Torts and Damages Case Digest 3
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Article 2177
Filomeno v. IAC
Difference between civil liability and criminal liability
FACTS: At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of
October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano
went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San
Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters
from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He
found the place where he stored his palay flooded
with water coming from the irrigation canal
nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the
elevated portion of the canal to see what
happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and
Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was
responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal
and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano
then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for
his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued.
Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long,
including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and
hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his
hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack.
Javier who was then unarmed ran away from
Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked
him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the
back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on
said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict
further injury, his daughter embraced and
prevented him from hacking Javier.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and
his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla
who conducted a medico-legal examination which
confirms that there has been an incised wound
caused by the hacking incident.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier
was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a
very serious condition. When admitted to the
hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having
convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who
personally attended to Javier found that the latter's
serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin.
noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's
palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide,
found guilty by RTC and affirmed by CA
ISSUE: Whether he is guilty
RULING: NO, he is not guilty but he is still
liable for damages
The evidence on record does not clearly show that
the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with
tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound.
The evidence merely confirms that the wound,
which was already healing at the time Javier
suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment,
somehow got infected with tetanus However, as
to when the wound was infected is not clear from
the record.
Proximate cause: "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have
occurred."And more comprehensively, "the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom."
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised
wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo
which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident
took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or
on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms
of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the
appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at
the time, it is more medically probable that Javier
should have been infected with only a mild cause
of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction
of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should
have been more than six days. Javier, however,
died on the second day from the onset time. The
more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the
severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet
present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have
been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have
been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20
to 22 days before he died.
The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound
by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later
or between the time Javier was wounded to the
time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime.
In re: Civil liability: We must stress, however, that
our discussion of proximate cause and remote
cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this
rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow
that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The
well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not
criminally liable, may still be civilly liable.
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the
Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of
the accused on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the
same act or omission
This is one of those causes where confused
thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear
line of demarcation between criminal liability and
civil responsibility, and to determine the logical
result of the distinction. The two liabilities are
separate and distinct from each other. One affects
the social order and the other, private rights. One
is for the punishment or correction of the
offender while the other is for reparation of
damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each other
that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil
Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise
upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the
public action for the imposition of the legal
penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is
just and proper that, for the purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. But for the purpose of indemnity the
complaining party, why should the offense also be
proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be
proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is
the right of the aggrieved person any less private
because the wrongful act is also punishable by the
criminal law?
Article 2179
Garciano v. CA
Negligence of petitioner
FACTS: The petitioner was hired to teach during
the 1981-82 school year in the Immaculate
Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes.
On January 13, 1982, or before the school year
ended, she applied for an indefinite leave of
absence because her daughter was taking her to
Austria where her daughter was employed (Exh.
B). The application was recommended for
approval by the school principal, Emerito O.
Labajo, and approved by the President of the
school's Board of Directors (Exh. B-1).
On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addressed a
letter to the petitioner through her husband,
Sotero Garciano (for she was still abroad),
informing her of the decision of Fr. Joseph
Wiertz, the school's founder, concurred in by the
president of the Parent-Teachers Association and
the school faculty, to terminate her services as a
member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the
absence of any written contract of employment
between her and the school due to her refusal to
sign one; and (2) the difficulty of getting a
substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one
would accept the position without a written
contract (Exhs. C and 1). Upon her return from
Austria in the later part of June, 1982, she received
the letter informing her that her services at the
Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been
terminated. She made inquiries from the school
about the matter and, on July 7, 1982, the
members of the Board of Directors of the school,
with the exception of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, signed a
letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to
report and do your usual duties as Classroom
Teacher effective July 5, 1982," and that "any
letter or notice of termination received by you
before this date has no sanction or authority by
the Board of Directors of this Institution,
therefore it is declared null and void
On September 3, 1982, petitioner filed a
complaint for damages in the Regional Trial
Court, Cebu, Branch XI, against Fr. Wiertz,
Emerito Labajo, and some members of the faculty
of the school for discrimination and unjust and
illegal dismissal. CA reversed the decision,
absolving the school officers
ISSUE: Whether the school officers are liable
for damages
RULING: NO, the school officers are not
liable for damages
The board of directors of the Immaculate
Concepcion Institute, which alone possesses the
authority to hire and fire teachers and other
employees of the school, did not dismiss the
petitioner. It in fact directed her to report for
work. While the private respondents sent her a
letter of termination through her husband, they
admittedly had no authority to do so.
