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San Beda College of Law
1. TANADA v. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, 29 December 1986
Facts: Petitioners sought the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus to compel the respondent public officials
to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders. However, the respondents contended that the publication in the Official Gazette
was not a condition sine qua non for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for the
effectivity.
Issue: Is publication indispensable in light of the clause, “unless it is otherwise provided” in Art. 2 of
the NCC?
Held: Yes. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that
the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without
its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen day period shall be shortened or extended.
The requirement of publication applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise
of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred
by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or
implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding
that it applies only to a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that
place;(5) Monetary Board circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce.
On the other hand, publication requirements does not apply to (1) interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, i.e. regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public; (2) Letters of Instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines
to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties; and (3) instructions of Ministry
heads on case studies, assignments of personnel, etc. Municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule
but by the Local Government Code.
2. DE ROY v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 80718, 29 January 1988
Facts: A firewall of a burned-out building owned by the petitioners collapsed over the tailoring shop of
the family of the respondents which resulted to the death of Marissa Bernal, their daughter. A decision
was rendered by RTC CA were in favor of the respondents. On the last day of appeal, petitioners filed a
motion for extension of time to file the appeal but was denied by CA, applying the ruling in Habaluyas
Enterprises v. Japzon.
Issue: Should SC decisions be published in the Official Gazette in order to be binding?
Held: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of
counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly
where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of
Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA) and law journals.
3. PEOPLE v. QUE PO LAY

G.R. No. L-6791, 29 March 1954
Facts: Que Po Lay was found guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20. He appealed the
conviction and said that since such circular was not published in the Official Gazette, it had no force
and effect.
Issue: Should bank circulars of general applicability be published in order to have force and effect?
Held: Yes. Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the
implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law, according to
settled jurisprudence. Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20
of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before
becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the
people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
4. NPC v. PINATUBO COMMERCIAL

GR NO. 176006, 26 March 2010
Facts: RTC declared unconstitutional items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 which provides that
only partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material in producing finished
products either purely or partly out of aluminum, to participate in the bidding for the disposal of ACSR
wires for being violative of substantial due process because, while it created rights in favor of third
parties, the circular had not been published. NPC contended that it not be published since it was not of
general application.
Issue: Should the NPC Circular be published?
Held: No. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules
or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it was merely an internal rule or regulation.
It did not purport to enforce or implement an existing law but was merely a directive issued by the
NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient disposal of scrap ACSRs to
qualified bidders. Thus, NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the responsibilities of the different NPC
personnel in the disposal, pre-qualification, bidding and award of scrap ACSRS. It also provided for
the deposit of a proposal bond to be submitted by bidders, the approval of the award, mode of payment
and release of awarded scrap ACSRs. All these guidelines were addressed to the NPC personnel
involved in the bidding and award of scrap ACSRs. It did not, in any way, affect the rights of the public
in general or of any other person not involved in the bidding process. Assuming it affected individual
rights, it did so only remotely, indirectly and incidentally.
5. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

GR NO. 180643, 25 March 2008
Facts: Respondent Committees argue that the Senate does not have to publish its Rules because it was
already published in 1995 and in 2006. They further claim that the Senate, as a continuing body, is not
required to republish the Rules, unless the same is repealed or amended.
Issue: Should the Senate rules on procedure be published?
Held: The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be
conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon
the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are
amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in
the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules
regarding effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings
conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the
rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the
publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.
6. PIMENTEL v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

GR NO. 187714, 8 March 2011
Facts: Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was elected Senate President. The Ethics Committee was reorganized
and thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges which
was published in the Official Gazette on March 23, 2009. Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need
to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
Issue: Is the publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole required for their
effectivity?
Held: The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since
rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate,
such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the
rules can take effect.
In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of the
Senate since the proceedings involve the Senate’s exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its
members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate.
However, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the
Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required
under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required
because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. The majority of the members of the Senate
approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, and the publication requirement which they
adopted should be considered as the will of the majority. Respondent cannot dispense with the
publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had already been published in
the Official Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole expressly require
publication before the Rules can take effect. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate
must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are affected.
7. GARCIA v. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001
Facts: Recio was married to an Australian citizen and on May 18, 1989, a divorce decree was issued
by an Australian family court. Respondent and the petitioner got married and it was later on revealed
that the respondent was previously married and dissolved. He contended that the divorce decree was
validly obtained which capacitated him to remarry.
Issue: Is the divorce decree obtained in Australia proved by the respondent?
Held: The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in
the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the
burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the
divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that
judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative.
8. VALEROSO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 164815. February 22, 2008
Facts: Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms under P.D. 1866 with a penalty of
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. During the trial of the case, the said law was amended was
amended by RA 8294 and the penalty for the said crime was lowered to prision coreccional in its
maximum with a fine of not less than fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00). Petitioner argues that the
lower penalty should be imposed upon him.
Issue: Is an amendatory law, lowering the penalty of the offense, the law to be applied even if the case
is still on the trial stage?
Held: Yes. As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the
character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous
to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is not as a right of the offender, but
founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the
penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule
founded on principles of strict justice. Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A.
No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered
to prision correccional in its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866.
9. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

G.R. No. 104528. January 18, 1996
Facts: Private respondents were buyers on instalment from Marikina Village Inc., who in turn
mortgaged the lots bought by respondents to petitioner PNB. When the loan secured by the mortgage
fell due, petitioner demanded that private respondents pay them the purchase price of the lots even if
they already paid Marikina Village Inc. The Office of the President applied, retroactively, PD 957
despite the fact that said law does not expressly provide for its retroactive effect.
Issue: Despite the fact that PD 957 does not expressly provide for its retroactive application, can it be
applied as such?
Held: Yes, PD 957 can be applied retroactively. While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for
retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be plainly inferred from the, unmistakable intent of the law
to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision developers. As between these small lot
buyers and the gigantic financial institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law
-- as an instrument of social justice -- must favor the weak. Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its
disposal vast resources with which it could adequately protect its loan activities, and therefore is
presumed to have conducted the usual due diligence checking and ascertained (whether thru ocular
inspection or other modes of investigation) the actual status, condition, utilization and occupancy of
the property offered as collateral. It could not have been unaware that the property had been built on by
small lot buyers. On the other hand, private respondents obviously were powerless to discover the
attempt of the land developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was precisely in order
to deal with this kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted, its very essence and intendment being to
provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D.
957 termed unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers.
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and condition it
sought to remedy, must be enforced.
10. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS

GR No. L-52306. October 12, 1981
Facts: The Bureau of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for alleged deficiency of withholding
income tax against ABS-CBN for the years 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968 by virtue of Revenue
Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 4-71, issued three years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had
withheld taxes. Petitioner contends that said RMC could not be applied retro-actively as it will be
prejudicial to the taxpayer and thus prescribed by Sec. 338-A (now Sec. 327) of the Tax Code.
Issue: If a ruling or circular issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is prejudicial to the
taxpayer, can it still be given a retroactive effect?
Held: No. Sec. 338-A (now Sec. 327) of the Tax Code provides that rulings or circulars promulgated
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no retroactive application where to so apply them
would be prejudicial to taxpayers. The prejudice to petitioner of the retroactive application of
Memorandum Circular No. 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years after
1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes under General Circular No. V-334. The
assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was also made three
years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. Petitioner was no longer in a position to
withhold taxes due from foreign corporations because it had already remitted all film rentals and no
longer had any control over them when the new Circular was issued. And in so far as the enumerated
exceptions are concerned, admittedly, petitioner does not fall under any of them.
11. D.M. CONSUNJI INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 137873. April 20, 2001
Facts: Private respondent, Maria Juego, is the wife of an employee of DM Consuji Inc. She filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner for its alleged negligence which resulted to the death of her
husband, despite her having already claimed benefits under the provisions of the Worker’s
Compensation Act. Petitioner argues that by claiming benefits under the said act, private respondent
has already waived his right to file a civil claim in the regular courts, as provided by the said act.
Private respondent however claims that at the time she filed a claim under the Workers Compensation
Act, she was unaware that her husband died due to the negligence of petitioner and that she is entitled
to a bigger amount if she filed a civil case.
Issue: Can a valid claim of ignorance of fact(s) result into a valid waiver?
Held: Yes. It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this
case, the "fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner’s
employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a
resolution stating that there may be civil liability.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash
when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police
investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form.
Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim
before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her
rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim
ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws.
This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance,
does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent
a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot
be held against her.
12. EMETERIO CUI v. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY

GR No. L-15127. May 30, 1961
Facts: The contract of scholarship between petitioner and respondent provides:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right to
transfer to another school without having refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of my
scholarship cash.”
When petitioner transferred to another school, respondent sought to enforce the provision of the said
contract demanding a refund.
Petitioner contends that the said provision is void, because the alleged “waiver” to transfer to another
school, in exchange for the scholarship is void for being contrary to public policy.
Issue: Can a student waive his right to transfer to another school in exchange for the scholarship being
given to him by his school?
Held: No. Such a stipulation is void for being contrary to public policy and good morals.
Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of
private schools, colleges and universities, provides that “to stipulate the condition that such
scholarships are good only if the students concerned continue in the same school nullifies the principle
of merit in the award of these scholarships.” Memorandum No. 38, series of 1994 is a sound policy.
Scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster
its prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a business scheme designed
to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent
with sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this definition. It is good
customs; those generally accepted principles of morality which have received some kind of social and
practical confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in
school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in
some private institutions as in Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which
implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving of free
scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the
scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the
United States after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions
scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda
mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first
lien
13. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. NEPOMUCENO PRODUCTIONS INC.

GR No. 139479. December 27, 2002
Facts: Respondent acquired a loan, secured by a real estate mortgage over its properties, from
petitioner PNB. When the loan fell due and the mortgage was foreclosed, the auction sale was
repeatedly re-scheduled without the republication of the notices of sale. Petitioner argues that there is
no more need to publish the notices of sale since it was stipulated in their Agreement to Postpone Sale,
and therefore the respondent has waived the said requirement.
Issue: Can the parties to a Mortgage, by agreement, waive the publication requirements of the
foreclosure sale.
Held: No, Petitioner and respondents have absolutely no right to waive the posting and publication
requirements of Act No. 3135. While it is established that rights may be waived, Article 6 of the Civil
Code explicitly provides that such waiver is subject to the condition that it is not contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized
by law.
The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notify the
mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and
of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of
the property. Clearly, the statutory requirements of posting and publication are mandated, not for the
mortgagors benefit, but for the public or third persons. In fact, personal notice to the mortgagor in
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary, unless stipulated. As such, it is imbued
with public policy considerations and any waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the intent and
letter of Act No. 3135.
14. PEOPLE v. SERZO, JR.

GR No. 118435. June 20, 1997
Facts: Accused-appellant, during the trial of his case, demanded that he be given time to choose his
counsel de parte. The court granted his request but accused-appellant repeatedly failed to acquire the
services of a counsel de parte, prompting the trial court to appoint, on three occasions, counsel de
oficios for him. When the trial court convicted him of the crime, accused-appellant contends that he
was deprived of his right to counsel since he was not able to appoint a counsel de parte.
Issue: Can a party waive his right to a counsel de parte
Held: Yes, the right to counsel de parte is, like other personal rights, waivable so long as (1) the
waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law and (2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and
intelligently made.
In Sayson vs. People, this Court held that the duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio is not
mandatory where the accused has proceeded with the arraignment and the trial with a counsel of his
choice but, when the time for the presentation of the evidence for the defense was due, he appears by
himself alone because of the inexcusable absence of his counsel. In another case, this Court held that
the right to be heard and to reopen the case (and send it to trial anew) could not be allowed if doing so
would sanction a plainly dilatory tactic and a reprehensible trifling with the orderly administration of
justice.
Appellant had been given ample time to secure the services of a counsel de parte, but his subsequent
appearances in court without such counsel and his act of allowing this situation to continue until the
presentation of his evidence betrays his lack of intention to do so. It even appears that he was merely
delaying his own presentation of evidence on purpose to the prejudice of the offended party, the trial
court and the orderly administration of justice.
Furthermore, appellant did not demonstrate in what way the services of his counsels de oficio were
unsatisfactory. He did not cite any instance substantiating his claim that he was not effectively
represented. In short, he was afforded a chance to be heard by counsel of his own choice, but by his
own neglect or mischief, he effectively waived such right. It taxes the mind to think that, almost two
years since appellant first invoked his right to be represented by counsel de parte, he still could not
find one who would suit his needs and desires. Neither did he cooperate with his court-named lawyers.
The facts of this case do not constitute a deprivation of appellants constitutional right to counsel
because he was adequately represented by three court-appointed lawyers: Atty. Lina-ac, Atty. Antonano
and Atty. Garcia. Courts are not required to await indefinitely the pleasure and convenience of the
accused as they are also mandated to promote the speedy and orderly administration of justice. Nor
should they countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public policy requires that the
trial continue as scheduled, considering that appellant was adequately represented by counsels who
were not shown to be negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him.
15. GONGON v. CA
G.R. No. L-24421, April 30, 1970
Facts: A certain lot (Lot 8- B, Block 23, 274 sq.m., Tambobong Estate, Malabon Rizal) owned by the
Catholic church was originally leased to Amada Aquino who in turn sublet it I to Matias Gongon. The
Government purchased the Estate by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 539. A dispute has arisen who
has preferential right over the lot in question. Gongon claimed a preferential right being a bonafide
occupant. Amada Aquino, alleges that as bona fide tenant or lessee she had the preferential right to
purchase the lot, and that Gongon waived his right to the lot in question in favor of respondents-
spouses Amada Aquino and Rufino Rivera (note that respondent spouses have considerable properties
in the estate).
Issue: Whether or not the waiver is valid.
Held: Petitioner’s preferential right could not be validly waived, such waiver being against public
policy. Under Article 6 of the new Civil Code "rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.".
Commonwealth Act No. 539 lays down a public policy to provide the landless elements of our
population with lots upon which to build their homes and small farms which they can cultivate and
from which they can derive their livelihood without being beholden to any man’ such measure having
been adopted in line with the policy of social justice enshrined in our Constitution to remedy and cure
the social unrest caused by the concentration of landed estates in the hands of a few by giving to the
landless elements a piece of land they can call their own."
Respondent spouses have their house on another lot in the Tambobong Estate. Furthermore, respondent
Rufino Rivera is the registered bona fide tenant of still another lot, also in Tambobong, with an area of
2,761 square meters, which is considerably bigger than the lot in question, where petitioner and his
family constructed their residence and where they have been living since 1934. Justice and equity
command that petitioner be given the preferential right to purchase in order to carry out the avowed
policy of the law to give land to the landless.
16. NAVARRO v. JUDGE DOMAGTOY

AM. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996
Facts: Complainant filed an administrative case against Judge Domagtoy for gross misconduct as well
as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated
from his first wife. Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano
Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario in his residence at the Municipality of Dapa which is outside of his
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the judge covers municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. The judge
avers that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar,
confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years,
and such affidavit is sufficient proof of the former spouse’s presumptive death, and ample reason for
him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in
solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate the Family Code.
Issue: Do the acts of the Judge constitute ignorance of the law?
Held: Yes. The law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage. In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not
institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this
judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. With regard to the solemnization of
marriage, a priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate
court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However,
judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas
and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
17. BESO v. DAGUMAN
A.M.MTJ-99-1211, 28 January 2000
Facts: Zenaida Beso charged Judge Daguman, with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction
and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of
the Local Civil Registrar. Respondent Daguman, MCTC Judge of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan Pagsanjan,
Samar, solemnized the marriage of complainant Beso to Bernardito Yman on August 28, 1987, at the
Judge’s residence in Calbayog City, Samar, or outside his jurisdiction. After the wedding, Yman
abandoned Beso for no clear reason. Beso went to check the marriage contract with the Local Civil
Registrar of Calbayog, from which she learned that the marriage has not been registered. Beso inquired
about the non-registration of her marriage with the Judge. Responding to Beso’s letter about the matter,
Daguman told her that all the copies of the marriage contract were taken by Yman.
Issue: Did Judge Daguman commit nonfeasance in office when he solemnized a marriage outside his
jurisdiction?
Held: Yes. The Judge solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction and he neglected his duty
when he failed to register the marriage of complainant to Yman. Respondent Judge has not only
committed nonfeasance in office, he also undermined the very foundation of marriage, which is the
basic social institution in our society whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law.
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it
and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. A judge is not only
bound by oath to apply the law; he must be conscientious and thorough in doing so.
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws - let alone that enacted in order to preserve so
sacrosant an inviolable social institution as marriage - and the stability of judicial Rulings laid down
by superior authority should have given judge pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his
authority and the performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge is, furthermore, presumed
to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his court.
18. MECANO v. COA

G.R. No. 103982. December 11, 1992
Facts: Petitioner is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized for cholecystitis in which he incurred
medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA under
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides allowances to government personnel
in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty.COA denied the claim to the effect
that Section 699 of the RAC has been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the
reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987.
Issue: Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed Section 699 of the RAC?
Held: No. The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a
matter of legislative intent. The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that
of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new
statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What is necessary is a manifest
indication of legislative purpose to repeal. Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a
statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on
the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a
clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the
old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the
later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue
so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the
entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not
found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding
law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others. COA failed
to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are in an
irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits
of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.
19. People vs. Licera

G.R. No. L-39990, 2 July 1975
Facts: In 1961, accused was granted an appointment as secret agent of Governor Leviste. In 1965,
accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. In 1968, he was convicted of the offense
charged. He claims that as secret agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People vs.
Macarandang (1959), was exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess
firearms. He alleges that the lower court erred in relying on the later case of People vs. Mapa (1967)
which held that section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons
appointed as secret agents by provincial governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.
Issue: Should the Macarandang ruling, the prevailing Ruling at the time of the appointment, operate
despite being abrogated by a new ruling removing the exemption?
Held: Yes. Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions,
although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or
interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the
said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.
The rule enunciated in Macarandang to the effect that the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to
assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him
within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent to a member of the municipal police" whom Section
879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearms licenses,
had been revoked by the rule in Mapa which held that said section provides no exemption for persons
appointed as secret agents by provincial governors from the firearm license requirement.
Where a new Ruling abrogates an old rule, the new Ruling should operate respectively only and should
not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the
faith thereof.
20. PEOPLE v. JABINAL

G.R. No. L-30061, 27 February 1974
Facts: Sometime in 1964, Jose Jabinal was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition. However, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent
from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC
Provincial Commander. He contends that he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme
Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero. The accused was found GUILTY
as charged and only considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret
Agent and Confidential Agent on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of
Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa.
Issue: Should the Ruling enunciated in the case of People v. Mapa be applied in the case against
Jabinal even if the said Ruling was pronounced after the commission of the crime and after the filing of
the criminal action against him?
Held: No. Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what
the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system.”The doctrine
laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at
the time appellant was found by possession of the firearm in question and when he was arraigned by
the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine
of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is
necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
21. CHUAYAN v. BERNAS

G.R. No. 10010, 1 August 1916
Facts: On the afternoon of June 26, 1913, a match was held in the cockpit of the municipality of
Tabaco, Albay, between two cocks belonging to the plaintiff and to the defendant respectively. Each of
said persons had put up a wager of P160; and as the referee of the cockpit had declared the defendant's
cock the winner in the bout, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant in the justice of the peace
court of the said pueblo, asking that his own rooster be declared the winner. The justice of the peace
court decided that the bout was a draw. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the Court of First
Instance of the province. On September 11, 1913, the said Court of First Instance rendered judgment
dismissing the appeal. The ground for the dismissal pronounced by the lower court in the judgment
appealed from was that the court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar with
the rules governing cockfights and the duties of referees thereof; that he does not know where to find
the law on the subject and, finally, that he knows of no law whatever that governs the rights of the
plaintiff and the defendant in questions concerning cockfights.
Issue: Does lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case justifies a judge's dismissal of a
case submitted to him for decision?
Held: No. The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case
submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules applicable to a certain
matter that is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and his not knowing where to find
the law relative to the case, are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the
proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the issues.
The Civil Code, in the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the customs of the place shall be
observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.
22. PEOPLE v. VENERACION

G.R. NO. 119987-88
Facts: After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court
rendered a decision finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with
the "penalty of reclusion perpetua. The City Prosecutor of Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed"
against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua).
Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge, issued an
Order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction. The Court believes that in the above-entitled cases, the
accused Lagarto and Cordero have complied with the legal requirements for the perfection of an
appeal. Consequently, for lack of jurisdiction, this Court cannot take cognizance of the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Public Prosecutor of Manila.
Issue: Is the judge allowed any discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or
Death?
Ruling: No. Respondent judge is bound by the provisions of RA 7659, the law in force at the time of
the commission of the crime for which the accused were found guilty. Under the law, the penalty
imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is not Reclusion Perpetua but Death. While RA 7659
punishes cases of ordinary rape with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, it allows judges the discretion
— depending on the existence of circumstances modifying the offense committed — to impose the
penalty of either Reclusion Perpetua only in the three instances mentioned therein. Rape with homicide
is not one of these three instances. The law plainly and unequivocably provides that "[w]hen by reason
or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." The provision leaves
no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty under the
circumstances described, other than a sentence of death.
23. CALTEX v. PALOMAR

G.R. No. L-19650
Facts: The contest was entitled “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”, which calls for participants to
estimate the actual number of liters as hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a
specific period. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for
publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications, representations were made by
Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing. This was
formalized in a letter sent by Caltex to the Post master General, dated October 31, 1960, in which
Caltex, thru its counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that
the contest does not violate the “The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law”. CALTEX sought
judicial intervention wherein the trial court ruled in its favor.
Issue: Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" fell on the purview of the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law
Ruling: The Court held that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" by CALTEX is not a “lottery” nor a
“gift enterprise” but rather a gratuitous distribution of property by chance, which the law does not
prohibit. The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as
policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The
three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. The
contest in question, lacking the element of “consideration”, cannot be deemed al lottery. The rules of
the contest made no mention of a valuable consideration of some kind being paid directly or indirectly
for the chance to draw a prize. The term “gift enterprise” also could not embrace the scheme at bar. As
already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to
the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy
the appellee's products.
24. PEOPLE v. LICERA

G.R. No. L-39990
Facts: This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the judgment the court of the
crime of illegal possession of firearm and sentencing him to imprisonment of five (5) years. Licera
invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his appointment as secret
agent on December 11, 1961 by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. He claims that as secret
agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People vs. Macarandang, 1 was exempt from the
requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. But at the time of the decision, said
case has been repealed by the case of Mapa.
Issue: Whether or not the case of Macarandang should be applied despite it repeal by the case of Mapa
requiring license to carry firearms
Ruling: At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension
for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the
Macarandang rule — the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code -
formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked the
Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new
doctrine should operate respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule,
especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more especially true in
the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in any
other, it is imperative that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of
society.
25. PEOPLE v. PURISIMA

G.R. No. L-42050-66
Facts: The petition is a consolidation of 26 cases involving one basic question of law. Information
were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. In dismissing or quashing the Information, the trial courts concurred that
the element of carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion,
organized lawlessness or public disorder was lacking.
Issue: Whether the information are sufficient in form and substance
Ruling: In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure - a presidential decree in these

cases - the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Statutes are to be
construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. When construing
a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute should be construed with
reference to its intended scope and purpose. It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there
exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure,
and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. It is to be
presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no intent to
work a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one
person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on. Thus since the two elements of such
crime are first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not
used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon
was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of
the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act
criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it.
26. IN RE: ESTATE OF PADILLA

74 PHIL 377
Facts: During the marriage of Padilla and Paterno, the former gave capital to their conjugal partnership
while the latter brought in properties. Later, Padilla died testate and gave his whole estate to his
mother. Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, commenced the instant proceedings by filing a petition
wherein she prayed, inter alia, that her paraphernal property be segregated from the inventoried estate
and delivered to her together with the corresponding reimbursements and indemnities; that she be
given one-half of the conjugal partnership property.
Issue: Whether the properties are conjugal
Ruling: Art. 1404 (2) of the Spanish Code provides that the improvements made on the separate
property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either
the husband or wife, belong to the conjugal partnership. Buildings constructed, at the expense of the
partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership,
but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
In the instant case, the husband constructed buildings on the wife’s lots. Isabel alleged that the CFI
erred in since from the time of the construction of the buildings, the conjugal partnership became the
owner of the whole property, that any increase in value should accrue to the conjugal partnership and
any depreciation should be suffered by the same. Based on the above provision, the ownership of the
land is retained by the wife until she is paid the value of the lot, as a result of the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. Mere construction of a building from common funds does not automatically
convey the ownership of the wife’s land to the conjugal partnership. Construction and improvements
are simply an exercise of the usufruct pertaining to the conjugal partnership over the wife’s land.
Subsequently, the conjugal partnership is not bound to pay any rent during the occupation of the wife’s
land. Before the payment of the value of land is made from the common funds, all the increase or
decrease in its value must be for her benefit or loss and she can only demand payment after the
conjugal partnership is liquidated. Furthermore, the wife should not be allowed to demand payment of
the lot during the marriage and before liquidation because this would disturb the husband’s
management of the conjugal partnership.
Whether the value of the paraphernal buildings which were demolished to construct new ones using
conjugal funds, are reimbursable to the wife. Concepcion maintains that is doubtful if the demolished
buildings were of any value. However, the SC maintained that however small the value of the buildings
at the time of the demolition should be, considering the principle of justice equity, reimbursed to the
wife. Suffice it to mention the ancient maxim of the Roman law, "Jure nature aequum est, meminem
cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem" which was restated by the Partidas in these
terms: "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." When the statutes are silent
or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental principles which the courts invoke in order to arrive at
a solution that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. There is also the issue of money
borrowed by the husband for horse race, pastime and for payment of personal debt of the husband.
Applying Art. 1386 of the Spanish Code which reads, the personal obligations of the husband cannot
be enforced against the fruits of the paraphernal property, unless it is proven that they redounded to the
benefit of the family, said amount cannot be applied to the conjugal partnership and should be paid by
the husband.
27. MARTINEZ v. VAN BUSKIRK

G.R. No. L-5691
Facts: Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of
Manila. When a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of
fodder by the defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the
opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of
the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great
speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped, in order to give
defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's
wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it,
severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head. Defendant presented evidence
to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred,
was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero.
Issue: Whether or not the cochero is negligent.
Held: It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle
and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses
several years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of
leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never
run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave
the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident
was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being
delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by
their employers.
28. YAO KEE v. SY-GONZALES

G.R. No. L-55960
Facts: Upon the death of Sy Kiat, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy
filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration alleging that hey are the children of the
deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not
recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate
Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased. The petition
was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that: Yao Kee is
the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married in China; that she does not have a marriage certificate
because the practice during that time was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in
her case, her elder brother was the one who contracted or entered into an agreement with the parents of
her husband.
Issue: Whether or not Yao Kee should be declared as the lawful wife of Sy Kiat
Ruling: Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed as a
social rule, legally binding and obligatory". The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence". On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom
as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact". The same evidence, if not one of a higher
degree, should be required of a foreign custom. In the case at bar petitioners did not present any
competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and
Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they
are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify
on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of
the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot
be recognized in this jurisdiction.
29. PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE THE USE OF FIRM NAME

92 SCRA 1; July 30, 1979
Facts: Surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip and Atty. Herminio Ozaeta prayed that they be
allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who passed away. They
argued that under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm
name which includes the name of a deceased partner, in regulating other professions, such as
accounting and engineering and that “no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased
partner's name in a professional firm's name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least
in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the
individual members of the firm.”
Issue: Whether or not the use of the name of a deceased partner in the continuance of a firm is
sanctioned by the local custom
Held: Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. A local custom as a source of right
cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent
evidence like any other fact. Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not
be countenanced. The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of
justice and should not be considered as an ordinary “money-making trade.” In fine, the petitioner’s
desire to preserve the identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to the legal and ethical
impediment.
NOTE: The dissenting opinion of Justice Aquino proffers that the retention of their names is not illegal
per se, it may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms that
Sycip and Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
30.GARCIA VERSUS RECIO

GR No. 13822; October 2, 2001
Facts: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen. On 1989, a
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. Two
years after becoming an Australian citizen, Recio married Grace Garcia in Cabanatuan City. In 1995,
they lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. In 1998, Grace Garcia filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy and claimed that she learned
Recio’s marriage to Samson in 1997. While the suit was pending in Philippine courts, Recio was able
to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Australia because the marriage had irrevocably
broken down.
Issue: Whether or not an Australian divorce decree is a public document and requires no other proof
of its authenticity and due execution contrary to petitioner’s contention that it is a question of fact.
Held: Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written
act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested] by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
rules on evidence must be demonstrated. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian
marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
31. CIR VERSUS PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC.

GR No. 162155; August 28, 2007
Facts: Gilbert Yap, vice chairperson of Primetown Property Group, Inc. applied for a refund or credit
of income tax paid in 1997. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required respondent to
submit additional documents to support its claim. Yap complied but his claim was not acted upon,
hence he filed for a petition for review. On December 15, 2000, CTA dismissed the petition for it was
filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or credit for the
year 2000 was a leap year, filing 731 days beyond the reglementary period.
Issue: Whether or not CIR is correct in holding the two-year prescriptive period was equivalent to 730
days, because 2000 was a leap year.
Held: Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code provides that:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. Year shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; month of thirty days,
unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number
of days the specific month contains; day, to a day of twenty-four hours and; night from sunrise to
sunset.
A calendar month is a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may
contain. It is the period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not
including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of
days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month. To illustrate, one calendar
month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month
from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008. Appying such, the
respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month
from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return.
32. MICIANO VERSUS BRIMO

GR No. L-22595; November 1, 1927
Facts: Andre Brimo opposed the partition of the estate filed by the judicial administrator for the
scheme proposed puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo’s will not in accordance with the laws
of Turkish nationality, in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not Philippine laws shall govern the testamentary disposition of a Turkish national,
which according to Brimo, contrary to the express provision of the Civil Code that it should be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question.
Held: Oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the
matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines. It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself,
acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much
so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition
until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
33. VAN DORN v. ROMILLO JR.

