ELECTION LAWS l Atty.
Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
PART I – ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
DEFINITION OF ELECTIONS
Q. How do you define election?
It is the means by which the people choose their officials for a definite
and fixed period and to whom they entrust for the time being, the
exercise of the powers of government.
Q. What are the “means” to choose officials?
Either manual or automated system.
Q. What is the basis for the phrase “people choose their
officials?”
It is based on the sovereign will or power of the people.
Q. What does the phrase “definite and fixed period” mean?
It refers to the term of office, which means a fixed and definite period
of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office.
It is the time during which an officer may claim to hold office as a matter
of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another.
Q. How is election defined in its ordinary or common use?
It is voting which includes the act of receiving and casting the ballots,
counting them and making the return.
Q. How is election defined in the context of the Constitution?
It refers to the conduct of polls including registration, campaign, casting,
counting and canvassing of votes.
Taule v. Santos
Facts:
The Secretary of Local Government nullified the election of federation
officers on ground of irregularity. It was argued that jurisdiction over
election contests involving election of federation officer belongs to
Comelec.
Held:
The jurisdiction of the Comelec is limited to popular election only, which
is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign
power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to
public office by popular vote as opposed to election of federation
officers. In Constitutional context, it is the conduct of polls, including
registration, campaign, casting, counting and canvassing of votes. None
of these characterizes the federation election.
Javier v. Comelec
Facts:
Javier challenged the proclamation of Pacificador by the Comelec
Second Division on the ground that it should be done by the en banc
pursuant to the Constitution. Pacificador argued that at the time the
complaint was filed, it was still in the nature of a pre-proclamation
controversy hence may be resolved by a division in the exercise of its
administrative power to enforce election laws relative to election, return
and qualifications.
Held:
Under the Constitution, the term “election” should be interpreted in its
totality, that it refers to the conduct of polls, registration of voters,
campaign and the casting and counting of votes. In making the Comelec
the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns and
qualifications of Members of Congress, the Constitution intended to give
it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end
and on all related matters, including those arising before the
proclamation of winners.
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PURPOSE OF ELECTIONS AND ELECTION LAWS
PURPOSE OF ELECTIONS
Lino Luna v. Rodriquez
The purpose of elections in a democratic society is to give the voters a
direct participation in the affairs of their government, either in
determining who shall be their public officials or in deciding some
question of public interest; and for that purpose all the legal voters
should be permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot.
PURPOSE OF ELECTION LAWS
Rulloda v. Comelec
Facts:
A widow substituted her deceased husband as candidate for Punong
barangay and obtained the highest number of votes. But it was voided
because substitution is allowed in barangay elections, it being non-
partisan. As such, there is no political party from which a substitute is
designated.
Held:
The absence of provision for substitution in barangay elections does not
mean it is prohibited. Such interpretation ignores the purpose of
elections laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of
the voters.
HOW ARE ELECTON LAWS CONSTRUED
Carlos v. Angeles
Facts:
The proclamation of a mayor was nullified by the lower court on account
that he won through significant badges of fraud like mismatch of keys
to the padlocks, empty ballot boxes, boxes with election returns, delay
in counting due to brownout, absence of watchers during counting.
Held:
These did not affect the integrity of the ballots. Election contests involve
public interest and technicalities should not impeded the determination
of the true will of the people.
Frivaldo v. Comelec
Facts:
A candidate for governor was disqualified because he did not reacquire
his Filipino citizenship at the time he filed his COC and at the time of
election.
Held:
Citizenship need not be possessed at the time of filing of COC or election,
but must be at the start of the term. In case of doubt, election laws are
liberally and construed in favor of the sovereign will. In applying election
laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than
to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.
CLASSIFICATIONS OF ELECTION
Q. What are the kinds of election?
1. Regular elections – refers to one provided by law on such dates
at regular intervals for the election of officers either nationwide
or in certain subdivisions.
2. Special elections – refers to one held to fill a vacancy before
the expiration of the full term for which the incumbent was
elected. It is also held when there is failure of election.
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
Q. Is the Sangguniang Kabataan election regular or special?
Neither, based on the definition of a regular and special election.
Paras v. Comelec
Facts:
A Punong barangay was subject of a recall election that was scheduled
within a year prior to the SK election, which also falls on the second year
of the term of office of local elective officials.
Section 74 of the LGC prohibits recall election within a year from
assumption of office and within a year immediately preceding the next
regular local election.
Held:
If the SK election was a regular election, there would be no more recall
election because it always falls within the second year of term of office,
the only time when a recall election is allowed. Thus, the next regular
must refer to one where the office of the official sought to be recalled is
contested. The SK election is not a regular election because its members
do not even possess suffrage under the Constitution.
The SK is nothing more than a youth organization. Its elected officers
are not one of those enumerated as elective local officials under the law.
Q. What are the requisites of special election after failure of
election?
Lucero v. Comelec
Facts:
Two candidates for district representative were separated by a mere 175
votes. But no election was done in one polling place with 213 voters due
to ballot snatching. But the leading candidate questioned the authority
of the Comelec to call for a special election after almost two years.
Held:
There are two requisites for holding a special election:
1. There is failure of election
2. Failure affects the results of the election
Since only 175 votes separate them, the 213 votes in the polling place
where election failed could still affect the results of the election. Hence,
it is still statistically probable for the special election to affect or change
the final result of the election.
The delay is not attributable to the voters of the polling place where
election failed but to the legal maneuvers of parties. Thus, the holding
of the special election almost two years after the regular election is still
“reasonable close to the date of election not held.”
SYSTEMS OF ELECTION
Q. What are the systems of election?
1. Manual system of election
2. Automated system of election
Q. Can there be manual count during an automated election?
Loong v. Comelec
Facts:
During the first automated election in ARMM, the counting machines in
the Province of Sulu could not accurately read the official ballots because
the ovals opposite the names of candidates were misaligned. In 5
municipalities, the official ballots were rejected because of incorrect
sequence codes. Thus, Comelec ordered a manual count which was
opposed on the ground that under the automation law, automated
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counting is mandatory. The remedy is not manual count but
replacement of defective counting machines.
Held:
Manual counting during automated election is not prohibited by law. The
Constitutional grant of the power to “enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of elections” is so broad as to cover
all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of
holding a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR ELECTION
Article 2, Section 1, 1987 Constitution
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanate from them.
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
Q. Who are elective officials?
1. President
2. Vice-President
3. Senators
4. House of Representatives
5. Governors
6. Vice-Governors
7. SP Members
8. ARMM Governors and Vice-Governors
9. ARMM Assemblymen
10. Mayors
11. Vice-Mayors
Q. Is there a Cordillera Autonomous Region?
Ordillo v. Comelec
Facts:
RA 6766 An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region was enacted and the people of the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra, and Baguio cast their votes
in a plebiscite. Only the Province of Ifugao approved the creation of the
Region, leading to the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region of
Ifugao. This was challenged by the petitioners, alleging that the law
requires that the said Region must be composed of more than one
constituent unit.
Issue:
Whether the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted
favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can,
alone legally and validly constitute such Region.
Ruling:
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. The term region in its ordinary sense means two
or more provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a
region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas.
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
PRESIDENT
HOW ELECTED, TERM OF OFFICE AND TERM LIMIT
HOW ELECTED, TERM OF OFFICE AND TERM LIMIT
Q. How is the President elected? How long is his term of office
and is there a limit to it?
The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of
the people for a term of six (6) years which shall begin at noon of the
same date six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for
any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and has
served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to
the same office at any time. (Article 7, Section 4 (1) 1987 Constitution)
Take note:
1. By a direct vote
2. For a term of 6 years
3. Not eligible for any re-election
Q. What does the sentence “The President shall not be eligible
for any re-election” mean?
It means that the Presidency is a once in a lifetime opportunity. He
cannot be re-elected either immediately after his term of office or after
an interval of two or more terms.
Q. But why was Joseph Estrada allowed to run in 2010 after
having been elected in 1998?
The Comelec said that the provision applies to incumbent presidents
only. It said the better policy approach is to let the people decide who
the next president is. For on political questions, this court may err but
the sovereign people will not.
Pormento v. Estrada
Facts:
Joseph Estrada was elected as President in the general elections on May
He sought the Presidency again in 2010. A disqualification case was filed
on the ground of the constitutional provision which states that “The
President shall not be eligible for any re-election”, but such petition was
denied by Comelec saying that the provision applies to incumbent
presidents only. It said that the better policy approach is to let the
people decide who the next president is. For on political questions, this
court may err but the sovereign people will not. Estrada did not win in
the said elections.
Issue:
What is the proper interpretation of the provision “The President shall
not be eligible for any re-election?
Ruling:
The issue is now moot and academic. Since Estrada was not elected
President for the second time, any discussion of his “re-election” will
simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical
purpose.
Q. What is the difference of effects of succession on term limit
between the vice president and vice mayor?
Borja v. Comelec
One liner: Succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency for more
than 4 years is counted as one term, whereas succession of the Vice
mayor to the mayorship is not counted as one term for the purpose of
determining term limit.
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Facts:
The vice-mayor succeeded the mayor upon the latter’s death by
operation of law. Consequently, he ran and was elected mayor for
another two terms. On his third attempt to run for mayor, a
disqualification case was filed against him, on the ground that he already
served as mayor for three consecutive terms, counting as one term that
he served by virtue of succession.
Issues:
1. Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by
operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is
considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of
the three-term limit.
2. How different is the effect of succession on term limit with the
Vice-President.
Ruling:
1. No. If he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he
is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official
cannot be considered to have fully served the term. The Constitution
provides for succession of the VP as President in the event of vacancy.
It further provides that “No person who has succeeded as President and
has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election
to the same office at any time.”
The absence of a similar provision on elective local officials throws in
bold relief the difference between two cases. It underscores the intent
to cover only the terms of office to which one may have been elected
for purpose of the three-term limit on local elective officials, disregarding
for this purpose service by automatic succession.
A fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people
should be allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them.
To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three
terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law
rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle.
2. The Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the
event of the latter’s death, permanent disability, removal or resignation.
While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming so is entirely
dependent on the good graces of the President. In running for VP, he
may this be said to also seek the President. For their part, the electors
likewise choose as VP the candidate who they think can fill the
Presidency in the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the
Presidency for more than four years may rightly be considered as service
for a full term.
This is not so in the case of the Vice-Mayor. Under the LGC, he is the
presiding officer of the Sanggunian and he appoints all officials and
employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions,
succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one
of them. It cannot be said of him, as much as of the VP in the event of
a vacancy in the Presidency that in running for Vice-Mayor, he also seeks
the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy
is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that
office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.
QUALIFICATIONS
QUALIFICATIONS
Art VII, Sec 2, 1987 Constitution
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age
on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
TN:
1. Natural-born citizen of the Phils
2. Registered voter
3. Able to read and write
4. At least 40 years old on the day of the election
5. Resident of the Phils for at least 10 years, immediately
preceding the elections.
Q. Who are citizens of the Philippines?
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO
Q. Who are natural-born citizens?
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.
Q. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Is this rule
absolute?
No, because it may be done through election. Article VI, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution provides that those born before January 17, 1973 of
Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority, shall be deemed natural-born citizens.”
Fornier v. Comelec
One liner: A natural-born Filipino citizen is one who did not perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship, except those born
before January 17,, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state
believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well
as an inestimable acquisition," that cannot be taken lightly by anyone
— either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Facts:
FPG ran for President but he was sought to be disqualified because he
is not a natural-born Filipino, since his mother was American and his
father, Spanish. Petitioner said that FPG’s father could not be Filipino
because his grandfather was a Spanish subject. Even if his father was a
Filipino, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to his son
FPG because the latter is an illegitimate child.
Issue: Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino and thus did not materially
misrepresent his COC.
Held:
Yes. To trace, FPJ’s roots – FPJ’s grandpa died in Pangasinan in 1954, it
could have been his residence before death and he would have
benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” of the Philippine Bill in 1902.
Having acquired Filipino citizenship, the grandfather extended it to his
son, who is the father of FPJ.
Under Article 4, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution, the following are
citizens of the Philippines:
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
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Since FPJ has first seen light under the 1935 Constitution which confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless
of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate, he is a natural-
born Filipino because he did not need to perform any act to acquire or
perfect his Filipino citizenship.
RESIDENCE, DEFINED
Q. How is residence treated under election laws?
Residence is synonymous with domicile.
Marcos v. Comelec
One liner: For election purposes, residence is synonymous with
domicile, that is, a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent,
one has the intention of returning.
Facts:
A candidate for district representative wrote in her COC 7 months as her
period of residence in the constituency where she seeks to be elected
preceding the election. She was sought to be disqualified for failure to
comply with the one-year residency requirement because she briefly
stayed in the constituency and resided and even voted in different places
for four decades.
Held:
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in the COC that is decisive
whether an individual satisfies the residence requirement. Domicile
means the individual’s permanent home, a place to which whenever
absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return.
An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has maintained several
residences for difference purposes over a long period of time. If none of
these purposes point unequivocally to an intention to abandon her
domicile of origin, she retains it.
Domino v. Comelec
One-liner: "Residence" as used in the law prescribing the qualifications
for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile,"
which requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a
declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed and permanent place
of abode, one's home.
Facts:
Domino ran as Representative in Sarangani, with 1 yr and 2 months as
residency in his COC. Comelec disqualified him as his Voter’s
Registration Record negate such. The Constitution required at least 1
year residency. Domino won, but his proclamation was put on hold.
Issue: Whether Domino satisfied the residency requirement.
Held:
No. The principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality
involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to
establish a new domicile. Domino lacked the intention to abandon his
residence in QC as he registered there as a voter (then just had it
cancelled by a MeTC to effect transfer to Sarangani). While voting is not
conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of
residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former
barangay.
Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion
of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided preponderance in a
doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his
residence. While, Domino's intention to establish residence in Sarangani
can be gleaned from the fact that be bought a house, sought
cancellation of his previous registration in QC and that he applied for
transfer of registration, DOMINO still falls short of the one year
residency requirement
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
RATIONALE OF THE RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT
Torayno v. Comelec
One liner: The Constitution and the law requires residence as a
qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in order to
give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties,
aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of
their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the
seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for.
Facts:
Immediately after being the governor of Misamis Oriental for the third
term, Emano ran as Mayor of CDO, saying in his COC his residency
thereat for 2 yrs and 5 months. Emano asserted under oath that he was
qualified to act as governor until end of his term and admitted in sworn
statements that he was a resident of Misamis Oriental.
Petitioners: Residence is a continuing qualification that an elective
official must possess throughout his term. Thus, private respondent
could not have changed his residence to CDO while he was still governor
of Misamis Oriental.
Emano: I actually and physically resided in CDO while being Governor,
since the seat of provincial government is in CDO. There is no law
preventing an elective official from transferring residence while in office.
Issue: Whether Emano acquired a bona fide domicile of choice for at
least 1 year to qualify him to run as Mayor of CDO.
Held:
Yes. The Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a
stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
community and not identified with the latter from seeking an elective
office to serve that community. Such provision is aimed at excluding
outsiders from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in
that community for electoral gain. Emano could not be said to be a
stranger or newcomer.
PROPERTY QUALIFICATION
Maquerra v. Borra
One liner: The right to vote and be voted for is not dependent upon
the wealth of the individual concerned. Social justice presupposes equal
opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, no person shall, by
reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public office.
Facts:
Republic Act No. 4421 requires a candidate to post a surety bond
equivalent to one-year salary of the position to which he is a candidate,
which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the government, if the
candidate, except when declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of
the votes cast for the office.
Issue: Whether RA 4421 is constitutional.
Held:
No. Property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence
of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle
of social justice underlying the same, for said political system is premised
upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them. This implies necessarily that the right to
vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the
individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes equal
opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person
shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public
office.
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The effect of said Republic Act No. 4421 is to impose property
qualifications in order that a person could run for a public office, which
property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of
the Republican system ordained in the Constitution and the principle of
social justice underlying the same. Consequently, Republic Act No. 4421
is unconstitutional and hence null and void.
1. To prevent monopoly of power
2. To enhance the freedom of choice
VICE-PRESIDENT
HOW ELECTED, TERM OF OFFICE AND TERM LIMIT
HOW ELECTED
Article VII, Section 4, 1987 Constitution
The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people
for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date six years
thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who
has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall
be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
TERM-LIMIT
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms.
Voluntary resignation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full
term for which he was elected.
QUALIFICATIONS
The Vice-President shall have the same qualifications and term of office
and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. He may
be removed from office in the same manner as the President.
Q. How is voluntary renunciation defined in Aldovino v.
Comelec?
It is an act of surrender based on the free will or loss of title to office by
free choice. It is an act of abandonment that emanates from the author.
Q. Does preventive suspension interruption the term of office?
NO. Preventive suspension does not involve loss of title to office hence
it cannot interrupt the term of office.
Q. How do you illustrate the sentence “No person who has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more than
four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at
any time?”
Joseph Estrada assumed the Presidency on June 30, 1998, but was
forced by People Power II to step down on January 2001. Thus, he
served for only 2 years and 6 months, leaving a balance of 3 years and
6 months from his 6-year term as president.
Gloria Arroyo succeeded and served for 3 years and 6 months. Since she
did not serve for more than 4 years, she was able to run and win the
Presidency in 2004.
BASIS FOR PROCLMANATION OF THE PRES AND VP
Article VII, Section 4 (5), 1987 Constitution
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but
in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them
shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
Q. Who shall be declared winner?
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected.
Q. How is a tie resolved?
By a vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.
WINNER DEFINED
Rudolla v. Comelec
One-liner: The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or
plurality of valid votes cast in the election.
Facts:
A widow substituted her deceased husband as candidate for Punong
Barangay and obtained the highest number of votes. But it was voided
because substitution is not allowed in barangay elections, it being non-
partisan. As such, there is no political party from which a substitute is
designated.
Issue: Can the widow be proclaimed as the duly elected Brgy Chairman?
Held:
Yes, as it was she who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested
election. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should
not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate.
Absence of any provision governing substitution of candidates in
barangay elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition against it. As
doing so would ignore the purpose of election laws which is to give effect
to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters.
In case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and
spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. In all
republican forms of government the basic idea is that, no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or
it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN CASE OF VACANCY
VACANCY AT THE START OF THE TERM
 If the President-elect fails to qualify –The Vice-President-elect shall
act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified.
 If a President shall not have been chosen – The Vice-President-elect
shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified.
 If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-
elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled
– The Vice-President-elect shall become President.
 Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or
shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled – The President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act as President
until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.
VACANCY ON MID-TERM
 In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of the President – The Vice-President shall become the
President to serve the unexpired term.
 In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of both the President and Vice-President – The Senate
President or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-
President shall have been elected and qualified.
6|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
PERMNANENT DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
PERMANANET DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
 Whenever the President transmits to the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office – Such powers and
duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
 Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit
to the Senate President and to the Speaker of the House their
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office –The Vice-President shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
 When President transmits to the Senate President and to the
Speaker of the House his written declaration that no inability
exists – He shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.
 If majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five
days to the Senate President and to the Speaker of the House their
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office – The Congress shall decide the issue
by a vote of 2/3 of both Houses, voting separately.
Estrada v. Desierto
One-liner: The determination of the President’s inability to govern is
determined by Congress and such is a political judgment that cannot be
subject to judicial review.
Facts:
Estrada was accused to be a jueteng lord that led to his impeachment
case. Edsa Revolution II ensued with people asking Estrada’s
resignation, and his allies defected (AFP, PNP and most of his cabinet
members). On the day Arroyo took her oath as the new President,
Estrada wrote Senate President and Speaker of the House that he is
unable to exercise Presidential powers and duties. However, he claims
he did not resign as President, but merely was on leave on the ground
that he is unable to govern temporarily. Despite receipt of letter, the
House of Reps and Senate passed Resolutions expressing support to
Arroyo as the new President.
Issue:
Whether SC has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of
Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress
recognizing Arroyo as the new President.
Held:
SC does not have jurisdiction. It is Congress that has the ultimate
authority to determine such, and the determination of Congress is a
political judgment which the SC cannot review. Estrada’s claim had been
put to rest by Congress by the latter declaring Arroyo as the de jure
President. Such decision made by the Congress, a co-equal branch of
government, cannot be reviewed by SC.
RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT
Estrada v. Desierto
One-liner: Estrada’s acts and omissions before, during and after
Arroyo’s oath taking, or taking into account the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue, implied his resignation from
presidency.
Facts:
Estrada claims he did not resign as President, but merely was on leave
on the ground that he is unable to govern temporarily. He wrote a letter
(see above) about it. Further, Estrada relies on RA No. 3019 (AGACPA)
prohibiting his resignation from office. The circumstances surrounding
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
the case were based on an “Angara Diary”, where he said, “Ayoko na,
masyado nang masakit”. Negotiations involving Estrada’s resignation
and Arroyo’s assumption took place.
Issue: Whether Estrada has resigned as President before Arroyo took
her oath as President.
Held:
Yes. Elements of resignation are (1) there must be an intent to resign
and (2) the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is not
governed by any formal requirement – it can be oral, written, express
or implied. As regards the letter re: inability to govern, if it was prepared
before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation
from the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act. If,
however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands
scant legal significance.
Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a
changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is
the result of his repudiation by the people. Further, reliance on RA No.
3019 was misplaced. The intent of the law is to prevent the act of
resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a
protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or
administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution. But no
person can be compelled to render service if he wants to retire or resign.
VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE VP, HOW FILLED
Article VII, Section 9, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during
the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President
from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who
shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of
both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
Q. How is vacancy in the office of the Vice-President filled?
The President shall nominate a VP from among the Members of the
Congress. Such nomination shall be confirmed by a majority vote of all
the Members of both Houses, voting separately.
Estrada v. Desierto
One-liner: Upon nomination for VP of the President from among the
Congress members, both Houses of Congress shall confirm such by
voting separately.
Facts:
After assumption into office, Pres. Arroyo nominated Sen. Guingona as
her Vice President. Both the Senate and House of Reps separately
resolved to confirm such nomination. Thereafter, Guingona took his oath
as Vice President.
VACANCY IN BOTH THE P AND VP, HOW FILLED
Article VII, Section 10, 1987 Constitution
The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy
in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling for
a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier
than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill
calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section
26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third
reading by the Congress.
Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current
appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section
25, Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be
suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called
if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next
presidential election.
7|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
TN: This presupposes that succession cannot happen since the Senate President
and Speaker of the House are likewise dead.
Q. How are the vacancies occurring midterm in both the
Presidency and Vice-Presidency filled?
TN: If the President, Vice-President, Senate President and House Speaker die,
resign or are permanently disabled at the middle of term.
GR: The Congress shall enact a law calling for a special election to elect
a President and VP, to be held not earlier than 45 days nor later than 60
days from the time of such all.
XPN: If the vacancy occurred within 18 months before the date of the
next presidential election, no special election shall be called.
Q. How are the vacancies occurring at the start of the term in
both the Presidency and Vice-Presidency filled?
TN: If the President, Vice-President, Senate President and House Speaker die,
resign or are permanently disabled at the start of term.
Congress legislates the manner in which one who is to act as President
shall be selected.
SENATORS
HOW ELECTED, TERM OF OFFICE AND TERM LIMIT
COMPOSITION AND HOW ELECTED
Q. How many members shall compose the Senate?
24 members. Of the Senators elected in the election of 1992, the first
twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six years
and the remaining twelve for three years.
Q. How are senators elected?
They are elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines.
Tolentino v. Comelec
One-liner: Although the Comelec failed to call and give notice, the
special election is still valid as the right and duty to hold the election
emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some
authority and the law charges voters with knowledge of the time and
place of the election (statutory notice).
Facts:
After Arroyo’s succession to Presidency and Sen. Guingona’s
confirmation as the new VP, a seat in Senate was left vacant. Senate
resolved to call on Comelec to fill such vacancy through a special election
to be held simultaneously with the upcoming regular election, such that
the Senatorial candidate with the 13th highest number of votes shall fill
the vacancy. The Comelec did so.
Issue: Whether a special election to fill a vacant 3-yr term Senate seat
was validly held.
Held:
Yes. The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and
place of its occurrence, whether made by the legislature directly or by
the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the election's
validity. In a special election to fill a vacancy, a statute that expressly
provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next
general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held
and operates as the call for that election.
In determining whether there was a failure of election, it should be
determined whether the lack of notice misled a substantial number of
voters to believe that there was no special election. This did not happen
in this case since more than 10 million voters already cast their votes
for the winning candidate.
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
TERM OF OFFICE AND TERM LIMIT
Article VI, Section 4, 1987 Constitution
The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Q. What is the term of office and term limit of Senators?
The term of office shall be six years and they shall not serve for more
than two consecutive terms.
Q. What is the effect of voluntary renunciation of the office?
It shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
QUALIICATIONS
Q. What are the qualifications to be a senator?
1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
2. At least thirty-five years of age on the day of the election
3. Able to read and write
4. A registered voter
5. A resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.
Pimentel v. Comelec
One-liner: The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election
should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of a requirement
not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Facts:
Law and Comelec resolution requiring mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, etc were questioned as unconstitutional.
Issue: Can Congress or Comelec expand the qualification requirements
of candidates for senator under the Constitution?
Held: No. A law or an administrative rule violating any norm of the
Constitution is null and void and has no effect.
MEMEBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NUMBER, HOW ELECTED, TERM OF OFFICE
COMPOSITION AND HOW ELECTED
Article VI, Section 5 (1), (2) & (4), Section 7
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in
this section.
8|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
Q. How many members compose the HREP?
The House of Reps shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
unless otherwise fixed by law.
Q. How are the members of the House of Reps elected?
They shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants.
TERM OF OFFICE
The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a
term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law,
at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No
Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
Q. What is the term of office and term limit of the HREPs?
The Members of the House of Reps shall be elected for a term of 3 years
and shall not serve for more than 3 consecutive terms.
QUALIICATIONS
Q. What are the qualifications to be a member of the HREP?
1. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines
2. At least twenty-five years of age on the day of the election
3. Able to read and write
4. A registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected
(except the party-list representatives)
5. A resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election (except the
party-list representatives)
NUMBER OF PARTY LIST
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%)
of the total number of representatives including those under the party
list.
Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec
One-liner: Having determined that the 20% seat allocation is merely a
ceiling, and having upheld the constitutionality of the 2% vote threshold
and the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, to determine how
many party list seats the qualified parties are entitled to, rank all of the
parties and allocate basing on the votes garnered by the party in first
rank.
Facts:
Two Comelec resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38 additional
party-list representatives to complete the full complement of 52 seats in
the House of Reps were challenged.
Issues:
1. Whether the 20% allocation for party-list is mandatory.
2. Whether the 2% threshold requirement and three-seat limit is
constitutional.
3. If yes to number 2, how should the additional seats of a
qualified party be determined?
Held:
1. No, the 20% is just a mere ceiling and the mechanics by which it
is to be filled up has been left to Congress in the exercise of its
prerogative.
2. Yes. The 2% threshold is constitutional since it is consistent with
the very essence of “representation”, because to have a
meaningful representation the elected persons must have the
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, the result
might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of
contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a
threat to the stability of Congress.
Yes. The three-seat limit is likewise constitutional since it ensures
