Republic of the Philippines constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.

364 and 379,

both issued in 2004, via the present Petition for Certiorari and
SUPREME COURT
Prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief.
Manila

E.O. No. 364, which President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued

EN BANC on September 27, 2004, reads:

G.R. No. 166052 August 29, 2007 EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364

ANAK MINDANAO PARTY-LIST GROUP, as represented TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
by Rep. Mujiv S. Hataman, and MAMALO DESCENDANTS INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM
ORGANIZATION, INC., as represented by its Chairman
Romy Pardi, Petitioners,
WHEREAS, one of the five reform packages of the Arroyo
vs.
administration is Social Justice and Basic [N]eeds;
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE HON. EDUARDO R.
ERMITA, and THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN/LAND
REFORM, THE HON. RENE C. VILLA, Respondents. WHEREAS, one of the five anti-poverty measures for social
justice is asset reform;

DECISION
WHEREAS, asset reforms covers [sic] agrarian reform, urban
land reform, and ancestral domain reform;
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

WHEREAS, urban land reform is a concern of the Presidential

Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Commission [for] the Urban Poor (PCUP) and ancestral domain
Mamalo Descendants Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the
reform is a concern of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP);
WHEREAS, another of the five reform packages of the Arroyo
administration is Anti-Corruption and Good Government;
WHEREAS, one of the Good Government reforms of the Arroyo
administration is rationalizing the bureaucracy by consolidating
related functions into one department;
WHEREAS, under law and jurisprudence, the President of the
Philippines has broad powers to reorganize the offices under
her supervision and control;
NOW[,] THEREFORE[,] I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, by the
powers vested in me as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby
transformed into the Department of Land Reform. It shall be
responsible for all land reform in the country, including
agrarian reform, urban land reform, and ancestral domain
reform.
SECTION 2. The PCUP is hereby placed under the supervision
and control of the Department of Land Reform. The Chairman
of the PCUP shall be ex-officio Undersecretary of the
Department of Land Reform for Urban Land Reform.
SECTION 3. The NCIP is hereby placed under the supervision
and control of the Department of Land Reform. The Chairman
of the NCIP shall be ex-officio Undersecretary of the
Department of Land Reform for Ancestral Domain Reform.
SECTION 4. The PCUP and the NCIP shall have access to the
services provided by the Department’s Finance, Management
and Administrative Office; Policy, Planning and Legal Affairs
Office, Field Operations and Support Services Office, and all
other offices of the Department of Land Reform.
SECTION 5. All previous issuances that conflict with this
Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SECTION 6. This Executive Order takes effect immediately.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
E.O. No. 379, which amended E.O. No. 364 a month later or on
October 26, 2004, reads:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 379
AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364 ENTITLED
TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8371 created the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples;
WHEREAS, pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987, the
President has the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the National Government.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President
of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution and existing laws, do hereby
order:
Section 1. Amending Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364.
Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364, dated September 27,
2004 shall now read as follows:
"Section 3. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) shall be an attached agency of the Department of Land
Reform."
Section 2. Compensation. The Chairperson shall suffer no
diminution in rank and salary.
Section 3. Repealing Clause. All executive issuances, rules and
regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this
Executive Order are hereby revoked, amended or modified
accordingly.
Section 4. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect
immediately. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
Petitioners contend that the two presidential issuances are
unconstitutional for violating:
- THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS AND OF THE RULE OF LAW[;]
- THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME AND POLICIES FOR
AGRARIAN REFORM, URBAN LAND REFORM, INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS AND ANCESTRAL DOMAIN[; AND]
- THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE AND THEIR
ORGANIZATIONS TO EFFECTIVE AND REASONABLE
PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING, INCLUDING THROUGH
ADEQUATE CONSULTATION[.]1
 Petitioners find it impermissible for the Executive to
intrude into the domain of the Legislature. They posit that
By Resolution of December 6, 2005, this Court gave due course
an act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress
to the Petition and required the submission of memoranda,
causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which
with which petitioners and respondents complied on March 24,
can be questioned by a member of Congress.7 They add that to
2006 and April 11, 2006, respectively.
the extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right
to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.8
The issue on the transformation of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) into the Department of Land Reform (DLR)
became moot and academic, however, the department having
Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has
reverted to its former name by virtue of E.O. No. 4562 which
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers
was issued on August 23, 2005.
and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.9

The Court is thus left with the sole issue of the legality of
The OSG questions, however, the standing of MDOI, a
placing the Presidential Commission3 for the Urban Poor (PCUP)
registered people’s organization of Teduray and
under the supervision and control of the DAR, and the National
Lambangian tribesfolk of (North) Upi and South Upi in
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) under the DAR as the province of Maguindanao.
an attached agency.