GR No. L-68470; October 8, 1985
Facts: Alice Van Dorn, a Filipino, and Richard Upton a US Citizen, were married in Hongkong in
1972 and after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines. They were divorced in
Nevada in 1982 and has remarried, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Upton sought for the accounting
of the business in Ermita, Manila and be declared that he has the right to manage the conjugal property.
Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case for a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings bars Upton
from pursuing the contention since the latter admitted that they had no community of property and it
was not established through conjugal funds.
Issue: Whether Upton can no longer pursue the property in Ermita, Manila due to the validity of the
Nevada divorce decree
Held: The divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. The purpose and effect of a decree of
divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie
when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
34. PILAPIL v. IBAY-SOMERA

GR No. 80116; June 30, 1989
Facts: Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Erik Ekkehard Gelling, a German national were married in
Friedensweiler, Germany. They were divorced before the Schoneberg Local Court for failure of
marriage. More than five months after the German divorce decree, Gelling filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila for having an affair with William Chia in 1982 and another
man named Jesus Chua in 1983.
Issue: Whether or not in the commencement of a criminal action of adultery, the marital bonds
between the parties be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action.
Held: Yes. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at
the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact,
lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the
filing of the complaint or petition. After the divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse has no
longer the right to institute the proceedings.
35. BARRETO v. GONZALES

GR No. 37048; March 31, 1933
Facts: Manuela Barreto and Augusto Gonzales were married until 1926. They voluntarily separated
and since that time have not lived together as man and wife. Gonzales left to Reno, Nevada and
secured an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion. He remarried in California subsequently after
getting the divorce decree. Barreto brought action to confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued by
the Nevada courts.
Issue: Whether a foreign divorce relating to Filipinos be recognized in Philippine courts
Held: The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to
this court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a
purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for
themselves a change of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times
the matrimonial domicile of the couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence
acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband for the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona
fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds of
matrimony in which he had entered in 1919.
36. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. GEORGE FRANK

G. R. No. 2935, March 23, 1909
Facts: The defendant entered into a contract with the plaintiff in the City of Chicago whereby the
former agreed serve the latter as stenographer for 2 years with a salary of 1,200 dollars. The said
contract contained a provision that in case of violation of its terms on the part of defendant, he should
become liable to the plaintiff for the amount expended for his travel and ½ salary paid during such
period. The Government sought to recover the said expenses when the defendant left the service of the
plaintiff and refused to make a further compliance with the terms of the contract but the defendant
claimed that he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible
under the law.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant is responsible for the contract?
Ruling: Yes. It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is admitted — that at the time and place of
the making of the contract in question the defendant had full capacity to make the same. No rule is
better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a
contract are determined b the law of the place where the contract is made. (Scudder v. Union National
Bank, 91 U. S., 406.) Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the
place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of
evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.
The plaintiff [defendant] being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time the
contract was made, he can not plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being
enforced.
37. CONSTANZA YANEZ DE BARNUEVO v. GABRIEL FUSTER

G.R. No. L-7487, December 29, 1913
Facts: Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yanez were joined in a Catholic or canonical marriage in the city
of Malaga, Spain. They made an agreement to live apart and Yanez commenced divorce proceedings
upon returning in the Philippines on the ground of adultery. Fuster claimed that both of them are
natives and subject of Spain and therefore, all courts of the Philippines have lack of jurisdiction to try
the case.
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine courts have the jurisdiction to try the said case?
Ruling:
Yes. The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised within the
personal status of the husband and wife, simply because the whole theory of the statutes and of the
rights which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private law, and the authority and
jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the private law of persons, but of the public or political law
of the nation. "The jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to procedure are considered to be
of a public nature and consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle. . . . All persons
that have to demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene, since they can gain nothing by a
simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to the tribunales of the state which have coercive means
(property situated in the territory) to enforce any decision they may render. Otherwise, one would
expose himself in the suit to making useless expenditures which, although he won his case, would not
contribute to secure his rights because of the court's lack of means to enforce them."
In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not lack
jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were
residents of this city and had their domicile herein.
38. TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN v. BOHANAN

G.R. No. L-12105, January 30, 1960
Facts: The last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. However, his children was not able to receive their supposed legitime under the
Civil Code of the Philippines. His permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon
his personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his domicile and therefore at the time of his
death, he was a citizen of that state.
Issue: Whether or not the children are entitled to their legitime under the Civil Code?
Ruling: No. The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944,
expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of
the person whose succession is in question.
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the testator was
a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent
residence So the question at issue is whether the testementary dispositions, especially those for the
children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid.
39. TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS BELLIS v. BELLIS

G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1976
Facts: Amos G. Bellis was born in Texas and was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States. He executed a will in the Philippines distributing his estate to his first wife, his 3 children and
the remainder to his 7 surviving children by his first and second wives. However, Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis opposed the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of
their legitimes as illegitimate children and therefore, compulsory heirs.
Issue: Whether or not the 2 illegitimate children are entitled to their legitimes?
Ruling: No. Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his
Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate
Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867,
870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
40. ADOLFO AZNAR v. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
Facts: Edward Christensen, a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of
his death, executed a last will and testament in Manila declaring Maria Lucy Christensen as his sole
heir and devising Php 3,600 in favor of Maria Helen Christensen Garcia. The latter opposed the project
of partition on the ground it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child.
Issue: Whether or not Garcia is entitled to her legitime?
Ruling: Yes. The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its
rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of
its law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied
in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of
California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle
cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of
its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting
to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord
with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or
rights which follow the person of the owner.
41. WOLFGANG ROEHR v. MARIA CARMENT RODGIUEZ

G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003
Facts: Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen, married Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina. The latter filed an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage but Roehr sought to have the action dismissed on the
ground he was able to obtain a decree of divorce in Germany wherein the custody of the children was
given to him. Rodriguez asked the case be set for hearing for the purpose of determining the issues of
custody of children and the distribution of their properties.
Issue: Whether or not the court may determine the custody of the children despite the divorce decree?
Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the
children, must still be determined by our courts.23Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to
a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown
that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds
allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with
regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. Unlike petitioner who
was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said
proceedings.27 More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the
German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three years, the
marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending
spouse was.
42. GRACE GARCIA v. REDERICK RECIO

G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2011
Facts: Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, but a divorce
decree was allegedly later issued dissolving the marriage. Recio became an Australian citizen and was
married to Grace Garcia, a Filipino. Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
the ground of bigamy after they lived separately without prior judicial dissolution but Recio sought the
dismissal of the case after he was able to secure a divorce decree from a Family Court in Sydney
during the pendency of the case.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce between Recio and Samson was proven?
Ruling: No. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce
was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it
falls squarely upon him.
43. PEOPLE v. LOL-LO & SARAW

G.R. No. 17958, February 27, 1922.
Facts: • 2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject,
and in the other boat 11 men, women, and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat arrived between
the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas
manned by 24 Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for
themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated 2 of the women. All of the
persons on the Dutch boat, except the 2 young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in
it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. 2 of the
Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the 2 women
were able to escape.
• Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy
• All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on
the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of
universal hostility.
• Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.
• Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried.
The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.
• As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed
within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not
neutral to crimes."
Issue: W/N the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
Ruling: In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is
found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead.
YES.
 Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the
Philippines.
 The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment
of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to
determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed.
 At least 3 aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was
deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was
taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects
of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
44. Eugenio v. Velez

G.R. No. 85140, May 17, 1900
Facts: Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the former’s death on August 28, 1988 filed a
petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that
she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner,
Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ of
habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitaliana’s body to the sheriff on the ground that a
corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart
failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio’s residence. The court ordered that the body should be
delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.
Ruling: The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the
surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides:
“Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and
left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.
Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine
law does not recognize common law marriages where “a man and a woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions”. In addition, it requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from
even legally marrying Vitaliana.

G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989
Facts: On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and Erich Geiling were
married at Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a half
years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany in January 1983.
Pilapil, petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before RTC of Manila on January 23, 1983 where it is still pending as
a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local Court of Germany promulgated a divorce decree
on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that,
while still married to respondent, petitioner “had an affair with a certain William Chua as
early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
Issue: Should the adultery case prosper?
Ruling: NO. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. The petition entered
dismissing the complaint in criminal case was upheld for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case was made permanent. The law provides that in
prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse. The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, is admitted. Private respondent, being no longer married to petitioner has no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the posture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.
46. VAN DORN v. ROMILLO

G.R. No L-68470, October 8, 1985
Facts: Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a
citizen of the United States; they were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their
residence in the Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently, they were divorced in
Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore
Van Dorn. Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioner’s business in
Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner be ordered to render accounting of the
business and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.
Ruling: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own country’s court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
stopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
47. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRASUS L. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005
Facts: Crasus married Fely in 1961 (Cebu City). After the celebration of their marriage,
respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 1984,
Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children.
Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their
children, that Fely got married to an American, Fely returned to the Philippines several times.
She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the
U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was
named as “Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus.” Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that
Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity,
being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Issue: Whether the totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the
finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
Ruling: Yes. The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and
embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and
extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even
her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations
of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for
such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot
be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither
could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is
incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no
longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29]
respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down inRepublic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina[30] that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a
psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.
48. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005
Facts: The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an
American citizen while residing in the U.S.A. In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady
Myros M. Villanueva in the Philippines. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live
in California. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its
origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Issue: Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of
themarriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
Ruling: YES. If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. In view of the foregoing, we state the twin
elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner;
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but theircitizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and
Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino
spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
49. ROEHR v. RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003
Facts: Wolfang O. Roehr, a German citizen married Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina in 1980 in
Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They begot
two children. In 1996, Carmen filed an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage. A
motion to dismiss was denied and the subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but was denied and the case
was remanded to the RTC. Meanwhile, Wolfang obtained a decree of divorce in Germany and
granted parental custody over their children to him. In view of said decree, petitioner filed a
Second Motion to Dismiss in 1999 on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated
dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private respondent. An order granting the Motion to
Dismiss was issued because of the dissolution of the marriage.
A motion was filed by the respondent asking that the case be set for hearing for the purpose
of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of their properties. It was
opposed on the ground that there was nothing to be done anymore as the marital tie of the
spouses had already been severed by the divorce decree and that the decree has already been
recognized by the court in its order. The lower Court issued an order partially setting aside the
former order for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well
as support and custody of their children. This order was questioned on the basis of the
contention that the divorce decree obtained in Germany had already severed the marital
relations of the parties, hence, nothing can be done anymore.
Issue: Is a foreign divorce decree recognized in our jurisdiction and does it affect the
obligations on care and support of the children?
Ruling: NO. In Garcia v. Recio, Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., and Llorente v. Court of Appeals, it
has been consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera where the Court specifically recognized
the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country. It was held in Pilapil
that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support
of the children, must still be determined by our the Rules of Court.
50. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 137916, December 8, 2004
Facts: The Spouses Jacinto Gotangco and Charity Bantug were the owners of seven parcels of
land located in Palayan City. On August 22, 1980, the Spouses Gotangco secured a loan for
their poultry project in Palayan City from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). They then executed a real estate mortgage over
the parcels of land. On July 17, 1982, the Spouses Gotangco, as vendors, executed in favor of
Elpidio O. Cucio a contract to sell over the seven parcels of land mortgaged to DBP for
P50,000.00, payable in two installments. The parties agreed that the said amount shall be paid
directly to DBP and applied to the mortgage indebtedness of the Spouses Gotangco and that,
upon full payment of the purchase price, the Spouses shall execute a deed of sale over the
said their account with the DBP. parcels of land in favor of Cucio. The contract to sell was
known to DBP. On February 20, 1989, the DBP wrote the Spouses Gotangco demanding
payment of the balance of their loan in the amount of P408,026.96 within ten (10) days from
notice thereof. However, the Spouses failed to respond or pay Cucio then filed a complaint
against the Spouses Gotangco and the DBP with the RTC of Palayan City for injunction and
damages. Cucio alleged, inter alia, that despite his payment of the full purchase price of the
seven (7) parcels of land and his demands for the turnover of the owner’s duplicates of the
said title to the Spouses Gotangco, the DBP refused to do so. He further alleged that the DBP
even demanded the payment of the interest on the loan account of the Spouses Gotangco.
Furthermore, the Spouses Gotangco refused to execute a deed of absolute sale of the said parcels of
land in his favor. While the case was pending, the DBP informed the Spouses Gotangco in a
Letter dated February 20, 199020 that it was going to have the mortgage foreclosed for their
failure to settle their account.
On June 8, 1990, the Spouses Gotangco wrote the DBP requesting for an updated statement of
their account and the application of their payments, inclusive of the proceeds of their insurance
claims. On the same date, the DBP filed an application for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage executed in its favor by the Spouses Gotangco. The Spouses Gotangco
forthwith filed a petition before the trial court for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
the public auction, alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate in favor of the
DBP would render the decision of the court on the merits moot and academic. During the
trial, Jacinto Gotangco testified that he suffered mental anguish and serious anxieties because
of the threatened extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage in favor of DBP. The
Trial Court ordered DBP to pay the Gotangcos the sum of P250,000.00 as moral damages. On
appeal by the DBP, the CA affirmed the decision, but reduced the award of moral damages to
P50,000.00.
Issue: Is there a factual or legal basis for the grant of moral damages in favor of the
Gotangcos as against DBP?
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that there is no sufficient basis for the award of moral
damages in favor of the respondents spouses based on Article 19 of the New Civil Code as a
result of petitioner’s application for foreclosure of real estate mortgage. For one thing, Charity
Bantug Gotangco did not testify. There is no factual basis for the award of moral damages in her
favor. Abuse of right under Article 19 of the New Civil Code, on which the RTC anchored its
award for damages and attorney’s fees, provides: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Malice or bad faith is at the core of said provision.
Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Good
faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple
negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a
breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of
fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. The Spouses
Gotangco failed to prove malice on the part of the petitioner. The bare fact that the petitioner
filed its application of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, notwithstanding those
differences, cannot thereby give rise to the conclusion that the petitioner did so with malice, to
harass the Spouses Gotangco. The records show that, time and again, the petitioner had sent
notices to the respondents spouses and demanded the updating of their account and the payment
of the balance thereof, but the respondents spouses failed to comply. In the meantime, interests
and penalties on the loan considerably accrued. Under the terms of the real estate mortgage
and its charter, the petitioner had the right to foreclose the said mortgage extrajudicially.
Hence, the petitioner was constrained to file its application for the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage for the Spouses Gotangco’s past due obligation. Instead of settling their account,
the Spouses filed their petition for a writ of preliminary injunction. Because of the preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court, the foreclosure was aborted. Under the circumstances, it
cannot be gainsaid that the petitioner acted in bad faith or with malice in seeking the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage in its favor.
51. UYPITCHING v. QUIAMCO

G.R. No. 146322, 6 December 2006
Facts: In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan, Josefino
Gabutero and Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery
filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and
a photocopy of its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of
registration but the three accused never came to see him again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle
was parked in an open space inside respondent's business establishment, Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible to the public. It turned out that, in October 1981,
the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching
Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching.
To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation. been "taken by
respondent's men." "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle." When Gabutero could no longer pay the
installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payments. In September 1982,
however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told petitioner corporation's
collector, Wilfredo Veraño, that the motorcycle had allegedly Nine years later, on January 26,
1991, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to
recover the motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola, talked to the
clerk in charge and asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking,
petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering On learning that
respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, the policemen left to look for respondent in
his residence while petitioner Uypitching stayed in the establishment to take photographs of the
motorcycle. Unable to find respondent, the policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises
and, on petitioner Uypitching's instruction and over the clerk's objection, took the motorcycle.
Issue: Did the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor warrant the award of moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and costs in favor of respondent?
Ruling: Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not
to injure others and to give everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice are the underlying
principles of law and order in society.
YES. Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner corporation's exercise
of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement
of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly mistaken. foreclosure.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or
protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the
recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of
a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover
such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial Petitioner corporation
failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle.
Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent's establishment with his policemen and
ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the
course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous
statement. No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly
disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of
respondent. Petitioners' acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper
norms of human relations. The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the
Civil Code, provides: Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person
should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens
himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty)
as a means to unjust ends. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or
injure another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it
was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.
52. WASSMER v. VELEZ

G.R. No. L-20089, 26 December 1964
Facts: The facts that culminated in this case aasàtarted with dreams and hopes, followed by
appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse,
complete public humiliation. Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual
promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On
September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be: Dear Bet — Convair today. create a scandal.
Paquing PAKING Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only But the next day,
September 3, he sent her the following telegram: NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED
RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE . Thereafter Velez did not appear
nor was he heard from again. Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was
declared in default.
Issue: Is Velez liable for damages?
Ruling: YES. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30,
1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a
promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so. It must not
be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated
with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article
21 aforesaid.
53. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN, ET AL v. REYES

G.R No. 154259 February 28, 2005
Facts: Roberto Reyes a.k.a. Amay Bisaya was invited to a party at the hotel’s penthouse when
allegedly, he was asked to leave by the hotel’s executive secretary. Reyes alleged that he was told
"huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang" and escorted out by policeman. Thus,
he suffered humiliation.
Issue: Are the Hotel and its Executive Secretary solidarily liable for damages?
Held: NO. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was
not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its
employee. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the
Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not obtain herein
as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.
54. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. COURT OF APPEALS
219 SCRA 115
Facts: Petitioner is an Iranian who proposed to marry Marilou Gonzales, 22 years old. He forced
Marilou to live with him and Marilou, then a virgin, allowed herself to be deflowered by petitioner.
However, petitioner’s attitude towards her changed and he maltreated her.
Issue: Is Article 21 of the Civil Code applicable for the breach of promise to marry in this case?
Held: YES. Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise, thereafter becomes the proximate cause
of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle
her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of fraud and deceit behind it
and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.
55. PE v. PE
5 SCRA 200
Facts: Defendant, a married man, frequently visited Lolita, unmarried, on the pretext that he wanted
her to teach him to pray the rosary. Parents of Lolita, plaintiffs herein, prohibited their affair as
defendant is a married man. Lolita disappeared and plaintiffs found a note handwr itten by defendant.
Issue: May a married man be held liable for moral damages for seducing an unmarried woman into an
illicit relationship?
Held: YES. No other conclusion can be drawn from the chain of events that he not only deliberately,
but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the woman's affection and love to the extent of
having illicit relations with her. Verily he has committed an injury to the woman's family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil
Code.
56. Spouses Quisumbing v. MERALCO
G.R No. 142943; April 3, 2002
Facts: The house of the Quisumbings was inspected by MERALCO without the ERB representative
after asking permission from the Quisumbings through their secretary. After finding out that the meter
was tampered, they informed Quisumbings that they were liable to pay the differential billing.
Thereafter, MERALCO disconnected their electric supply.
Issue: Is MERALCO liable to Spouses Quisumbings for disconnecting their electricity supply?
Held: YES. One of the cases that entitle an individual to damages is, violation of the right against
deprivation of property without due process of law. Although MERALCO has a right by law and equity
to protect itself from any fraud, such right should not be exercised arbitrarily. MERALCO should have
given the Quisumbings simple opportunity to dispute the electric charges brought about by the alleged
meter-tampering. Procedural due process requires reasonable notice to pay the bill and reasonable
notice to discontinue supply.
57. GLOBE MACKAY CABLE v. COURT OF APPEALS
176 SCRA 778
Facts: Tobias, employee of petitioner was suspected to have been involved in various anomalies in the
company. He was even called “crook” and “swindler”. Notwithstanding the police reports exculpating
Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the report of the private investigator, was, by its own terms,
not yet complete, petitioners filed 6 complaints against Tobias.
Issue: Are petitioners liable for damages to private respondent because of petitioners' abusive manner
in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment?
Held: YES. Article 21 is adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury".
Even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive
manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be
held liable.
58. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST v. JADER
G.R No. 132344; February 7, 2000
Facts: Jader’s name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for Graduation of UE College of
LAw, with the annotation that he had an incomplete grade in Practice Court 1. He attended the
investiture ceremonies and tendered a blow-out thereafter. He took a leave from work for five (5)
months to attend a review class in preparation for the Bar examination. Upon learning of his
deficiency, he dropped the review class and was not able to take the Bar examination.
Issue: May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into
believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case?
Held: YES. UE, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination,
particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to
have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful
prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter's actual
damages; we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages. It is also
respondent’s duty to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be
eligible for the bar examinations.
59. AZNAR v. CITIBANK
G.R. No. 164273 March 28, 2008
Facts: Aznar, holder of a Preferred Mastercard issued by Citibank made an advance deposit to increase
his credit limit as he was travelling with his wife and his grandchildren. During the tour, when he
presented his Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was
not honored. He claims to have been humiliated when one establishment spoke of swindlers trying to
use blacklisted cards.
Issue: Is Citibank liable for damages for the dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard?
Held: NO. In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the
defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to
bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The breach must be wanton, reckless,
malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. The Court did not grant his present petition as he
failed to show by preponderance of evidence that Citibank breached any obligation that would make it
answerable for said suffering.
60. HEIRS OF NALA v. CABANSAG

G.R. No. 164273, March 28, 2008
Facts: Artemio Cabansag bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio and Felisa, part of
a 400-square meter lot registered in the name of the Gomez spouses. In October, 1991, he received a
demand letter from Atty. Alexander demanding payment for rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves
the premises, as said property is owned by Purisima; failing which, civil and criminal charges will be
brought against him. This demand letter was followed by another demand letter. According to Artemio,
the demand letter caused him damages prompting him to file a complaint for damages against Purisima
and Atty. Alexander. In their defense, Atty. Alexander alleged that he merely acted in behalf of his
client Purisima, who contested the ownership of the lot by Artemio. Purisima alleged that the lot was
part of an 800-sq. meter property owned by her late husband, Eulogio, which was divided into two
parts. The 400-square meter lot was conveyed to the spouses Gomez by virtue of a fictitious deed of
sale, with the agreement that it will be held in trust by the Gomezes in behalf of their (Eulogio and
Purisima) children. Artemio is only renting the property which he occupies. She only learned of the
deed of sale by the Gomez spouses to Artemio when the latter filed the case for damages against her
and Atty. Alexander.
The RTC ruled in favour of Artemio and held Atty. Alexander and Purisima liable for damages, which
the Court of Appeals affirmed. The heirs of Purisima thereafter file a petition for review on certiorari
with the Supreme Court.
Issue: May Purisima Nala and her lawyer be held liable for abuse of rights when they demanded
Artemio to leave the property in contest?
Ruling: NO. “Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The foregoing provision sets the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s
rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by itself
legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right; that is,
when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is
an abuse of right when it is exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The
exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not
be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is
presumed, and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on the other hand,
does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy
and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will
that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty.
It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del
Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there
was ground for Nala’s actions since she believed that the property was owned by her husband Eulogio
Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the same. She had no knowledge that spouses
Gomez violated the trust imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property
to respondent. It was only after respondent filed the case for damages against Nala that she learned of
such sale. The bare fact that respondent claims ownership over the property does not give rise to the
conclusion that the sending of the demand letters by Nala was done in bad faith. Absent any evidence
presented by respondent, bad faith or malice could not be attributed to petitioner since Nala was only
trying to protect their interests over the property.
Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del Prado’s acts were done with the sole
intention of prejudicing and injuring him. It may be true that respondent suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety and sleepless nights when he received the demand letters; however, there is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the
hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.
Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the demand letters.
She had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable rights over the property
occupied by respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Thus, whatever
damages are suffered by respondent should be borne solely by him.”
61. CARPIO v. VALMONTE

G.R. No. 151866, September 9, 2004
Facts: Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged
her services for their church wedding. On that day, Valmonte went to Manila Hotel to where the bride
and her family were billeted. When she arrived at the Suite, several persons were already there
including the petitioner, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion. After
reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites
and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception
was to be held. She went back to the suite after, and found several people staring at her when she
entered. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: “Ikaw
lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mongbag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng
kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.” Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte’s bag.
It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the
pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. A few days after
the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which she
wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds’ relatives ad guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a
result of petitioner’s imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus, on
20February 1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against petitioner.
Issue: May Carpio be held liable for the alleged public humiliation she did against Valmonte?
Ruling: YES. Valmonte is entitled to damages. In the case at bar, petitioner’s verbal reproach against
respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she
brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. True, petitioner had the right o ascertain
the identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one
who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible.
Petitioner had willfully caused the injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and
good customs. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in
mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article
21 for which she should be held accountable.
62. VILLALVA v. RCBC SAVINGS BANK

G.R. NO. 165661, 28 August 2006
Facts:
In June 1993, petitioner spouses issued forty-eight (48) checks totaling P547,392.00 to cover
installment payments due on promissory notes executed in favor of Toyota, Quezon Avenue (TQA) for
the purchase of a ’93 Toyota Corolla. The promissory notes were secured by a Chattel Mortgage
executed by the petitioner spouses on the vehicle in favor of TQA. Under the Deed of Chattel
Mortgage, petitioner spouses were to insure thevehicle against loss or damage by accident, theft and
fire, and endorse and deliver the policies to the mortgagor. On June 22, 1993, the promissory notes and
chattel mortgage were assigned to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). They were later
assigned by RCBC to RCBC Savings Bank. 5 In time, all forty-eight (48) checks issued by the
petitioner spouses were encashed by respondent RCBC Savings Bank. The evidence shows that the
petitioner spouses faithfully complied with the obligation to insure the mortgaged vehicle from 1993
until 1996. 7 For the period of August 14, 1996 to August 14, 1997, 8 petitioner spouses procured the
necessary insurance but did not deliver the same to the respondent until January 17, 1997. 9 As a
consequence, respondent had the mortgaged vehicle insured for the period of October 21, 1996 to
October 21, 1997 and paid a P14,523.36 insurance premium. 10 The insurance policy obtained by
respondent was later cancelled due to the insurance policy secured by petitioner spouses over the
mortgaged vehicle, and respondent bank was reimbursed P10,939.86 by Malayan Insurance Company.
11 The premium paid by respondent bank exceeded the reimbursed amount paid by Malayan Insurance
Company by P3,583.50. On February 10, 1999, respondent sent a letter of demand to the petitioners
for P12,361.02 allegedly representing unpaid obligations on the promissory notes and mortgage as of
January 31, 1999. In lieu thereof, respondent demanded that petitioner spouses surrender the
mortgaged vehicle within five days from notice. 12The petitioner spouses ignored the demand letter.
On April 5, 1999, respondent, in order to get the ’93 Toyota Corolla, filed a complaint for Recovery of
Possession with Replevin with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, which was raffled to Branch
45 thereof. 13 Two weeks later, or on April 19, 1999, the respondent caused the enforcement of a writ
of replevin and recovered possession of the mortgaged vehicle. 14 On June 18, 1999, petitioner
spouses filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim for moral damages, exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees. 15 Petitioners asserted that they insured the mortgaged vehicle in compliance with
the Deed of Chattel Mortgage. The lower courts ruled in favor of the petitioner but the CA reversed
their rulings and issued a writ of replevin in favor of private respondents. The respondent Bank argued
that no reversible were made by the Court of Appeals, and to set aside its decision would result in the
unjust enrichment of the petitioners.
Issue: Were the petitioners unjustly enriched when the respondent Bank paid the insurance premiums
on behalf of the former?
Ruling: NO. Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage, so long as it is
appreciable in money. It may also take the form of avoidance of expenses and other indispensable
reductions in the patrimony of a person. It may also include the prevention of a loss or injury. In the
case at bar, petitioner spouses were not enriched when respondent obtained insurance coverage for the
mortgaged vehicle as the petitioner spouses had already obtained the required insurance coverage for
the vehicle from August 14, 1996 to August 14, 1997.
63. TENCHAVEZ v. ESCANO

G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965
Facts: Vicenta Escaño exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez without the knowledge of her
parents. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil register. She, thereafter, admitted to her
parents that she had already married Pastor. The shocked Escaño spouses then sought an advice from
the priest who suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage.The
recelebration did not take place because the father received a letter disclosing an amorous relationship
between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel, their supposed matchmaker. To escape from the scandal
that her marriage stirred in Cebu society, Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental. There, a
lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She
did not sign the petition. The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her nonappearance at
the hearing. Without informing her husband, Vicenta left for the United States and subsequently filed a
verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the
State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." A decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
Vicenta, thereafter, married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, has begotten children; she also acquired American citizenship. Tenchavez had
initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and
Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its
Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage
to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way
influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
Issue: Should the parents of Vicenta Escaño be held liable for alienating the affections of their
daughter and influencing Vicenta Escaño's conduct toward her husband?
Ruling: NO. An action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez
about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes the Court to be merely conjecture and exaggeration,
and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun. In these letters he expressly
apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his
"impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity".
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her
original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and
being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected.
Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of
malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the
contrary is proved. In falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and
with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused
them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been
impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and
circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
64. ST. LOUIS REALTY v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-46061, 14 November 1984
Facts: On December 15, 1968, St. Louis realty published an ad with the permission of Arcadio
Arcadio (but without permission from Dr. Aramil, an advertisement with the heading “WHERE THE
HEART IS”. In the advertisement, the house featured was that of Dr. Aramil and not that of Mr.
Arcadio with whom the company asked permission. The same advertisement was republished on
January 5, 1969.
After Mr. Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demaning explanation. No
rectification or apology was published despite reciept of the letter by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in
charge of the advertisement. On March 18, 1969, St. Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadio’s
real house but no apology or explanation was given by the company about the error. Dr. Aramil then
filed a complaint for damages on March 29. On April 15, 1969, an ad with a notice of rectification was
published.
Issue: Is St. Louis Realty liable to pay damages for misrepresenting (in an advertisement) the house of
Dr. Conrado Aramil as that of Mr. Arcadio?
Ruling: YES. St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under 21 and 26 of the Civil Code
because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but
to Doctor Aramil who was annoyed by the contretemps. St. Louis Realty was grossly negligent in
mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication. It never made any written apology and
explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier “rectification.”
65. CHING v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124642, 23 February 2004
Facts:
Alfredo Ching was charged with four counts of estafa punishable under Article 315 par. 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree 115, otherwise known as the "Trust Receipts
Law" for having executed a trust receipt agreement in favor of Allied Banking Corporation in
consideration of the receipt of some goods. Under the terms of the agreement, the accused agreed to
sell those goods for cash with the express obligation to remit to the bank the proceeds of the sale
and/or to turn over the goods, if not sold, on demand. But Ching, once in possession of said goods,
misappropriated misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit the said goods and/or
the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, failed and refused to account for and/or
remit the proceeds of sale thereof to the bank.
Thereafter, petitioner Ching, together with Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc., filed a case before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages entitled
"Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. et. al. vs. Allied Banking Corporation." Then, Ching filed a petition
before the said court for the suspension of the criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial
question in a civil action.
Issue: Does the pendency of a civil action for damages and declaration of nullity of documents,
specifically trust receipts, warrant the suspension of criminal proceedings instituted for violation of
Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to P.D. 115, otherwise known as the "Trust
Receipts Law”?\
Ruling: NO. Under the prevailing circumstances, the alleged prejudicial question in the civil case for
declaration of nullity of documents and for damages, does not juris et de jure determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal action for estafa. Thus, even on the assumption that the
documents are declared null, it does not ipso facto follow that such declaration of nullity shall
exonerate the accused from criminal prosecution and liability.
For the court to appreciate the pendency of a prejudicial question, the law, in no uncertain terms,
requires the concurrence of two essential requisites, to wit:
1. The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and
2. The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The criminal liability of the accused for violation of Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, may
still be shown through the presentation of evidence to the effect that: (a) the accused received the
subject goods in trust or under the obligation to sell the same and to remit the proceeds thereof to
Allied Banking Corporation, or to return the goods, if not sold; (b) that accused Ching misappropriated
or converted the goods and/or the proceeds of the sale; (c) that accused Ching performed such acts
with abuse of confidence to the damage and prejudice of Allied Banking Corporation; and (d) that
demand was made by the bank to herein petitioner.
66. TE v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 126746, 29 November 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites. While petitioner’s
marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain
Julieta Santella. Respondent filed an action against petitioner for bigamy. Meanwhile, petitioner filed
an action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to
marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of
their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations. Petitioner filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC where the administrative
case for the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings
therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent
and criminal case for bigamy. The Board denied the motion. The Court of Appeals ruled that the denial
of petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord
with law. Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be
suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil case.
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals commit a serious error in refusing to suspend the legal (criminal and
administrative) proceedings despite the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of
marriage?
RULING:
NO. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions.
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of
marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would
necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated. The
outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing
upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all
that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time
the second marriage is contracted. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which
states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage
unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. It is clear from the foregoing
that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not
give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the
law, still valid and subsisting. Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the
suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. The concept of prejudicial
question involves a civil and a criminal case.
We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the
other is civil.
67. VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO v. CONSUELO TAN