the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature.
Thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership,
would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
3. The following rules shall be followed to determine the additional
seats:
TN: Under this, only those already qualified can have additional seats.
 Rank all the parties according to the votes each obtained
 Compute the ratio for each party by dividing its votes by
the total votes cast for the party-list
 All those who garnered at least 2% shall have a guaranteed
seat. Only these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats
 The party having the highest number of votes is referred to
as the “first party”
 Determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to,
in order to be able to compute that for the other parties.
(4% - additional 1; -6% - additional 2)
 The number of seats allotted to the other parties cannot
possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled to.
Q. What is the formula in determining additional seats for the
first party?
Number of votes of first party / Total votes for party-list system
If at least 6% = 2 additional seats
If equal to or greater than 4 % but less than 6% = 1 additional seat
Less than 4% - no additional seat
Example:
1,178,747 / 16,261369 = 7.2% (2 additional seats)
Q. What is the formula in determining additional seats for the
other qualified parties?
No. of votes of qualified party / No. of votes of first party X No. of
additional seats allocated to first party
Example:
977,476 / 1,178,747 X 2 = 1.65% (1 additional seat)
Q. What are the four parameters to determine the winners in
the party-list election under the Veterans case?
1. The 20% allocation – the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of
the House of Representatives, including those elected under the
party list.
2. The 2% threshold – only those parties garnering a minimum of
2% of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
“qualified” to have a seat in the House.
3. The three-seat limit – each qualified party, regardless of the
number of votes obtained is entitled to a maximum of three seats
only, one qualifying and two additional seats.
4. Proportional representation – the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to
their total number of votes.
9|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
BANAT v. Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner BANAT party-list, questioned the proclamations of the
Comelec as well as the formula being used. They questioned Sec. 11 of
RA 7941 for being void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify
for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in
the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the
2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list
seat prescribed by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether the 2% threshold is unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes, but only insofar as it is used in the distribution of additional party-
list seats. The allocation of the additional seats is no longer limited to
the two-percenters. Hence, even those who did not get at least 2% of
votes, can still benefit from the second round of seat allocation.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives
The following rules shall be followed to determine the additional seats:
Allocation of guaranteed seats:
 Rank all the parties according to the votes each obtained
 Compute the ratio for each party by dividing its votes by the total
votes cast for the party-list
 All those who garnered at least 2% shall have a guaranteed seat.
Allocation of additional seats
 The percentage of votes is multiplied by the remaining available
seats, 38. (55 maximum seats less the 17 guaranteed seats of
the two-percenters)
Examples:
7.33% x 38 = 2.79% (2 additional seats)
4.74% x 38 = 1.80% (1 additional seat)
2.12% x 38 = 0.80% (1 additional seat)
THREE-TERM LIMIT
PURPOSE OF THE THREE-TERM LIMIT
Borja v. Comelec
One-liner: The purpose of limiting the number of terms elective local
officials may serve is to prevent excessive accumulation of power by
perpetuating themselves in office. It seeks to protect the people from
the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about.
Facts:
The vice-mayor succeeded the mayor upon the latter’s death by
operation of law. Consequently, he ran and was elected mayor for
another two terms. On his third attempt to run for mayor, a
disqualification case was filed against him, on the ground that he already
served as mayor for three consecutive terms, counting as one term that
he served by virtue of succession.
Issue:
Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation
of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served
a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
Held:
No. Under the Constitution, the three-term limitation refers to the term
of office for which the local official was elected. The purpose of this
provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number
of terms an elective local official may serve. If he is not serving a term
for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of
the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office
prior to its expiration. While the people should be protected from the
evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be
taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
Latasa v. Comelec
One-liner: The framers of the Constitution included an exception to the
people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid
the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the
same office.
Facts:
Latasa held three consecutive offices as mayor, and on his third term,
the Municipality of Digos was made into the City of Digos. He does not
deny the fact that he has already served for three consecutive terms as
municipal mayor. However, he asserts that when Digos was converted
from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality.
Therefore, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, he
cannot be construed as vying for the same local government post.
Issue:
Whether Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor
of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three
consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos.
Held:
No. Although the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate
and distinct from that of the municipality, it does not mean, that for the
purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of
the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local
government post as that of the office of the city mayor.
The territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the
municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the
same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of
voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for
three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over
whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine year.
The framers of the Constitution included an exception to the people’s
freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil
of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.
To allow petitioner to vie for the position of city mayor after having
served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would
obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this
exception.
Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the
City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief
executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total
of eighteen consecutive years.
Q. What are the requisites of the three-term limit rule?
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply,
two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit:
1. That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post
2. That he has fully served three consecutive terms.
10 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
EFFECTS OF THE FOLLOWING ON THE CONTINUITY OF TERM:
1. Succession
2. Preventive suspension
3. Disqualification prior to end of term
4. Disqualification after end of term
5. Recall
6. Conversion of municipality to city
7. Election protest
SUCCESSION
Borja v. Comelec
One-liner: If the official is not serving a term for which he was elected
because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds,
such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term.
Facts:
The vice-mayor succeeded the mayor upon the latter’s death by
operation of law. Consequently, he ran and was elected mayor for
another two terms. On his third attempt to run for mayor, a
disqualification case was filed against him, on the ground that he already
served as mayor for three consecutive terms, counting as one term that
he served by virtue of succession.
Issue:
Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation
of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served
a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
Ruling:
No. If he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is
simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official
cannot be considered to have fully served the term.
Montebon v. Comelec
Facts:
A disqualification case was filed against a municipal councilor alleging
that he has already served three terms. In his defense, the councilor
said that his second term was interrupted when he succeeded as vice
mayor when the latter retired. Consequently, he is not disqualified from
running for councilor again.
Issue: Whether respondent is deemed to have fully served his second
term in view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor.
Ruling:
No. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. In this
case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due
to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest
ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. It
is clear therefore that his assumption of office as vice mayor can in no
way be considered a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal
mayor.
The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to
accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local Government
Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is
permanently unable to succeed to the post does the law speak of
alternate succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the
official concerned be considered as permanent inability within the
contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the successor cannot refuse
to assume the office that he is mandated to occupy by virtue of
succession. He can only do so if for some reason he is permanently
unable to succeed and occupy the post vacated.
Succession by law to a vacated government office is involuntary since it
involves performance of a public duty, non-performance of which
exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. It
is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
Aldovino v. Comelec
One liner: Voluntary renunciation refers only to the elective official's
voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does
not speak of the temporary "cessation of the exercise of power or
authority" that may occur for various reasons, with preventive
suspension being only one of them.
Facts:
Respondent was elected councilor for three consecutive terms. During
his third term, Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him which was
subsequently lifted. When he ran again for councilor, a disqualification
case was filed on the ground that he has already served for three
terms.
Issue: Whether preventive suspension of an elective official is an
interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit
rule.
Held:
The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the three-
term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of
title to office. However, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise
the functions of an elective post, as in preventive suspension, even if
involuntary, should not be considered as an effective interruption of a
term because suspended official continues to stay in office although
barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office
within the suspension period.
DISQUALIFICATION PRIOR TO END OF TERM
Lonzanida v. Comelec
One liner: A proclamation subsequently declared void is no
proclamation at all and one assuming office on the strength of a
protested proclamation does so as a presumptive winner and subject to
the final outcome of the election protest.
Facts:
Petitioner was duly elected and served two terms as mayor. He ran for
the same office the third time and was proclaimed winner. He assumed
office and discharged his duties until he was ordered to vacate the post
by reason of a Comelec decision on the election protest filed against him
which declared his opponent as the duly elected mayor. In the next
elections, he ran again for mayor. A disqualification case was filed
against him on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms
in the same post.
Issue:
Whether petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor may be considered
as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term
limit for elective local government officials.
Held:
No. First off, petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly
elected to the post in the last election. His assumption of office as mayor
cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by
reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court
that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all
and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of
the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive
winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election
protest.
11 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
Secondly, he cannot be deemed to have served the third term because
he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. He
vacated his post not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with
the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that
effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-
1998 mayoral term.
DISQUALIFICATION AFTER END OF TERM
Ong v. Alegre
One-liner: Assumption of office by an elective official and continuous
exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term,
notwithstanding a belated decision by the court in an election protest
case disqualifying said elective official, should legally be taken as service
for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
Facts:
A disqualification case predicated on the three-consecutive term limit
rule was filed against Francis Ong. During his second term, the opposing
party filed an election protest and the RTC declared the opposing party
as the duly elected mayor. However, such decision came out only three
years after, when Francis already finished his second term and in fact
already starting with his third term.
Issue:
Whether or not the assumption of office as mayor from July 1, 1998 to
June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service in the context
of the consecutive three-term limit rule.
Held:
Yes. Such assumption of office constitutes, "service for the full term",
and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the
three-term limit.
It is true that the court ruled in the election protest case that it was
Francis’s opponent who was the legally elected mayor. However, such
decision, was without practical and legal use and value, having been
promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired.
His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente
as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof
from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a
full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
Rivera v. Comelec
Facts:
A petition to cancel the candidate’s Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive
terms as mayor. Respondent however countered that he served his
second term only as a caretaker of the office or a de facto officer
because he was not validly elected for the term 1998 to 2001 since the
RTC, declared in its Decision that his proclamation as mayor was void.
Issue:
Whether or not the term 1998 to 2001 should be counted for purposes
of the three-term limit, when his proclamation as mayor was
subsequently declared void.
Ruling:
Yes. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the decision of
the RTC in the electoral protest case ousting him as mayor. Such
circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
RECALL
Adormeo v. Comelec
Facts:
A petition was filed to disqualify the candidate from running for Mayor
on the ground that the candidate was elected and had served as city
mayor for three (3) consecutive terms. The candidate was elected mayor
in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-
1998. In the election of 1998 he lost. In the recall election of May 12,
2000, he again won and served the unexpired term until June 30, 2001.
Issue: Whether the candidate was elected for 3 consecutive terms.
Ruling:
No. For nearly two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his
mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. Neither
can respondent's victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as "voluntary renunciation" for
clearly it was not. Hence, he was not disqualified to run for mayor in the
May 14, 2001 elections.
Socrates v. Comelec
One-liner: What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election
for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. A recall election
mid-way in a term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent
election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.
Facts:
Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor for three consecutive
terms. Obviously aware of the three-term limit rule, Hagedorn opted not
to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which
Socrates ran and eventually won.
However, due to the loss of confidence, members of the incumbent
barangay officials convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall
Assembly, midway into Socrates’ term. Socrates faced recall proceedings
and in the recall election held, Hagedorn ran and eventually won the
recall election.
Issue: Whether or not one who has been elected and served for 3
consecutive full terms is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election.
Held:
Yes. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek
immediate re-election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers
to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the
third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is
no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent
election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after
three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
CONVERSION OF MUNICIPALITY TO CITY
Latasa v. Comelec
Facts:
Latasa held three consecutive offices as mayor, and on his third term,
the Municipality of Digos was made into the City of Digos. He does not
deny the fact that he has already served for three consecutive terms as
municipal mayor. However, he asserts that when Digos was converted
from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality.
Therefore, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, he
cannot be construed as vying for the same local government post.
Issue: Whether Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of
mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served
for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos.
12 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
Held:
No. Although the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate
and distinct from that of the municipality, it does not mean, that for the
purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of
the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local
government post as that of the office of the city mayor.
The territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the
municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the
same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of
voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for
three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over
whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine year.
ELECTION PROTEST
Abundo v. Comelec
Facts:
Abundo vied for the position of mayor of for four consecutive elections
(2001, 2004, 2007, 2010). In both 2001 and 2007, he was proclaimed
the winner and served his terms. However, in the 2004 elections, Torres
was proclaimed as the winner in the election. Abundo unseated Torres
after a successful election protest. Abundo served the remaining 1 year
and 1 month of the term. In the 2010 elections, Abundo and Torres
again opposed each other. Torres filed a petition to disqualify Abundo
based on the three-term limit rule.
Issue: Whether Abundo is deemed to have served 3 consecutive terms.
Held:
No. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s
three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during
the 2004- 2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was
veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after
due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful
choice of the electorate. The two-year period during which Torres was
serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which
effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit
rule.
VACANCY IN THE SENATE OR HOUSE OF REPS
HOW FILLED
Article VI, Section 9, 1987 Constitution