As co-petitioner, MDOI alleges that it is concerned with

Before inquiring into the validity of the reorganization,
the negative impact of NCIP’s becoming an attached
petitioners’ locus standi or legal standing, inter alia,4
agency of the DAR on the processing of ancestral domain
becomes a preliminary question.
claims. It fears that transferring the NCIP to the DAR
would affect the processing of ancestral domain claims
filed by its members.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of
respondents, concedes that AMIN5 has the requisite
legal standing to file this suit as member6 of Congress.
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.10
It has been held that a party who assails the
constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and
personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any
governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or
that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.11
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a
constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as
a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.12
An examination of MDOI’s nebulous claims of "negative
impact" and "probable setbacks"13 shows that they are
too abstract to be considered judicially cognizable. And the line
of causation it proffers between the challenged action and
alleged injury is too attenuated.
Vague propositions that the implementation of the
assailed orders will work injustice and violate the rights
of its members cannot clothe MDOI with the requisite
standing. Neither would its status as a "people’s
organization" vest it with the legal standing to assail the
validity of the executive orders.14
La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,15 which
MDOI cites in support of its claim to legal standing, is
inapplicable as it is not similarly situated with the therein
petitioners who alleged personal and substantial injury
resulting from the mining activities permitted by the assailed
statute. And so is Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,16 for the indigenous peoples’ leaders and
organizations were not the petitioners therein, who necessarily
had to satisfy the locus standi requirement, but were
intervenors who sought and were allowed to be impleaded, not
to assail but to defend the constitutionality of the statute.
Moreover, MDOI raises no issue of transcendental importance
to justify a relaxation of the rule on legal standing. To be
accorded standing on the ground of transcendental
importance, Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita17
requires that the following elements must be
established: (1) the public character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a
clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of government, and (3) the lack of any
other party with a more direct and specific interest in
raising the questions being raised. The presence of
these elements MDOI failed to establish, much less
allege.
Francisco, Jr. v. Fernando18 more specifically declares that the
transcendental importance of the issues raised must relate to
the merits of the petition.
This Court, not being a venue for the ventilation of
generalized grievances, must thus deny adjudication of
the matters raised by MDOI.
Now, on AMIN’s position. AMIN charges the Executive
Department with transgression of the principle of
separation of powers.
Under the principle of separation of powers, Congress, the
President, and the Judiciary may not encroach on fields
allocated to each of them. The legislature is generally limited to
the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of
laws, and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to
cases and controversies. The principle presupposes mutual
respect by and between the executive, legislative and judicial
departments of the government and calls for them to be left
alone to discharge their duties as they see fit.19
AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were
created by statutes,20 they can only be transformed,
merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive
orders.
While AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in the
President21 who, as Chief Executive, holds the power of control
of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices,22 it
posits that this broad power of control including the power to
reorganize is qualified and limited, for it cannot be exercised in
a manner contrary to law, citing the constitutional duty23 of
the President to ensure that the laws, including those creating
the agencies, be faithfully executed.
AMIN cites the naming of the PCUP as a presidential
commission to be clearly an extension of the President, and the
creation of the NCIP as an "independent agency under the
Office of the President."24 It thus argues that since the
legislature had seen fit to create these agencies at separate
times and with distinct mandates, the President should respect
that legislative disposition.
In fine, AMIN contends that any reorganization of these
administrative agencies should be the subject of a statute.