The fact that defendants-appellants had "acidly"
received the action of the Board of Directors
repudiating their decision to terminate plaintiff-
appellee is not proof that defendants-appellants
had effectively and physically prevented plaintiff-
appellee from resuming her post. It was nothing
more than a reaction to what defendants-
appellants perceived as an affront to their
collective prestige. It would appear, therefore, that
plaintiff-appellee voluntarily desisted from her
teaching job in the school and has no right to
recover damages from defendants-appellants.
The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that
petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her
own choice. While the respondents admittedly
wanted her service terminated, they actually did
nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming
her post, as ordered by the school's Board of
Directors. That the school principal and Fr.
Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision to
retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened
to resign en masse, even if true, did not make
them liable to her for damages. They were simply
exercising their right of free speech or their right
to dissent from the Board's decision. Their acts
were not contrary to law, morals, good customs or
public policy. They did not "illegally dismiss" her
for the Board's decision to retain her prevailed.
She was ordered to report for work on July 5,
1982, but she did not comply with that order.
Consequently, whatever loss she may have
incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-
inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria.
Bataclan v. Medina
The overturning of the bus and not the fire is the proximate
cause
FACTS: Shortly after midnight, on September 13,
1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation,
operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina
under a certificate of public convenience, left the
town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City,
driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon.
At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while
the bus was running within the jurisdiction of
Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the
vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or
ditch on the right side of the road and turned
turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave
the bus the best way they could, others had to be
helped or pulled out, while the three passengers
seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and
the Visayan and the woman behind them named
Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the
overturned bus.
After half an hour, came about ten men, one of
them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo
with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with
petroleum. These men presumably approach the
overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce
fire started, burning and all but consuming the
bus, including the four passengers trapped inside
it. It would appear that as the bus overturned,
gasoline began to leak and escape from the
gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading
over and permeating the body of the bus and the
ground under and around it, and that the lighted
torch brought by one of the men who answered
the call for help set it on fire.
By reason of his death, his widow, Salud
Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five
minor children, brought the present suit to
recover from Mariano Medina compensatory,
moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees
in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the
Court of First Instance of Cavite ruled in favour
of the heirs.
The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter
endorsed the appeal to us because of the value
involved in the claim in the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether the bus company is liable for
damages
RULING: YES, they are liable for damages
because they are negligent
We also agree with the trial court that there was
negligence on the part of the defendant, through
his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to
show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was
speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers,
and as shown by the fact that according to the
testimony of the witnesses, including that of the
defense, from the point where one of the front
tires burst up to the canal where the bus
overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance
of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the
blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to
stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which
the bus must have been running, its momentum
carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it
fell into the canal and turned turtle.
Proximate Cause: It may be that ordinarily, when a
passenger bus overturns, and pins down a
passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if
through some event, unexpected and
extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire,
say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after
looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the
passenger is burned to death, one might still
contend that the proximate cause of his death was
the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But
in the present case under the circumstances
obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold
that the proximate cause was the overturning of
the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its
back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was
not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of
the men with a lighted torch was in response to
the call for help, made not only by the passengers,
but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was
dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had
to carry a light with them, and coming as they did
from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights
were not available; and what was more natural
than that said rescuers should innocently approach
the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue
requested from them. In other words, the coming
of the men with a torch was to be expected and
was a natural sequence of the overturning of the
bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and
the call for outside help.