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special
election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but
the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve
only for the unexpired term.
Q. How is vacancy in the Senate or HREP filled?
Through a special election called for such purpose. However, the person
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Q. Is the rule on special elections absolute in case a vacancy
occurs in the Senate or House of Representatives?
NO. The rule will depend on the date when the vacancy occurred and
the House where the vacancy originated. If the vacancy occurred in the
Senate, irrespective of the date it occurred, the special elections shall
be simultaneous with the next regular elections. If the vacancy occurred
in the House of Representative, the rule will depend on the date when
it occurred:
 If vacancy falls inside the one year period prior to the next regular
elections – no more special elections. It shall be done
simultaneously with the next regular elections
 If vacancy falls outside the one year period prior to the next
regular elections – there will be a special election.
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
Q. When shall the special election be held?
Not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence
of the vacancy.
PARTY-LIST
PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES OR NOMINEES
COMPOSITION
Q. How many party-list representatives shall compose the
HREP?
The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number
of representatives including those under the party list.
Q. What is the policy of the State?
The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members
of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the broadcast possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
QUALIFICATIONS
Q. What are the qualifications of party-list nominees?
1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
2. Registered voter
3. Resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election
4. Able to read and write
5. Bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of
the election
6. At least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election
TN: In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be 25 but
not more than 30 years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of 30 during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v. Comelec
One-liner: The nominees must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. They must be Filipino citizens "who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Hence, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a
retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an
industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give
genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Facts:
Petitioners Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna object to the
participation of major political parties. They seek the disqualification of
private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented
Issues:
1. Whether political parties may participate in the party-list stem
13 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
2. Whether the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.
Held:
1. Yes. They cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections
merely on the ground that they are political parties. The
Constitution provides that members provides that members of the
House may be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. The
purpose of the party-list is to open up the system. Indubitably,
therefore, political parties — even the major ones — may
participate in the party-list elections.
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections
does not mean, however, that any political party — or any
organization or group for that matter — may do so. The requisite
character of these parties or organizations must be consistent
with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941. In other words, while they are not
disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties,
they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and underrepresented.
2. Yes. Only those Filipinos who are marginalized and
underrepresented become members of Congress under the party-
list system. Logic shows that the system has been opened to
those who have never gotten a foothold within it — those who
cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need
the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be
illogical to open the system to those who have long been within
it — those privileged sectors that have long dominated the
congressional district elections. This Court, therefore, cannot
allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those
who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented.
Q. What is the purpose of the party-list system?
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give
more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but
also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves,
empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to
benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's
benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative
democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those
which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to
participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and
mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for
traditional politics.
Q. May political parties participate under the party-list system
of elections?
Yes. The Supreme Court laid down 8 parameters before a political party
may be allowed registration. For a political party to be allowed
participation, it must align itself with sectoral groups. In like manner that
nominee thereof must also be representing the underrepresented and
the marginalized sectors.
8 parameters:
1. The political party must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups
2. It must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling “Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors
3. The religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system
4. The party must not be disqualified under Sec 6 of RA 7941
5. The party must not be an adjunct of or a project organized or an entity
funded or assisted by the government.
6. The party must not only comply with the requirements of the law, but its
nominees must likewise do so under Sec 9 of RA 7941
7. Not only the candidate must represent the marginalized, so also must its
nominees
8. The nominees must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
TN: But this was modified by the subsequent ruling in the case of Atong
Paglaum v. Comelec
BANAT v. Comelec and Bayan Muna v. Comelec
One-liner: It is not necessary that the party-list organization's nominee
"wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity" as there is no financial
status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral
party belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, that
is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a
fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she
must be a senior citizen.
Atong Paglaum v. Comelec
One-liner: It is not necessary that the nominee be a member of the
marginalized sector which he seeks to represent. It is enough that he is
an advocate of such sector, that, he has a proven track record for the
advocating the cause of the organization he seeks to represent.
Facts:
52 party-list groups assailed the Resolutions issued by Comelec denying
their petitions for registration under the party-list system.
Issue:
Whether the criteria for participating as party-list system laid down in
Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT should be applied by the Comelec in the
coming May 2013 party-list elections.
Held:
No. Political parties need not align themselves with sectoral groups or
organizations, and the nominees thereof need not come from that sector
itself, provided that he can show that he has a proven track record for
advocating the cause of the organization he seeks to represent.
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral
parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be
"marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political
constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.
On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisher folk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the
margins of society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented"
an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
TN: Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean
one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or
his or her sector, is below the middle class or those who fall in the low income
group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
6 parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: The
national, regional and sectoral parties.
2. National parties and regional parties do not need to organize along the
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized or
underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections
4. Sectoral parties may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or
lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.”
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to such sector which
they represent
6. National, regional and sectoral parties shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.
14 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
SECTORS TO BE REPRESENTED BY PARTY-LIST
Q. What organizations may qualify under the party-list system?
1. Labor
2. Peasant
3. Urban poor
4. Fisherfolk
5. Indigenous cultural communities
6. Women
7. Youth
8. Elderly
9. Handicapped
10. Veterans
11. Overseas workers
12. Professionals
13. Such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.
Q. Describe the process of registration of party-list.
Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or
coalition for purposes of the party-list system by:
1. Register with Comelec – file a verified petition not later than 90
days before the election, accompanied by its constitution, by-
laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, etc.
2. The petition has to be published in 2 newspapers of general
circulation
3. It should be acted upon within 15 days, and no later than 60
days before elections. (There should be a formal hearing)
4. Once a party-list is accredited by the Comelec, it must submit to
the Comelec a list of 5 nominees not later than 45 days before
the elections.
CLASSIFICATIONS OF PARTY-LIST SECTORS
Atong Paglaum v. Comelec
One-liner: Sectoral parties may either be “marginalized and
underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.”
Held:
The party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized
along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor,
peasant, fisher folk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals." The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily
"marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not
by definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly,
women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and
the youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus
organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special
interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Lacking well-defined political constituency: Their number in the district
is not sufficient to earn a seat in Congress but taking into account that
of the entire nation, it could be sufficient.
NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY ENUMERATION
Ang Ladlad v. Comelec
One-liner: The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented
sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies
with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
Facts:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who
identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs). They applied for registration for party-list since the
LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and
gender identity. The Comelec denied the application on the ground that
Ang Ladlad advocates sexual immorality.
Issue: Whether Ang Ladlad can qualify as a party-list.
Held:
Yes. The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. They can fall on the
“Such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.”
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of
dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest.
NATURE OF LIST OF NOMINEES
BA-RA 7941 v. Comelec
One-liner: Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release
the names of the nominees of the party-list groups. The people have
the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed
judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that
have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system
of blind voting.
Facts:
Both petitions seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the
names of the nominees of various party-list groups. Comelec denied
arguing that the party-list elections must not be personality oriented and
that people are to vote for sectoral parties and not for their nominees.
Issues: Whether Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to
the public the names of said nominees.
Held:
Yes. It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have
the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed
judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that
have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system
of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the
Comelec. The Court has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon
any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the
free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election.
While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such
vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate
cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS
TERM OF OFFICE AND TERM LIMIT
TERM OF OFFICE AND TERM LIMIT
Article X, Section 8, 1987 Constitution
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
15 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected.
Q. What is the term of office of elective local officials?
Term of office is 3 years and shall not serve for more than 3 consecutive
terms. (Except barangay officials – their term of office is determined by
law)
Section 43, Local Government Code of 1991
Term of Office. –
(a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity
of this Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992
or such date as may be provided for by law, except that of elective
barangay officials: Provided, That all local officials first elected during the
local elections immediately following the ratification of the 1987
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected.
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the Sangguniang
Kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular
election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.
Q. What is the term of office of barangay officials?
David v. Comelec
One-liner: While the term for barangay officials is not constitutionally
provided, the intent and design of the legislature to limit their term to
only 3 years as provided under the Local Government Code emerges as
bright as the sunlight. RA 6679 which provides for a term of five years
was repealed by RA 7160 reducing it to 3 years. Basic is the principle in
statutory construction that between two laws with apparent
irreconcilable conflict, the later law prevails because it is the later
legislative will.
QUALIFICATIONS
QUALIFICATIONS
Q. What are the qualifications of elective local officials?
1. A citizen of the Philippines
2. A registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang
Bayan, the district where he intends to be elected
3. A resident therein for at least 1 year immediately preceding
the day of the election
4. Able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect
Q. What are the age requirements?
21 years old 18 years old At least 15 but
not more than 21
Governor, Vice-
Governor, member
of the Provincial
Council, Mayor, Member of the City Sangguniang
Vice-Mayor, Member or Municipal Council Kabataan
of the City Council
of highly urbanized
cities
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
Mayor, Vice-Mayor Punong barangay,
of independent member of the
component cities or Barangay council
municipalities
What are the qualifications of an elective official of the SK?
1. A Filipino citizen
2. Qualified voter of the katipunan ng Kabataan
3. Resident of the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately
prior to election
4. At least fifteen (15) years but less than eighteen (18) years of
age on the day of the election
5. Able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect,
6. Must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude.
Q. What is the purpose of Philippine citizenship as a
requirement?
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is
none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance
to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof.
Frivaldo v. Comelec
One-liner: The citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code
is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he
is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been
elected.
Facts:
A disqualification case was filed against Frivaldo when he ran for
Governor of Sorsogon, by reason of his not being a citizen of the
Philippines. Apparently, prior to his filing of COC, he already applied for
repatriation. While his repatriation was not yet approved during
elections, it was however granted at the time of his proclamation, albeit
2 hours late.
Issue: Whether Frivaldo can be validly proclaimed as governor.
Held:
Yes. The law does not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship. In fact, the LGC speaks of
qualifications of “elective officials” and not of candidates. Hence, unless
otherwise expressly stated, such qualification should thus be possessed
when the elective official begins to govern – at the time he is proclaimed
and at the start of his term. But to remove all doubts, the Court also
held that the repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing
of his application.
Q. Is the Frivaldo doctrine controlling?
According to Sir, the Frivaldo doctrine may still hold true in the sense
that no contrary jurisprudence has been laid down by the Supreme
Court.
How to answer if confronted with such a question in the exam?
If the facts of the case falls on all four with the circumstances of Frivaldo,
then you can answer in the same way. But make sure that you qualify
that it can be a ground for disqualification.
What are the unique circumstances attendant in the case of Frivaldo?
1. He was forced to give up his Filipino citizenship and political
aspiration as his means of escaping the clutches of Marcos’
dictatorship
16 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
2. At the first opportunity, he returned to the Philippines and
sought to serve his people once more and the people of
Sorsogon voted for him three times
3. His demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-
assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs
speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal
technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-
embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of
81 years.
4. He was stateless as the time he filed his COC as he has long
given up his US nationality
TN: No filing fee in filing for COC – otherwise it becomes a property
qualification.
Labo v. Comelec
One-liner: Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be
easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the
returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country
he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and
exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be
accomplished by election to public office.
Facts:
Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio. A petition for quo warranto
was filed against him for being an Australian citizen by virtue of his
marriage with an Australian. Right after he divorced, he sought for the
change of his status from immigrant to returning former Filipino citizen.
However, he categorically declared that he was an Australian citizen in
a number of sworn statements he voluntarily made and even sought to
avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was
a foreigner.
Issue: Whether Labo’s proclamation was valid.
Held:
No. Labo is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections, a
citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under
the Constitution itself because of his alienage. Hence, he was therefore
ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City. These qualifications
are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at
bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost
but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election.
The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although
elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
DISQUALIFICATIONS
DISQUALIFICATIONS
Local Government Code of 1991, Section 40
Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of
allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or
abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have
acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the
same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez

DUAL CITIZENSHIP and Re-Acquisition Act. He argues that mere filing of COC constituted as
a renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 5
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt Issue: Whether De Guzman is disqualified from running.
with by law.
Held:
Valles v. Comelec
Yes. He is disqualified in view of his failure to renounce his American
citizenship. It is true that he re-acquire his Philippine citizenship after
One-liner: Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with
taking the oath of allegiance. However, RA 9225 imposes an additional
dual allegiance. Her filing of a certificate of candidacy, where she
requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office, that is, to
declared that she is a Filipino citizen and that she will support and defend
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
the Philippine Constitution and will maintain true faith and allegiance
citizenship before any public office authorized to administer oath. The
thereto, sufficed to renounce her foreign citizenship, effectively
mere filing of a COC does not ipso facto amount to renunciation of his
removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.
foreign citizenship.
Held:
Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec
The mere fact that Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and
had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an
One-liner: The personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim
citizenship before any public office authorized to administer oath is an
of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens
citizenship, the same must be express.
who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. Failure
to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of
Mercado v. Manzano
Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and
thus hold any elective public office.
One-liner: The provision that persons with dual citizenship are
prohibited from running or seeking public office must be understood as
Macquiling v. Comelec
referring to dual allegiance. The mere filing of certificate of candidacy
therefore has the effect of electing Philippine citizenship and renouncing
One-liner: Anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely
other foreign citizenships and/or allegiances.
and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who
reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport —
Held:
which indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its
Dual allegiance is different from dual citizenship. The former is a result
national — even after the Filipino has renounced his foreign citizenship,
of the intentional act of an individual by some positive act to owe loyalty
is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
to two or more states, while the latter may be obtained by reason of the
cross applications of the jus soli and jus sanguinis principles. While dual
Facts:
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s
Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen and subsequently acquired
volition.
American citizenship by naturalization. He reacquired his Filipino
citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that
Labo v. Comelec
he renounced his American citizenship. However, after renouncing his
American citizenship, he used his U.S. passport at least six times.
One-liner: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law.
Held:
The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath
Labo claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only
emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation
a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such
to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of
a specious argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No.
a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is
63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath,
lost:
reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.
(1) Naturalization in a foreign country
It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only
(2) Express renunciation of citizenship
those who are exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public office.
(3) Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce
laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.
their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign
passports, we are creating a special privilege for these dual citizens,
It is also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV,
thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40 (d) of the Local
Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is
Government Code.
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
FUGITIVES OF JUSTICE
Roseller de Guzman v. Comelec
Marquez v. Comelec
One-liner: One who re-acquires Philippine citizenship under RA 9225,
and wish to seek public office, shall comply with the additional
One-liner: Fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after
requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
citizenship before any public office authorized to administer oath.
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support
from jurisprudence and it may be so conceded as expressing the general
Facts:
and ordinary connotation of the term.
A disqualification case was filed against De Guzman on the ground that
he is not a Filipino citizen but an immigrant and resident of the US. He
Facts:
admitted that he was a naturalized American, however, argued that he
Marquez filed a petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate,
applied for dual citizenship under RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention
respondent Rodriguez, for being a fugitive from respondent. Allegedly,