AMIN’s position fails to impress.
The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of
control over executive departments, bureaus and offices in the
President alone. And it lays down a limitation on the legislative
power.
The line that delineates the Legislative and Executive power is
not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The
Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to
Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative
body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and
tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the
Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited
by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative
power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general
concern or common interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the
President executes the laws. The executive power is vested in
the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief
Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees
to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his department. He has control over the executive department,
bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive department,
bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials.
Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the
duty of supervising and enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under
his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.25
(Italics omitted, underscoring supplied)
The Constitution’s express grant of the power of control in the
President justifies an executive action to carry out
reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.26
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have
deliberated with full knowledge of all existing laws and
jurisprudence on the subject.27 It is thus reasonable to
conclude that in passing a statute which places an agency
under the Office of the President, it was in accordance with
existing laws and jurisprudence on the President’s power to
reorganize.
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the
legislature necessarily ordains an executive agency’s position
in the scheme of administrative structure. Such determination
is primary,28 but subject to the President’s continuing (2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to
authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As far as any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions
bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are to the Office of the President from other Departments and
concerned, the power of control may justify the President to Agencies; and
deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law may
expressly grant the President the broad authority to carry out
reorganization measures.29 The Administrative Code of 1987 (3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to
is one such law:30 any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to
the Office of the President from other departments or
SEC. 30. Functions of Agencies under the Office of the
agencies.31 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
President.– Agencies under the Office of the President shall
supplied)
continue to operate and function in accordance with their
respective charters or laws creating them, except as otherwise
provided in this Code or by law.
In carrying out the laws into practical operation, the President
is best equipped to assess whether an executive agency ought
to continue operating in accordance with its charter or the law
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize
creating it. This is not to say that the legislature is incapable of
his Office.– The President, subject to the policy in the Executive
making a similar assessment and appropriate action within its
Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
plenary power. The Administrative Code of 1987 merely
efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
underscores the need to provide the President with suitable
administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this
solutions to situations on hand to meet the exigencies of the
purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
service that may call for the exercise of the power of control.