Pilipinas Bank v. CA and Lilia Erchaus
(Not Torts and Damages) Involves legal rate
FACTS: On another civil case, respondent filed a
complaint against petitioner and its president,
Constantino Bautista, for collection of a sum of
money.
The complaint alleges that Pilipinas Bank and
Greatland Realty Corporation executed a Dacion
en Pago , wherein several parcels of land were
conveyed for the sum of 7,776,335.69. Greatland
then assigned 2,300,000 out of the total
consideration of the Dacion, in favour of
respondent and despite demand for payment,
petitioner refused to pay the amount assigned to
her.
Petitioner argued that its former president had no
authority, and that it never ratified the same, and
assuming arguendo that the agreement was
binding, the conditions were never fulfilled.
RTC ruled in favour of private respondent and
ordered the petitioner to pay. CA modified the
decision by limiting the execution pending appeal
to 5,517,707.
Petitioner complied with the writ of execution by
issuing 2 manager’s checks to cover said amount,
which was encashed on July 15, 1988. Later on,
the decision of the CA became final.
Petitioner then filed a motion in the trial court to
refund her the excess payment of 1,898, 623.67
with interest, since the advanced amount fell short
of the actual awarded amount. [since the interest
rate used by petitioner was 6%]
Respondent opposed it and argued that the legal
interest was 12%. CA again ruled in favour of
respondent. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the legal interest should be
12% [for forbearance of money, goods and
credits & loans]
RULING: NO, the rate should be 6%
The said amount was a portion of the
P7,776,335.69 which petitioner was obligated to
pay Greatland as consideration for the sale of
several parcels of land by Greatland to petitioner.
The amount of P2,300,000.00 was assigned by
Greatland in favor of private respondent. The said
obligation therefore arose from a contract of
purchase and sale and not from a contract of loan
or mutuum. Hence, what is applicable is the rate
of 6% per annum as provided in Article 2209 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and not the rate
of 12% per annum as provided in Circular No.
416.
Private respondent was paid in advance the
amount of P5,517,707.00 by petitioner to the
order for the execution pending appeal of the
judgment of the trial court. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals reduced the total damages to
P3,619,083.33, leaving a balance of P1,898,623.67
to be refunded by private respondent to
petitioner. In an execution pending appeal, funds
are advanced by the losing party to the prevailing
party with the implied obligation of the latter to
repay former, in case the appellate court cancels or
reduces the monetary award. Hence, Circular No.
416 applies to cases where money is transferred
from one person to another and the obligation to
return the same or a portion thereof is adjudged.
Article 2180
Cuadra v. Monfort
Vicarious liability of a parent
FACTS: Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria
Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six
at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City.
On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them,
together with three other classmates, to weed the
grass in the school premises. While thus engaged
Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband,
an ornamental object commonly worn by young
girls over their hair. Jokingly she said aloud that
she had found an earthworm and, evidently to
frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her.
At that precise moment the latter turned around
to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye.
Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured
part and treated it with some powder. The next
day, July 10, the eye became swollen and it was
then that the girl related the incident to her
parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for
treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice,
first on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and
stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three
days, for all of which the parents spent the sum of
P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however,
Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of
her right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the
parents in behalf of their minor daughter against
Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father,
the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as
actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the
suit.
ISSUE: Whether the parent is liable for the
negligence of his child
RULING: NO, they are not liable based from
the circumstance in the case
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by provisions of this
Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
When the act or omission is that of one person
for whom another is responsible, the latter then
becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in the
different cases enumerated therein, such as that of
the father or the mother under the circumstances
above quoted. The basis of this vicarious,
although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176,
fault or negligence, which is presumed from that
which accompanied the causative act or omission.
The presumption is merely prima facie and may
therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical
inference that may be drawn from the last
paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the
responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage."