G.R. No. 137110; August 1, 2000
Facts: Petitioner Vincent Mercado married complainant Consuelo Tan without having his first
marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva declared null. A month after the bigamy case was filed against
petitioner, he filed for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva to which
was later on granted. Petitioner appeals the decision of his conviction for bigamy.
Issue: Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of
petitioner.
Held: It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in
a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The
Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their
marriage before they should be allowed to marry again.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial.
To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively
encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare
his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
criminal case. We cannot allow that.
68. LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 145226; February 06, 2004
Facts: Lucio Morigo was convicted for the crime of bigamy for contracting marriage with Maria
Jececha Lumbago while being married to Lucia Barrete. During the pendency of the criminal case, his
marriage was declared a nullity as no marriage ceremony took place as they only signed a marriage
contract.
Issue: Whether or not Lucio may be convicted of bigamy.
Held: The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married.
But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no
first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no
legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not
married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the
validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The
petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but
twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later
before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired,
although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs
no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
69. SPOUSES VICENTE YU AND DEMETRIA LEE-YU v. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL

INTERNATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. 147902, 17 March 2006
Facts: Petitioners defaulted on their obligation with PCIB that resulted to the foreclosure of the
mortgaged properties. PCIB as highest bidder filed a petition for writ of possession over the said
properties. Petitioner then filed for the annulment of the certificate of sale and contends that the writ of
possession cannot be issued pending the annulment case.
Issue: Whether or not the pendency of a prejudicial issue renders the issues in Special Proceedings No.
99-00988-D as [sic] moot and academic.
Held: A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally
comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there
exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris
et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
In the present case, Civil Case No. 99-01369-D and Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D are both civil in
nature. The issue in Civil Case No. 99-01369-D is whether the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage executed by the petitioners in favor of the respondent and the sale of their properties at
public auction are null and void, whereas, the issue in Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D is whether the
respondent is entitled to a writ of possession of the foreclosed properties. Clearly, no prejudicial
question can arise from the existence of the two actions. The two cases can proceed separately and take
their own direction independently of each other.
70. LEONILO C. DONATO v. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA
Facts: Petitioner was charged with bigamy. Before his arraignment, his second wife filed a case for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that she did not know the existence of the first
marriage when they got married. Respondent judge refused to suspend the criminal case on the basis of
prejudicial question.
Issue: Whether or not the concept of prejudicial question applies in this case.
Held: In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the
bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must
be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the
second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for
bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to
be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the
ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as
defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his
marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation.
Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would
not be material to the outcome of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to
suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.
71. CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and
JACOBA CABILIN, v. FELIX ICAO
G.R. No. L-26795, July 31, 1970
Facts: Carmen through her parents sued Icao for support for having succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with her without her consent and as such she became pregnant. Icao refused on the ground
that no child was born.
Issue: Whether or not Carmen is entitled to support.
Held: A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-
appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the
said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive
donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his
testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir,
even if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes
that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's
womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it
were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.
72. ANTONIO GELUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO

G.R. No. L-16439; July 20, 1961
Facts: Nita Villanueva married to Oscar Lazo became pregnant for 3 times all of which were aborted
at the instance of Nita without consent or knowledge of Oscar. Oscar filed this case for damages
against Geluz as the doctor who performed the abortion.
Issue: Does an unborn child acquire civil personality that an action for damages may be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child?
Held: No. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the
unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can
take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity
to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato
habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional
personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be
born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute
that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an
award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his
wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration
of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the
Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the
probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the
event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the
punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does
not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only
concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he
sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the
circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.
73. ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL v. CESAR SYQUIA

G.R. No. L-39110; November 28, 1933
Facts: Petitioner filed a case to compel Syquia to acknowledge Ismael and Pacita as his natural
children. At the time the baby was conceived, Syquia wrote several letters acknowledging such child
and even suggested that the first born be named after him.
Issue: Whether or not letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an
acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
Held: It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of
legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn child
is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child already born
and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of identification are different. Even a
bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the
name used.
74. LIMJOCO v. ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGRANTE

G.R. No. L-770
Facts: X, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience
(CPC) to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal while he was still alive. The Public
Service Commission (PSC) granted the CPC even after the death of X since X's estate is financially
capable of maintaining the proposed service and authorized X's intestate estate through its judicial
administrator appointed by the court to maintain and operate the said plant. Y however opposed the
issuance of the CPC as he claims that the intestate estate of X is neither a person nor a citizen.
Issues:
1. Whether the estate of X may be considered a person for purposes of settlement and distribution;
and
2. Whether the estate of X may be considered a citizen.
Held:
1. Yes. Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself,such as under the bill of rights
(Article III), it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases
relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) thereof must be
deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the
constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law, or the
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. Among these artificial or juridical persons are
estates of deceased persons.
Thus, it has been the constant Ruling that the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the
decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his
demise. The underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of
the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting
from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of
the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
2. Yes. If by legal fiction the decedent’s personality is considered extended so that any debts or
obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be exercised
for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, there is no sound and cogent reason for
denying the application of the same fiction to his citizenship.
The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and
motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is made
necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his
death to the loss of the investment.
75. DUMLAO v. QUALITY PLASTICS, INC.

G.R. No. L-27956, 30 April 1976
Facts: X, one of several defendants in a civil case, died long before the institution of the civil action.
Such death being unknown to the plaintiffs, the latter obtained from the court an order to foreclose the
surety bond and sell at a public auction a land belonging to X because the judgment rendered by the
court in favor of the plaintiffs was not satisfied. Therefore, the heirs of X sued to annul the judgment
against X for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused despite the appearance of X's counsel
in the case.
Issue: Whether the judgment of the court is valid against X who was already deceased and was
incapable of receiving the summons.
Held: No. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over X, the judgment against him is a patent nullity.
He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil
personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost
through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
The lower court erred in ruling that since X's counsel also appeared as counsel for him, there was a
voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over X. The counsel could
not have validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.
76. MO YA LIM v. CID

G.R. No. L-21289, 4 October 1971
Facts: X, a Chinese citizen who wanted to visit a relative in the Philippines, applied for and was
granted a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant valid for one month. To guarantee
that X would depart the Philippines on or before the expiration of the passport visa and so that the
requests for extensions would be granted, Y filed a bond in the amount of Php 1,000.00. However,
after being granted several extensions, X contracted marriage with Z, a Filipino citizen, prompting the
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate the bond filed by Y and order the immediate deportation of
X. Petitioners opposed the contemplated action on the ground that X ipso facto became a Filipino
citizen upon her marriage with Z.
Issue: Whether X ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage with Z, a Filipino citizen.
Held: Yes. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native
born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen
of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who
is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he
takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization proceeding in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that
the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there
is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.
The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology of the
law, the legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a
Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized.
Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she
is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of
citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship as a
factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that
phrase, precisely replies that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien
woman "had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. That
she establishes such power long after her marriage does not alter the fact that at her marriage, she
became a citizen.
77. FRIVALDO v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996
Facts: X was disqualified to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he did not
possess the required citizenship to run for the said office thus allowing Y, who garnered the second
highest number of votes, to be proclaimed as the new governor. X, in praying for the annulment of the
proclamation of Y as Governor of Sorsogon, alleges that prior to the said proclamation but after the
filing of his candidacy, he had already taken his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after
his "Petition for Repatriation under P.D. 725" which he filed a year before had been granted. As such,
when the said order of the COMELEC disqualifying him to run as Governor of Sorsogon was issued,
there was no longer any legal impediment to his proclamation and assumption of office.
Issue: Whether X's repatriation can be given retroactive effect to cure his ineligibility to run for public
office.
Held: Yes. It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines," laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as
when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new
remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes
the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to
aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C. A. No. 63, as amended) avail of
repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who
could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman
who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship xxx" because "such provision of the
new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said
constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women—the right to re-
acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to
P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other
"natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship," because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would
have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent
of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified
procedure of repatriation.
78. ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995
Facts: X, as incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same
position in the May 9, 1995 elections, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification against Y
with the COMELEC. X alleged that based on the declarations made by Y in her Voter's Registration
and Certificate of Candidacy, Y did not meet the constitutional requirement of one year residency for
the position. Y on the other hand argues that she never abandoned Leyte as her home despite being
absent therefrom for years and only returning seven months prior to the election.
Issue: Whether Y had beed a resident of Leyte for a period of at least one year prior to May 9, 1995
elections.
Held: Yes. Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that for the exercise of civil and fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence. In Ong vs.
Republic, this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual’s permanent home, a place
to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on the facts
and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies factual relationship of an individual to a certain

place. It is the physical presence in a given area, community or country. The essential
distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when
the purpose for which the residence has taken up his abode end.
Residence in the civil law is material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in place. A
person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence.
Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without living
in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in
one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some
other place.
A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new
one gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner’s being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was
her domicile of origin by operation of law.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one;
3. Acts with which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should
be deemed to continue.
When petitioner was married to the then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged
by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband’s actual place of residence
fixed by him. What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose
her domicile or residence.
79. NINAL v. BAYADOG

328 SCRA 122
Facts: One year and six months after the death of X's wife with whom he begot three children, X
contracted a second marriage with Y without a marriage license. X claimed that they were exempt from
the required marriage license since he and Y had been cohabiting for more than 5 years prior to the
solemnization of the second marriage and that during said period, X and his first wife had been
separated de facto. After X died in a car accident, his children from his first wife filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of X and Y on the ground that it was void for lack of the required
marriage license.
Issue:
1. Whether the marriage of X and Y is void;
2. Whether the heirs of X may file a petition for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between X
and Y after his death.
Held: 1. Yes. The marriage of X and Y is void for absence of the marriage license. They
cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for
at least 5 years because from the time of X's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with Y, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, X and his first wife had separated
in fact, and thereafter both X and Y had started living with each other that has already lasted for five
years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Y is still void.
2. Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.
80. GARCIA v. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001
Facts: X, a Filipino, was married to Y who is an Australian citizen and was divorced two years later
through a decree of divorce issued by the Australian Family Court. Three years later, X became an
Australian citizen and married Z, a Filipina. After living separately with X, Z filed a complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy but on the other hand, X claims that by
virtue of the decree of divorce issued by the Australian Family Court, his first marriage was validly
dissolved capacitating him to remarry ipso facto.
Issue: Whether the divorce obtained by X in Australia ipso facto capacitated him to remarry.
Held: No. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce
decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other
facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to
our law on evidence. Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal
capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.
81. REPUBLIC v. ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005
Facts: After the marriage between Cipriano and Lady, the latter went to the U.S., got naturalized,
obtained a divorce decree from a U.S. court, and then married an American man. Hoping to find new
love, Cipriano filed for a petition to remarry under Article 26(2) of the Family Code which the trial
court granted. The Solicitor-General took exception to this ruling averring that Article 26(2) covers
only mixed marriages, that is, one between an alien and a Filipino and not one between two Filipinos
where one later on becomes naturalized then gets a divorce decree.
Issue: Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Held: YES. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the requisites for
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
82. SAN LUIS v. SONGALONGOS

G.R. No. 134029, February 6, 2007
Facts: Felicisimo San Luis was predeceased by his first wife, divorced by his second American wife
via divorce decree she obtained from a court in Hawaii, and was survived by his third wife Felicidad.
Felicidad brought a petition for letters administration of Felicisimo’s assets but this was contested by
his children of his first marriage on the ground that the marriage with Felicidad was bigamous and that
Article 26(2) of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to marriages solemnized in 1974
such as that between Felicidad and Felicisimo. Felicidad counter-argues that she has the personality to
file the petition and that Article 26(2) which allows Filipinos to remarry after their alien spouse
divorces them should be given retroactive effect.
Issue: Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the
Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized before the Family
Code took effect.
Held: YES. There is no need to retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art.
26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative. In case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. the divorce in Nevada released the Filipino spouse
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by the American
spouse absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
83. VAN DORN v. ROMILLO

G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985
Facts: A Filipina married an American man, but later on, the latter obtained a divorce decree from
Nevada wherein he acknowledged that he had no community property with his Filipina wife. However,
thereafter, the American brought an action before a Philippine court praying, among others, that he be
granted the right to administer their conjugal business in Manila. The Filipina moved for dismissal on
the ground that the divorce decree obtained by the American divested him of the personality to file the
said action and that he is bound by his representations in the decree. The American retorts that the
divorce decree in Nevada cannot be recognized in the Philippines, being contrary to its laws.
Issue: For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.
Held: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released the American from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as the Filipina’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989
Facts: Imelda, a Filipina, married Erich a German. Due to domestic discord, the latter obtained a
decree of divorce from Germany. After this he filed a criminal case against Imelda for alleged adultery
committed by the latter while the marriage was still subsisting. Imelda moved quash the information on
the ground that Erich had no legal personality anymore at the time he instituted the criminal action as
he could no longer be an “offended spouse” in view of the German divorce decree.
Issue: Whether Erich still qualifies as an offended spouse, having obtained a final divorce decree
under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint for adultery.
Held: NO. The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
In the present case, the fact that Erich obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar he
is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Erich, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
85. SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS

G.R. No. 133473, February 6, 2007
Facts: Felicisimo San Luis was predeceased by his first wife, divorced by his second American wife
via divorce decree she obtained from a court in Hawaii, and was survived by his third wife Felicidad.
Felicidad brought a petition for letters administration of Felicisimo’s assets but this was contested by
his children of his first marriage on the ground that the marriage with Felicidad was bigamous and that
Article 26(2) of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to marriages solemnized in 1974
such as that between Felicidad and Felicisimo. Felicidad counter-argues that she has the personality to
file the petition and that Article 26(2) which allows Filipinos to remarry after their alien spouse
divorces them should be given retroactive effect.
Issue: Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the
Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized before the Family
Code took effect.
Held: YES. There is no need to retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art.
26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative. In case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. the divorce in Nevada released the Filipino spouse
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by the American
spouse absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
86. REPUBLIC v. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577; September 21, 2005
Facts: The marriage between Crasus Iyoy and Fely Iyoy went falling apart as a result of domestic
discord and the alleged materialism, bellicose attitude and extravagance of the woman. Subsequently,
the woman left for the U.S. where she obtained a divorce, became a naturalized American, married an
American man and never came home, even publicly representing herself as Mrs. Micklus. Crasus now
wants to have the marriage nullified on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the
Family Code. The Republic objects arguing that there is no psychological incapacity as shown by the
evidence and that the CA erred in holding that the divorce decree procured by Fely abroad severed her
marriage with Crasus.
Issue(s):
1. WON the marriage is null and void for Fely’s psychological incapacity.
2. WON the divorce decree obtained by the Fely operated to sever the marriage bonds.
Held:
1. NO. Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus
and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent
Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American
surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified.
2. NO. Article 26(2) cannot be applied to the case of Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
87. REPUBLIC v. ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005
Facts: After the marriage between Cipriano and Lady, the latter went to the U.S., got naturalized,
obtained a divorce decree from a U.S. court, and then married an American man. Hoping to find new
love, Cipriano filed for a petition to remarry under Article 26(2) of the Family Code which the trial
court granted. The Solicitor-General took exception to this ruling averring that Article 26(2) covers
only mixed marriages, that is, one between an alien and a Filipino and not one between two Filipinos
where one later on becomes naturalized then gets a divorce decree.
Issue: Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Held: Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the requisites for
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
88. PAULA T. LLORENTE V. CA and ALICIA F. LLORENTE

G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000
Facts: Lorenzo and petitioner Paula were married. Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship
ring part of the marine. Upon returning to the Philippines, he discovered that his wife Paula was
pregnant and was “living in” with his brother. He then returned to the United States filed for divorce.
Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. The
Superior Court issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce which also became final. Lorenzo went
back to the Philippines married Alicia F. Llorente. Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament
bequeathing all his property to Alicia and their three children. After the will was probated, Paula filed
with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor
contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, that such properties were acquired during their
marriage and that Lorenzo’s will would encroach her legitime.
Issue: Whether or not the decree of divorce of a former Filipino citizen obtained abroad will be
recognized in the Philippines rendering a subsequent marriage valid.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife
Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
As to the validity of the foreign divorce , jurisprudence reiterates that once it is proven that an
individual is no longer a Filipino, thus an alien, when he obtains a divorce abroad, its effects shall be
recognized in the Philippines.
In this case, Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his
divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established,
admitted and undisputed.
As to the successional rights

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
“However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.”
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the
formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
The Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of
Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of
foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the
estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
89. CHI MING TSOI v. CA
GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997
Facts: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding,
they proceed to the house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them
during their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their
honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with them. Again, there
was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping
on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the
same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted
themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of
the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even
the medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to
maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi
and want their marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand,
the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no
defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still
young, they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical
examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.
Issue: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes
psychological incapacity.
Held: The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of
a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital
obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
The Supreme Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment declaring their marriage void.
90. JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. MANUEL SIAYNGCO

G.R. No. 158896. October 27, 2004
Facts: Juanita and Manuel were married at civil rites. After discovering that they could not have a
child of their own, the couple decided to adopt. After twenty-four (24) years of married life together,
respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of
Juanita based on the ff:
embarrassed by his wife’s outbursts and overbearing ways;
wife’s obsession with cleanliness;
tight reign on his wallet “irritants”;
lack of support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge;
her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
However, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported
that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of
marriage. In addition the testimony of Manuel's expert witness, Dr. Garcia clearly shows that the root
cause of petitioner Juanita’s behavior is traceable – not from the inception of their marriage as required
by law – but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws’ disapproval of her as they
wanted their son to enter the priesthood, her husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him, and her
inability to conceive.
Issue: Whether or not the allegation and evidence establish the psychological incapacity of Juanita.
Held: As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio.
In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack of respect for him, her
jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with
respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies
that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any
showing that these “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable.
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into
the Siayngcos’s life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way
out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of “irreconcilable
differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume.
The frustration and misery respondent Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to
a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law
nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
91. REPUBLIC v. CA AND MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
Facts: The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in
1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a
father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his
parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986,
the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her
work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her
and their child. Since then he abandoned them.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Held: The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the
essential marital responsibilities and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the
time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband
cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this
case:
 burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

 root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
 such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
 such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of
marital obligations of marriage
 such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code
 decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
 court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the
state.
92. BRENDA MARCOS v. WILSON MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000
Facts: Brenda and Wilson were married. Problems ensued when Wilson left the military service and
then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. Due to his failure to get a
job, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force
her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children
for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during
their cohabitation, he would leave their house until they were already living separately.
On the other hand, when Brenda was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her
Although living separately, the couple had a violent fight causing Brenda to file a complaint for the
nullify of their marriage based on psychological incapacity of Wilson.
In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as
cruel and physically abusive to them. Brenda submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan,
Ph.D., for psychological evaluation while Wilson the other hand, did not. The trial court ruled that
Wilson was psychologically incapacitated to consummate the marriage. However CA reversed the
ruling because it was only Brenda who was subjected to psychological evaluation.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of
psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply
because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
Ruling: The Court ruled that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she
presented does not show such incapacity. Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of
various tests that were submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the
obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because
respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that
under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to
determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
Republic v. CA and Molina laid down the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of
psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code. The guidelines incorporate the
three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is
the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed,
if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
However, the Court ruled that the totality of the evidence presented were not sufficient to prove
psychological incapacity. Also, there is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present
at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.The behavior is attributed when he lost his
job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. That time he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.Thus, his
alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage.
Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he
is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
93. NOEL BUENAVENTURA, v. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH

BUENAVENTURA
G.R. No. 127449. March 31, 2005
Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a petition to declare the marriage void on the ground of the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura. The trial court ruled that (1) marriage
entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura
null and void ab initio; and (2) ordered the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of
2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this
decision plus attorneys fees of P100,000.00. The award or moral damages was based on the finding
that Noel deceived the Isabel into marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that
he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married her that he was not
ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his first priority; that he was
unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that
he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in times cause Isabel to suffer mental
anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years the parties were
together but also after and throughout their separation.
Issue:
(1) whether or not the facts surrounding the nullify of marriage constitute a ground for the recovery of
damages.
(2)How will the properties be divided/partitioned.
Ruling.
(1) No award for damages. The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the
petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his
incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts
considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to
characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party
because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By
declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on
the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere
act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice
by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such
evidence appears to have been adduced in this case. For the same reason, since psychological
incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and
discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner
purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a
willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in
law and in fact.
(2) Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the
general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime
applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered
by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included
or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in
common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the
basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
94. IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS v. ISAGANI BOBIS

GR No. 138509 : July 31, 2000
Facts: On 1985, Isagani contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said
marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, Isagani contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain
Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on Imelda's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed
against Isagani. Sometime thereafter, Isagani initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license
constituting a prejudicial question to the bigamy case.
Issue: Whether or not the fact that the first marriage was celebrated without license validated the
second marriage, hence a defense in bigamy case.
Ruling: No. Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the
second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party
may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to
determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack
of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time
the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be
prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent
marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first
marriage.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second
marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such
fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void.[19] The reason
is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the
case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner.[20] Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the
civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during
the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above,
respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.
95. LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 145226; February 06, 2004
Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete, boardmates who later became sweethearts, were married in
1990. Lucia worked in Canada and filed a petition for divorce which was granted. Morigo married
Maria Jececha Lumbago and filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Morigo was charged and later found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
Issue: Whether the elements of bigamy are present in this case to convict Morigo. NO
Held: There was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing
officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires
that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was
never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.
Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never
married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this
argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time
he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage
being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense
cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.
96. OFELIA GOMEZ, as Administratrix of the Estate of the late ISIDRA GOMEZ Y AQUINO v.
JOAQUIN P. LIPANA
G.R. No. L-23214; June 30, 1970
Facts: Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two marriages: the first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the
second with Isidra Gomez in 1935. At the time of the second marriage the first was still subsisting,
which fact, however, Lipana concealed from the second wife. The trial court, ruling that the second
marriage was void ab initio and that the husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, declared
his interest in the disputed property forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.
Issue: When did the conjugal partnership formed by virtue of the marriage of Lipana to the deceased
Isidra Gomez terminate?
Held: It is when the marriage was dissolved by Gomez’ death. The legal situation arising from these
facts is that while insofar as the second wife was concerned, she having acted in good faith, her
marriage produced civil effects and gave rise, just the same, to the formation of a conjugal partnership
wherein she was entitled to an equal share upon dissolution. The second marriage in this case was
void ab initio.
The conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved by the death of the second
wife; and there has been no judicial declaration of nullity. The only just and equitable solution in this
case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her husband, and consider the other half as
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
97. ENGRACE NIÑAL, et al. v. NORMA BAYADOG

G.R. No. 133778; March 14, 2000
Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones and out of their marriage were born Engrace
Niñal, et al. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death and 1 year and 8 months thereafter,
Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father's death, Engrace, et al. filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license, for the purpose
of securing their successional rights.
Issue:
1. Was the second marriage valid without the required marriage

license? NO
2. May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Held:
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio. The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the
State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested. There is no dispute that the marriage was celebrated without any
marriage license. The second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, thus it is void ab initio.
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court;
whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place and cannot
be the source of rights. Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either,
in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage.
The law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the
ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. A final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes
that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
98. ORLANDO VILLANUEVA v. CA and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 132955; October 27, 2006
Facts: Orlando Villanueva and Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married in 1988. Orlando filed a petition
for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying
Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never
cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child died
during delivery.
Issue: Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent. NO
Held: Orlando freely and voluntarily married Lilia and that no threats or intimidation, duress or
violence compelled him to do so. It was only after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8)
months when Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the
prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit was filed by
Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not
altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was then already pending
against him.
99. LEOUEL SANTOS v. CA AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS

G.R. No. 112019; January 4, 1995
Facts: Leouel and Julia Santos got married in Iloilo City and lived with the latter's parents but the
marriage did not last long because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents and "quarrel" over a
number of other things. Julia finally left for the U.S. to work as a nurse. Having failed to get Julia to
come home, Leouel filed a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code".
Issue: Whether the subject marriage may be declared void due to psychological incapacity. NO
Held: The use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses. It should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The factual settings in the case at bench, in
no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably
and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably,
neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
100. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CA and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763; February 13, 1997
Facts: Roridel O. Molina filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina, alleging that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and
friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and
was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them.
Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them Hence, Reynaldo had thus
shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations.
Issue: Whether psychological incapacity exists in the case at bar.
Held: The psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken
of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in
the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration.
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby
handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. (4)
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state.
101. LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ v. CA and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 126010; December 8, 1999
Facts: Lucita Estrella and Mario C. Hernandez were married in 1981 and begot 3 children. Lucita filed
a petition seeking the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. She
alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, Mario failed to
perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the household,
devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends, cohabiting with another woman
with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that, because
of his promiscuity, Mario endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease
(STD).
Issue: Whether psychological incapacity exists in the case at bar.
Held: In the instant case, other than self-serving declarations, Lucita failed to establish the fact that at
the time they were married, Mario was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived
him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. No
evidence was presented to show that Mario was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. Mario’s
alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves
constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make Mario completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state, and not merely due to his youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome. Moreover, expert
testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of Mario’s psychological
incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
102. DEDEL v. CA
421 SCRA 461; March 31, 2006
Facts: In 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married and had five children. In 1996, Norma filed for
declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogios psychological incapacity to comply
with his essential marital obligations.According to Norma, the manifestations of Eulogios
psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment,
constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his family since December 27, 1985.
Issue: Is the alleged physchological incapacity of respondent the is the incapacity contemplated by
Article 36?
Ruling: No. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. It should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The Court
cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact of Eulogios immaturity, habitual alcoholism,
unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his family. These
circumstances by themselves cannot be equated with psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make Eulogio completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state. At best, the circumstances relied upon by Norma are grounds for legal separation under Article
55.
103. LAM v. CHUA

G.R. No. 131286. March 18, 2004
Facts: Adriana Chua was married to Jose Lam as arranged by her parents in the traditional Chinese
way. She alleged that her married life was abnormal because Jose very seldom came home, never
worked for a living and instead kept asking for money from her to buy his sports cars, and that she was
also the one spending for all the expenses of their only child, John Paul. She also presented evidence to
show that Jose was married twice before, hence, the marriage was bigamous.
Issue: Whether the proper ground to dissolve the marriage was bigamy not psychological incapacity
Held: The proper ground was bigamy. The court held that it was enough for chua to prove that Lam
had no capacity to marry her by reason of the existence of a previous marriage.
104. MALLION v. ALCANTARA

G.R. No. 141528; October 31, 2006
Facts: Oscar Mallion filed a petition with RTC seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Editha Alcantara under Article 36 citing Alcantara’s alleged psychological incapacity. After trial on the
merits, the RTC denied the petition on the ground that there is failure to adduce preponderant evidence
to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking. After the decision attained finality, Mallion filed another
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC this time alleging that his marriage with
respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. For
her part, Alcantara filed a motion to dismiss praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground
of res judicata and forum shopping.
Issue: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of
marriage license?
Held: Yes. The instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no
valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In the previous
case for declaration of nullity based on psychological incapacity, however, petitioner impliedly
conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is
now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now
could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not
only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to
any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters
that could have been adjudged in that case. It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid
the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method
of presenting his case.
105. CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. SIAYNGCO

G.R. NO. 158896. October 27, 2004
Facts: Respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of petitioner alleging that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over
domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and
bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with
him; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of
their neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional advancement; that her 17 psychological
incapacity arose before marriage; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless
marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years. Petitioner alleged that respondent invented malicious stories
against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it
was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported
respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering.
Issue: Is the marriage of Siayngcos null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity?
Held: NO. From the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window
into the Siayngcos’s life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way
out. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos: Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
106. NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR. v. CYNTHIA CECILIO-NAVARRO

G.R. No. 162049 April 13, 2007
Facts: Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly complained that he didn’t have time for her; and
that she constantly quarreled with him even before marriage when he could not give her the things she
wanted. He added that she was not supportive of his career. Even marriage counseling did not work.
Petitioner stated that when they quarreled, she refused to have sex with him and even told him to look
for other women. He filed the petition for nullification of their marriage when he found out their eldest
daughter had been made pregnant by a man whom respondent hired to follow him.
Issue: Is the marriage void on the ground of the parties’ psychological incapacity?
Held: NO. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, we categorically said that psychological incapacity required
by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. These include the obligations to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. We likewise have repeatedly reminded
that the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. Petitioner failed to show that grave and incurable incapacity, on the
part of both spouses, existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Their bickerings and
arguments even before their marriage and respondent’s scandalous outbursts in public, at most, show
their immaturity, and immaturity does not constitute psychological incapacity.
107. ANTONIO v. REYES

GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006
Facts: Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne Reyes got married barely a year after their first meeting. A
child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her,
her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal
bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as adopted child of their family.
They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Petitioner then filed in a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and
void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Issue: Is Reyes psychologically incapcitated
Held: Yes. Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage
as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony
presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy
of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, which
amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and
letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage. The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically
identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondent’s psychological
incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their
consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable
considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged. Hence, the
court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article
36 of the Family Code.
108. REPUBLIC v. QUINTERO-HAMANO

GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004
Facts: Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio
Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went
back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987. In
1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family.
Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him
several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the
country but did not bother to see her nor their child.
Issue: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.
Held: Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven
to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not
needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified Toshio’s illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a
person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness.
Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
109. DONATO v. LUNA,

160 SCRA 441
Facts: A case for bigamy was filed by Paz Abayan against petitioner Leonilo Donato .Before the
petitioner’s arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner on the ground that
Paz married Donato since she had no previous knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain
Rosalinda Maluping. Donato defensed that his second marriage with Paz was void since it was
solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were
employed by the latter to obtain his consent to the marriage.
Issue: Is the civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic relations
court a prejudicial question to the criminal case for bigamy?
Held: NO. Petitioner Leonilo Donato can’t apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for
annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the
accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by means of duress
violence and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot
be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the
respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
110. LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL v. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY

G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
Facts: Karl Heinz Wiegel is asking for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July,
1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with Lilia
Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to Eduardo A. Maxion. Lilia, while
admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void,
she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union.
Issue: Is the prior marriage void or voidable?
Held: VOIDABLE. There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by
force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but
merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet
been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first
husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband
at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this
Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel.
111. ROBERTO DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
Facts: On May 29, 1991, Delia Domingo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
including separation of property against Roberto Domingo. She alleged that when they got married she
had no knowledge that Roberto had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz which is still
valid and still existing and that she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when
Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy.
Issue: Is a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage necessary?
Held: YES. The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases
where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void, bigamous marriage.
In the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held
that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband
at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this
Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely."
As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the
Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case
"solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. When a
marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the
issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the
incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.
112. MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 137567, JUNE 20, 2000
Facts: Meynardo L. Beltran filed a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity
of his wife for 24 years- Charmaine E. Felix. Charmaine alleged that it was Beltran who abandoned
the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently
filed a criminal complaint for Concubinage under Art. 334 of the RPC against Beltran and Milagros.
Beltran filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings in the criminal case arguing that the pendency of the civil
case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the
criminal case.
Issue: Is the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage a prejudicial question to
the criminal case for concubinage?
Held: NO. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must
appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue/s raised in the civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
In Domingo vs. C.A., the Court ruled that according to Art. 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity
is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. So that in a case for concubinage, the accused need not
present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of
the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
Moreover, even if there is a subsequent pronouncement that the marriage is void from the beginning, it
cannot be used as a defense in the case of concubinage; for so long as there is no declaration of nullity,
the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
113. VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO v. CONSUELO TAN

G.R. No. 137110 August 1, 2000
Facts: Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado and Ma. Consuelo Tan were married. In their Marriage Contract,
duly executed and signed by them, the status of Mercado was ‘single’. At the time of the celebration of
the wedding, Mercado was actually in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva. Tan filed a complaint
for Bigamy. More than a month after the bigamy case was lodged, Mercado filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Oliva, which was subsequently declared null and void.
Issue: Should Mercado be held liable for Bigamy notwithstanding the subsequent declaration of nullity
of his previous marriage?
Held: YES. All the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that Mercado married Oliva and
that while that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage with Tan, who
subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy. That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of
the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. The crime had already been consummated by then. The
fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a
voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before a second
marriage may be contracted, as stated in Art. 40 of the Family Code. The Code Commission believes
that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such
is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be
allowed to marry again.
114. REPUBLIC v. NOLASCO

G.R. NO. 94053, MARCH 17, 1993
Facts: Gregorio Nolasco is Filipino seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in a bar in England. They
eventually fell in love and got married in January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the
province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born
but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janet’s whereabouts.
He did so by securing another seaman’s contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar
where they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of
presumptive death of Janet.
Issue: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead.
Held: NO. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife
with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead. The Court considers that
the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead
of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract
and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Respondent's testimony also showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his
supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. Moreover, the Court also views respondent's claim that
Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal background even after she had
married respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said
of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all
returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Furthermore, neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had
inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those
friends in his testimony.
115. ARMAS v. CALISTERIO

GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000
Facts: Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in April
1992 leaving several parcel of land. He was the second husband of Marietta who was previously
married with William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February
1947. Eleven (11) years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married
in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds’ presumptive death.
Issue: Whether Marrieta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration of
presumptive death.
Held: NO. The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was solemnized on
08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect
only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive governance only
to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New Civil Code
which provides:
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court."
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of
the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is
danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of
disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead;
and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for
which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial
intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the
Family Code.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William
Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a
second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been
contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the
absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
116. EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
Facts: Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña in 1975. In 1996, Eduardo married Tina Gandalera. It
appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single." Eduardo claimed that it was done in
good faith and insisted that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from
Rubylus for more than 20 years.
Issue: Whether Eduardo Manuel is guilty of Bigamy.
Ruling: Yes. It was proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and such marriage was not
judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. Also, it was proved that the
petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in
1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from
her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent
court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that
the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the
private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The
petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
117. LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004
Facts: Lucia Barrete and Lucio Morigo got married in 1990. Lucia later on obtained a divorce decree
from the Ontario Court (Canada). In 1992, Lucio M. married Maria Lumbago. In 1993, Lucio M. filed
a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage (with Lucia B.) on the ground that no
marriage ceremony actually took place. Lucio M. was charged with Bigamy to which he moved for
suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case posed a prejudicial question.
Issue: Whether Lucio M. is guilty of Bigamy
Ruling: No. No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia B. merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of
signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
118. VERONICO TENEBRO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

Facts: Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas in 1990.
Tenebro was actually previously married to Hilda Villareyes since 1986. In 1993, petitioner contracted
another marriage with Nilda Villegas. Ancajas filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Tenebro
denied the validity of his marriage with Villareyes on the ground that no marriage ceremony took
place. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his
office in connection with his work as a seaman. Petitioner also claims that the declaration of the nullity
of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his
marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second
marriage was celebrated.
Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty of bigamy
Ruling: Yes. The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the
existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence
than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering
that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the
civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a
marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused
himself.
As soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of
the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no
cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it
is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. Moreover, the
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity.
119. SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts: SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without a marriage license. They had two
children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10, 1992, with whom he had no children in their
almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. He passed away on November 23, 1992.
Nicdao and Yee each filed with the RTC the claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000
while Yee received a total of P21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively denominated
as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with Cariño took place during the subsistence of,
and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage with Nicdao.
In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.
Ruling: No. The marriage between Yee and Cariño falls under Article 148 of the Family Code, which
refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage
relationships. Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to
the deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased
through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her
exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said
“death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not
one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to
absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if she
did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to
share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first marriage, she can claim
one-half of the disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate
succession.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized
without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4.
120. OFELIA P. TY vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES
G.R. No. 127406, November 27, 2000
Facts: In 1977, respondent married Anna Villanueva. Said marriage was declared void for lack of
marriage license in 1980. Before such declaration, respondent wed petitioner in 1979. In 1991,
respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner stating that at the time
he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued.
Issue: Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can
be entered into validly.
Ruling: No. Since the first marriage of private respondent is void for lack of license and consent, there
is no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case,
therefore, we conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.
The provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so
would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of
Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the
present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent.
121. SARAO VS. GUEVARRA
G.R. No. 47063, 40 OG 263 (CA)
Facts: Sarao and Guevarra got married in 1932. In the afternoon, plaintiff tried to have carnal
knowledge with defendant but he was asked to wait for the evening. That night, he proceeded but
though he found the orifice of the defendant sufficiently large for his organ, she complained of pains in
her private parts. He also noticed that something was oozing therefrom with an offensive smell. Upon
the advice of a physician, defendant submitted to a operation as she had a tumor which infected her
uterus and ovaries. With the consent of plaintiff, her uterus and ovaries were removed thereby making
her incapable to procreate but not to copulate. Plaintiff now comes before the courts to have his
marriage annulled on the ground in impotency.
Issue: May the marriage be annulled on the ground of incompetency?

Ruling: No. US law generally held that the meaning of impotency is not the ability to procreate but the
inability to copulate. It is thus a defect of copulation and not of reproduction. Barrenness will not
invalidate the marriage. In this case, defendant is not impotent. The operation made her sterile but by
no means made her unfit for sexual intercourse. It was due to plaintiff’s own voluntary desistance,
memory of first unpleasant experience that made him give up the idea of again having carnal
knowledge with her even after she had already been rid of her disease.
122. GODOFREDO BUCCAT vs. LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT
G.R. No. 47101, April 25, 1941.
Facts: Godofredo married Luida in 1938. After cohabiting for about 89 days, Luida gave birth to a
child of nine months. In 1939, Godofredo filed for annulment on the ground that in consenting to the
marriage, he did it because the defendant had assured him that she was virgin.
Issue: Whether the marriage may be annulled on the ground of concealment
Ruling: No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in
which the State is interested and where society rests.
There was no proof of the concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It
was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s condition
considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation,
ie. enlarged stomach) when they got married.
123. FERNANDO AQUINO v. CONCHITA DELIZO

G.R. No. L-15853, July 27, 1960
Facts: Fernando Aquino filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Conchita Delizo based on
the ground of fraud, alleging that Conchita concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man,
and four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. Conchita said that the child was conceived
out of lawful wedlock between her and Fernando.
Issue: Was Delizo’s alleged concealment of pregnancy sufficient to annul her marriage with Aquino?
Held: No. Under the New Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for
annulment of marriage.
Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her
marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent,
especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical
authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below
the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is
hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the
abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen
reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and
apparent.
If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely
by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she must
have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the
woman herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective symptoms, can only claim positive
diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five months. and 50% at six months.
Also, it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendent to have had sexual intercourse before they got
married and therefor the child could be their own.
124. EMILIO TUASON v. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON
G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996
Facts: Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Emilio Tuason alleging, among others, that the latter was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his essential marital obligations due to the violent fights between the husband and wife.
Emilio Tuason denied the imputations against him. A full-on trial was conducted and the trial court
rendered judgment declaring the nullity of the marriage which the appellate court affirmed. Hence, this
petition where Emilio Tuason argues that in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the
prosecuting officer should intervene for the state because the law looks with disfavor upon the
haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default, thus, when he failed to appear at the
scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state
and inquire as to the reason for his non-appearance.
Issue: Was the non-interference of a prosecuting attorney fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the
trial court if one of the parties vehemently opposed the annulment of their marriage in court?
Held: No. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of
collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing
any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If
the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but
instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The
prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Emilio’s vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings
negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by Emilio that
evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, the non-
intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not
fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
125. MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS v. JUDGE WILFREDO OCHOTORENA, RTC BR. 11,
SINDANGAN, ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861, July 30, 2004
Facts: Mariano Joaquin Macias filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage against Margie
Corpus-Macias. On the same day of filing, Judge Ochotorena immediately issued summons to Mrs.
Macias which were, however, not served because her whereabouts were allegedly unknown so, instead,
summons were published. Mrs. Macias claims that she learned of the publication within the 30-day
period to file an answer so she filed a motion to dismiss but the judge, instead of acting upon the
motion, set the hearing on the merits of the case. Hence, Mrs. Macias filed a complaint against Judge
Ochotorena alleging that she was deprived of her fundamental right to due process with utmost bias
and partiality for Mrs. Macias.
Issue: Did the conduct of Judge Ochotorena constitute bias, partiality, and conduct unbecoming a
judge?
Held: Yes. Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: If the defending party in an
action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties
exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated. Thus, the report of the Public Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for
further proceedings to go on in the case. Respondent judge ignored this procedural rule.
While the record shows that Public Prosecutor Arturo M. Paculanag had filed a Certification dated
May 04, 2001 with the t judge’s court, stating, among others, that he appeared in behalf of the Solicitor
General during the ex-parte presentation of plaintiff’s evidence, even cross-examining the plaintiff and
his witness, the psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos, and that he had no objection to the granting of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, such Certification does not suffice to comply with the
mandatory requirement that the court should order the investigating public prosecutor whether a
collusion exists between the parties. Such directive must be made by the court before trial could
proceed, not after the trial on the merits of the case had already been had. Notably, said Certification
was filed after the respondent judge had ordered the termination of the case.
The judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence.
126. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR
ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES NELSON L. CERVANTES and ZENAIDA CARREON
CERVANTES v. GINA CARREON FAJARDO and CONRADO FAJARDO
G.R. No. 79955, January 27, 1989
Facts: A minor, Angelie Anne Cervantes, was born to Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are
common-law husband and wife, whom they offered for adoption to Gina Carreon’s sister and brother-
in-law, Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses who took care and custody of the
child when she was barely two weeks old, as evidenced by an affidavit of consent to the adoption of
the child executed by Carreon. The appropriate petition for adoption was filed and granted by the Sps.
Cervantes. Later, the adoptive parents received a letter from the biological parents demanding
P150,000, otherwise they would get back their child to which Sps. Cervantes refused to accede, so
Carreon took the child from her yaya while the Sps. Cervantes were at work. Hence, this petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.
Issue: Should the petition for the writ of habeas corpus be granted?
Held: Yes. In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's
welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years
of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies
regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of
the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the
contending parents. Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than Gina Carreon, and his
relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with
Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into
an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another
child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left
her and vanished. For a minor to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also
affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, Sps. Cervantes who are legally
married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and
giving her a future better than what the natural mother who is not only jobless but also maintains an
illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by Sps. Cervantes with the full knowledge and consent of
the natural parentsThe adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and
exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
127. REPUBLIC OF THEE PHILIPPINES v. CRASUS L. IYOY
G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005
Facts: Crasus L. Iyoy filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Fley Ada
Rosal Iyoy alleging, among others, that: (1) after the celebration of their marriage, Crasus discovered
that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger, and extravagant; (2) despite having five children, Fely left and
abadoned them for the USA 13 years ago and even contracted a second marriage with an American;
and (3) Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of their marriage, such incapability being
incurable and continuing, thereby constituting a ground for declaration of nummity of marriage under
Art. 36, 68, 70, and 72 of the Family Code.
Issue: Did Crasus sufficiently establish the psychological incapacity of his wife Fely warranting the
declaration of nullity of their marriage?
Held: No. The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed Crasus
and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of Crasus; her
marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname,
may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations;
nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not
identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious
or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor
that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no
longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
Crasus must still have complied with the requirement that the root cause of the incapacity be identified
as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.
128. REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GULLERMA LAYUG v. COURT OF APPEALS and
TERESITA MASAUDING
G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995
Facts: Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding had a child, Rosalind Therese, on August 16, 1986,
got married on October 7, 1987, and had another child, Reginald Vince, on Janaury 12, 1988. However,
the relationship deteriorated and they decided to separate with Teresita blaming Reynaldo for the
break-up stating that he was always nagging her about money matters while Reynaldo contended that
Teresita was a spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of attending to
household expenses. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance, Teresita left Reynaldo and the
children and went back to California, so Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines leaving
them with his sister, Guillerman Layug, but, Teresita later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
claiming that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for
bigamy against her and was afraid of being arrested.
Issue: Should the custody of the children be given to Teresita?
Ruling: No. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration
is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. In ascertaining the
welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all
relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the
best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling
reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that
choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other
parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. Both are studying in
reputable schools and appear to be fairly intelligent children, quite capable of thoughtfully determining
the parent with whom they would want to live. Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to
the court to investigate if the parent thus chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and custodial
responsibility. Teresita, or at least, her counsel are more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony"
of a mother separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a result of her character
being made a key issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her
children. While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent,
whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that
his or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and
other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration.
129. MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her minor children REBECCA
ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL DELGADO v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. NO. 125041, June 30, 2006
Facts: Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for
Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati
for the twins’ education as against the grandfather of the twins Francisco Delgado. In Francisco part,
he alleged that support should come from the father and not from him as the grandfather.
Issue: Whether in default of the financial capacity of Rica and Rina’s parent, the obligation to give
support devolves on the grandfather.
Ruling: YES. Thr Court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment
or final order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of
the case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the
kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is
enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the
record.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of
Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their children’s
college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should
be borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the
next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of
their parents.
130. AURORA ANAYA v. FERNANDO PALAROAN
G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970
Facts: Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953; that defendant
Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and intimidation. Judgment was rendered therein dismissing the
complaint and upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora’s counterclaim. While the
amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged to
Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative
of his; and that "the non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of
defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had
hardly commenced ... frank disclosure of which, certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein
from going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her
consent, within the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil Code”. She prayed for the
annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.
Issue: Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
Ruling: NO. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of
the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded
by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ...
chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-
disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the
marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for
upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The
lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the
rule or not.
131. JUANARIA FRANCISCO v. LOPE TAYAO
G.R. No. L-26435, March 4, 1927
Facts: Juanaria Francisco, the plaintiff, and Lope Tayao, the defendant, contracted marriage in the City
of Manila in 1912. They separated in 1917. The husband then removed to Zamboanga. There he was
later prosecuted for having committed adultery with a married woman named Bernardina Medrano,
wife of Ambrosio Torres, at whose instance the criminal complaint was instituted. As a result of that
proceeding, Lope Tayao, together with his coaccused Bernardina Medrano, was convicted. On these
facts, the action of Juanaria Francisco, the plaintiff, against Lope Tayao, the defendant, to have the
bonds of matrimony between them dissolved was instituted and was there denied.
Issue: Whether or not the wife can secure a divorce from the husband, where the latter has been
convicted of adultery and not of concubinage, although the acts for which the husband was convicted
of adultery may also constitute concubinage.
Ruling: NO. The Philippine Divorce Law, Act No. 2710, is emphatically clear in this respect. Section
1 of the law reads: "A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband . . . ." Note well the adverb "only" and the conjunctive "or."
The same thought is again emphasized in section 3 of the Divorce Law which provides that "The
divorce may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or
consent to the adultery or concubinage, as the case may be. . . . " Later on comes section 8 providing
that "A divorce shall not be granted without the guilt of the defendant being established by final
sentence in a criminal action"—that is, in relation with section 1 of the same law, by final sentence in a
criminal action for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband. Counsel
argues along the line that the plaintiff is here the innocent spouse and that acts for which the defendant
was convicted of adultery also constitute concubinage. But the undeniable fact remains that the
defendant was prosecuted for, and was convicted of, the crime of adultery and not the crime of
concubinage. It was not instituted by the injured wife which is essential for the proper initiation of a
prosecution for concubinage.
132. FROILAN GANDIONCO v. HON. SENEN PEÑARADA
G.R. No. 79284, November 27, 1987
Facts: Private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed a complaint against petitioner for legal
separation, on the ground of concubinage. Private respondent also filed a complaint against petitioner
for concubinage. Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation should be suspended in
view of the criminal case for concubinage. Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage
will have to be first secured before the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis
of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of concubinage.
Issue: Whether or not conviction for concubinage is necessary before action for legal separation on
that ground can prosper.
Ruling: NO. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is
necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao has been modified as that case was decided
under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed and had for its grounds the same
grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the requirement, under such former law,
that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by final judgment in a criminal action.
133. ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG v. LUCITA ONG
G.R. No. 153206; October 23, 2006
Facts: William and Lucita were married. Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article
55 par. (1) of the Family Code alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence,
threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. William would also scold and beat the children at
different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from
hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her. William for his part denied that he ever
inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting language against her, or whipped the children with
the buckle of his belt. RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation. William appealed to CA
which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the decree of legal separation is correct.
Ruling: YES. William posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in
order for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to
destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings could
control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe. What is
more probable is that there truly exists a ground for legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had
to seek redress from the courts. The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his
reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this
Court. If there would be such a smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucita’s
decision to seek relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first
place. Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a
decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which
provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation.
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more
than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not
constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
134. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRASUS IYOY

G.R. No. 152577; September 21, 2005
Facts: After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-
tempered, a nagger and extravagant." Fely left the Philippines for the U.S.A., leaving all of their five
children to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent
Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded
the said request. Respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely
got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. She had been openly using the
surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. At the time the Complaint was
filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus. Respondent Crasus finally
alleged that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether or not Article 26 applies in this case.
Ruling: No. Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting
married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. The said
provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely
herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American
husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At
the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino
spouses.
135. BENJAMIN BUGAYONG v. LEONILA GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956
Facts: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant Leonila
Ginez. Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco (plaintiff's sister-in-law)
and some from anonymous writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife which he did
not even care to mention. In August, 1952, plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his
wife. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of the
plaintiff-husband, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. Then they
repaired to the plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the second
day, Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she
had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which
he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. Benjamin Bugayong filed a
complaint for legal separation against his wife, Leonila Ginez.
Issue: Whether or not there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground
for dismissal for the action for legal separation.
Ruling: YES. The Supreme Court considered the plaintiff’s line of conduct under the assumption that
he really believed his wife guilty of adultery. In August, 1952, he went to Pangasinan and looked for
his wife and after finding her they lived together as husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day, after
which he says that he tried to verify from her the truth of the news he had about her infidelity, but
failed to attain his purpose because his wife, instead of answering his query on the matter, preferred to
desert him, probably enraged for being subjected to such humiliation. And yet he tried to locate her,
though in vain. Now, do the husband's attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights despite his alleged
belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous
acts? The Supreme Court said that the conduct of the plaintiff-husband above narrated despite his
belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the offended spouse, of any action for legal
separation against the offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article
100 of the Civil Code.
136. CARMEN LAPUZ-SY v. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY
G.R. No. L-30977; January 31, 1972
Facts: Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio.
According to Carmen, they married in 1934 and lived together as husband and wife continuously until
1943 when her husband abandoned her. She discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman
named Go Hiok. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others,
would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on two (2) grounds,
namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in
Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
Issue: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the
action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?
Held: An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of
the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself —
actio personalis moritur cum persona. The right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
(or of the absolute community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the
profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the
innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse
made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code
article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such claims
and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible. Any property rights acquired by
either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and
determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
137. CERVANTES v. FAJARDO

GR. No. 79955. January 27, 1989
Facts: Petitioners herein, Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes are the brother-in-law and
sister-in-law of respondent herein Gina Carreon Fajardo who adopted the child of the both respondents
Gina and Conrado Fajardo, Angelie. After a decree of adoption was granted by the court, respondents
demanded from petitioners to be paid the amount of 150,000, otherwise, they would get their child
back. Petitioners’ failure to heed respondents’ demand prompted them to take Angelie away thus
causing petitioners to file a petition for habeas corpus.
Issue: Considering the circumstances surrounding the life of the natural parents as compared to that of
the adoptive parents, the latter being in a better position, are the adoptive parents entitled to the
custody of the child?
Ruling: Yes. In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's
welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years
of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise.
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical
and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social
standing of the contending parents.
Conrado Fajardo's relationship with the Gina Carreon is a common-law husband and wife relationship.
His open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can
grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Gina Carreon previously gave birth to
another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who
eventually left her and vanished. For a minor to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true
father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. On the other hand, petitioners who
are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the
minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also
maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and the consent of respondents.
A decree of adoption has the effect of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the
adopted child. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and to
exercise parental authority and responsibility over her.
138. ESPIRITU v. CA
GR. No. 115640. March 15, 1995.
Facts: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in the US and later
had a child out of wedlock and later had another after their marriage. Sometime after their marriage
went sour, Teresita allegedly left Reynaldo with their children in the Philippines and went back to the
US. However after sometime, Teresita went back to Philippines and filed a petition for habeas corpus
against petitioners which was initially denied but later reversed by the CA granted her the custody over
her children. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in applying the provisions of Art. 363 of the Family Code despite
the choice of the children as shown by the records and the unfit character of the mother as proven in
the lower court.
Ruling: Yes, the CA erred in awarding custody to the mother, Teresita. In ascertaining the welfare and
best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best
custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling
reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that
choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other
parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
Instead of scrutinizing the records to discover the choice of the children and rather than verifying
whether that parent is fit or unfit, respondent court simply followed statutory presumptions and general
propositions applicable to ordinary or common situations. The seven-year age limit was mechanically
treated as an arbitrary cut off period and not a guide based on a strong presumption.
The SC sustained the findings and conclusions of the regional trial court because it gave greater
attention to the choice of Rosalind and considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing on the issue
of custody.
139. GOITIA v. CAMPOS-RUEDA

G.R. No. 11263. November 02, 1916.
Facts: Petitioner, Eloisa Goita and respondet, Jose Rueda got married and subsequently lived together
in their conjugal home. After a month, petitioner Eloisa returned back home to her parents as she was
forced to do so because respondent demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on
his genital organs and was maltreated by him for refusing to accede. Petitioner then filed an action
demanding for support from respondent as husband despite her absence in the conjugal domicile.
Issue: Whether or not the wife can compel the husband to give her support outside the conjugal
domicile.
Ruling: Yes. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of
marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of
such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own
wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home.
A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it
a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty
made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve
the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his
wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her.
The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that
public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a
stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a
means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect
whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
140. ARROYO v. VASQUEZ

G.R. No. L-17014. August 11, 1921.
Facts: Plaintiff Mariano Arroyo and defendant Dolores Vasquez were married in 1910, with a few
short intervals of separation, until 1920 when the wife, Dolores, went away from their common home
with the intention of living separately from her husband. Plaintiff then filed an action to compel
Dolores to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way
of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of
her husband.
Issue: Can one of the spouses be compelled by a court order to cohabit with the other spouse?
Ruling: NO. Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province
of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invalid, an action
for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But the Court is disinclined to sanction the doctrine
that an order, enforceable by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the
purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than
to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the
court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the
practice is extremely questionable.
141. VALDES v. RTC

G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996
Facts: Petitioner herein, Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes got married on 1971
and subsequently, in 1992, Antonio sought for the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. The RTC granted the declaration of nullity of the marriage and
ordered the spouses, among others, to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties
as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code. Both spouses assailed the order contending that Family
Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions
without marriage” and that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be held controlling.
Issue: Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code is applicable for purposes of liquidation of
properties in marriages declared void for psychological incapacity.
Ruling: YES. The court held that The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without
the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers
to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen
years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
The court added that the RTD did not commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102
and 129 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail.
142. AGAPAY v. PALANG

G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997
Facts: One of the respondents herein, Carlina Agapay, was married to Miguel Palang and begot an
only child, the other respondent, Herminia Palang-Dela Cruz. Miguel Palang after retiring and
returning back from the US, he never went back home to live with respondents but instead chose to
live somewhere else. Miguel Palang then met petitioner herein, Erlinda Valdez, and with her bought a
Riceland before they got married and a house and lot after their marriage. After Miguel Palan died,
responden Carlina filed an action for recovery of ownership of both the Riceland and the house and lot.
Issue: Whether or not ownership and right of possession over said properties pertained to respondents.
Ruling: Yes. The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law
applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a
woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted
marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and
Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the latters de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in
contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be
no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, the
court found no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland
should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the
deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void
and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of
the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal
union.
143. HARDING v. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE

G.R. No. L-12707. August 10, 1918.
Facts: Plaintiff herein, Mrs. Henry Harding, was the owner of a “Studebaker” automobile, a gift given
given by her husband shortly after the issuance of the policy here in question, and which was insured
by respondent Commercial Union through its duly authorized agent here in the Philippines, Smith, Bell
& Company after paying the due premium. After a month, the said automobile was destroyed by fire
which prompted Mrs. Harding to claim the value of the insurance. The respondent refused on the
ground, among many others, that Mrs. Harding did not have an insurable interest over the said car as
she was not the owner at the time the insurance policy was issued based on the contention that the gift
was void, citing article 1334 of the Civil Code which provides that "All gifts between spouses during
the marriage shall be void. Moderate gifts which the spouses bestow on each other on festive days of
the family are not included in this rule.
Issue: Whether or not the transfer of title of the automobile to Mrs. Harding was valid under Art.
1334 of the Old Civil Code.
Ruling: Yes. The court citing Cook vs. McMicking 27 Phil. Rep., 10 held that respondents are not in a
position to challenge the validity of the transfer, if it may be called such. They bore absolutely no
relation to the parties to the transfer at the time it occurred and had no rights or interests inchoate,
present, remote, or otherwise, in the property in question at the time the transfer occurred.
Although certain transfers from husband to wife or from wife to husband are prohibited in the article
referred to, such prohibition can be taken advantage of only by persons who bear such a relation to the
parties making the transfer or to the property itself that such transfer interferes with their rights or
interests. Unless such a relationship appears the transfer cannot be attacked. The court added that even
assuming that defendant might have invoked article 1334 as a defense, the burden would be upon it to
show that the gift in question does not fall within the exception therein established. The court added
that it cannot determine, as matter of law, that the gift of an automobile by a husband to his wife is not
a moderate one. Whether it is or is not would depend upon the circumstances of the parties, as to which
nothing is disclosed by the record.
144. ARCABA v. VDA. DE BATOCAEL

G.R No. 146683 November 22, 2001
Facts: After his spouse died and having no children, Fransisco asked Leticia, his niece and her cousins
Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, to take care of him as well as the house and the store inside. According
to Leticia, Cirila and Fransisco were lovers. On the other hand, Cirila denies such claim stating that she
was merely a helper in the house. Before Fransisco’s death he executed a donation inter vivos in favour
of Cirila allegedly for 10 years of faithful service.
Issue: whether or not the donation made by Fransisco to cirila is valid.
Held: The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein
donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents
bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and
the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication
that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and
may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and
women holding themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
145. BA FINANCE CORPORATION v. CA

G.R No. 61464; May 28 1988
Facts: Yulo secured a loan from petitioner BA Finance Corporation two months after he abandoned
their conjugal home, as evidenced by a promissory note. Yulo subsequently failed to pay the same and
the petitioner filed a complaint for payment and the preliminary attachment some of their conjugal
properties in A & L properties. Lily Yulo the spouse of herein respondent answered that he had already
left the conjugal home before the contracting of such obligation as such the attached properties should
be released by the court.
Issue: whether or not the attachment was valid
Held: SC ordered the release of the attachment of the said property. Though it is presumed that the
single proprietorship established during the marriage is conjugal and even if it is registered in the name
of only one of the spouses. However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation contracted
by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
In the case at bar, the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property
managed by the private respondent was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit
because at the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their
conjugal home.
146. MARMOUNT RESORT HOTEL v. GUIANG

G.R No. 79734 Dec 8, 1988
Facts: A memorandum of Agreement was executed between Maris Trading and Marmount. Under the
agreement, Maris Trading undertook to drill for water and to provide all equipment necessary to install
and complete a water supply facility to service the Marmont Resort Hotel in Olongapo, for a stipulated
fee of P40,000.00. a second agreement was executed between them. After some time, the water supply
of the Marmont Resort Hotel became inadequate to meet the hotel's water requirements. Petitioner
Marmont secured the services of another contractor (the name of which was not disclosed), which
suggested that in addition to the existing water pump, a submersible pump be installed to increase the
pressure and improve the flow of water to the hotel. Accordingly, Juan Montelibano, Jr., manager of
the Marmont Resort Hotel, sought permission from the Guiang spouses to inspect the water pump
which had been installed on the portion of the land previously occupied by the spouses and to make the
necessary additional installations thereon. No such permission, however, was granted. Marmount filed
a complaint for damages for such refusal. On the other hand spouses Guiang answered by stating that
the second agreement was not valid and further moved on the dismissal on the complaint on the ground
that the subject matter thereof involved conjugal property alienated by Aurora Guiang without the
marital consent of her husband
Issue: whether or not the agreement was valid
Held: Article 165 and 172 state the general principle under our civil law, that the wife may not validly
bind the conjugal partnership without the consent of the husband, who is legally the administrator of
the conjugal partnership. In this particular case, however, as noted earlier, the second Memorandum of
Agreement, although ostensibly contracted solely by Aurora Guiang with Maris Trading, was also
signed by her husband Federico, as one of the witnesses thereto. This circumstance indicates not only
that Federico was present during the execution of the agreement but also that he had, in fact, given his
consent to the execution thereof by his wife Aurora. Otherwise, he should not have appended his
signature to the document as witness. Respondent spouses cannot now disown the second
Memorandum of Agreement as their effective consent thereto is sufficiently manifested in the
document itself.
147. PNB v. CA
GR No. L-57757, Aug 13 1987
Facts: On November 28, 1952, Donata Montemayor, through her son, Salvador M. Vitug, mortgaged
to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) several parcels of land. The above-mentioned Transfer
Certificates of Titles covering said properties were all in the name of Donata Montemayor, of legal age,
Filipino, widow and a resident of Lubao, Pampanga at the time they were mortgaged to PNB and were
free from all hens and encumbrances. Now the other sons of the first wife of Donata’s dead spouse are
claiming their shares on the property on the ground that the said mortagaged properties were conjugal
properties of their deceased father.
Issue: Does the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the spouses during coverture
provided for in Article 160 of the Civil Code apply to property covered by a Torrens certificate of title
in the name of the widow?
Held: The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In
this case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor
when she was already a widow. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there
is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the
property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code
cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties
are involved
148. DE LA CRUZ V. DE LA CRUZ

G.R. No. L-19565; January 30, 1968
Facts: Estrella de la Cruz, petitioner, was married to Severino de la Cruz, defendant. The defendant
started living in Manila, although he occasionally returned to Bacolod City, sleeping in his office at the
Philippine Texboard Factory in Mandalagan, instead of in the conjugal home at Bacolod City. Estrella
then filed a petition on the ground of abandonment upon the defendant who had never visited their
conjugal abode. She also began to suspect the defendant in having an illicit relation while in Manila to
a certain Nenita Hernandez, which she confirmed upon getting several pieces of evidence on the
defendant’s polo shirt and iron safe.
The defendant denied the allegations of the petitioner and that the reason he transferred his living
quarters to his office in Mandalagan, Bacolod City was to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome
and extremely jealous of every woman. He decided to live apart from his wife temporarily because at
home he could not concentrate on his work. The defendant, with vehemence, denied that he has
abandoned his wife and family, averring that he has never failed, even for a single month, to give them
financial support. In point of fact, his wife and children continued to draw allowances from his office
and he financed the education of their children, two of whom were studying in Manila.
Issue: Whether or not respondent abandoned his family and failed to comply with his obligations.
Ruling: The SC have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is considered view that the
defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife, nor of such abuse of his powers of administration
of the conjugal partnership, as to warrant division of the conjugal assets. There must be real
abandonment, and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but
also amount to financial and moral desertion.
Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the husband,
despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the
conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The fact that the defendant never ceased to
give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal
abode and resume his marital duties and rights.
149. METROPOLITAN BANK ET. AL v. TAN

GR No. 163712, November 30, 2006
Facts: A day before the scheduled public auction of the mortgaged properties or on April 16, 1998,
respondent spouses Jose B. Tan and Eliza Go Tan filed a complaint [3] against petitioners, along with
Albano L. Cuarto, Sheriff IV of the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Misamis Oriental, for removal
of cloud on the title in question and injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-225. Respondents cite as ground that Eliza
Tan never gave her consent to encumber the title in question.
Issue: whether or not the mortgage of the properties were valid.
Held: In any event, lack of respondent Eliza Go Tans consent to the mortgage covering the title in
question would not render the encumbrance void under the second paragraph of Article 124 of the
Family Code. For proof is wanting that the property covered by the title is conjugal that it was acquired
during respondents marriage which is what would give rise to the presumption that it is conjugal
property. The statement in the title that the property is registered in accordance with the provisions of
Section 103 of the Property Registration Decree in the name of JOSE B. TAN, of legal age, married to
Eliza Go Tan does not prove or indicate that the property is conjugal. So Ruiz v. Court of Appeals
instructs:
The presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that properties acquired during
the marriage are presumed to be conjugal cannot apply in the instant case. Before such
presumption can apply, it must first be established that the property was in fact acquired
during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership. No such proof was offered nor presented in the case at bar.
150. RODRIGUEZ v. DE LA CRUZ

8 Phil. 665
Facts: Petitioner sued respondents alleging that she had inherited said lands during her first marriage
from her deceased father, Alejo Rodriguez; that Hilarion de la Cruz was her second husband, and
HIlarion did not have any interest in the said lands. Respondents claim that it that HIlarion acquired it
during his first marriage and that they are entitled thereto.
Issue: Whether petitioner is entitled to recover the disputed lands.
Ruling: Yes. In view of the evidence presented, petitioner is the owner and is entitled to the
possession, as against the said defendants, of the lands subject to the controversy.
151. PELAYO V. PEREZ

GR No 141323 June 8, 2005
Facts: Mr. Pelayo sold two parcels of agricultural land. Mrs Pelayo, however, signed only the third
space in the space provided for the witness. Mrs. Pelayo claimed that the sale was void because she did
not consent thereto.
Issues: Did Mrs. Pelayo expressed her consent in the deed of Sale executed by Mrs Pelayo?
Held: Yes. A wife’s consent to the husbands disposition of conjugal property does not always have to
be explicit or set forth in any particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such
consent or approval was indeed given.
Considering that the sale was made when the Civil Code was still in effect, lack of the consent of the
wife does not render the sale void but merely voidable.
152. HOMEOWNERS AND SAVINGS LOAN BANK v. CA

GR No 153802, March 11, 2005
Facts: Without consent of the wife, Mr. Dailo mortgaged a house and lot which he and his wife bought
but which was conveyed solely under his name. The loan remained unfaid and the security was
forclose. Meanwhile Mr. Dailo died, and Mrs. Dailo discovered the mortgage.
Issue: whether or not the mortgage is valid.
Ruling: NO. The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of
respondent and the late Mr. Dailo, even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of
gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or
both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein
the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by
the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the
chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.
153. SECURITY BANK v. MAR TIERRA CORP.,

GR No. 143382, November 29, 2006
Facts: Mr. Martinez bound himself jointly and severally with Mar Tierra for the payment of credit
accomodation. Mar Tierra was not able to pay all its debt balance thus it sued Mar Tierra and Mr.
Martinez among other. Among those levied were the conjugal propertyies of Mr. Martinez and his
wife.
Issue: Whether or not the conjugal partnership be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into
by the husband to accommodate a third party?
Ruling: No. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In acting as a
guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as
the benefit is clearly intended for a third party. When the money or services are given to another person
or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be
deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. However, if the husband himself is
the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or
for his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the term obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.
In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and Mar Tierra, was
solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which
individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for Mar Tierra was similarly for the
latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses
Martinez benefited from the transaction.
154. VILLANUEVA v. CA
427 SCRA 439
Facts: Mr. and Mrs. Retuya were married on 1926, but on 1945 Mr. Retuya cohabited with Villanueva
and no longer lived with his legitimate family. In 1998, Mrs. Retuya, sought reconveyance of several
properties, claiming that they were conjugal properties with Mr. Retuya. Villanueva the concubine,
contends that Article 148 of the Family Code applies to those properties.
Issue: Whether or not the properties are conjugal?
Ruling: Yes. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations
between Mr. and Mrs. Retuya even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code. Article
105of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships
established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil
Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage,
the presumption is that they are conjugal.
The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does not sever the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage.
Article 148 cannot be applied because there must be proof of actual joint contribution by both the live-
in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution. The
presumption of equality of contribution arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate
contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint contribution is proven first.
155. VILLANUEVA v. IAC

192 SCRA 21
Facts: Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land from his father. Modesto’s illegitimate
children mortgaged their father’s property. They failed to pay the loan resulting to foreclosure of
mortgage and thereafter Bernas acquired the land as the highest bidder. Aftewards, the Aranases
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, in which they adjudicated the same land unto themselves in
equal share pro-indiviso. Bernas then consolidated his ownership over the lot when the mortgagors
failed to redeem it within the reglementary period.
The children then filed a complaint against respondents spouses Jesus and Remedios Bernas, for the
cancellation of the TCT under their name
Issue: WON Villanueva had a right over the land and the improvements thereon made by Victoria who
rendered the lot as conjugal property.
Ruling: No. The land was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria and Modesto. The property
should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law. This is what Article 148 of the Civil
Code clearly decrees: that to be considered as "the exclusive property of each spouse" is inter alia,
"that which is brought to the marriage as his or her own," or "that which each acquires, during the
marriage, by lucrative title." Thus, even if it be assumed that Modesto's acquisition by succession of
Lot 13-C took place during his marriage to Victoria Comorro, the lot would nonetheless be his
"exclusive property" because acquired by him, "during the marriage, by lucrative title."
Moreover, since Victoria died ahead of Modesto, Victoria did not inherit said lot from him and
therefore had nothing of the land to bequeath by will of otherwise to Consolacion.
156. TAN v. CA
G.R. No. 120594. June 10, 1997
Facts: A case for partition of a 906-square meter lot and accounting was instituted by the spouses
Alfonso and Eteria Tan against herein private respondents who are the Alfonsos brothers, Celestino and
Maximo, and their respective wives. Alfonso then moved to dismiss the case claiming that his wife
had no interest therein and that they inherited the land from their mother. Eteria claims that the lot is
presumed to be their conjugal property.
Issue: Whether or not the share of Alfonso in the lot is conjugal.
Ruling: No. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife. It is not necessary, to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership.
So that when an immovable was acquired by purchase during the marriage, it is considered as conjugal
property. In fact, even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear, the
presumption applies and it will be considered conjugal property.
Said presumption is, however, rebuttable with strong clear, categorical, and convincing evidence that
the property belongs exclusively to one of the spouses and the burden of proof rests upon the party
asserting it. In the case at bar, conclusive evidence points to the fact that the undivided one-third (1/3)
of the parcel of land in question is not the conjugal partnership property of the spouses Alfonso Tan
and Eteria Teves Tan. It is the former's exclusive property which he had inherited from his mother,
Trinidad Uy, the original owner of the property. Thus it is exclusive property of Alfonso under Art.
148:
Article 148: The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
x x x.
(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title.
157. FLORENTINO GENATO, et al. v. FELISA GENATO DE LORENZO

G.R. No. L-24983; May 20, 1968
Facts: Doña Simona Vda. de Genato (Simona) explained that due to her advanced age it is more
convenient that Florentino Genato, now Vice-President of the corporation, act as Assistant Secretary-
Treasurer. Florentino Genato (Florentino) was elected. Thereafter, Florentino cancelled share
certificates Nos. 7 and 18 and in lieu thereof issued share certificate No. 118 for 265 shares in favor of
him and share certificate No. 119 for 265 shares in favor of Francisco G. Genato. Simona died shortly
after liberation and an intestate proceeding of her estate was filed, which did not include the shares in
litigation.
Legal heirs, the respondents, filed the complaint in the case at bar to recover from the other two legal
heirs, Florentino and Francisco, the 530 shares of stock in order that they may be included in the
inventory of the intestate estate of their deceased mother. The petitioners alleged that they had acquired
the ownership of the 530 shares by simple donation from their mother.
Issue: Whether there has been a valid donation as petitioners claim.
Ruling: There was none. Incontestably, one of the two donees was not present at the delivery, and
there is no showing that he, Francisco Genato, had authorized his brother, Florentino to accept for both
of them. The delivery by the donor and the acceptance by donee must be simultaneous, and the
acceptance by a person other than the true donee must be authorized by a proper power of attorney set
forth in a public document. None has been claimed to exist in this case.
The donation intended was a joint one to both donees, one could not accept independently of his co-
donee, for there is no accretion among donees unless expressly so provided (Art. 637) or unless they be
husband and wife. There being neither valid donation, nor sale, the cancellation of the original
certificates of stock as well as the issuance of new certificates in the name of Florentino and Francisco
Genato was illegal and improper for lack of valid authority. It is a consequence of this that the shares in
question are deemed never to have ceased to be property of their mother, Simona B. de Genato, and
must be considered still forming part of the assets of her estate.
158. BPI, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADOLPHE OSCAR

SCHUETZE V. JUAN POSADAS
G.R. No. L-34583; October 22, 1931
Facts: On January 16, 1914, Adolphe Oscar Schuetze (Adolphe) married the plaintiff-appellant
Rosario Gelano. The late Adolphe named his own estate as the sole beneficiary of the insurance on his
life, upon his death the latter became the sole owner of the proceeds, which therefore became subject to
the inheritance tax
BPI seeks to recover from the Juan Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, the amount of P1,209
paid by the plaintiff under protest, in its capacity of administrator of the estate of the late Adolphe
Oscar, as inheritance tax upon the sum of P20,150, which is the amount of an insurance policy on the
deceased's life.
Issue: Whether the amount thereof is paraphernal or community property.
Ruling: As all the premiums on the life-insurance policy taken out by the late Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze, were paid out of the conjugal funds, with the exceptions of the first, the proceeds of the
policy, excluding the proportional part corresponding to the first premium, constitute community
property, notwithstanding the fact that the policy was made payable to the deceased's estate, so that
one-half of said proceeds belongs to the estate, and the other half to the deceased's widow, the plaintiff-
appellant Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze.
The proceeds of a life-insurance policy whereon the premiums were paid with conjugal money, belong
to the conjugal partnership. If the premiums are paid with the exclusive property of husband or wife,
the policy belongs to the owner; if with conjugal property, or if the money cannot be proved as coming
from one or the other of the spouses, the policy is community property. The estate of a deceased person
cannot be placed on the same footing as an individual heir. The proceeds of a life-insurance policy
payable to the estate of the insured passed to the executor or administrator of such estate, and forms
part of its assets; whereas the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to an heir of the insured as
beneficiary belongs exclusively to said heir and does not form part of the deceased's estate subject to
administrator.
159. MOISES JOCSON v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA and ERNESTO

G.R. No. L-55322; February 16, 1989
Facts: Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled.
Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate. Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete,
while respondent Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of Agustina.
The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson
during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what
apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his
wife.
Petitioner assails that the properties subject matter therein are conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete. It is the position of petitioner that since the properties sold to Agustina Jocson-
Vasquez were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," the certificates
of title he presented as were enough proof to show that the properties covered therein were acquired
during the marriage of their parents, and, therefore, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, presumed to
be conjugal properties.
Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the properties subject
matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.
Issue: Whether the properties are conjugal properties.
Ruling: No. The SC is of the opinion that Jocson has not sufficiently proven that the questioned
documents are without consideration.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he
must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio
Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim
is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does
not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. It may be that the properties under dispute
were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his
marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as
married to the latter.
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties were
exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered owner. This is so because the words "married to' preceding
"Alejandra Poblete' are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson
Registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being
conjugal. But this ruling is not inconsistent with the above pronouncement for in those cases there was
proof that the properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed conjugal
properties, or that they have been acquired during the marriage of the spouses, and therefore, presumed
conjugal, without the adverse party having presented proof to rebut the presumption.
160. HERMOGENES MARAMBA v. NIEVES DE LOZANO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-21533; June 29, 1967
Facts: Maramba filed an action against the Nieves de Lozano (Nieves) and her husband Pascual
Lozano for the collection of a sum of money. Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued, and levy was
made upon a parcel of land covered by transfer certificate title No. 8192 of Pangasinan in the name of
Nieves de Lozano.
Nieves filed amended motion alleging that during the pendency of the case, defendant Pascual Lozano
died and that the property levied upon was her paraphernal property, and praying that her liability be
fixed at one-half (½) of the amount awarded in the judgment and that pending the resolution of the
issue an order be issued restraining the Sheriff from carrying out the auction sale. The sale proceeded
anyway. The trial court granted Nieves’ motion.
Maramba contends that in any event the entire judgment debt can be satisfied from the proceeds the
property sold at public auction in view of the presumption that it is conjugal in character although in
the of only one of the spouses. Moreover, Maramba points out that even if the land levied upon were
originally paraphernal, it became conjugal property by virtue of the construction of a house thereon at
the expense of the common fund, pursuant to Article 158 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether the property is paraphernal or conjugal property.
Ruling: Paraphernal. The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to property acquired during
the marriage. But in the instant case there is no showing as to when the property in question was
acquired and hence the fact that the title is in the wife's name alone is determinative. Furthermore,
appellant himself admits in his brief that the property in question is paraphernal.
Moreover, the construction of a house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of one of the
spouses doe not automatically make it conjugal. It is true that meantime the conjugal partnership may
use both in the land and the building, but it does so not as owner but in the exercise of the right of
usufruct. The ownership of the land remains the same until the value thereof is paid, and this payment
can only be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership.
The record does not show that there has already been a liquidation of the conjugal partnership between
the late Pascual Lozano and Nieves de Lozano. Consequently, the property levied upon, being the
separate property of defendant Nieves de Lozano, cannot be made to answer for the liability of the
other defendant.
161. EPIFANIA MAGALLON v. HON. ROSALINA L. MONTEJO, CONCEPCION,

ELECERIA and PURITA LACERNA
G.R. No. 73733; December 16, 1986
Facts: Respondents instituted a case against Martin Lacerna to compel partition of parcel of land
located in Barrio Kasuga Municipality of Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, to which said defendant had
perfected a claim by homestead.
Respondents claiming to be the common children of Martin Lacerna and his wife, Eustaquia Pichan,
who died in 1953, asserted a right to one-half of the land as their mother's share in her conjugal
partnership with Martin. While said defendant denied having contracted marriage with Eustaquia
Pichan — although he admitted living with her without benefit of marriage until she allegedly
abandoned him — as well as paternity of two of the respondents who, he claimed, were fathered by
other men, the Trial Court gave his denials no credence.
The trial court, on the basis of the evidence presented to it, found that Martin had in fact been married
to Eustaquia, and that the respondents were his children with her. The Trial Court further found that
Martin had begun working the homestead, and his right to a patent to the land accrued, during his
coverture with Eustaquia. On the basis of these findings, the respondents were declared entitled to the
half of the land claimed by them.
Issue: Whether a wife, not a party to an action is bound by a judgment therein for or against her
husband with respect to community or homestead property or property held as an estate in entirety.
Ruling: Yes. Magallon is bound by the judgment against Martin Lacerna. Community property. It has
been held that a judgment against the husband in an action involving community property, is
conclusive on the wife even if she is not a party, but it has also been held that a judgment against either
husband or wife with respect to community property in an action to which the other spouse is not a
party does not prevent the other spouse from subsequently having his or her day in court, although, of
course, a judgment against both husband and wife is binding on both.
Estate by entirety. It has been both affirmed and denied that a wife is in such privity with her husband
in respect of property held by them as an estate in entirety that a judgment for or against him
respecting such property in a suit to which she is not a party is binding on her.
Homestead. A judgment affecting a homestead is, according to some authorities, not binding on a
spouse who is not a party to the action in which it is rendered, unless the homestead is community
property or the homestead claim or interest would not defeat the action; but, according to other
authorities, where the husband sets up and litigates a claim for the homestead, an adjudication for or
against him is binding on the wife.
In this case, petitioner is bound by the judgment against Martin Lacerna, despite her not having in fact
been impleaded in the action against the latter. This ruling presumes that petitioner is, as she claims,
the legal wife of Lacerna though, as observed by the IAC, no marriage contract was presented by
Lacerna to prove his marriage to the petitioner either before or after the death of Eustaquia Pichan.
Indeed, it is clear that the petitioner cannot assert any claim to the land other than by virtue of her
supposed marriage to Lacerna. As a mere mistress, she cannot pretend to any right thereto.
162. In re testate estate of NARCISO A. PADILLA

G.R. No. L-48137; October 4, 1943
Facts: In order that his property may be divided according to his last will and testament, it is necessary
first to liquidate the conjugal partnership.
It was in connection with such liquidation that the widow, Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla,
commenced the instant proceedings by filing a petition wherein she prayed, inter alia, that her
paraphernal property be segregated from the inventoried estate and delivered to her together with the
corresponding reimbursements and indemnities; that she be given one-half of the conjugal partnership
property; and that her usufructuary right over one-half of the portion pertaining to the heir instituted in
the will be recognized.
The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment declaring certain pieces of real estate and
jewelry as well as certain sums of money to be paraphernal, and ordering the same to be delivered to
the widow. Testator's mother and instituted heir, Isabel Bibby Vda. de Padilla, appeals.
Issues:
1. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the properties mentioned are paraphernal?
2. How far is a Torrens title conclusive and incontestable?
3. Whether the value of the paraphernal land to be reimbursed to the wife is that obtaining at the time
of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership?
4. Whether the value of the paraphernal buildings which were demolished to make possible the
construction of new ones, at the expense of the conjugal partnership, should be reimbursed to the wife.
5. Whether the personal obligations of the husband may be paid out of the fruits of the paraphernal
property?
Ruling:
1. The SC found no error in the findings of fact made by the trial court.
The husband, who was a medical student, contributed a small capital to the conjugal partnership at the
time of the marriage. The wife, on the other hand, brought to the marriage considerable property in real
estate, jewelry and cash. Practically all of the conjugal partnership property came from the fruits of the
paraphernal property. The conjugal partnership lasted twenty-one years.
The trial court was right in finding that the properties in Manila are paraphernal. We also agree with
the finding of the lower court that certain jewels, namely: two pairs of ear-rings, a bracelet, and a gold
watch, belong to the widow.
2. We are of the opinion that an exception should in no wise be made when the property is registered in
the names of both spouses. In such instances, the property may be shown to be really of either spouse,
though recorded in the names of both. The underlying reason is the same in all cases, which is the
confidential relation between husband and wife. Because of the feelings of trust existing between the
spouses, certificates of title are often secured in the name of both, or of either, regardless of the true
ownership of the property, and regardless of the source of the purchase money. It is thus but fair that on
liquidation of the partnership, the trust should be recognized and enforced, so that the real ownership
of the property may be established.
There is another reason why evidence of the nature of any property as paraphernal should be allowed,
despite the Torrens certificate. It is this: the manager of the conjugal partnership is the husband. He
may, without let or hindrance, deal with and dispose of any property appearing in the names of both
spouses, even if the property should really be paraphernal. In the course of years, any such property
may have been sold, transformed or substituted. Upon liquidation of the conjugal partnership, to forbid
an investigation of the true source of the purchase price of the original property, after many years of
marriage, would make liquidation a mockery, for it would be well nigh impossible to trace and identity
the paraphernal property. The law positively ordains that the wife's property (dowry and paraphernal)
should be returned, even before the payment of the debts of the conjugal partnership
3. The ownership of the land is retained by the wife until she is paid the value of the lot, as a result of
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The mere construction of a building from common funds
does not automatically convey the ownership of the wife's land to the conjugal partnership. Such a
mode of using the land, namely, by erecting a building thereon, is simply an exercise of the right of
usufruct pertaining to the conjugal partnership over the wife's land.
In consequence of this usufructuary right, the conjugal partnership is not bound to pay any rent during
the occupation of the wife's land because if the lot were leased to a third person, instead of being
occupied by the new construction from partnership funds, the rent from the third person would belong
to the conjugal partnership. Therefore, before payment of the value of the land is made from the
common funds, inasmuch as the owner of the land is the wife, all the increase or decrease in its value
must be for her benefit or loss. And when may she demand payment? Not until the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership because up to that time, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to transfer to the
partnership the dominion over the land, which is lawfully held in usufruct by the conjugal partnership
during the marriage.
The wife should not be allowed to demand payment of the lot during the marriage and before
liquidation because this would unduly disturb the husband's management of the conjugal partnership.
The scheme of the Civil Code is that in the interest of successful administration of the common
property, the wife should not interfere with the husband's way of directing the affairs of the
partnership. Besides, such premature requirement of the value making improvements, whereas article
1404, par. 2, has for its purpose the encouragement of construction by the husband. On the other hand,
if the payment for the lot is deferred till the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the initial outlay for
the erection of the building would be less, and consequently the construction would be facilitated.
4. We entertain no manner of doubt that the conjugal partnership derived a positive advantage from the
demolition, which made it possible to erect new constructions for the partnership. It is but just,
therefore, that the value of the old buildings at the time they were torn down should be paid to the wife.
We dismiss, as without any merit whatever, the appellant's contention that because article 1404, par. 2,
of the Civil Code does not provide for the reimbursement of the value of demolished improvements,
the wife should not be indemnified.
5. In the instant case, it is quite plain that if the amount of P7,000.00 under review should be charged
against the conjugal partnership property which came almost exclusively from the fruits of the
paraphernal property, the reservation and privilege established by law on behalf of the paraphernal
patrimony would be encroached upon and tempered with.
Fruits of the paraphernal property form part of the conjugal partnership and are subject to the payment
of the charges against the marriage. All debts and obligations contracted by the husband during the
marriage are chargeable against the conjugal partnership, but article 1386 is an exception to the rule,
and exempts the fruits of the paraphernal property from the payment of the personal obligations of the
husband, unless there is proof that they redounded to the benefit of the family. It is self-evident that the
amounts in question did not benefit the family. Hence, they cannot be charged against the fruits of the
paraphernal property. They should be paid from the husband's funds.
Article 1386 of the Civil Code provides that the personal obligations of the husband may not be paid
out of the fruits of the paraphernal property, unless it be proved that such obligations redounded to the
benefit of the family.
The wife contributes the fruits, interests, and rents of her paraphernal property to help bear the
expenses of the family. When the husband contracts any debt in his own name, it is chargeable against
the conjugal partnership as a general rule because it is presumed that the debt is beneficial to the
family. But when such a debt is enforced against the fruits of the paraphernal property, such a
presumption no longer applies, considering article 1386. On the contrary, it must be proved that the
purpose for which the wife contributes the fruits of her paraphernal property has been accomplished
through such personal debt of the husband.
163. SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, ET AL v. HON. IAC and ROMARICO
HENSON
G.R. No. 70082; August 19, 1991
Facts: Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even during
the early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living separately. During the
marriage or on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father
using the money borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an agreement
with Anita Chan where the latter consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95.
Katrina failed to return the same within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their
value. Katrina issued in September 1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of
funds. The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money
against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of
Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the
4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots
were sold at public auction to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before
such redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of
execution.
Issue: Whether or not the execution of a decision in an action for collection of a sum of money may be
nullified on the ground that the real properties levied upon and sold at public auction are the alleged
exclusive properties of a husband who did not participate in his wife's business transaction from which
said action stemmed.
Ruling: The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with
Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to
enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where
the husband obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal
partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the husband and even though
they had been living separately. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases
things necessary for support of the family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico
and the execution of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The
conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrina’s obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter
without the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the benefit of the family. There was also
no evidence submitted that the administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by
Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as
Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against
Katrina, personally and exclusively.
164. CARANDANG v. HEIRS OF DE GUZMAN

508 SCRA 469
Facts: Quirino de Guzman and the Spouses Carandang are stockholders as well as corporate officers of
Mabuhay Broadcasting System with equities at 54% and 46% respectively.
The capital stock of MBS was increased twice and spouses Carandang subscribed to both increases. De
Guzman claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions were paid by him, thus, he sent a
demand letter to the spouses Carandang for the payment of said total amount. The spouses Carandang
refused to pay the amount, contending that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed between
Arcadio Carandang and de Guzman, whereby the latter promised to pay for the stock subscriptions of
the former without cost, in consideration for Carandang’s technical expertise, his newly purchased
equipment, and his skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communication equipment therefore, there is
no indebtedness on their part. Thereafter, Quirino filed a complaint seeking to recover the P336,375
total amount of the loan together with damages.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to implead Milagros De
Guzman.
Held: Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married before the effectivity of the Family Code on 3
August 1988. As they did not execute any marriage settlement, the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains govern their property relations.
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved. Credits are personal properties, acquired during the time the loan or other credit
transaction was executed. Therefore, credits loaned during the time of the marriage are presumed to be
conjugal property.
Consequently, assuming that the four checks created a debt for which the spouses Carandang are liable,
such credits are presumed to be conjugal property. There being no evidence to the contrary, such
presumption subsists. As such, Quirino de Guzman, being a co-owner of specific partnership property,
is certainly a real party in interest. Dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, by
reason that the suit was allegedly not brought by a real party in interest, is therefore unwarranted.
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to
Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any
kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely
the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party
thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a
complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed
to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
We therefore hold that Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party in the action for the recovery
of the allegedly loaned money to the spouses Carandang. As such, she need not have been impleaded
in said suit, and dismissal of the suit is not warranted by her not being a party thereto.
165. LILIUS v. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

62 Phil 56
Facts: At about 7 o'clock on the morning of May 10, 1931, the plaintiff, his wife Sonja Maria Lilius,
and his 4-year old daughter Brita Marianne Lilius, left Manila in their Studebaker car — driven by the
said plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius on a sight-seeing trip. Where the road was clear and unobstructed, the
plaintiff drove at the rate of from 19 to 25 miles an hour. He was entirely unacquainted with the
conditions of the road at said points and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing at
Dayap. Before reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing to indicate its existence and
inasmuch as there were many houses, shrubs and trees along the road, it was impossible to see an
approaching train. With his attention occupied, he did not see the crossing but he heard two short
whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to
be locomotive No. 713 of the defendant company's train coming eastward from Bay to Dayap station.
The locomotive struck the plaintiff's car right in the center. After dragging the said car a distance of
about ten meters, the locomotive threw it upon a siding. The force of the impact was so great that the
plaintiff's wife and daughter were thrown from the car and were picked up from the ground
unconscious and seriously hurt.
Issue: Whether or not Lilius is entitled to damages for the loss of Anglo-Saxon common law
“consortium” of his wife, that is, “her services, society and conjugal companionship”, as a result of
personal injuries she received from the injuries.
Held: Under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husband's rights is to count on his wife's
assistance. This assistance comprises the management of the home and the performance of household
duties, including the care and education of the children and attention to the husband upon whom
primarily devolves the duty of supporting the family of which he is the head. When the wife's mission
was circumscribed to the home, it was not difficult to assume, by virtue of the marriage alone, that she
performed all the said tasks and her physical incapacity always redounded to the husband's prejudice
inasmuch as it deprived him of her assistance. However, nowadays when women, in their desire to be
more useful to society and to the nation, are demanding greater civil rights and are aspiring to become
man's equal in all the activities of life, commercial and industrial, professional and political, many of
them spending their time outside the home, engaged in their businesses, industry, profession and within
a short time, in politics, and entrusting the care of their home to a housekeeper, and their children, if
not to a nursemaid, to public or private institutions which take charge of young children while their
mothers are at work, marriage has ceased to create the presumption that a woman complies with the
duties to her husband and children, which the law imposes upon her, and he who seeks to collect
indemnity for damages resulting from deprivation of her domestic services must prove such services.
In the case under consideration, apart from the services of his wife Sonja Maria Lilius as translator and
secretary, the value of which has not been proven, the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius has not presented any
evidence showing the existence of domestic services and their nature, rendered by her prior to the
accident, in order that it may serve as a basis in estimating their value.
Furthermore, inasmuch as a wife's domestic assistance and conjugal companionship are purely
personal and voluntary acts which neither of the spouses may be compelled to render, it is necessary
for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such services to prove that the person obliged to render
them had done so before he was injured and that he would be willing to continue rendering them had
he not been prevented from so doing.
166. GO v. YAMANE
G.R. No. 160762, May 3 2006
Facts: Involved in the suit is a 750 square meters parcel of lot located in Baguio City, registered in the
name of Muriel Pucay Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane, herein, under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 12491.
As a result of a motion for execution of a charging lien filed by Atty. Guillermo F. De Guzman in Civil
Case No. 1841, entitled 'Florence Pucay De Gomez, Elsie Pucay Kiwas and Muriel Pucay Yamane v.
Cypress Corporation,' which said counsel handled for the plaintiffs therein, hereinafter collectively
referred to as the Pucay sisters, the subject property was levied to satisfy the lien for attorney's fees in
the amount of P10,000. The said property was scheduled to be sold at public auction on August 11,
1981.
Four days prior to the auction sale, respondent filed a 3 rd Party Claim to stop the public auction on the
ground that the subject property is conjugal property and, therefore, should not be held answerable for
the personal obligation of the Pucay sisters. However, the Sheriff proceeded with the auction sale
despite respondent's protest. The subject property was sold to petitioner spouses as highest bidder. No
redemption having been made during the one-year period, a Final Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was
eventually issued on August 26, 1982 conveying and transferring the said property to petitioners.
Rrespondent filed a Complaint with the RTC Baguio against petitioners and Sheriff Melgar for
annulment and cancellation of auction sale upon the same ground stated in the abovementioned third-
party claim.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the parcel of land is conjugal or parephernal;

2. Whether or not charging lien is chargeable against conjugal property.
Held: 1. The purchase of the property had been concluded in 1967, before the Family Code took effect
on August 3, 1988.20 Accordingly, the transaction was aptly covered by the then governing provisions
of the New Civil Code. On the latter basis, therefore, we shall resolve the issue of the nature of the
contested property.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
As a conditio sine qua non for the operation of this article in favor of the conjugal partnership, the
party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage.
In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when
the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only
with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence.25 There must be strict proof of the exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses,26 and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.
The CA committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Spouses Muriel and Leonardo Yamane. They acquired it from Eugene Pucay on February 27, 1967, or
specifically during the marriage. We then follow the rule that proof of the acquisition of the subject
property during a marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption operative. It is clear enough
that the presently disputed piece of land pertains to the conjugal partnership.
Petitioners concede that the property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Muriel to
respondent. Nonetheless, they insist that it belonged exclusively to her for the following reasons:
First. Respondent never denied nor opposed her claim in Civil Case No. 505-R, which she had filed
during her lifetime; or in AG-GR Sp. No. 01616 (entitled "Muriel Pucay Yamane v. Josephine Go"),
that the disputed parcel of land was her exclusive paraphernal property. They allege that his failure to
file a denial or opposition in those cases is tantamount to a judicial admission that militates against his
belated claim.
Second. The Deed of Absolute Sale of the property is in the sole name of Muriel. Petitioners posit that,
had the spouses jointly purchased this piece of land, the document should have indicated this fact or
carried the name of respondent as buyer.
Third. The failure of respondent to redeem the parcel of land within the redemption period after the
auction sale indicated that he was not its co-owner.
2. It is indisputable that the services of Atty. de Guzman were acquired during the marriage of
respondent and Muriel. The lawyer's legal services were engaged to recover from Cypress Corporation
(in Civil Case No. 1841) the balance of the purchase price of the sale of the exclusive property of
Muriel and her sisters. The recovery was done during the marriage.
The expenses incurred by Muriel for the recovery of the balance of the purchase price of her
paraphernal property are her exclusive responsibility. This piece of land may not be used to pay for her
indebtedness, because her obligation has not been shown to be one of the charges against the conjugal
partnership. Moreover, her rights to the property are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership.
Under the New Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things
necessary for the support of the family, or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her
husband's failure to deliver the needed sum; when administration of the conjugal partnership is
transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband;5 or when the wife gives moderate donations for
charity. Failure to establish any of these circumstances in the present case means that the conjugal asset
may not be bound to answer for Muriel's personal obligation.
167. JOVELLANOS v. CA
210 SCRA 126
Facts: Daniel Jovellanos contracted with Philamlife a lease and conditional sale agreement of a
property. When the agreement took place, Daniel was still married to his first wife, Leonor, with whom
he had three children. Leonor died on January 2, 1959. On May 30, 1967, Daniel was remarried to
Annette (respondent). On December 18, 1971, Mercy (daughter from first marriage) and her husband
built an extension at the back of the said property. On January 8, 1975, the lease was paid and
Philamlife executed a deed of absolute sale to Daniel. The following day, he then donated the said
property to his children in the first marriage (petitioners). On September 8, 1985, Daniel died.
Annette now claims that the said property is the conjugal property belonging to the second marriage
due to the fact that the deed of absolute sale was dated during the celebration of their marriage (Jan. 8,
1975).
Issue: Whether or not the house and lot pertains to the second marriage.
Held: The Court held that the said property belongs to the second marriage, but also proclaims that
reimbursements should be made to the children of the first marriage (in line with ART 118 of the FC).
The contract entered into by Daniel and Philamlife is specifically denominated as a "Lease and
Conditional Sale Agreement" with a lease period of twenty years. During the twenty-year period,
Daniel had only the right of possession over the property. The lessor transfers merely the temporary
use and enjoyment of the thing leased. Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery; however, the
ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made.
Only at the time when the payments are made in full will the deed of absolute sale be given, entitling
the buyer (Daniel) as the true owner, rather than just having inchoate rights to the property. The time
when he was able to pay the remaining balance, he was already married to his second wife, Annette,
which makes the said property as their conjugal property.
ART 118: “any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed”
Depriving the children from the first will be unfair due to the fact that the lease was contracted during
the first marriage, wherein a portion of the payment came from.
168. CASTILLO v. PASCO

11 SCRA 102
Facts: On December 22, 1932, Gabriel and Purificacion Gonzales, as co-owners of the litigated
fishpond, executed a deed of sale conveying said property to the spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria
Pasco for the sum of P6,000.00 (although the deed recited a higher amount), payable in three
installments: P1,000 upon execution of the deed; P2,000 on January 25, 1933 without interest; and
P3,000 within one year thereafter, with 11% interest from February 1, 1933, but extendible for another
year.
Against the contention of petitioners-appellants that the fishpond thus bought should be considered
conjugal for its having been acquired during coverture, the Court of Appeals declared it to be
paraphernalia because it was purchased with exclusive funds of the wife, Macaria Pasco. She was
admittedly a woman of means even before she married Marcelo Castillo, Sr. and the latter's principal
source of income was only his P80 a month salary, as provincial treasurer (as found by the Court of
First Instance), besides two small residential lots and fishponds, which were encumbered and later
transferred to his five children by his first wife and whom he was then supporting in medical and high
school. Actually, Marcelo Castillo, Sr. died without enough assets to pay his debts. .
Issue: Whether or not the fishpond is exclusive paraphernal property of Pasco.
Ruling: The two installments, totalling P5,000, of the price of the fishpond were paid with conjugal
funds, unlike the first installment of P1,000 that was paid exclusively with money belonging to the
wife Macaria Pasco, appellee herein.
As the litigated fishpond was purchased partly with paraphernal funds and partly with money of the
conjugal partnership, justice requires that the property be held to belong to both patrimonies in
common, in proportion to the contributions of each to the total purchase price of P6,000. An undivided
one-sixth (1/6) should be deemed paraphernalia and the remaining five-sixths (5/6) held property of the
conjugal partnership of spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco.
The payment by the widow, after her husband's death, of the mortgage debt due to Dr. Pasco, the
assignee of the original mortgagee, Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, does not result in increasing her share in the
property in question but in creating a lien in her favor over the undivided share of the conjugal
partnership, for the repayment of the amount she has advanced, should it be ultimately shown that the
money thus delivered to the creditor was exclusively owned by her.
It follows from the foregoing that, as the fishpond was undivided property of the widow and the
conjugal partnership with her late husband, the heirs of the latter, appellants herein, were entitled to ask
for partition thereof and liquidation of its proceeds. The ultimate interest of each party must be
resolved after due hearing, taking into account (a) the widow's one-sixth direct share; (b) her half of the
community property; (e) her successional rights to a part of the husband's share pursuant to the
governing law of succession when the husband died; and (d) the widow's right to reimbursement for
any amounts advanced by her in paying the mortgage debt as aforesaid. All these details must be
settled after proper trial.
169. AYALA INVESTMENTS v. CA

GR No. 118305, February 12, 1998
Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM,
executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally
answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint
against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and
severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC
issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and
service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May
1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not
redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from
enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal
properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July
1982.
Issue: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered “for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership” and is it chargeable.
Ruling: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted
the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and
separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said
corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only
to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money or services are given to
another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership”. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not
for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf
of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not
embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety
agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have
resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of
shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must
be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself.
170. CHING v. CA
423 SCRA 357
Facts: Ching is the Vice President of Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc., which obtained a loan from
ABC Bank. Ching execetued a continuing guarantee with the bank binding himself to jointly and
severally guarantee the loan. PBM Inc. defaulted on the loan, and as a consequence the deputy sheriff
levied on attachment the 100,00 common shares in Citycorp Investment Phils. in the Ching’s name.
Ching’s wife filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on the attachment on the ground that the stocks were
acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds and therefore cannot be
used to pay off her husband’s exclusive liability.
Issue: Whether or not the stocks are part of their conjugal property and therefore cannot bound by the
exclusive liability of the husband.
Ruling: Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the
marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. In Tan v. Court of Appeals, we held that it is not even
necessary to prove that the properties were acquired with funds of the partnership. As long as the
properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are presumed to be conjugal in
nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the
presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. The presumption of
the conjugal nature of the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in the absence of clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the same.
In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in
the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of
the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done
during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus,
presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The private respondent failed to
adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money. The
barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment
Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-
husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.
Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now Article 121[2 and 3] of the Family Code of the Philippines)
provides:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and
those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership.
The petitioner-husband signed the continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement as security for the
payment of the loan obtained by the PBMCI from the private respondent in the amount of
P38,000,000. In Ayala Investment and Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that
the signing as surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a
business. No matter how often an executive acted on or was persuaded to act as surety for his own
employer, this should not be taken to mean that he thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or
guaranty.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there
must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal
partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate
the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well being of the
family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted
risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was
benefited by the petitioner-husbands act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement
with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private
respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from
the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of
surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to
establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership
171. HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK v. MIGUELA C. DAILO

G.R. No. 153802 March 11, 2005
Facts: Spouses Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr purchased a house and lot and the Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the
exclusion of his wife. Marcelino executed an SPA in favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to
obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses
Dailo’s house and lot in San Pablo City. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result,
petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property and after the lapse
of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership. In the
meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property, Miguela instituted a
Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against
petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Dailo Jr.
Issue: IS THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN
OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR?
Held: NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, “[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . .
(1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have been benefited; . . . .”
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband
alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern
for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. The burden of proof that the debt was
contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant
claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies,
must prove). Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance
the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without
adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot
be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
172. LACSON v. DIAZ

G.R. No. L-19346 May 31, 1965
Facts: Abelardo G. Diaz was sentenced to pay the Soledad Lacson the sum P132,718.30.of from July
1, 1960 until fully paid. The Sheriff sent a notice to his employer to garnish one-third of his monthly
salary and of any other personal properties belonging to said defendant, to cover the total amount.
Diaz filed with the court a motion to quash the writ of execution and to lift the notice of garnishmenton
the ground that the same are not enforceable against his present family. The money-judgment arose out
of a contract entered into by him during his first marriage said judgment cannot be enforced against his
salaries which form part of the conjugal properties of the second marriage. Plaintiffs opposed this
motion, for the reason that re-marriage is not a cause for extinction of obligations.
Issue: Is Diaz’s contention correct?
Held: The appellant, who became a widower in 1951, remarried in 1960. The writ of execution and
notice of garnishment in this case were issued and implemented in 1961. The conjugal partnership of
the second marriage is different from that of the first marriage, during which existence the obligation
arose, such obligation, as far as the second conjugal partnership is concerned, is personal to the
husband and cannot be charged against the properties of the second union. Since his salaries form part
of the conjugal asset the same cannot be garnished to satisfy his personal obligations.
As a general rule, debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, as well as fines and
pecuniary indemnities imposed thereon, are not chargeable to the conjugal partnership. However, such
obligations may be enforced against the conjugal assets if the responsibilities enumerated in Article
161 of the new Civil Code have already been covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive property or
the same is insufficient. In the instant case, it is a personal obligation of the husband, and it has not
been established that the latter does not have properties of his own or that the same are not adequate to
satisfy appellees’ claim. Furthermore, there is no showing that the responsibilities named in Article 161
of the new Civil Code have already been covered in order that the personal obligation of the husband
may be made chargeable against the properties of the second marriage.
173. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.FROILAN LAGRIMAS

G.R. No. L-25355; August 28, 1969
Facts: An information was filed against the accused, Froilan Lagrimas, for murder. The lower court
found the accused guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the appellants as such heirs in the sum of P6,000.00 plus the additional sum
of P10,000.00 in the concept of damages, attorney's fees and burial expenses. A writ of execution to
cover the civil indemnity was issued by the lower court upon motion of appellants. A levy was had on
eleven parcels of land in the province declared for tax purposes in the name of the accused. The sale
thereof at public auction was scheduled but the wife of the accused, Mercedes Aguirre de Lagrimas,
filed a motion to quash the writ of attachment as well as the writ of execution with the allegation that
the property levied upon belonged to the conjugal partnership and, therefore, could not be held liable
for the pecuniary indemnity the husband was required to pay.
Issue: Can the eleven parcels of land in the province be held liable for the indemnity the husband was
required to pay?
Held: Yes. According to Article 163 of the Civil Code: "The payment of debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership. Neither shall
the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. However, the
payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, and that of fines and
indemnities imposed upon them, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have
no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership
such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.
174. UY v. CA
G.R. No. 109557; 29 November 2000
Facts: The controversy came about when Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s suffered of a stroke which left
him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. He is the father of respondent Teodoro
Jardeleza and husband of petitioner Gilda Jardeleza.
Gilda L. Jardeleza filed a petition regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto, assumption of
sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the same. Gilda averred
the accumulated expenses sets the urgency to sell one piece of real property.
RTC of Iloilo rendered a decided that Ernesto was truly incapacitated to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, and that the sale of the property was necessary to defray the
mounting expenses for treatment and hospitalization.
Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the petition for declaration of
incapacity, assumption of sole powers of administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties
was a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., as such, it cannot
be prosecuted on summary proceedings. He further alleged that Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. had acquired
vested rights as a conjugal partner, and that these rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced without his
consent. While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Gilda Jardeleza disposed by absolute sale
Lot No. 4291 and all its improvements to her daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza Uy for P 8 million.
Issue: Whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. manage their
conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property
Held: Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:

The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly… In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
A spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe
the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964
Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
175. THELMA A. JADER-MANALO v. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA

G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002
Facts: Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties of the respondents from
the husband of Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto Camaisa. After some bargaining,
petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price and terms of payment. The agreement
handwritten by the petitioner was signed by Edilberto, with assurance from him that he would secure
his wife’s consent. Petitioner was later on surprised when she was informed that respondent spouses
were backing out of the agreement. Hence, she filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages.
Issue: Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's
written consent.
Held: Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: “In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.”
The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must be obtained. Respondent Norma Camaisa did not
give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is
required by law for its validity. She may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their
conjugal properties, however that is not sufficient to demonstrate consent.
176. GUIANG SPOUSES v. CA AND CORPUZ

GR. No. 125172 June 26, 1998
Facts:
The Corpuz spouses sold one-half portion of their Lot spouses Guiang. The latter have since then
occupied the one-half portion [and] built their house thereon .They are thus adjoining neighbors of the
Corpuzes.
Mrs Corpuz left for Manila trying to look for work abroad and her departure was with the consent of
her husband. Sometime in 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining
one-half portion including their house, of their home lot to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to
her mother informing her. She [Gilda Corpuz] replied that she was objecting to the sale.
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda defendant Judie pushed through the sale of the remaining
one-half portion. He sold to defendant Luzviminda Guiang thru a document known as “Deed of
Transfer of Rights” the remaining one-half portion of their lot and the house.
Issue: Whether the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was a void or a voidable contract
Held: The sale is void. The said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family
Code:
“Art. 124…..In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.”
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of
the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable.
Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
177. GUIANG SPOUSES vs. CA AND CORPUZ

GR. No. 125172; June 26, 1998
Facts: The Corpuz spouses sold one-half portion of their Lot spouses Guiang. The latter have since
then occupied the one-half portion [and] built their house thereon .They are thus adjoining neighbors of
the Corpuzes. Mrs Corpuz left for Manila trying to look for work abroad and her departure was with
the consent of her husband. Sometime in 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell
the remaining one-half portion including their house, of their home lot to defendants Guiangs. She
wrote a letter to her mother informing her. She [Gilda Corpuz] replied that she was objecting to the
sale. However, in the absence of his wife Gilda defendant Judie pushed through the sale of the
remaining one-half portion. He sold to defendant Luzviminda Guiang thru a document known as
“Deed of Transfer of Rights” the remaining one-half portion of their lot and the house.
Issue: Whether the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was a void or a voidable contract
Held: The sale is void. The said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family
Code:
“Art. 124…..In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.”
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of
the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable.
Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
178. VALDES v. RTC

G.R. No. 122749; July 31, 1996
Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the
other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation
of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children
filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
Issue: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if
said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
179. CARINO v. CARINO

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
Facts: During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first
with petitioner Susan Nicdao and the second was with respondent Susan Yee. Due to diabetes, he died
in 1992 under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Respondent Susan
Yee filed a case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying that petitioner
be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the death benefits which petitioner received. The Court
passed upon the validity of the two marriages and found that both are void ab initio, the first due to the
absence of marriage license and the second for being a bigamous marriage.
Issue: What property regime would govern the two marriages? What are the effects of the applicable
property regime on the claim of petitioner and respondent?
Held:
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
Property Regime of Petitioner Susan Nicdao and Deceased

Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license.
Wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in
equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and
the other did not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by
the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under
scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to
the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan
Nicdao.
Property Regime of Respondent Susan Yee and Deceased

The application of Article 148 is in order, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and
woman are married to other persons.
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution
shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her
exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or
spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP
Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly
renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police
officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she
contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are
not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and
respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same.
180. BUENAVENTURA v. CA
G.R. No. 127358. March 31, 2005
Facts: These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by
petitioner Noel Buenaventura, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel
Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. The trial court granted the petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage and ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property
particularly the plaintiff’s separation/retirement benefits and one-half of his outstanding shares of stock
with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies.
Issue: What property relations govern the parties to a void marriage?
Held: The general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property
regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. In a
void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of
the Family Code.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. A party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered
by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included
or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in
common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the
basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
181. GONZALES v. GONZALES

G.R. No. 159521, December 16, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Francisco Gonzales and respondent Erminda Gonzales got married in 1979. On
October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for annulment of marriage on the ground of petitioner’s
alleged psychological incapacity to comply with the obligations of marriage. The trial court declared
the marriage void ab initio and ordered that the conjugal properties between petitioner and respondent
be divided equally.
Issue: What property relations govern the parties to a void marriage?
Held: Their property relation shall be governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the Family Code.
These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to marry
each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and
(2) when a man and woman live together under a void marriage. Under this property regime of co-
ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned
by them in equal shares.
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have
been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
182. AGAPAY v. PALANG

G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997
Facts: Miguel Palang contracted two marriages during his lifetime, the first with respondent Carlina
Vallesterol on July 16, 1949 and the second with petitioner Erlinda Agapay on July 15, 1973. On May
17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land. A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23,
1975, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. Miguel died on February 15, 1981. Thereafter, Carlina
and her daughter Herminia instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession, seeking to
get back the riceland and the house and lot.
Issue: Who between the parties has the right to possess the property?
Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals declaring respondents as the
owners of the properties in question.
The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of
cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. Under
Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to
Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income
or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal shares.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland and the
house and lot, there is no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently,
the riceland and house and lot should revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased
Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
183. MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY CO., INC. v. TEODORO

G.R. No. L-20530, June 29, 1967
Facts: Petitioner Manila Surety sought to levy the properties of respondent Trinidad Teodoro for the
satisfaction of debt of Jose Corominas, Jr. However, respondent claimed that the properties levied upon
were exclusively hers. The records reveal that Corominas was first married to Sonia Lizares but a
decree of divorce granted by the State of Nevada was later obtained dissolving their bonds of
matrimony. Thereafter, Corominas and respondent were married in Hongkong.
Issue: What property relations should govern Corominas and Teodoro’s marriage?
Held: The rule on co-ownership applies in this case. Under Article 144 of the Civil Code, When a man
and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void
from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through then work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
The particular properties involved here which were admittedly acquired by respondent Teodoro, cannot
be deemed to belong to such co-ownership because, as found by the trial court and confirmed by the
Court of Appeals, the funds used in acquiring said properties were fruits of respondent's paraphernal
investments which accrued before her "marriage" to Corominas. In other words they were not acquired
by either or both of the partners in the void marriage through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries, and hence cannot be the subject of co-ownership under Article 144. They remain respondent's
exclusive properties, beyond the reach of execution to satisfy the judgment debt of Corominas.
184. JUANIZA v. JOSE

G.R. No. L-50127-28 March 30, 1979
Facts: Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an
accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways which resulted in the
death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At the time of the accident,
Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-appellant,
Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years. In the resulting cases for damages, the trial court rendered Jose
and Arroyo jointly and severally liable.
Issue: Whether or not the rule on co-ownership under Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a
case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry.
Held: The co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and the
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose
is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia
Arroyo. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney.
The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis
for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the
passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision.
185. BELCODERO v. CA
G.R. No. 89667 October 20, 1993
Facts: The husband, Alayo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday on 27 July 1927. In 1946, he left the
conjugal home, and he started to live with Josefa Rivera with whom he later begot one child, herein
petitioner Josephine Belcodero.
In 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on from the Magdalena Estate. Alayo authorized Magdalena
Estate to transfer the lot in the name of Josefa. Thus, a Transfer Certificate of title was issued in the
name of Josefa. In 1980, after the death of Alayo, Juliana and her children filed an action for
reconveyance of the property.
Issue: Who between the Juliana and Josefa has the right to possess the property?
Held: The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife
Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), "all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This presumption has not been convincingly
rebutted.
186. JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO v. MASTER IRON WORKS & CONSTRUCTION

CORPORATION and ROBERTO V. ALEJO, Sheriff IV, RTC of Makati City, Branch 142
G.R. No. 151967. February 16, 2005
Facts: Josefina Castillo was only 24 years old when she married Eduardo Francisco in January 1983.
Eduardo was then employed as Vice President in a Private Corporation. In 1984, Josefina acquired two
parcels of land where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina, married to
Eduardo. An affidavit of waiver, recorded at the dorsal portion of the titles was executed by Eduardo
where he declared that prior to his marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the land with her own
savings and that he waived whatever claims he had over the property. In 1990, Eduardo who was then
a General Manager of Reach Out Trading International, bought bags of cement from defendant but
failed to pay the same. The latter filed a complaint for recovery and trial court rendered judgment
against Eduardo. The court then issued a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a notice of levy on
execution over the alleged property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the amount due under
the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels of land in which
she claimed as her paraphernal property. The RTC ruled that the property is paraphernal. The CA held
that it was a part of the conjugal partnership. In a separate case, the RTC of Paranaque declared the
marriage between Josefina and Francisco as null and void for being bigamous.
Issue: Is the subject property the conjugal property of the spouses and may be held to answer for the
personal obligations of Eduardo?
Held: YES. Petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her
cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The evidence on record
shows that the Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property to the petitioner on
August 31, 1984 and titles over the property were, thereafter, issued to the latter as vendee on
September 4, 1984 after her marriage to Eduardo on January 15, 1983. Article 148 of the FC which
provides that: “In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions”, is applicable in
the case at bar. Also, even though Francisco and Josefina got married before the effectivity of the
Family Code, Article 256 is applicable. Hence, the provision of Article 148 shall be applied
retroactively if it does not prejudice any vested right.
187. LUPO ATIENZA vs. YOLANDA DE CASTRO

G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006
Facts: Lupo, a married man and the President and General Manager of Enrico Shipping Corporation
and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, cohabited with Yolanda. During their union as common law
husband and wife, they acquired the subject parcel of land in BelAir Subdivision, Makati. When their
relationship tourned sour, Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial partition of the
subject property. Alleging that the property was acquired by Yolanda in 1987 using his exclusive funds.
In turn, Yolanda averred that she acquired the subject property using her exclusive funds. The RTC
declared that the property was owned in common by Yolanda and Lupo and ordered its partition in two
equal shares. The CA adjudged the litigated property as exclusively owned by Yolanda. Lupo is now
arguing that pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code, he was in no way burdened to prove that he
contributed to the acquisition of the subject property because with or without the contribution by either
partner, he is deemed a co-owner thereof, adding that under Article 484 of Civil Code, as long as the
property was acquired by either or both of them during their extramarital union, such property would
be legally owned by them in common and governed by the rules on co-ownership, which apply in
default of contracts, or special provisions.
Issue: Is the subject property co-owned by Lupo and Yolanda?
Held: NO. It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because
petitioner Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with the
respondent. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which
applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the
same married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions ... Proof of actual contribution is required.
Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
Petitioners claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he fail
to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents
pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent.
188. MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS J. REYES v. LOURDES REYES,

MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR. -- all surnamed REYES
G.R. No. 154645. July 13, 2004
Facts: Respondent Lourdes Reyes is the widow of Rodolfo Reyes. Years before Rodolfo’s death, he
had illicit relations with petitioner Joaquino. A house and lot in BF Homes Paranaque was sold and a
TCT was registered under the name of Joaquino. Joaquino had no means to pay for this property.
Respondents allege that the funds used to purchase the subject property were from the earnings of
Reyes from his position as executive of Warner Barnes and Company and from the mortgage executed
by Rodolfo in favor of Commonwealth Insurance Corporation and that Joaquino was without the
means to pay for the same.
Issue: Is the subject property owned in common by petitioner and the late Rodolfo Reyes?
Held: NO. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, when a common-law couple have a legal
impediment to marriage, only the property acquired by them -- through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry -- shall be owned by them in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. All told, respondents have shown that the property was bought during the
marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that gives rise to the presumption that it is conjugal. More
important, they have established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were used to pay for
the property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid from his salaries and earnings, which were conjugal
funds under the Civil Code. In contrast, petitioner has failed to substantiate either of her claims -- that
she was financially capable of buying the house and lot, or that she actually contributed to the
payments therefor.
Under the circumstances, therefore, the purchase and the subsequent registration of the realty in
petitioners name was tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to Milagros. By express provision of Article
739(1) of the Civil Code, such donation was void, because it was made between persons who were
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.
189. GUILLERMA TUMLOSv. SPOUSES FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000
Facts: Spouses Fernandez filed an action for ejectment against the Tumlos, alleging that they are the
absolute owners of an apartment building located in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and that through
tolerance they allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment building since 1989, without any payment
of any rent. When the demand for payment went unheeded, they prayed that the Tumlos be ordered to
vacate the property in question and to pay the stated unpaid rents. Guillerma filed an answer to the
complaint, claiming that she is also the co-owner and co-vendee of the apartment in question together
with Mario Fernandez since they had an amorous relationship and that they acquired the property in
question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived together in the said apartment
building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the property by
collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of
their marriage.
Issue: Is Guillerma a co-owner of the subject property?
Held: Even considering the evidence presented before the MTC and the RTC, we cannot accept
petitioners submission that she is a co-owner of the disputed property pursuant to Article 144 of the
Civil Code. As correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code, but
Article 148 of the Family Code. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or
concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal
partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife. Hence, petitioners argument
-- that the Family Code is inapplicable because the cohabitation and the acquisition of the property
occurred before its effectivity. In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an
actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership
merely on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez deserves scant consideration. Suffice it
to say that the law itself states that it can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or
acquired rights.
190. JOHN ABING v. JULIET WAEYAN

G.R. No. 146294; July 31, 2006
Facts: In 1986, Abing and Waeyan cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage and
together bought a 2-storey residential house. In December 1991, Juliet left for Korea and worked
thereat, sending money to John which the latter deposited in their joint account. The original structure
underwent renovation and housed a sari-sari store. When their relationship turned sour in 1995, they
decided to partition their property and executed a Memorandum of Agreement. Under the unsigned
MOA, John shall leave the couple’s dwelling and in turn, Juliet shall pay him his share in their
properties. Juliet partially paid John of his shares in their properties but failed to make good the
balance. On account thereof, John demanded of her to vacate the annex structure housing the sari-sari
store. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an ejectment suit against her before the MTC of Mankayan,
Benguet alleging that the money used to build the annex structure was from his exclusive funds. Juliet
countered that their original house was renovated thru their common funds and that the subject
structure annexed thereto was merely an attachment or an extension of their original residential house,
hence the same pertained to the two of them in common.
Issue: Is the subject property exclusively owned by petitioner?
Held: NO. Other than John's bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money he borrowed
from his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support
such naked claim. Sure, petitioner has in his favor the tax declaration covering the subject structure.
We have, however, ruled time and again that tax declarations do not prove ownership but at best an
indicia of claims of ownership. The law is clear. Under Article 147 of the Family COde, in the absence,
as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of
cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal
shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime,
they owned their properties in common "in equal shares." Being herself a co-owner of the structure in
question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.
191. PEDRO GAYON v. SILVESTRE GAYON and GENOVEVA DE GAYON

G.R. No. L-28394; November 26, 1970
Facts: Pedro Gayon filed a complaint against the spouses Silvestre and Genoveva alleging that the
spouses executed a deed where they sold to one Pedro Gelera a parcel of unregistered land in Guimbal,
Iloilo. Gelera, in turn, sold the same to Pedro Gayon, who prays that a judicial decree for the
consolidation of the title be issued in his favor. Genoveva, in her answer, denied the execution of any
document in favor of petitioner and that Silvestre died long before the institution of the complaint. The
lower court issued an order dismissing the complaint considering the fact that Silvestre Gayon is now
dead and his wife Genoveva de Gayon has nothing to do with the land subject of plaintiff's complaint
and due to the fact that plaintiff “did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case” before
filing his complaint.
Issue: Is Compromise, Under Article 222 Of The Civil Code, Required?
Held: NO. It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from Article 222, as to the requirement of
earnest efforts towards a compromise, applies to suits “filed or maintained between members of the
same family.” This phrase, “members of the same family,” should, however, be construed in the light
of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which: Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff’s sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch
as none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 — which should be
construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule — and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be
excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art.
222, and plaintiff’s failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.
192. EMILIA O'LACO and HUCO LUNA vs. VALENTIN CO CHO CHIT, O LAY KIA and
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 58010. March 31, 1993.
Facts: In 1943, Emilia O’Laco purchased from the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company,
Ltd. A parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, for which a TCT was issued in her name. Private
respondents learned that O’Laco sold the same to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila and in
turn sued petitioners for the recovery of the purchase price of the land asserting that O’Laco knew that
they were the real vendees of the property and that the legal title thereto was merely place in O’Laco’s
name. Finding no trust relation between the parties, the RTC dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed
the ruling of the trial court.
Issue: Is there a trust relation between the parties in contemplation of law?
Held: YES. After a thorough review of the evidence on record, We hold that a resulting trust was
indeed intended by the parties under Art. 1448 of the Civil Code.
Indeed, there can be no persuasive rationalization for the possession of these documents of ownership
by respondent-spouses for seventeen (17) years after the Oroquieta property was purchased in 1943
than that of precluding its possible sale, alienation or conveyance by Emilia O'Laco, absent any
machination or fraud. This continued possession of the documents, together with other corroborating
evidence spread on record, strongly suggests that Emilia O'Laco merely held the Oroquieta property in
trust for respondent-spouses.
After all, so long as the trustee recognizes the trust, the beneficiary may rely upon the recognition, and
ordinarily will not be in fault for omitting to bring an action to enforce his rights. There is no running
of the prescriptive period if the trustee expressly recognizes the resulting trust. Since the complaint for
breach of trust was filed by respondent-spouses two (2) months after acquiring knowledge of the sale,
the action therefore has not yet prescribed.
193. FLORANTE F. MANACOP v. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC.