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the

x x x The law grants the President this power in recognition of
President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office
Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
"to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of
Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating,
the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To
or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit
remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must
to another;
be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in
the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies.
After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the
President. This is the rationale behind the President’s
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure
of the Office of the President.32
The Office of the President consists of the Office of the
President proper and the agencies under it.33 It is not disputed
that PCUP and NCIP were formed as agencies under the Office
of the President.34 The "Agencies under the Office of the
President" refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship
of the President, those under the supervision and control of the
President, those under the administrative supervision of the
Office of the President, those attached to the Office for policy
and program coordination, and those that are not placed by law
or order creating them under any special department.35
As thus provided by law, the President may transfer any agency
under the Office of the President to any other department or
agency, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. Gauged
against these guidelines,36 the challenged executive orders
may not be said to have been issued with grave abuse of
discretion or in violation of the rule of law.
The references in E.O. 364 to asset reform as an anti-poverty
measure for social justice and to rationalization of the
bureaucracy in furtherance of good government37 encapsulate
a portion of the existing "policy in the Executive Office." As
averred by the OSG, the President saw it fit to streamline the
agencies so as not to hinder the delivery of crucial social
reforms.38
The consolidation of functions in E.O. 364 aims to attain the
objectives of "simplicity, economy and efficiency" as gathered
from the provision granting PCUP and NCIP access to the range
of services provided by the DAR’s technical offices and support
systems.39
The characterization of the NCIP as an independent agency
under the Office of the President does not remove said body
from the President’s control and supervision with respect to its
performance of administrative functions. So it has been
opined:
That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the
control of the President in all instances is evident in the IPRA
itself, which provides that the decisions of the NCIP in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be appealable to the
Court of Appeals, like those of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the NCIP, although
independent to a certain degree, was placed by Congress
"under the office of the President" and, as such, is still subject
to the President’s power of control and supervision granted
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution with respect to
its performance of administrative functions[.]40 (Underscoring
supplied)
In transferring the NCIP to the DAR as an attached agency, the
President effectively tempered the exercise of presidential
authority and considerably recognized that degree of
independence.
The Administrative Code of 1987 categorizes administrative
relationships into (1) supervision and control, (2)
administrative supervision, and (3) attachment.41 With
respect to the third category, it has been held that an attached
agency has a larger measure of independence from the
Department to which it is attached than one which is under
departmental supervision and control or administrative
supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship"
between the Department and the attached agency. The
attachment is merely for "policy and program coordination."42
Indeed, the essential autonomous character of a board is not
negated by its attachment to a commission.43
AMIN argues, however, that there is an anachronism of sorts
because there can be no policy and program coordination
between conceptually different areas of reform. It claims that
the new framework subsuming agrarian reform, urban land
reform and ancestral domain reform is fundamentally
incoherent in view of the widely different contexts.44 And it
posits that it is a substantive transformation or reorientation
that runs contrary to the constitutional scheme and policies.
AMIN goes on to proffer the concept of "ordering the law"45
which, so it alleges, can be said of the Constitution’s distinct
treatment of these three areas, as reflected in separate
provisions in different parts of the Constitution.46 It argues
that the Constitution did not intend an over-arching concept of
agrarian reform to encompass the two other areas, and that
how the law is ordered in a certain way should not be
undermined by mere executive orders in the guise of
administrative efficiency.
The Court is not persuaded.
The interplay of various areas of reform in the promotion of
social justice is not something implausible or unlikely.47 Their
interlocking nature cuts across labels and works against a rigid
pigeonholing of executive tasks among the members of the
President’s official family. Notably, the Constitution inhibited
from identifying and compartmentalizing the composition of
the Cabinet. In vesting executive power in one person rather
than in a plural executive, the evident intention was to invest
the power holder with energy.48
AMIN takes premium on the severed treatment of these reform
areas in marked provisions of the Constitution. It is a precept,
however, that inferences drawn from title, chapter or section
headings are entitled to very little weight.49 And so must
reliance on sub-headings,50 or the lack thereof, to support a
strained deduction be given the weight of helium.
Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not to create
doubt.51 AMIN’s thesis unsettles, more than settles the order
of things in construing the Constitution. Its interpretation fails
to clearly establish that the so-called "ordering" or
arrangement of provisions in the Constitution was consciously
adopted to imply a signification in terms of government
hierarchy from where a constitutional mandate can per se be
derived or asserted. It fails to demonstrate that the "ordering"
or layout was not simply a matter of style in constitutional
drafting but one of intention in government structuring. With
its inherent ambiguity, the proposed interpretation cannot be
made a basis for declaring a law or governmental act
unconstitutional.
A law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For it
to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity
must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.52 Any reasonable
doubt should, following the universal rule of legal hermeneutics,
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law.53
Ople v. Torres54 on which AMIN relies is unavailing. In that
case, an administrative order involved a system of
identification that required a "delicate adjustment of various
contending state policies" properly lodged in the legislative
arena. It was declared unconstitutional for dealing with a
subject that should be covered by law and for violating the right
to privacy.
In the present case, AMIN glaringly failed to show how the
reorganization by executive fiat would hamper the exercise of
citizen’s rights and privileges. It rested on the ambiguous
conclusion that the reorganization jeopardizes economic, social
and cultural rights. It intimated, without expounding, that the
agendum behind the issuances is to weaken the indigenous
peoples’ rights in favor of the mining industry. And it raised
concerns about the possible retrogression in DAR’s
performance as the added workload may impede the
implementation of the comprehensive agrarian reform
program.lavvphil
AMIN has not shown, however, that by placing the NCIP as an
attached agency of the DAR, the President altered the nature
and dynamics of the jurisdiction and adjudicatory functions of
the NCIP concerning all claims and disputes involving rights of
indigenous cultural communities and
indigenous peoples. Nor has it been shown, nay alleged, that
the reorganization was made in bad faith.55
As for the other arguments raised by AMIN which pertain to the
wisdom or soundness of the executive decision, the Court finds
it unnecessary to pass upon them. The raging debate on the
most fitting framework in the delivery of social services is
endless in the political arena. It is not the business of this Court
to join in the fray. Courts have no judicial power to review
cases involving political questions and, as a rule, will desist
from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases,
advisory opinions and cases that have become moot.56
Finally, a word on the last ground proffered for declaring the
unconstitutionality of the assailed issuances ─ that they violate
Section 16, Article XIII of the Constitution57 on the people’s
right to participate in decision-making through adequate
consultation mechanisms.

The framers of the Constitution recognized that the

consultation mechanisms were already operating without the
State’s action by law, such that the role of the State would be
mere facilitation, not necessarily creation of these consultation
mechanisms. The State provides the support, but eventually it
is the people, properly organized in their associations, who can
assert the right and pursue the objective. Penalty for failure on
the part of the government to consult could only be reflected in
the ballot box and would not nullify government action.58

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Executive Order Nos.

364 and 379 issued on September 27, 2004 and October 26,
2004, respectively, are declared not unconstitutional.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice