requirements
before he can be admitted to the practice of law.

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE, HARON S.

MEILING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS
MEMBER OF PHILIPPINE SHARI'A BAR, MELENDREZ.

FACTS:
1. MELENDREZ filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S.
Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate
disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
1. Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has
three (3) pending criminal cases both for Grave Oral Defamation and for Less Serious Physical
Injuries.
i. Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of
media practitioners and other people.
ii. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the
injuries to the latter.
2. Alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as Secretary to the
Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
2. MELING explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired Judge Corocoy
Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle misunderstanding.
1. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy
over them, considered the three cases that arose from a single incident as “closed and terminated.”
i. Denies the charges and added that the acts do not involve moral turpitude.
2. Use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the
word “Attorney” as they were typed by the office clerk.
3. Office of Bar Confidant disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling:
1. Meling should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a
retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending.
2. Even if these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court
to ascertain his good moral character.

ISSUE:
WON Meling’s act of concealing cases constitutes dishonesty. YES.

HELD:
PETITION IS GRANTED. MEMBERSHIP IS SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court,
the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling
from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine
Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic (Meling did not pass the
bar).

1. Rule 7.01: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing
a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.”
1. He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as
“attorney” whoever may have typed the letters. i. Unauthorized use
of the appellation “attorney” may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.
2. PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE.
1. Limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly
ascertained and certified.
2. Requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public
and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
3. Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant that applicant to aver that he or
she “has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a
fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court
 or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or
charge against him/her.”
1. Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes
concealment, done under oath at that.

AGUIRRE VS RANA
EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT

Facts:

Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled mass oath-
taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate
in an election.

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal

government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As
such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of

acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging
respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent
the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
Issue:

Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not
deserve admission to the Philippine Bar

Ruling:

the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of
legal knowledge or skill.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does
not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law
is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However,
it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact
that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites
for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO,

PETITIONER. (DIGEST)

B.M. No. 2540

September 24, 2013

TOPIC:

Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing of the Roll of Attorneys

FACTS:

Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the
Attorney’s Oath at the PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,
but failed to do so allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys.
Several years later, while rummaging through his things, he found said Notice. He then realized
that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was
probably just an attendance record.

He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as
important. The matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.

In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll number for
his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable
to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither
willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s
gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that petitioner could offer no
valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition
of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the
ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions. In
this case, said action is not warranted.

The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition himself, albeit
after the passage of more than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses the character
required to be a member of the Philippine Bar; and that he appears to have been a competent and
able legal practitioner, having held various positions at different firms and companies.

However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.

A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to

know the law and its consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he
had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys.
However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was just an attendance record, he
could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, he should
have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it was the act of
signing therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to
continue practicing law, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the
unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As
aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to conduct themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession.
Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. However, the Court imposed
upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1)
year after receipt of the Resolution. He was also made to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the
one-year period, petitioner was not allowed to engage in the practice of law.

IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE

PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner.
The Facts

Epifanio B. Muneses, a Filipino and member of the Philippine Bar but lost the privilege because
he became a citizen of the United States of America on August 28, 1981. On September 15, 2006
reacquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003" (R.A. No. 9225). He intends to retire in the Philippines & return to the practice of
law after compliance with the requirements of the Office of the Bar Confidant, hence this
petition.

Issue

If petitioner, after reacquiring Philippine citizenship, can practice law in the Philippines.

Decision

The court - In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, allowed Benjamin M. Dacanay (a
Filipino citizen and a barrister who migrated to Canada) to return to the practice of law after
complying with R.A. No. 9225 and the requirements of the Office of the Bar Confidant to wit:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP on updated payments of annual membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with
public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.

Wherefore, the petition of Atty. Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby granted.

ATTY. PALAD VS. LOLIT SOLIS, ET. AL GR #206691 OCT 3, 2016

FACTS:
On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
issued a Resolution in CBD Case No. 09-2498, recommending the penalty of suspension of
herein petitioner Atty. Raymund P. Palad.

Petitioner averred that on April 23, 2013, he received a text message from his fellow lawyer
friends informing him that the latter read in an article in Filipino Star Ngayon that petitioner was
already suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. The article was written by
respondent Solis in her column "Take it, Take it", which was also published on the tabloid's
website.