G.R. No. 97898, August 11, 1997
Facts: In 1986, E & L Mercantile, Inc. and Sps. Florante and Eulaceli Manacop entered into a
compromise agreement after the former filed a complaint against the latter to collect an indebtedness.
A motion for execution was granted but the execution of judgment was delayed. In 1989, the
Manacops filed a motion to quash the alis writs of execution alleging, among others, that their
residence is their family home, thus, exempt from execution. E & L opposed averring that the property
could not be considered a family home since the Manacops were already living abroad and the
property, having been acquired in 1972, should have been judicially constituted as a family home to
exempt it from execution.
Issue: May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectivity of the
Family Code be executed on a house and lot executed as a family home under the same Code?
Ruling: Yes. The exemption from execution granted under Art. 155 of the Family Code is effective
from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein. Under Art. 162, all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of
the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to
a family home under the Family Code. Art. 153 does not have retroactive effect.
In this case, under the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property becamet
Manacop’s family home under the simplified process embodied in Article 153. However, there being
absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family
home, it follows that the law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by Manacop. Since the debt
involved herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3, 1988,
Manacop cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the Family Code. Furthermore,
occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual.
Occupancy of a family home by an overseer, like Carmencita Abat in this case, is insufficient
compliance with the law since maids and overseers are not one of those beneficiaries enumerated in
Art. 154 of the Family Code.
194. JOSE MODEQUILLO v. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA, FRANCISCO SALINAS,
FLORIPER ABELLAN-SALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-CULAN, and DEPUTY SHERIFF
FERNANDO PLATA
G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
Facts: Pursuant to a final judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals on January 29, 1988 against Jose
Modequillo, a writ of execution was issued and the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land
registered in the name of Modequillo. Modequillo filed a motion to quash and/or to set aside the levy
of execution alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the
commencement of the case and, as such, is exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment under
Art. 152-153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Art. 155 thereof, and that the
judgment debt sought to be enforced, i.e. damages arising from a vehicular accident which took place
on March 16, 1976, against the family home is not one those enumeration under Art. 155 of the Family
Code.
Issue: May a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages be satisified by way of
execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code?
Ruling: Yes. Pursuant to Art. 152, 153, and 155 of the Family Code, the residential house and lot of
Modequillo was not constituted as a family home judicially or extrajudicially. It became a family home
by operation of law only under Art. 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home
upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Art. 152-153 do not have a retroactive efffect such that all existing family residences are deemed to
have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code. Under Art. 162, all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the
appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
195. MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO v.

ROEL, NOEL, and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INES
G.R. No. 132537, October 14, 2005
Facts: Pursuant to a final judgment rendered on Janaury 24, 1989 against Marietta Sta. Ines, a writ of
execution was issued, by virtue of which, a parcel of land registered in the name of Marietta was levied
upon and sold at a public auction to satisfy the damages awarded in the civil case for accounting filed
by the Gomezes. On July 12, 1993, a complaint for annulment of said sale was filed by Hinahon Sta.
Ines, together with Noel, Roel, and Jannette, husband and children of Marietta, respectively, against the
Gomezes and the sheriff on the ground that said house and lot sold is their family residence, and is thus
exempt from exeuction under Sec. 12(a), Rule 139 of the Rules of Court and Art. 155 of the Family
Code.
Issue: Can an undivided interest of the owner of the family home, like Marietta Sta. Ines, be levied
upon on execution without violating the prohibition on such levy under the Family Code?
Ruling: No. Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from execution,
forced sale, or attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to the constitution of the
family home.
In this case, however, the house and lot of the Sta. Ineses was not constituted as a family home,
whether judicially or extrajudicially, at the time Marietta incurred her debts. Under prevailing
jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such only upon the effectivity of the Family Code on 03
August 1988, thus, the debts were incurred before the constitution of the family home.
Neither is it correct to say that the obligation sought to be satisfied by the levy of the property was
incurred only upon the issuance of the judgment in the original case in January of 1989. The complaint
against Marietta was instituted on June 17, 1986 to seek redress for damages suffered by them due to
acts and omissions committed by Marietta as early as 1977 when she assumed management and
supervision of their deceased mother’s rice land. Marietta’s liability, which was the basis of the
judgment, arose long before the levied property was constituted as a family home by operation of law
in August 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta falls squarely under one of the instances when a
family home may be the subject of execution, forced sale, or attachment, as provided for by Article 155
of the Family Code, particularly, to answer for debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home.
196. PERLA G. PATRICIO v. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006
Facts: After the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Marcelino V. Dario between his wife Perla
Patricio and his two sons Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III, Perla and Marcelino Marc advised
Marcelino III of their intention to partition a parcel of land with a residential house built thereon.
Marcelino III refused so Perla and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition. The RTC ordered
the parititon but the CA reversed the decision holding that the family home should continue despoute
the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof and the heirs could not
partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise and that since the
minor son of Marcelino III, who is a grandson of the deceased, was a minor beneficiary of the family
home.
Issue: Is the partition of the family home, in this case, proper where one of the co-owners refuse to
accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home?
Ruling: Yes. Under Art. 154 of the Family Code, to be a beneficiary of the family home, three
requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family
Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of
the family. Under Art. 159 of the Family Code, if there are benficiaries who survuve and are living in
the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor
beneficiary, in which case, the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
In this case, the third requisite is not satisfied. Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV, the grandson of the
deceased, cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of
supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV’s parents,
especially his father, Marcelino III, who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the
obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their
default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. Thus, despite residing in the family home and
his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV cannot be considered as
beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being
dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support,
and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being
of legal age.
197. SPOUSES EDUARDO and ELSA VERSOLA v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SHERIFF
REYNALDO B. MADOLARIA, JUDGE LYDIA QUERUBIN LAYOSA BOTH OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 217, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
QUEZON CITY and DR. VICTORIA T. ONG OH
G.R. No. 164740, July 31, 2006
Facts: Dr. Victoria Ong Oh and Dolores Ledesma entered into a loan transaction wherein the former
granted a P1,000,000 loan to the latter secured by a check in the same amount and a promise to execute
a deed of REM over Ledesma’s house in Tandang Sora, QC which, however, did not materialize.
Thereafter, Ledesma sold the house and lot to Sps. Versola who had to secure a loan from Asiatrust
Bank to pay the remaining balance to Ledesma wherein, among others, Sps. Versola promised that they
would execute a REM over the property, once the title has been secured in their name, in favor of
Asiatrust Bank. When Asiatrust Bank tried to register the REM covering the property executed in its
favor by Sps. Versola, it discovered a notice of levy on execution was annotated on the title in
connection with Ledesma’s obligation to Milady’s Jewels, Inc. so Asiatrust Bank refused to release the
loan of Sps. Versola. When Dr. Ong Oh tried to encash the check, the same was dishonored so she filed
a complaint for a sum of money against Ledesma, Sps. Versola, and AsiaTrust Bank. A favorable
judgment was obtained by Dr. Ong Oh before the RTC and the CA and later attained finality so Dr.
Onhg Oh filed a motion for execution which was granted and the property in the names of Sps. Versola
was levied upon and sold at at public auction. When Dr. Ong Oh filed an ex-parte motion for issuance
of confirmation of judicial sale, Sps. Versola opposed on the grounds that (1) nthe property is their
family home which is exempt from execution pursuant to Art. 155 of the Family Code and (2) no
application application was made by Dr. Ong Oh for the determination of the value of their family
home to be subjected to execution, as required under Art. 160 of the Family Code.
Issue: Did Sps. Versola timely raise and prove that their property is exempt from execution?
Ruling: No. Under Art. 153 of the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence; there is no need to constitute the same judicially
or extrajudicially. The right to exemption or forced sale under Art. 153 of the Family Code is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but
by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the
person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for
exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. Failure to do so would estop the party from later
claiming the exception.
In this case, Sps. Versola failed to set up and prove that the property to be sold was their family home.
On the day immediately prior to the scheduled sale of the property, Sps. Versola filed with the sheriff
an “Objection/Exception to Sheriff's Sale of Defendant Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola's Family Home”
where they simply alleged there that the property subject of the intended auction sale was their family
home. Instead of substantiating their claim, Sps. Versola languidly presupposed that the sheriff had
prior knowledge that the said property was constituted by them as their family home. Lamentably, in
the said objection, Sps. Versola did not set forth therein any evidence to substantiate their claim that the
property to be sold at the execution sale was indeed exempt for having been constituted as a family
home. It was only after almost two years from the time of the execution sale and after the "Sheriff's
Final Deed of Sale" was issued did Sps. Versola rigorously claim in their Opposition to Dr. Ong Oh’s
“Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of Sps. Eduardo and
Elsa Versola” that the property in question is exempt from execution. Even then, there was no showing
that Sps. Versola adduced evidence to prove that it is indeed a family home.
198. PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T.
MORING and HUSBAND v. COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG
G.R. No. 108532, March 9, 1999
Facts: As a result of a judgment in a civil case for recovery of property in favor of Abdon Gilig, two of
the Taneos’ properties, one of which was the family home extrajudicially constituted, were levied and
sold at a public auction to Gilig, as the highest bidder, to satisfy the judgment. Afrer the Taneos failed
to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968. To forestall such
conveyance, the Taneos filed an action on November 5, 1985 to declare the deed void and to quiet title
over the land alleging, among others, that the house which their father, Pablo Taneo, constituted as
family home in 1964 is exempt from execution invoking the benefits accorded to the same under the
Family Code.
Issue: Is the family home exempt from execution?
Ruling: No. Under Art. 224-251 of the Civil Code, a family home may be constituted judicial and
extrajudicially, the former by the filing of the petition and with the approval of the proper court, and
the latter by the recording of a public instrument in the proper registry of property declaring the
establishment of the family home. The operative act then which created the family home
extrajudicially was the registration in the Registry of Property of the declaration prescribed by Art.
240- 241 of the Civil Code. Under the Family Code, however, registration was no longer necessary.
Art. 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied in the family. However, it has been settled that Art. 153 and 162 of the
Family Code have no retroactive effect, thus, all existing family residence at the time of the effectivity
of the Family Code are considered family homes and are only prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home. Thus, in this case, the applicable law is the Civil Code where where
registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Furthermore, Art. 243 of the Civil
Code provides that the family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced
sale, or attachment, except for debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of
Property.
On March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question, erected on the land of Plutarco
Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting the family home was registered only on
January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus,
at that time when the "debt" was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered.
Clearly, the Taneos’ alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under
the exception of Article 243 (2).
Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering that such
constitution did not comply with the requirements of the law. The house was erected not on the land
which the Taneos owned but on the land of one Plutarco Vacalares. By the very definition of the law
that the "family home is the dwelling house where a person and his family resides and the land on
which it is situated”, it is understood that the house should be constructed on a land not belonging to
another. Apparently, the constitution of a family home by Pablo Taneo in this case was merely an
afterthought in order to escape execution of their property but to no avail.
199. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor
JEYLNN H. AGUAS, represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS
G.R. No. 165546, February 27, 2006
Facts: After the SSS’ denial of their claim for death benefits of pensioner Pablo Aguas, Rosanna,
Janet, and Jeylnn, claiming to be the wife and children of Pablo, filed a claim/petition for the
Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC) averring that (1) Jeylnn
was a legitimate child of Pablo as evidenced by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s signature as
Jeylnn’s father; (2) Rosanna never left Pablo, contrary to SSS’ contention that Rosanna abandoned her
husband and contracted another marriage with the children’s real father Romeo dela Peña, and they
lived together as husband and wife under one roof until Pablo’s death, as evidenced by a joint affidavit
of their neighbors; (3) in Janet’s birth certificate, it appears that her father was Pablo and her mother
was Rosanna; (4) the claims of Pablo’s infertility is unsubstantiated since the doctor who gave the
opinion was not an expert on such matters treating only tuberculosis.
Issue: Are Jeylnn and Janet legitimate children of Pablo, thus, entitled to the SSS death benefits
accruing from the death of Pablo?
Ruling: Jeylnn – YES. Janet – NO. Under Art. 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more
firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption
that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical
incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and
wife are living separately in such way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of
the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of
the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took
effect on August 03, 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child would no longer be legally
feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. Indeed,
impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases,
his heirs. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his
lifetime. Hence, Jeylnn’s status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be contested.
(1) Jeylnn: Her claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of
Pablo. Jeylnn was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing that she was
born on October 29, 1991. Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 and the marriage
subsisted until the latter’s death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born
during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage. A birth certificate signed by the father is a competent evidence
of paternity.
(2) Janet: Janet’s date of birth was not proven, thus, the presumption of legitimacy under Art. 164
cannot extend to her. Janet’s birth certificate could not be given the same probative weight as Jeylnn’s
because it was not verified in any way by the civil register. It stands as a mere photocopy, without
probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn, there was no confirmation by the civil register of the fact of Janet’s
birth on the date stated in the certificate. In any case, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence
of the facts contained therein.
Also, the witnesses were unanimous in saying that Janet was not the real child but merely adopted by
Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also testified that Janet’s adoption did not undergo any legal proceedings;
hence, there were no papers to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended,
only "legally adopted" children are considered dependent children. Absent any proof that the family
has legally adopted Janet, she was not considered a dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary
beneficiary.
200. MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO

AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994
Facts: Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar, private respondents, instituted a special
proceeding before the RTC for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate in favor of
private respondent Aguilar. They claimed that decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be
they ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted. Marissa Benitez-
Badua, petitioner, then opposed the petition alleging that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente
Benitez and capable of administering his estate. The trial court decided in favor of the petitioner but
the CA reversed the decision ruling that the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the
Family Code.
Issue: Did the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to apply the provisions, more particularly, Arts.
164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code in this case and in adopting and upholding private
respondent's theory that the instant case does not involve an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child?
Ruling: No. Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family
Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained.
A careful reading of the articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant
case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.
Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his
wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by
proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the
first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological
or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children
conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171
reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his
heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court
did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one
where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their
clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel.
201. ANTONIO MACADANGDANG vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

ELIZABETH MEJIAS, G.R. No. L-49542 , September 12, 1980
Facts: Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. Sometime in March 1967 she allegedly had
intercourse with Antonio Macadangdang. Elizabeth alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband
separated in 1967. October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days after the illicit encounter) – she gave birth
to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang. April 25, 1972 – Elizabeth filed a complaint
for recognition and support against Antonio. The lower court dismissed the complaint but the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision ruling that minor Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio
Macadangdang. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied.
Issue: Can Rolando be conclusively presumed the legitimate child of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and
Crispin Anahaw?
Ruling: YES. The separation of Elizabeth and Crispin was not proven. The finding of the Court of
Appeals that Elizabeth and Crispin were separated was based solely on the testimony of the wife which
is self-serving. Her testimony is insufficient without further evidence. Art. 225 of the CC provides
that : Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and
before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed
to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of
three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that
access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
During the initial 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child, there was no concrete or
substantial proof that was presented to establish physical impossibility of access between Elizabeth and
Crispin. Elizabeth and Crispin continued to live in the same province, therefore there is still the
possibility of access to one another. The baby was born seven months after the first illicit intercourse
and seven months from the separation of the spouses. Under Art. 255 of the CC the child is
conclusively presumed to be the legitimate child of the spouses. (note the baby was not premature).
This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of
access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. The
presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in marriage,
particularly during the period of conception. In order to overthrow the presumption it must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have enabled the husband to be the father of
the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed when personal access is not disproved. Policy of law is
to confer legitimacy upon children born in wedlock when access of the husband at the time of the
conception was not impossible and there is the presumption that a child so born is the child of the
husband and legitimate even though the wife was guilty of infidelity during the possible period of
conception.
202. Babiera vs. Catotal, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000
Facts: On September 20, 1996 Teofista Barbiera (TEOFISTA) was delivered by Flora Guinto in the
house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera. Without their knowledge, Flora Guinto, the
housemaid of the spouses caused the registration/recording of the facts of Teofista’s birth, by
simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54
years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature.
Presentacion Catotal now asserts that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa.
Issues: Does respondent (Catotal) have standing to sue, given Article 171 of the Family Code which
states that the child's filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special circumstances, his
heirs?
Ruling: Yes. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The interest of respondent in the
civil status of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the latter filed against the
former. The case concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this
provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's
child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother.
The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the
prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that
the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner's filiation
to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first
place.
203. Tison vs. CA, G.R. No. 121027; July 31, 1997
Facts: Corazon Dezoller Tison and Rene Dezoller (petitioners) then filed an action for reconveyance
claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of a property by right of representation. During the
hearing, petitioners offered the following documentary evidence offered to prove their filiation to their
father and aunt, namely: a family picture, baptismal certificates, certificates of destroyed records of
birth of their father and aunt together with their death certificates, certification of destroyed records of
petitioners, and joint affidavits.
Private respondent responded by filing a demurrer to evidence which the CA granted.
Issue: Is the question on legitimacy an issue that can be properly raised in the action for reconveyance
of herein questioned property?
Ruling: No. It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably
overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law
more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of
legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller
cannot be properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from
the further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of
herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless
and until it is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of proof rests not on
herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent
who is disputing the same. This fact alone should have been sufficient cause for the trial court to
exercise appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to evidence. It would have
delimited the issues for resolution, as well as the time and effort necessitated thereby.
204. Mariategui vs. CA, G.R. No. L-57062, January 24, 1992
Facts: Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages and died without a will. His descendants by his
first and second marriages (Petitioners) then executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they
adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Aggrieved, Lupo's children by his
third marriage (Respondents) filed an amended complaint claiming that they were deprived of their
respective shares in the lots. They prayed, among others, that they be declared as children and heirs of
Lupo Mariategui and an adjudication in their favor of their lawful shares in the estate of the decedent.
Issues:Did the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, able to prove their
successional rights over said estate?
Ruling:Yes. Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate
is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts
contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents,
Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article
172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as
their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in substance as to
certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided, these are but minor details. The
nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the
private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be noted that even the
trial court mentioned in its decision the admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui
Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga
kapatid ko sa
ama . . ."
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate
children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for
filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against
private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose
benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other
words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly
repudiated by the co-owner.
205. Reyes vs. CA, 135 SCRA 439; G.R. No. L-39537; March 19, 1985
Facts: Irene Reyes then registered a document of self-adjudication claiming to be the illegitimate child
and sole heir of Francisco Delgado by virtue of which pieces of properties were acquired in her favor.
Respondents sought the reconveyance of the said properties and alleged that Irene Reyes was never the
illegitimate child of Francisco. The CA then ruled that although Irene Delgado was the spurious
daughter of Francisco Delgado, she nevertheless cannot inherit from the estate of the deceased
Francisco Delgado because she was not recognized either voluntarily or by court action.
Issue: Is there a need to be recognized voluntarily or by a court action in order for an illegitimate child
to inherit?
Ruling:Yes. Though the Civil Code is silent with respect to spurious children as to their recognition,
this Court, in applying the rules of recognition, applicable to natural children, to said spurious children,
declared in Clemeña vs. Clemeña, supra, that:
The considerations of fairness and justice that underlie the time limit fixed in Article 285 of the Civil
Code for actions seeking compulsory acknowledgment of natural children are fully applicable, if not
more, to actions to investigate and declare the paternity of illegitimate children that are not natural. The
motive that led the codifiers to restrict the period for bringing action for compulsory recognition of
natural children were stated by this Court in Serrano vs. Aragon, 22 Phil. 18, to be as follows:
... the writers of the code no doubt had in mind that there would arise instances where
certain illegitimate children, on account of the strong temptation due to the large estates
left by deceased persons, would attempt to establish that they were natural children of
such persons in order to get part of the property, and furthermore, they considered that it
is nothing but just and right that alleged parents should have a personal opportunity to
be heard. It was for these reasons and others equally as well founded that Article 137
was enacted (p. 724).
There are two (2) general classifications of illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born
out of wedlock. They may be either natural (actually or by fiction) or spurious (the incestuous,
adulterous or illicit). Natural children are defined as those born outside of wedlock of parents, who at
the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other
(Article 269, New Civil Code). On the other hand, spurious children are those born of parents, who at
the time of their conception, are disqualified to marry each other on account of certain impediment.
Because of this basic distinction between these children, it is not legally possible to classify
unrecognized natural children under the class of spurious children. Besides, commentators construe the
phrase "illegitimate children other than natural" as excluding from the grants of rights under Article
287 of the New Civil Code those children who are natural child proper by birth and who have not
secured voluntary or compulsory recognition They fag within the scope of the definition of natural
children enumerated in Article 269, New Civil Code. Lastly, to follow petitioners' contention win not
be in accordance with the consistent pronouncements of this Court. It is an elementary and basic
principle under the old and new Civil Code, that an unrecognized natural child has no rights
whatsoever against his parent or his estate. His rights spring not from the filiation itself, but from the
child's acknowledgment by the natural parent.
206. Jison vs. CA, G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998
Facts: A case was filed by Monina Jison for recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco Jison who
is married to Lilia Lopez Jison. Monina alleged that she is the daughter of Francisco who impregnated
her mother Esperanza F. Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny of francisco's daughter. She
claims that she has openly and continuously possessed the status of an illegitimate child of Francisco
and that Francisco had also openly and continuously recognized her as such.
The trial court categorized Monina’s many evidences as hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence, or
self-serving evidence and ruled against Monina while the Court of Appeals decided in favor of Monina
and declared her to be the illegitimate daughter of Francisco.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimonies of Monina’s witnesses were sufficient to establish
MONINA's filiation.
Issue: Did Monina successfully establish her filiation under Article 172 par. 2 of the Family Code
(open and continuous possession of the status)?
Ruling: Yes. Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. The Supreme
Court sustained the findings of the CA that Monina was able to prove her illegitimate filiation.
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under Article 172 par. 2, a "high
standard of proof" is required. To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that
they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child
as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.
By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular length of
time.
In deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably
redounds to the victim's or mother's word, as against the accused's or putative father's protestations. In
the instant case, MONINA's mother could no longer testify as to the fact of intercourse, as she had
already passed away. But the fact of Monina’s birth and her parentage may be established by evidence
other than the testimony of her mother.
The testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her narration of circumstances and events
that occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled with the
testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly established that the following:
1) FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was
in the employ of the former;
2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and conduct like
sending her to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and lodging at
the Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying for her hospitalization expenses, providing her
with monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of her mother, acknowledging her
paternal greetings and calling appellant his "Hija" or child, instructing his office personnel to
give appellant's monthly allowance, recommending her to use his house in Bacolod and paying
for her long distance telephone calls, having her spend her long distance telephone calls, having
her spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing her
to use his surname in her scholastic and other records.
3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the years publicly,
spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.
The totality of the evidence on record established Monina’s filiation.
207. CASIMIRO MENDOZA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA TORING
TUÑACAO G.R. No. 86302, September 24, 1991
FACTS: The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but
the latter denied her claim to his dying day. In order to prove her claim, she testified together with her
son and two other witnesses. Teopista based her claim on the ground that she was in continuous
possession of an illegitimate child of Casimiro as proof of filiation allowed under Article 283 of the
Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Teopista is an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza.
HELD: Yes, Teopista is an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza.

To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary
to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not mean that the concession
of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it
continues. The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly
and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the
relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to
consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.
Hence, Teopista was not able to prove that she was in continuous possession of an illegitimate child of
Casimiro.
But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that status by another
method.
An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor
that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds
of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Teopista has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be
recognized as such.
208. MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE,
CATALINO K. LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE, and TIU CHUAN vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, in their
capacities as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Manila and Branch 130,
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, respectively and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK
SHENG in their personal capacities and ROSA K. LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY K. LEE-
CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG, JULIAN K. LEE, HENRY K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE,
VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-MIGUEL, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented
by RITA K. LEE
G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001
FACTS: Lee Tek Cheng is the common father of the petitioners and respondents (with the lawful wife).
The private respondents filed two separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in
the records of birth of the respondents by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of the
respondents’ mother as petitioners’ mother. The private respondents alleged that every time the mother
of the petitioners gave birth to each of them, their common father falsified the entries in the records of
birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners mother was Keh Shiok Cheng (the mother of
the respondents).
ISSUES:
Whether or not Rule 108 is inappropriate for impugning the legitimacy and filiation of children.
Whether or not the heirs of the father can only bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of his children
after his death as provided under Art. 171 of the Family Code.
HELD:
No, Rule 108 is not inappropriate for umpugning the legitimacy and filiation of children.
The thrust of said proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain
events which created or affected the status of persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of rights.
It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed
by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners’ records of birth were intended to
establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have
conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners’
contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the
prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to
establish that the former are not the latter’s children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood
relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.
No, the heirs of the father can bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of his children even before his
death.
Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of the provision
shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child. The
provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present
case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer
therein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the
former is not the latter’s child at all
209. WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia vs. JUANITA
TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA
CHRISTINA LIYAO
G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002
FACTS: William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother
(Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to
recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to all
successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the child of
the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his
lifetime. Corazon maintained that she and the deceased were legally married but living separately for
more than 10 years and that they cohabited from 1965 until the death of the deceased, while one of the
children of the deceased stated that her mom and the deceased were legally married and that her
parents were not separated legally or in fact.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the
estate of his supposed father, William Liyao.
HELD: No, the petitioner may not impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his
supposed father.
It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot
allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the
husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a
valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband,
presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is
fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand,
if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who
successfully defeated the presumption.
210. ROSALINA P. ECETA vs. MA. THERESA VELL LAGURA ECETA

G.R. No. 157037, May 20, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta, and they begot a son,
Vicente. In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria Theresa, an illegitimate
daughter, thus at the time of his death, his compulsory heirs were his mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate
child, Maria Theresa. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case for "Partition and Accounting with Damages"
against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir and co-
owner of a property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is an illegitimate child of Vicente Eceta.
HELD: Yes, the respondent is an illegitimate child of Vicente Eceta.

Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated
birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate thereby acknowledging that
she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over
Maria Theresa.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval.
211. REYNALDO RODRIGUEZ and NANCY A. RODRIGUEZ vs. CONCORDIA ONG LIM,
EURESTES LIM AND ELMER LIM
G.R. No. 135817, November 30, 2006
FACTS: Dominga Goyma, who originally owned the subject property died in 1971 and was survived
by her only son, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., a spurious son acknowledged and recognized by her. The
subject property was transferred in the name of the petitioners. Petitioners assail the filiation of Pablo
Goyma Lim, Jr. stating that he was not duly acknowledged or recognized by either of his parents,
hence the respondents have no right/title to the subject property.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, Pablo Goyma Lim was an illegitimate
child.
HELD: Yes, Pablo Goyma Lime was an illegitimate child.

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of
an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in, any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further action
is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is
in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
Various documentary evidence were proffered by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. to prove that he was the
illegitimate and acknowledged son of Dominga Goyma. Among them were his certificate of birth
indicating that his mother was Dominga Goyma; statement of assets, income and liabilities for of
Dominga Goyma indicating him as her son and; income tax returns. These pieces of documentary
evidence, whose authenticity were not refuted by petitioners, were properly considered by the court a
quo and the appellate court to establish that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was acknowledged by Dominga
Goyma to be her illegitimate son.
212. TEOFISTO I. VERCELES MARIA CLARISSA POSADA, in her own behalf, and as
mother of minor VERNA AIZA POSADA, CONSTANTINO POSADA and FRANCISCA
POSADA
G.R. No. 159785, April 27, 2007
FACTS: Respondent filed an action for damages with support pendente lite against petitioner.
Respondent alleged that Petitioner is the father of Verna Aiza Posada and as a proof she presented the
letters sent by the petitioner to the respondent that he will take responsibility should the respondent
become pregnant unexpectedly.
ISSUES:
Whether or not paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action for damages with support pendente
lite.
Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was proven.
HELD:
Yes, paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action for damages with support pendent lite.
The caption is not determinative of the nature of a pleading. In determining the nature of an action, it is
not the caption, but the averments in the petition and the character of the relief sought, that are
controlling.
Yes, the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was proven.
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aizas filiation under
Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he
himself presented no evidence of his own.
213. BELEN SAGAD ANGELES vs. ALELI CORAZON ANGELES MAGLAYA

G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005
FACTS: Petitioner is the wife of the deceased while the respondent is the child of the deceased in his
first wife. Respondent seeks administration of the estate of the deceased but opposed by the surviving
wife (2nd wife) alleging that the respondent is an illegitimate child of the deceased.
ISSUES: Whether or not respondent is a legitimate daughter of Francisco.
HELD: No, respondent is not a legitimate daughter of Francisco.

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the
element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article
164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate.
However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact thus prima facie established by legal
presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved, the presumption of legitimacy under Article
164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefore, i.e.,
that the child's parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the
subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise. To
stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract, doubtless the best evidence of Francisco's and
Genoveva's marriage, if one had been solemnized, was offered in evidence.
214. ARNEL L. AGUSTIN v. CA

G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005
FACTS:
Martin (minor), as represented by his mother Angela, sued Arnel Agustin, his alleged biological father,
for support. Martin, on the other hand, refused to recognize Martin as his own child and denied the
genuineness and authenticity of the child’s birth certificate, which he purportedly signed as the father.
Upon motion, the Court issued the disputed Order directing the parties to submit themselves to
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing. Martin claims that the Order effectively converted the
complaint for support to a petition for recognition, which is supposedly proscribed by law. Martin also
claims that DNA testing violates his right against self-incrimination and his right to privacy.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assailed Order converted the action to a petition for recognition.
Whether or not compulsory DNA testing is constitutional.
RULING:
(a) NO. The assailed order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely
allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the
authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and
order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid
and in accordance with jurisprudence. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given
how intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of
filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings.
(b) YES. The SC upheld the constitutionality of DNA Testing in Pp v, Yatar. If, in a criminal case, an
accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why,
in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do
the same.
For the claim of violation of the right to privacy, the SC ruled in this manner:
“ Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement
of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue.
Martin’s case involves neither.”
215. ROSENDO HERRERA v. ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI
A. ALBA,
G.R. No. 148220. June 15, 2005
FACTS:
Rosendo (minor), as represented by his mother Armi, filed a Petition for Compulsory Recognition
against Rosendo Herrera. The latter denied that he is the father. Rosendo (minor) and Armi filed a
motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. Rosendo opposed.
He claims that: (a) DNA testing has not gained acceptability; and (b) it violates the right against self-
incrimination.
ISSUE:
Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation.
RULING:
YES. The validity of DNA testing has long been recognized by the SC in various cases. It discussed
that in a paternity test, it is not enough to state that the child’s DNA profile matches that of the putative
father. A complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative
father does not necessarily establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest standard adopted
in an American jurisdiction, trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the
Probability of Paternity (W) prior to a paternity inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood
of paternity of a putative father compared to the probability of a random match of two unrelated
individuals. An appropriate reference population database, such as the Philippine population database,
is required to compute for W. Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never
equal to 100%. However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher when the putative father, mother and
child are subjected to DNA analysis compared to those conducted between the putative father and child
alone. DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of
non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be
considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable
presumption of paternity. This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo
standards. In Vallejo, the Court said that in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore,
courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how
they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
DNA testing does not violate the right against self-incrimination, since the gist of the privilege is the
restriction on testimonial compulsion.
216. CASIMIRO MENDOZA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 86302 September 24, 1991
FACTS:
Teopista Toring Tuñacao claimed that she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the
latter has denied her claim. The lower courts have denied Teopista’s claim for her failure to show that
she was in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro because
she never lived with and received support from Casimiro. The lower courts also ruled that the
declarations of Casimiro’s relatives, that she is the daughter of Casimiro, are not sufficient to prove her
filiation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 39 of Rule 130 (Acts or declaration about pedigree) may be used in proving
filiation.
RULING:
YES. All the requisites in applying Section 39 of Rule 130 are present in the case at bar. The persons
who made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida
Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of the testimony of Casimiro’s cousin.
The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very
issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before the
complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the
relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than such
declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which
Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs. The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro
could have done this by deposition if he was too old and weak to testify at the trial of the case.
In view of the circumstances of this case, Teopista has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of
Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such. In so holding, we give effect to the policy
of the Civil Code and the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of "the paternity of
illegitimate children, without prejudice to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed status
with his own defenses, including evidence now obtainable through the facilities of modern medicine
and technology
217. VICTORIA C. TAYAG v. CA

G.R. No. 174680 March 24, 2008
FACTS:
Felicidad Tayag (respondent), illegitimate child of the decedent, filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. Victoria Tayag, who claims to be the
legitimate wife of the deceased, opposed the petition. She averred, among others, that it is necessary to
allege that Felicidad was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child.
There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought
after the death of the putative father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Felicidad may be allowed to prove her illegitimacy.
RULING:
YES. Felicidad must be allowed to adduce proof of her illegitimacy to be able to know whether she
falls under the first paragraph of Article 172 or the second paragraph thereof. There is a need to
determine if her petition is actually one to compel recognition which had already been foreclosed by
the death of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct interest to maintain the suit by
reason of the decedent’s voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her illegitimate filiation.
218. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA

GARCIA, HONORATO B. CATINDIG
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Honorato filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie. He prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be
changed to "Catindig," his surname
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, may use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name.
RULING:
YES. The SC allowed this by stating that, although there is no law to this effect, no law also prohibits
the same from being done. Moreover, allowing the adopted child to use as her middle name the
surname of her biological mother, whose parental authority in this case was, in effect, terminated due
to the adoption, is in accordance with the intent of the adoption law to provide the child all the rights of
a legitimate child. It is also a custom that a legitimate child uses as his or her middle name the surname
of her mother.
219. DIWATA LANDINGIN v. REPUBLIC

GR No. 164948.June 27, 2006
FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3
minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. A Social Worker
of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the
biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to
her children, she voluntarily consented. However, Landingin failed to present the said social worker as
witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Landingin also
failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for adoption may be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s
biological mother.
RULING:
NO. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if
known is necessary to the adoption.
This requirement may only be dispensed with if the child has been abandoned, which must be shown to
have existed at the time of adoption. Abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and
legal obligations of love and support. In this case, Landingin failed to show that the children have been
abandoned by their mother. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of
others is not such abandonment.
220. MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her minor children REBECCA
ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL DELGADO v. CA
G.R. No. 125041 June 30, 2006
FACTS:
At the time of the institution of this Petition, the twins were about to enter college in the US where
Mangonon, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. The
expensive tuition in the US has constrained Belen to seek the aid of the Court to compel the father and
the grandfather of the twins to give them financial support for their education in the US. The Delgados
claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support
the twins. Their choice for that matter was to send the twins back to the Philippines and let them study
in any of the local universities. Francisco (grandfather) further claims that he should not be compelled
to give support since the same is the primary responsibility of the parents.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Francisco may be compelled to support his grandchildren despite the presence of the
parents of the twins.
Whether or not the Delgados may choose the manner of giving support.
RULING:
YES. The SC ordered Francisco, who was proven to be well-off, to support his grandchildren on the
basis of Article 199, considering that their parents were not capable of supporting their children.
The SC ordered Francisco the payment of support in arrears since the twins may have already finished
their schooling by the time this decision was rendered. The amount of support to be paid was computed
from the time they entered college until they had finished their respective studies.
NO. With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the
relationships among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina
must be the fact that those who they had considered and claimed as family denied having any familial
relationship with them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the
Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them.
221. ZAGUIRRE v. CASTILLO

A.C. No. 4921; March 6, 200
FACTS:
Atty. Alfredo Castillo was already married with three children when he had an affair with Carmelita
Zaguirre. Zaguirre then got pregnant allegedly with Castillo’s daughter. The latter, who was already a
lawyer, notarized an affidavit recognizing the child and promising for her support which did not
materialize after the birth of the child and now he is facing disbarment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Castillo is guilty of gross immoral conduct, making him punishable of
Indefinite Suspension.
HELD:
YES. Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his wife and now refuses to
recognize and support a child whom he previously recognized and promised to support. Clearly
therefore, respondent violated the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be
disciplined accordingly.
As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser punishment could be
given. Records show that from the time he took his oath in 1997, he has severed his ties with
complainant and now lives with his wife and children in Mindoro. As of now, the Court does not
perceive this fact as an indication of respondent’s effort to mend his ways or that he recognizes the
impact of his offense on the noble profession of law. Nevertheless, the Court deems it more appropriate
under the circumstances that indefinite suspension should be meted out than disbarment. The
suspension shall last until such time that respondent is able to show, to the full satisfaction of the
Court, that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and uprightness
required of every member of the profession.
222. DADIVAS DE VILLANUEVA v. VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. L-29959; December 3, 1929
FACTS:
Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva, plaintiff-appellant, instituted an action against her husband Rafael
Villanueva to obtain separate maintenance (monthly allowance), custody of her two younger minor
children Guillermo and Sergio and attorney’s fees and other costs on the ground of cruelty and
infidelity. Proof showed that the defendant is guilty of repeated acts of infidelity (illicit affairs with 4
different women and another one before the action was begun) and exhibited brutality against the
plaintiff, pushing the latter to finally leave their home and establish a separate abode with the children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff-appellant can ask separate maintenance from respondent-appellee after she
left their domicile
HELD:
YES. The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband
whose incurable propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable.
Deeply rooted instincts of human nature sanction the separation in such case, and the law is not so
unreasonable as to require as acquiescence on the part of the injured party which is beyond the capacity
of nature. In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance
from her husband it is not necessary that the husband should bring a concubine into the marital
domicile. Perverse and illicit relations with women outside of the marital establishment are enough. As
was said by Justice Moreland in Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (35 Phil., 252, 262), a husband cannot, by
his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a
husband by wrongful, illegal, and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him,
he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and
repudiate his duties thereunder.
223. QUINTANA v. LERMA

G.R. No. L-7426; February 5, 1913
FACTS:
The action is by a wife against her husband for support based upon a written contract. The evidence
shows that the parties were lawfully married in 1901 and that in February, 1905, they entered into a
written agreement of separation whereby each renounced certain rights as against the other and divided
the conjugal property between them, the defendant undertaking in consideration of the premises to pay
the plaintiff within the first three days of each month the sum of P20 for her support and maintenance.
The defendant set up as a special defense that the wife had forfeited her right to support by committing
adultery
ISSUES:
Whether or not the written agreement made by parties is void.
Whether or not adultery may be permitted as a special defense against action for support.
HELD:
1. YES. Article 1432 of the Civil Code provides: "In default of express declarations in the marriage
contract, the separation of the property of the consorts, during marriage, shall only take place by virtue
of a judicial decree, except in the case provided by article 50."
Under this article the agreement in suit is void. The wife, however, has a right of action against her
husband for support under the provisions of the Civil Code and, although the contract in question is
void, her right of action does not for that reason fail.
2. YES. We are of the opinion that the special defense of adultery set up by the defendant in his answer
both to the original and the amended complaint is a good defense, and if properly proved and sustained
will defeat the action.
224. MENDOZA v. PARUÑGAO
G.R. No. L-26231; August 7, 1926
FACTS:
Petitioner Lorenzo Mendoza filed a writ of certiorari against Gorgonia Paruñgao, et. al. to prohibit the
carrying out of sale of property of petitioner and forward the case to the Supreme Court for revision.
On August 1925, the CFI declared Mendoza and Paruñgao’s marriage null and void upon the
reappearance of the Paruñgao’s first husband, Antonio Buenaventura, who was considered dead after
an absence of more than 7 years (Buenaventura died later on). While the first judgment was on appeal,
Paruñgao filed for alimony and settlement of her conjugal property with Mendoza on September 14,
1925 and the sum of P300 as alimony during the pendency of the suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Paruñgao, when she filed for liquidation of conjugal property and alimony, is entitled
to support during pendency of the action.
HELD:
NO. The right to support between spouses arises from law (Art. 143 of the Civil Code) and is based
upon their obligation to mutually help each other created by the matrimonial bond. After the complaint
for annulment of marriage has been filed by the wife and admitted she is entitled to support during the
pendency of the suit (Arts. 67 and 68, par. 4, Civil Code), but once the nullity is decreed, the right
ceases, because the mutual obligation created by the marriage is extinguished. The marriage of the
respondent with the petitioner having been annulled on August 7, 1925, by virtue of the rule
enunciated, she was no longer entitled to support on September 14, 1925, when she filed her complaint
for support. This does not mean, however, that she is not entitled to payment in advance of a part of her
undetermined share of the conjugal property if, after the liquidation sought by her, there exists such
conjugal property. In those states of the United States where the institution of conjugal partnership
prevails, it has been held by the courts that the necessary sum may be taken from the community
property for the support of the wife (24 C. J., 246; 31 C. J., 175).
225. FRANCISCO v. ZANDUETA

G.R. No. L-43794 ; August 9, 1935
FACTS:
Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and curator ad litem, Rosario Gomez, instituted
an action for support against petitioner Luis Francisco in a separate case, alleging that he is the latter’s
acknowledged son and as such is entitled to support. Luis denied the allegation, claimed that he never
acknowledged Eugenio as his son and was not present at his baptism and that he was married at time of
Eugenio’s birth. Despite the denial of paternity however, respondent judge Francisco Zandueta issued
an order granting Eugenio monthly pension, pendente lite.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first establishing his status as
petitioner’s son.
HELD:
NO. Paraphrasing the language used in the decision in the Yangco case it may be said that in the
present case the action for support is brought by a minor, through his guardian ad litem, who alleges
that he is the son of the petitioner; therefore it is necessary for him to prove his civil status as such son.
His alleged civil status being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken for granted upon the
point in issue. There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person who
claims to be a son in the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son.
In the latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while in the former there is no
presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must not
be confounded with an established right recognized by a final judgment. The civil status of sonship
being denied and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived, being in issue, it is
apparent that no effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as
to the existence of the cause. It is also evident that there is a substantial difference between the capacity
of a person after the rendition of a final judgment in which that person is declared to be in possession
of the status of a son and his capacity prior to such time when nothing exists other than his suit or
claim to be declared in possession of such a status.
The Civil Code grants the right of support to a son. This status not appearing by a final judgment, the
respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order the petitioner, as defendant in case No. 47238, to
pay the plaintiff the sum of P30, or any other amount as monthly support, pendente lite.
226. QUIMIGUING v. ICAO

G.R. No. 26795; July 31, 1970
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual
relations with her through force and intimidation which resulted to pregnancy despite efforts and drugs
supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed for monthly support, damages and
attorney’s fees but the defendant-appellee moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to allege
the fact that a child had been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and
subsequently denied further amendment to the complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for
failure of the original complaint to state a cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure
to allege fact of birth in complaint.
HELD:
YES. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-
appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the
said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive
donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his
testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir,
even if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not
his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear
violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.
227. ADVINCULA v. ADVINCULA

G.R. No. L-19065; January 31, 1964
FACTS:
Manuela Advincula, represented by her guardian-ad-litem, Pura Borbon, filed Civil Case No. 3553,
CFI of Iloilo, against Manuel Advincula, for acknowledge merit and support but was dismissed. On
January 16, 1961, Manuela Advincula filed the complaint under consideration against the same
Manuela Advincula, also acknowledgment and support, Civil Case No. 5659, same court. Instead of
filing his answer, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the dismissal of Civil Case No.
3553 barred the filing of the second complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the former was with prejudice.
HELD:
NO.In both Civil Cases Nos. 3553 and 5659, the action of the plaintiff was for acknowledgment and
support. Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its
allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that needy party is entitled to support,
his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increase or decreased needs, and
with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.
It appears that the former dismissal was predicated up a compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it
does civil status of persons and future support, cannot be subject of compromise (pars. 1 & 4, Art.
2035, Civil Code). Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and cannot bar the filing of
another action, asking the same relief against the same defendant.
228. JOCSON VS SERAFINO

G.R. No. L-10792; April 30, 1958
FACTS:
Agustin Jocson, who was appointed guardian of the persons and properties of his minor children
Carlos, Rodolfo, Perla, Enrique and Jesus, had a bond filed with Empire Insurance Co. for surety and
managed his children’s properties that included war damage payments, which formed part of their
inheritance from their mother.
In the course of the guardianship, Agustin submitted periodic accounts to the court for expenses for
education and clothing of the children.
After his death, Perla, who had already reached age of majority and thereafter appointed guardian of
her still minor brothers Enrique and Jesus, filed a petition for the reopening of Agustin’s accounts,
claiming that illegal disbursements were made from the guardianship funds for education and clothing.
Upon reaching age of majority, Enrique and Jesus adopted the petition and moved for declaration of
illegality of disbursements—which Empire Insurance Co. and Agustin’s administratrix appealed from
—on the ground that these should have come instead from the support, which they were entitled to
receive from their father.
Issue:
W/N the petitioners-appellants’ contention their father’s disbursements from their guardianship funds
are illegal are valid
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that right to support (which includes education and clothing) must be demanded
and established before it becomes payable. It does not arise from the petitioners’ mere relationship with
their father. “The need for support, as already stated, cannot be presumed and especially must this be
true in the present case where it appears that the minors had means of their own.” Therefore, the
disbursements made by Agustin, which were even sanctioned by the lower court, are not illegal. Claim
for support should also be done in a separate action, not in guardianship proceedings.
229. BALTAZAR VS SERFINO
GR No. L-17315 July 31, 1965
Facts:
Plaintiff-appellant Olympia Baltazar, in behalf of her minor son, Armenio Serfino appeals from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, ordering defendant-appellee Sergio
Serfino to pay P15-worth of monthly support from the rendering of judgment on July 1960. Olympia, a
widow, bore the son of Sergio, a married man, on December 19, 1943. She contends that the amount
granted by the court should have been P50, payable from the time of Armenio’s birth except for the
period of May 1957 to April 1959 when the child was living with his father and that the defendant-
appellee should pay P1000 on account of attorney’s fees.
Issue:
1. W/N the amount of support should be increased
2. W/N the defendant should pay a monthly support dating from his son’s birth
Ruling:
1. Yes. According to Art. 196 of the Civil Code, the amount of support should be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and the needs of the recipient. The lower court found that defendant-
appellee, who was supporting his wife and legitimate children, was earning amply from his rice mill,
ten-hectare land and palay produce, which places his average annual income at P1,085. Additionally,
the court took notice of the facts that he does not need to pay rent for his family’s residence and his
tailoring shop was profiting well.
2. No. The Supreme Court ruled that obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the
person who has a right to receive it needs it for maintenance. However, it shall not be paid from the
date it is extrajudicially demanded.
Additionally, the Court held that attorney’s fees are recoverable from the person obliged to give
support when the other party entitled to such support had to resort to the court for the enforcement of
his right.
230. DE MARCAIDA VS REDFERN

G.R. No. L-26062 December 31, 1926
FACTS:
The plaintiffs are Jose V. Ramirez and his wife, Eloisa de Marcaida. The defendant is J. R. Redfern.
Jose V. Ramirez and J. R. Redfern are brothers-in-law. In 1908, J. R. Redfern took his wife and three
minor children to England and left them there. He returned to the Philippines the following year.
Beginning with 1910 and continuing until 1922, Mr. Redfern provided his wife with funds for her
expenses Mr. Redferd is now furnishing his wife P300 per month for the support of herself and one
child. The two grown sons are employed and are earning their own living.
In 1920, while still in England, Mrs. Redfern obtained from her sister, Mrs. Ramirez, the sum of £600.
Mrs. Redfern later secured an additional £185 from her sister in England. Mrs. Redfern did not make
use of this money until 1922. Eight hundred seventy-five pesos were advanced by Mr. and Mrs.
Ramirez to Mrs. Redfern after the latter had return to Manila.
The action is brought by the plaintiffs to recover from the defendant the sums of $600, £185, and P875
for alleged advances to the defendant’s wife for her support and maintenance. The judgment of the trial
court absolves the defendant from the demands of the plaintiffs with costs against the plaintiffs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs can demand support from the defendants relying on Article 216 of the
Family Code.
RULING:
No. For one to recover under the provisions of Art 216 of the Family Code, it must be alleged and
proved, first, that support has been furnished a dependent of one bound to give support but who fails to
do so; second, that the support was supplied without the knowledge of the person charged with the
duty. The negative qualification is when the support is given without the expectation of recovering it.
In the case at bar, there is a failure of proof as to the first essential, and possibly the second essential, of
the law. The husband and wife are mutually bound to support each other. Parents are also required to
bring up and educate their children. But in this connection, the point of interest is that the wife
accepted assistance from another, when it is not shown that she had ever made any complaint to her
husband or any of his agents with regard to her allowance. Mr. Redfern's reason for reducing the
allowance, he says, was his precarious financial situation in 1921 and 1922. Before one can tender
succor to the wife of another with an expectation or recouping himself for the loan, the husband should
be given an opportunity to render the needful assistance. Also, it is clear that there is evidence in the
record which corroborates the finding of the trial judge that the defendant was amply providing for his
wife and children in London.
231. SANTOS v. CA
G.R. No. 113054; March 16, 1995
Facts: In this petition for review, we are asked to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals 1
granting custody of six-year old Leouel Santos, Jr. to his maternal grandparents and not to his father,
Santos, Sr. What is sought is a decision which should definitively settle the matter of the care, custody
and control of the boy.
Issue: Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.?
Ruling: Custody over the minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein petitioner
Leouel Santos, Sr.
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising
parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental
authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one
where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United States while the father, petitioner
Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are they physically apart but are also emotionally separated. There has
been no decree of legal separation and petitioner's attempt to obtain an annulment of the marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has failed.
The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three
years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to
strip him of his permanent right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is
inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal
of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be
regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the
bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and
for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform
who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural
guardians of their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority, care and custody over their
children merely because of the normal consequences of their duties and assignments, such as
temporary separation from their families.
232. SAGALA-ESLAO v. CA
G.R. No. 116773. January 16, 1997
Facts: Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple
stayed with Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The couple had two children namely Leslie and
Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria's mother while Angelica was entrusted
with her parents at Teresita's house. Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria intended to bring Angelica to
her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and entrusted to the custody of Angelica. Maria returned to
her mother's house and stayed with Leslie.
Years later, Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated
to US with him. A year after the marriage, Maria returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her
children and bring them to US. Teresita, however, resisted by way of explaining that the child was
entrusted to her when she was 10 days old and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica.
The trial court rendered a decision where Teresita was directed to cause the immediate transfer of
custody of the child to Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's decision. In this petition for review,
Teresita Sagala-Eslao seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision dated March 25, 1994, which
affirmed the trial courts judgment granting the petition of Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye to recover the
custody of her minor daughter from her mother-in-law, Teresita Sagala-Eslao.
Issue: W/N Teresita have the right to the custody of the child.
Ruling: NO. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely
personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor
to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and
entitled to keep them in their custody and company.
In this case, when Maria entrusted the custody of her minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the
latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental
authority.
233. Vancil V. Belmes

G.R. No. 132223. June 19, 2001
Facts: Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the
United States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime,
Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.
Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent. Petitioner,
Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian. The natural mother of the minors, Helen
Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had
already filed a similar petition for guardianship. After due proceedings, the trial court rejected and
denied Belmes’ motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian.
Issue:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.
Held: The natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be
hisguardian. Article 211 of the Family Code provides:
“Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicialorder to the contrary.”
Being the natural mother of the minor Vincent, she has the corresponding natural and legal right to be
in her custody. Petitioner‘s claim to bethe guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of
substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be
exercised by the surviving grandparent.
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only incase of death,
absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is verymuch alive and has
exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to
be the minor‘s guardian, respondent‘s unsuitability.
Petitioner asserts this based on the allegation that Valerie was raped several times by the a live in
partner. However this case pertains to Vincent and is thus not directly attestable to that fact. Moreover
the status as U.S.resident, her old age and her conviction of libel in the country deem her unlikely to
be able to execute the duties of a guardian (has not been in RP since 87‘). Moreover courts should not
appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it
difficult to protect the wards.
234. ESPIRITU VS CA
GR 115640, March 15, 1995
FACTS:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding maintainED a common law relationship of husband while in
US. They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a
brief vacation when they also got married. Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald. In
1990, they decided to separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but Teresita left Reynaldo and the
children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them
with his sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the children.
ISSUE: WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.
HELD: NO. In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be
the paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from
the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child
under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2
children were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she preferred to stay must be
considered. It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She
was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother’s infidelity. Furthermore, there
was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to
give the children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to extend. On
the other hand, the mother’s conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already
caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the daughter.
235. ZENAIDA MEDINA vs. DRA. VENANCIA L. MAKABALI.

G.R. No. L-26953
March 28, 1969
FACTS: Petitioner gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph Casero but left the child in the birthing
clinic owned by respondent, who assisted at the delivery. Respondent took care of the child since then;
however, petitioner instituted this habeas corpus proceeding to retrieve Joseph. Before the RTC, Joseph
testified that he is choosing to stay with his “Mammy,” referring to respondent.
ISSUE: Who is entitled to the custody of Joseph?

HELD: The SC held that it was for the child's best interest to be left with his foster mother – the
respondent. While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not
lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of
children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 363), and that for
compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother. Petitioner
proved remiss in her parental obligations; she not only failed to provide the child with love and care
but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his tenderest years, when he needed his mother the
most.
236. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR
ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES and ZENAIDA CARREON
CERVANTES vs. GINA CARREON FAJARDO and CONRADO FAJARDO
G.R. No. 79955
January 27, 1989
FACTS: This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over the person of the
minor Angelie Anne Cervantes, the daughter of respondents, who are common-law husband and
wife.When Angelie was barely 2 weeks old, she was adopted by the petitioners, with the written
consent of the respondents. A few months after the adoption, respondents took Angelie from her yaya
and demanded that petitioners pay them money if they want the child returned.
ISSUE: Should the petition be granted?
HELD: YES. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the
moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral
as well as social standing of the contending parents. It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo
is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and their cohabitation will not
accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-
minded person.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in
natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural
parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by
both spouses.
237. DAISIE T. DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR

G.R. No. 111180
November 16, 1995
FACTS: Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private
respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother, petitioner
Daise David. Villar refused to return the child to petitioner; hence, the latter instituted this instant
habeas corpus case. The lower court ruled in favor of Villar on the ground that he is financially well-off
than Daisie and thus, is able to properly support the child.
ISSUE: Is petitioner entitled to the custody of the child?
HELD: YES. Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided
by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody, pursuant to Art. 213 of the Family Code. Even
now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld
because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Daisie and her children
may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is
enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according
to her means.
238. HORACIO LUNA and LIBERTY HIZON-LUNA vs. IAC

G.R. No. L-68374
June 18, 1985
FACTS: After the birth of Shirley Salumbides, her natural parents gave her to the petitioners, a
childless couple with considerable means, who thereafter showered her with love and affection and
brought her up as their very own. When Shirley reached the age of four (4) years in 1979, her natural
parents took her without the consent of petitioners. During the hearing, Shirley manifested that she
would kill herself or run away from home if she should be taken away from petitioners and forced to
live with her natural parents. Despite this statement, the court denied the petition and granted the
parents with custody.
ISSUE: Should custody be given to petitioners?
HELD: YES. Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody,
education and property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. Since, in this case, the very
life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent
choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice
and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual
development.
Besides, Shirley depicted her biological parents as selfish and cruel and who beat her often; and that
they do not love her. To return her to the custody of the private respondents to face the same emotional
environment which she is now complaining of would be indeed traumatic and cause irreparable
damage to the child.
239. JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO

G.R. No. 156254
June 28, 2005
FACTS: This court involves the claims of the parents for custody pendente lite of Rafaello, the child of
the parties who is less than seven years old. On the one hand, the mother (petitioner) insists that, based
on Article 213 of the Family Code, her minor child cannot be separated from her. On the other hand,
the father (respondent) argues the immorality of petitioner due to her alleged lesbian relations as the
compelling reason to deprive her of custody.
ISSUE: Whether the mother should be deprived of her child’s custody?
HELD: NO. The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code may be
overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. In the instant case, the sexual
preference or moral laxity of the mother alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. To
deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an
adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising
proper parental care.
240. CHARLTON TAN vs. JUDGE ABEDNEGO O. ADRE

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1898
January 31, 2005
FACTS: Charlton Tan was the respondent in a habeas corpus case filed by his wife Rosana Reyes-Tan.
Judge Adre issued the writ prayed for and ordered Charlton to bring before the court the body of their
daughter, Charlene Reyes Tan and to provisionally turn over the custody of the child to the mother.
Hence, Charlton filed this administrative complaint charging Judge Adre with gross ignorance of law
and grave abuse of authority when the latter ordered the provisional custody.
ISSUE: Was Judge Adre correct in issuing the said order?
HELD: YES. The law grants the mother the custody of a child under seven (7) years of age. In the case
at bar, it is uncontroverted that the child subject of the habeas corpus case is only four years old, thus,
the custody should be given to the mother.
Be it noted also that the questioned order was only provisional; hence, it does not preclude Charlton
from proving the compelling reasons cited by him which can be properly ventilated in a full-blown
hearing scheduled by the court for that purpose.
241. JOEY D. BRIONES vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL,

FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL
G.R. No. 156343
October 18, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner Joey Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents, to obtain
custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.Petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin
Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. Petitioner concedes that Respondent
Loreta has preferential right over their minor child. He insists, however, that custody should be
awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan to work and during the period that she stays there.
Respondent insists that she should be granted custody pursuant to Article 213 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Who should have custody of the child?
HELD: An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of that
authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody,
absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care.
The recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give
support to, but not custody of, the child. Nonetheless, the Court sustained the visitorial right of
petitioner over his child in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents
over their children.

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San Beda College of Law

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