Since the fact thus required to be proven is a
matter of defense, the burden of proof necessarily
rests on the defendant. But what is the exact
degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a
parent prove it in connection with a particular act
or omission of a minor child, especially when it
takes place in his absence or outside his immediate
company? Obviously there can be no meticulously
calibrated measure applicable; and when the law
simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father
of the family to prevent damage," it implies a
consideration of the attendant circumstances in
every individual case, to determine whether or not
by the exercise of such diligence the damage could
have been prevented.
In the present case there is nothing from which it
may be inferred that the defendant could have
prevented the damage by the observance of due
care, or that he was in any way remiss in the
exercise of his parental authority in failing to
foresee such damage, or the act which caused it.
On the contrary, his child was at school, where it
was his duty to send her and where she was, as he
had the right to expect her to be, under the care
and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the
act which caused the injury was concerned, it was
an innocent prank not unusual among children at
play and which no parent, however careful, would
have any special reason to anticipate much less
guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous
propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's
character which would reflect unfavorably on her
upbringing and for which the blame could be
attributed to her parents.
Libi v. IAC
The nature of liability of the parents under vicarious
liability: Applicability of Art. 2180 for delicts and quasi
delicts
FACTS: Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi
were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie
Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after
she supposedly found him to be sadistic and
irresponsible. During the first and second weeks
of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann
with demands for reconciliation but the latter
persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to
resort to threats against her.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died,
each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with
the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver
licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi,
which was recovered from the scene of the crime
inside the residence of private respondents at the
corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem
streets of the same city.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of
their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her
death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm
and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to
commit suicide.
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann
filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu against the parents of
Wendell to recover damages arising from the
latter's vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code.
RTC dismissed the case but was reversed by CA
ISSUE: Whether the parents of Libi should be
held liable
RULING: YES, they should be held liable
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell,
testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a
gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a
drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners
holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's
key is always in her bag, all of which facts were
known to Wendell. They have never been their
son Wendell taking or using the gun. She
admitted, however, that on that fateful night the
gun was no longer in the safety deposit box.[16]
We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious
doubts that petitioner spouses had really been
exercising the diligence of a good father of a
family by safely locking the fatal gun away.
Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless
one of the keys to the safety deposit box was
negligently left lying around or he had free access
to the bag of his mother where the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required
by law in a parent and child relationship consists,
to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely
remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently
supervising the activities of their son, despite his
minority and immaturity, so much so that it was
only at the time of Wendell's death that they
allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent
and that Cresencio's gun was missing from the
safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly
wanting in their duty and responsibility in
monitoring and knowing the activities of their
children who, for all they know, may be engaged
in dangerous work such as being drug
informers,[17] or even drug users.
It is still the duty of parents to know the activity
of their children who may be engaged in this
dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs.
Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in
supervising the activities of their son, Wendell,
and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could
have prevented Wendell from killing, Julie Ann
Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code
In Fuellas v. Cadano: Our concern stems from our
readings that if the liability of the parents for
crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is
subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor
be absolved of civil liability on the defense that
they acted with the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if
such liability imputed to the parents is considered
direct and primary, that diligence would constitute
a valid and substantial defense.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for
quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is
primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply
Article 2194 of said code which provides for
solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons
responsible for the act or omission, in this case
the minor and the father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable.
Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and
not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article
2180 provides that "(t)he responsibility treated of
in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage."
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we
hereby rule that the parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from
criminal offenses committed by their minor
children under their legal authority or control, or
who live in their company, unless it is proven that
the former acted with the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent such damages. That
primary liability is premised on the provisions of
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with
respect to damages ex delicto caused by their
children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but
under 15 years of age who acted without
discernment; and, with regard to their children
over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with
discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21
years of age, such primary liability shall be
imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.
Tamargo v. CA
What parental authority means
FACTS: On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc,
then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner
Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and
petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo,
Jennifer's natural parents against respondent
spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's
natural parents with whom he was living at the
time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case
for damages, a criminal information or Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal
Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc.
Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted
from criminal liability on the ground that he bad
acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981,
the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a
petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in
Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition
for adoption was grunted on, 18 November 1982,
that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed
Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc,
Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of
the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that
not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely
the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were
indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from
the moment the successful petition for adoption
was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since
Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with
his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing
and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed
petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent
natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
indispensable parties to the action.
ISSUE: Whether the natural parents are
absolve of their vicarious liability by virtue of
adoption
RULING: YES, the reckoning point is the
exercise of parental control at the time of the
quasi-delict
To extend that liability, without regard to the lack
of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility
for the negligence of those persons whose acts or
omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to
others who are in a position to exercise an
absolute or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil Code has
elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with
certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in
which moral culpability can be directly imputed to
the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to
exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having
failed to exercise due care in the selection and
control of one's agent or servants, or in the
control of persons who, by reasons of their status,
occupy a position of dependency with respect to
the person made liable for their conduct.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the
torts of their minor children living with them, may
be seen to be based upon the parental authority
vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The
civil law assumes that when an unemancipated
child living with its parents commits a tortious
acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely
to supervise the child who is in their custody and
control. Parental liability is, in other words,
anchored upon parental authority coupled with
presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of
the duties accompanying such authority. The
parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed
and the presumption can be overtuned under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the
parents had exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted,
under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability
for the torts of a minor child is the relationship
existing between the parents and the minor child
living with them and over whom, the law
presumes, the parents exercise supervision and
control.
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines
9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the
child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in
the actual custody of the parents sought to be held
liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons
exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their
 company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by
Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural
parents who had then actual custody of the minor
Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit
for damages.
We do not believe that parental authority is
properly regarded as having been retroactively
transferred to and vested in the adopting parents,
the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. We do not consider that
retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the
adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting
parents had no actual or physically custody over
the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps
be given to the granting of the petition for
adoption where such is essential to permit the
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of
the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to
hold that parental authority had been retroactively
lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden
them with liability for a tortious act that they
could not have foreseen and which they could not
have prevented (since they were at the time in the
United States and had no physical custody over
the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would
be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy
basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Put a little differently, no presumption of parental
dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control
at the time the tort was committed.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. Philam
Forwarders
Definition of manager in vicarious liability
FACTS: In the complaint for damages filed by
the bus company and Pangalangan against Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda, it
was alleged that on November 24, 1962, Pineda
drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc., along the national
highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck
bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which
was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered
injuries and the bus was damaged and could not
be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the
company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51.
Balingit was the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc.
Among the defenses interposed by the defendants
in their answer was that Balingit was not Pineda's
employer.
The dismissal was based on the ground that
Balingit as the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., which together with Fernando
Pineda and Balingit, was sued for damages in an
action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, is
not the manager of an establishment
contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code
(dismissed by trial court)
ISSUE: Whether Balingit should be liable as a
manager
RULING: NO, he is not liable as the manager
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible
The owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches
in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
 Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former
are not engaged in any business or
industry.
The novel and unprecedented legal issue in this
appeal is whether the terms "employers" and
"owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise" (dueños o directores de un
establicimiento o empresa) used in article 2180 of
the Civil Code, formerly article 1903 of the old
Code, embrace the manager of a corporation
owning a truck, the reckless operation of which
allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from
which the damage arose.
We are of the opinion that those terms do not
include the manager of a corporation. It may be
gathered from the context of article 2180 that the
term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish
version) is used in the sense of "employer".
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no
tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened
on Balingit as manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular
accident already mentioned because he himself
may be regarded as an employee or dependiente
of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
Duavit v. CA
Liability of the owner of a vehicle who figured into an
accident while being driven by someone who was not given
consent
FACTS: July 28, 1971 plaintiffs Antonio
Sarmiento, Sr. and Virgilio Catuar were aboard a
jeep with plate number 77-99-F-I Manila, 1971,
owned by plaintiff, Ruperto Catuar was driving
the said jeep on Ortigas Avenue, San Juan, Rizal;
that plaintiff's jeep, at the time, was running
moderately at 20 to 35 kilometers per hour and
while approaching Roosevelt Avenue, Virgilio
Catuar slowed down; that suddenly, another jeep
with plate number 99-97-F-J Manila 1971 driven
by defendant Oscar Sabiniano hit and bumped
plaintiff's jeep on the portion near the left rear
wheel, and as a result of the impact plaintiff's jeep
fell on its right and skidded by about 30 yards; that
as a result plaintiffs jeep was damaged, particularly
the windshield, the differential, the part near the
left rear wheel and the top cover of the jeep; that
plaintiff Virgilio Catuar was thrown to the middle
of the road; his wrist was broken and he sustained
contusions on the head; that likewise plaintiff
Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. was trapped inside the
fallen jeep, and one of his legs was fractured.
Defendant Gualberto Duavit, while admitting
ownership of the other jeep (Plate No. 99-07-F-J
Manila, 1971), denied that the other defendant
(Oscar Sabiniano) was his employee. Duavit
claimed that he has not been an employer of
defendant Oscar Sabiniano at any time up to the
present.
On the other hand documentary and testimonial
evidence show that defendant Oscar Sabiniano
was an employee of the Board of Liquidators
from November 14, 1966 up to January 4, 1973
(Annex A of Answer).
Defendant Sabiniano, in his testimony,
categorically admitted that he took the jeep from
the garage of defendant Duavit without the
consent or authority of the latter (TSN, September
7, 1978, p. 8). He testified further, that Duavit
even filed charges against him for theft of the
jeep, but which Duavit did not push through as
his (Sabiniano's) parents apologized to Duavit on
his behalf.
RTC ruling: The trial court found Oscar Sabiniano
negligent in driving the vehicle but found no
employer-employee relationship between him and
the petitioner because the latter was then a
government employee and he took the vehicle
without the authority and consent of the owner.
CA ruling: We cannot go along with appellee's
argument. It will be seen that in Vargas v.
Langcay, supra, it was held that it is immaterial
whether or not the driver was actually employed
by the operator of record or registered owner, and
it is even not necessary to prove who the actual
owner of the vehicle and who the employer of the
driver is. When the Supreme Court ruled, thus:
'We must hold and consider such owner-operator
of record (registered owner) as the employer in
contemplation of law, of the driver,' it cannot be
construed other than that the registered owner is
the employer of the driver in contemplation of
law. It is a conclusive presumption of fact and law,
and is not subject to rebuttal of proof to the
contrary.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner herein is liable
RULING: NO, he is not liable. The
jurisprudence followed by CA cannot apply to
the case
Vargas case, just before the accident occurred
Vargas had sold her jeepney to a third person, so
that at the time of the accident she was no longer
the owner of the jeepney. This court, nevertheless,
affirmed Vargas' liability since she failed to
surrender to the Motor Vehicles Office the
corresponding AC plates in violation of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law and Commonwealth
Act No. 146. We further ruled that the operator of
record continues to be the operator of the vehicle
in contemplation of law, as regards the public and
third persons, and as such is responsible for the
consequences incident to its operator. The vehicle
involved was a public utility jeepney for hire. In
such cases, the law does not only require the
surrender of the AC plates but orders the vendor
operator to stop the operation of the jeepney as a
form of public transportation until the matter is
reported to the authorities.
As can be seen, the circumstances of the above
cases are entirely different from those in the
present case. Herein petitioner does not deny
ownership of the vehicle involved in tire mishap
but completely denies having employed the driver
Sabiniano or even having authorized the latter to
drive his jeep. The jeep was virtually stolen from
the petitioner's garage. To hold, therefore, the
petitioner liable for the accident caused by the
negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver
nor employee would be absurd as it would be like
holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an
accident caused by the person who stole such
vehicle. In this regard, we cannot ignore the many
cases of vehicles forcibly taken from their owners
at gunpoint or stolen from garages and parking
areas and the instances of service station
attendants or mechanics of auto repair shops
using, without the owner's consent, vehicles
entrusted to them for servicing or repair.
We cannot blindly apply absolute rules based on
precedents whose facts do not jibe four square
with pending cases. Every case must be
determined on its own peculiar factual
circumstances. Where, as in this case, the records
of the petition fail to indicate the slightest indicia
of an employer-employee relationship between the
owner and the erring driver or any consent given
by the owner for the vehicle's use, we cannot hold
the owner liable.
Genson v. Adarle
Suability of the state for torts committed
FACTS: Arturo Arbatin was the successful bidder
in the sale at public auction of junk and other
unserviceable government property located at the
compound of the Highway District Engineer's
Office of Roxas City. Private respondent Eduardo
Adarle was hired as a laborer by Arbatin to gather
and take away scrap iron from the said compound
with a daily wage of P12.00 or about 312.00 a
month.
On September 8, 1979, at 4:00 o'clock in the
morning, on a Saturday and a non-working day,
while the private respondent was tying a cable to a
pile of scrap iron to be loaded on a truck inside
the premises of the compound, and while the
bucket of the payloader driven by Ramon
Buensalido was being raised, the bucket suddenly
fell and hit Adarle on the right back portion of his
head just below the nape of his neck. Adarle was
rushed to the St. Anthony Hospital, Roxas City.
While still in the hospital, the private respondent
instituted the action below for damages against
Arbatin, his employer; Buensalido, the payloader
operator; Candelario Marcelino, the civil engineer;
and petitioner, the Highway District Engineer.
During the trial on the merits, the petitioner put
up the defense that he had no knowledge of or
participation in the accident and that, when it
happened, he was not present in the government
compound. Apart from the fact that it was a
Saturday and a non-working day, he was in Iloilo.
The trial court found that, with the exception of
the petitioner, all of the defendants were present
at the Highway's compound when the accident
occurred. However, it still adjudged the petitioner
liable for damages because the petitioner was
supposed to know what his men do with their
government equipment within an area under his
supervision.
CA affirmed the decision
ISSUE: Whether petitioner should not be
liable on the ground that he is a govt. official
RULING: NO, he is still liable
In Belizar v. Brazas, (2 SCRA 526), we ruled that
"the fact that the duties and positions of the
defendants are indicated does not mean that they
are being sued in their official capacities, especially
as the present action is not one against the
Government." Furthermore, the accident in the
case at bar happened on a non-working day and
there was no showing that the work performed on
that day was authorized by the government. While
the equipment used belongs to the Government,
the work was private in nature, for the benefit of a
purchaser of junk
According to the trial court, Mr. Genson
authorized work on a Saturday when no work was
supposed to be done. It stated that the petitioner
should know what his men do with their
government equipment and he should neither be
lax nor lenient in his supervision over them.
There is likewise no sufficient basis for the
"master-servant" doctrine in tort law to apply.
Buensalido was not working overtime as a
government employee. It is doubtful if the district
engineer can be considered an "employer" for
purposes of tort liability who may be liable even if
he was not there. No evidence was presented to
show that an application for overtime work or a
claim for overtime pay from the district engineer's
office was ever filed. It is more logical to presume
that Buensalido, the operator of the payloader,
was trying to earn a little money on the side from
the junk buyer and that his presence in the
compound on that Saturday was a purely private
arrangement. From the records of this case, we are
not disposed to rule that a supervisor who
tolerates his subordinates to moonlight on a non-
working day in their office premises can be held
liable for everything that happens on that day. It
would have been preferable if Mr. Arbatin
brought his own payloader operator and perhaps,
his own equipment but we are not dealing with
sound office practice in this case. The issue before
us is subsidiary liability for tort comitted by a
government employee who is moonlighting on a
non-working day.