Petitioner also alleged that respondent Lo broached the same topic in his column Funfare in The
Philippine Star on April23, 2013.

Petitioner avowed that respondents clearly violated the confidentiality rule in proceedings
against attorneys as provided by Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court when they disclosed the
pending administrative case to the public and are, likewise, liable for indirect contempt since
they made comments, opinions and conclusions as to the findings of the IBP Board of Governors
regarding the administrative case against him.

In their Joint Comment, respondent Solis alleged that she has been an entertainment journalist
for forty (40) years who writes about anything that pertains to both local and international
entertainment industry, including, among others, news about local and international celebrities
and personalities who are associated with them. On the other hand, respondent Asis contended
that she has been the editor of Pilipino Star Ngayon's Showbiz section for four years. As editor,
she edits the articles submitted to the entertainment section by the entertainment columnists
before they are published, but she has no control or discretion over the topics that the columnists
write.
Solis and Lo further claimed that sometime in April 2013, they received information from a
reliable source that petitioner was reportedly suspended from the practice of law for supposed
violation of the code of ethics. They argued that the administrative case against petitioner is a
matter of public interest because he became a public figure by gaining national recognition and
notoriety as the ardent counsel of Katrina Halili, whose scandal with Hayden Kho made
headlines a few years ago. Petitioner inevitably became an overnight celebrity lawyer due to his
extensive media exposure in defending his client. The issue with which petitioner was associated
as Halili's lawyer generated so much publicity, captured the entire nation's attention, and even
led to a Senate investigation. As such, they alleged that their writings about petitioner's
suspension arc considered qualified privileged communication, which is protected under the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents violated rule 139-b of the rules of court which declares that proceedings
against attorney shall be private and confidential.

No.
It is settled that Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom
of the press. As long as there is a legitimate public interest, the media is not prohibited from
making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a disbarment complaint. However, in the absence
of a legitimate public interest in a disbarment complaint, members of the media must preserve
the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its pendency.

The Court has always grappled with the meaning of the term "public intcrest." Public interest is
something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some
interest by which their legal rights or liabilities arc affected; it does not mean anything so narrow
as mere curiosity, or as the interests of the particular localities, which may be affected by the
matters in question. As observed in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:

“In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to
determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it
relates to or affects the public.”

Since petitioner has become a public figure for being involved in a public issue, and because the
event itself that led to the filing of the disciplinary case against petitioner is a matter of public
interest, the media has the right to report the disciplinary case as legitimate news. The legitimate
media has a right to publish such fact under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.
Respondents merely reported on the alleged penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
year against petitioner, and the supposed grounds relied upon. It appeared that the respondents,
as entertainment writers, merely acted on information they received from their source about the
petitioner who used to appear before the media in representing his actress client. Also, there was
no evidence that the respondents published the articles to influence this Court on its action on the
disciplinary case or deliberately destroy petitioner's reputation. Thus, they did not violate the
confidentiality rule in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers.

Furthermore, to be considered malicious, the libelous statement must be shown to have been
written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether
they are false or not. "Reckless disregard of what is false or not" means that the author or
publisher entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication, or that he possesses a high
degree of awareness of their probable falsity.

Aside from his bare allegation, petitioner presented no proof that respondents have their own
copies of the Resolution, or that they made their own comments, opinions and conclusions.
Petitioner also failed to prove that the publication of the articles is malicious. Likewise, there
was no evidence that respondents entertained awareness of the probable falsity of their
information.

JOSEPH C. CHUA VS. ATTY. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO

A.C. NO. 10671. DECEMBER 5, 2016

Facts
Before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) filed by respondent Atty. Arturo M. De
Castro (Atty. De Castro) of the Court's Resolution dated November 25, 2015 which found him
liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and was meted out the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months.

Chua alleged that his company, Nemar Computer Resources Corp. (NCRC) filed a collection
case against Dr. Concepcion Aguila Memorial College, represented by its counsel Atty. De
Castro. According to Chua, since the filing of the collection case on June 15, 2006, it took more
than five (5) years to present one witness of NCRC due to Atty. De Castro's propensity to seek
postponements of agreed hearing dates for unmeritorious excuses. Atty. De Castro's flimsy
excuses would vary from simple absence without notice, to claims of alleged ailment unbacked
by any medical certificates, to claims of not being ready despite sufficient time given to prepare,
to the sending of a representative lawyer who would profess non-knowledge of the case to seek
continuance, to a plea for the postponement without providing any reason therefore.

For his defense, Atty. De Castro countered that his pleas for continuance and resetting were
based on valid grounds. Also, he pointed out that most of the resetting were [sic] without the
objection of the counsel for NCRC, and that, certain resettings were even at the instance of the
latter.

On April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting and approving with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD. The Board of Governors modified
the penalty meted out to [Atty. De Castro] [by] reducing the period of suspension from six (6)
months to three (3) months.
On November 25, 2015, the Court affirmed the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors. The Court held that Atty. De Castro violated his oath of
office in his handling of the collection case filed against his client. Undaunted with the Court's
ruling, Atty. De Castro filed the present motion for reconsideration. He strongly disputes the
allegations of Chua averring that the long delay in the disposition of the collection case before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) was due to the several postponements which were found
meritorious by the RTC.

Issue
Whether Atty. De Castro's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is proper.

Ruling
After a second hard look at the facts of the case, relevant laws, and jurisprudence, the Court finds
merit in the motion for reconsideration. A lawyer indubitably owes fidelity to the cause of his
clients, and is thus expected to serve the client with competence and utmost diligence. He is
enabled to utilize every honorable means to defend the cause of his client and secure what is due
the latter. Under the CPR, every lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it his duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Upon careful consideration of the circumstances, the Court finds that the delay in the disposition
of Civil Case No. 7939 was not solely attributable to Atty. De Castro. The trial court itself, either
at its own initiative or at the instance of Chua's counsel, allowed the delays. Consequently, if not
all of such delays were attributable to Atty: De Castro's doing, it would be unfair to hold him
solely responsible for the delays caused in the case. Moreover, it appears that the trial court
granted Atty. De Castro's several motions for resetting of the trial; and that at no time did the
trial court sanction or cite him for contempt of court for abuse on account of such motions.
Verily, if his explanations for whatever delays he might have caused were accepted by the trial
court without any reservations or conditions, there would be no legitimate grievance to be justly
raised against him on the matter.

While Atty. De Castro's repeated requests for resetting and postponement of the trial of the case
may be considered as contemptuous if there was a showing of abuse on his part, the Court,
however, finds that Chua failed to show that Atty. De Castro was indeed moved to cause delays
by malice, or dishonesty, or deceit, or grave misconduct as to warrant a finding of administrative
liability against him. The operative phrase for causing delay in any suit or proceeding under Rule
1.03 is ''for any corrupt motive or interest."Considering that this matter concerned Atty. De
Castro's state of mind, it absolutely behooved Chua to present sufficient evidence of the overt
acts committed by Atty. De Castro that demonstrated his having deliberately intended thereby to
do wrong or to cause damage to him and his business. That demonstration, however, was not
made by Chua.

Notwithstanding the absence of malice, dishonesty, or ill motive, it is good to remind Atty. De
Castro that as a member of the Bar, he is expected to exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice and to be more circumspect whenever
seeking the postponements of cases.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Atty.
Arturo M. De Castro is hereby GRANTED. The Court's Resolution dated November 25, 2015
is SET ASIDE. Atty. Arturo M. De Castro is ADMONISHED to exercise the necessary
prudence required in the practice of his legal profession in his representation of the defendant in
Civil Case No. 7939 in the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City.

EUFEMIA A. CAMINO v. ATTY. RYAN REY L. PASAGUI

A. C No. 11095
January 31, 2017

FACTS

Disbarment complaint was filed against respondent Atty. Ryan Rey L. Pasagani before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-commission on bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), that the respondent
violated their agreement for the latter to facilitate and secure a loan to finance the payment of
necessary expenses to transfer the title of a certain property under her name, she claimed that
respondent obtained a loan using their property as a collateral, but atty. Pasagni arrogated the
proceeds.

ISSUE

Whether or not a malpractice or gross misconduct can be used as grounds for disbarment of a
lawyer.
The court ruling was in favor of the complainant, the Court found that the respondent was guilty
of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in converting the money of his client to his own use
without her consent, his failure to use the proceeds for the transfer of the title in complainant’s
name. He did not only betray the trust and confidence of his client, he is likewise guilty of
engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct.

RULING
The Court affirmed the findings and conclusions of the IBP Board of Governors and imposed the
penalty to disbarment. The Court also ordered to return the load proceeds he received from
Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative Inc.