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ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
at the time respondent filed his COC, a criminal charge against him for
10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was
still pending before the court of Los Angeles. A warrant for his arrest
was issued but has yet to be served on account of his alleged flight from
that country.
Issue: Whether Rodriguez, who at the time of the filing of his COC, is
said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a
warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice”.
Held:
"Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction
to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to
avoid prosecution. However, whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive
from justice” under the definition thus given was not passed upon by
the Court.
Rodriguez v. Comelec
One-liner: Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must be
established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least,
a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. Not being a
"fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied
the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.
Facts:
Rodriguez sought a reconsideration for the above ruling.
Held:
"Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction
to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to
avoid prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade
is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade
prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing
subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated
judgment of conviction.
Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. His arrival in the
Philippines from US preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the
Los Angeles Court and of the issuance on even date of the arrest
warrant, by almost 5 months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to
have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time
he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant
much less conviction to speak of yet at such time. What prosecution or
punishment then was Rodriguez deliberately running away from?
PERMANENT RESIDENTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRY
Caasi v. CA
One-liner: Application for immigrant status and permanent residence
in the U.S. and possession of a green card attesting to such status are
conclusive proof of being a permanent resident of the US.
Held:
To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law
requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have waived
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country.
Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in
the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his
green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of
and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country.
Without such prior waiver, he was disqualified to run for any elective
office.
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VACANCY IN ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICES
HOW VACANCY IS FILLED
Q. How is the vacancy caused by a Sangguniang member not
belonging to any political party, filled?
The Local Chief Executive shall appoint a qualified person to fill the
vacancy, upon the recommendation of the sanggunian concerned.
DATE OF ELECTION
DATE OF ELECTIONS
1. National, District, Local elective officials – Second Monday
of May 1992 and every three (3) years thereafter.
2. Regional elective local officials – Second Monday of May 2013
and every three (3) years thereafter.
3. Barangay and SK officials – Last Monday of October 2007 and
every three (3) years thereafter.
ADJUSTMENT OF PRE-ELECTION REQUIREMENTS
ADJUSTMENT OF PRE-ELECTION REQUIREMENTS
RA 6646, Section 29
Designation of Other Dates for Certain Pre-elections Acts. - If it should
no longer be reasonably possible to observe the periods and dates
prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts, the Commission shall fix
other periods and dates in order to ensure accomplishment of the
activities so voters shall not be deprived of their right of suffrage.
Akbayan v. Comelec
One-Liner: The right of suffrage is not at all absolute. It is subject to
existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in the
Constitution and statute books. The act of registration is an
indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage, for it is part and
parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election
process.
Facts:
The AKBAYAN-Youth sought the extension of registration of voters for
the May 2001 election since about 4 million youth were not able to
register and are now disenfranchised. The Comelec denied such petition.
Issue: Whether Comelec was right in denying the petition.
Ruling.
Yes. The right of suffrage, although accorded a prime niche in the
hierarchy of rights embodied in the fundamental law, ought to be
exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitution
and must properly yield to pertinent laws skilfully enacted by the
Legislature.
The Comelec was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear
provisions of RA 8189 which provides that no voter’s registration shall
be conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The right of
suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters
registration which is not a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the
exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard
and regulate the act of voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election. The law aids the
vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
NATURE OF BARANGAY ELECTIONS
Omnibus Election Code, Section 38
Conduct of elections. - The barangay election shall be non-partisan and
shall be conducted in an expeditious and inexpensive manner.
Q. What is the nature of the barangay elections?
It is non-partisan and must be conducted in an expeditious and
inexpensive manner. Not supporting, belonging to or biased in favor of
any political party.
Q. What are the specific acts of partisanship?
1. Filing of COC representing or allowing to be represented as a
candidate of any political party or any other organization.
2. No party, organization intervenes in the nomination or in the
filing of COC
3. Party or organization giving support, directly or indirectly,
material or otherwise favorable to or against a candidate.
Exceptions:
a. Relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity
b. Campaign staff – not more than 1 in every 100 registered
voters.
Caveat: It should not be in any manner construed to impair the
freedom of individuals to support or oppose any candidate for any
barangay office.
Q. What is the purpose of the nonpartisan character?
Barangay is the basic unit or the base of the pyramid of both social and
political structure. It should be insulated from divisive and debilitating
partisan politics.
Q. What are the functions of barangay officials?
1. Have legislative and consultative powers
2. Act as agents of neutral community action such as distribution of
basic services
3. Instruments in conducting plebiscites and referenda.
4. Settle local disputes
Occena v. Comelec
Facts:
The constitutionality of an old law which had virtually the same provision
on the non-partisan character of barangay elections was challenged for
being violative of the constitutional guarantees on the right to form
associations and societies for purposes not contrary to law.
Held:
The right to form associations is not absolute. It is subject to pervasive
police power, thus may be constitutionally regulated to serve important
and appropriate public interest. The right to organize remains intact but
certain activities are restricted. The ban is narrow, not total. It operates
only on concerted or group action of political parties. Acting individually,
party, party members may intervene.
POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTION
GROUNDS FOR POSTPONMENT OF ELECTION
Q. What are the grounds for postponement of election?
1. Violence
2. Terrorism
3. Loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records
4. Force majeure
5. Other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of
a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible
in any political subdivisions.
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Q. What is the process of postponement of election?
1. Motu proprio by the Comelec or upon a verified petition by
any interested party
2. Due notice and hearing where all parties are afforded equal
opportunity to be heard
Q. What if the ground is not one of those enumerated?
Montesclaros v. Comelec
The Comelec cannot postpone, it merely recommends, as when it is
operationally very difficult to simultaneously hold the barangay and SK
elections, legislative action to amend the law resetting the election is
required.
POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTION, JURISDICTION
Q. Who shall postpone elections?
Benito v. Comelec
The Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members, motu
proprio or upon verified petition by any interested party, after due notice
and hearing where all the interested parties are afforded equal
opportunity to be heard.
Q. Can the election officer postpone elections?
Bashier v. Comelec
The election officer, on the basis of threats of violence and bloodshed,
cannot by herself declare a failure of election and reset it even with the
agreement of the candidates.
DATE OF POSTPONEMENT
Q. When is election postponed?
To a date reasonably close to the date of election not held, suspended
or failed, but not later than 30 days after cessation of the cause.
Bashier v. Comelec
But it should not be too close as to preclude notice to the electorate.
The announcement made minutes before the supposed voting is not a
notice at all to the electorate who should be given ample notice of the
exact schedule and venue of the election.
Hassan v. Comelec
A one day notice is too short. The time for holding it must be
authoritatively designated in advance.
Q. Is the 30-day period mandatory?
Lucero v. Comelec
No. Thus, it cannot be argued that once it lapses, the authority to
postpone transfers to Congress. In fixing the date of special elections,
the Comelec sees to it that it should:
 Not be later than 30 days
 Reasonably close to the election not held.
TN: It always depends on the peculiarity of the circumstances.
The Comelec is given enough leeway to determine which date is
ideal for the special elections
Pangandaman v. Comelec
The holding of elections within the next few months from the cessation
of the cause may still be considered reasonably close to the date of
election not held.
Lucero v. Comelec
The period of 2 years after the failure of election is still reasonable close
to the election not held if the delay is not attributable to the registered
voters but to the legal maneuvers of the parties.
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez
Hassan v. Comelec
But it should not be unreasonably too close for all voters to be notified
of the changes. For even in highly urbanized areas, dissemination poses
a problem. In the absence of proof of actual notice to the special
elections reached a great number of voters, the special election is
invalid. One day notice is insufficient.
Less than a day’s notice of time and transfer of polling places 15
kilometres away deprive the voters of opportunity to participate in the
elections. Even if voting occurred. Where the difference is only 219 votes
and only 328 out of 1,546 registered voters were able to vote, there is
failure of elections.
Take note: It is always a case-to-case basis. The most important
requisite is that there is actual notice to the voters.
FAILURE
GROUNDS FOR FAILURE OF ELECTION
OF ELECTION
Q. What are the grounds for declaration of failure of election?
1. Force majeure
2. Violence
3. Terrorism
4. Fraud
5. Other analogous causes the election in any polling place was
not held:
Q. What are the 3 instances where a failure of election may be
declared?
1. Election in any polling place was not held on the fixed date on
account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, violence and other
analogous cases.
2. Election in any polling place had been suspended before the
close of voting on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud,
violence and other analogous cases
3. After voting and during preparation and transmission of election
returns or inter custody of canvass, such election results in
failure to elect on the same grounds.
Illustrative case
Facts:
A mayor was proclaimed winner after obtaining a majority of 24, 000
votes. But the second placer petitioned to declare failure of election due
to fraud, violence, intimidation, threat, vote-buying and delay in the
delivery of election documents and paraphernalia. He alleges that:
 Missing names of registered voters
 More than half of the registered voters failed to vote because
others voted for them
 He was credited with less votes than he actually obtained
 Control data of election returns were not filled out in some polling
Held:
These grounds do not warrant failure of election as none of them fall
under the 3 instances where failure of election may be declared.
 Missing names in voter’s list – Remedy is inclusion or exclusion or
annulment of book of voters PRIOR TO ELECTIONS.
TN: Since a copy of the complete list of voters is published in the
Comelec website and posted in the bulletin of the Comelec.
 More than half failed to vote because others already voted for
them – remedy is challenge identity of voter during voting inside
the polling place. (Role of watchers)
 Less votes – should have been raised before the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI) that counted the votes.
20 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
TN: Manifest error readily seen by the naked eye – raise that before the
Board of Election Canvassers that counted the votes)
 Control data of election returns were not filled – should have been
raised before the Board of Canvassers that canvassed the election
returns.
 Unsecured ballot boxes – a mere formal defect that does not
affect their integrity.
 Late election returns – not a ground for failure.
Q. What are the two requisites for the en banc to act on a
verified petition to declare failure of election?
1. No voting took place in the polling places on the date fixed by law
2. The votes that were not cast affect the result of elections
Illustrative case:
Facts:
A Punong barangay lost by 29 votes. He alleged 100 of his relatives and
supporters were not able to vote because the BEI in 3 polling places
discontinued the voting. It was found out however than out of 316
voters, 220 actually voted.
Held:
There is no failure of election. If indeed voters were prevented from
voting, the remedy is election protests.
Mitmug v. Comelec
Even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned polling places
cast their votes, it must still be respected. Low turnout does not result
in failure of elections. It only means no interest on the part of the people
to vote.
Benito v. Comelec
Even if only 1 out of 177 voted in a polling place, there is still no failure
of election.
Sardea v. Comelec
For as long as there is voting, regardless of number, there is no failure
of election. It only fails if the sovereign will has been muted and cannot
be ascertained. If the will of the people is determinable, it must be
respected.
Ruiz v. Comelec
The power to nullify an election must be exercised with the greatest care
so as not to disenfranchise voters.
Benito v. Comelec
Facts:
Elections is only 3 out of 5 polling places were sought to be nullified
even if disruption of voting was caused by a common act, firing guns to
intimidate voters.
Held:
Petition to declare failure of election should not be selective as to polling
places if they were exposed to the same ground.
Batabor v. Comelec
Facts:
Proclamation of one position was sought to be annulled on the ground
of failure of election.
Held:
Failure of election necessarily affects all elective positions in the place
where elections failed. To hold otherwise is discriminatory and violates
equal protection clause.
ELECTION LAWS l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l Notes by Tanya Ibanez

Canicosa v. Comelec
Late election returns is not a ground for failure of election. That the
election returns were delivered late and the ballot boxes brought to the
office of the Municipal Treasurer unsecured, i.e., without padlocks nor
self-locking metal seals cannot impel us to declare failure of election.
The late deliveries did not convert the election held in Calamba into a
mockery or farce to make us conclude that there was indeed a failure of
election.
FAILURE OF ELECTION, JURISDICTION
Q. Who declares failure of election?
The Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members, motu
proprio or upon verified petition by any interested party, after due notice
and hearing where all the interested parties are afforded equal
opportunity to be heard.
Carlos v. Angeles
The RTC, on account that a victory was attended by significant badges
of fraud, cannot declare failure of election in the guise of voiding the
proclamation of the winner despite obtaining 25,000 majority votes
during canvass, 27,000 votes by physical count and 17,000 votes by
revision.
statute and not from any call for the election by some authority and the
law charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election
(statutory notice).
REQUISITES
Lucero v. Comelec
Facts:
Two candidates for district representative were separated by a mere 175
votes. But no election was done in one polling place with 213 voters due
to ballot snatching. But the leading candidate questioned the authority
of the Comelec to call for a special election after almost two years.
Held:
There are two requisites for holding a special election:
1. There is failure of election
2. Failure affects the results of the election
Since only 175 votes separate them, the 213 votes in the polling place
where election failed could still affect the results of the election. Hence,
it is still statistically probable for the special election to affect or change
the final result of the election.