Wherefore, Resolution No. XX1-2014-938 dated December 14, 2014 of the IBP Board of
Governors which found respondent Atty. Ryan Rey I Pasagan GUILTY of violation for Rule 1.0
if the Code of Professional responsibility affirmed with Modification as to the penalty.
Respondent is instead meted the penalty of Disbarment, Respondent is further ordered to Return
the load proceeds amounting to 1,000.000.00 and to pay legal interest at the rate of twelve
percent per annum computed from the release of the loan on February 15, 2011 up to June 30,
2013 and six percent per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid as well as the 120,000.00
received for the purpose or transferring of the title in the name of the complainant to pay legal
interest at the rate of twelve percent per annum computed from receipt of the amount on
February 3, 2011 up to June 30, 2013 and six percent per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully
paid. He is likewise ordered to return all other documents pertinent to the load obtained from
PHCCI and those received from complaint.

EDGARDO AREOLA, COMPLAINANT,

VS.
ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA, RESPONDENT

Facts:

Areola alleged that during Prisoners’ Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and
called all detainees with pending cases before the Regional Trial Court where she was assigned,
to attend her speech/lecture. Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her
speech:

“O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang-areglo ay maging praktikal sana
kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera
ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay
kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa
drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon.”

Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees should
prepare and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know the facts of their
cases and their defenses and also to give her the necessary payment for their transcript of
stenographic notes.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct or the code professional responsibility

Ruling:

Yes, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and plead for
compassion so that their motions would be granted. This admission corresponds to one of
Areola’s charges against Atty. Mendoza—that she told her clients “Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si
Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon.” Atty. Mendoza made it appear
that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and crying in
order for their cases to be dismissed.

As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made
irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that “a lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.” Rule
15.07 states that “a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness.”

DIGEST: Zalamea v. Atty. De Guzman, A.C. No. 7387, November 7, 2016

Disbarment

MANUEL ENRIQUE L. ZALAMEA, AND MANUEL JOSE L. ZALAMEA,

v.
ATTY. RODOLFO P. DE GUZMAN, JR. AND PERLAS DE GUZMAN, ANTONIO,
VENTURANZA, QUIZON-VENTURANZA, AND HERROSA LAW FIRM

A.C. No. 7387

Third Division
November 07, 2016
Peralta, J.

Facts:

The petitioners, Zalamea brothers, acquired a property in Scout Limbaga, Quezon City from their
mother’s estate with the help of Atty. De Guzman. Said property, however, is mortgaged to
BDO. The property was subsequently foreclosed due to the failure of the Zalameas to pay their
loan. The Zalamea then seek the advice of Atty. De Guzman to reacquire the property. The BDO,
through Atty. De Guzman, agreed to sell the property for P20 Million, and with a 10%
downpayment. Due to lack of funds of the Zalameas, Atty. De Guzman’s wife, Angel, agreed to
shoulder the P2 Million downpayment. Subsequently, Angel was forced to pay the monthly
installments and all in all, paid a total of P13 Million.

Not long after, the relationship, between the Zalamea brothers and the Spouses De Guzman
turned sour. The Spouses De Guzman wanted reimbursement of the amounts which they had
advanced, while the Zalamea brothers claimed sole ownership over the property. Hence, the
brothers filed a disbarment case against De Guzman for allegedly buying a client's property
which was subject of litigation under Article 1491 of the Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether the prohibition under Art. 1491 for lawyers apply in the case.

Ruling:

No. The SC held that the prohibition does not apply in the case.
The Court dismissed the Petition for Disbarment against Atty. Rodolfo P. de Guzman, Jr. for
utter lack of merit.

According to the SC, the prohibition which the Zalameas invoke does not apply where the
property purchased was not involved in litigation. De Guzman clearly never acquired any of his
client's properties or interests involved in litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his
profession. There exists not even an iota of proof indicating that said property has ever been
involved in any litigation in which De Guzman took part by virtue of his profession. True, they
had previously sought legal advice from De Guzman but only on how to handle their mother's
estate, which likewise did not involve the contested property. Neither was it shown that De
Guzman's law firm had taken part in any litigation involving the Speaker Perez property.

The prohibition [in Article 1491] which rests on considerations of public policy and interests is
intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary
and confidential relationship with him.

De Guzman could not have possibly exerted such undue influence, as a lawyer, upon the
Zalameas, as his clients.

MERCULLO AND VEDANO V ATTY. MARIE FRANCES E. RAMON

A.C. 11708. JULY 19, 2016

Facts:
Complainants Verlita Mercullo and Raymond Vedano were authorized by their mother,
Carmelita Verdano, to inquire from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) about the status of her unpaid obligations secured by a mortgage covering their
residential property in Novaliches, Caloocan City. They learned that their mother’s arrear had
amounted to P350,000.

Respondent Atty. Ramon advised them about their right to redeem the property within
one year from foreclosure.
 Complainants handed respondent P350,000 who in turn issued two acknowledgment
receipts for the redemption price and for litigation expenses. She even showed them her
NHMFC identification card.
When complainants went to the NHMFC to follow up on the redemption, they discovered
that Atty. Ramon is no longer connected to them. Nevertheless, respondent informed them that
the redemption is on process and that the certificate of redemption will be issued in two or three
weeks time.
Complainants went to see the Clerk of Court of the RTC in Caloocan City to inquire on
the status of the redemption. There they discovered that respondent had not deposited the
redemption price and had not filed the intent of redeeming the property.
They then demanded the return of the money to which respondent promised to deposit it
in Verlita’s account, but failed to do so.
Complainants brought their disbarment complaint in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).
The IBP required respondent to file her and answer and to attend the mandatory
conference set. Respondent failed to do so.
In IBP Commissioner’s Report and Rrecommendation, he found respondent to have
violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended her suspension
for two years and to return the P350,000. This was adopted by IBP Board of Governors.
Issue:
WON respondent should be disbarred.
Ruling:
The court declared respondent guilty of dishonesty and deceit.
The Lawyer's Oath is a source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer. Any
violation of the oath may be punished with either disbarment, or suspension from the practice of
law, or other commensurate disciplinary action. Every lawyer must at no time be wanting in
probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his admission to the Bar, but
are also essential for his continued membership in the Law Profession. Any conduct unbecoming
of a lawyer constitutes a violation of his oath.
The respondent certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving money from the
complainants after having made them believe that she could assist them in ensuring the
redemption in their mother's behalf. She was convincing about her ability to work on the
redemption because she had worked in the NHFMC. She did not inform them soon enough,
however, that she had meanwhile ceased to be connected with the agency. It was her duty to
have so informed them. She further misled them about her ability to realize the redemption by
falsely informing them about having started the redemption process. She concealed from them
the real story that she had not even initiated the redemption proceedings that she had assured
them she would do. Everything she did was dishonest and deceitful in order to have them part
with the substantial sum of P350,000.00. She took advantage of the complainants who had
reposed their full trust and confidence in her ability to perform the task by virtue of her being a
lawyer. Surely, the totality of her actuations inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal
Profession.
As a lawyer, the respondent was proscribed from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct in her dealings with others, especially clients whom she should
serve with competence and diligence. Her duty required her to maintain fealty to them, binding
her not to neglect the legal matter entrusted to her. Thus, her neglect in connection therewith
rendered her liable. Moreover, the unfulfilled promise of returning the money and her refusal to
communicate with the complainants on the matter of her engagement aggravated the neglect and
dishonesty attending her dealings with the complainants.

The respondent's conduct patently breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful act or omission of the respondent
within the coverage of Rule 1. 01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Code exacted
from her not only a firm respect for the law and legal processes but also the utmost degree of
fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted by them pursuant to their
fiduciary relationship.

Yet another dereliction of the respondent was her wanton disregard of the several notices sent to
her by the IBP in this case. Such disregard could only be wrong because it reflected her
undisguised contempt of the proceedings of the IBP, a body that the Court has invested with the
authority to investigate the disbarment complaint against her. She thus exhibited her
irresponsibility as well as her utter disrespect for the Court and the rest of the Judiciary. It cannot
be understated that a lawyer in her shoes should comply with the orders of the Court and of the
Court's duly constituted authorities, like the IBP, the office that the Court has particularly tasked
to carry out the specific function of investigating attorney misconduct.

The Court FINDS and HOLDS ATTY. MARIE

FRANCES E. RAMON guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath; SUSPENDS HER
FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS
EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the
future will be dealt with more severely; ORDERS her to return to the complainants the sum of
P350,000.00 within 30 days from notice, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the
finality of this decision until full payment.