Bashier v. Comelec The delay is not attributable to the voters of the polling place where
The election officer, on account of threats of violence and bloodshed, election failed but to the legal maneuvers of parties. Thus, the holding
cannot by herself validly suspend or postpone elections even with the of the special election almost two years after the regular election is still
agreement of the candidates. “reasonable close to the date of election not held.”

Q. When is the date of special elections after failed elections? CALLING OF SPECIAL ELECTION, JURISDICTION
It must not be later than 30 days after cessation of causes like force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. Benito v. Comelec
The Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members, motu
Q. When is the date of special elections to fill out permanent proprio or upon verified petition by any interested party, after due notice
vacancy? and hearing where all the interested parties are afforded equal
opportunity to be heard.
A. District representatives – not earlier than 60 days nor longer than
90 days after the office is vacated.
Exception: If it occurs within a year prior to the expiration of the term.
If so, it shall be simultaneous with the next regular elections.

B. Senators – simultaneous with the succeeding regular election.

SPECIAL ELECTION

SPECIAL ELECTION

1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 9

In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special
election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but
the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve
only for the unexpired term.

FIXING DATE OF SPECIAL ELECTION

Pangandaman v. Comelec
The holding of elections within the next few months from the cessation
of the cause may still be considered reasonably close to the date of
election not held.

NOTICE OF SPECIAL ELECTION

Hassan v. Comelec
A one day notice is too short. The time for holding it must be
authoritatively designated in advance.

Tolentino v. Comelec
Although the Comelec failed to call and give notice, the special election
is still valid as the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the

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